Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
 unreal
 things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
 then is not
 a real property.


I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the question, what does it 
means for an object not to be real (hence being abstract) ? it is not a joke, 
I want to know. All your explanations till now are tautologies and in 
themself have no explanatory power at all.

Quentin

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
 unreal
 things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
 then is not
 a real property.

I'll take another stupid example to try to explain my question...

Considering materialist view, what does it means to have existed ?

So I'm living right now, I'd say I exists, one day I'll die and in a 
materialist view I'll not exists anymore, will not ever have conscious state. 
What remains of my existance is in the memory of people who knew me, when 
they'll die, It'll be in the memory of people who have been taugh that I 
existed... then they'll die too, and one day humanity will disappear, earth 
will disappear, any trace that humanity has ever existed will disappear, when 
this time come what will render me more real as Tintin (the Hergé comics 
hero)... I have existed but nothing could tell it (even me as at that time 
I'll not be anymore), so what does it means to have existed at all ?

Quentin

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
 mathematical,
 I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
 you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
 respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
 adopt it either.

 But can you make a difference between adopting it and
 being able to consider that it might make sense (whether
 it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections
 in a context in which it would be conjectured as true?
 
 I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense

OK. Just consider that it does make sense to some people.

 (to be precise it
 is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical
 objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that
 they all do)..

I do not see how it can be inconsistent with observation.

 [...] Maps are isomorphic to
 territories, but are not territories.
 Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type
 of map but maps anyway.
 
 err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a map of a farm.
 
 Identity is just an isomorphism
 among possibly many others.
 
 All identity relations are isomorphisms as well.
 Not all isomporhisms are identity relations.
 
 The territory can be the map
 and indeed vice versa.
 
 You can't fold up the farm and put it in your pocket.

You're right. I can't.

Georges.

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Georges Quénot wrote:
  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
  mathematical,
  I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
  you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
  respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
  adopt it either.
 
  But can you make a difference between adopting it and
  being able to consider that it might make sense (whether
  it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections
  in a context in which it would be conjectured as true?
 
  I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense

 OK. Just consider that it does make sense to some people.

  (to be precise it
  is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical
  objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that
  they all do)..

 I do not see how it can be inconsistent with observation.

If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical structures
consisting
of a counterpart of me plus a Harry Potter universe exist. Yet this
is not
observed. Of course that might be coincidence.


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
  Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
  unreal
  things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
  then is not
  a real property.
 

 I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the question, what does it
 means for an object not to be real (hence being abstract) ?

it means it is not an object at all.

 it is not a joke,
 I want to know. All your explanations till now are tautologies

what is tautologous about:

Real properties can be observed empirically

i.e. unreal ones cannot.

  and in
 themself have no explanatory power at all.

 Quentin




Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
  Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
  unreal
  things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
  then is not
  a real property.

 I'll take another stupid example to try to explain my question...

 Considering materialist view, what does it means to have existed ?

 So I'm living right now, I'd say I exists, one day I'll die and in a
 materialist view I'll not exists anymore, will not ever have conscious state.
 What remains of my existance is in the memory of people who knew me, when
 they'll die, It'll be in the memory of people who have been taugh that I
 existed... then they'll die too, and one day humanity will disappear, earth
 will disappear, any trace that humanity has ever existed will disappear, when
 this time come what will render me more real as Tintin (the Hergé comics
 hero)... I have existed but nothing could tell it (even me as at that time
 I'll not be anymore), so what does it means to have existed at all ?

The question is what it means to exist now. You, now, are real. What
connects
with you causally is also real.

 Quentin


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
 mathematical,
 I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
 you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
 respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
 adopt it either.

 But can you make a difference between adopting it and
 being able to consider that it might make sense (whether
 it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections
 in a context in which it would be conjectured as true?
 I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense
 OK. Just consider that it does make sense to some people.

 (to be precise it
 is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical
 objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that
 they all do)..
 I do not see how it can be inconsistent with observation.
 
 If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical
 structures consisting of a counterpart of me plus a Harry
 Potter universe exist. Yet this is not observed. Of course
 that might be coincidence.

I see at least three possibilities:

1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes
a counterpart of you.

2. There may well exist a Harry Potter universe that
includes a counterpart of you but it is not causaly
related to our universe (too far for instance) and
this is why we cannot observe it.

3. You actually are in a Harry Potter universe but it
just happened that you are not a sorcerer and you must
know that in Harry Potter universes, non sorcerers
are prevented fromm observing magical events.

Georges.

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Georges Quénot wrote:
 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Georges Quenot wrote:
 
  That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
  other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what
  I called a dualist view.
  Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances.
  Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical
  realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism.
  This *splits* things into realness and abstractedness.
 
  No abstract objects aren't real things at all.

 Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to
 force you to believe or consider something you are not
 willing to believe or consider.

 The question is not whether they are real things or not.
 It is whether they are things or not.

They are not. The King of France is not a person.

 Once they are things,
 you have to decide how many types of things there must be.

 You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not
 nothing*.

 Just tell me: do you consider natural numbers as something,
 as nothing, as something that would neither be something
 nor nothing, or as anything else (please explain)?

I consider them as concepts , as the intentional
objects of neural activity. Of course intentional
objects are not real things -- things are not brought into existence
by thinking about them.

 Please
 answer without considering whether they are real or not,
 just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can
 discuss *which type of* thing (or whatever) they might be.

  There is only
  one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things.

 You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical?
 Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of
 (or identical to) which? How do you define any of them?

It think they all mean the same as each other, i.e. causally connected
to me.

  It postulates material substance
 
  yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism.

 No, this is material substance besides abstract objetcs.

Not if abstract objects do not really exist at all.

 You do split things between material and immaterial.

I do not split existing things.

  just as classical dualism
  postulates a spiritual substance
 
  as well as a material substance.

 Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial
 (abstract) ones.

I oppose existence to non-existence. However, existence
is not sub-divided into two realms.

  (and just as once vitalism
  postulated a living substance).
 
  Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean
  bt real except by a tautology or via a reference to common
  sense that no longer appears to be consensual.
 
  I am not sure what you mean by non-consensual. Everyone believes
  that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real.

 Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the
 main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to
 real. I guarantee you that there are people (including
 me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not
 to say that something must be wrong either way, only that
 several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist).

Even people who think numbers are real do not think
they are real in the same sense as their breakfast.

  Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that
  when saying This has to be saying simply that the multiverse
  IS a mathematical object. Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends
  the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while
  when saying [The universe] has real existence, as opposed
  to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract.
  Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you
  ever seen the number 3?
  Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron?
 
  They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation.

 This might be more complicated. Looking at them
 can significantly change them.

They are still causally conneceted to me, and I to them

They might also be an
 abstraction.

Why ? Why should two-way causality imply anstractness ?

 They can hardly be objects in the common
 sense of the word.

Why ? all you are saying is that they kick back.

  Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother?
  :-)
 
  You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does
  not (completely) appear as such to everybody.
 
  The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of
  consciousness, causality and time.

 Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for
 thousands of years an account of how living beings can
 have appeared in an inert world and though the account
 is now about a century and a half old it still did not
 make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not
 the majority).

Switching to a maths-only ontology does not necessarily make that any
easier.

 I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how
 consciousness can arise in living beings. 

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


Brent Meeker wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Georges Quénot wrote:
 
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 
 
 What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical 
 object
 real and others abstract...
 
 A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
 to explain the world. QED.
 
 
  This has to be a non-mathematical property because it is contingent,
  and all mathematical
  truth is necessary.

 It is necessairly true *given the axioms*.  Suppose there is an axiom that 
 picks
 out some worlds as real.


An axiom that follows necessarily from other axioms, or a contingent,
optional
axiom ?

Picks out some worlds as real ..from what ?


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot

Georges Quénot wrote:
 
 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
 equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes
 a counterpart of you.

I meant:

1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe including
a counterpart of you would be a solution.

Georges.

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Georges Quénot wrote:
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Georges Quénot wrote:

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Georges Quenot wrote:

 That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
 other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what
 I called a dualist view.
 Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances.
 Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical
 realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism.
 This *splits* things into realness and abstractedness.
 No abstract objects aren't real things at all.
 Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to
 force you to believe or consider something you are not
 willing to believe or consider.

 The question is not whether they are real things or not.
 It is whether they are things or not.
 
 [...]

Thanks for your answers.

Georges.

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 17-mars-06, à 16:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

 I don't agree. I think you slip from minds can be implemented on more
 than one kind of hardware to minds do not need any kind of hardware.

I slip?  Where ?
I take care of precisely not doing that, mainly through UDA *plus* the 
movie graph argument for eliminating any use of Occam razor.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit :


 *If* comp is true. I am not sure of that.

 Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some
 neat etalon philosophy to compare with other theories. The advantage
 of comp (which I recall includes Church thesis) is that, at least, 
 many
 fundamental questions can be addressed.

 Which one for instance (that is not addressed in the view of
 the universe/multiverse as a mathematical object)?

The relation between first and third person concepts. Comp allows (at 
least) and actually necessitates the use of theoretical computer 
science(s). It is a mine of interesting results. My work exploits many 
of them for the translation of the UD Argument in the language of the 
universal machine. Actually it is one of them, Godel's theorem, which 
convinces me of the possibility of the enterprise.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit :


 John M writes:
 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?

 Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where 
 physical
 reality is part of mathematical reality.

 Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer (UD)
 is an abstract machine that runs all possible computer programs.
 In this way it creates all possible universes, and more... it creates
 all possible information objects: all of mathematics, logic, all 
 written
 texts, everything.  In particular it creates the information patterns
 of conscious entities like you and me.

 Let us assume that this in fact represents the reality of the 
 multiverse,
 that what we perceive and experience is all caused by the operation
 of the UD, when it creates information patterns that correspond to
 those experienes.  I know that many people here reject this hypothesis,
 but let us follow it forward to see what it can say about solipsism.

 The first thing to notice is that within the UD, each person exists 
 more
 than once.  There are many programs that include a particular 
 information
 pattern in their output, in fact an infinite number of programs.  Some 
 of
 those programs will look much like the kind of model a physicist might
 construct for a theory of everything.  It would include the physical
 laws and initial conditions that define our universe.  Running that
 program forward would create the entire history of our universe, 
 including
 the experiences of all of its inhabitants.

 However there are other kinds of programs that would also create the
 patterns of our conscious experiences.  Some might do it purely by 
 random
 chance: they might produce enormous outputs and somewhere buried in 
 there
 will be the pattern that corresponds to a portion of our experience.
 Others would include bizarre universes such as one inhabited by aliens
 who create computer simulations of other kinds of beings, and who have
 created us.  Yet another example would be a universe composed only of 
 one
 person, with all that is outside of him being supplied by the computer
 program, perhaps from some kind of table of sensory impressions, so 
 that
 only he is real within that universe.

 Solipsism is the doctrine that only I exist, that everything else is an
 illusion.  In the context of the platonic multiverse, it would 
 correspond
 to that last case: a portion of the UD program where only the one 
 person
 is in his universe, and nothing else in the universe is real.

 So this raises the question: given that I exist multiple times within
 the UD structure, and given that in some of them the universe I see
 around me is real and in some of them it is an illusion, which is the
 reality for me?  In which one do I actually exist?

 I believe Bruno argues, and I agree, that this is a meaningless 
 question.
 You exist in all of them.  There is no single instance of your 
 information
 pattern which is really you.  Your consciousness spans all of the
 places in the UD where it is instantiated.  However, there is a related
 question which is relevant: what will happen next?  If some of your
 consciousness is in the real universe, and some of it is in universes
 where you are an alien simulation, some in a universe where it is a
 random fluctuation, and some in a universe where you are all there is,
 how can you make a prediction about the future?  In the random universe
 you would expect to disintegrate into chaos.  In the aliens, they might
 open up the simulation and start talking to you.  In the solipsism 
 case,
 various bizarre things might happen.  And in the plain vanilla 
 universe,
 you would expect things to go along pretty much as you remember them.

 Here is where I may depart from Bruno, although I am not sure.


OK.



 I argue
 that you can in fact set up a probability distribution over all of the
 places in the UD where your mind exists, and it is based roughly on the
 size of the part of the UD program that creates that information 
 pattern.


I will take the time to come back on this. I have a problem with this 
which is not entirely unrelated to our perennial ASSA/RSSA debate.
Another problem is related with the fact that from the first person 
point of view it is hard to distinguish big and little programs, and 
their way of recurring hyper-redundantly.




 Recall that the UD in effect runs all programs at once.  But some 
 programs
 are shorter than others.  I use the notion of algorithmic complexity
 and the associated measure, which is called the Universal Distribution
 (an unfortunate collision of the UD acronym).  Basically this says that
 the measure of the output of a given UD program of n bits is 1/2^n.



Yes. And it is even a machine independent notion (modulo some 
constant). But big programs cannot be dismissed so easily, I will 
try to find a short explanation for why I think saying yes to the 
doctor makes, for the first person point of view,  

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread George Levy




Quentin Anciaux wrote:

  Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
  
  
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.


  
  
I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the question, what does it 
means for an object not to be real (hence being abstract) ? it is not a joke, 
I want to know. 

I will insert my grain of salt in a very active thread

In my opinion, reality is relative, more precisely, the perception of
reality depends on the level of implementation or the level of
illusion. 

Here I use the term implementation to refer to third person perception
and illusion to refer to first person perception. 

For example, a simulated character perceives simulated objects as real.
He has the illusion that they are real. 

Similarly we perceive our world to be real. It kicks back. We have the
illusion that our world is real. Is it? It all depends how you look at
it. One could say that our consciousness is emergent by the
bootstrapping of reflexive illusions: our world is an illusion that
allows us to have the illusion that we exist.

(I am not sure but it may be that  my term "illusion" has the same
meaning as the term "dream" that Bruno very often uses as in "we are
dreaming machines." )

Thus, in my opinion, there is no absolute reality. All we have is the
implementation/illusion of reality at our level of
implementation/illusion.


George Levy

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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


Georges Quénot wrote:
 Georges Quénot wrote:
 
  1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
  equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes
  a counterpart of you.

 I meant:

 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
 equations of which a Harry Potter universe including
 a counterpart of you would be a solution.

 Georges.

1) Any configuration of matterial bodies can be represented as a some
very long number

2) Any number is the solution to some sufficiently complicated
polynomial


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones


George Levy wrote:
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 
 
 Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
 unreal
 things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
 then is not
 a real property.
 
 
 
 
 I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the question, what does it
 means for an object not to be real (hence being abstract) ? it is not a joke,
 I want to know.
 
 I will insert my grain of salt in a very active thread

 In my opinion, reality is relative, more precisely, the perception of
 reality depends on the level of implementation or the level of illusion.

 Here I use the term implementation to refer to third person perception
 and illusion to refer to first person perception.

 For example, a simulated character perceives simulated objects as real.
 He has the illusion that they are real.

Yes but he is simulated by something real (or simulated by something
simulated by something real).

 Similarly we perceive our world to be real. It kicks back. We have the
 illusion that our world is real. Is it?

that's the simplest explanation.

 It all depends how you look at
 it. One could say that our consciousness is emergent by the
 bootstrapping of reflexive illusions: our world is an illusion that
 allows us to have the illusion that we exist.

Although the illusions we are familiar with do not work
on a bootstrapping basis,


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Territories and maps

2006-03-18 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 04:55:37PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
   [...] Maps are isomorphic to
   territories, but are not territories.
 
  Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type
  of map but maps anyway.
 
 err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a map of a farm.

If the map is sufficiently detailed it contains a full simulation down
to the chemistry level of the soil, then most people would say that
you can grow (simulated) potatoes on the map.

 
  Identity is just an isomorphism
  among possibly many others.
 
 All identity relations are isomorphisms as well.
 Not all isomporhisms are identity relations.
 
  The territory can be the map
  and indeed vice versa.
 
 You can't fold up the farm and put it in your pocket.
 

I can't fold up the atlas that sits on my bookshelf and fit it in my
pocket either. Yet the atlas is undeniably a map, and undeniably less
detailed than the sorts of maps that might be confused with territory.

Bruno's commentary is still valid. Ad hominem arguments like these are
simply laughable.

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is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
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A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02


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Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Georges Quénot wrote:

 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe including
a counterpart of you would be a solution.
 
 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some
 very long number

Unlike some others I did not introduce representations.

One cannot represent any configuration of material bodies
by a number with an infinite precision however long the number.
As some mentioned also, you would need a (de)coding scheme.

My 2. and 3. remain anyway.

Georges.

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Re: Fw: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Russell Standish

But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to
perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the compiler
theorem. One can simply iterate this process such that there is no
concrete machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way
of putting the UDA.

Cheers


On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote:
 
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Hal Finney wrote:
  The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.
  When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.
  But they are not really typical of numbers.  Even restricting ourselves to
  the integers, the information content of the average number is enormous;
  by some reasoning, infinite.  Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!
  They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe;
  indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our
  universe.  A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information.
 
 How ? Surely this claim needs justification!
 ~
 The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can 
 therefore contain unlimited information.  One could compare the single number 
 to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine.  Granted, the UTM needs a head and a 
 program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold 
 information.
 
 Norman
 `
 
 

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*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02


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Re: Fw: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Norman Samish

Are you saying that a tape of infinite length, with infinite digits, is not 
Turing emulable?

I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem' makes a 'concrete' machine 
unnecessary.  I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing 
machine - as well as anything else that's describable.

Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a 'concrete' machine executing 
the tape, irrespective of the contents of the tape.

Norman
~

- Original Message - 
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM
Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers



But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to perform the 
interpretation. This is the essence of the compiler theorem. One can 
simply iterate this process such that there is no concrete machine 
interpreting the tape. I think this is another way of putting the UDA.

Cheers


On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote:

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  Hal Finney wrote:
  The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.
  When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.
  But they are not really typical of numbers.  Even restricting ourselves 
  to
  the integers, the information content of the average number is 
  enormous;
  by some reasoning, infinite.  Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!
  They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole 
  universe;
  indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of 
  our
  universe.  A single number can (in some sense) hold this much 
  information.

 How ? Surely this claim needs justification!
 ~
 The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can 
 therefore contain unlimited information.  One could compare the single 
 number to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine.  Granted, the UTM needs a 
 head and a program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not 
 sufficient to hold information.

 Norman
 `


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