Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. Because you think that leads to some overdetermination and it doesn;t. Shaking Muhammad Ali's hand is shaking Cassius Clay's. It's a different and equally valid of the same stuff And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. It's precisely because the microphysics is so complex that we do use higher level descriptions The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. I could not perfectly predict your behavior without creating a full simulation of your brain. Doing so would instantiate your consciousness. Therefore I cannot determine what you will do without invoking your consciousness, thought, reason, etc. I wouldn't necessarily agree that a full computer simulation of a human brain would produce conscious experience. Maybe it's true. Maybe it's not. I have serious doubts. I'm not a physicalist, or a dualist, but rather an accidental idealist. Or maybe an idealistic accidentalist? One or the other. I do not disagree with your assertion that something must be either caused or random, but does _what_ caused you to do something have any bearing? If your mind is the cause, does that count as free will? Even if that were the case, there must be *something* that connects the mind to the choice. Otherwise how can you say that the mind is the cause of the choice? So what is the nature of that connective something? If it is a rule or a law, then the choice was determined by the rule/law. Nope. That reason causes choice causes action does not mean reason was itself caused. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 28, 11:36 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Rex and Bruno, I think that you are both missing an important point by taking an from infinity view. The fact that the world is not given to us in terms where these is one and only one option given some condition forces us to deal with alternatives. We can go on and on about causation and determinism but let us get Real, there is only rarely a situation where there can only be one singular effect to a singular cause. In fact there is never a actual singular cause to some event so the argument falls flat because of a false premise. I am not sure if you are saying determinism is false as an ontological fact, or just that alternatives will subjectively appear to be open due to ignorance. We can build and knock over straw men for ever or we can look at Nature honesty and see that our pet theories of Monolithic Static Structure will always be Incomplete. Free Will, illusory or otherwise is an attempt to deal with the reality that there are always alternatives that can occur. We promote a notion of Agency to act as a mechanism that chooses between alternatives without bias or cohesion and imagine that we have such an agency. I don't see why bias should be inimical to FW. Surely this is a falsehood from the point of view of infinity where we can imagine we can see all of the variables, but we are only thinking of ourselves as an observer that is external to the system that we observe and so can see its properties and *that our means of perception of such has no effect upon what those properties are*. This role used to be played by the notion of a Deity. Now we find a secular version of the same thing and wonder why we make no progress beyond this conundrum! We are not Omniscient, we are not Omnipresent and we most certainly are not Omnipotent. Deal with it. I don;'t see your point. Are you saying FW is the same as omnipotence? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Hi 1Z, -Original Message- From: 1Z Sent: Monday, November 29, 2010 8:38 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Compatibilism On Nov 28, 11:36 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Rex and Bruno, I think that you are both missing an important point by taking an from infinity view. The fact that the world is not given to us in terms where these is one and only one option given some condition forces us to deal with alternatives. We can go on and on about causation and determinism but let us get Real, there is only rarely a situation where there can only be one singular effect to a singular cause. In fact there is never a actual singular cause to some event so the argument falls flat because of a false premise. [1Z] I am not sure if you are saying determinism is false as an ontological fact, or just that alternatives will subjectively appear to be open due to ignorance. [SPK] What is the notion of determinism? Is it that ...is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is, to some large degree, determined by prior states and involving the belief that the universe is fully governed by causal laws resulting in only one possible state at any point in time? (quotes from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism ) We have direct empirical evidence that this is not the case, for example in the case of the Two Slit Experiment, we have the situation that the relative positions of the impact of photons (or whatever particle is shot from the gun) on the screen is “determined” (if we can even use that word in a consistent manner!) not by a single localized event but by the shape of the wave function of the combined system of gun ⊗ particle ⊗ slits ⊗ Screen. I did not invent this idea, I am just thinking of the implications of the content of this conversation so far and what I have learned from my studies. The notion of free will (real or imaginary) involves the notion of a set of alternative outcomes to any one situation, a condition is that is not consistent with the basic premises of determinism as per the definition that I referenced. What am I missing? We can build and knock over straw men for ever or we can look at Nature honesty and see that our pet theories of Monolithic Static Structure will always be Incomplete. Free Will, illusory or otherwise, is an attempt to deal with the reality that there are always alternatives that can occur. We promote a notion of Agency to act as a mechanism that chooses between alternatives without bias or cohesion and imagine that we have such an agency. [1Z] I don't see why bias should be inimical to FW. [SPK] The term “free” in FW means that it is unconstrained by other factors external to the agent that we are positing might have Free Will. A bias would be a factor that could act as a constraint IFF that bias where imposed from an external source. If I am biased in my choices and I am free to select the conditions of my bias, so be it; I am still free. Surely this is a falsehood from the point of view of infinity where we can imagine we can see all of the variables, but we are only thinking of ourselves as an observer that is external to the system that we observe and so can see its properties and *that our means of perception of such has no effect upon what those properties are*. This role used to be played by the notion of a Deity. Now we find a secular version of the same thing and wonder why we make no progress beyond this conundrum! We are not Omniscient, we are not Omnipresent and we most certainly are not Omnipotent. Deal with it. [1Z] I don;'t see your point. Are you saying FW is the same as omnipotence? [SPK] No, to the contrary; I am pointing out that the basic premise of determinism requires the equivalent of an Omniscient Being to obtain for only such a “Being” could have the frame of reference of seeing all of the variables that enter into a choice and thus be able to make a conclusion that there was really no “free will” what happened in any occasion just is the result of some prior state. My point is that we have evidence that 1) events are not constrained to follow uniquely fro some specific prior state because there does not even exist a prior state that has some sharp properties independent of the specification of the means to measure such properties. This is the Einstein-Bohr debate redux. Do we really need to retrace that road? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. wlEmoticon-smile[1].png
Re: Compatibilism
On 28 Nov 2010, at 23:49, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. Very good. So what we are really arguing about here is whether your definition or my definition is closer to what is generally meant when people use the term “free will”. I think your definition is not very close to what is generally meant, and so you should come up with a different term for it. I assume that you resist doing this because you are trying to convince the general populace that they don’t *NEED* what is generally meant by “free will” in order to continue with their lives pretty much as before. However, you (and the other compatibilists) don’t just come out and say “free will doesn’t exist, but you don’t need it anyway”. Instead you say: “I have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism!” And then you proceed with explicating your theory as to why they don’t need free will after all - hoping that they won’t notice the subtle switch from “free will is compatible with determinism” to “you don’t need free will”. Ultimately, you have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism: change the definition of free will. And maybe this is the best way to get the general populace on-board with a more reasonable view of things. But it’s still a rhetorical tactic, and not a valid argument. There would be no lengthy discussion on free will if we had a definition on which everyone agrees. See Jason and Russell's answer on this. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, but this is not an argument either. But we’re arguing over whose definition is closer to the general usage of “free will”. The general usage by the general populace. Free will has originally be (re)introduce by christians for justifying the notion of hell. No doubt the people can be a bit confused. I recall you that since 523 after JC (closure of Plato Academy) scientific theology is still a taboo subject. Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today find hard the idea that they are machine (except perhaps in the DM large sense for people with a bit of education). I’m not necessarily saying that there’s something wrong or inconsistent or impossible with your proposal. All I’m saying is that it’s not free will. The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will with ignorance of causes. Again that is not an argument. It would even be doubtful that humans would be naturally correct on such hard technical question, especially with the mechanist assumption which justified *why* most truth are just unbelievable. “What do you mean by ‘free will’” is not a technically hard question. ? I just said it was a technical hard question. Except with your definition, in which case it follows from elementary logic that it does not exist. Also, “do you believe in ultimate responsibility” is not a technically hard question. It is an hard question, even one which cannot provably (with the definition I gave) be solved algorithmically, and so will be based on discussion between many people and eventually the judge intimate conviction. G* minus G is the precise logic of what is true but unbelievable. It shows that machine have genuine free-will. But humans already dislike the idea that their neighbors have free-will. They *love* the idea that their neighbors have free-will. Bertrand Russell: “Whatever may be thought about it as a matter of ultimate metaphysics, it is quite clear that nobody believes it in practice. Everyone has always believed that it is possible to train character; everyone has always known that alcohol or opium will have a certain effect on behaviour. The apostle of free will maintains that a man can by will power avoid getting drunk, but he does not maintain that when drunk a man can say British Constitution as clearly as if he were sober. And everybody who has ever had to do with children knows that a suitable diet does more to make them virtuous than the most eloquent preaching in the world. The one effect that the free- will doctrine has in practice is to prevent people from following out such common-sense knowledge to its rational conclusion. When a man acts in ways that annoy us we wish to think him wicked, and we refuse to face the fact that his annoying behaviour is a result of antecedent causes which, if you follow them long enough, will take you beyond the moment
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 27, 8:17 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:17 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can justify our beliefs. It seems to me that an entirely acceptable solution is just to accept that we can't justify our beliefs. ..in an absolute way. We still can relative to other beliefs. And that isn;t a problem specific to higher-level categories such as reason and logic. The Trilemma applies just as much to microphysical causality How do you justify your belief that you can justify your beliefs relative to other beliefs? Non-absolutely. As for microphysical causality, right, it doesn’t solve any ontological problems to introduce it as an explanation because it just raises the question “what causes microphysical causality?” It isn't an absolute explanation. It's still an explanation. BTW *you* introduced causality in order to deprecate reason and logic. If you don't believe in physical causality either, then you should level down. And also, if you buy multiple realizability, then you can’t justify your belief in one particular microphysical causal structure instead of some other functionally isomorphic one. Yes I can: Occam;s razor. Of course that isn't absolute... As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? I don't believe so, no. Then the sense in which we are not robots is somewhat honorific: we are not because we have consciousness, but consc. doesn't explain out behaviour since it doesn't cause anything , so we behave as determined... OR, there is no reason we behave as we do. Whatever. I don't see how you can be a sceptic about everything and still insist its a fact you're not a robot. And claiming that consciousness is itself caused just runs into infinite regress, as you then need to explain what causes the cause of conscious experience, and so on. The claim is more that it causes. And it could be causal under interactive dualism (brain causes consc causes different brains state) and it could be causal under mind brain identity: mind is identical to brain; brain causes; therefore mind identically causes. If you anesthetize me, the brain is still there. Where is the mind? Pfft. If you switch your telly off, you don;t get a picture. Switch it on again, you do. That doesn't mean the picture is some additional immaterial thingumajig. If you lightly smush my brain in a press, the brain is still there. Is the mind still there? The brain is not there in a meaningful sense. You can't read a copy of War and Peace tat's been pulped. Obviously in these contexts the brain doesn't just mean so many electrons, protons, and neutrons, it means something material that has a certain structure and function. The atoms and molecules can be replaced over time, the structure and functions is vital Assuming multiple realizability, if you run a simulation of me on a computer, the mind is there. Where is the brain? If you have one, it is, under those circumstances, identical to the structural and functioning silicon substrate. Multiple realisability doesn't preclude token identity. Mind-brain identity doesn’t seem so convincing to me. The world seems real to me. Therefore, taking the same approach as with Agrippa's Trilemma, it seems best to just accept that there is no cause for conscious experience either. Again, the trillema only means there is no non-arbitrary ultimate cause. Well, the Agrippa’s trilemma applies to justification, not “cause” per se. I just said we should apply the same approach and do away with the “causal trilemma” by denying its assumptions. Though your right in that the causal trilemma does look pretty similar to Agrippa’s trilemma. They are structurally identical Our three choices are: 1) An uncaused first cause. 2) Some sort of circular causation. 3) An infinite number of prior causes. Kant was pretty close to this with his first antinomy of pure reason. The trillema does not mean that nothing whatsoever is caused. In any case it is a rather poor reason for dismissing the causal efficacy of consciousness. The causal trilemma just shows that attempting to explain our experiences by invoking a cause merely results in the question “what causes the cause”. And *that* only means you don't have absolute non-arbitray causes, not that you don't have causes at all You don’t get anywhere. You could just be satisfied with the predictive success of your “useful” explanation and not inquire further...but people don’t seem to like to stop there. They go on to ascribe metaphysical/ontological significance to it. Whatever.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 27, 8:53 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:44 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. Mine does Random events don't qualify as free will. So you say. I think that;s arbitrary. I think the real object is to irrational decision, and I have argued that rationality is compatible with FW I could prove you don;t exist by redefining Rex Allen to mean square circle. So what? Philosophical questions always boil down to definitiions, and particularly, to how reaosnable they are. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. Very good. So what we are really arguing about here is whether your definition or my definition is closer to what is generally meant when people use the term “free will”. I think your definition is not very close to what is generally meant, and so you should come up with a different term for it. I assume that you resist doing this because you are trying to convince the general populace that they don’t *NEED* what is generally meant by “free will” in order to continue with their lives pretty much as before. However, you (and the other compatibilists) don’t just come out and say “free will doesn’t exist, but you don’t need it anyway”. Instead you say: “I have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism!” And then you proceed with explicating your theory as to why they don’t need free will after all - hoping that they won’t notice the subtle switch from “free will is compatible with determinism” to “you don’t need free will”. Ultimately, you have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism: change the definition of free will. And maybe this is the best way to get the general populace on-board with a more reasonable view of things. But it’s still a rhetorical tactic, and not a valid argument. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, but this is not an argument either. But we’re arguing over whose definition is closer to the general usage of “free will”. The general usage by the general populace. Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today find hard the idea that they are machine (except perhaps in the DM large sense for people with a bit of education). I’m not necessarily saying that there’s something wrong or inconsistent or impossible with your proposal. All I’m saying is that it’s not free will. The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will with ignorance of causes. Again that is not an argument. It would even be doubtful that humans would be naturally correct on such hard technical question, especially with the mechanist assumption which justified *why* most truth are just unbelievable. “What do you mean by ‘free will’” is not a technically hard question. Also, “do you believe in ultimate responsibility” is not a technically hard question. G* minus G is the precise logic of what is true but unbelievable. It shows that machine have genuine free-will. But humans already dislike the idea that their neighbors have free-will. They *love* the idea that their neighbors have free-will. Bertrand Russell: “Whatever may be thought about it as a matter of ultimate metaphysics, it is quite clear that nobody believes it in practice. Everyone has always believed that it is possible to train character; everyone has always known that alcohol or opium will have a certain effect on behaviour. The apostle of free will maintains that a man can by will power avoid getting drunk, but he does not maintain that when drunk a man can say British Constitution as clearly as if he were sober. And everybody who has ever had to do with children knows that a suitable diet does more to make them virtuous than the most eloquent preaching in the world. The one effect that the free- will doctrine has in practice is to prevent people from following out such common-sense knowledge to its rational conclusion. When a man acts in ways that annoy us we wish to think him wicked, and we refuse to face the fact that his annoying behaviour is a result of antecedent causes which, if you follow them long enough, will take you beyond the moment of his birth and therefore to events for which he cannot be held responsible by any stretch of imagination.” People will not like that, but in the long run, they will prefer that to the idea that *they* have no free will themselves. It is still genuine partial free will. You can manage some of your classes of futures, you have a partial control. What causes you to manage them one way as opposed to another way? If you ask “most people”, they will not agree that the human choice is random, and they will not agree that human choice can be explained by causal forces. Such question are known to be hot, and most people disagree with each other. Many among those who criticizes determinism often relies on sacred texts, and show an unwillingness to even reason. This is true. And it could be that your sneaky approach is the best way to
Re: Compatibilism
Hi Rex and Bruno, I think that you are both missing an important point by taking an from infinity view. The fact that the world is not given to us in terms where these is one and only one option given some condition forces us to deal with alternatives. We can go on and on about causation and determinism but let us get Real, there is only rarely a situation where there can only be one singular effect to a singular cause. In fact there is never a actual singular cause to some event so the argument falls flat because of a false premise. We can build and knock over straw men for ever or we can look at Nature honesty and see that our pet theories of Monolithic Static Structure will always be Incomplete. Free Will, illusory or otherwise is an attempt to deal with the reality that there are always alternatives that can occur. We promote a notion of Agency to act as a mechanism that chooses between alternatives without bias or cohesion and imagine that we have such an agency. Surely this is a falsehood from the point of view of infinity where we can imagine we can see all of the variables, but we are only thinking of ourselves as an observer that is external to the system that we observe and so can see its properties and *that our means of perception of such has no effect upon what those properties are*. This role used to be played by the notion of a Deity. Now we find a secular version of the same thing and wonder why we make no progress beyond this conundrum! We are not Omniscient, we are not Omnipresent and we most certainly are not Omnipotent. Deal with it. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:49 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Compatibilism On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. Very good. So what we are really arguing about here is whether your definition or my definition is closer to what is generally meant when people use the term “free will”. I think your definition is not very close to what is generally meant, and so you should come up with a different term for it. I assume that you resist doing this because you are trying to convince the general populace that they don’t *NEED* what is generally meant by “free will” in order to continue with their lives pretty much as before. However, you (and the other compatibilists) don’t just come out and say “free will doesn’t exist, but you don’t need it anyway”. Instead you say: “I have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism!” And then you proceed with explicating your theory as to why they don’t need free will after all - hoping that they won’t notice the subtle switch from “free will is compatible with determinism” to “you don’t need free will”. Ultimately, you have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism: change the definition of free will. And maybe this is the best way to get the general populace on-board with a more reasonable view of things. But it’s still a rhetorical tactic, and not a valid argument. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, but this is not an argument either. But we’re arguing over whose definition is closer to the general usage of “free will”. The general usage by the general populace. Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today find hard the idea that they are machine (except perhaps in the DM large sense for people with a bit of education). I’m not necessarily saying that there’s something wrong or inconsistent or impossible with your proposal. All I’m saying is that it’s not free will. The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will with ignorance of causes. Again that is not an argument. It would even be doubtful that humans would be naturally correct on such hard technical question, especially with the mechanist assumption which justified *why* most truth are just unbelievable. “What do you mean by ‘free will’” is not a technically hard question. Also, “do you believe in ultimate responsibility” is not a technically hard question. G* minus G is the precise logic of what is true but unbelievable. It shows that machine have genuine free-will. But humans already dislike the idea that their neighbors have free-will. They *love* the idea that their neighbors have free-will. Bertrand Russell: “Whatever may be thought about it as a matter of ultimate metaphysics, it is quite clear
Re: Compatibilism
On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:45 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 11/27/2010 12:53 PM, Rex Allen wrote: Free will = ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused This is a false dichotomy. If a deterministic algorithm evaluates the probability of success for three different actions as A=0.5 B=0.45 and C=0.05 and then a choice between A and B is made at random, then the process has made a choice that is both deterministic and random. Then we have two processes. The deterministic process evaluated the probabilities and deterministically rejected C. Then the deterministic process deterministically chose between A and B by using the output from some other random process. The deterministic process's use of the random process’s output was deterministically constrained to A or B. If it had *become* a random process in the sense I mean - it might have gone in with the options of (A or B) but then ended up taking entirely unrelated action X. Or not taken any action at all. Or turned into a bird. By random, I’m using the Merriam-Webster definition of: “without definite aim, direction, rule, or method”. I don’t mean: “relating to, having, or being elements or events with definite probability of occurrence”. As I’ve said before, I think that probabilistic processes still count as caused. Ultimately I think the difference between deterministic and probabilistic laws is not significant. If a law is deterministic then under it's influence Event A will cause Result X 100% of the time. Why does Event A always lead to Result X? Because that's the law. There is no deeper reason. If a law is probabilistic, then under it's influence Event B will cause Result Q, R, or S according to some probability distribution. Let's say that the probability distribution is 1/3 for each outcome. If Event B leads to Result R, why does it do so? Because that's the law. There is no deeper reason. Event A causes Result X 100% of the time. Event B causes Result R 33.% of the time. Why? For fundamental laws (if such things exist) there is no reason. That's just the way it is. Determinism could be seen as merely a special case of indeterminism...the case where all probabilities are set to either 0% or 100%. Yes? Or no? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Rex, You're mention of whose definition was closer to that of the common person intrigued me. I decided to look up what some dictionaries said on the matter: From: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/free+will dictionary.com –noun 1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will. 2. Philosophy. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces. world english dictionary —n 3. a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined b. Compare determinism the doctrine that such human freedom of choice is not illusory c. (as modifier): a free-will decision 4. the ability to make a choice without coercion: he left of his own free will: I did not influence him cultural dictionary: 5. The ability to choose, think, and act voluntarily. For many philosophers, to believe in free will is to believe that human beings can be the authors of their own actions and to reject the idea that human actions are determined by external conditions or fate. (See determinism, fatalism, and predestination.) Brittanica: 6. in humans, the power or capacity to choose among alternatives or to act in certain situations independently of natural, social, or divine restraints. Free will is denied by those who espouse any of various forms of determinism. Arguments for free will are based on the subjective experience of freedom, on sentiments of guilt, on revealed religion, and on the universal supposition of responsibility for personal actions that underlies the concepts of law, reward, punishment, and incentive. In theology, the existence of free will must be reconciled with God's omniscience and goodness (in allowing man to choose badly), and with divine grace, which allegedly is necessary for any meritorious act. A prominent feature of modern Existentialism is the concept of a radical, perpetual, and frequently agonizing freedom of choice. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, speaks of the individual condemned to be free even though his situation may be wholly determined. -- I personally find many of the above definitions to be inconsistent, but do you agree that definitions 1 and 4 refer to something that is real? I think most on this list would agree that definition 2 is inconsistent, since it seems to posit will contains an unpredictable element outside of physics or arithmetical truth. None of the definitions above seem to explicitly mention compatibilism, but neither definition 1 nor 4 is incompatible with determinism in my opinion. The idea of predestination and predetermination is in itself interesting, because it implies it is possible to know what you would do before you ever did it, but how could any entity determine what you would do without actually seeing what you in fact do? If it is not possible to have such foreknowledge, it rescues free will since what you ultimately decide cannot be predicted, determined, or known without invoking you to make the decision. It is unknowable to any entity how some equation or formula unfolds without actually unfolding it. It is like knowing what the 16th number in the Fibonacci sequence is without first having to determine what the 15th and 14th were. By the same extension, one can't know what you will do without stepping through the process of your brain and seeing what your brain decides to do (according to its will). Also, when you asked: If no conscious experiences are ruled out by arithmetical truth...then what good does it do to posit it as a factor in producing conscious experience? It reminded me of something David Deutsch said in Fabric of Reality about impossible experiences. An example he gave was the conscious experience of factoring a prime number. To use your example, you could say: seeing a square circle. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 26 Nov 2010, at 22:55, Brent Meeker wrote: On 11/26/2010 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Nov 2010, at 22:38, Rex Allen wrote: How does ignorance of what choice you will make lead to ultimate responsibility for that choice? Because I can have a pretty good pictures of the alternatives. Usually the conflict will be in instantaneous reward against long term rewards. I can speed my car and look at TV, or respect the speed limits and miss the TV. I can stop smoking tobacco and live older, or I can enjoy tobacco here and now, and die sooner, etc. I do have an amount of choice and information, but I am ignorant of the details (notably of my brain functioning, my 'unconscious', etc.), and can act accordingly as a responsible person. I deny the possibility of ultimate responsibility and I’m not a eliminative materialist. I follow you that ultimate responsibility is asking too much. Even a sadist murderer is usually not responsible for the existence of its pulsion, but this does not preclude him to be responsible for its action, in some spectrum. Reasons can be multiple. A sadist could commit an act in a society where sadism is repressed, and not commit an act if sadism is sublimated through art and movies, so the society or system can share responsibility with some act without preventing such act to be done. Free will is not ultimate: i can choose between tea and coffee, but I have not chose to be a drinking entity. But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except by fiat declaration that it does). That is a subtle point. Many mechanist are wrong on this. The expression mechanism can account for consciousness is highly ambiguous. That is why I present mechanism in the operational form of saying yes to a doctor who proposes you a digital brain copying your brain or body or universe at some level of description. No theory can account for truth, which is independent on any theory or observers, yet truth is what will eventually select a theory or an observer. Likewise, if my consciousness is preserved by a mechanist substitution of my brain, this might be due to a relationship between consciousness and truth which typically will not been accounted by mechanism per se, like a theory cannot account for its own consistency already. That is why mechanism per se is unbelievable by sound machine, and asks for a type of act of faith. You are free, and necessarily free, to say no to the doctor. The theory mechanism explains why it has to be a religion, in a sense. It is akin to a belief in reincarnation, if you think about it. Calling on my favorite intuition pump, the artificially intelligent Mars Rover, I can imagine it faced with a decision about which way to go to complete its mission. It tries to make predictions of success for different paths, calling on it's experience with past maneuvers. Thus it develops alternatives, but they are not decisive - no probability is 1.0 and some are equivalent within its estimates of uncertainty. This I think corresponds to the narrative of consciousness. Having estimated probabilities and finding no clear winner, the Rover selects one of the better alternatives at random. This is an exercise of will - whether you want to call it free or not, it must *seem* free because otherwise it would be part of the narrative. I think so. That is why we cannot do an act of free will, or by free will, with the purpose to illustrate free will. The purpose would be part of the narrative. This illustrates that free will, like consciousness, belongs to the incommunicable or the non justifiable, non provable, except by paradoxical assertions, or by arts. Responsibility only seems to be important in social terms - whom shall we punish or reward? That only requires that the punishment/ reward has the desired effect on the person and others. I think so too, and a society has the duty, if it can, to protect the majority of people. To judge if someone deserves jail or asylum (abstracting from the possibility of escaping) is strictly speaking an infinite difficult task; no one (on earth) can really know for sure and the answer will be jury, experts, and judge dependent: the main thing is the protection of the others, essentially the probability/ plausibility of second offense. Rewards, in that setting, will be much more based on subjectivity, fashion, taste, current myth, ideas of progress, etc. The following sentences come back (again?) to my mind: - You kill one person: you are a murderer, - You kill one hundred persons, you are a heroic soldier, - You kill all persons, you are God. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group,
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:17 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can justify our beliefs. It seems to me that an entirely acceptable solution is just to accept that we can't justify our beliefs. ..in an absolute way. We still can relative to other beliefs. And that isn;t a problem specific to higher-level categories such as reason and logic. The Trilemma applies just as much to microphysical causality How do you justify your belief that you can justify your beliefs relative to other beliefs? As for microphysical causality, right, it doesn’t solve any ontological problems to introduce it as an explanation because it just raises the question “what causes microphysical causality?” And also, if you buy multiple realizability, then you can’t justify your belief in one particular microphysical causal structure instead of some other functionally isomorphic one. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? I don't believe so, no. Then the sense in which we are not robots is somewhat honorific: we are not because we have consciousness, but consc. doesn't explain out behaviour since it doesn't cause anything , so we behave as determined... OR, there is no reason we behave as we do. And claiming that consciousness is itself caused just runs into infinite regress, as you then need to explain what causes the cause of conscious experience, and so on. The claim is more that it causes. And it could be causal under interactive dualism (brain causes consc causes different brains state) and it could be causal under mind brain identity: mind is identical to brain; brain causes; therefore mind identically causes. If you anesthetize me, the brain is still there. Where is the mind? If you lightly smush my brain in a press, the brain is still there. Is the mind still there? Assuming multiple realizability, if you run a simulation of me on a computer, the mind is there. Where is the brain? Mind-brain identity doesn’t seem so convincing to me. Therefore, taking the same approach as with Agrippa's Trilemma, it seems best to just accept that there is no cause for conscious experience either. Again, the trillema only means there is no non-arbitrary ultimate cause. Well, the Agrippa’s trilemma applies to justification, not “cause” per se. I just said we should apply the same approach and do away with the “causal trilemma” by denying its assumptions. Though your right in that the causal trilemma does look pretty similar to Agrippa’s trilemma. Our three choices are: 1) An uncaused first cause. 2) Some sort of circular causation. 3) An infinite number of prior causes. Kant was pretty close to this with his first antinomy of pure reason. The trillema does not mean that nothing whatsoever is caused. In any case it is a rather poor reason for dismissing the causal efficacy of consciousness. The causal trilemma just shows that attempting to explain our experiences by invoking a cause merely results in the question “what causes the cause”. You don’t get anywhere. You could just be satisfied with the predictive success of your “useful” explanation and not inquire further...but people don’t seem to like to stop there. They go on to ascribe metaphysical/ontological significance to it. But if you do, then you have to face the causal trilemma. You are saing that you are not causally responsible for what you have written here, for instance I am saying that, correct. Is it a useful answer? Maybe not. But where does it say that all answers have to be useful? If true knowledge is unobtainable, it makes a lot of sense to settle for useful knowledge. Sure, if you believe that your beliefs are useful, that’s fine with me. Just don’t go pretending that they’re justified. Besides, what causes you to care about usefulness? Evolution. What causes evolution? Initial conditions and causal laws. What causes initial conditions and causal laws? And so on. We've been through this before I think. Yep. That it is in a sense caused by evolution does not make it wrong. Doesn’t make it right either. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:44 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. Mine does Random events don't qualify as free will. A deterministic process doesn't qualify as free will. Random events feeding into a deterministic process don't qualify as free will. It doesn't matter how complex you make the whole system, it's still doesn't have free will. This system isn't ultimately responsible since it isn't responsible for the random events that feed into it, and it isn't responsible for the deterministic rules that filter the random events. Every act this system executes is traceable to those two things, and it can never be free of them. Neither is sufficient for ultimate responsibility The only way you can get free will from this is to redefine free will. And I still don't understand why your so desperate to do so. Free will, like square circle, refers to something that doesn't exist. Free will = ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused square circle = an object that is both a square and a circle -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/27/2010 12:53 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:44 AM, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. Mine does Random events don't qualify as free will. A deterministic process doesn't qualify as free will. Random events feeding into a deterministic process don't qualify as free will. It doesn't matter how complex you make the whole system, it's still doesn't have free will. This system isn't ultimately responsible since it isn't responsible for the random events that feed into it, and it isn't responsible for the deterministic rules that filter the random events. Every act this system executes is traceable to those two things, and it can never be free of them. Neither is sufficient for ultimate responsibility The only way you can get free will from this is to redefine free will. And I still don't understand why your so desperate to do so. Free will, like square circle, refers to something that doesn't exist. Free will = ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused square circle = an object that is both a square and a circle This is a false dichotomy. If a deterministic algorithm evaluates the probability of success for three different actions as A=0.5 B=0.45 and C=0.05 and then a choice between A and B is made at random, then the process has made a choice that is both deterministic and random. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:12 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. If a higher level description is a valid description of some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of why the result happened given the initial conditions It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will microphysical causality So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can justify our beliefs. It seems to me that an entirely acceptable solution is just to accept that we can't justify our beliefs. ..in an absolute way. We still can relative to other beliefs. And that isn;t a problem specific to higher-level categories such as reason and logic. The Trilemma applies just as much to microphysical causality As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? I don't believe so, no. Then the sense in which we are not robots is somewhat honorific: we are not because we have consciousness, but consc. doesn't explain out behaviour since it doesn't cause anything , so we behave as determined... And claiming that consciousness is itself caused just runs into infinite regress, as you then need to explain what causes the cause of conscious experience, and so on. The claim is more that it causes. And it could be causal under interactive dualism (brain causes consc causes different brains state) and it could be causal under mind brain identity: mind is identical to brain; brain causes; therefore mind identically causes. Therefore, taking the same approach as with Agrippa's Trilemma, it seems best to just accept that there is no cause for conscious experience either. Again, the trillema only means there is no non-arbitrary ultimate cause. The trillema does not mean that nothing whatsoever is caused. In any case it is a rather poor reason for dismissing the causal efficacy of consciousness. You are saing that you are not causally responsible for what you have written here, for instance Is it a useful answer? Maybe not. But where does it say that all answers have to be useful? If true knowledge is unobtainable, it makes a lot of sense to settle for useful knowledge. Besides, what causes you to care about usefulness? Evolution. What causes evolution? Initial conditions and causal laws. What causes initial conditions and causal laws? And so on. We've been through this before I think. Yep. That it is in a sense caused by evolution does not make it wrong. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:20 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet undetermined, as required If there is no rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then what is it connects the state to the choice? What needs to? Actions need to be connected to reasons, and they can be. That you cannot trace reasons back in an infinite chain doesn;t affect that. The state occurs. Then the choice occurs. But nothing connects them? That is accidentalism isn't it? I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you insist that FW is a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally different from both determinism and causation, then you won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging It seems to me that when people discuss free will, they are always really interested in ultimate responsibility for actions. Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. Mine does I say that ultimate responsibility is impossible, because neither caused actions nor random actions nor any combination of cause and randomness seems to result in ultimate responsibility. That is the essence of the libertarian's claim to be able to provide a stronger basis for our intuitions about responsibility than any variety of compatibilist. The missing factor the libertarian can supply is origination. Responsibility lies with human agents (acting intentionally and without duress) — the buck stops with them — because that is where the (intention behind the) action originated. An indeterministic cause is an event which is not itself the effect of a prior cause. Thus, if you trace a cause-effect chain backwards it will come to a halt at an indeterministic cause; the indeterministic cause stands at the head of a cause-effect chain. Thus, such causes can pin down the originative power, of agents. There are two important things to realise at this point: Firstly, we are not saying that indeterministic causes correspond one- to-one to human decisions or actions. It takes(at least) billions of basic physical events to produce a human action or decision. The claim that indeterminism is part of this complex process does not mean that individual decisions are just random. (As we expand in (Section III. 1)). We will go onto propose that there are other mechanisms which filter out random impulses, so that there is rational self-control as well as causal originative power, and thus both criteria for UR are met. Second, we are also not saying that indeterminism by itself is a fully sufficient criterion for agenthood. If physical indeterminism is widespread (as argued in section IV.2), that would attribute free will to all sorts of unlikely agents, such as decaying atoms. Our theory requires some additional criteria. There is no reason why these should not be largely the same criteria used by compatibilists and supercompatibilists — rule-following rationality, lack of external compulsion, etc. Where their criteria do not go far enough, we can supplement them with UR and AP. Where their criteria attribute free will too widely to entities, our supplementary criteria will narrow the domain. It is worth mentioning some of the exaggerated, perhaps supernatural ideas that can get confused with indeterminism-based Origination. One is causa sui, the idea of an entity creating or causing itself out of nothing. Naturalistically this is impossible — an entity has to exist in the first place to cause something. Associating self- determination with self-causation is a route to a superficially convincing argument against free will, but the two/o ideas are really distinct. Self-determination — self-control — is not just naturalistically acceptable, it has its own branch of science, cybernetics. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Compatibilism
On 25 Nov 2010, at 22:38, Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 11:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Nov 2010, at 19:47, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. I was not describing the subjective feeling of free will, which is another matter, and which may accompany or not the experience of free will. Free-will is the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot genuinely predict in advance so that reason fails, and yet it is not random. The ability to choose among unpredictable alternatives? What??? The ability to choose among alternatives which are unpredictable by me right now. The possibility to hesitate, to recognize inner contradictory pulsions and tendencies, and to act without being able to justify precisely why we act this way or in some other way yet able to measure some risk in harming oneself or the others, for examples. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. In no way does “ability to choose from unpredictable alternatives” match my conception of free will. It might be felt as counter-intuitive, like most truth is the mechanist theory. That should be expected. I guess it is your non- mechanism assumption which prevents you to pursue such a line of investigation. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, but this is not an argument either. Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today find hard the idea that they are machine (except perhaps in the DM large sense for people with a bit of education). You’re just redefining “free will” in a way that allows you to claim that it exists but which bears little relation to the original conception. In a deterministic universe, there are no alternatives. There are alternatives of many kinds based on many notion of randomness and indeterminacy which appears from all points of view except the God's eyes, or view of nowhere, or truth, or assumed ultimate reality, etc. You are collapsing all the notion of person points of view. Things can only unfold one way. Not necessarily from the observer's view. Both in QM and DM, it is provably not the case that things unfold in one way. We might be multiplied at the third person level, and feel indeterminacy at the first person level. This happens in both QM and DM. (but plays no direct role in the emergence of free will) Our being unable to predict that unfolding is neither here nor there. Again, ignorance is not free will. Ignorance is just ignorance. Free will is the ability to act with that ignorance. I have never said that free will is ignorance. That ignorance is what makes free-will genuine, because that ignorance is unavoidable, and can be known (metaknown if you prefer). Free will is closed to the ability to take decision in presence of partial information, like those studied in some AI technic. Like consciousness it accelerates (relatively to a universal number) the decision. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. You have interpret too much quickly what I was describing. Free- will as I define it is not the subjective feeling of having free-will. It is really due to the fact that the choice I will make is not based on reason, nor on randomness from my (real) perspective (which exists). I didn’t say that the options were choices based on “reason or randomness” I said: “Either there is *a reason* for what I choose to do, or there isn't.” By “a reason” I mean “a cause”. I don’t mean “reason” in the sense of rationality. I know that. This does not answer my remark. Subjective does not mean inexisting. Free-will is subjective or better subject-related, but it exists and has observable consequences, like purposeful murdering, existence of jails, etc. It is the root of moral consciousness, or conscience. How does my inability to predict my choices or alternatives in advance serve as the root for moral conscience? Because free-will gives you the actual possibility to do bad things knowing that they are illegal or even really bad, and if the judge can argue
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/26/2010 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Nov 2010, at 22:38, Rex Allen wrote: How does ignorance of what choice you will make lead to ultimate responsibility for that choice? Because I can have a pretty good pictures of the alternatives. Usually the conflict will be in instantaneous reward against long term rewards. I can speed my car and look at TV, or respect the speed limits and miss the TV. I can stop smoking tobacco and live older, or I can enjoy tobacco here and now, and die sooner, etc. I do have an amount of choice and information, but I am ignorant of the details (notably of my brain functioning, my 'unconscious', etc.), and can act accordingly as a responsible person. I deny the possibility of ultimate responsibility and I’m not a eliminative materialist. I follow you that ultimate responsibility is asking too much. Even a sadist murderer is usually not responsible for the existence of its pulsion, but this does not preclude him to be responsible for its action, in some spectrum. Reasons can be multiple. A sadist could commit an act in a society where sadism is repressed, and not commit an act if sadism is sublimated through art and movies, so the society or system can share responsibility with some act without preventing such act to be done. Free will is not ultimate: i can choose between tea and coffee, but I have not chose to be a drinking entity. But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except by fiat declaration that it does). That is a subtle point. Many mechanist are wrong on this. The expression mechanism can account for consciousness is highly ambiguous. That is why I present mechanism in the operational form of saying yes to a doctor who proposes you a digital brain copying your brain or body or universe at some level of description. No theory can account for truth, which is independent on any theory or observers, yet truth is what will eventually select a theory or an observer. Likewise, if my consciousness is preserved by a mechanist substitution of my brain, this might be due to a relationship between consciousness and truth which typically will not been accounted by mechanism per se, like a theory cannot account for its own consistency already. That is why mechanism per se is unbelievable by sound machine, and asks for a type of act of faith. You are free, and necessarily free, to say no to the doctor. The theory mechanism explains why it has to be a religion, in a sense. It is akin to a belief in reincarnation, if you think about it. Calling on my favorite intuition pump, the artificially intelligent Mars Rover, I can imagine it faced with a decision about which way to go to complete its mission. It tries to make predictions of success for different paths, calling on it's experience with past maneuvers. Thus it develops alternatives, but they are not decisive - no probability is 1.0 and some are equivalent within its estimates of uncertainty. This I think corresponds to the narrative of consciousness. Having estimated probabilities and finding no clear winner, the Rover selects one of the better alternatives at random. This is an exercise of will - whether you want to call it free or not, it must *seem* free because otherwise it would be part of the narrative. Responsibility only seems to be important in social terms - whom shall we punish or reward? That only requires that the punishment/reward has the desired effect on the person and others. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 11:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Nov 2010, at 19:47, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. I was not describing the subjective feeling of free will, which is another matter, and which may accompany or not the experience of free will. Free-will is the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot genuinely predict in advance so that reason fails, and yet it is not random. The ability to choose among unpredictable alternatives? What??? In no way does “ability to choose from unpredictable alternatives” match my conception of free will. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. You’re just redefining “free will” in a way that allows you to claim that it exists but which bears little relation to the original conception. In a deterministic universe, there are no alternatives. Things can only unfold one way. Our being unable to predict that unfolding is neither here nor there. Again, ignorance is not free will. Ignorance is just ignorance. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. You have interpret too much quickly what I was describing. Free-will as I define it is not the subjective feeling of having free-will. It is really due to the fact that the choice I will make is not based on reason, nor on randomness from my (real) perspective (which exists). I didn’t say that the options were choices based on “reason or randomness” I said: “Either there is *a reason* for what I choose to do, or there isn't.” By “a reason” I mean “a cause”. I don’t mean “reason” in the sense of rationality. Subjective does not mean inexisting. Free-will is subjective or better subject-related, but it exists and has observable consequences, like purposeful murdering, existence of jails, etc. It is the root of moral consciousness, or conscience. How does my inability to predict my choices or alternatives in advance serve as the root for moral conscience? They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. And this becomes, with the approach I gave: the ability to make choices that aren't random, but for which they have to ignore the cause. And I insist: they might even ignore that they ignore the cause. They will say because I want do that or things like that. The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will with ignorance of causes. I disagree that many people would accept your definition, because it would entail (even for religious rationalist believers) that free-will does not exist, and the debate would be close since a long time. If you ask “most people”, they will not agree that the human choice is random, and they will not agree that human choice can be explained by causal forces. Rather, they claim that human choice is something not random *and* not caused. Though they can’t get any more specific than that. The debate isn’t settled because they won’t admit that there is no third option. They feel free, therefore they *believe* that they must actually be free. Free from randomness and free from causal forces. “I feel free, therefore I must be free.” That reasoning is what keeps the free will debate alive. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. They are right. That is what the materialist eliminativist will deny, and eventually that is why they will deny any meaning to notion like person, free-will, responsibility or even consciousness. How does ignorance of what choice you will make lead to ultimate responsibility for that choice? I deny the possibility of ultimate responsibility and I’m not a eliminative materialist. But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except by fiat declaration that it does). As to “person”, I take a deflationary view of the term. There’s less to it than meets the eye. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Because as a person she is conscious and feel a reasonable amount of sense of responsibility, which is genuine and legitimate from her first person perspective (and from the perspective of machine having a similar level of complexity). This comes back to my earlier point. She “feels” a sense of responsibility and therefore believes that she is genuinely and legitimately responsible. But the fact that she feels responsibility in no way means that she actually is
Re: Compatibilism
On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except by fiat declaration that it does). Rex, I am interested in your reasoning against mechanism. Assume there is were an] mechanical brain composed of mechanical neurons, that contained the same information as a human brain, and processed it in the same way. The behavior between these two brains is in all respects identical, since the mechanical neurons react identically to their biological counterparts. However for some unknown reason the computer has no inner life or conscious experience. If you were to ask this mind if it is conscious it would have to say yes, but since it is not conscious, this would be a lie. However, the mechanical mind would not believe itself to be lying. It's neural activity would match the activity of a biological brain telling the truth. It not only is lying about it's claim of consciousness, but would be wrong in its belief that it is conscious. It would be wrong in believing it sees red when you hold a ripe tomato in front of it. My question is what could possibly make the mechanical mind wrong in these beliefs when the biological mind is right? The mechanical mind contains all the same information as the biological one; the information received from the red-sensitive cones in its eyes can be physically traced as it moves through the mechanical mind and leads to it uttering that it sees a tomato. How could this identical informational content be invalid, wrong, false in one representation of a mind, but true in another? Information can take many physical forms. The same digital photograph can be stored as differently reflective areas in a CD or DVD, as charges of electrons in Flash memory, as a magnetic encoding on a hard drive, as holes in a punch card, and yet the file will look the same regardless of how it is physically stored. Likewise the file can be sent in an e-mail which may transmit as fields over an electrical wire, laser pulses in an glass fiber, radio waves in the air, the physical implementation is irrelevant. Is the same not true for information contained within a conscious mind? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:12 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. If a higher level description is a valid description of some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of why the result happened given the initial conditions It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will microphysical causality So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can justify our beliefs. It seems to me that an entirely acceptable solution is just to accept that we can't justify our beliefs. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? I don't believe so, no. And claiming that consciousness is itself caused just runs into infinite regress, as you then need to explain what causes the cause of conscious experience, and so on. Therefore, taking the same approach as with Agrippa's Trilemma, it seems best to just accept that there is no cause for conscious experience either. Is it a useful answer? Maybe not. But where does it say that all answers have to be useful? Besides, what causes you to care about usefulness? Evolution. What causes evolution? Initial conditions and causal laws. What causes initial conditions and causal laws? And so on. We've been through this before I think. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:20 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet undetermined, as required If there is no rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then what is it connects the state to the choice? The state occurs. Then the choice occurs. But nothing connects them? That is accidentalism isn't it? I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you insist that FW is a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally different from both determinism and causation, then you won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging It seems to me that when people discuss free will, they are always really interested in ultimate responsibility for actions. Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. I say that ultimate responsibility is impossible, because neither caused actions nor random actions nor any combination of cause and randomness seems to result in ultimate responsibility. Ultimate responsibility means that reward and punishment are justified for acts *even after* setting aside any utilitarian considerations. So *if* it were possible to be ultimately responsible for a bad act, we wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of deterring future bad behavior by the offender or others. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of rehabilitating the offender so that they don't commit similar bad acts in the future. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of motivating better behavior by them or others in the future. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of compensating their victims or insuring social stability. Instead, we could justify the offender's punishment purely in terms of their ultimate responsibility for it. Using their free will, they chose to commit the bad act, and therefore they deserve the punishment. End of story. So, given that the punishment would no longer need to be justified in terms of anything other than ultimate responsibility, how would one justify limits on the punishment's severity? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. If a higher level description is a valid description of some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of why the result happened given the initial conditions It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will microphysical causality Only causal explanations do that. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Neither is your version of the argument -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet undetermined, as required =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. How does this differ in meaning from my definition? I don't think it does. Not that according to this definition: 1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (Rationally choose and consciously perform). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives Related by what? Deterministic rules? Probabilistic? If one's actions are determined by ones thoughts and motives, what determines one's thoughts and motives? And why do some particular set of thoughts and motives result in one choice instead of some other? If there is no reason for one choice instead of the other, the choice was random. 4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (...at least some of which...). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible. Select using what rule? What process? What mechanism? Magic? Either there is a reason that you selected the action you did, in which case the reason determined the selection - or there isn't, in which case the selection was random. Also the phrase from what is physically possible is suspicious. If the natural laws determine what is physically possible, don't they determine everything? Not if they are probablistic. In a probablistic universe, some things are still impossible Where does this leave room for free will? the ability to select actions from what is physically possible Select by means that is neither random nor caused. Okay. That's what I said. Select means it is neither determined nor unreasoned 6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you insist that FW is a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally different from both determinism and causation, then you won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging If you ask most people is this free will? - they will say no. Free will (in most peoples estimation) requires a process that is neither random *nor* determinstic. Surely not most people. Theres a lot of compatibilists about, for instance. Not one that is both. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: Compatibilism
On 21 Nov 2010, at 19:47, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 07:31, Rex Allen wrote: As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... Lol. I agree with you. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think that if you question most people who believe in free will closely, my definition is what their position boils down to. But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. I was not describing the subjective feeling of free will, which is another matter, and which may accompany or not the experience of free will. Free-will is the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot genuinely predict in advance so that reason fails, and yet it is not random. This is independent of the subjective feeling of free- will, where I am aware that I know that I don't know the reason of my act. We can do that even in situation we believe (wrongly) that we are following reason, and so in absence of any subjective feeling of free will. Some self-ignorance plays a role, and we might be ignorant of that self-ignorance. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. You have interpret too much quickly what I was describing. Free-will as I define it is not the subjective feeling of having free-will. It is really due to the fact that the choice I will make is not based on reason, nor on randomness from my (real) perspective (which exists). It is indeed closer to the computational irreducibility. It is related to some particular case of such an irreducibility, and its existence can be justified from the logic of self-reference or from some other use of the second recursion theorem of Kleene. Subjective does not mean inexisting. Free-will is subjective or better subject-related, but it exists and has observable consequences, like purposeful murdering, existence of jails, etc. It is the root of moral consciousness, or conscience. They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. And this becomes, with the approach I gave: the ability to make choices that aren't random, but for which they have to ignore the cause. And I insist: they might even ignore that they ignore the cause. They will say because I want do that or things like that. I disagree that many people would accept your definition, because it would entail (even for religious rationalist believers) that free-will does not exist, and the debate would be close since a long time. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. They are right. That is what the materialist eliminativist will deny, and eventually that is why they will deny any meaning to notion like person, free-will, responsibility or even consciousness. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Because as a person she is conscious and feel a reasonable amount of sense of responsibility, which is genuine and legitimate from her first person perspective (and from the perspective of machine having a similar level of complexity). Silly, I know. It is not silly at all. That is why mechanism is not a reductionism, and eventually saves the notion of person. That is why consciousness, even if matter exists in some fundamental way, is not an epiphenomenon. When you say random or not random, you are applying the third excluded middle which, although arguably true ontically, is provably wrong for most personal points of view. We have p v ~p, but this does not entail Bp v B~p, for B used for almost any hypostasis (points of view). I'd think that ontically is what matters in this particular case? I don't see why. A murderer remains a murderer independently of the ontic level, be it particles, waves, fields, or number relations. We just don't live at the ontic level, we cannot even experience it, only make third person theories, testable experimentally, not testable exclusively from a first person perspective. That is why science per se has no direct practical bearing on moral issues, even the (theoretical) science of ethics. That is why, also, no one, nor any group of people, can decide for *you*
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/22/2010 8:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Nov 2010, at 19:47, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 07:31, Rex Allen wrote: As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... Lol. I agree with you. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think that if you question most people who believe in free will closely, my definition is what their position boils down to. But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. I was not describing the subjective feeling of free will, which is another matter, and which may accompany or not the experience of free will. Free-will is the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot genuinely predict in advance so that reason fails, and yet it is not random. This is independent of the subjective feeling of free-will, where I am aware that I know that I don't know the reason of my act. We can do that even in situation we believe (wrongly) that we are following reason, and so in absence of any subjective feeling of free will. Some self-ignorance plays a role, and we might be ignorant of that self-ignorance. Suppose you are in a situation in which you make a decision but don't have the feeling of free will, e.g. some points a gun at you and says, You money or your life. You don't feel that you have free will; you feel coerced. But that has nothing to do with whether the processes in your brain are deterministic or have some stochastic component. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. You have interpret too much quickly what I was describing. Free-will as I define it is not the subjective feeling of having free-will. It is really due to the fact that the choice I will make is not based on reason, nor on randomness from my (real) perspective (which exists). Hmmm? The dichotomy Rex presents is caused (determined) vs random; not reasoned vs random. Certainly decisions can be made which are not reasoned, not consciously weighed, and yet are not random either, e.g when I play tennis almost none of my actions are reasoned. But based on our theories of the brain etc, they are caused. It is indeed closer to the computational irreducibility. It is related to some particular case of such an irreducibility, and its existence can be justified from the logic of self-reference or from some other use of the second recursion theorem of Kleene. Subjective does not mean inexisting. Free-will is subjective or better subject-related, but it exists and has observable consequences, like purposeful murdering, existence of jails, etc. It is the root of moral consciousness, or conscience. They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. And this becomes, with the approach I gave: the ability to make choices that aren't random, but for which they have to ignore the cause. And I insist: they might even ignore that they ignore the cause. They will say because I want do that or things like that. I disagree that many people would accept your definition, because it would entail (even for religious rationalist believers) that free-will does not exist, and the debate would be close since a long time. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. They are right. That is what the materialist eliminativist will deny, and eventually that is why they will deny any meaning to notion like person, free-will, responsibility or even consciousness. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Because as a person she is conscious and feel a reasonable amount of sense of responsibility, which is genuine and legitimate from her first person perspective (and from the perspective of machine having a similar level of complexity). Silly, I know. It is not silly at all. That is why mechanism is not a reductionism, and eventually saves the notion of person. That is why consciousness, even if matter exists in some fundamental way, is not an epiphenomenon. When you say random or not random, you are applying the third excluded middle which, although arguably true ontically, is provably wrong for most personal points of view. We have p
Re: Compatibilism
On 22 Nov 2010, at 20:47, Brent Meeker wrote: On 11/22/2010 8:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Nov 2010, at 19:47, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 07:31, Rex Allen wrote: As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... Lol. I agree with you. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think that if you question most people who believe in free will closely, my definition is what their position boils down to. But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. I was not describing the subjective feeling of free will, which is another matter, and which may accompany or not the experience of free will. Free-will is the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot genuinely predict in advance so that reason fails, and yet it is not random. This is independent of the subjective feeling of free-will, where I am aware that I know that I don't know the reason of my act. We can do that even in situation we believe (wrongly) that we are following reason, and so in absence of any subjective feeling of free will. Some self-ignorance plays a role, and we might be ignorant of that self-ignorance. Suppose you are in a situation in which you make a decision but don't have the feeling of free will, e.g. some points a gun at you and says, You money or your life. You don't feel that you have free will; you feel coerced. But that has nothing to do with whether the processes in your brain are deterministic or have some stochastic component. I agree with the last sentence, but in that situation I still have free-will, I have probably less freedom. A prisoner, in jail, has the same amount of free-will than a non prisoner, but it has much less freedom. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. You have interpret too much quickly what I was describing. Free- will as I define it is not the subjective feeling of having free- will. It is really due to the fact that the choice I will make is not based on reason, nor on randomness from my (real) perspective (which exists). Hmmm? The dichotomy Rex presents is caused (determined) vs random; not reasoned vs random. That is the whole point. Rex uses sometimes reasoned, sometimes caused as it was the same. That is why I agree with him. With his notion of free-will, free-will does not exist. Certainly decisions can be made which are not reasoned, not consciously weighed, and yet are not random either, e.g when I play tennis almost none of my actions are reasoned. But based on our theories of the brain etc, they are caused. Yes. It is indeed closer to the computational irreducibility. It is related to some particular case of such an irreducibility, and its existence can be justified from the logic of self-reference or from some other use of the second recursion theorem of Kleene. Subjective does not mean inexisting. Free-will is subjective or better subject-related, but it exists and has observable consequences, like purposeful murdering, existence of jails, etc. It is the root of moral consciousness, or conscience. They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. And this becomes, with the approach I gave: the ability to make choices that aren't random, but for which they have to ignore the cause. And I insist: they might even ignore that they ignore the cause. They will say because I want do that or things like that. I disagree that many people would accept your definition, because it would entail (even for religious rationalist believers) that free-will does not exist, and the debate would be close since a long time. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. They are right. That is what the materialist eliminativist will deny, and eventually that is why they will deny any meaning to notion like person, free-will, responsibility or even consciousness. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Because as a person she is conscious and feel a reasonable amount of sense of responsibility, which is genuine and legitimate from
Re: Compatibilism
It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. Evgenii on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty and emergence, which for luminaries like Parmenides, Spinoza and Einstein were mere epiphenomena to be explained away, are likely the Uni- verse's very mode of existence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 21 Nov 2010, at 09:11, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. The account on free will by Wolfram is coherent with the mechanist assumption, and is a good example of how computer science can help to build a compatibilist account of free will. But his account of physicalness is wrong. He is forced to put the quantum weirdness (non locality notably) under the rug, and he is not aware that if we are machine, then the observable reality cannot be a machine. By the mechanist first person indeterminacy, the observable reality has to be a non constructive (non Turing emulable) first person plural reality. Also, I begin to think that digital mechanism entails also that the physical universe is infinite in time, space and scale. The big bang would only be a local explosion/singularity, and not the (physical) origin of the cosmos. Bruno on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty and emergence, which for luminaries like Parmenides, Spinoza and Einstein were mere epiphenomena to be explained away, are likely the Uni- verse's very mode of existence. Brent -- You received
Re: Compatibilism
Dear Bruno, Could you please recommend some reading about the mechanist assumption? Especially that then the observable reality cannot be a machine Evgenii on 21.11.2010 15:58 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 21 Nov 2010, at 09:11, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. The account on free will by Wolfram is coherent with the mechanist assumption, and is a good example of how computer science can help to build a compatibilist account of free will. But his account of physicalness is wrong. He is forced to put the quantum weirdness (non locality notably) under the rug, and he is not aware that if we are machine, then the observable reality cannot be a machine. By the mechanist first person indeterminacy, the observable reality has to be a non constructive (non Turing emulable) first person plural reality. Also, I begin to think that digital mechanism entails also that the physical universe is infinite in time, space and scale. The big bang would only be a local explosion/singularity, and not the (physical) origin of the cosmos. Bruno on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. How does this differ in meaning from my definition? I don't think it does. Not that according to this definition: 1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (Rationally choose and consciously perform). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives Related by what? Deterministic rules? Probabilistic? If one's actions are determined by ones thoughts and motives, what determines one's thoughts and motives? And why do some particular set of thoughts and motives result in one choice instead of some other? If there is no reason for one choice instead of the other, the choice was random. 4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (...at least some of which...). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible. Select using what rule? What process? What mechanism? Magic? Either there is a reason that you selected the action you did, in which case the reason determined the selection - or there isn't, in which case the selection was random. Also the phrase from what is physically possible is suspicious. If the natural laws determine what is physically possible, don't they determine everything? Where does this leave room for free will? the ability to select actions from what is physically possible Select by means that is neither random nor caused. Okay. That's what I said. 6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you ask most people is this free will? - they will say no. Free will (in most peoples estimation) requires a process that is neither random *nor* determinstic. Not one that is both. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 07:31, Rex Allen wrote: As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... Lol. I agree with you. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think that if you question most people who believe in free will closely, my definition is what their position boils down to. But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Silly, I know. When you say random or not random, you are applying the third excluded middle which, although arguably true ontically, is provably wrong for most personal points of view. We have p v ~p, but this does not entail Bp v B~p, for B used for almost any hypostasis (points of view). I'd think that ontically is what matters in this particular case? Why would I care about whether or why I or anyone else *seem* to have free will from their personal points of view? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. Only causal explanations do that. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Sat, Nov 20, 2010 at 8:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? Well...maybe. But I'm not overly concerned with the question of whether the causal laws of the universe are deterministic or probabilistic. The implications are mostly the same either way. And it's the implications of there being causal laws that mainly interests me. So we have orderly perceptions and ask where the order comes from. Perhaps causal laws? But then where do causal laws come from? What causes causal laws? And why our causal laws instead of some others? Do these causal laws actually cause some things to happen and actively prohibit other things from happening? Or do they merely describe what happens, without any actual causation? In other words, is it the case that A) nothing *can* violate the laws of physics, or is it merely that B) nothing *does* violate the laws of physics. If A), why not? What enforces the causal laws? If B) why not? Why do things happen *as though* there were governing laws? I lean towards B. There are no causal laws, and there is no reason that things happen as though there were. Which is the gist of the Meillassoux paper that started the other thread. I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? I thought it was an interesting talk. Things could be that way I reckon. Though the problem is that things could be lots of other ways instead. If reality is as Wolfram believes instead of as Leibniz believed (e.g., in Monadology), why is that? What explains the difference? And then, what explains the explanation of the difference? And then, what explains the explanation of the explanation of the difference? And so on. If reality is one particular way, we're faced with the question of why this way and not some other?. Which leads directly to infinite regress, as above. The only way to avoid this is to accept, as with Meillassoux, that there *is* no reason that reality is this way. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/21/2010 10:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. Only causal explanations do that. No, causal explanations only push the question back a step. And even the one step is just description plus asserting necessity. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Proof is for mathematics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Sun, Nov 21, 2010 at 4:18 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 11/21/2010 10:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Proof is for mathematics. Not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in the juridical sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
This is exactly the model of free will I argue in favour for in my book Theory of Nothing. Thanks 1Z - this is well put. Not that it will convince the others who argue that free will is excluded by being neither deterministic nor random. That debate will rage for centuries... Cheers On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 04:28:51AM -0800, 1Z wrote: I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will These arguments are not to be regarded as finalising the issue of free will, but only of showing that there is a case to be answered. 1. The existence of the introspective sense of free will. (Determinists will quickly tell you this is down to not understanding the causes of our actions — but why don't we intuitively see our actions as being random, or, for that matter determined by unknown causes? (Determinism by unknown causes is certainly thinkable, after all it is just what the determinist thinks. It is not as if we can't conceive of either of those). 2. The tendency to value freedom. (No-one, not even a determinist, would want a benevolent dictator making their decisions, even if the decisions in questions were better than the ones they would have made). 3. Our ability to detect greater and lesser amounts of 'robotic' or 'zombie' like behaviour in others. 4. Creativity and innovation. (Determinists often make a hand- waving argument (like this)listing all the external influences that go to act on an individual, and conclude that there is no room left for any individual contribution. But then why aren't we still in caves ?) It is often claimed that free will is an inherently contradictory idea, or that if free will is possible at all, it must be somehow magical or supernatural. We intend to argue against both these claims by building a consistent theoretical model of free will could work in an indeterminstic universe, that is entirely naturalistic. It is often objected that a random event cannot be rational or responsible. However, human decision-making is not an individual event occurring at the atomic level, it is a very complex process involving billions of neurons. It is often assumed that indeterminism can only come into play as part of a complex process of decision-making when the deterministic element has reached an impasse, and indeterminism has the casting vote (like an internalised version of tossing a coin when you cannot make up your mind). This model, which we call the Buridan model, has the advantage that you have some level of commitment to both courses of action; neither is exactly against your wishes. It is, however, not so good for rationality and self-control. The indetermistic coin-toss can reasonably be seen as the crucial cause of your decision, yet it is not under your control. In our model, by contrast, the indetermistic element is moved back in the descision-making process. A funtional unit we call the Random Idea Generator proposed multiple ideas and courses of action, which are then pruned back by a more-or-less deterministic process called the Sensible Idea Selector. (This arrangement is structurally modelled on random mutation and natural selection in Darwinian theory). The output of the R.I.G is controlled in the sense that the rest of the system does not have to act on its proposals. It can filter out anything too wild or irrational. Nonetheless, in a rewinding history scenario, the individual could have acted differently, as requied by libertarian free will, because their R.I.G. could have come out with different proposals — and it would still be something they wanted to do, because it would not have been translated into action without the consent of the rest of the neural apparatus. (As naturalists, we take it that a self is the sum total of neural activity and not a ghost-in-the-machin). It could be argued that placing indeterminism at the source of decision-making in this way means that our decisions are ultimately unfounded. We respond that being able to give a rational account of your actions, the reasons behind them, the reasons behind those reasons and so on to infinity is setting the bar too high. In real life, nobody is that rational. We also comment on the definitions of free will and determinism, the alleged empirical evidence against free will and the existence and significance of genuine indeterminism. Of course, being able to build a model of it does not show that that free will actually exists, but the claim is made that it is impossible, that there is no way of conceiving it, and the appropriate response to such a claim is in fact to conceive of it. We are only arguing for its possibility, and how else do you argue for the possibility of something other than showing that it can be posited to exist without entailing any contradiction? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group,
Re: Compatibilism
The problem you're making is that, we can't choose (freely) under deterministics rules and we can't choose (freely) under random rules... Because the world is ruled (random or not). I think free will is compatible to both views. As long as you defined it to be ignorance of the knowing entities, the burden rest to define what in that context are the knowing entities (and what knows mean, where I think Bruno is near the truth) ;-) Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Well it would seem to me that ignorance is not free will. Ignorance is ignorance. Belief in free will is not free will. Belief in free will is *belief* in free will. Why do you want to define it in terms of ignorance? What motivates this? And how does that fit with how the term is used with respect to ultimate responsibility for acts committed (good and bad)? Why not just say: Free will as it is commonly used doesn't exist, but we have this other thing you might be interested in: faux will - which we define in terms of ignorance... On Sun, Nov 21, 2010 at 5:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: The problem you're making is that, we can't choose (freely) under deterministics rules and we can't choose (freely) under random rules... Because the world is ruled (random or not). I think free will is compatible to both views. As long as you defined it to be ignorance of the knowing entities, the burden rest to define what in that context are the knowing entities (and what knows mean, where I think Bruno is near the truth) ;-) Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty and emergence, which for luminaries like Parmenides, Spinoza and Einstein were mere epiphenomena to be explained away, are likely the Uni- verse's very mode of existence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Nov 2010, at 04:51, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ? Are you saying that it is obvious that compatibilism is false? Compatibilism is false. Unless you do something sneaky like change the meaning of the term free will to make it true. Which is like changing the definition of unicorn to mean a horse with a horn glued to it's forehead. I agree with the critics of compatilism in this passage: Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definition of free will: Incompatibilists may agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that something ought not to be called 'free will'. Compatibilists are sometimes accused (by Incompatibilists) of actually being Hard Determinists who are motivated by a lack of a coherent, consonant moral belief system. Compatibilists are sometimes called 'soft determinists' pejoratively (William James's term). James accused them of creating a 'quagmire of evasion' by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism. Immanuel Kant called it a 'wretched subterfuge' and 'word jugglery.' What is your position? And what is your definition of free-will? My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. If there is no reason, then the choice was random. No free will. I don't see a third option. =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. Not that according to this definition: 1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances. 2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (Rationally choose and consciously perform). 3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives 4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (...at least some of which...). 5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible. 6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained. I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will These arguments are not to be regarded as finalising the issue of free will, but only of showing that there is a case to be answered. 1. The existence of the introspective sense of free will. (Determinists will quickly tell you this is down to not understanding the causes of our actions — but why don't we intuitively see our actions as being random, or, for that matter determined by unknown causes? (Determinism by unknown causes is certainly thinkable, after all it is just what the determinist thinks. It is not as if we can't conceive of either of those). 2. The tendency to value freedom. (No-one, not even a determinist, would want a benevolent dictator making their decisions, even if the decisions in questions were better than the ones they would have made). 3. Our ability to detect greater and lesser amounts of 'robotic' or 'zombie' like behaviour in others. 4. Creativity and innovation. (Determinists often make a hand- waving argument (like this)listing all the external influences that go to act on an individual, and conclude that there is no room left for any individual contribution. But then why aren't we still in caves ?) It is often claimed that free will is an inherently contradictory idea, or that if free will is possible at all, it must be somehow magical or supernatural. We intend to argue against both these claims by building a consistent theoretical model of free will could work in an indeterminstic universe, that is entirely naturalistic. It
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 19 Nov 2010, at 13:36, 1Z wrote: We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance key point, I agree. I would say we always do that. No one will explain why a chess playing computers makes a move in term of the material and physical laws making up the computer activity. With a so strong form of reductionism, power sets would not exist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? I could not perfectly predict your behavior without creating a full simulation of your brain. Doing so would instantiate your consciousness. Therefore I cannot determine what you will do without invoking your consciousness, thought, reason, etc. I do not disagree with your assertion that something must be either caused or random, but does _what_ caused you to do something have any bearing? If your mind is the cause, does that count as free will? Jason On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 12:31 AM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Nov 2010, at 04:51, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ? Are you saying that it is obvious that compatibilism is false? Compatibilism is false. Unless you do something sneaky like change the meaning of the term free will to make it true. Which is like changing the definition of unicorn to mean a horse with a horn glued to it's forehead. I agree with the critics of compatilism in this passage: Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definition of free will: Incompatibilists may agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that something ought not to be called 'free will'. Compatibilists are sometimes accused (by Incompatibilists) of actually being Hard Determinists who are motivated by a lack of a coherent, consonant moral belief system. Compatibilists are sometimes called 'soft determinists' pejoratively (William James's term). James accused them of creating a 'quagmire of evasion' by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism. Immanuel Kant called it a 'wretched subterfuge' and 'word jugglery.' What is your position? And what is your definition of free-will? My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. If there is no reason, then the choice was random. No free will. I don't see a third option. =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. I could not perfectly predict your behavior without creating a full simulation of your brain. Doing so would instantiate your consciousness. Therefore I cannot determine what you will do without invoking your consciousness, thought, reason, etc. I wouldn't necessarily agree that a full computer simulation of a human brain would produce conscious experience. Maybe it's true. Maybe it's not. I have serious doubts. I'm not a physicalist, or a dualist, but rather an accidental idealist. Or maybe an idealistic accidentalist? One or the other. I do not disagree with your assertion that something must be either caused or random, but does _what_ caused you to do something have any bearing? If your mind is the cause, does that count as free will? Even if that were the case, there must be *something* that connects the mind to the choice. Otherwise how can you say that the mind is the cause of the choice? So what is the nature of that connective something? If it is a rule or a law, then the choice was determined by the rule/law. If there is nothing that connects the mind to the choice, then the choice was random and the mind didn't cause it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
