Re: MGA 3
On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get a hole in the movie, but everything which enters and go out of the hole remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity. The hole has trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality whose special behavior was described by the film. And this is true for any subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself. I don't think this step follows at all. Consciousness may supervene on the stationary unprojected film, This, I don't understand. And, btw, if that is true, then the physical supervenience thesis is already wrong. The physical supervenience thesis asks that consciousness is associated in real time and space with the activity of some machine (with MEC). I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. BTW - I don't think the film is conscious by virtue of the counterfactuals issue, but that's a whole different story. And Olympization doesn't work, unless we rule out the multiverse. Why does the physical supervenience require that all instantiations of a consciousness be dynamic? Surely, it suffices that some are? What do you mean by an instantiation of a dynamical process which is not dynamic. Even a block universe describe a dynamical process, or a variety of dynamical processes. A block universe is nondynamic by definition. But looked at another way, (ie from the inside) it is dynamic. It neatly illustrates why consciousness can supervene on a stationary film (because it is stationary when viewed from the inside). The film, however does need to be sufficiently rich, and also needs to handle counterfactuals (unlike the usual sort of movie we see which has only one plot). c) Eliminate the hypothesis there is a concrete deployment in the seventh step of the UDA. Use UDA(1...7) to define properly the computationalist supervenience thesis. Hint: reread the remarks above. I have no problems with this conclusion. However, we cannot eliminate supervenience on phenomenal physics, n'est-ce pas? We cannot eliminate supervenience of consciousness on what we take as other persons indeed. Of course phenomenal physics is a first person subjective creation, and it helps to entangle our (abstract) computational histories. That is the role of a brain. It does not create consciousness, it does only make higher the probability for that consciousness to be able to manifest itself relatively to other consciousness. But consciousness can rely, with MEC, only to the abstract computation. The problem is that eliminating the brain from phenomenal experience makes that experience even more highly probable than without. This is the Occam catastrophe I mention in my book. Obviously this contradicts experience. Therefore I conclude that supervenience on a phenomenal physical brain is necessary for consciousness. I speculate a bit that this may be due to self-awareness, but don't have a good argument for it. It is the elephant in the room with respect to pure MEC theories. Sorry for being a bit short, I have to go, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Lost and not lost?
Hey, Kim Jones wrote: I think this idea is so momentous that I actually wish to compose a piece of music - possibly a symphony - which seeks to represent this idea in music. That would be cool! Et pourquoi pas? Most of the great composers attempted to represent the TRANSCENDENTAL in music. Yes. In Bach (for instance The Art of Fugue) I can hear it most clearly :-) Concerning Bruno: I believe you, more than any human whose mind I have frotté (grazed? Rubbed against?) has a representation of ultimate things. I would like to second this opinion. I think Bruno is onto something deep :-) And certainly he has thought more about this than most (all?) people I know. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 2
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives? As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative is to deny that consciousness exists at all, which seems to me incoherent. ACK But the differences are so enormous that one is again very far from religion. In religion, the soul is an essence of a person interfacing with a material body and usually exposed to some kind of judgement in an afterlife. With COMP the soul - better: mind - is all there is - no material world, no essence, no judgements, just COMP. And it supervenes on - better: is (inside/outside view) - computations (see UDA for details ;-) Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness and free will
Bruno, I wanted to submit some reflections to M.A. but you did it better. Two words, however, I picked out: *1. bifurcate* I consider it a human narrowness to expect anything *to split in TWO*(only) - Nature (the existence?) does not 'count'. It has unlimited varants and the choices come under the 2nd word I picked out: *2. (free?) WILL* The *'Free Will'* is the invention of the religious trend to invoke responsibility and punishment. In 'my' position-kind even 'Will implies some personal(?) decision instead of a deterministic *consequence of relations all over* acting upon the observed change of the observed item. As for the elusive *consciousness?* 'my' attempt to find some generalized and widened identification for all those different things people (as is said)* 'everybody knows what it is'*(but many in *different ways* G), I ended up with the ID (first published 1992): *Acknowledgement of and response * *to information (changes?)* (considering it rather a process than only an 'awareness'.) I posted this on several lists for psych, mind, consciousness, even diverse complexities and did NOT get a refusal over the 15 years). Acceptance neither. So I thought: Si tacent, clamant (or dormiunt?) I hold one thing for sure: Ccness (whatever it may be) is NOT a 'thing' callable 'physical'. (I feel M.A. tacitly assigns to universe,the program, or whatever some god-like authoritative decisionmaking role). John M * * On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 29 Nov 2008, at 16:45, M.A. wrote: *(Assuming MEC/Comp.and MWI) If the computational universe which I experience* Assuming MEC I would say *you* experience an infinity of computational histories. The term universe is far too ambiguous (now). *is a single instance of a vast array of similar universes playing out every possible variation of the initial axioms, then no one universe could depart from its predetermined program since in so doing it would alter its program and duplicate that of another universe thus spoiling the overall mission of implementing every possible variation.* Histories can bifurcate in a way that you will find yourself in both histories (you seen from some third person point of view). Each histories is deterministic but, your future is uncertain. *It follows that each program-universe is completely detirministic * All right. *and that consciousness is merely an observing passenger inside the program;* At some point I could defined consciousness as the state of (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed up yourself relatively to your current stories, and make greater the set of your possible continuation. As an exemple you become aware an asteroïd is coming nearby make it possible for you to envisage a set of possible decisions, which can themselves augment your probability of survival. * thus each program that contains a thinking entity is in a schizophrenic condition. * Come on! *This is because consciousness--which is part of the program--is capable of judging the actions of the program. When the program acts in a way approved by it, * by it? *the thinker is encouraged to believe that its free will produced the action. * ? *But when the program acts in a manner repugnant to it,* to who? *the conscious observer, refusing to give up the notion of free will, explains the lapse by rationalizations such as: God, luck, destiny, possession, halluciation etc. * As far as I understand, the program here acknowledge its ignorance. If, by being too much proud, he doesn't, then he make higher some catastrophe probabilities. *So every consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions, must either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism),* Wrongly, I would say. *accept the intercession of supernatural powers (theology), * it could just accept it belongs to a collection of deep unknown histories, and many other unknown things, some even not nameable (and deadly if named). It can consolate itself by pointing on its *partial* control. Note also that it is not really the program or the machine who thinks, but the people vehiculated trough that machine computation relatively to its most probable (and local) computational histories. *or theorize an inaccessible part of itself that is able to override its purposes (Freud). * That is not entirely meaningless imo. *All of which implies a schism between consciousness and one of the following: the program, the universe or itself.* Here I agree. Universal machine are born to experience such a schism. We can come back on this. In its purer form it is a consequence of incompleteness. All universal machine hides a mystery to themselves, and more the machine learn, more that mystery is bigger. (This is related to the gap between G and G*, for those who reminds previous
Re: MGA 3
On 30 Nov 2008, at 04:23, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution level. You are reintroducing some consciousness on the elementary parts, here, I think. The problem would not be with removing individual elementary parts and replacing them with functionally equivalent pieces; this obviously preserves the whole. Rather with removing whole subgraphs and replacing them with equivalent pieces. As Alice-in-the-cave is supposed to show, this can remove consciousness, at least in the limit when the entire movie is replaced... The limit is not relevant. I agrre that if you remove Alice, you remove any possibility for Alice to manifest herself in your most probable histories. The problem is that in the range activity of the projected movie, removing a part of the graph change nothing. It changes only the probability of recoevering Alice from her history in, again, your most probable history. Isn't this reliance on probable histories assuming some physical theory that is no in evidence? Not at all. I have defined history by a computation as see from a first person (plural or not). Of course, well I guess I should insist on that perhaps, by computation I always mean the mathematical object; It makes sense only with respect to to some universal machine, and I have chosen elementary arithmetic as the primitive one. Although strictly speaking the notion of computable is an epistemic notion, it happens that Church thesis makes it equivalent with purely mathematical notion, and this is used for making the notion of probable history a purely mathematical notion, (once we got a mathematical notion of first person, but this is simple in the thought experience (memory, diary ..., and a bit more subtle in the interview (AUDA)). A difficulty, in those post correspondences, is that I am reasoning currently with MEC and MAT, just to get the contradiction, but in many (most) posts I reason only with MEC (having abandon MAT). After UDA, you can already understand that physical has to be equivalent with probable history for those who followed the whole UDA+MGA. physical has to refer the most probable (and hopefully) sharable relative computational history. This is already the case with just UDA, if you assume both the existence of a physical universe and of a concrete UD running in that concrete universe. MGA is designed to eliminate the assumption of a physical universe and of the concrete UD. IThere are no physical causal link between the experience attributed to the physical computation and the causal history of projecting a movie. But there is a causal history for the creation of the movie - it's a recording of Alice's brain functions which were causally related to her physical world. Assuming MEC+MAT you are right indeed. But the causal history of the creation of the movie, is not the same computation or causal chain than the execution of Alice's mind and Alice's brain during her original dream. If you make abstraction of that difference, it means you already don't accept the physical supervenience thesis, or, again, you are introducing magical knowledge in the elementary part running the computation. You can only forget the difference of those two computations by abstracting from the physical part of the story. This means you are using exclusively the computational supervenience. MGA should make clear (but OK, I warned MGA is subtle) that the consciousness has to be related to the genuine causality or history. But it is that very genuineness that physics can accidentally reproduced in a non genuine way, like the brain movie projection, making the physical supervenience absurd. It seems to me quasi obvious that it is ridiculous to attribute consciousness to the physical events of projecting the movie of a brain. That movie gives a pretty detailed description of the computations, but there is just no computation, nor even genuine causal relation between the states. Even one frame is not a genuine physical computational states. Only a relative description of it. In a cartoon, if you see someone throwing a ball on a window, the description of the broken glass are not caused by the description of someone throwing a ball. And nothing changes, for the moment of the projection of the movie, if the cartoon has been made from a real similar filmed situation. To attribute consciousness to the stationary (non projected) contradict immediately the supervenience thesis of course. All this is a bit complex because we have to take well into account the distinction between
Re: MGA 3
Abram, My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual behaviors during that time. ? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals. And, moreover, if only part of the brain were being run by a recording ... which lacks the counterfactual, ... then she would lack only some counterfactuals, I don't understand. The recording lacks all the counterfactuals. You can recover them from inert material, true, but this is true for the empty graph too (both in dream and awake situations). and so she would count as partially conscious. Hmmm Can she be conscious that she is partially conscious? I mean is it like after we drink alcohol or something? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Platonia and causality
Hi all, Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: Brent Meeker wrote: But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an implicit assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just because there is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and other) sequences depend on causal chains. Kory wrote: I have an intuition that causality (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, before and after. The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside view, as a succession of consistent patterns. In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic Eternal Mess (chaos) - somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science In this sense, the computations would assemble themselves to consistent histories. Bruno said: Even in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still makes sense in Platonia - viewed from the acausal perspective outlined above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be platonic descriptions that are not conscious. But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and conscious. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
On 30 Nov 2008, at 11:57, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get a hole in the movie, but everything which enters and go out of the hole remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity. The hole has trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality whose special behavior was described by the film. And this is true for any subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself. I don't think this step follows at all. Consciousness may supervene on the stationary unprojected film, This, I don't understand. And, btw, if that is true, then the physical supervenience thesis is already wrong. The physical supervenience thesis asks that consciousness is associated in real time and space with the activity of some machine (with MEC). I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the definition of the physical superveneience thesis; BTW - I don't think the film is conscious by virtue of the counterfactuals issue, but that's a whole different story. And Olympization doesn't work, unless we rule out the multiverse. Why does the physical supervenience require that all instantiations of a consciousness be dynamic? Surely, it suffices that some are? What do you mean by an instantiation of a dynamical process which is not dynamic. Even a block universe describe a dynamical process, or a variety of dynamical processes. A block universe is nondynamic by definition. But looked at another way, (ie from the inside) it is dynamic. It neatly illustrates why consciousness can supervene on a stationary film (because it is stationary when viewed from the inside). OK, but then you clearly change the physical supervenience thesis. The film, however does need to be sufficiently rich, and also needs to handle counterfactuals (unlike the usual sort of movie we see which has only one plot). OK. Such a film could be said to be a computation. Of course you are not talking about a stationary thing, which, be it physical or immaterial, cannot handle counterfactuals. The problem is that eliminating the brain from phenomenal experience makes that experience even more highly probable than without. This is the Occam catastrophe I mention in my book. Obviously this contradicts experience. Therefore I conclude that supervenience on a phenomenal physical brain is necessary for consciousness. It is vague enough so that I can interpret it favorably through MEC. Bruno I speculate a bit that this may be due to self-awareness, but don't have a good argument for it. It is the elephant in the room with respect to pure MEC theories. Sorry for being a bit short, I have to go, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
Hello Bruno, I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because it supervenes on the physical activity. MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the substrate. MAT says: we need some substrate to perform a computation. In MGA 1 and 2 we have substrates (neurons or optical boolean graph that performs the computation). Now in MGA 3 you say: Now, consider the projection of the movie of the activity of Alice's brain, the movie graph. Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not. Agreed. Is it necessary to have a screen? Well, the range of activity here is just one dynamical description of one computation. Suppose we make a hole in the screen. What goes in and out of that hole is exactly the same, with the hole and without the hole. For that unique activity, the hole in the screen is functionally equivalent to the subgraph which the hole removed. We can remove those optical boolean nodes which are not relevant for the caterpillar dream Clearly we can make a hole as large as the screen, so no need for a screen. but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore. You are dropping MAT at this step, not leading MEC+MAT to a contradiction. But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get a hole in the movie, but everything which enters and go out of the hole remains the same, for that (unique) range of activity. The hole has trivially the same functionality than the subgraph functionality whose special behavior was described by the film. And this is true for any subparts, so we can remove the entire film itself. We can talk about this part after I understand why you can drop our optical boolean network *grin* Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the recording didn't account for, then she may or may not become conscious of the fact of her partial consciousness-- in that case it would be very much like brain damage. Anyway, yes, I am admitting that the film of the graph lacks counterfactuals and is therefore not conscious. My earlier splitting of the argument into an argument about (1) and a separate argument against (2) was perhaps a bit silly, because the objection to (2) went far enough back that it was also an objection to (1). I split the argument like that just because I saw an independent flaw in the reasoning of (1)... anyway... Basically, I am claiming that there is a version of COMP+MAT that MGA is not able to derive a contradiction from. The version goes something like this: Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order for a computation to be physically instantiated, the physical instantiation needs to satisfy a few properties. One of these properties is clearly some sort of isomorphism between the computation and the physical instantiation: the actual steps of the computation are represented in physical form. A less obvious requirement is that the physical computation needs to have the proper counterfactuals: if some external force were to modify some step in the computation, the computation must progress according to the new computational state (as translated by the isomorphism). --Abram On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Abram, My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual behaviors during that time. ? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals. And, moreover, if only part of the brain were being run by a recording ... which lacks the counterfactual, ... then she would lack only some counterfactuals, I don't understand. The recording lacks all the counterfactuals. You can recover them from inert material, true, but this is true for the empty graph too (both in dream and awake situations). and so she would count as partially conscious. Hmmm Can she be conscious that she is partially conscious? I mean is it like after we drink alcohol or something? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
Bruno, I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following: We have the optical boolean graph: OBG - this computes alice's dream. we make a movie of this computation. Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in the end, the computation is performed. So, with MEC+MAT and ALL NODES broken, I say this: a) If the OBG nodes MALFUNCTION, but their function is subsituted with the movie (on/off), it is conscious. b) If the OBG is broken that in a way that all nodes are not active anymore (no on/off, no signal passing), then no consciousness. I think we can split the intuitions along these lines: if you assume that consciousness depends on activity along the vertices, then Alice is conscious neither in a nor in b, and then indeed I see why already MGA 2 leads to a problem with MEC+MAT. But if I think that consciousness supervenes only on the correct lighting up of the nodes (not the vertices!! - I don't need causality then, only the correct order), than a) would be conscious, b) not, and MGA 3 does not work I you take away my OBG (with the node intuition)! Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 2
On 30 Nov 2008, at 16:31, Günther Greindl wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives? As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative is to deny that consciousness exists at all, which seems to me incoherent. ACK But the differences are so enormous that one is again very far from religion. In religion, the soul is an essence of a person interfacing with a material body and usually exposed to some kind of judgement in an afterlife. I guess you mean our occidental religion ( which are about 40% Plato, 60% Aristotle, say). With COMP the soul - better: mind - is all there is - no material world, no essence, no judgements, Well, to be frank, we don't know that. Open problem :) just COMP. Well, mainly its consequences, IF true. Thanks for your encouraging kind remarks in your posts, Günther. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonia and causality
Günther Greindl wrote: Hi all, Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts: Brent Meeker wrote: But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an implicit assumption that digitally represented states form a sequence just because there is a rule that defines that sequence, but in fact all digital (and other) sequences depend on causal chains. Kory wrote: I have an intuition that causality (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, before and after. The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside view, as a succession of consistent patterns. I agree. But what is it about the patterns that creates a succession as viewed from the inside? And how do we know that this does not obtain in the projection of the MGA? Brent In a sense, order (shareable histories) must arise from the Platonic Eternal Mess (chaos) - somehow along the lines of self-organization maybe: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Self-organization_in_mathematics_and_computer_science In this sense, the computations would assemble themselves to consistent histories. Bruno said: Even in Platonia consciousness does not supervene on description of the computation, even if those description are 100% precise and correct Hmm, I understand the difference between description and computation in maths and logic, and also in real world, but I do not know if this still makes sense in Platonia - viewed from the acausal perspective outlined above. Well maybe in the sense that in some histories there will be platonic descriptions that are not conscious. But in other histories those descriptions will be computations and conscious. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 2
On Nov 30, 2008, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yes, and I think of consciousness as an essential side-effect of the computation, as addition is an essential side-effect of the sum of two numbers. Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your concept of a computation in Platonia. Here's one way I've been picturing platonic computation: Imagine an infinite 2-dimensional grid filled with the binary digits of PI. Now imagine an infinite number of 2-dimensional grids on top of that one, with each grid containing the bits from the grid beneath it, as transformed by the Conway's Life rules. This is a description of a platonic computational object. Of course, my language is somewhat visual, but that's incidental. The point is, this is a precisely defined mathematical object. We can point at any cell in this infinite grid, and there is an answer to whether or not this bit is on or off, given our definitions. (More formally, we can define an abstract computational function that accepts any integer and returns the state of that bit, given all of our definitions.) Do you find this an acceptable way (not necessarily the only way) of describing a computational platonic object? How would you talk about how consciousness relates to the conscious-seeming patterns in this platonic object? Would you say that consciousness supervenes on those portions of this platonic computation? -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness and free will
Bruno, Thanks for the reply. I appreciate the detailed explanations. I'll post my responses in an interlinear manner using color to differentiate (if that's ok). M.A. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2008 3:49 PM Subject: Re: Consciousness and free will On 29 Nov 2008, at 16:45, M.A. wrote: (Assuming MEC/Comp.and MWI) If the computational universe which I experience Assuming MEC I would say *you* experience an infinity of computational histories. The term universe is far too ambiguous (now). But isn't each history separated from all others by impermeable walls? Do you mean that the word universe is ambiguous or just my use of it? is a single instance of a vast array of similar universes playing out every possible variation of the initial axioms, then no one universe could depart from its predetermined program since in so doing it would alter its program and duplicate that of another universe thus spoiling the overall mission of implementing every possible variation. Histories can bifurcate in a way that you will find yourself in both histories (you seen from some third person point of view). Each histories is deterministic but, your future is uncertain. But what about the first person me? I am only conscious of one history. It follows that each program-universe is completely detirministic All right. and that consciousness is merely an observing passenger inside the program; At some point I could defined consciousness as the state of (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed up yourself relatively to your current stories, and make greater the set of your possible continuation. As an exemple you become aware an asteroïd is coming nearby make it possible for you to envisage a set of possible decisions, which can themselves augment your probability of survival. It seems like the present copy of me can envisage these decisions, but be unable to carry them out unless they are part of his deterministic history. thus each program that contains a thinking entity is in a schizophrenic condition. Come on! You agree to the presense of schism below. Is it the connotation of schizophrenic that you don't like? This is because consciousness--which is part of the program--is capable of judging the actions of the program. When the program acts in a way approved by it, by it? Sorry. It means consciousness in this and the following paragraphs. the thinker is encouraged to believe that his will produced the action. ? But when the program acts in a manner repugnant to it, to who? (The conscious observer.) the conscious observer, refusing to give up the notion of free will, explains the lapse by rationalizations such as: God, luck, destiny, possession, halluciation etc. As far as I understand, the program here acknowledge its ignorance. If, by being too much proud, he doesn't, then he make higher some catastrophe probabilities. But isn't his problem of pride determined in some history, namely the one I experience? So every consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions, must either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism), Wrongly, I would say. accept the intercession of supernatural powers (theology), it could just accept it belongs to a collection of deep unknown histories, and many other unknown things, some even not nameable (and deadly if named). It can consolate itself by pointing on its *partial* control. Not very consoling when entangled with the intense immediacy and sensitivity of one's ego. Note also that it is not really the program or the machine who thinks, but the people vehiculated trough that machine computation relatively to its most probable (and local) computational histories. But I think as an individual, not as a group. or theorize an inaccessible part of itself that is able to override its purposes (Freud). That is not entirely meaningless imo. All of which implies a schism between consciousness and one of the following: the program, the universe or itself. Here I agree. Universal machine are born to experience such a schism. We can come back on this. In its purer form it is a consequence of incompleteness. All universal machine hides a mystery to themselves, and more the machine learn, more that mystery is bigger. (This is related to the gap between G and G*, for those who reminds previous explanations). I find this most profound. I'd be interested to know to what extent my thinking about this question agrees with or goes against the present discussion.
Re: Platonia and causality
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:53 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: Kory wrote: I have an intuition that causality (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. But we must realise that causality is a concept that is deeply related (cognitively, in humans) to time and physical change. But both time and space _emerge_ only from the inside view (1st person or 1st person shareable) in the sum over all computations. In Platonia (viewed, for the time being, ludicrously and impossibly, from the outside) - there is no notion of time, space, sequentiality, before and after. The very notion of causation must be one that arises only in the inside view, as a succession of consistent patterns. For what it's worth, I do think that that there's a *kind* of causality in Platonia. Let me once again trot out the picture of a platonic block universe in which the initial state is the binary digits of PI, and the succeeding states are determined by the rules of Conway's Life. This block universe exists unchangingly and eternally in Platonia, but the states of the bits within it are related in a kind of causal fashion. The state of each bit in the block is determined (in a sense, caused) by the pyramid of cells beneath it, stretching back to the initial state, which is determined by the algorithm for computing the binary digits of PI. In this sense, causality is an essential aspect of the platonic notion of computation. One might argue that this is really a misuse of the concept of causality - that I should just talk about the necessary logical relationships that are there by definition in my platonic object. But my point is that these logical relationships fill the exact role that causality is supposed to fill for the physicalist. When patterns of bits within this platonic block universe discuss their own physics, they might talk about how current configurations of physical matter were caused by previous states. The logical connections in Platonia are a good candidate for what they can actually be talking about. This platonic form of causality may not always be directly related to the concept of time that patterns of bits in a block universe might have. For instance, there's a cellular automaton rule (which deserves to be much more widely known than it is) called Critters which is as simple as Conway's Life, uses only bits (on or off), is known to be computation universal, and is also fully reversible. This gets weird, because the computational structures within a Critters block universe will still seem to favor one direction in time - they'll store memories about the past and try to anticipate the future, etc. But in fact, our own physics seems to be reversible, so we have these same issues to work out regarding our own consciousness. The point is that, within a Critters block universe in Platonia, the states will still be logically related to each other in a way that precisely matches what physicists in the block universe (the critters within Critters!) would think of as causality. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness and free will
On 01/12/2008, at 6:21 AM, M.A. wrote: Is it the connotation of schizophrenic that you don't like? The term schizophrenic is an incredibly misused/misunderstood adjective. It specifically DOES NOT mean multiple personality (disorder) which is the common coin usage (ie not in a medico- diagnostic context) Please help out by using some other word or term: perhaps split existence or multiple instantiation which conveys graphically what you mean. Perhaps there is another single word. From the Wikipedia article on Schizophrenia: The word schizophrenia—which translates roughly as splitting of the mind and comes from the Greek roots schizein(σχίζειν, to split) and phrēn, phren- (φρήν, φρεν-, mind)[187]—was coined by Eugen Bleuler in 1908 and was intended to describe the separation of function between personality, thinking, memory, and perception. Bleuler described the main symptoms as 4 A's: flattened Affect, Autism, impaired Association of ideas and Ambivalence.[188] Bleuler realized that the illness was not a dementia as some of his patients improved rather than deteriorated and hence proposed the term schizophrenia instead. The term schizophrenia is commonly misunderstood to mean that affected persons have a split personality. Although some people diagnosed with schizophrenia may hear voices and may experience the voices as distinct personalities, schizophrenia does not involve a person changing among distinct multiple personalities. The confusion arises in part due to the meaning of Bleuler's term schizophrenia (literally split or shattered mind). The first known misuse of the term to mean split personality was in an article by the poet T. S. Eliot in 1933.[189] Kim --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms of cellular automata. Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but finite 2D grid of bits, and then iterates the rules to some CA (Conway's Life, Critters, whatever) on that grid a large but finite number of times, and stores all of the resulting computations in memory, so that we have a 3D block universe in memory. And lets say that the resulting block universe contains patterns that MECH-MAT would say are conscious. If we believe that consciousness supervenes on the physical act of playing back the data in our block universe like a movie, then we have a problem. Because before we play back the movie, we can fill any portions of the block universe we want with zeros. So then our played back movie can contain conscious creatures who are walking around with (say) zeros where their visual cortexes should be, or their high- level brain functions should be, etc. In other words, we have a fading qualia problem (which we have also called a partial zombie problem in these threads). I find the argument compelling as far as it goes. But I'm not convinced that all or most actual, real-world mechanist-materialists believe that consciousness supervenes on the physical act of playing back the stored computations. Bruno indicates that it must, by the logical definitions of MECH and MAT. This just makes me feel like I don't really understand the logical definitions of MECH and MAT. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the definition of the physical superveneience thesis; It is, prima facie, no more absurd than consciousness supervening on a block universe. A block universe is nondynamic by definition. But looked at another way, (ie from the inside) it is dynamic. It neatly illustrates why consciousness can supervene on a stationary film (because it is stationary when viewed from the inside). OK, but then you clearly change the physical supervenience thesis. How so? The stationary film is a physical object, I would have thought. The film, however does need to be sufficiently rich, and also needs to handle counterfactuals (unlike the usual sort of movie we see which has only one plot). OK. Such a film could be said to be a computation. Of course you are not talking about a stationary thing, which, be it physical or immaterial, cannot handle counterfactuals. If true, then a block universe could not represent the Multiverse. Maybe so, but I think a lot of people might be surprised at this one. The problem is that eliminating the brain from phenomenal experience makes that experience even more highly probable than without. This is the Occam catastrophe I mention in my book. Obviously this contradicts experience. Therefore I conclude that supervenience on a phenomenal physical brain is necessary for consciousness. It is vague enough so that I can interpret it favorably through MEC. That is my point - physical supervenience (aka materialism) is not only not contradicted by MEC (aka COMP), but in fact is necessary for to even work. Only what I call naive physicalism, (aka the need for a concrete instantiation of a computer running the UD) is contradicted by MEC. What _is_ interesting is that not all philosophers distinguish between physicalism and materialism. David Chalmers does not, but Michael Lockwood does, for instance. Much of this revolves around the ontological status of emergence. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
