R: Re: A profound lack of profundity

['scerir' via Everything List]

First person, second person, and third person are basically grammatical 
categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third person, him/them. 
The third independent person plays a central role in the interpretation of 
perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual models of the world. What 
do you think 3p means?
 
 Bruce
 

BTW, Shan Gao just published this paper
https://www.academia.
edu/34156349/Failure_of_psychophysical_supervenience_in_Everetts_theory
'Failure of psychophysical superveniencein Everett’s theory'
(abstract) Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental propertiesof 
a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties.For a 
system with many minds, the principle requires that the men-tal properties of 
each mind of the system cannot change without thechange of the physical 
properties of the system. In this paper, I arguethat Everett’s theory seems to 
violate this principle of psychophysicalsupervenience. The violation results 
from the three key assumptionsof the theory: (1) the completeness of the 
physical description by thewave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for 
the wave func-tion, and (3) multiplicity. For a post-measurement state with 
twodecoherent result branches, multiplicity means that each result 
branchcorresponds to a mindful observer, whose mental properties superveneon 
the branch, and in particular, whose mental content contains a def-inite record 
corresponding to the result branch. Under certain unitaryevolution which swaps 
the two result branches, the post-measurementstate does not change, and the 
completeness of the physical descriptionby the wave function then means that 
the physical state of the com-posite system does not change. While the 
linearity of the dynamicsfor the wave function requires that each result branch 
changes, andcorrespondingly the mental properties of the observer which 
superveneon the branch also change. Thus the principle of psychophysical su-
pervenience as defined above is violated by Everett’s theory.

I did not read it but, maybe, it is about "identity" and "x-person" 





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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 First person experience is individual and private. The third person
 point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is
 observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be
 observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might
 be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of
 view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and
 auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing
 entities in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I
 would say that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always
 first person and private; information is that which is third person
 communicable. But perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.


 If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
 communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your
 personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained
 by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that
 you say above is mere logic chopping.

>>>
>>> Most first person experiences are based on third person information,
>>> namely sensory data.
>>>
>>>
>>> How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make
>>> everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I
>>> experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning,
>>> that is surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin.
>>>
>>> Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with
>>> learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.
>>>
>>> Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a
>>> duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication?
>>> That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything.
>>>
>>>
>>> If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is,
>>> then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you have
>>> been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any
>>> duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you could
>>> simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p
>>> experience tell the difference?
>>>
>>> This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in
>>> this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being
>>> told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?
>>>
>>
>> This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a conclusion
>> about what has happened based on your observations and deductions, but you
>> could be mistaken.
>>
>>
>> That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction between
>> quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is veridicial -- I
>> might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the sensation is
>> incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are in a different
>> category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible experience associated with
>> them. I am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately aware of
>> their veracity.
>>
>
> You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make deductions
> about a hot, bright object in space. It is an analogous process when you
> hear human speech and come to conclusions about the world.
>
>
> And I compare notes with other people so that I can be assured that I am
> not totally deceived. Thus such knowledge becomes 3p. It is not just what I
> suspect on the basis of immediate experience, but what can be agreed among
> a large number of people -- those who are independent of me.
>
> First person, second person, and third person are basically grammatical
> categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third person,
> him/them. The third independent person plays a central role in the
> interpretation of perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual
> models of the world. What do you think 3p means?
>

I don't think we really disagree on the distinction between first and third
person, but I don't understand your claim that there is a special problem
acquiring knowledge in duplication experiments, which is not a problem in
other experiences such as taking the train.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/08/2017 6:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


First person experience is individual and private.
The third person point of view is the view of an
external observer. Suppose person A is observed
laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing
- can be observed by anyone; this is the third
person point of view. Person A might be
experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the
first person point of view and only person A
himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and
auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside
world (there are laughing entities in it), and
this is again from the first person point of view.
I would say that knowledge is a type of
experience, and therefore always first person and
private; information is that which is third person
communicable. But perhaps this last point is a
matter of semantics.


If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it
is necessarily communicable information, and thus
third person. First person is your personal
experience, which is not communicable. However,
knowledge gained by experience is communicable, and
thus third person. Otherwise, all that you say
above is mere logic chopping.


Most first person experiences are based on third person
information, namely sensory data.


How is sensory data 'third person information'? That
would make everything 3p, and you have eliminated the
first person POV. If I experience the pleasure of
sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning, that is
surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory
in origin.


Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge,
starts with learning about the subjectvfrom outside
sources.

Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the
subject on a duplication experiment cannot have first
person knowledge of duplication? That would mean no-one
could ever have first person knowledge of anything.


If you go into the duplicating machine without being
told what it is, then you are duplicated and come out in
Moscow, you will know that you have been transported
from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any
duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the
protocol -- you could simply have been rendered
unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p experience
tell the difference?

This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p
experiences in this duplication protocol. The subject
only knows the protocol by being told about it. How does
he know he is not being lied to?


This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to
a conclusion about what has happened based on your
observations and deductions, but you could be mistaken.


That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction
between quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my
face is veridicial -- I might be mistaken about it being the
sun, but the sensation is incontrovertible. But things that I
am told about are in a different category -- I have no
immediate incontrovertible experience associated with them. I
am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately
aware of their veracity.


You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make
deductions about a hot, bright object in space. It is an
analogous process when you hear human speech and come to
conclusions about the world.


And I compare notes with other people so that I can be assured
that I am not totally deceived. Thus such knowledge becomes 3p. It
is not just what I suspect on the basis of immediate experience,
but what can be agreed among a large number of pe

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
>> machine, but when they do the English language is going to need a massive
>> overhaul.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> There are already billions of "I's" in the world without such a
> duplicating machine, and no-one is confused by the large number of them.
>

​
That's because none of the
​ ​
billions of "I's" in the world
​ ​
right now claim to be the same I. The fact that pronouns seldom cause
confusion today (except on this list) isn't due to some physical law or
deep philosophical principle, its simply due to a temporary lack of
technological prowess that limits the options on what we can do. It's the
same reason we don't today have 600
​ ​
mph trains crossing continents.
​ ​
There is no physical mathematical or philosophical reason this insufficient
engineering capability
​ ​
will continue forever, or even until the end of this century. The times are
changing.

​> ​
> If the subject predicts, prior to duplication, "I will see W" then
> ​ [...]
>

​Then will that "prediction" turn out to be correct?​

​After the duplication one I will say yes and the other I will say no. So
the answer to the question isn't just unknown ​
prior to duplication​
​ it *doesn't exist*, and the answer doesn't exist after the duplication
either. The answer will NEVER exist. So it's not a question.


> ​> ​
> one copy will be correct and the other copy will be wrong.
>

​Yes, and
BOTH are "I:

​. And all this is 100% predictable. ​


> ​> ​
> If the subject predicts, prior to duplication,  "SP1 will see W" then both
> copies will be correct.
>

​True because tautologies are always true; SP1 means the
Stathis Papaioannou
​ that will see W.  And all this is easily predictable, so who's going to
be stupid enough to take their ​bet? And where is this indeterminacy I keep
hearing about.

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Aug 2017, at 00:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 12/08/2017 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Aug 2017, at 04:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*  
expect when pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The  
guys in W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H  
to make any prediction whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication  
thought experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret  
the scenario inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion.  
The first person (1p) concerns only things that the person can  
experience directly for himself. It cannot, therefore, involve  
things that he is told by other people, because such things are  
necessarily third person (3p) knowledge -- knowledge which he does  
not have by direct personal experience. So our subject does not  
know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct experience  
(he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button  
in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will  
happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the  
button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will  
happen if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular  
outcome is zero.


That is just plain false. The guy in Helsinki knows the protocol,  
and he assumes Mechanism. So he knows that P(W) = P(M) , and that  
P(W) ≠ 0, and P(M) ≠ 0, and P(X) for any X different from W and  
M is equal to 0.


He only knows the protocol because he has been told about it. How  
does he know that he isn't being lied to? Knowledge of the protocol  
is 3p knowledge.


If he is lied to, it is a different thought experiment. Obviously, if  
he opens the door, and see Vienna, his prediction "W v M" was false,  
but that change noting to the reasoning.







So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to  
find himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he  
will not have gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he  
is for ever barred from any such knowledge.


Yes, that is the 3p/1p confusion that John Clark is doing. He told  
me that the guy in Moscow says "I knew it", or I predicted it, by  
saying that P(W & M) = 1.


You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is  
indeed based on the 1p/3p confusion).


I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If  
the duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol,  
he will never be aware of being duplicated.


Explain this to John. We agree.




In fact, he can never get first person knowledge of that  
duplication, even if he is, in fact, duplicated.


Which I sum up often by: the candidate does not feel the split, which  
is of course an allusion to the similar phenomenon happening with  
Everett. You make my point, thanks.







If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his  
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some  
probability that he can estimate by keeping records over a period  
of time. If you take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment,  
the parallel with the early development of QM is more evident. In  
QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that all possible outcomes are  
realized (in different worlds).


So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are  
p(M) = p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1.


What?

(I recall that in H the person is annihilated).


He doesn't know this because he doesn't know the protocol.



?

The question is : do you agree with step 3, step 4, step 5, step 6,  
step 7?


In all case, he knows the protocol. I am OK with different thought  
experience, but then propose them in another thread, and explain what  
you want to prove. You can't change the premise of the reasoning in  
the middle without explaining why?








On the other hand, if you allow 3p knowledge of the protocol to  
influence his estimation of probabilities before the experiment,  
you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at any time after  
pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is  
complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities.  
In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


W and M, as they have defined (they concern the experience of  
opening a door and describing which city is seen) are incompatible  
experience, and the protocol entails that P(W) = P(M). If P(M) =  
P(W) = 1, you get a probability equal to 2.


Rubbish. You have no basis for adding these probabilities because  
they are not independent events.


The third axiom of Kolmogorov asks only that the events are  
incompatible, or disjoint (in the algebra of events).


In this case the 

Re: R: Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Brent Meeker]

I didn't read it either because it wanted access to all my contacts.  
But Shan Gao has a number of papers on arXiv.org.  He has some peculiar 
ideas about QM.


Brent

On 8/13/2017 12:30 AM, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:



First person, second person, and third person are basically grammatical
categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third person, him/them.
The third independent person plays a central role in the interpretation of
perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual models of the world. What
do you think 3p means?
  
  Bruce
  


BTW, Shan Gao just published this paper
https://www.academia.
edu/34156349/Failure_of_psychophysical_supervenience_in_Everetts_theory
'Failure of psychophysical superveniencein Everett’s theory'
(abstract) Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental propertiesof
a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties.For a
system with many minds, the principle requires that the men-tal properties of
each mind of the system cannot change without thechange of the physical
properties of the system. In this paper, I arguethat Everett’s theory seems to
violate this principle of psychophysicalsupervenience. The violation results
from the three key assumptionsof the theory: (1) the completeness of the
physical description by thewave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for
the wave func-tion, and (3) multiplicity. For a post-measurement state with
twodecoherent result branches, multiplicity means that each result
branchcorresponds to a mindful observer, whose mental properties superveneon
the branch, and in particular, whose mental content contains a def-inite record
corresponding to the result branch. Under certain unitaryevolution which swaps
the two result branches, the post-measurementstate does not change, and the
completeness of the physical descriptionby the wave function then means that
the physical state of the com-posite system does not change. While the
linearity of the dynamicsfor the wave function requires that each result branch
changes, andcorrespondingly the mental properties of the observer which
superveneon the branch also change. Thus the principle of psychophysical su-
pervenience as defined above is violated by Everett’s theory.

I did not read it but, maybe, it is about "identity" and "x-person"







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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 1:56 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
>>> machine, but when they do the English language is going to need a massive
>>> overhaul.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> There are already billions of "I's" in the world without such a
>> duplicating machine, and no-one is confused by the large number of them.
>>
>
> ​
> That's because none of the
> ​ ​
> billions of "I's" in the world
> ​ ​
> right now claim to be the same I.
>

After duplication, the copies will not claim to be the same person any
more, because there are obviously two of them. But they will each correctly
refer to themselves as "I", and talk about their shared past before the
duplication.

The fact that pronouns seldom cause confusion today (except on this list)
> isn't due to some physical law or deep philosophical principle, its simply
> due to a temporary lack of technological prowess that limits the options on
> what we can do. It's the same reason we don't today have 600
> ​ ​
> mph trains crossing continents.
> ​ ​
> There is no physical mathematical or philosophical reason this
> insufficient engineering capability
> ​ ​
> will continue forever, or even until the end of this century. The times
> are changing.
>
> ​> ​
>> If the subject predicts, prior to duplication, "I will see W" then
>>
> ​ [...]
>>
>
> ​Then will that "prediction" turn out to be correct?​
>
> ​After the duplication one I will say yes and the other I will say no. So
> the answer to the question isn't just unknown ​
> prior to duplication​
> ​ it *doesn't exist*, and the answer doesn't exist after the duplication
> either. The answer will NEVER exist. So it's not a question.
>

You agree that after the duplication one will say he was right and the
other will say he was wrong, which is an answer, and an easily verifiable
one, so why do you say the answer does not exist?

​> ​
>> one copy will be correct and the other copy will be wrong.
>>
>
> ​Yes, and
> BOTH are "I:
>
> ​. And all this is 100% predictable. ​
>

But not to the copies, because it will seem to them that they either got
lucky or got unlucky with the answer. Everyone watching knows exactly what
will happen, the subject prior to duplication knows intellectually exactly
what will happen, but the subject nevertheless has a sense of uncertainty
because he feels he will end up in one or other city, but not both. It is
this subjective sense of uncertainty despite knowing exactly what will
happen objectively that is the first person indeterminacy. Perhaps you can
see this, but your mind rebels at the thought of it, driving you to call it
"gibberish" where others might use a different word such as "paradoxical".

​> ​
>> If the subject predicts, prior to duplication,  "SP1 will see W" then
>> both copies will be correct.
>>
>
> ​True because tautologies are always true; SP1 means the
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ​ that will see W.  And all this is easily predictable, so who's going to
> be stupid enough to take their ​bet? And where is this indeterminacy I keep
> hearing about.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 13/08/2017 6:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett < 
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
 On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett <
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> First person experience is individual and private. The third person
> point of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is
> observed laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be
> observed by anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might
> be experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of
> view and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and
> auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are 
> laughing
> entities in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I
> would say that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always
> first person and private; information is that which is third person
> communicable. But perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.
>
>
> If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily
> communicable information, and thus third person. First person is your
> personal experience, which is not communicable. However, knowledge gained
> by experience is communicable, and thus third person. Otherwise, all that
> you say above is mere logic chopping.
>

 Most first person experiences are based on third person information,
 namely sensory data.


 How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make
 everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I
 experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring morning,
 that is surely a first person experience, and entirely sensory in origin.

 Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts with
 learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.

 Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject on a
 duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge of duplication?
 That would mean no-one could ever have first person knowledge of anything.


 If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it is,
 then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know that you have
 been transported from Helsinki, but how can you know anything about any
 duplicates? As far as you know -- not knowing the protocol -- you could
 simply have been rendered unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p
 experience tell the difference?

 This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences in
 this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol by being
 told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?

>>>
>>> This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a
>>> conclusion about what has happened based on your observations and
>>> deductions, but you could be mistaken.
>>>
>>>
>>> That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction between
>>> quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is veridicial -- I
>>> might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the sensation is
>>> incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are in a different
>>> category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible experience associated with
>>> them. I am aware of words being spoken, but I am not immediately aware of
>>> their veracity.
>>>
>>
>> You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make deductions
>> about a hot, bright object in space. It is an analogous process when you
>> hear human speech and come to conclusions about the world.
>>
>>
>> And I compare notes with other people so that I can be assured that I am
>> not totally deceived. Thus such knowledge becomes 3p. It is not just what I
>> suspect on the basis of immediate experience, but what can be agreed among
>> a large number of people -- those who are independent of me.
>>
>> First person, second person, and third person are basically grammatical
>> categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third person,
>> him/them. The third independent person plays a central role in the
>> interpretation of perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual
>> models of the world. What do you think 3p means?
>>
>
> I don't think we really disagree on the distinction between first and
> third person, but I don't understand your claim that there is a sp

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Aug 2017, at 13:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 13/08/2017 6:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


First person experience is individual and private. The third  
person point of view is the view of an external observer.  
Suppose person A is observed laughing by person B. The  
behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by anyone; this is  
the third person point of view. Person A might be experiencing  
happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view  
and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual  
and auditory experiences and knowledge of the outside world  
(there are laughing entities in it), and this is again from the  
first person point of view. I would say that knowledge is a  
type of experience, and  
therefore 
   
always first person and private; information is that which is  
third person communicable. But perhaps this last point is a  
matter of semantics.


If your knowledge is gained from someone else, it is necessarily  
communicable information, and thus third person. First person is  
your personal experience, which is not communicable. However,  
knowledge gained by experience is communicable, and thus  
third 
person. Otherwise, all that you say above is mere logic chopping.


Most first person experiences are based on third person  
information, namely sensory data.


How is sensory data 'third person information'? That would make  
everything 3p, and you have eliminated the first person POV. If I  
experience the pleasure of sitting in the sun on a fine spring  
morning, that is surely a first person experience, and entirely  
sensory in origin.


Even a priori knowledge, such mathematical knowledge, starts  
with learning about the subjectvfrom outside sources.


Returning to the point, why were you claiming that the subject  
on a duplication experiment cannot have first person knowledge  
of duplication? That would mean no-one could ever have first  
person knowledge of anything.


If you go into the duplicating machine without being told what it  
is, then you are duplicated and come out in Moscow, you will know  
that you have been transported from Helsinki, but how can you  
know anything about any duplicates? As far as you know -- not  
knowing the protocol -- you could simply have been rendered  
unconscious and flown to Moscow. How does 1p experience tell the  
difference?


This is why I think some 3p is being mixed in with 1p experiences  
in this duplication protocol. The subject only knows the protocol  
by being told about it. How does he know he is not being lied to?


This is the case with any experience whatsoever: you come to a  
conclusion about what has happened based on your observations and  
deductions, but you could be mistaken.


That would appear to put a large hole in Bruno's distinction  
between quanta and qualia. The sensation of the sun on my face is  
veridicial -- I might be mistaken about it being the sun, but the  
sensation is incontrovertible. But things that I am told about are  
in a different category -- I have no immediate incontrovertible  
experience associated with them. I am aware of words being spoken,  
but I am not immediately aware of their veracity.


You feel the Sun on your face, see the Sun in the sky and make  
deductions about a hot, bright object in space. It is an analogous  
process when you hear human speech and come to conclusions about  
the world.


And I compare notes with other people so that I can be assured that  
I am not totally deceived. Thus such knowledge becomes 3p. It is  
not just what I suspect on the basis of immediate experience, but  
what can be agreed among a large number of people -- those who are  
independent of me.


First person, second person, and third person are basically  
grammatical categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you,  
third person, him/them. The third independent person plays a  
central role in the interpretation of perceptual evidence in terms  
of reliable conceptual models of the world. What do you think 3p  
means?


I don't think we really disagree on the distinction between first  
and third person, but I don't understand your claim that there is a  
special problem acquiring knowledge in duplication experiments,  
which is not a problem in other experiences such as taking the train.


I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one restrict the  
subjects of the duplication to first person knowledge.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Aug 2017, at 01:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*  
expect when

>>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>>
>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys  
in
>> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make  
any

>> prediction whatsoever.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.

Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p)  
knowledge


Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences. We  
accept them (or not) based on our own internal models of reality.  
Some people trust evangelical preachers, others trust what is  
published in Nature. It is only by personal cognitive processes that  
we can make such choices. There is no such thing as pure 3p  
knowledge, that is nonsensical.


There is no 3p knowledge as such. But there is still a 3p Theaetetical  
possible knowledge, in a theoretical frame.


For example, just imagine that 2 + 2 = 4 is really really really  
really true (imagine!), then I would say that if a machine is such that


(B_(that machine) "2 + 2 = 4") is true about that machine, then,  
assuming Mechanism, (or not, I am not sure) we can say that the  
machine has a correct 3p knowledge, even 0p knowledge if the machine  
itself bet on Mechanism.


So, we don't have third person (3p) knowledge, OK, it would be non  
sensical. In fact knowledge is pure 1p.


But, in the frame of some axiom in metaphysics, like Mechanism, I  
think that a part of mathematics becomes a 3p knowledge (arithmetic!).  
You can someone observe the arithmetical truth from outside, and "see"  
all the "diaries" of all machines, and their astonishment when  
"opening" the doors, or just through birth, when they find themselves  
in this or that galaxy or city ...


I think that for a believer in mechanism, who would based his belief  
from studying computer science (and not just obeying his doctor!),  
arithmetic and the core of computer science is 3p knowledge, and even  
0p knowledge: Nagel's point of view of nowhere.


That 3p knowledge, is of course still only an 1p belief, from the 1p  
view. I agree with you from the 1p view! I just make precise that in a  
theoretical frame, God can see that sometimes,  some-relative-states I  
should say, some of our belief are true. I do think that this is the  
case for 2 is a divisor of 24.






-- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So
our subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from
direct experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he  
presses

the button in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what
will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the
button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen
if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is  
zero.

So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find
himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not  
have

gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred
from any such knowledge.

If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some  
probability

that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you
take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with  
the

early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p
knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in different  
worlds).


So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are  
p(M) =

p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can  
gain

at any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p
confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both
cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.

This argument can be applied to any scientific theory whatsoever.  
That is what hardcore postmodernists do. Ok, but then you are just  
rejecting science as a whole.


Also, you are in profound disagreement with John Clark. The only  
thing your positions have in common is your disagreement with Bruno.


Good point.

Bruno




Telmo.



Bruce

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Re: R: Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Aug 2017, at 09:30, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:





First person, second person, and third person are basically  
grammatical
categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third  
person, him/them.
The third independent person plays a central role in the  
interpretation of
perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual models of the  
world. What

do you think 3p means?

Bruce


BTW, Shan Gao just published this paper
https://www.academia.
edu/34156349/ 
Failure_of_psychophysical_supervenience_in_Everetts_theory

'Failure of psychophysical superveniencein Everett’s theory'
(abstract) Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental  
propertiesof
a system cannot change without the change of its physical  
properties.For a
system with many minds, the principle requires that the men-tal  
properties of
each mind of the system cannot change without thechange of the  
physical
properties of the system. In this paper, I arguethat Everett’s  
theory seems to
violate this principle of psychophysicalsupervenience. The violation  
results
from the three key assumptionsof the theory: (1) the completeness of  
the
physical description by thewave function, (2) the linearity of the  
dynamics for
the wave func-tion, and (3) multiplicity. For a post-measurement  
state with

twodecoherent result branches, multiplicity means that each result
branchcorresponds to a mindful observer, whose mental properties  
superveneon
the branch, and in particular, whose mental content contains a def- 
inite record
corresponding to the result branch. Under certain unitaryevolution  
which swaps
the two result branches, the post-measurementstate does not change,  
and the
completeness of the physical descriptionby the wave function then  
means that

the physical state of the com-posite system does not change. While the
linearity of the dynamicsfor the wave function requires that each  
result branch
changes, andcorrespondingly the mental properties of the observer  
which
superveneon the branch also change. Thus the principle of  
psychophysical su-

pervenience as defined above is violated by Everett’s theory.



I agree. Everett should take into account the self-referential logic,  
which are counter-intuitive.

I might read the paper, but I have not really much time now.




I did not read it but, maybe, it is about "identity" and "x-person"


Notion of "person" does not appear in the abstract. But I agree with  
the abstract.


I can say only that the title is correct, but for perhaps a different  
(simpler) reason, which does not contradict the possible explanation  
sketched in the abstract.


Bruno









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Fwd: Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2017 3:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is 
indeed based on the 1p/3p confusion).


I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If 
the duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol, he 
will never be aware of being duplicated. In fact, he can never get 
first person knowledge of that duplication, even if he is, in fact, 
duplicated. 


Let's examine that a bit.  Suppose I've created an AI.  Could this AI 
experience "being in Moscow */and/* being in Washington".  I think so.  
I simply provide duplicate sets of sensors, visual, audio, temperature, 
etc in both M and W.  Now suppose the AI consists of two computers 
synchronously executing the same AI routine using the same sensory 
inputs, and this AI is connected to sensors in Helsinki.  Now I switch 
the sensors to those in M */and/* W.  The AI experience M */and/* W.  
But suppose that instead I switch one of the computers to the M sensors 
and the other to the W sensors.  You ask the AI, when still connected to 
Helsinki, to bet on whether it will experience M */xor/* W.  Is there a 
right answer?


Brent

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Re: Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 5:38 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 8/12/2017 3:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is indeed
> based on the 1p/3p confusion).
>
>
> I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If the
> duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol, he will
> never be aware of being duplicated. In fact, he can never get first person
> knowledge of that duplication, even if he is, in fact, duplicated.
>
>
> Let's examine that a bit.  Suppose I've created an AI.  Could this AI
> experience "being in Moscow *and* being in Washington".  I think so.  I
> simply provide duplicate sets of sensors, visual, audio, temperature, etc
> in both M and W.  Now suppose the AI consists of two computers
> synchronously executing the same AI routine using the same sensory inputs,
> and this AI is connected to sensors in Helsinki.  Now I switch the sensors
> to those in M *and* W.  The AI experience M *and* W.  But suppose that
> instead I switch one of the computers to the M sensors and the other to the
> W sensors.  You ask the AI, when still connected to Helsinki, to bet on
> whether it will experience M *xor* W.  Is there a right answer?
>
>
> Brent
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 13, 2017  PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

​> ​
> After duplication, the copies will not claim to be the same person any
> more,
>

​True but both will claim they are the "I
' who yesterday asked the question "What city will I see?"​

​. Do you think maybe just maybe that could cause a wee bit of confusion
and when this sort of thing becomes commonplace the rules on
English shouldn't continue on in the same old way they always have?  ​


> ​> ​
> But they will each correctly refer to themselves as "I",
>

​Yes​

​the TWO will ​
refer to themselves as "I"
​, and the ONE before the duplication that both of the TWO remember being
will also referred to himself as "I". And that is why you can bet your
bottom dollar the English language will radically change the way it uses
personal pronouns the day the engineering difficulties are overcome and "I"
duplicating machines become practical.   ​


> ​> ​
> You agree that after the duplication one will say he was right and the
> other will say he was wrong, which is an answer
>

​The only one who can answer ​that question is Mr. I,  and Mr. I says the
answer is yes and no. Shady politicians may say yes and no is an answer but
I don't.


​>> ​
>> ​Yes, and
>> BOTH are "I:
>>
>> ​. And all this is 100% predictable. ​
>>
>
> ​> ​>
> But not to the copies
>

​Of course the copies couldn't have predicted what city they will see
before the duplication, ​they didn't exist then!!



> ​> ​
> because it will seem to them that they either got lucky or got unlucky
> with the answer.
>

​If the Moscow man is surprised to see Moscow, or after seeing Moscow he is
surprised to be informed that he is the Moscow man ​then the Moscow man
isn't very bright.



> ​> ​
> Everyone watching knows exactly what will happen, the subject prior to
> duplication knows intellectually exactly what will happen
>

​Yes.​



> ​> ​
> but the subject nevertheless has a sense of uncertainty because he feels
> he will
> ​
> end up in one or other city, but not both.
>

What a subject "feels​" depends entirely on the emotional makeup of the
specific subject, no doubt some will feel they will end up in
Santa Claus's workshop
​, but science is about what will happen not what some
hillbilly
​ thinks will happen.
 ​And by the way, nothing will happen to *THE* subject, something will
happen to TWO subjects.


> ​> ​
> you to call it "gibberish"
> ​
> where others might use a different word such as "paradoxical".
>

​Two different people​ remembering being me right now is odd, asking what
*one* thing I will see after I become* two *is gibberish, neither is
paradoxical.

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 7:59 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Aug 13, 2017  PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> After duplication, the copies will not claim to be the same person any
>> more,
>>
>
> ​True but both will claim they are the "I
> ' who yesterday asked the question "What city will I see?"​
>
> ​. Do you think maybe just maybe that could cause a wee bit of confusion
> and when this sort of thing becomes commonplace the rules on
> English shouldn't continue on in the same old way they always have?  ​
>

That both refer to themselves as "I" and claim have entered the duplicator
in Helsinki yesterday and asked "What city will I see?" is not
grammatically confusing at all. The problem is with proper nouns, not
pronouns. Legally it could be problematic, due to disputes over property,
for example, but the English language will cope.

​> ​
>> But they will each correctly refer to themselves as "I",
>>
>
> ​Yes​
>
> ​the TWO will ​
> refer to themselves as "I"
> ​, and the ONE before the duplication that both of the TWO remember being
> will also referred to himself as "I". And that is why you can bet your
> bottom dollar the English language will radically change the way it uses
> personal pronouns the day the engineering difficulties are overcome and "I"
> duplicating machines become practical.   ​
>

Multiple people today refer to themselves as "I" and there is no problem.

​> ​
>> You agree that after the duplication one will say he was right and the
>> other will say he was wrong, which is an answer
>>
>
> ​The only one who can answer ​that question is Mr. I,  and Mr. I says the
> answer is yes and no. Shady politicians may say yes and no is an answer but
> I don't.
>
>

The W copy will say "yesterday I predicted I would be in W today, and I was
right". The M copy will say "yesterday I predicted I would be in W today,
and I was wrong". I think you are the only person who would claim to have a
problem understanding this.

​>> ​
>>> ​Yes, and
>>> BOTH are "I:
>>>
>>> ​. And all this is 100% predictable. ​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​>
>> But not to the copies
>>
>
> ​Of course the copies couldn't have predicted what city they will see
> before the duplication, ​they didn't exist then!!
>
>

My tomorrow self doesn't exist yet, does this mean there is no point in
planning anything for tomorrow?

​> ​
>> because it will seem to them that they either got lucky or got unlucky
>> with the answer.
>>
>
> ​If the Moscow man is surprised to see Moscow, or after seeing Moscow he
> is surprised to be informed that he is the Moscow man ​then the Moscow man
> isn't very bright.
>
>

He remembers being uncertain yesterday whether he would see Moscow or
Washington, and was hoping it would be Washington because that is what he
bet on and now obviously has lost the bet. Your claim that he is not really
the same person the original and that the bet was gibberish does not make
him think differently or behave differently he next time he is facing
duplication.

​> ​
>> Everyone watching knows exactly what will happen, the subject prior to
>> duplication knows intellectually exactly what will happen
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> but the subject nevertheless has a sense of uncertainty because he feels
>> he will
>> ​
>> end up in one or other city, but not both.
>>
>
> What a subject "feels​" depends entirely on the emotional makeup of the
> specific subject, no doubt some will feel they will end up in
> Santa Claus's workshop
> ​, but science is about what will happen not what some
> hillbilly
> ​ thinks will happen.
>  ​And by the way, nothing will happen to *THE* subject, something will
> happen to TWO subjects.
>

An intelligent subject who trusts the experimental setup knows that he will
end up in one or other city but not both, and not in Santa Claus's
workshop. A less intelligent subject, such as a rat, will figure this out
and set his expectations for the future based on his memory of going
through the duplicator in the past. Even the copies of stubborn old John
Clark will come to this conclusion.

>

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:



I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one restrict
the subjects of the duplication to first person knowledge. Their
knowledge of the protocol cannot be purely 1p -- there has to be a
3p component in that they are told the set up, and they have
sufficient background 3p knowledge to trust the operator, etc.
Then, after duplication, they also have access to 3p knowledge
about both duplicates -- they can arrange to communicate, for
example. So they can easily become aware of the fact that the
person that remembers being Helsinki man sees both Moscow and
Washington. My point here is that if you restrict them to 1p
knowledge after the duplication, you must, in order to be
consistent, restrict them to just 1p knowledge before the
experiment; in which case they are necessarily unaware of the
details of the protocol and will have a different perception of
what has happened.

In the case of restriction to 1p knowledge the situation becomes
much more analogous to what happens in QM where experiments might
have multiple outcomes. In that case there is no possibility of
communication between the different branches of the wave function,
so there is genuine uncertainty about outcomes, and probabilities
are estimated from limiting relative frequencies in the usual way.
If one derives and/or applies the Born Rule in QM, then one can
assign low probabilities to untypical sequences of results and the
like. If you mix 1p and 3p knowledge in the duplication scenario,
you lose this parallel with QM because the analogous 3p knowledge
is not available in QM.


If someone believes the MWI is true, then he is aware of the protocol 
and trusts the operator. In duplication experiments there is no 
logical reason why the copies could not be kept ignorant of each other


And there is no logical reason that prevents them from arranging 
beforehand to communicate after the experiment -- in Helsinki, I could 
decide to post my subsequent location to Facebook, and communicate with 
other similar posts.


and there is no logical reason why copies in the MWI can't see what 
each other is doing.


Such inter-branch communication in MWI is physically impossible. This is 
the main reason why person duplication experiments can never emulate QM, 
MWI or not.


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one restrict the
>> subjects of the duplication to first person knowledge. Their knowledge of
>> the protocol cannot be purely 1p -- there has to be a 3p component in that
>> they are told the set up, and they have sufficient background 3p knowledge
>> to trust the operator, etc. Then, after duplication, they also have access
>> to 3p knowledge about both duplicates -- they can arrange to communicate,
>> for example. So they can easily become aware of the fact that the person
>> that remembers being Helsinki man sees both Moscow and Washington. My point
>> here is that if you restrict them to 1p knowledge after the duplication,
>> you must, in order to be consistent, restrict them to just 1p knowledge
>> before the experiment; in which case they are necessarily unaware of the
>> details of the protocol and will have a different perception of what has
>> happened.
>>
>> In the case of restriction to 1p knowledge the situation becomes much
>> more analogous to what happens in QM where experiments might have multiple
>> outcomes. In that case there is no possibility of communication between the
>> different branches of the wave function, so there is genuine uncertainty
>> about outcomes, and probabilities are estimated from limiting relative
>> frequencies in the usual way. If one derives and/or applies the Born Rule
>> in QM, then one can assign low probabilities to untypical sequences of
>> results and the like. If you mix 1p and 3p knowledge in the duplication
>> scenario, you lose this parallel with QM because the analogous 3p knowledge
>> is not available in QM.
>>
>
> If someone believes the MWI is true, then he is aware of the protocol and
> trusts the operator. In duplication experiments there is no logical reason
> why the copies could not be kept ignorant of each other
>
>
> And there is no logical reason that prevents them from arranging
> beforehand to communicate after the experiment -- in Helsinki, I could
> decide to post my subsequent location to Facebook, and communicate with
> other similar posts.
>

But if they were prevented from communicating would it make any fundamental
difference to the experiment?

and there is no logical reason why copies in the MWI can't see what each
> other is doing.
>
> Such inter-branch communication in MWI is physically impossible. This is
> the main reason why person duplication experiments can never emulate QM,
> MWI or not.
>

It is physically impossible, but what fundamental difference would it make
if you could communicate with a copy in a parallel world who diverged from
you a while ago? Would you suddenly feel that you weren't you, or that you
were in two places at once?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/08/2017 11:19 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one
restrict the subjects of the duplication to first person
knowledge. Their knowledge of the protocol cannot be purely
1p -- there has to be a 3p component in that they are told
the set up, and they have sufficient background 3p knowledge
to trust the operator, etc. Then, after duplication, they
also have access to 3p knowledge about both duplicates --
they can arrange to communicate, for example. So they can
easily become aware of the fact that the person that
remembers being Helsinki man sees both Moscow and Washington.
My point here is that if you restrict them to 1p knowledge
after the duplication, you must, in order to be consistent,
restrict them to just 1p knowledge before the experiment; in
which case they are necessarily unaware of the details of the
protocol and will have a different perception of what has
happened.

In the case of restriction to 1p knowledge the situation
becomes much more analogous to what happens in QM where
experiments might have multiple outcomes. In that case there
is no possibility of communication between the different
branches of the wave function, so there is genuine
uncertainty about outcomes, and probabilities are estimated
from limiting relative frequencies in the usual way. If one
derives and/or applies the Born Rule in QM, then one can
assign low probabilities to untypical sequences of results
and the like. If you mix 1p and 3p knowledge in the
duplication scenario, you lose this parallel with QM because
the analogous 3p knowledge is not available in QM.


If someone believes the MWI is true, then he is aware of the
protocol and trusts the operator. In duplication experiments
there is no logical reason why the copies could not be kept
ignorant of each other


And there is no logical reason that prevents them from arranging
beforehand to communicate after the experiment -- in Helsinki, I
could decide to post my subsequent location to Facebook, and
communicate with other similar posts.


But if they were prevented from communicating would it make any 
fundamental difference to the experiment?


and there is no logical reason why copies in the MWI can't see
what each other is doing.

Such inter-branch communication in MWI is physically impossible.
This is the main reason why person duplication experiments can
never emulate QM, MWI or not.


It is physically impossible, but what fundamental difference would it 
make if you could communicate with a copy in a parallel world who 
diverged from you a while ago? Would you suddenly feel that you 
weren't you, or that you were in two places at once?


The ability to communicate, or the physical impossibility of such 
communication, is the fundamental difference between the duplication 
scenario and quantum MWI. It changes the probabilities: just think of 
duplication of the apparatus in a spin measurement experiment without 
simultaneous duplication of the experimenter -- then it is clear that I 
get both spin up and spin down, in my laboratory, in front of my eyes. 
This is not possible in MWI since the branches are, by definition, 
non-interacting.


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/08/2017 3:25 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Aug 2017, at 01:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*
expect when
>>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>>
>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The
guys in
>> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to
make any
>> prediction whatsoever.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.

Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by
other
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p)
knowledge


Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences. We 
accept them (or not) based on our own internal models of reality. 
Some people trust evangelical preachers, others trust what is 
published in Nature. It is only by personal cognitive processes that 
we can make such choices. There is no such thing as pure 3p 
knowledge, that is nonsensical.


There is no 3p knowledge as such. But there is still a 3p Theaetetical 
possible knowledge, in a theoretical frame.


I think you and Telmo are losing sight of the basic grammatical meaning 
of first, second, and third person. First person = 1/we; second person = 
you/you; third person = he/they (to retain the nominative case!).


Essentially all of science is third person knowledge: they did this 
experiment; he wrote this paper/text book; etc. Of course, I can read 
the paper or the text book and I then gain first person knowledge about 
the experiments/results/theories. But this is knowledge /about/, and it 
is about third person knowledge: it is not first person knowledge 
because I did not do the experiments, write the papers, and so on.


So you accuse scientists of seeking to eliminate the first person, while 
you explicitly eliminate the third person!  It is the fact that you 
include 3p knowledge in the duplication experiments -- by claiming that 
the subject has full knowledge of the protocol, which is 3p knowledge -- 
but then deny that the duplicates can exchange information, thus 
excluding 3p knowledge after the duplication in an arbitrary and /ad 
hoc/ way. It would seem that this is why you have your duplicates 
reconstructed in remote cities -- a smoke-and-mirrors trick to make the 
reader believe that the copies cannot communicate. But there is no 
reason why the same experiment could not be performed with the 
duplicates appearing in adjacent rooms, or even the same room, so that 
direct communication between them is evident. Once the copies 
communicate, they can see that both possibilities are in fact realized, 
so the probabilities before duplication are all unity. The only escape, 
then, is to accept that the copies are different distinct persons, and 
neither is the same person as the original.


So the argument through steps 3, etc., are all based on the elimination 
of the third person. This is an unjustifiable /ad hoc/ manoeuvre, and 
the argument collapses.


Bruce




For example, just imagine that 2 + 2 = 4 is really really really 
really true (imagine!), then I would say that if a machine is such that


(B_(that machine) "2 + 2 = 4") is true about that machine, then, 
assuming Mechanism, (or not, I am not sure) we can say that the 
machine has a correct 3p knowledge, even 0p knowledge if the machine 
itself bet on Mechanism.


So, we don't have third person (3p) knowledge, OK, it would be non 
sensical. In fact knowledge is pure 1p.


But, in the frame of some axiom in metaphysics, like Mechanism, I 
think that a part of mathematics becomes a 3p knowledge (arithmetic!). 
You can someone observe the arithmetical truth from outside, and "see" 
all the "diaries" of all machines, and their astonishment when 
"opening" the doors, or just through birth, when they find themselves 
in this or that galaxy or city ...


I think that for a believer in mechanism, who would based his belief 
from studying computer science (and not just obeying his doctor!), 
arithmetic and the core of computer science is 3p knowledge, and even 
0p knowledge: Nagel's point of view of nowhere.


That 3p knowledge, is of course still only an 1p belief, from the 1p 
view. I agree with you from the 1p view! I just make precise that in a 
theoretical frame, God can see that sometimes,  some-relative-states I 
should say, some of our belief are true. I do think that this is the 
case for 2 is a divisor of 24.


--

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 11:30 am, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 14/08/2017 11:19 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one restrict the
>>> subjects of the duplication to first person knowledge. Their knowledge of
>>> the protocol cannot be purely 1p -- there has to be a 3p component in that
>>> they are told the set up, and they have sufficient background 3p knowledge
>>> to trust the operator, etc. Then, after duplication, they also have access
>>> to 3p knowledge about both duplicates -- they can arrange to communicate,
>>> for example. So they can easily become aware of the fact that the person
>>> that remembers being Helsinki man sees both Moscow and Washington. My point
>>> here is that if you restrict them to 1p knowledge after the duplication,
>>> you must, in order to be consistent, restrict them to just 1p knowledge
>>> before the experiment; in which case they are necessarily unaware of the
>>> details of the protocol and will have a different perception of what has
>>> happened.
>>>
>>> In the case of restriction to 1p knowledge the situation becomes much
>>> more analogous to what happens in QM where experiments might have multiple
>>> outcomes. In that case there is no possibility of communication between the
>>> different branches of the wave function, so there is genuine uncertainty
>>> about outcomes, and probabilities are estimated from limiting relative
>>> frequencies in the usual way. If one derives and/or applies the Born Rule
>>> in QM, then one can assign low probabilities to untypical sequences of
>>> results and the like. If you mix 1p and 3p knowledge in the duplication
>>> scenario, you lose this parallel with QM because the analogous 3p knowledge
>>> is not available in QM.
>>>
>>
>> If someone believes the MWI is true, then he is aware of the protocol and
>> trusts the operator. In duplication experiments there is no logical reason
>> why the copies could not be kept ignorant of each other
>>
>>
>> And there is no logical reason that prevents them from arranging
>> beforehand to communicate after the experiment -- in Helsinki, I could
>> decide to post my subsequent location to Facebook, and communicate with
>> other similar posts.
>>
>
> But if they were prevented from communicating would it make any
> fundamental difference to the experiment?
>
> and there is no logical reason why copies in the MWI can't see what each
>> other is doing.
>>
>> Such inter-branch communication in MWI is physically impossible. This is
>> the main reason why person duplication experiments can never emulate QM,
>> MWI or not.
>>
>
> It is physically impossible, but what fundamental difference would it make
> if you could communicate with a copy in a parallel world who diverged from
> you a while ago? Would you suddenly feel that you weren't you, or that you
> were in two places at once?
>
>
> The ability to communicate, or the physical impossibility of such
> communication, is the fundamental difference between the duplication
> scenario and quantum MWI. It changes the probabilities: just think of
> duplication of the apparatus in a spin measurement experiment without
> simultaneous duplication of the experimenter -- then it is clear that I get
> both spin up and spin down, in my laboratory, in front of my eyes. This is
> not possible in MWI since the branches are, by definition, non-interacting.
>

The equivalent examples would be if the experimenter along with the lab and
the apparatus were duplicated, with one experimenter seeing spin up and the
other spin down. What difference would it then make if the experimenters,
now two of them, walked down the road to see each other, or if they were
prevented from doing so?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/08/2017 12:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 11:30 am, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


On 14/08/2017 11:19 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


I think the problem I see is in the insistence that one
restrict the subjects of the duplication to first person
knowledge. Their knowledge of the protocol cannot be
purely 1p -- there has to be a 3p component in that they
are told the set up, and they have sufficient background
3p knowledge to trust the operator, etc. Then, after
duplication, they also have access to 3p knowledge about
both duplicates -- they can arrange to communicate, for
example. So they can easily become aware of the fact
that the person that remembers being Helsinki man sees
both Moscow and Washington. My point here is that if you
restrict them to 1p knowledge after the duplication, you
must, in order to be consistent, restrict them to just
1p knowledge before the experiment; in which case they
are necessarily unaware of the details of the protocol
and will have a different perception of what has happened.

In the case of restriction to 1p knowledge the situation
becomes much more analogous to what happens in QM where
experiments might have multiple outcomes. In that case
there is no possibility of communication between the
different branches of the wave function, so there is
genuine uncertainty about outcomes, and probabilities
are estimated from limiting relative frequencies in the
usual way. If one derives and/or applies the Born Rule
in QM, then one can assign low probabilities to
untypical sequences of results and the like. If you mix
1p and 3p knowledge in the duplication scenario, you
lose this parallel with QM because the analogous 3p
knowledge is not available in QM.


If someone believes the MWI is true, then he is aware of the
protocol and trusts the operator. In duplication experiments
there is no logical reason why the copies could not be kept
ignorant of each other


And there is no logical reason that prevents them from
arranging beforehand to communicate after the experiment --
in Helsinki, I could decide to post my subsequent location to
Facebook, and communicate with other similar posts.


But if they were prevented from communicating would it make any
fundamental difference to the experiment?

and there is no logical reason why copies in the MWI can't
see what each other is doing.

Such inter-branch communication in MWI is physically
impossible. This is the main reason why person duplication
experiments can never emulate QM, MWI or not.


It is physically impossible, but what fundamental difference
would it make if you could communicate with a copy in a parallel
world who diverged from you a while ago? Would you suddenly feel
that you weren't you, or that you were in two places at once?


The ability to communicate, or the physical impossibility of such
communication, is the fundamental difference between the
duplication scenario and quantum MWI. It changes the
probabilities: just think of duplication of the apparatus in a
spin measurement experiment without simultaneous duplication of
the experimenter -- then it is clear that I get both spin up and
spin down, in my laboratory, in front of my eyes. This is not
possible in MWI since the branches are, by definition,
non-interacting.


The equivalent examples would be if the experimenter along with the 
lab and the apparatus were duplicated, with one experimenter seeing 
spin up and the other spin down. What difference would it then make if 
the experimenters, now two of them, walked down the road to see each 
other, or if they were prevented from doing so?


I am not sure that this is equivalent. It could just be that there were 
two experiments done. I don't think that my example of the spin 
measurement really works as a parallel either.


The point, as I see it, is that if, after duplication, the copies can 
communicate, and they agree that they both have psychological continuity 
with the original person, and that, consequently, the original person 
saw both cities/results. If they cannot communicate, as in QM, then they 
are debarred from such direct knowledge  -- the doppelganger is only a 
theoretical po

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 14 August 2017 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

The point, as I see it, is that if, after duplication, the copies can
> communicate, and they agree that they both have psychological continuity
> with the original person, and that, consequently, the original person saw
> both cities/results.
>

If they could communicate after duplication, they would agree that they
both have psychological continuity with the original person, but why would
they agree that the original person saw both cities or results? This seems
to be the same point if dispute. I would feel exactly the same whether my
copy was in the next street, the next galaxy or the next universe, and I
would have exactly the same expectations about the future if I were to
undergo duplication again.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/08/2017 2:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 August 2017 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


The point, as I see it, is that if, after duplication, the copies
can communicate, and they agree that they both have psychological
continuity with the original person, and that, consequently, the
original person saw both cities/results.


If they could communicate after duplication, they would agree that 
they both have psychological continuity with the original person, but 
why would they agree that the original person saw both cities or 
results? This seems to be the same point if dispute. I would feel 
exactly the same whether my copy was in the next street, the next 
galaxy or the next universe, and I would have exactly the same 
expectations about the future if I were to undergo duplication again.



That is only the case if you choose to ignore a large part of the 
evidence available to you. In exclusively concentrating on a closed 1p 
view after duplication, you are inconsistent with the fact that you used 
3p information about the protocol before duplication. Why refuse to use 
this 3p (or 2p if you talk to you doppelganger in person) information 
after duplication?


Bruce

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 3:08 pm, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 14/08/2017 2:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 14 August 2017 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> The point, as I see it, is that if, after duplication, the copies can
>> communicate, and they agree that they both have psychological continuity
>> with the original person, and that, consequently, the original person saw
>> both cities/results.
>>
>
> If they could communicate after duplication, they would agree that they
> both have psychological continuity with the original person, but why would
> they agree that the original person saw both cities or results? This seems
> to be the same point if dispute. I would feel exactly the same whether my
> copy was in the next street, the next galaxy or the next universe, and I
> would have exactly the same expectations about the future if I were to
> undergo duplication again.
>
>
>
> That is only the case if you choose to ignore a large part of the evidence
> available to you. In exclusively concentrating on a closed 1p view after
> duplication, you are inconsistent with the fact that you used 3p
> information about the protocol before duplication. Why refuse to use this
> 3p (or 2p if you talk to you doppelganger in person) information after
> duplication?
>

By what process would the 3p information make me feel differently about
myself?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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