Edwina, Jon S, list,

At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
by me in all cases).

1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*

1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign
which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing
itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other
forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate
present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of
past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*

1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands for
that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which
I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to
be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in everyday talk;
I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s
idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at
some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the
thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a
*like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the
interval a new idea.

1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6

…a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature of
a sign.* [—]


Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
> bird....the IO-Representamen-II.
> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react
> and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is
> the IO.
> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which
> is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
> stand alone.
> ------------------------
> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
> -----------------------------------------------------------
> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a
> mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both
> biological and learned, of that bird.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>  Edwina
> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
> Edwina, List:
> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
> differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis
> during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
> that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
> bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
> to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
> bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it
> should flee, as well.
> As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be
> one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903
> Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to
> agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent.  The bird's
> reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the individual action of flight;
> the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever happened.
> Regards,
> Jon S.
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>> 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms
>> the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation...
>> So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
>> as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.
>> I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of
>> Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as
>> O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of
>> local stimuli as referenced to a general rule.
>> So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of
>> flight.
>> But- the Representamen can be in other modes.
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness.
>> this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where
>> all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example
>> was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A
>> local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state.
>> 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are
>> three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness:
>> O-R-I   or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an
>> iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation
>> O-R-I or 2-2-1  A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign .  A spontaneous cry. a
>> local non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical stimuli.
>> O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction.
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>> So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a mode
>> of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>> ---------------------------
>> But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the
>> Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation.
>> Edwina
>> On Sun 04/02/18 7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>> Edwina, List:
>> Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen."  Just
>> to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound cannot be
>> treated as the Representamen in any semiotic analysis of this scenario?
>> If so, why not?
>> Thanks,
>> Jon S.
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>> I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]....with
>>> the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree
>>> might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI].
>>> But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud
>>> sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate
>>> Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound.
>>> The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an
>>> interpretation [II and DI].
>>> Edwina
>>> On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>> Helmut, List:
>>> In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen,
>>> as I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs
>>> significantly from Edwina's.  This leads to a different analysis in which
>>> the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound,
>>> with the other terms reassigned accordingly.  Sign-action is mediation,
>>> even though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the
>>> genuine triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and
>>> the Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903).
>>> Regards,
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> -----------------------------
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