Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Re: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

You forget to look at the timeline of the flow of mails. you respended only 
after I addressed Gary R.

So, it is you who has to watch for allegations.

But, all in all, I get tired of this short memory triumvirate and will leave 
the list. By now the people I value left or keep silent.

This podium is yours, enjoy.

Auke


> Op 22 juni 2021 om 20:06 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB: With regard to the issue: who to ask for 
> clarification? See below, I started with Jon. But he didn't deem it worth to 
> address the issue when I asked him.
> > 
> > > 
> On the contrary, I addressed the issue in my post last night ( 
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-06/msg00192.html), which also 
> included the earlier responses from both Gary F. and Gary R.
> 
> I suggest that offering supporting arguments for one's claims is more 
> likely to foster substantive discussion than merely making assertions and 
> allegations.
> 
>     Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Tue, Jun 22, 2021 at 1:41 AM Auke van Breemen < 
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon, Gary and Gary,
> > 
> > Gnox already confessed not to be interested in the history of a 
> > tread, so it is to be expected that he responds without knowledge of 
> > context.
> > 
> > With regard to the issue: who to ask for clarification? See below, 
> > I started with Jon. But he didn't deem it worth to address the issue when I 
> > asked him. So, when Gary R repeated the words in admiration, I decided to 
> > try him.
> > 
> > Finally, Jas wrote that qualisense, etc (see below) are the 
> > firstness, secondness and thirdness of consciousness, without any further 
> > qualification. But we must not forget that we were discussing phaneroscopy. 
> > Occupied with tha phaneron only, we still have to take the step of 
> > consciousness of objects-referred-to and consciousness of interaction.
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > >  Oorspronkelijk bericht --
> Van: Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl >
> Aan: Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
> mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Datum: 21 juni 2021 om 22:34
> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
> 
> Jon,
> 
> Instead of consciousness I would prefer awareness or, maybe still 
> better, apperception (in the sense of leibniz) but for the remainder it is a 
> good correction of Gary R's erronous response to Helmut and I think in line 
> with the intention of Helmuts remark.
> 
> Auke 
> 
> > > Op 21 juni 2021 om 22:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < 
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >:
> > 
> > Helmut, Gary R., List:
> > 
> > I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or 
> > qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 
> > consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the 
> > application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness 
> > itself. Does that clarify the matter?
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > 
> > > 
> 
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Re: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon, Gary and Gary,

Gnox already confessed not to be interested in the history of a tread, so it is 
to be expected that he responds without knowledge of context.

With regard to the issue: who to ask for clarification? See below, I started 
with Jon. But he didn't deem it worth to address the issue when I asked him. 
So, when Gary R repeated the words in admiration, I decided to try him.

Finally, Jas wrote that qualisense, etc (see below) are the firstness, 
secondness and thirdness of consciousness, without any further qualification. 
But we must not forget that we were discussing phaneroscopy. Occupied with tha 
phaneron only, we still have to take the step of consciousness of 
objects-referred-to and consciousness of interaction.

Auke

 Oorspronkelijk bericht --
Van: Auke van Breemen 
Aan: Jon Alan Schmidt , peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Datum: 21 juni 2021 om 22:34
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5


Jon,

Instead of consciousness I would prefer awareness or, maybe still better, 
apperception (in the sense of leibniz) but for the remainder it is a good 
correction of Gary R's erronous response to Helmut and I think in line with the 
intention of Helmuts remark.

Auke 

Op 21 juni 2021 om 22:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :

Helmut, Gary R., List:

I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or 
qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 
consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the 
application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness 
itself. Does that clarify the matter?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
-http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:

> Helmut, List,
> 
> May I ask you, then, why do  you think that Peirce posits a 
> primisense, altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not 
> just categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science 
> which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted 
> science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking here 
> of a science (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense, altersense, and 
> medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again, Peirce's terms. Are 
> you suggesting that he was in error somehow by not restricting himself (and 
> us) to primisense? 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> 
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien < h.raul...@gmx.de 
> mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote:
> 
> > > Gary, List
> >  
> > Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 
> > 1ns", "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns 
> > reentered into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error?
> >  
> > Best
> > Helmut
> > 
> > 
> >   21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr
> >"Gary Richmond" < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com >
> >   wrote:
> > 
> >   Helmut, 
> > 
> >   You wrote: " I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science 
> > of what happens in the primisense."
> >
> >   I believe that it has already been posited that 
> > primisense (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of 
> > phaneroscopy, the 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, 
> > the 3ns of 1ns. After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' 
> > of not one but of three categories.
> >
> >   Best,
> >
> >   Gary R
> >
> > 
> > 
> >   “Let everything happen to you
> >   Beauty and terror
> >   Just keep going
> >   No feeling is final”
> >  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F.

I think your next step is a little premature since there are still some 
unsettled questions regarding the slow read of the former sheet. Unless of 
course the method of tenacity is entertained, in that case you are justified to 
hurry up.

Auke

> Op 21 juni 2021 om 23:34 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s 
> slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
> https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations site.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Text:
> 
> Necessary assumption for the purposes of this talk:
> 
> You are already minimally familiar with Peirce's three categories of 
> firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
> 
> • 1864-1867: Initial search for a new conception of the logical role a 
> set of genuinely universal categories should fulfill
> 
> - Discovery that this set is small and gradually ordered.
> 
> - Each category is a distinct and indispensable stage in the process of 
> turning a cloudy manifold into a clarified unifying intellection.
> 
> - Each category is found inductively and confirmed through the test of 
> PRESCISSION, a powerful kind of heuristic abstraction.
> 


 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary,


Why consciousness and not awareness or apperception? Those terms seem more 
adequate for the situation.

Auke

> Op 21 juni 2021 om 23:05 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Jon, Helmut, List,
> 
> Thank you for correcting me, Jon. Yes, 1ns/2ns/3ns of consciousness. My 
> error. 
> 
> What I meant to get across is that Peirce says that phenomenology deals 
> with phenomena in their 1ns, that the normative sciences (esthetic, ethic, 
> logic as semeiotic) deals with them in their 2ns, and metaphysics with them 
> in their 3ns. But no logician, for example, limits himself to 2ns (or 1ns and 
> 2ns) just because normative science (in the classification of sciences) 
> relates phenomena to ends, their 2ns.
> 
> 
> > > 1903  | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V  | CP 
> 5.121-127
> > 
> > Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena 
> > to ends; that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.
> > 
> > > 
> Similarly, phenomenology:
> 
> > > 
> > 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:196-197; CP 
> > 5.121-122
> > 
> > For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in 
> > their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, 
> > treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.
> > 
> > 
> > > I apologize for my foolish error, made in haste, rather 
> > thoughtlessly.
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > > Best,
> 
> Gary R 
> 
> 
> 
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:25 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < 
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> 
> > > Helmut, Gary R., List:
> > 
> > I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or 
> > qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 
> > consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the 
> > application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness 
> > itself. Does that clarify the matter?
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > 
> > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond < 
> > gary.richm...@gmail.com mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> > 
> > > > > Helmut, List,
> > > 
> > > May I ask you, then, why do  you think that Peirce posits a 
> > > primisense, altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron 
> > > not just categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a 
> > > science which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very 
> > > constricted science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we 
> > > are speaking here of a science (or, at least a "science egg"), and 
> > > premisense, altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron 
> > > are, again, Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that he was in error 
> > > somehow by not restricting himself (and us) to primisense? 
> > > 
> > > Best,
> > > 
> > > Gary R
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > “Let everything happen to you
> > > Beauty and terror
> > > Just keep going
> > > No feeling is final”
> > > ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Gary Richmond
> > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> > > Communication Studies
> > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> > > 
> > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien < 
> > > h.raul...@gmx.de mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote:
> > > 
> > > > > > > Gary, List
> > > >  
> > > > Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 
> > > > 1ns", "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns 
> > > > reentered into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error?
> > > >  
> > > > Best
> > > > Helmut
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >   21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr
> > > >"Gary Richmond" < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> > > > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com >
> > > >   wrote:
> > > > 
> > > >   Helmut, 
> > > > 
> > > >   You wrote: " I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the 
> > > > science of what happens in the primisense."
> > > >
> > > >   I believe that it has already been 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

Instead of consciousness I would prefer awareness or, maybe still better, 
apperception (in the sense of leibniz) but for the remainder it is a good 
correction of Gary R's erronous response to Helmut and I think in line with the 
intention of Helmuts remark.

Auke 

> Op 21 juni 2021 om 22:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Helmut, Gary R., List:
> 
> I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or 
> qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 
> consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the 
> application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness 
> itself. Does that clarify the matter?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> 
> > > Helmut, List,
> > 
> > May I ask you, then, why do  you think that Peirce posits a 
> > primisense, altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not 
> > just categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science 
> > which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted 
> > science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking 
> > here of a science (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense, 
> > altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again, 
> > Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that he was in error somehow by not 
> > restricting himself (and us) to primisense? 
> > 
> > Best,
> > 
> > Gary R
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > “Let everything happen to you
> > Beauty and terror
> > Just keep going
> > No feeling is final”
> > ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> > 
> > 
> > Gary Richmond
> > Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> > Communication Studies
> > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> > 
> > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien < h.raul...@gmx.de 
> > mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote:
> > 
> > > > > Gary, List
> > >  
> > > Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", 
> > > "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered 
> > > into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error?
> > >  
> > > Best
> > > Helmut
> > > 
> > > 
> > >   21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr
> > >"Gary Richmond" < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> > > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com >
> > >   wrote:
> > > 
> > >   Helmut, 
> > > 
> > >   You wrote: " I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of 
> > > what happens in the primisense."
> > >
> > >   I believe that it has already been posited that primisense 
> > > (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the 
> > > 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. 
> > > After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but 
> > > of three categories.
> > >
> > >   Best,
> > >
> > >   Gary R
> > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > >   “Let everything happen to you
> > >   Beauty and terror
> > >   Just keep going
> > >   No feeling is final”
> > >   ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> > > 
> > > 
> > >   Gary Richmond
> > >   Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> > >   Communication Studies
> > >   LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> > >
> > >   On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien < 
> > > h.raul...@gmx.de mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote:
> > > 
> > >   > > > >   List,
> > > >   Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial 
> > > > parts of consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three 
> > > > categorial parts of the/a phaneron? I thought the first 
> > > > (consciousness). And when phaneroscopy became the topic, I was 
> > > > thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the 
> > > > primisense. I think, in the primisense not only original qualities 
> > > > (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the altersense and 
> > > > thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into 
> > > > quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed 
> > > > again in altersense and medisense.
> > > >
> > > >   Best
> > > >   Helmut
> > > > 
> > > >   > > > 
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

You wrote:

In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making "good faith 
attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in discussing 
Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."

--

1

Please specify current context. I get the impresion that context ought to be 
interpreted as triumvirate of Gary, Gary and Jon.

2

How do we.other lister, have to relate the freedom of terminology you allow 
your party  with the rigor you demand from others to stick to Peirce's terms ?

Auke

> Op 21 juni 2021 om 19:19 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> 
> > > GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is not Peirce's term but 
> your invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of 
> qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he 
> refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP 8.303) 
> and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use of 
> "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the 
> substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of the 
> two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier definition of 
> "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between 
> primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter ... the 
> consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the consciousness of 
> means," as well as its division into "three modes,  Abstraction,  Suggestion, 
>  Association" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).
> 
> 
> > > GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of 
> Peirce's two phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we 
> could replace "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at 
> least as much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic 
> terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's 
> "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two 
> sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations 
> between them.
> > 
> > > 
> The difference is that "qualisense" is still Peirce's term, and at least 
> arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it some 13 
> years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as reflecting 
> his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on the same 
> occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition minus all 
> desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of exertion of any kind" (CP 
> 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as well as "a 
> double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all quite 
> consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle between 
> self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he never uses "sinsense" or 
> "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing prefixes from 
> speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For one thing, I 
> notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than "legisense" in this 
> quoted statement.
> 
> Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative 
> grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with 
> tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for 
> "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal 
> letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of 
> terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific 
> community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making 
> "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in 
> discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:35 AM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> 
> > > Jon, Gary F, List,
> > 
> > 
> > > > > JAS: I did not say that the terminology of 
> > "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with 
> > semeiotic, I said that it  runs the risk of fostering such conflation.
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that 
> > it's a slight risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots 
> > ("sense" and "sign") not only make it quite unlikely that the terms will be 
> > conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation between those 
> > trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective sciences, viz., 
> > phenomenology and logic as semeiotic. 
> > 
> >   

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary R,


You wrote:

> Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative 
> grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with 
> tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for 
> "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal 
> letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of 
> terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific 
> community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making 
> "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in 
> discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
> Udell.
> 

--

The experimentation with different terms pertaining to the sigfn regarded in 
itself has nothing to do with ethics of tewrminology or wider audience. It is a 
justified differentiation of different perspectives on the same joint in the 
proces of semiosis. 

Auke

> 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F.

I advise you to look at the starting point of this exchange. I don't object to 
transferring my message to another heading but I don't therewith give you the 
right to use that transfer to discard my response as not to the point. If you 
hadn't made the transfer you wouldn't have a point with this message. Just to 
recall, it was about semiotics and phaneroscopy an interesting point raised by 
Cathy dealing with the Mona Lisa.

By the way Peirce commented himself on cartesian doubt. It is that take on the 
matter I use, not the conventional one. Whatever that may be.

Auke

 

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 15:47 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, I’m not suggesting anything different from what Peirce said about 
> phaneroscopy. The trouble is that in order to grasp what it is, you have to 
> take Peirce at his word rather than translating his ideas into habitual 
> categories such as “Cartesian thought experiment,” “absolute doubt” and “the 
> unreal.”
> 
> I know that you have access to a large sampling of Peirce’s texts and can 
> search through it for “phenomenology” and “phanero.” If you’re not willing to 
> wait for some of those texts to turn up in this slow read, I recommend that 
> you find and read them yourself while setting aside your preconceptions. 
> (which is in itself a crucial and challenging aspect of phaneroscopic 
> practice.) Then you’ll be in a position to judge whether anything I’ve said 
> is in conflict with anything Peirce said on the subject.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 19-Jun-21 09:18
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary F.
> 
> Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian 
> thought experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from 
> absolute doubt, or, in your case, the unreal?
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> > 
> > GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question 
> > related to the nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some 
> > metaphysical issue which does not exist for phaneroscopy.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: Auke van Breemen  > mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl >
> > Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
> > To: g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca ; 
> > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > > 
> > > Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you 
> > > would mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy 
> > > professes to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an 
> > > earlier post, I must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to 
> > > the proposition that “the dynamical object of the science is reality,” so 
> > > I can’t guess whether it would be true or not. Peirce says that 
> > > phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the semiotic distinction between 
> > > dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if it were a sign, at 
> > > least not in any text that I can recall.
> > > 
> > > I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the 
> > > universal categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves 
> > > devoid of any reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles 
> > > from phaneroscopy, not the other way round. The object of attention in 
> > > phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s 
> > > use of the word “object” in connection with phaneroscopy, and give some 
> > > examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll 
> > > have to leave it at that.
> > > 
> > > Gary f.
> > > 
> > >  
> > > 
> > > From

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F.

Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian thought 
experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from absolute doubt, 
or, in your case, the unreal?

Auke

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> 
> GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to 
> the nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical 
> issue which does not exist for phaneroscopy.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Auke van Breemen 
> Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> 
>  
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would 
> > mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes 
> > to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I 
> > must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition 
> > that “the dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess 
> > whether it would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a 
> > “science,” not that the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate 
> > objects applies to it as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I 
> > can recall.
> > 
> > I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal 
> > categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of 
> > any reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from 
> > phaneroscopy, not the other way round. The object of attention in 
> > phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use 
> > of the word “object” in connection with phaneroscopy, and give some 
> > examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll 
> > have to leave it at that.
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> > Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
> > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary F., list,
> > 
> > Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The 
> > issue was whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object 
> > of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I 
> > stated, or not. 
> > 
> > best,
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > > 
> > > Auke, Gary R, list,
> > > 
> > > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or 
> > > propositions that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I 
> > > had last night, I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually 
> > > remember; but lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my 
> > > memory), I can’t claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that 
> > > the dream actually occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have 
> > > no way to ascertain how the content of the dream relates to any reality 
> > > external to it; and that is the reality which might be definable as the 
> > > totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes 
> > > much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
> > > 
> > > The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any 
> > > judgments about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the 
> > > ability to discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of 
> > > whatever can appear is what generates the concept of reality in the first 
> > > place. Specifically, Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness 
> > > is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way 
> > > to recogniti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Helmut,

I take this 1905 quote to mean that although the contents of the pheneron do 
not always entertain a representative relation with an object (real thing, 
sic), we must accept the reality of the pheneron. In other words the reality of 
the phaneron does not depend on its representative relation. 

With regard to your:

Claiming regardlessness to me sounds rather like a scientific method to better 
focus on the phaneron alone, than like a completely distinct science.

--

Indeed, each of the theoretical sciences concentrate on an aspect of semeiosis. 
Pheneroscopy on aspects that (with conciderable effort because of our habits of 
interpretation) can be adressed without invoking the questions of 
representation, truth, etc. And so, again, being concerned with questions obout 
objects like the phaneron that function pre-truth, does not mean they are 
unreal. That position comes down to mixing upo the object of the phaneron with 
the object of phaneroscopy.

best,

Auke

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 13:32 schreef Helmut Raulien :
> 
> List
>  
> Here again the maybe most frequently used quote about "phaneron", from 
> the Commens Dictionary:
> "
> 1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | CP 1.284
> 
> Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I 
> mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
> to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or 
> not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
> questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
> the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
> minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is 
> occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.
> 
> "
> 
> Due to this quote I was wondering, why Peirce in other places speaks of 
> multiple "phanerons", or of "a phaneron". To me there are two possible 
> explanations:
> 
> 1. "Never having entertained a doubt" is two weak negations, that make a 
> merely weak definition, i.e. a possibility. So he did not exclude the other 
> possibility, that there may be distinct phanerons.
> 
> 2. The phaneron is spatially total, but temporally separable, though, due 
> to the continuity-claim, blurredly separable.
> 
> I like number 1 better.
> 
> Another question by me is, that "quite regardless of whether it 
> corresponds to any real thing or not" does not exclude the possibility, that 
> it does correspond to a real thing, i.e. include a dynamic object, i.e. be 
> semiotic. Claiming regardlessness to me sounds rather like a scientific 
> method to better focus on the phaneron alone, than like a completely distinct 
> science. But I dont know the exact definition of "science", so ok, I guess, 
> phaneroscopy may be called a science. Setting closer borders of "regard" 
> helps to not miss something.
> 
> Did I get everything ok?
> 
> Best
> 
> Helmut
> 
>  
> 
> 
>19. Juni 2021 um 11:33 Uhr
>"Auke van Breemen" 
>   wrote:
> 
>
> 
>   John,
> 
>   Good points. You might be interested in Ramchandran and Hirstein's : 
> Three laws of Qualia.
> 
>   
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233684568_Three_laws_of_qualia_What_neurology_tells_us_about_the_biological_functions_of_consciousness
>  
> 
>   Auke
> 
>   > > Op 19 juni 2021 om 5:36 schreef "John F. Sowa" 
> :
> >
> > 
> >   Gary F> For me at least, �veracity� only applies to stories or 
> > propositions that are publicly verifiable. 
> > 
> >   But a huge amount of information that we get every day is 
> > reported by people whose observations cannot be  verified by any other 
> > sources.  When your friends or family discuss their experiences, they 
> > rarely have photographic evidence or other confirming sources about what 
> > they did or saw.
> > 
> >   Over time, we learn that some people are more reliable or 
> > truthful than others.  We also learn that people whose reports are usually 
> > truthful may hide or distort some issues that may be painful or 
> > embarrassing.
> > 
> >   For dreams and feelings, the subject's introspective reports are 
> > the only sources for the details.  But neuroscientists have found those 
> > reports to be extremely valuable for interpreting the data they receive 
> > from brain scans.
> > 
> >   Modern technology can 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Good points. You might be interested in Ramchandran and Hirstein's : Three laws 
of Qualia.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233684568_Three_laws_of_qualia_What_neurology_tells_us_about_the_biological_functions_of_consciousness
 

Auke

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 5:36 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Gary F> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or 
> propositions that are publicly verifiable. 
> 
> But a huge amount of information that we get every day is reported by 
> people whose observations cannot be  verified by any other sources.  When 
> your friends or family discuss their experiences, they rarely have 
> photographic evidence or other confirming sources about what they did or saw.
> 
> Over time, we learn that some people are more reliable or truthful than 
> others.  We also learn that people whose reports are usually truthful may 
> hide or distort some issues that may be painful or embarrassing.
> 
> For dreams and feelings, the subject's introspective reports are the only 
> sources for the details.  But neuroscientists have found those reports to be 
> extremely valuable for interpreting the data they receive from brain scans.
> 
> Modern technology can provide important resources for enhancing the 
> science of phaneroscopy.
> 
> John
> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?


Auke

> Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
> stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
> its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
> missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
> dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it 
> would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that 
> the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it 
> as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall.
> 
> I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal 
> categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any 
> reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, 
> not the other way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously 
> the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in 
> connection with phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably 
> wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary F., list,
> 
> Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
> whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
> phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Auke, Gary R, list,
> > 
> > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions 
> > that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, 
> > I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but 
> > lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t 
> > claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually 
> > occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain 
> > how the content of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and 
> > that is the reality which might be definable as the totality of facts 
> > expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more than 
> > that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
> > 
> > The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments 
> > about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to 
> > discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear 
> > is what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, 
> > Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for 
> > the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as 
> > something other than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and 
> > metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some 
> > method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and 
> > that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> > 
> > By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I 
> > think Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
> > terminological change (he decided there were too many other established 
> > uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday 
> > suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he 
> > expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as 
> > bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved 
> > will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these 
> > branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or 
> > phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is 
> > to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science is that 
> > Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> > 
> > I hope this helps …
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: peirce-l-req

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

> Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, Gary R, list,
> 
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that 
> are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do 
> so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
> independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity 
> for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and 
> thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content 
> of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality 
> which might be definable as the totality of facts expressible in true 
> propositions. The phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, 
> possibilities and so on.
> 
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
> essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
> generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce 
> says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
> that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to 
> develop their senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and 
> generalizing that does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called 
> phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> 
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses 
> of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that 
> as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), 
> it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other 
> sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make 
> more terminological decisions about what to call these branches or whether to 
> call them “branches” of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read 
> though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and 
> distinct idea of what the science is that Peirce called phenomenology or 
> phaneroscopy.
> 
> I hope this helps …
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
> To:
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List
> 
> I wrote:
> 
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
> 
> --
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, 
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> --
> 
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe 
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice. 
> 
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. 
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.   
> 
>  
> 
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
> categories.”
> 
> --
> 
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role 
> in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder 
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Helmut, Auke, list,
> > 
> > I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit 
> > overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts 
> > so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability 
> > to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. 
> > Consequently I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving 
> > Cathy away from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that 
> > their use of the word “embodied” would have such an effect on 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   


The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Helmut, Auke, list,
> 
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): 
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently 
> to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on 
> the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t 
> think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the 
> discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word 
> “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
> 
> Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
> because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:
> 
> [[ Jon,
> 
> CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing 
> themselves upon our recognition.
> 
> CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real 
> is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation.
> 
> This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:
> 
> CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of 
> being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 
> 2:343, 1905)
> 
> And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.
> 
> In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it 
> is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about 
> the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]
> 
> GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It 
> is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science 
> from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
> what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in 
> their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, 
> treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).
> 
> GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic 
> consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is 
> independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual 
> thinkers does not appear in the direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. 
> That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the differences between 
> individual minds and treats all possible minds as one mind.
> 
> CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron 
> I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
> to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or 
> not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
> questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
> the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
> minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)
> 
> CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the 
> total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any 
> other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its 
> cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905)
> 
> GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not 
> an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the 
> phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.”
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
> Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
> To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> 
> List,
> 
>  
> 
> the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I 
> suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,


CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as somethingotherthan 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

Best,

Auke


> Op 16 juni 2021 om 16:31 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, Edwina, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB: The dynamical object of science is reality.
> > 
> > > 
> The dynamical object of every true proposition is reality, but as De 
> Tienne's slide 4 (posted yesterday) hints at the very bottom, phaneroscopists 
> are "pre-truthists." Again, the subject matter of phaneroscopy is whatever is 
> or could be present to the mind, including imagination and hallucination.
> 
> 
> > > AvB: If you were right, the different sciences would be 
> concerned with different realities.
> > 
> > > 
> Phaneroscopy is not concerned with the reality of phenomena at all, only 
> their appearances; that is what differentiates it from metaphysics. It is 
> also not limited to the study of signs, but examines any and every kind of 
> phenomenon; that is what differentiates it from semeiotic.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:38 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Auke, list
> > 
> > Exactly. Splitting up areas into separate domains might give one 
> > the feeling of being-in-control, but the dynamic object of science, namely, 
> > reality - has been lost - within all the unconnected immediate objects 
> > entrapped in each classification.
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Wed 16/06/21 3:54 AM , "Auke van Breemen" 
> > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Jon,
> > > 
> > > You wrote:
> > > 
> > > It is not just the method of analysis that is different for 
> > > each science within Peirce's classification, but also the object of 
> > > study. Phaneroscopy examines whatever is or could be present to the mind. 
> > > Semeiotic studies only signs and semiosis.
> > > 
> > > --
> > > 
> > > The dynamical object of science is reality. The branches of 
> > > the sciences deliver immediate objects of that dynamical object. If you 
> > > were right, the different sciences would be concerned with different 
> > > realities. But then, how could an involved branch provide the principles 
> > > for the next branch?
> > > 
> > > Best,
> > > 
> > > Auke
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,


You wrote:

It is not just the method of analysis that is different for each science within 
Peirce's classification, but also the object of study. Phaneroscopy examines 
whatever is or could be present to the mind. Semeiotic studies only signs and 
semiosis.

--

The dynamical object of science is reality. The branches of the sciences 
deliver immediate objects of that dynamical object. If you were right, the 
different sciences would be concerned with different realities. But then, how 
could an involved branch provide the principles for the next branch?

Best,

Auke

> Op 15 juni 2021 om 20:05 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> 
> > > ET: But this suggests that a researcher, dependent on the 
> method-of-analysis, could come up with a completely different interpretation 
> of 'that-which-is-studied'.
> > 
> > > 
> It is not just the method of analysis that is different for each science 
> within Peirce's classification, but also the object of study. Phaneroscopy 
> examines whatever is or could be present to the mind. Semeiotic studies only 
> signs and semiosis.
> 
> 
> > > ET: You don't get even that 'quality-of-feeling' without 
> the 'input' into the body of this external force. ... my point is that 
> Firstness has to involve the inclusion/insertion of the external stimulus 
> into the body.
> > 
> > > 
> On the contrary, again, pure 1ns is that quality of feeling in itself, 
> completely independent of us "getting" it by means of "input" into the body 
> by means of "external stimulus." Any such physical process is, by definition, 
> 2ns as governed by 3ns. We never experience 1ns directly, we always must 
> prescind it from 2ns and 3ns, as we will be discussing further in forthcoming 
> slides of the slow read.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:39 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > JAS, list
> > 
> > 1] JAS wrote, in reply to my first question:
> > 
> > "Therefore, the proper interpretation of the results of 
> > phaneroscopic study is different from the proper interpretation of the 
> > results of semeiotic study."
> > 
> > But this suggests that a researcher, dependent on the 
> > method-of-analysis, could come up with a completely different 
> > interpretation of 'that-which-is-studied'. I think this is problematic. I'm 
> > not a fan of McLuhan's 'the medium is the message'.
> > 
> > 2] You are confining the term 'sensation' to 'awareness'. I don't 
> > do this. You don't get even that 'quality-of-feeling' without the 'input' 
> > into the body of this external force. Otherwise - there wouldn't be any 
> > 'feeling' quality or not. So, if "the first is agent', the second patient' 
> > 1.361, my point is that Firstness has to involve the inclusion/insertion of 
> > the external stimulus into the body.  This does not involve awareness or 
> > consciousness but it does involve 'acceptance' into the self-domain, so to 
> > speak. 
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Tue 15/06/21 1:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
> > mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
> > 
> > > > > Edwina, List:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > ET: What is the functionality of 
> > > putting an area of study, such as Jappy's work, into 'semeiotic' rather 
> > > than 'phaneroscopy'? How does such a categorization affect the results of 
> > > the study?
> > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > Why did Peirce develop a classification of the sciences that 
> > > carefully distinguishes phaneroscopy from semeiotic? Primarily because 
> > > their purposes are different, with the result that their principles are 
> > > different. In fact, the principles of semeiotic depend upon the 
> > > principles of phaneroscopy, while the latter do not depend upon the 
> > > former. Therefore, the proper interpretation of the results of 
> > > phaneroscopic study is different from the proper interpretation of the 
> > > results of semeiotic study.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > ET: My understanding is that pure 
> > > Firstness is simply the sensation of X
> > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > No, sensation is a physical process and therefore a 
> > > manifestation of 2ns. Pure 1ns is a quality of feeling, as it is in 
> > > itself without reference to anything else; not any actual feeling, as it 
> > > is experienced and distinguished from other feelings.
> > > 
> > > Regards,
> > > 
> > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> > > http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > > 
> > > On 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina, Jon,


I disagree with both of you. With ET because yes that is possible. With Jon, 
no, it may be the same dynamical object.

I always liked the distinction between formal and material object. Both 
phenomenology and semiotics have the same material object, but differ in formal 
object, or also, way of looking at the matter. 

Best,

Auke

> Op 15 juni 2021 om 20:05 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> 
> > > ET: But this suggests that a researcher, dependent on the 
> method-of-analysis, could come up with a completely different interpretation 
> of 'that-which-is-studied'.
> > 
> > > 
> It is not just the method of analysis that is different for each science 
> within Peirce's classification, but also the object of study. Phaneroscopy 
> examines whatever is or could be present to the mind. Semeiotic studies only 
> signs and semiosis.
> 
> 
> > > ET: You don't get even that 'quality-of-feeling' without 
> the 'input' into the body of this external force. ... my point is that 
> Firstness has to involve the inclusion/insertion of the external stimulus 
> into the body.
> > 
> > > 
> On the contrary, again, pure 1ns is that quality of feeling in itself, 
> completely independent of us "getting" it by means of "input" into the body 
> by means of "external stimulus." Any such physical process is, by definition, 
> 2ns as governed by 3ns. We never experience 1ns directly, we always must 
> prescind it from 2ns and 3ns, as we will be discussing further in forthcoming 
> slides of the slow read.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:39 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > JAS, list
> > 
> > 1] JAS wrote, in reply to my first question:
> > 
> > "Therefore, the proper interpretation of the results of 
> > phaneroscopic study is different from the proper interpretation of the 
> > results of semeiotic study."
> > 
> > But this suggests that a researcher, dependent on the 
> > method-of-analysis, could come up with a completely different 
> > interpretation of 'that-which-is-studied'. I think this is problematic. I'm 
> > not a fan of McLuhan's 'the medium is the message'.
> > 
> > 2] You are confining the term 'sensation' to 'awareness'. I don't 
> > do this. You don't get even that 'quality-of-feeling' without the 'input' 
> > into the body of this external force. Otherwise - there wouldn't be any 
> > 'feeling' quality or not. So, if "the first is agent', the second patient' 
> > 1.361, my point is that Firstness has to involve the inclusion/insertion of 
> > the external stimulus into the body.  This does not involve awareness or 
> > consciousness but it does involve 'acceptance' into the self-domain, so to 
> > speak. 
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Tue 15/06/21 1:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
> > mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
> > 
> > > > > Edwina, List:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > ET: What is the functionality of 
> > > putting an area of study, such as Jappy's work, into 'semeiotic' rather 
> > > than 'phaneroscopy'? How does such a categorization affect the results of 
> > > the study?
> > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > Why did Peirce develop a classification of the sciences that 
> > > carefully distinguishes phaneroscopy from semeiotic? Primarily because 
> > > their purposes are different, with the result that their principles are 
> > > different. In fact, the principles of semeiotic depend upon the 
> > > principles of phaneroscopy, while the latter do not depend upon the 
> > > former. Therefore, the proper interpretation of the results of 
> > > phaneroscopic study is different from the proper interpretation of the 
> > > results of semeiotic study.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > ET: My understanding is that pure 
> > > Firstness is simply the sensation of X
> > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > No, sensation is a physical process and therefore a 
> > > manifestation of 2ns. Pure 1ns is a quality of feeling, as it is in 
> > > itself without reference to anything else; not any actual feeling, as it 
> > > is experienced and distinguished from other feelings.
> > > 
> > > Regards,
> > > 
> > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> > > http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > > 
> > > On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 11:34 AM Edwina Taborsky < 
> > > tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > List
> > > > 
> > > > I have several comments
> > > > 
> > > >   

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Cathy,

Knowing that is is a portrait already is having a legend or label. While 
studying design processes in the visual arts from a semiotical perspective, I 
always had problems with understandng the background of an image. In graphic 
srorytelling at the same time it co-determines the signature that unites the 
succesive images and it co-determines the atmoshere. In one sense  the 
background is an index of the universe of discourse, in another it does not 
convey a meaning. maybe this comes closer to experincing a hypoicon.

Best,

Auke

> Op 15 juni 2021 om 19:15 schreef Synechism Center :
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> Ahh... Thank you! That makes perfect sense when you describe it that way. 
> So... If I come upon a painting in a museum, and I know it is hanging in the 
> museum because it is a portrait of 'someone', I just don't know who, and 
> there is no label identifying who it is a portrait of, it would be a 
> hypoicon. It reaches fullness as an icon to me once I find out who it is a 
> portrait of. Correct?
> 
> 
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > " CSP: But a sign may be iconic, 
> > > that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter 
> > > what its mode of being.  If a substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may 
> > > be termed a hypoicon.  Any material image, as a painting, is largely 
> > > conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend 
> > > or label it may be called a hypoicon.  (1903, CP 2.276)
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > 
> I am trying to line this scenario up with First Firstness/Second 
> Firstness/Third Firstness.
> 
> 
> Much appreciated,
> 
> Cathy T .
> 
> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:51 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < 
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> 
> > > Cathy, Auke, List:
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CT: Imagine I am standing in front of the 
> > Mona Lisa. The 'painting' (canvas and frame),  if absent of the image of 
> > the Mona Lisa, is a  hypoicon.
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > I respectfully disagree that the absence of the image is what would 
> > cause a physical painting to be classified as a hypoicon. Rather, as Auke 
> > points out, it is the absence of a "legend or label" telling us who or what 
> > is being depicted.
> > 
> > In accordance with CP 2.276 (quoted below), I understand "hypoicon" 
> > to be Peirce's term for any embodied sign that is primarily iconic, a 
> > sinsign/token that represents its object by qualitatively resembling it and 
> > does not otherwise indicate what that object is. A hypoicon is also not in 
> > any kind of existential relation to its object, as a photograph would be, 
> > which is why Peirce classifies the latter as primarily indexical rather 
> > than iconic. When a "legend or label"  is provided with a physical 
> > painting, that serves as an indexical part of the overall sign, turning it 
> > into a dicisign/proposition by separately identifying its object.
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CSP: A man's portrait with a man's name 
> > written under it is strictly a proposition, although its syntax is not that 
> > of speech, and although the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a 
> > Hypoicon. (CP 2.320, EP 2:282, 1903)
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > CSP: It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a 
> > > pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an 
> > > icon, as a weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, 
> > > as the legend under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a 
> > > proposition. (EP 2:307, 1904)
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > CSP: But a pure picture without a legend only 
> > says " something is like this." True he attaches what amounts to a legend. 
> > But that only makes his sentence analogous to a portrait we will say of 
> > Leopardi with Leopardi written below it. It conveys its information to a 
> > person who knows who Leopardi was, and to anybody else it only says 
> > "something called Leopardi looked like this." (CP 8.183, EP 2:496, 1909)
> >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Cathy,

Gary must speak for himself, but I like the way in which you exemplfy the 
'without legend or label' part of Peirce's determination of a painting as a 
hypericon. 

best,

Auke van Breemen


> Op 15 juni 2021 om 17:26 schreef Synechism Center :
> 
> Gary R, List,
> 
> From your last post
> 
> 
> > > " CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent 
> its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being.  If a 
> substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon.  Any 
> material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of 
> representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a 
> hypoicon.  (1903, CP 2.276)
> > 
> > > 
> The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the 
> trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons'  partaking of 
> "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First 
> Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can similarly 
> be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as signs of 2nd 
> firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which represent the 
> representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in 
> something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd firstness.
> 
> 
> > > CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the 
> mode of Firstness which they partake.  Those which partake the simple 
> qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the 
> relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by 
> analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent 
> the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism 
> in something else, are metaphors.  (R478 62; EP2274, 1903)"
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > Please correct me if I am not understanding... I always try to relate 
> > these topics to real life, as that is my intention with trying to help a 
> > more general audience understand. . Imagine I am standing in front of 
> > the Mona Lisa. The 'painting' (canvas and frame), if absent of the image of 
> > the Mona Lisa, is a hypoicon. It is a 'container', so to speak, a 
> > Firstness, and a potential placement for 2nd firstness (that which the 
> > artist applies to the canvas), the Mona Lisa becomes a metaphor when I gaze 
> > at it and in my mind it represents a 16th century woman with knowing eyes. 
> > This activity that my mind is now engaged in is 3rd firstness. It is the 
> > manifestation of the original potentiality of First Firstness.
> 
> Semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin would expand on this idea of continued 
> interaction with the painting as dialogic.
> 
> Am I making sense?
> 
> Cathy T.
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 10:44 AM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
> mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> 
> > > Jon, John, List
> > 
> > Jon, thank you for pointing out that Jappy's work, which John 
> > referenced, is not about phaneroscopy but, rather, about semeiotic; and, 
> > similarly, that the Peirce snippets John quoted also -- as I see it, rather 
> > obviously --  concern semeiotic (specifically, semeiotic grammar) and not 
> > phaneroscopy/  phenomenology. I'll comment only on those three quotations 
> > here.
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided 
> > according to the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the 
> > icon does not imperatively call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903).
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > Now this quotation is of considerable interest for several reasons. 
> > The entire short paragraph as it appears in EP2 reads:
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided 
> > according to the categories but the mere completeness of the notion of the 
> > icon does not imperatively call for any such division. For a pure icon does 
> > not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents 
> > whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is 
> > an affair of suchness only.
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > The icon/index/symbol trichotomy is introduced in Peirce's 
> > semeiotic grammar (along with two other trichotomies added somewhat later, 
> > namely, the qualisig

Re: Sowa and the Meaning of Equivalence Relation. Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Consequence as Logical Primitive (was Resending)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

I think you did hit the weak spot: 

> But, I will save you the time and effort and suggest that the term 
> “equivalence” as you used it in the sentence:
> 
> 
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely 
> > > interchangeable in all contexts without any change in meaning.
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > does not have a triadic meaning and does not imply an 
> > “equivalence relation”. 
> 


I only would add 'real' to your remark. For logical space it is freely 
interchangable as Jon acknowledges.


Best,

Auke

> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> Research Professor
> Krasnow Institute of Advanced Study
> 
> Headwater House
> Little Falls, MN
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 


 

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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

[Auke van Breemen]

> Op 1 februari 2021 om 17:03 schreef Helmut Raulien :
> 
> Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,
>  
> I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ 
> example is valid in a transparent universe too:
> 


Helmut,

The point is not if Jon's example is valid in a transparant universe too: if it 
works in the fog, it works on a transparant day too, although it may be more 
demanding than the regular tools. But what is working on a transparant day, 
does not on that account work in the fog.


Auke




> From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not 
> follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in 
> a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I 
> would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think 
> the following makes sense:
>  
> I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 
> 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This 
> is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not 
> generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot 
> conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not 
> pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" 
> is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 
> 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to 
> be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards 
> the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss 
> "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the 
> existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that 
> adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law 
> (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely 
> status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.
>  The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on 
> reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the 
> Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce 
> of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something 
> positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form 
> habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you 
> think?
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better 
understood as an
inductive rather than a deductive science, for the ampliative work of inductive 
inference
better exemplifies, in a richer, fuller sense, the illative, ecstatic essence 
of inference per
se. While deduction still stands as essential and irreplaceable aspect of 
logic, it remains a
purely formal and hence more abstract (and more ‘degenerate’) expression of the 
illative
essence of inference (and argumentation) in its fullest sense.

---

You keep assuming that Jon is talking about logic as a calculus in a 
transparant logical universe. But in this respect he never denied negation its 
role. As far as I get it, Jon's attempt can be seen as a diagrammatical 
calculus in the way of its development, but not for logic in the sense you take 
it, but as a dia-logical calculus. And in dialogues we ought to be interested 
in the reasons for the negation. Proof must be constructive.

The shaded ovals are interesting, especially in combination with the sheets and 
the lines of identity running on (self conversation) and through different sets 
of them (comminication or dialogue). 

It is as if you at the end of your carreer are diving in the method of tenacity.

Best,

Auke

> Op 1 februari 2021 om 5:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the subject line to the 
> title of 
> https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047=ossaarchive
> 
> The full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce’s ecstatic logic of 
> illation", and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about 
> illation as a process, not as a particular sign for if-then,
> 
> The Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' 
> is the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus' 
> is the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.
> 
> When Peirce said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that 
> signals the end of a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of 
> inference' for what Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle 
> suggests one step of a continuing process.
> 
> The article makes some good points, but it should not be considered as an 
> argument for the scroll as a logical primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in 
> every version of EGs from 1897 to the end) depend only insertions and 
> deletions in negative or positive areas. 
> 
> A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in R670, a 
> scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and later, he 
> raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any suggestion that 
> the scroll shape had any significance.  
> 
> There is, of course, more to say.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Let's take the sequence from the architecture of science:  math. logic, 
phenomenology, semiotics, critical logic, ... , methaphysics. You assume that 
my remarks concern the interval logic ... methaphysics. That however was not 
the object of my remarks. My remarks concerned the interval phenomenology, 
semiotics, critical logic. So, who suggested that metaphysics should be based 
on Hegel Style verbiage? (The destructive destillation paragraph is from 
Peirce.) Jon most certainly not. How could he, if indeed, as you assume, he 
focusses to much on words or literary criticism? 

best,

Auke

 


> Op 30 januari 2021 om 0:35 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Auke,
> 
> I agree with your observation, and the conclusion: "It is a line of 
> thought I can see leading to what Jon wrote."
> 
> Charles' father Benjamin Peirce gave him a thorough training in 
> mathematics from early childhood, and Charles devoured Whateley's logic book 
> in a week when he was 13.  He insisted that metaphysics should be based on 
> mathematics, not on Hegel-style verbiage.
> 
> Jon's method  of focusing on the words is a kind of literary criticism 
> that would be more appropriate for analyzing Shakespeare than Peirce.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

During your repeated debates with Jon an experience I had as a freshman 
philosophy kept knocking at my doors of perception. It was the first meeting in 
which each of the students had to read a passage of Hegels logic. I was the 
first to read and started with the first alinea in which logic is defined as 
being concerned with the idea in the formal element. Just having had my first 
course in logic, I relied on what I learned and started talking about  that, 
i.e. as logic trying to lay down the rules of formal thought, the formal 
element. And met with serious opposition from the teachers present. I recall 
that it took them some time to get me to realize that the emphazis is on 
"'idea' in the formal element" and not on the formal element severed from any 
actuality. It is a line of thought I can see leading to what Jon wrote. 

Jon A. wrote:

In this particular case, my purpose is the same as Peirce's--analyzing 
reasoning into its most fundamental and irreducible elements. Even more 
specifically, I am currently exploring intuitionistic/constructive/synechistic 
logic using EGs, consistent with Peirce's own skepticism of excluded middle. 
John can speak for himself, but it is clear by now that he does not share these 
same objectives.

--

Logical positivism could restrict itself to logic regarded sub species 
eternitate (Tractatus), we know for certain that Peirce was not of like 
opinion. His view on logic is multi-facetted. 

He is not just concerned with, I cite:

John wrote:

For mathematicians and logicians, clarity and precision are essential. The 
formal structure is everything, and the words are of minor interest.  The 
fewer, the better.

--

For him, as far as I understood his thought, the formal structure is not 
everything. It only is "the formal structure as it operates in a living 
intelligence". It did not prevent him from focussing exclusively on the formal 
structure, as his formal work shows. But he was aware of the limitations. You 
seem to be less so. 


It is in this light that I find the negation - ilation debate of interest. 

Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated
and then thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that
a mental synthesis precedes every analysis. What really happens is
that something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which
nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts
consists in this that the mind afterward recognizes those parts in it.
Those partial ideas are really not in the 1rst idea, in itself, though
they are separated out from it. It is a case of destructive distillation.
CP 1.384

I think that this quote backs up Jon's approach from a systematic perspective. 
Systematic here to be taken in the philosophical sense, not the logical. 

Best,

Auke


> Op 29 januari 2021 om 5:51 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> Auke> I was thinking in terms of goals, i.e. what is the object you
> try to understand, not credentials.  I can connect Jon's answer to my
> question with his line of reasoning and I did like that.  There might
> be differences in the goals and then it is always better to asses and
> value the differences, instead of fighting about who is right.
> 
> I have been doing research and teaching in logic, computer science,
> computational linguistics, and artificial intelligence for many
> years.  In 1976, I had published an article on Conceptual Graphs in
> the IBM Journal of Research and Development.
> 
> Then in 1978, I came across Don Roberts' book on EGs, and it was
> exactly what I was looking for.  Peirce's EGs were far more elegant
> and powerful than the AI research in the 1970s.  (including my own).
> I immediatetly adopted it as the foundation for the book I published
> in 1984.  I continued reading Peirce's other writings and various
> publications about Peirce since then.
> 
> Then in 2001, I came across Michel Balat's transcription of a first
> draft of L231 (mistakenly classified as R514).  I realized that it
> was an excellent introduction to EGs, and I posted a copy with
> commentary on my web site:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm .
> 
> I also realized that this version was far superior to Peirce's
> earlier versions.  In particular, I used it to solve a previously
> unsolved research problem from 1988.  I published the solution in
> Semiotca in 2011:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf .
> 
> In April 2015, I presented a lecture on related issues at a Peirce
> Session at the APA conference in Vancouver.  In December of 2015, I
> presented an extended version at a workshop that Zalamea sponsored in
> Bogota.  And in 2018, I publishted a 76-page version that spelled out
> all the details.
> 
> The following slides are minor revisions of the 2015 version:
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf . Slide 2 has a link to the 2018
> publication in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[Auke van Breemen]

John, 

I was thinking in terms of goals, i.e. what is the object you try to 
understand, not credentials. I can connect Jon's answer to my question with his 
line of reasoning and I did like that. Their might be differences in the goals 
and then it is always better to asses and value the differences, instead of 
fighting about who is right.

Best,

Auke

> Op 29 januari 2021 om 0:02 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Auke> Since perspective is important, it might be a good idea to 
> explicate the differences in purpose each of you entertain. 
> 
> That's a good question.
> 
> I have been working on research and teaching in logic, computer science, 
> artificial intelligence and related areas for many years.  In the 1970s, I
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[Auke van Breemen]

From the list perspective:

Jas wrote:

I have said it before, I will say it again--we have different purposes, so we 
reach different conclusions.

--

Since perspective is important, it might be a good idea to explicate the 
differences in purpose each of you entertain.

best,

Auke

> Op 24 januari 2021 om 5:32 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Jon AS, List,
> 
> The *opinion* that the EG version of June 1911 is Peirce's best is 
> Peirce's own, as he stated in December, after six months of further 
> consideration.  The fact that he stated it in a lengthy letter to a member of 
> Lady Welby's significs group is further evidence of its importance.
> 
> That opinion is further supported by the development of logic in the 
> following century.  Please read beyond slide 12 of 
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf .  See also 
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .  Slide 2 of ppe.pdf has a link to a 76-page 
> article published in the Journal of Applied Logics that goes into all the 
> details.
> 
> One of the most important features of the 1911 version is its ability to 
> serve as a foundation for Gerhard Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction 
> and clause form (published in 1934).  Those two system have had immense 
> influence on modern proof procedures -- including the development of modern 
> methods of computational theorem proving.
> 
> But in 1988, Larry Wos, one of the pioneers in theorem proving methods, 
> published an unsolved problem about relating Gentzen's two systems.  This 
> problem is important for automatically relating two different proof 
> procedures.  In 2011, I published the solution in Semiotica.  For a quick 
> outline, see egintro.pdf or ppe.pdf.  For the details, see the article in the 
> J. of Applied Logics.
> 
> That proof is clean and clear in terms of the 1911 EGs.  It's possible in 
> terms of the earlier versions, but it is more complex and harder to discover.
> 
> Another important point:  The 1911 EGs can be generalized beyond two 
> dimensions for "stereoscopic moving images".  It's not an accident that 
> Peirce mentioned them in L231, but he had not yet decided how to proceed with 
> the details.  ppe.pdf  (and the JAL article) present a generalization.  
> Whether that is what Peirce was thinking is not clear, but it shows that the 
> 1911 EGs are sufficient to support something along the lines that Peirce was 
> contemplating.
> 
> As for the point that negation must be inferred, please reread slides 11 
> and 12 of egintro.pdf.  Note that observing if-then is impossible (for a 
> lengthy discussion, see Hume and the lengthy debates that followed).
> 
> But the inference required for negation is quite simple:  If you expect 
> something and don't observe it, you can use the word 'not'.  Children learn 
> to use the word 'not' sometime after their second birthday -- around the same 
> time that they learn to use the words 'I' and 'you' correctly.  But they 
> don't learn to use 'if-then' and 'or' until much later.
> 
> And the idea that children (or even adults) would learn 'not' from the 
> derivation that Peirce presented in 1906 or the one in R669  is absurd.
> 
> There is much more to say about all these issues, but please read at 
> least to the end of egintro.pdf.  It also has many references for further 
> study.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Auke van Breemen]

John,


> Op 30 augustus 2020 om 20:55 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Auke, I agree with you about the issues and priorities.
> 
> AvB> Peirce is multi facetted.  Each of us looks from a particular 
> angle...  I am not interested in what might be the final version Peirce wrote 
> on the negation vs scroll issue...  I can agree with you if we are discussing 
> EG as a formal system.
> 
> Yes.  Formal EGs are the foundation.  As Peirce himself said, logic as 
> semiotic is much broader.  It includes the methodeutic for analyzing and 
> developing the immense variey empirical sciences.
> 

We have discussed this point before. It seems to me that you forget about 
speculative grammar and only recognize critic and speculative rethoric. But if 
we abstract from the apprehension of the sign as an object when we look with 
the detached eye of the logician (the realm of critic), we must take care when 
going to speculative rethoric to again direct our attention to the role the 
apprehension of the sign as an object plays in our processes of interpretation. 
We must acknowledge that each interpreter has its own verso sheet. And, that 
this sheet determines as what sign a representamen gets interpreted.

Auke




> 
> AvB> In a sense when we interpret we look at the input from all logical 
> perspectives.  Box-X running from  to , or from doubt to belief.
> 
> Yes.  All versions of classical first-order logic are sufficiently 
> expressive to define all the patterns of mathematics.  But the eg1911 version 
> (as stated in L231) has a simplicity and symmetry that makes the definitions 
> easier to state and the proofs easier to discover.
> 
> For examples, see the slides I presented at an APA conference in 2015 and 
> extended with more examples for another workshop:  "Peirce, Polya, and 
> Euclid:  Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry," 
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .
> 
> Note that the two-dimensional shaded areas of eg1911 can be generalized 
> to 3-D shaded regions for proofs in solid geometry.  They could even be 
> generalized to 4-D regions for "stereoscopic moving images", which Peirce 
> mentioned in L231.  Those generalizations are not possible with the 1903 
> scrolls or the 1906 recto/verso sides of a 2-D sheet.
> 
> Another important example is an unsolved research problem that was stated 
> in 1988 and remained unsolved until 2010.  Good logicians failed to find the 
> proof because they made the same mistake that Peirce stated in 1893 (CP 
> 4.76):  "For [the reader] cannot reason at all without a monstrative sign of 
> illation."  See the proof with EG rules in slide 65 ff of ppe.pdf.
> 
> Examples of signs of illation (or inference) include Peirce's claw
> symbol for if-then in Boolean algebra or his scroll in EGs.  Those
> symbols are asymmetric, but the critical step for solving the problem of
> 1988 is easier to discover with the symmetric EG "permissions".
> 
> As for the time and date when Peirce discovered the simplicity and
> generality of the eg1911 rules, compare R669, which ends abruptly
> shortly after 7:40 pm on 2 June 1911, to the completely rewritten R670,
> which begins on June 7. On June 22, he began L231, which contains a
> complete and polished version of the logic in R670.
> 
> The date of the discovery is interesting for Peirce scholars.  But the
> power and generality of eg1911 is demonstrated by the applications.  For
> more examples, see "Diagrammatic reasoning with EGs and EGIF",
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/diagrams.pdf ; "Reasoning with diagrams and
> images", http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen, list,

I don't see how the quote you provide could lead to the insetion of 'of the 
scroll' after interpretation. I don't see any reason for it in that text.

It is very well posssible and more probable given the remark on common sense 
and logicians that Peirce was pointing to a  curiosity that follows from FOL 
from an interpretative or pragmatic perspective and looked at the matter in 
those quotes from the outside. 

best,

Auke

 

> Op 23 augustus 2020 om 0:19 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt 
> :
> 
> Auke, All:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  The interesting word being the emphasized 
> interpretation. Jon Alen inserts in his comment 'of the scroll' just after 
> interpretation. I do not know on what grounds.
> > 
> > > 
> Here is what comes right before the quoted passage.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  A conditional proposition is false only if the 
> condition of it is satisfied, while the consequent is falsified. For the 
> proposition asserts nothing at all in case the condition is not satisfied. So 
> then it is only if the condition is satisfied, while the consequent is 
> falsified, that the conditional proposition is false. But a proposition that 
> is not false is true. ... This reasoning is irrefragable as long as a mere 
> possibility is treated as an absolute nullity. Some years ago, however, when 
> in consequence of an invitation to deliver a course of lectures in Harvard 
> University upon Pragmatism, I was led to revise that doctrine, in which I had 
> already found difficulties, I soon discovered, upon a critical analysis, that 
> it was absolutely necessary to insist upon and bring to the front, the truth 
> that a mere possibility may be quite real. That admitted, it can no longer be 
> granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen 
> to be realized is true, and the whole reasoning just given breaks down. (R 
> 490:23-26, 1906)
> > 
> > > 
> As I explained before, the interpretation that Peirce deems to be "too 
> narrow" in light of "the truth that a mere possibility may be quite real" is 
> that "every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be 
> realized is true."  Since "the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs 
> represents a universe of possibilities," not just the denial of actuality, a 
> consequence (scroll) is not strictly equivalent to a composite of two 
> negations (nested cuts); he later explicitly reaffirms this in "The Bed-Rock 
> Beneath Pragmaticism" (R 300:48-50[47-51], 1908).  Technically it only 
> affects the revised Gamma EGs that use tinctures for different modalities 
> rather than broken cuts, not Beta EGs that use shading but still conform to 
> classical first-order logic as explained in R 670 and RL 231, unless the 
> latter are adapted for intuitionistic logic.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  At the very least it is not necessary to evaluate 
> the issue in terms of L231. The dicision of what is obsolete or not must be 
> based on a reality check and the context of his thought and experiences. Not 
> on what is written last. 
> > 
> > > 
> I strongly agree.  While I generally give more weight to Peirce's later 
> writings as presumably reflecting his more considered views, this does not 
> warrant summarily dismissing his earlier writings as "irrelevant and 
> obsolete."  Such an approach would be no more legitimate than relying 
> entirely on earlier passages and ignoring the later ones.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sat, Aug 22, 2020 at 11:44 AM Auke van Breemen < 
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > John, Jon Alen, list,
> > 
> > I am not interested in what might be the final version Peirce wrote 
> > on the negation vs scroll isue. Even if John is right, the interesting 
> > point that remains is not the actual history of Peirce's thought, but the 
> > systematic problem it poses. It remainds me of Hempels confirmation 
> > paradox. Jon Alen arguing the Peirce did not fall pry to it and John that 
> > he did. 
> > 
> > Jon Alen provided an interesting quote:
> > 
> > CSP:  I often think that we logicians are the most obtuse of men, 
> > and the most devoid of common sense. As soon as I saw that this strange 
> > rule, so foreign to the general idea of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs

[Auke van Breemen]

John, Jon Alen, list,

I am not interested in what might be the final version Peirce wrote on the 
negation vs scroll isue. Even if John is right, the interesting point that 
remains is not the actual history of Peirce's thought, but the systematic 
problem it poses. It remainds me of Hempels confirmation paradox. Jon Alen 
arguing the Peirce did not fall pry to it and John that he did. 

Jon Alen provided an interesting quote:

CSP:  I often think that we logicians are the most obtuse of men, and the most 
devoid of common sense. As soon as I saw that this strange rule, so foreign to 
the general idea of the System of Existential Graphs, could by no means be 
deduced from the other rules, nor from the general idea of the system, but has 
to be accepted, if at all, as an arbitrary first principle,--I ought to have 
poked myself, and should have asked myself if I had not been afflicted with the 
logician’s bêtise, What compels the adoption of this rule? The answer to that 
must have been that the interpretation requires it; and the inference of common 
sense from that answer would have been that the interpretation was too narrow. 
Yet I did not think of that until my operose method like that of a hydrographic 
surveyor sounding out a harbour, suddenly brought me up to the important truth 
that the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs represents a universe of 
possibilities. This, taken in connection with other premisses led me back to 
the same conclusion to which my studies of Pragmatism had already brought me, 
the reality of some possibilities. (R 490:26-28, CP 4.581,1906)

--

The interesting word being the emphasized interpretation. Jon Alen inserts in 
his comment 'of the scroll' just after interpretation. I do not know on what 
grounds. It can be read as 'the movement of thought' being different when 
thinking something in a scroll or a double negation form. The context, 
logicians devoid of common sense, seems to point to a perspective wider than 
the strict formal logical.

John wrote:

Familiarity does not imply agreement.  The writings prior to June 1911 have 
some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material.  It's necessary to 
evaluate them in terms of L231.

--

At the very least it is not necessary to evaluate the issue in terms of L231. 
The dicision of what is obsolete or not must be based on a reality check and 
the context of his thought and experiences. Not on what is written last. 

Best,

Auke

> Op 22 augustus 2020 om 6:47 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Jon AS, List
> 
> This thread began with my note of  August 2nd, which I include below in 
> the file 2aug20.txt.  All the points in that note are based on the citations 
> included in it.  But I changed the subject line of this note to emphasize 
> Peirce's fundamental insight of 2 June 1911 shortly after 7:40 pm.
> 
> That was when Peirce finished writing two of his three "Illative 
> Permissions" in R669.  He then wrote a short paragraph with a few lines at 
> the top of a new page.  And he stopped.
> 
> He did not write the third permission (about double negations), he left 
> most of the sheet blank, and he never resumed R669.  Three questions:  Why 
> did he stop when he had enough paper to write the third permission?  Why did 
> he begin a completely new version of EGs  in R670 with different notation and 
> terminology?  And what did he do in the time between June 2 and June 7?
> 
> My guess:  He reviewed his earlier writings on EGs, especially the ones 
> from 1903 and 1906.   The content of R670 and L231 shows what he rejected.  
> His comments in L378  and L376 show that he considered the presentation in 
> 1906 "as bad as it could be".   But his comments in R670 show that he 
> considered some combination of shading with tinctured areas as possible.  
> That would be an option for Delta graphs, as I mentioned in an earlier note.
> 
> JAS> understanding the entire system of EGs requires familiarity with all
> his different writings about them.
> 
> Familiarity does not imply agreement.  The writings prior to June 1911 
> have some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material.  It's necessary 
> to evaluate them in terms of L231.
> 
> JFS>   There is no need to derive negation from anything else.
> 
> JAS>  Peirce repeatedly says otherwise, as I have repeatedly 
> demonstrated..
> 
> All those quotations are prior to June 1911.  They're irrelevant and 
> obsolete.
> 
> JAS> In R 669 (May 1911), he notes--just three weeks before composing RL 
> 231--that necessary reasoning is possible without the concept of falsity
> 
> No, for several reasons:  (1) That is not an exact quotation, since 
> Peirce knew that affirmation and negation are fundamental to every version of 
> logic from Aristotle onward. (2) Peirce had forgotten his 1884 point that all 
> reasoning can be done with just insertions and deletions (W 5:107).   And 
> Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's methodology

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Thanks for the Eisele pdf. I did like this ms fragment very much:

Further, "It is not so much the history of science as it is the history of 
sound scientific thinking which I am considering" [Peirce MS 12801.

--

It seems to come down to: never consider the textual production of a scientist 
only in itself, but also look at the reality the text tries to explain.  

Auke

> Op 2 augustus 2020 om 14:13 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Carolyn Eisele wrote an excellent 9-page article about a topic we have 
> been discussing recently:   Mathematical methodology in the thought of 
> Charles S. Peirce, 
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0315086082901276/pdf
> 
> On page 5 of that article, she made a point that I believe is 
> fundamental:  "to understand pragmatism in a Peircean sense, one must 
> approach the concept in terms of Peirce's scientific methodology --  in terms 
> of the mathematical procedure that he called  Theorematic Reasoning."
> 
> Apparently that topic was controversial, because she mentioned a "New 
> York philosopher" who "challenged" it.  For the complete paragraph, see the 
> attached Eisele82.png.
> 
> John
> 
>  
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The Pragmatic Trivium)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

You are a nasty kind of guy, trying to expose yourself by reading all kind of 
opinion to be corrected in others messages.

Disgusting rethorical tactics. As disgusting as the neighbour cat that allways 
is pissing against the same doorpost.

Auke


> Op 27 juni 2020 om 2:12 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, Edwina, List:
> 
> Just to clarify, according to Peirce neither the absolutely indeterminate 
> "initial stage" (1ns) nor the absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is 
> actual.  Instead, these are ideal limits that correspond to the infinite past 
> and the infinite future, respectively.  In the meantime, all three categories 
> are always operative.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  We look back toward a point in the infinitely 
> distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to 
> a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy 
> or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the 
> past, however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and 
> at any assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from 
> law. (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8)
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > CSP:  The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, 
> tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of 
> regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the 
> nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of 
> all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in 
> which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree 
> of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth 
> of habit. (CP 8.317, 1891)
> > 
> > > 
> In other words, the ongoing evolution (3ns) of our existing universe is 
> such that it is always becoming more determinate in accordance with Gary 
> Richmond's vector 
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm of 
> process (1ns→3ns→2ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 2:19 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Yes - I like that outline by Peirce as well. The first stage if we 
> > can call it that, after 'nothing', is chaos [Firstness] and then, the 
> > second stage is Thirdness where Mind begins to take charge and develop 
> > habits of organization - which permit the discrete 'bits' of Secondness to 
> > actually exist for more than a nanosecond, and, to reproduce as types 
> > [whether as chemical molecules or as cells].
> > 
> > Firstness continues within Thirdness; and therefore, there cannot 
> > be a final state of pure habits.
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Fri 26/06/20 2:59 PM , Auke van Breemen peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> > mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Edwina,
> > > 
> > > With regard to the estimate of final stage I always am of the 
> > > opinion that we can only reasonably  discuss it afterwards as to its true 
> > > nature.  
> > > 
> > > I have no religious inclinations, but can have sympathy with 
> > > certain religious expressions.  I do like Spinoza's naturalization of 
> > > god.   What I did value in Peirce's estimate is this fragment:
> > > 
> > > We exist in time, which is the second stage of cosmological 
> > > evolution, that of thirdness, characterized by both regularity (laws) and 
> > > diversity (spontaneity and "chance"). As the universe evolves, laws and 
> > > habits develop and become more and more regular. What was originally 
> > > spontaneity becomes law. But new spontaneities continue to arise, 
> > > increasing the variety of the world (Peirce, 1931-1935, 6.101). 
> > > 
> > > It is an improvement on Spinoza, a process approach. 
> > > 
> > > best,
> > > 
> > > Auke
> > > 
> > > Op 26 juni 2020 om 17:05 schreef Edwina Taborsky :
> > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > Auke, list
> > > > 
> > &

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Pragmatic Trivium

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina,

With regard to the estimate of final stage I always am of the opinion that we 
can only reasonably  discuss it afterwards as to its true nature.  

I have no religious inclinations, but can have sympathy with certain religious 
expressions.  I do like Spinoza's naturalization of god.   What I did value in 
Peirce's estimate is this fragment:

We exist in time, which is thesecond stageof cosmological evolution, that 
ofthirdness, characterized by both regularity (laws) and diversity (spontaneity 
and "chance"). As the universe evolves, laws and habits develop and become more 
and more regular. What was originally spontaneity becomes law. But new 
spontaneities continue to arise, increasing the variety of the world (Peirce, 
1931-1935, 6.101). 

It is an improvement on Spinoza, a process approach. 


best,

Auke


Op 26 juni 2020 om 17:05 schreef Edwina Taborsky :



> 
> Auke, list
> 
> Thanks for the link and the interesting comments about the artistic 
> process.
> 
> My comment is only about the cosmological outline, and of course reflects 
> my own view. As an atheist, I have a problem with the anthropomorphic 
> transformation of 'Mind' [which is a term Peirce also uses to refer to 'god' 
> ] to the term of 'God', which is a term overloaded with anthropomorphic 
> meanings, including agency, predetermined goals, interventionism, etc.
> 
> But my other quibble is her suggestion that the final stage is one of 
> Secondness.  My view of Secondness is that it functions within individual 
> particles, ie, 'bits of matter' - and as such finite entities, will always be 
> undergoing dissipation [unless time also stops] . My understanding of the 
> final stage is instead, 'the complete induration of habit reducing the free 
> play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death'. 
> 6.201. This refers to Thirdness.  However, as noted in 6.148, "habits would 
> become wooden and ineradicable, and no room being left for the formation of 
> new habits, intellectual life would come to a speedy close" But - Peirce 
> reminds us that 'There always remains a certain amount of spontaneity in its 
> action, without which it would be dead" 6.148.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Fri 26/06/20 7:30 AM , Auke van Breemen peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> 
> > > 
> > John,
> > 
> > A good summary of Peirce's take on esthetics is to be found at: 
> > http://www.signosemio.com/peirce/esthetics.asp
> > 
> > A nice feat of the description is that it contains some fine 
> > remarks on Peirce's conception of God.
> > 
> > In the end, I think, that Peirce could regard any work on art less 
> > feeble only if three aspects are explicated in the study:
> > 
> > 1. The quality of the artwork in itself
> > 
> > 2. the way in which (or adequacy) it expresses qualities of feelings
> > 
> > 3. the way in which it adresses (effectiveness) its interpretant 
> > thought.
> > 
> > 
> > and discussed in their interrelation with each other  in any case 
> > study.
> > 
> > 
> > best,
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > > > Op 25 juni 2020 om 19:20 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Iris and Jerry R,
> > > 
> > > The question of what Peirce knew or thought about deriving 
> > > ethics from esthetics is problematical. He analyzed issues of science and 
> > > logic to such a great depth, that his knowledge of esthetics would seem 
> > > trivial by comparison, at least to himself.   But before claiming that 
> > > Peirce was incompetent about esthetics or ethics, we should compare his 
> > > writings to someone who was more competent.  Who might that be?
> > > 
> > > Iris> Jerry Rhee asks, "Is it not obvious that Peirce was 
> > > incompetent for the task imposed upon him of defining the esthetically 
> > > good?" In some ways, I think he might be right: it's easier to ask 
> > > questions about the pragmatic trivium as it relates to today's world than 
> > > to find satisfying answers in Peirce's writings.
> > > 
> > > Yes.  Questions are very important.  The greatest 
> > > philosophers of all time have been asking such questions.  Has anyone 
> > > found answers about the normative sciences that are more satisfying than 
> > > Peirce's?  Who?
> > > 
> > > CP 2.197> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Pragmatic Trivium

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

A good summary of Peirce's take on esthetics is to be found at: 
http://www.signosemio.com/peirce/esthetics.asp

A nice feat of the description is that it contains some fine remarks on 
Peirce's conception of God.

In the end, I think, that Peirce could regard any work on art less feeble only 
if three aspects are explicated in the study:

1. The quality of the artwork in itself

2. the way in which (or adequacy) it expresses qualities of feelings

3. the way in which it adresses (effectiveness) its interpretant thought.


and discussed in their interrelation with each other  in any case study.


best,

Auke




> Op 25 juni 2020 om 19:20 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Iris and Jerry R,
> 
> The question of what Peirce knew or thought about deriving ethics from 
> esthetics is problematical. He analyzed issues of science and logic to such a 
> great depth, that his knowledge of esthetics would seem trivial by 
> comparison, at least to himself.   But before claiming that Peirce was 
> incompetent about esthetics or ethics, we should compare his writings to 
> someone who was more competent.  Who might that be?
> 
> Iris> Jerry Rhee asks, "Is it not obvious that Peirce was incompetent for 
> the task imposed upon him of defining the esthetically good?" In some ways, I 
> think he might be right: it's easier to ask questions about the pragmatic 
> trivium as it relates to today's world than to find satisfying answers in 
> Peirce's writings.
> 
> Yes.  Questions are very important.  The greatest philosophers of all 
> time have been asking such questions.  Has anyone found answers about the 
> normative sciences that are more satisfying than Peirce's?  Who?
> 
> CP 2.197> We shall next take up the logic of the normative sciences, of
> which logic itself is only the third, being preceded by Esthetics and 
> Ethics. It is
> now forty-seven years ago that I undertook to expound Schiller's 
> Aesthetische
> Briefe to my dear friend, Horatio Paine. We spent every afternoon for long
> months upon it, picking the matter to pieces as well as we boys knew how 
> to do.
> In those days, I read various works on esthetics; but on the whole, I 
> must confess
> that, like most logicians, I have pondered that subject far too little. 
> The books do
> seem so feeble.
> 
> CP has 129 passages about esthetics.  He said that he read various works 
> on the subject, but he found those books "so feeble". 
> 
> Can anyone point to books that are not "feeble" according to the 
> standards that Peirce set for himself?
> 
> John
> 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


I do not see from your quote of Edwina that she states that the logical and the 
final interpretant are the same. 

And just repeating quotes does not solve interprative difficulties.

best,

Auke





> Op 16 juni 2020 om 19:32 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > JAS:  As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I 
> do not consider the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same 
> as the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.
> > 
> > AvB:  I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did 
> > not notice somebody else doing so in our exchanges.
> > 
> > > 
> Edwina suggested that they are the same, or at least that the logical and 
> final interpretants are the same.
> 
> 
> > > ET:  I question whether every sign has, necessarily, a 
> final interpretant. I refer to Peirce's comment that "not all signs have 
> logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like" ...
> > My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final 
> > interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce does not point out that only intellectual concepts have final 
> interpretants, he points out that only intellectual concepts (and the like; 
> i.e., symbols) have logical interpretants.  He even goes on to distinguish a 
> logical interpretant from a final or ultimate logical interpretant, which is 
> a habit (EP 2:418, 1907) or a habit-change (CP 5.476, 1907).
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning 
> of the sign a sign of reassurance?
> > 
> > > 
> No, it seems to me that "the sense of comprehending the meaning of the 
> sign" is (or includes) a feeling of reassurance, rather than being a sign of 
> reassurance.  In any case, Peirce clearly draws the same distinction that I 
> am making.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and 
> an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the 
> Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to 
> an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 
> 4.536, 1906)
> > 
> > > 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 2:57 AM Auke van Breemen < 
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon Alen,
> > 
> > Just to avoid misunderstanding.
> > 
> > JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not 
> > consider the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as 
> > the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants. 
> > 
> > I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not 
> > notice somebody else doing so in our exchanges. Neither did I read any 
> > remark to the extend that you do regard them the same.
> > 
> > The most curious part of your response however is that according to 
> > you a feeling is not a sign. While at the same time you quote Peirce
> > 
> > JAS: "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings; for 
> > there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign" 
> > (EP 2:409, 1907).
> > 
> > But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a 
> > sign of reassurance?
> > 
> > Best,
> > 
> > Auke 
> > 
> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

Just to avoid misunderstanding.

JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the 
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the 
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants. 

I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice somebody 
else doing so in our exchanges. Neither did I read any remark to the extend 
that you do regard them the same.

The most curious part of your response however is that according to you a 
feeling is not a sign. While at the same time you quote Peirce

JAS: "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at 
least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign" (EP 2:409, 1907).

But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a sign of 
reassurance?


Best,

Auke 




> Op 16 juni 2020 om 2:55 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, Auke, List:
> 
> As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the 
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the 
> immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.  On the contrary, in my view these 
> two trichotomies are orthogonal to each other--emotional/energetic/ logical 
> describe the nature of the sign's effect as either a feeling (1ns), an 
> exertion (2ns), or a further sign (3ns); while immediate/dynamical/final 
> correspond to the possible effects of a general type, the actual effect of an 
> individual token, and the conditionally necessary effect of the sign itself.
> 
> That being the case, I agree that only intellectual concepts and other 
> symbols have logical interpretants; but I hold that all signs have immediate 
> and final interpretants, regardless of whether they ever determine a 
> dynamical interpretant.  I also agree that all signs have emotional 
> interpretants; as Peirce wrote, "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes 
> feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning 
> of the sign" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Logical interpretants are further signs (3ns) 
> that involve exertions (2ns) and feelings (1ns), while energetic 
> interpretants are exertions (2ns) that involve feelings (1ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 9:43 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > With regard to this particular sentence of JAS:
> > 
> > "Every sign has a conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and 
> > thus a possible (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an actual 
> > (dynamical) interpretant because there does not happen to be an interpreter 
> > present to be determined by it. "
> > 
> > In addition to my post concerning my interpretation that the sign 
> > is irreducibly triadic, and includes an interpretant even without an 
> > 'interpreter' - [unless one assigns that function of interpreter to the 
> > entity, such as the human body's immune system is the interpreter of the 
> > virus [object] entering it - and the interpretant is the effects of that 
> > intrusioin [rash, fever]…..In this case, the interpreter is equivalent to 
> > the mediative representamen/sign.
> > 
> > But- my question concerns the comment by JAS above - and I question 
> > whether every sign has, necessarily, a final interpretant. I refer to 
> > Peirce's comment that "not all signs have logical interpretants, but only 
> > intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either general or 
> > intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me. This shows that the 
> > species of future tense of the logical interpretant is that of the 
> > conditional mood, the 'would-be'" EP p 410.
> > 
> > My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final 
> > interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts. So - that 
> > measles, that wind-on-the-water, that weathercock - which are all 
> > functioning as triads - don't have final interpretants.
> > 
> > As for the concept that the triad has an immediate/emotional 
> > interpretant but not necessarily an actual/dynamic interpretant - I'd agree 
> > with that. But not for the reason outlined by JAS, which requires that 
> > 'interpreter present to be determined by it'.  I'd say that the interpreter 
> > IS present. In the case of measles, the interpreter is the human body's 
> > immune system; in the case of the weathercock, it's the metal/wooden stand; 
> > in the case of the water ripples, it's the water.
> > 
> > Now - there may not be an active, dynamic interpretant resulting 
> > from the stimulus from the Dynamic Object. There might instead be an 
> > interpretant which is below the 'critical threshold' for an actuality, a 
> > dynamic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Sign Relations

[Auke van Breemen]

failed

> Op 16 juni 2020 om 3:42 schreef Jon Awbrey  mailto:jawb...@att.net >:
> 
> 
> Test • Please Ignore
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

to identify the essential ingredient of the 
> interpreter as the interpretant (EP 2:409-410).  Every sign has a 
> conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible (immediate) 
> interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical) interpretant because 
> there does not happen to be an interpreter present to be determined by it. 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 3:59 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon Alen,
> > 
> > Is this your opinion or Peirce's?
> > 
> > > > > Moreover, my point continues to be that it is 
> > not necessary for something to be  actually perceived in order to qualify 
> > as a sign.  It is sufficient that (1) it may determine a dynamical 
> > interpretant under various circumstances by virtue of having an immediate  
> > interpretant, and (2) it would determine a dynamical interpretant under 
> > ideal circumstances by virtue of having a final  interpretant.
> > >  
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > I am particular interested in where to find the source.
> > 
> > best,
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


> That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that 
> Peirce invented and defined "the commens."  I find it misleading to use his 
> peculiar term to mean something else.
>  
> 

Isn't our duscussion about the meaning of a particular term, i.e. commens? And, 
my contribution, about the need to look at the wider context in order to grasp 
the direction of a thought?

> 
> > > At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for 
> either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his 
> more considered views, and hence should be given slightly more weight 
> accordingl
> > 
> > > 

Fine that you made clear that it is just your default assumption and not the 
nature of the case.

Look, with regard to your immediate...final interpretant, I prefer not want to 
discuss this with you. It feels like a boy coming to my shop asking for a cents 
worth of candy. I reply, which kind you would like: jelly beans, mint or 
licorice? And the boy responds: I want candy because that is all there is. 
There is no such tihng as a jelly bean, or mint or liquorice.

best,

Auke

 
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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,


> RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and 
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of 
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our 
> lives.
> 

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all 
these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not 
what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" 
that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's 
concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps 
even encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written 
https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many 
places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical 
phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a 
special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or 
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that 
much more general entity" (p. 40).


Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only 
the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect 
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count 
heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. 
Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la 
lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms 
that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is such a term. 
Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but 
arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic 
concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas.

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking 
similarities with this first cultural antropological movement:

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, 
as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the 
commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.  

2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here,  was 
so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing 
his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his 
preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth 
seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives.

It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even 
that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for 
longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the 
intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with 
Peirce quote's:

JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of 
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three 
occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is 
also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and 
"communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or 
"intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from 
around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he 
explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the 
Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so 
betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the 
interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

--

If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that 
he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he 
discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case.

Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of 
inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign 
as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably 
his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular 
line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and 
comming from all kinds of directions.  

Best,

Auke 


> Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Helmut, Robert, List:
> 
> Returning to substantive matters ...
> 
> 
> > > HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which 
> Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?
> > 
> > > 
> Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions 
> tend to focus on topics about which he did write.
> 
> 
> > > HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is 
> named 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Thanks for this info. I came to this conclusion by analyzing the 8th signtype 
(rhematic, symbolic, legisign) from the point of view of KiF. ()= involvement. 
The outer brackets signify that the process is not yet finished. It just are 
fragments of what is involved in the proces: sheet, sign >- sign respons. 

1. The (((qualisign) (icon, sinsign)), (legisign)) is the classification or 
pattern recognition mode,

The sinsign is dual faced, it signifies a) the icon is, and, b) it is on this 
sheet. The sheet is signifing the index position gluing the process elements or 
sign aspects together and introducing the historical context of this sheet as 
it is virtually present. 

3. The (((symbol), index), (legisign)) my find the same habit of interpretation 
(symbol) attached, with a modification of the legisign as a result.

But then, somewhere at their rheme position the interpretative possibilities of 
the two sign systems overlap. 

2. ((Rheme), (icon, (index)))


Best,

Auke


> Op 25 mei 2020 om 16:56 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Jon and Auke,
> 
> General principle:  Never assume that Peirce was unaware of or hadn't 
> considered some issue.  Peirce had studied Aristotle in depth, and he would 
> certainly be familiar with the first paragraph of _On Interpretation_:
> 
> Aristotle> First we must determine what are noun (onoma) and verb 
> (rhêma); and after that, what are negation (apophasis), assertion 
> (kataphasis), proposition (apophansis), and sentence (logos). Those in speech 
> (phonê) are symbols (symbola) of affections (pathêmata) in the psyche, and 
> those written (graphomena) are symbols of those in speech. As letters 
> (grammata), so are speech sounds not the same for everyone. But they are 
> signs (sêmeia) primarily of the affections in the psyche, which are the same 
> for everyone, and so are the objects (pragmata) of which they are likenesses 
> (homoiômata). On these matters we speak in the treatise on the psyche, for it 
> is a different subject. (16a1)
> 
> JAS> One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the 
> written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems 
> of signs. 
> 
> AvB> This is an interesting point. I entertained the same idea as you did 
> until I recognized that we may distinguish legisigns in two classes.
> 
> 1. legisigns by comparison: the sinsign icons belong to a family either 
> of visual or auditive signs
> 
> 2. legisigns by convention. legisigns of two families (visual and 
> auditive) are conjoined and recognaized as the same type. The bridge is 
> furnished by the very same symbol called forth by either of the signs, i.e. 
> the spoken and written forms of horse.
> 
> This distintion is similar to the point that Aristotle was making.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary R,

First of all, no offence taken.

This is a nice example of a intentional and a effectual representant standing 
asunder. I did not write 'nasty webmail' in response to the content of your 
mail. Always nice to see a native writer toying around with words. Jon Awbry is 
a master at it. I did write it because I was fed up with my webmail that has an 
inclination to pick a mailadres that is not recognized by the list. The mail 
you responded to on list was not send to the list, so listers might be 
surprised. And when I replied on your mail, again the adress went wrong the 
first time. 

Best,

Auke



> Op 3 mei 2020 om 22:38 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Auke,
> 
> I apologize for appearing to be 'nasty' in my recent post addressed to 
> you. I didn't mean to be while, admittedly, meaning to "pull your leg" a bit 
> as the English idiom would have it. I should have learned long ago that it's 
> near impossible to get humor across in an email and clearly my smiley face 
> didn't do it for you. 
> 
> In truth, I haven't had Dutch beer since I visited my Dutch friend, Aldo, 
> in Tilburg many years ago (I'm not much of a beer drinker) when we went to a 
> monastery where the monks make beer. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves and the 
> beer! Another Dutch friend, Merel, who lives in Gouda has brought me tasty 
> samples not only of the cheese famously named after her town, but also 
> delicious chocolates as well. I must admit that the very best chocolate I've 
> had was hand made in small amounts in a town near Brussels, but for the most 
> part I couldn't tell Belgian from Dutch chocolate if you paid me! As for 
> pommes de terre, I like both the Belgian and the Dutch varieties. I should 
> note parenthetically that one of my very favorite spirits is Genever which I 
> was introduced to in Holland and, btw, the Belgian variety doesn't come close.
> 
> I see that I should have stuck to my original thought for a concluding 
> paragraph. Still meaning to have some fun with the chocolate idea, I was 
> going to make the thought experiment of deciding to paint my den. I go to my 
> local paint store and the proprietor asks, "What color are you planning to 
> paint your den?" I say definitively, "Chocolate!" He brings out a swatch of 
> color and says, "OK here's our most popular chocolate paint; what do you 
> think?" I say, "Well I think it's rather too light" at which point he laughs 
> and says, "Ah, so I take it that you prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate."
> 
> In any event, I certainly didn't mean to offend. I love Holland, have 
> several beloved Dutch friends there, enjoy the cozy bars in Amsterdam, eating 
> delicious Dutch food in outdoor restaurants, especially those in the center 
> of Tilburg, and you can be certain that when in Holland I top off many a 
> night clinking glasses of Genever and toasting "Proost!"
> 
> Well, I'm disappointed that I didn't win the chocolate. But perhaps I can 
> keep trying? 
> 
> Again, take this message to be a heartfelt apology as I never meant to 
> offend, just to play a little game that, sadly, went bad.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 7:41 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Nasty webmail.
> > 
> > Gary R,
> > 
> > With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings 
> > (see below the Hausman quote) you utilized.
> > 
> > The qualisign aspect is a medad or collection of medads brought 
> > together by the mind in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the 
> > medads themselves, but by our habits of interpretation.  
> > 
> > For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy 
> > By Carl R. Hausman
> > 
> > p. 122  
> > 
> > "What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the 
> > categories? Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? 
> > This point depends on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge 
> > that is unattachable to any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce 
> > suggests in his figurative description, would be like a heat charge that 
> > has no effect. etc.."
> > 
> > The quality is monadic, involv

Fwd: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Auke van Breemen]

Nasty webmail.

Gary R,

With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings (see below the 
Hausman quote) you utilized.

The qualisign aspect is a medad or collection of medads brought together by the 
mind in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the medads themselves, but 
by our habits of interpretation.  

For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy By Carl R. 
Hausman

p. 122  

"What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the categories? 
Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? This point depends 
on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge that is unattachable to 
any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce suggests in his figurative 
description, would be like a heat charge that has no effect. etc.."

The quality is monadic, involving qualisigns, involving quale:

i) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Qualisign [1.1] (e.g., a feeling of \red") is 
any
quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it is positively 
in itself, a
quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common ingredient or 
similarity;
so that a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere 
logical
possibility, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a 
Rheme

ii) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Sinsign [1.2] (e.g., an individual diagram) 
is any
object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the 
idea of an
object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely of whatever it may be 
like,
it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a 
Qualisign.

Taken from CP. 2.254-2.263.

-

You cannot utilize the heat charges that were the occasion for my experience of 
green on a specific occasion. For an early take on the medad:

[...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of mediation
-the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a
continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 227 (1868)

Best, Auke


Op 3 mei 2020 om 12:31 schreef Gary Richmond : Auke, 
list,


What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my 'strange' -- 
is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same example, an " 
im[p]ression of green the moment I look at the trees out of my window," (well, 
in truth, my impression(s) occurred as one late Spring afternoon I lay on my 
back in a bed of silky soft grass and moss and staring up at tree branches -- 
their leaves in particular -- at a scenic spot on top of one of the foothills 
of the Catskill Mountains of New York overlooking the Tappan Zee where the 
Hudson River becomes as expansive as a 10 mile wide lake).

Rather intent on musing a bit, or even doing some phenomenology, I looked up at 
the canopy where the rapidly passing clouds made the myriad leaves look to be 
various shades of green, such as olive, lime, emerald, even sage (which is 
almost gray), as well as deep yellow, a kind of brown and even a dark purple 
nearing black. I thought (very short moments later) something like "those 
considerable variations in color are both the consequence of the play of light 
and clouds and sky and tree leaves in nature 'outside' of me and simultaneously 
affecting me with 'internal' color impressions" -- again none of those hues and 
shades were named then, that is, when or as experienced, but only in 
retrospect-- a kind of double-sided nature, both 'there' in 'external' nature 
as well as within my 'internal' experience of that nature. 

But note: there were only those, perhaps hundreds or even thousands, of 
possible (1ns) variations of color -- but, for example, no blues or pinks 
whatsoever. I later thought that just those hues and shades (or at least a, 
perhaps, rather large range of them) were possible for me  ( no possibility of, 
say, cerulean blue -- the color of a clear sky itself -- no cerulean leaves!) 
nor perhaps for any person with a normal color sense (i.e. not color blind, 
etc.) who might be looking up from such a spot.

I love dark chocolate (which, of course, also is never cerulean (not even such 
a deep, dark blue as cobalt blue), but prefer Belgian rather than Dutch bars of 
it, if you please, as I find the flavor of most fine Belgian chocolate somewhat 
subtler than the Dutch variety (same with beer and French fries and 
mayonnaise). :-) 

Best,

Gary

* 

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox



Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York








On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:29 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl > wrote:

Gary R,

Don't miss the distinction between qualities like 'hard' and the qualisigns. If 
you do the discussion becomes hilarious indeed.

You earn a box of bars of dark chocolate if you are able to scratch anything 
with the qualities i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] qualisigns

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

Novel phenomena give rise to a situation of doubt because there is no habit 
associated with that phenomenon. I want to have the posibility to talk about 
the formation of new habits. Only allowing habit change is too limited.

JAS: I am again having trouble making sense of the rest of the post below. 

I must admit that I did not state the intention. I projected box-x on the Bense 
scheme in order to show what you miss if you deny qualisigns.   is the 
logical situation in which any given interpreter (taken as a varable)  still 
does not know what situation (s)he is dealing with (TT, TF, FT or FF) when a 
sign (taken as a variable) inscribes itself on the sheet. In other words it 
describes a situation of doubt that is to be resolved in belief (whether true 
or false) on which it is possible to act.

And, I used the opportunity to argue in favor of an alpha, beta and gamma part 
of semiotics. The tinctures of the gamma part of EG were very helpful for me. 
Enabling the projection of the intentional and the eventual interpretant on a 
cominterpretant. For instance, the color of the dot indicating and 
distinguishing the different universes of discourse brought together. 

The relation of logic and semiotic is a very complicated one in my opinion. We 
have the utens and the docens of mathematical logic, and we have the 
sub-division Speculative Grammar, Critic and Rhetoric. We have to be conscious 
of the branch Peirce is writing in, if we want to decide the meaning of a term. 
In speculative grammar we talk about the mode of adress of term, proposition 
and argument. In critic we talk about composition, construction, truth and 
validity of terms, props and arguments. This may easily lead to 
misunderstanding. I think that Peirce's experiments with terms like seme, 
pheme/dicent and doleme are an attempt to avoid possible misunderstandings. 

The architectonic ordering: mathematics, including fromal logic [logic], 
phenemenology, speculative grammar [small classification], critic [logic], 
rethoric [welby classification], shows a layered approach to the relation of 
logic, as we know it as an academic discipline and semiotic.

Best,

Auke

 

> Op 2 mei 2020 om 3:35 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> I did not say that doubt is a habit, I said that a belief is a habit (of 
> conduct), such that "the resolution of doubt into belief" is a habit-change.
> 
> Since I deny that a quality in itself can be a sign of anything other 
> than itself--which is trivial, since everything is a sign of itself--I also 
> deny that there can be "collections of qualisigns."  As I said before, I 
> instead hold that there are tones embodied in tokens--"indefinite significant 
> character[s] such as a tone of voice" (CP 4.537, 1906)--which influence the 
> dynamical interpretants that those tokens determine.
> 
> I am again having trouble making sense of the rest of the post below.  I 
> will only point out that phaneroscopy is not "in between" logic and semeiotic 
> in Peirce's architectonic, unless "logic" here refers to strictly 
> formal/mathematical logic and not the normative science of logic (CP 4.240, 
> 1902); the latter, of course, is semeiotic (CP 1.191, 1903).  In phaneroscopy 
> we discern three irreducible elements in all phenomena, but only mediation 
> (3ns) is associated with signs.  Qualities (1ns) and reactions (2ns) are also 
> present to the mind, but not as signs.  Instead, we employ signs to think 
> about them subsequent to perceiving them, and this "cognitive resultant of 
> our past lives" constitutes our accumulated experience (CP 2.84, 1902).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 8:47 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon Alan, List,
> > 
> > I think that by now our discussion about interpretants has been 
> > carried trough to a sufficient degree. In the sense that the respective 
> > positions have been clarified as far as possible and no further gain is to 
> > be expected.
> > 
> > Yust one note about doubt supposed to be a habit. The method to 
> > resolve doubt can be called a habit (tenacity, etc.). But doubt itself is a 
> > secondness, a resistance, just like a tooth ache. Somewhere in the semiotic 
> > fabric a door proved shut and an interpretation process couldn't be 
> > completed satisfactory. Semiotics provides a strategy to systematically 
> > inspect the process and indicate whe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] qualisigns

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan, List,

I think that by now our discussion about interpretants has been carried trough 
to a sufficient degree. In the sense that the respective positions have been 
clarified as far as possible and no further gain is to be expected.

Yust one note about doubt supposed to be a habit. The method to resolve doubt 
can be called a habit (tenacity, etc.). But doubt itself is a secondness, a 
resistance, just like a tooth ache. Somewhere in the semiotic fabric a door 
proved shut and an interpretation process couldn't be completed satisfactory. 
Semiotics provides a strategy to systematically inspect the process and 
indicate where the obstruction resides and what to look for as a remedy. 

I only consider one subject deserving further discussion: qualisigns. It 
surprises me that you omit them. 

JAS: For example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, 
for the reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot represent 
something else as its object, it can only present itself. 

---

As a side remark I wrote "collection of qualities" and not just "quality".

You hit the hammer on the nail! Exactly. The question is: To what do they 
present themselves?

In analysis mode continuing. Collections of qualisigns present themselves to an 
interpreting thought in development, by being taken as a sign for some object. 
- I use the stages  Sarbo and farkas introduced-

First step is sorting, i.e. It gets severed from the interpreting sheet by 
appearing as a one time (with an indefinite beginning and end, etc.) iconic 
form (icon aspect, collection of qualities) written on the sheet (sinsign 
aspect).

Next comes abstraction. The form proves (un)familiar to the sheet (legisign 
aspect or doubt), but the completion of the process also depend on the 
interpretative interpretational possibilities a (un)familiar form offers to 
this sheet (Rheme aspect). 


By the way. I always regarded Claudio's nonagons to deal with this rhematic 
aspect. In short and incomplete: Take the Bense diagramm of the 9 sign aspects. 
Take something you are interested in. Claudio has a very nice one on color. Put 
color in the index position and start pondering color from the point of view of 
the different sign aspects. Like KiF, it is like doing a sudoku. A fascinating 
feat is the possibility to drill down in each field in order to arrange the 
items you found. In KiF you only drill down in the index position, in order to 
explicates the sub-processes, needed for completion of the process.


Next completion. The legisign may be indexically connected with a symbol, like 
for example 'horse'.  Lets just stick to part of a lexicon as rhematic 
possibilities of the sign and take 1. an animal and 2. a gymnastics device. 
Depending on the context the sheet is in, one of these possibilities (only 
potentially present) will surface (dynamical interpretant aspect). If the habit 
fits the situation, we have a satisfying result. As a side result, the normal 
interpretant gets strenghtend.  

How could we arive there, if the qualisigns did not present themselves?

it is of interest to note that already in 1868 Peirce remarked that `[. . . ] 
in no instant in my state of
mind there is cognition or representation, but in the relation of different 
instants there is.' 

[...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of mediation
-the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a
continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 22730

The step from stating that the unanalyzable runs in a coninuous stream through 
our lives, to the statement that
qualisigns enter the interpretational process by emerging on the Semiotic Sheet 
as an sinsign/icon adressing rheme and legisign, is not that great.

In box-x, the model Peirce created to generate the 16 booleans. First step take 
an x and put 00, 10, 10 and 11 in the 4 compartments. Step 2, repeat step one 
in each section, prefix the value we already have in that compartment.

Let  express the unintellectual, the unknowable that runs in a continuous 
stream through our lives (qualisigns)

And let  express all that can possibly be expressed by a sign, whether true 
or false in any assumed universe.


Over and against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable
reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the 
selfcontradictory.
Writings II, p. 208

hen,  box-x can be regarded as expressing what is logically involved in the 
process that runs from doubt to belief. Rotate the diamond and we get the Bense 
diagram, with qualisigns at the  position and  at the argument position 
and we established a link with the work of Claudio. Rotate again to its 
original position and we have KiF with the sign aspects on the nodes.

>From the point of view of architectonics here we have a nice example of how 
>logic and semiotic are related. The former delivering  the principles, the 
>latter the matter.  Phaneroscopy inbetween, 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


> while I indeed consider signs to be iconic/indexical/symbolic rather than 
> pure icons/indices/symbols, 
> 

re: I think we need to consider them from both angles. If we deal with 
interpretation processes we need the pure ones. The are needed to cover the 
apprehension of the sign as an object, the sign copy stage that we have 
virtually to go through before the meaning and effect of the sign develop 
themselves in a given interpreter.

> by contrast I view terms/propositions/arguments as sharply distinguished. 
> In other words, every sign is either a term, a proposition, or an argument.  
> As I recently summarized, every argument involves multiple propositions, and 
> every proposition involves multiple terms.
> 

re: Peirce does emphasize the mode of adress in the sign - interpretant 
relation, not the compositionality. suggestive only/term, statement of 
fact/prop. yes no, and providing a reason/argument.

cf: [. . . ] the diference between the Term, the Proposition, and the
Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not
so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally
intended to perform. (CP 4.572)

The intensional interpretant may be an argument, but the effectual interpretant 
may take this argument as a term that enters another process. A friend gets a 
stroke, after weeks you visit him. He starts talking and gives an argument in 
favor of the lock down (which he knows you opposed). Since you are curious 
about the damage done by the stroke, you do not take the argument as it is 
intended to be, instead you take the whole argument as a term, that, as 
indexically connected with the utterer, proves to be a proposition, that enters 
an argument with the conclusion: At first sight the damage at the least is 
limited. 

>   * A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or 
> a relative (triadic or higher).
>   * A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic 
> terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term).
>   * An argument is always a relative (involving two or more 
> propositions)
> 


JAS: In other words, we do not construct arguments from propositions, we 
prescind propositions from arguments.


I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my mumbling about input - 
output relations that are habitual, about which I talk in analysis mode.

Auke 


CSP:  I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and 
fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A 
proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of 
its premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional 
proposition at bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me 
nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or 
indefinite. ... This doctrine, which is in harmony with the above theory of 
signs, gives a great unity to logic ... (CP 3.440, 1896)

In existential graphs, the scroll corresponds to the "one primary and 
fundamental logical relation, that of illation," which is why the cut (or 
shading) for negation is derived from it rather than the other way around (CP 
4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906).  It is evident that "every proposition 
[is] a conditional proposition at bottom" from the fact that any EG is 
equivalent to the same EG in the inner close of a scroll with an empty outer 
close.

I look forward to receiving your feedback on this, as well as on my other 
recent posts.

Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
-http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 5:33 PM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
Jon, Helmut, List, 

Jon wrote:

JAS: At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic 
relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant is 
the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of 
Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and 
interpretant  themselves, but rather their relations  with the sign (CP 
2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary R.'s response 
earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them logically in a 
linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP 2:481,1908) results in 
the familiar 10 classes of signs. [Emphasis added by GR]



Thank you for your favorable response to my post. I was, however, a bit taken 
aback by your "quibble" above that " the second and third trichotomies of 
Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and 
interpretant  themselves , but rather their  relations  with the sign."

I was just about to furiously plunge into my CP and EP, esp. the former which I 
recalled had sections titled 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary f., list,

I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As far as 
JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already indicated 
that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read the 
unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the trouble.


I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view:

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

--

Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the 
total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished.  

1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the utterer; the EffectualInterpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, 
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in 
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.

---

Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its own 
identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply be 
reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 14:00 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, list,
> 
> Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an 
> excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a 
> responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these attacks — 
> and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry.
> 
> John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, 
> but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
> vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
> “cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your 
> own post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of 
> Peirce’s speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations 
> from Peirce, many of which have never been posted to the list before. 
> Apparently this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because 
> these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions 
> of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” 
> in which they would like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding 
> other scholars such as Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out 
> connections between one Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the 
> hypocrisy of this, you must have a girder in your own eye.
> 
> As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except 
> where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written 
> about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my 
> book, either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is 
> an exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater 
> part of the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or 
> two. The claim that he “denies it to others to have their interpretation of 
> Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those 
> others, is to build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative 
> grammar on a broad foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, 
> say so and say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more 
> or less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
> } Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice 
> of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {
> 
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition 
> conversation
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Auke van Breemen 
> Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List,
> 
> Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
> possible?
> 
> For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 
> 
>  
> 
> It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to 
> text exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a 
> science).
> 
> And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 
> 
> Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (inc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 


It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science).

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his 
writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Auke, List,
> 
> Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> 
> GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty 
> astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before; 
> I've done so myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.
> 
> Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> in order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of 
> disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the authority.
> 
> GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of 
> years. It always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is 
> patent.
> 
> Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> 
> GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first 
> said it (see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's 
> version:
> 
> > > 
> > Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out 
> > the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam 
> > that is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of 
> > thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is 
> > in thy brother's eye.
> > 
> > > 
> Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> 
> GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list 
> moderator, I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been 
> through this sort thing here before and even rather recently (last year). 
> This kind of double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've argued herel, 
> completely counter to forum culture. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
> 
> 
> 
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
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> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:53 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > List,
> > 
> > I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> > 
> > 
> > It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> > in order to uphold one's own a priori principles.
> > 
> > But only at the price of disregarding or disqualifying a lot of 
> > what has been written by the authority.
> > 
> > 
> > As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> > other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> > 
> > That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> > 
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Auke 
> > 
> > > 
>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

 
Jon Alen,

AvB:  So, in the end we proved not to communicate.

JAS: I am sincerely sorry that you see it that way.  I personally found it to 
be a stimulating discussion and appreciate the dialogue.
--

No need to feel sorry. I make a distinction between monologue, dialogue and 
communication. The difference between dialoque and communication being a common 
goal missing in dialogue and present in communication. 

There is stil another way of putting this. In negotiation we can imagine three 
extreme strategies: 
1. leaving each other at rest, Each entertaining its own monologue in persuit 
of its own goal. 'Indifference' is a suitable term for extreme cases.
2. trying to convince the other to adopt the own goal. A dialogue that at its 
extreme, in zero sum games, is 'conflict'
3. Clarifying the goal aimed at and working towards its realization. 'Goal 
orientedness' is a suitable term.

If we put this at the corners of a ternary plot, each interaction can be 
perceived to score somewhere as a mixture to some degree.

As a consequence of a suitable dash of indifference on both sides, we didn't 
get into outright conflict, but we also did not reach agreement on the goal, 
and thus also not about the means in reaching it. This does not exclude us to 
have profitted from it, looked at from the goal each of us entertains. 


Best,
Auke van Breemen






Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 2:00 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:

Jon Alan,

You wrote:

Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [

-

No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign segment 
of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in order to 
identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That would make 
things more difficult.

You wrote:

] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in 
speculative grammar. 

--

First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you 
think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative grammar? 
You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for you. As far as 
i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e. my interest is 
systematic not biographical. 

Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three 
interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be found 
in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of 
different terms, just to indicate the three very same interpretants every time. 
Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness?  

Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I 
was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot.

So, in the end we proved not to communicate.

Best,

Auke 

Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >:

Auke, List:

AvB:  You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the 
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its own 
qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects.

Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis, but rather the 
three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in speculative 
grammar.  Moreover, not all signs have further signs as their dynamical 
interpretants (usuals); some produce exertions (percussives), while others 
produce only feelings (sympathetics).

AvB:  ... the structure is given for the interpretant regarded as a sign 1. A;  
2. B. a.b.; 3. C. abc. 

That structure is given for any sign whatsoever, as follows (R 339:386[253r], 
1905 Oct 8).
* A is the "Division according to the matter of the sign," S = 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign.
* Under B are the "Divisions according to the Object."
o B.a is "According to the Immediate Object (how represented)," Oi = 
indefinite/singular/distributively general.
o Under B.b are the divisions "According to the Dynamic Object."
+ B.b.α is according to the "Matter of the Dynamic Object," Od = 
abstract/concrete/collection.
+ B.b.β is according to the "Mode of representing object," Od-S = 
icon/index/symbol.
* Under C are the "Division[s] according to Interpretant."
o C.a is "According to Immediate Interpretant (How represented)," Ii = 
clamatory/imperative/representative.
o Under C.b are the divisions "According to Dynamic Interpretant."
+ C.b.α is according to the "Matter of Dynamic Interpretant," Id = 
feeling/conduct/thought.
+ C.b.β is according to the "Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interp.," S-Id = by 
sympathy/compulsion/reason.
o Under C.c are the divisions "According to Representative Int

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce 
maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be 
that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same 
passage.

 

It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have 
Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three 
immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded the 
dynamical object.


JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine different interpretants.  
However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them that way

If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal arrangement, 
Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six interpretants. I 
follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the division according 
to interpretants in:

Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r


Best,

Auke



> Op 20 april 2020 om 3:30 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > JAS:  Peirce consistently maintains that there are 
> exactly three interpretants.
> > 
> > > 
> > > AvB:  This sentence most certainly is not true.
> > 
> > > 
> Please provide a citation or quote where Peirce assigns specific names to 
> more than three interpretants in the same passage.  Unless you can do that, I 
> stand by my statement.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  In the alpha part of semiotics it may seem so, but 
> not in the beta part (see my other mail) where he deals with the 
> interprtetation of the sign.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce did not designate "alpha" and "beta" parts of semeitoic, that is 
> your idea.  The same is true of your subsequent enumeration of six 
> interpretants, especially since you admit that "Peirce hemself did not 
> connect them directly."  In fact, everything that you outline below is in 
> accordance with your speculative grammar, not Peirce's, although it is 
> recognizably Peircean in spirit.  The same is true of my own approach, which 
> is different from both yours and his.  For example, since I understand the 
> immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical divisions to be 
> orthogonal to each other, there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine 
> different interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them 
> that way, just like I reject describing the 1903 taxonomy as having nine 
> different "sign aspects."
> 
> Instead, I maintain that there are exactly three interpretants--immediate 
> as whatever a type possibly could signify to someone with mere sign system 
> acquaintance (essential knowledge); dynamical as whatever a token with its 
> tones actually does signify to someone with relevant collateral 
> experience/observation (informed knowledge); and final as whatever the sign 
> itself necessarily would signify to someone in the ultimate opinion 
> (substantial knowledge).  I go on to add that the immediate interpretant 
> includes a range of possible feelings (emotional) for all signs, exertions 
> (energetic) for indexical and symbolic signs, and further signs (logical) for 
> symbolic signs; the dynamical interpretant is an actual feeling (emotional), 
> exertion (energetic), or further sign (logical); and the final interpretant 
> is a habit of feeling (emotional), action (energetic), or thought (logical).
> 
> Regards,
> 
>     Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 6:27 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon,
> > 
> > You wrote:
> > 
> > Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three 
> > interpretants.
> > 
> > -
> > 
> > This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of 
> > semiotics it may seem so, but not in the beta part  (see my other mail) 
> > where he deals with the interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count:
> > 
> > 1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign 
> > aspect
> > 
> > Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided 
> > into
> > 
> > 2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and
> > 
> > 3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect)
> > 
> > heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

 I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:
> > 
> > The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the 
> > command
> > is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that 
> > conduct
> > involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and 
> > recognizes
> > this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r,
> > October 9, 1905).
> > 
> > 1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the 
> > representative. not without reason because with normal Peirce looks at it 
> > from a truth functional perspective and with normal from a representative.
> > 
> > 2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between:
> > 
> > A.
> > 
> > The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of 
> > consciousness' (The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and became 
> > propositional for this interpreter. But still needed the representative 
> > content to enter the  argument, being put under the general rule of 
> > inference (representational interpretant) and judged on its truth value 
> > (normal i). It indicates a moment in a process of interpretation.
> > 
> > and B.
> > 
> > Dynamical interpretant as "The commanded act in the mere doing of 
> > it." In this case A must be fullfiled for B to happen. In A we are speaking 
> > in terms of sign aspects about the dynamical interpretant. In B it is a 
> > sign type, and it is the intended signtype in this argument (process) if 
> > communication is succesful. 
> > 
> > I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant' 
> > (aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for 
> > disambiguation pusposes.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > 
> > Auke van Breemen
> > 
> > > 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

Since it proves a recurrent theme, I  suggest we ought to try to find out what 
exactly is the meaning you attribute to the concept of God. 

You wrote:

God as the real and independent object that determines the entire universe as a 
sign.

--

And earlier you cited:

As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an 
argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out 
its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903).

--

I'd like to add to this Peirce's remark 'we have to choose between mammon 
(Greed, Trumps basic strategy, individualistic and setting communities against 
each other in a zero sum game) and god (conceived as pure reasonableness 
[community of investigators needed] that argumentatively works out its 
conclusions in living realities, Independend of what any individual might think 
but dependent on thought in general and thus realizes itself)'.  Along these 
lines Peirce's concept of god is a refinement of Comte who too bluntly equated 
the truth of science and god. And also of Spiniza who equated god=nature. 

What other characteristics do you attribute to the conception of god?

And what are the premisses of the argument in your take?

For me Peirce's conception of god is primarily to be looked at as the 
foundation (the recognition of reasonableness functioning somehow as the 
sublime in Kant) of a code of conduct and an urge not to rely on tenacity, 
authority or first principles, but on scientific method in the fixation of 
belief. In this case the premisses of the argument are 'reasonableness' and 
'living reality' that in their interaction determine the universe to be a sign.

best, Auke

> Op 18 april 2020 om 3:29 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> John, Edwina, Daniel, List:
> 
> Indeed, and I have never suggested any such thing, either; after all, it 
> would wrongly imply that metaphysics comes before semeiotic in a proper 
> classification of the sciences.  Peirce unambiguously has it the other way 
> around--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of 
> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" 
> (CP 1.487, c. 1896).  Accordingly, what I have suggested previously is that 
> semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible hypothesis of God as 
> the real and independent object that determines the entire universe as a 
> sign.  I know that you disagree with this, but we have debated it 
> sufficiently in the past and need not rehash those arguments.
> 
> Regards,
>  
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 10:03 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > John - thanks for your comment. I think that's an important point.
> > 
> > " Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for 
> > analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has 
> > suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently 
> > robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic."
> > 
> > Edwina 
> > 
> > On Fri 17/04/20 10:50 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net 
> > mailto:s...@bestweb.net sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Auke and Jon AS,
> > > 
> > > I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to 
> > > comment on the following point:
> > > 
> > > AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid 
> > > arguments in semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.
> > > 
> > > A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what 
> > > Peirce meant in his voluminous writings.  That is an important task for 
> > > Peirce scholars.   Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic 
> > > useful for analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, 
> > > has suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently 
> > > robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic.
> > > 
> > > John
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > 
> -
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> 
> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

I decided to insert our technical semiotic discussion in your exchange with 
Edwina. I noticed by the way that in 1. I at the end write normal where 
representative is ment.

You asked:

Just to be clear, are you suggesting a direct correspondence between the 
alpha/beta/gamma EGs and the 1903/hexadic/decadic sign taxonomies, or just a 
loose analogy? 

--

 

I am not suggesting a direct relation with EG. I am noticing that it is possible

1. to look at the sign

2. to look at the interpretational proces on the occasion a sign offers itself

3. to look at the interaction between two signs

As in logic (not just EG) it is possible to distinghuis propositional, first 
order predicate calculus and modal logic.

I take over alpha, beta and gamma because they are not prescriptive, but follow 
an order from less to increasing detail in the analyses and from first in the 
order of knowledge to later in that order. 

But with EG fruitful links can be established by a semiotician: the sheet of 
semiosis, the index and the line of identity, tinctures to distinguish 
different lines of identity, their universes of discourse and some more 
possibilities.


You wrote:

I am not aware of any solid arguments for treating the normal and final 
interpretants as different.  The various definitions that I just quoted in my 
last post seem to indicate that the two terms were virtually synonymous in 
Peirce's usage.  As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, 
specifically an argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's 
purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 
1903).

Maybe, this is the reason why you don't see the difference between normal and 
final interpretant.

Semiotics must be developed by a study of signs and sign processes, not by 
speculations on particular concepts of god, not even Peirce's. God or the 
conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in semiotics. My interest is 
systematical not biographical.

Best,

Auke


> Op 17 april 2020 om 3:38 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  ..  with the bones, i.e. the technical terms and 
> their arrangement YOU did a good job in sorting things out.
> > 
> > > 
> Thank you, I sincerely appreciate it.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  I do not know whether you recognized that as we 
> have an alpha, beta and gamma part of EG, we also have an alpha, beta and 
> gamma part of semiotics, i.e. the calssifications that yield 
> 10/propositional, 28/quantification and 66/modality.
> > 
> > > 
> Just to be clear, are you suggesting a direct correspondence between the 
> alpha/beta/gamma EGs and the 1903/hexadic/decadic sign taxonomies, or just a 
> loose analogy?  I am more inclined to see the 1903 and hexadic schemes as 
> almost entirely different--again, they have only one trichotomy in common, 
> the division according to the nature of the sign itself--and the decadic 
> approach as an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to combine and integrate the 
> other two.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, that only with the small classification it is 
> possible to correlate the sign aspects with the interpretant aspects 
> (emotional interpretant - qualisign, etc) ...
> > 
> > > 
> I disagree, although my current view is that the correlation is different 
> from anything that Peirce explicitly advocated.  The immediate interpretant 
> as a possibility pertains to a type, the dynamical interpretant as an 
> actuality pertains to a token with its tones, and the final interpretant as a 
> conditional necessity pertains to the sign itself.  All three are divisible 
> into emotional (feeling), energetic (exertion), and logical (further sign) 
> interpretants.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  ... and that this correlation is needed to come to 
> terms with interpretaional processes: it makes no sence to make distinctions 
> with regard to the sign if those distinctions do not play a role in the 
> proces of interpretation.
> > 
> > > 
> I agree, which is why I now try to focus more on analyzing the process of 
> semeiosis than on the classifying signs.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, since you take normal and final interpretant 
> as the very same, you generalize over grand scale sequences and there our 
> ways depart.
> > 
> > > 
> I am not aware of any solid arguments for treating the normal and final 
> interpretants as different.  The various definitions that I just quoted in my 
> last post seem to indicate that the two terms were virtually synonymous in 
> Peirce's usage.  As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, 
> specifically an argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's 
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 
> 2:193, 1903).
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  Did you read Hulswit's "A semiotic account of 
> causation"?
> > 
> > > 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief report on the pandemic from a Peircean triadic perspective by Fernando Zalamea

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina,

You wrote:

In my view, the citizen or government are Signs, full triads 
[Object-Representamen-Interpretant]. As such, they can interact with other full 
triad Signs using any of the six categorical modes, both genuine and degenerate 
[1-1, 2-2, 2-1, 3-3, 3-2, 3-1].

--

Also in my view, but  I keep insisting that it is possible to look at this 
complexus as a monad entering an interaction with another monad, the complexus 
being involved. For instance when describing an interaction and its ensuing 
proces of interpretation we just start with identifying the actors.  I don't 
think we disagree on this point. what is involved will evolve in the process of 
analizis. Which in order to be relatively complete must deal with two 
processes: 1. 'a,b-result'  and 2. 'b,a -result'.


You wrote:

3] You say that a citizen or government can be considered a monad [Firstness] 
.which then interacts [Secondness]..etc. I disagree with this, for it seems to 
be using the categories within a linear order, ie, setting them up as ordinals 
where First=Firstness, and Second=Secondness and Third=Thirdness. I disagree 
with such an analysis.

--

I can't easily respond to this for the risk of suffering from a lack of 
understanding the meaning. Do you state that you disagree with me raising that 
impression of linearity, knowing that I don't commit that fault or are you 
politely stating that I take matters linear?

If the latter, I disagree. In KiF the input output relation stands as a line 
perpendicular on the diamond, in the center at the index position, signifying 
the cotagation of all involved triadic relations. The plane is for analytical 
purposes. It is structured according to the categorical dependency relations, 
but has to be filled in with the telos of the proces of investigation in mind 
and explicated in the procress description.  

You wrote:

Although, I note that Peirce's cosmology puts Firstness as First]  And 
then...we begin to disagree.

--

For me the primacy issue is a matter of different ways of looking at matters. 
Akin to Aristotles remark on first in the order of being as contrasted to the 
order of knowledge.  Or Stampers distinction between a radical subjectivist and 
an actualist perspective on matters. As long as no ideological goals are served 
by the discussion, I am fine with either approach.

Auke


Op 9 april 2020 om 14:46 schreef Edwina Taborsky :



> 
> Auke - Thanks for your comments...I'll continue with my own comments
> 
> 1] I don't say that my view is not suited/or is suited to political 
> issues. I was only discussing the categorical mode of Thirdness, and since 
> Thirdness is an action providing rule-based continuity- then, of course, it 
> functions within the political or societal realm of life. Thirdness of 
> course, not does function alone [see 5.436]. None of the categories, really, 
> function alone.
> 
> 2] I agree therefore that the Sign, as a triad, is the point of departure 
> - not the nature of Thirdness. [Nor, indeed, are any of the categories the 
> 'point of departure'. Although, I note that Peirce's cosmology puts Firstness 
> as First]  And then...we begin to disagree.
> 
> 3] You say that a citizen or government can be considered a monad 
> [Firstness] .which then interacts [Secondness]..etc. I disagree with this, 
> for it seems to be using the categories within a linear order, ie, setting 
> them up as ordinals where First=Firstness, and Second=Secondness and 
> Third=Thirdness. I disagree with such an analysis.
> 
> In my view, the citizen or government are Signs, full triads 
> [Object-Representamen-Interpretant]. As such, they can interact with other 
> full triad Signs using any of the six categorical modes, both genuine and 
> degenerate [1-1, 2-2, 2-1, 3-3, 3-2, 3-1].
> 
> So, if we use as an example, a government or society as a full triadic 
> Sign, then, it could be reacting to the action of another government or 
> agency [its Object] within a mode of Secondness [eg, 9-11]; where the govt, 
> first reacts to the impact of 2ns, and the Immediate Interpretant is in a 
> mode of 1ns; the next is 2ns - and then, using its knowledge base within the 
> Representamen, the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. But these are not 
> linear; they are 'experiences' so to speak and more complex.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> On Thu 09/04/20 4:28 AM , Auke van Breemen a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
> 
> > > 
> > Edwina, 
> > 
> > Thanks for the clarification.  It seems to point to the difference 
> > in our respective approaches, and I agree that yours is not ideally suited 
> > to adress political issues. For completeness sake: for me, a sign that 
> > fulfills its sign-function in raising interpretant signs (responses) is

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief report on the pandemic from a Peircean triadic perspective by Fernando Zalamea

[Auke van Breemen]

pulation - well, I think we could analyze such a framework. Not easy 
> > > of course.
> > > 
> > > But the article did not deal with the categories in this way; 
> > > instead, it simply too each category 'in itself' and judged how it would 
> > > operate as the guiding principle of a society. I disagree with such a 
> > > tactic for the reasons I already gave.
> > > 
> > > Edwina
> > > 
> > >  
> > > 
> > > On Tue 07/04/20 10:10 AM , Auke van Breemen 
> > > a.bree...@upcmail.nl sent:
> > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > Edwina, list,
> > > > 
> > > > I feel inclined to give a less unfavorite response to 
> > > > the suggestion, although the way of putting things is too crude. 
> > > > 
> > > > if we want to look at diferent kinds of governments 
> > > > from a categorical perspective. The first thing we must admid is that 
> > > > always the categorical distinction must be taken in a relative way, 
> > > > i.e. it is about a firstness, secondness and thirdness aspect of a 
> > > > third.  
> > > > 
> > > > If taken in this way we could design a Trikon (taken as 
> > > > a ternary plot), dealing with control in society. First monad is self 
> > > > control or anarchy, second node is complete control or dictatorship and 
> > > > the third is representive government with free elections.
> > > > 
> > > > Now, it is immediately evident that all governments we 
> > > > score on the trikon partake in all three aspects but differ in the 
> > > > mixture.
> > > > 
> > > > With respect to the pandemic, we must accept that at 
> > > > this moment we cannot say which type of political response  proves 
> > > > best. What we can do is wait for the results, investigate the measures 
> > > > taken and associate them with a score on the Trikon. And next look at 
> > > > the consequences each of the governments harvested.
> > > > 
> > > > But all that is stuff to be discussed on the list and 
> > > > elsewhere. I guess the main intent after the message was: in harsh 
> > > > times people are inclined to look after each other, lets not forget 
> > > > keeping doing that once the cirsis is resolved. I symphatize with that.
> > > > 
> > > > Kind regards,
> > > > 
> > > > Auke van Breemen
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Op 7 april 2020 om 14:44 schreef Edwina Taborsky :
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > I disagree completely with this politicization of 
> > > > > the Peircean categories. I consider that is shows a complete 
> > > > > misunderstanding of the categories. I won't comment on the, what I 
> > > > > feel are incorrect, political references. Just the description of the 
> > > > > categories.
> > > > > 
> > > > > I disagree that Firstness can be compared to 
> > > > > 'capitalism' which is, after all, an economic system based around the 
> > > > > individual freedom of private enterprise; I disagree that Firstness 
> > > > > refers only to the individual 'I'  and even 'should' disappear.
> > > > > 
> > > > > All three categories in the Peircean framework 
> > > > > are necessary categories and none of them should be reduced or are 
> > > > > 'privileged'.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Edwina
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > >  
> > > > > 
> > > > > On Mon 06/04/20 10:37 PM , Gary Richmond 
> > > > > gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > List,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Below is a brief report  which the 
> > > > >

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List,

 

Regarding Stampers Ladder you wrote: my interests have changed considerably in 
the baker's dozen of years since I wrote that paper and …

 

RE: The ‘might’ in ‘you might be interested’ wasn’t meant as  ‘you should’, but 
as a polite alternative to  ‘may’. 

My aim was not to get you reading Stamper, but to show that from practical need 
somebody extended the amount of layers in such a way that somebody interested 
in nagging about the technical terms of semiotics and their relations, could 
recognize this as fitting with the Peircean scheme and decided to try to put 
the idea further in such a way that all sign aspects are covered.

 

This example seemed especially fit since, lately, I see some quit 
fundamentalist attitude on this list regarding the interpretation of Peircean 
semiotics. If you look at the foundation of those attempt, it strikes me that 
the one seems to originate in turning speculative grammar to the end all of the 
enterprise and the other the semantic layer. If we do this when interested in 
information systems (as well man as an information system as in building them 
for organizations) then not only such enterprises fall short in coming to terms 
with the subject matter. They also tend to block the way of inquiry. Each sign 
aspect provides another perspective on the problem and each aspect has its own 
telos. The question ought not to be ‘who is right according to Peirce’, but how 
do we connect the different perspectives? 

 

When a student, I bought a worn reproduction because I wanted the frame it was 
put in. When home I hung it at the wall and soon decided to keep it because it 
showed three reformation ladies reading the holy bible. 1. One was intensely 
scrutinizing the text (Jon, John). 2. The other reads it at an arm’s length 
(Tom Short, with the first involved, he did a great job in his books on 
understanding Peirce, and remained critical), 3. with the third the book on her 
lap, while see looked around (Edwina, Dan). 

It nicely expresses the way one should deal with the philosopher one has a 
particular interest in, as a safeguard for an uncritical attitude. 

 

 

With regard to the example. 

Let’s take the DSM classification of autism. The label z is deemed applicable 
if x out of x+y characteristics is applicable, where x+y=characteristics of z.  
Let x be the characteristics pertaining to information processing and let y be 
the characteristics pertaining to empathy and social behavior. 

Now a parent and a school disagree regarding a child/pupil having z. If we now 
turn the attention to each of the characteristics, it will prove the case that 
on that score, there is less divergence in opinion. On top of that, in many 
cases the characteristics that remain contested prove to result from the 
context the child is in, i.e. home for the parents and school for the 
authorities. For me it is an expression of “inconsistencies arise at the level 
of axioms” at the social level and “they can usually accept lower-level facts 
without creating any conflict”. 

 

Hope this is more clearly stated.

 

Best,

Auke van Breemen

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond  
Verzonden: maandag 1 april 2019 21:11
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

 

Auke, List,

 

Thank you for reading my paper on interoperability. It would appear that a 
great deal of work has been done in that area since I presented that paper as 
the keynote at a workshop developed by Aldo de Moor, Harry Delugach, and Simon 
Polovina at ICCS 2006. While interoperability continues to be, it seems to me, 
a vexing problem, it has appeared to me that clear advances have been made in 
the past decade.

 

I read some of Ronald Stamper's work years ago, but I must admit that my 
interests have changed considerably in the baker's dozen of years since I wrote 
that paper and, the following year, one on enterprise and inter-enterprise 
systems architecture:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic_architectonic.pdf
 _

 

You quoted me quoting John Sowa from the interoperability paper:

 

JS: The point is the UF is primarily intended as a framework for communication 
among potentially (or actually) incompatible systems. The major inconsistencies 
arise at the level of axioms, which none of these systems would accept from one 
another. But they can usually accept lower-level facts without creating any 
conflict.

 

And commenting on "[systems] can usually accept lower-level facts without 
creating any conflict" wrote:

 

AvB: It is supported in my research at the social level.

 

I would be interested in hearing more about this (your single example wasn't 
entirely clear to me).

 

Best,

 

Gary

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

 

 

 

On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 9:49 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> &

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Auke van Breemen]

itysense.nl 

many of these principles gleaned from his years of attending John Sowa's/Mary 
Keeler's ICCS conferences, listening to, reading and writing papers, giving and 
auditing talks, and organizing and participating in seminars either about or 
related to Peirce's work. For a time he was quite actively using Sowa's 
Conceptual Graphs (built on Peirce's EGs) in his work. With all this in mind, 
I'm going to forward your paper to him, Auke. You continued:

 

AvB: For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will 
see that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoretical.  
Without that work I would never have imagined to try to incorporate it in my 
application. It proved gold because it enables me to have participants in my 
method explicate their position in such a way that contestants in a conflict 
can compare their differences in a systematic way. 

 

I'm gratified that my Trikonic inspired your work. Occasionally I'll receive an 
off-list note or link telling me how that work is being used in a context I'd 
never imagined it being used in (although tricategorial thinking by its very 
nature ought to be, in my view, applicable to any number of fields). 

 

So, I agree with you, Edwina, and Dan that, as Dan wrote:

 

DE: Always the point was to use his ideas to do empirical work.

 

And as Auke somewhat metaphorically wrote:

 

AvB: ". . .in the end, it must be the fruit of application that proves the 
worth of the tree.

 

Or as Edwina put it, Peirce's pragmatism concerns:

 

ET: ". . .the powerful functionality of his analytic framework when used in 
examining and explaining our real world, its operation and our interactions 
with that world. :

 

Yet, as I see it, there remains considerable work yet remaining for developing 
and explicating Peirce's theories and this includes refining, as it were, with 
an eye especially to its pragmatic use, his terminology. After all, as Auke 
just wrote: 

 

AvB: . . .one pins down an conceptual infrastructure with the help of ‘terms 
and their relationship’.

 

And, while I found Dan's overgrown beanstalk metaphor spot on, I would tend to 
strongly agree with Auke's conclusion regarding Peirce's terminology. 

 

AvB: . . . I like to be able to inspect that framework as to its build [I take 
this to mean, "how it's constructed"?] and for that I find the technical term 
distinctions that Peirce made very inspiring. / / / The focus is on the 
understanding of semiosis, the tools are the technical terms.  Its good to keep 
inspecting and comparing ones tools.

 

As I've repeatedly said in this forum over the years, it seems to me that there 
is no good reason why work in one should exclude work in the other; that is, 
there is no reason why the development of theory (I, for example, am very 
interested in the possible development of Peirce's phenomenology and technical 
terminology will most certainly play a part in that) and practice (as suggested 
by the examples Auke, Dan, and Edwina offered) can't operate side by side if 
not quite hand in hand. In my opinion hostility to one or ignoring one are 
equally unwise because finally unbalanced. While it may be necessary to 
concentrate on one and not the other at any given time (and this is something 
Peirce strongly suggested and was, indeed, his practice), in my view both are 
essential.

 

Best,

 

Gary 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

 

 

 

On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 11:43 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

Dan, Edwina, List,

 

I agree with Dan and Edwina with an however in favor of work on the semiotic 
engine and its make up in the technical terms that shy off the general public.

 

Since I started analyzing design processes of artist in the late 80’íes I tried 
to combine an empirical bend with an interest of modelling the situation 
graphically in technical semiotical terms. The general scheme Dan and Edwina 
point to (and as I understand it in my own undoubtedly very personal way, which 
itself evolves along the way) functioning as the hard core of the research 
program.  I shifted from the production of objects made in arts to personal 
development and from there to interactions. Resulting in the application of a 
semiotically grounded method for conflict resolving in an educational setting, 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf   (it 
is of wider use, I extended the model and used it in a commercial domain).

 

However: This I could only do because I always tried to model semiosis in 
semiotic terms. And, because others on this list, and elsewhere (Sarbo, 
Farkas), were trying to come to grips with the technical side of semiotics. 

For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will see 
that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoret

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Auke van Breemen]

diting talks, and organizing and participating in seminars either about or 
related to Peirce's work. For a time he was quite actively using Sowa's 
Conceptual Graphs (built on Peirce's EGs) in his work. With all this in mind, 
I'm going to forward your paper to him, Auke. You continued:

 

AvB: For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will 
see that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoretical.  
Without that work I would never have imagined to try to incorporate it in my 
application. It proved gold because it enables me to have participants in my 
method explicate their position in such a way that contestants in a conflict 
can compare their differences in a systematic way. 

 

I'm gratified that my Trikonic inspired your work. Occasionally I'll receive an 
off-list note or link telling me how that work is being used in a context I'd 
never imagined it being used in (although tricategorial thinking by its very 
nature ought to be, in my view, applicable to any number of fields). 

 

So, I agree with you, Edwina, and Dan that, as Dan wrote:

 

DE: Always the point was to use his ideas to do empirical work.

 

And as Auke somewhat metaphorically wrote:

 

AvB: ". . .in the end, it must be the fruit of application that proves the 
worth of the tree.

 

Or as Edwina put it, Peirce's pragmatism concerns:

 

ET: ". . .the powerful functionality of his analytic framework when used in 
examining and explaining our real world, its operation and our interactions 
with that world. :

 

Yet, as I see it, there remains considerable work yet remaining for developing 
and explicating Peirce's theories and this includes refining, as it were, with 
an eye especially to its pragmatic use, his terminology. After all, as Auke 
just wrote: 

 

AvB: . . .one pins down an conceptual infrastructure with the help of ‘terms 
and their relationship’.

 

And, while I found Dan's overgrown beanstalk metaphor spot on, I would tend to 
strongly agree with Auke's conclusion regarding Peirce's terminology. 

 

AvB: . . . I like to be able to inspect that framework as to its build [I take 
this to mean, "how it's constructed"?] and for that I find the technical term 
distinctions that Peirce made very inspiring. / / / The focus is on the 
understanding of semiosis, the tools are the technical terms.  Its good to keep 
inspecting and comparing ones tools.

 

As I've repeatedly said in this forum over the years, it seems to me that there 
is no good reason why work in one should exclude work in the other; that is, 
there is no reason why the development of theory (I, for example, am very 
interested in the possible development of Peirce's phenomenology and technical 
terminology will most certainly play a part in that) and practice (as suggested 
by the examples Auke, Dan, and Edwina offered) can't operate side by side if 
not quite hand in hand. In my opinion hostility to one or ignoring one are 
equally unwise because finally unbalanced. While it may be necessary to 
concentrate on one and not the other at any given time (and this is something 
Peirce strongly suggested and was, indeed, his practice), in my view both are 
essential.

 

Best,

 

Gary 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

 

 

 

On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 11:43 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

Dan, Edwina, List,

 

I agree with Dan and Edwina with an however in favor of work on the semiotic 
engine and its make up in the technical terms that shy off the general public.

 

Since I started analyzing design processes of artist in the late 80’íes I tried 
to combine an empirical bend with an interest of modelling the situation 
graphically in technical semiotical terms. The general scheme Dan and Edwina 
point to (and as I understand it in my own undoubtedly very personal way, which 
itself evolves along the way) functioning as the hard core of the research 
program.  I shifted from the production of objects made in arts to personal 
development and from there to interactions. Resulting in the application of a 
semiotically grounded method for conflict resolving in an educational setting, 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf   (it 
is of wider use, I extended the model and used it in a commercial domain).

 

However: This I could only do because I always tried to model semiosis in 
semiotic terms. And, because others on this list, and elsewhere (Sarbo, 
Farkas), were trying to come to grips with the technical side of semiotics. 

For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will see 
that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoretical.  Without 
that work I would never have imagined to try to incorporate it in my 
application. It proved gold because it enables me to have participants in my 

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina,

 

Since we are in metatalk about semiotics and its importance I take your 
comments as refinements and not as criticism. As are mine remarks between your 
lines.

Auke - thanks for your post. A few comments.

1] I disagree that the analysis of Peirce is Either to focus on the terminology 
OR - there is no analysis but the focus is for the use of 'the general public'.

The research that makes use, even without using Peircean terms, but makes use 
of the basic analytic infrastructure - within the informational sciences, 
within the biological sciences, within cognitive and neurological research, 
within organic chemistry, within economic dynamics, within linguistic 
development - is NOT part of the 'general public's focus'. It's scientific. 

RE: I agree. I didn’t mean it exclusively. My remark is motivated by the 
struggle I had to go through before I at long last found a way to get the 
general scheme to the public.  As a matter of fact I did also profit from far 
less by technical semiotic terms steered research because it followed the basic 
analytic infrastructure. 

2] The use of the terms - or concepts - of the semiotic triad of O-R-I [and 
subsets] and the dynamics of the three modal categories, no matter how they are 
termed in the above research areas - is not focused on 'which term is the 
correct term' - but on the CONCEPTS of semiosis. Again -even if the researchers 
are not using semiotic terms. They are using that analytic framework - and any 
work on our part to expand the knowledge of the Peircean analytic framework - 
provides, in my view, a powerful tool to deal with areas in the above sciences. 
This expansion of use has nothing to do with terminology but with the 
conceptual infrastructure of semiosis.

Re: of course, but one pins down an conceptual infrastructure with the help of 
‘terms and their relationship’.

3] With regard to your use of Peircean semiotics - as you outline:

" I shifted from the production of objects made in arts to personal development 
and from there to interactions. Resulting in the application of a semiotically 
grounded method for conflict resolving in an educational setting, "...[and] 
..".how the sign aspects are related to the interpretants, Peirce 
distinguishes, when a sign is inscribed in a sheet in its actual state"

This is a pragmatic use of Peirce. Pragmatically using the Peircean 
infrastructure means you CAN use his terms - or - you can use other terms. 

RE: see my response to 1]

4] My point is that Peirce's vast work carried out over so many years is NOT 
something that is focused on terminology, which would confine it strictly to 
the elite seminar rooms, but is a powerful analytic framework for examining and 
understanding the real objective world. 

RE: And again. But of course. However I like to be able to inspect that 
framework as to its build and for that I find the technical term distinctions 
that Peirce made very inspiring. On top of that. Peirce started with 
similarities in his earliest work and throughout his career he added layer 
after layer, coining terms in high frequency. The focus is on the understanding 
of semiosis, the tools are the technical terms.  Its good to keep inspecting 
and comparing ones tools. 

Best,

 

Auke

 

 

 

Edwina

 

On Sat 30/03/19 11:43 AM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl 
<mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl>  sent:

Dan, Edwina, List,

 

I agree with Dan and Edwina with an however in favor of work on the semiotic 
engine and its make up in the technical terms that shy off the general public. 

 

Since I started analyzing design processes of artist in the late 80’íes I tried 
to combine an empirical bend with an interest of modelling the situation 
graphically in technical semiotical terms. The general scheme Dan and Edwina 
point to (and as I understand it in my own undoubtedly very personal way, which 
itself evolves along the way) functioning as the hard core of the research 
program.  I shifted from the production of objects made in arts to personal 
development and from there to interactions. Resulting in the application of a 
semiotically grounded method for conflict resolving in an educational setting, 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf   (it is 
of wider use, I extended the model and used it in a commercial domain).

 

However: This I could only do because I always tried to model semiosis in 
semiotic terms. And, because others on this list, and elsewhere (Sarbo, 
Farkas), were trying to come to grips with the technical side of semiotics. 

For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will see 
that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoretical.  Without 
that work I would never have imagined to try to incorporate it in my 
application. It proved gold because it enables me to have participants in my 
method explicate their position in such a way that co

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Auke van Breemen]

Dan, Edwina, List,

 

I agree with Dan and Edwina with an however in favor of work on the semiotic 
engine and its make up in the technical terms that shy off the general public.

 

Since I started analyzing design processes of artist in the late 80’íes I tried 
to combine an empirical bend with an interest of modelling the situation 
graphically in technical semiotical terms. The general scheme Dan and Edwina 
point to (and as I understand it in my own undoubtedly very personal way, which 
itself evolves along the way) functioning as the hard core of the research 
program.  I shifted from the production of objects made in arts to personal 
development and from there to interactions. Resulting in the application of a 
semiotically grounded method for conflict resolving in an educational setting, 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf   (it 
is of wider use, I extended the model and used it in a commercial domain).

 

However: This I could only do because I always tried to model semiosis in 
semiotic terms. And, because others on this list, and elsewhere (Sarbo, 
Farkas), were trying to come to grips with the technical side of semiotics. 

For example, everybody reading the Springer Quality of service text will see 
that I am inspired by Gary R’s Trikonic, which I class as theoretical.  Without 
that work I would never have imagined to try to incorporate it in my 
application. It proved gold because it enables me to have participants in my 
method explicate their position in such a way that contestants in a conflict 
can compare their differences in a systematic way. I leave out the valuable 
influence of many others on this list. 

 

It must be an interplay between both interests. It is also important to try to 
model the process of interpretation in semiotic terms for its own sake.  The 
key to that in my take is showing how the sign aspects are related to the 
interpretants, Peirce distinguishes, when a sign is inscribed in a sheet in its 
actual state. In that respect he left an interesting, still incomplete and as 
to its constituent pieces debated puzzle.

 

But of course, in the end, it must be the fruit of application that proves the 
worth of the tree.

 

Best Auke

 

 

 

Van: Dan Everett  
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 maart 2019 14:55
Aan: tabor...@primus.ca
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce

 

I agree with Edwina . Peirce himself left strong indications that some of his 
finer terminological distinctions were likely to be unimportant for research 
purposes, which was his main concern. 

 

Always the point was to use his ideas to do empirical work.

 

The kind of article that Edwina links to is a beautiful example of the kind of 
thing that would have really interested Peirce. 

 

I think of Peircean terminology as a beanstalk he planted. It grew far too 
large in many ways. But the science, the math, the logic, these are the things 
of true lasting importance. 

 

Dan 

Sent from my iPad


On Mar 30, 2019, at 9:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky <  
tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

In my view, the basis of Peirce is not which term is to be used when and where 
- although I acknowledge that such a descriptive outline can be fascinating for 
some - but my view is that Peirce is really 'all about pragmatics'; i.e., the 
powerful functionality of his analytic framework when used in examining and 
explaining our real world, its operation and our interactions with that world. 
This analytic framework - which functions regardless of the terms used - is, to 
me, 'the basic Peirce' - and can be of great insight in many disciplines.

 Here is an example. My minimal computer skills didn't allow me to copy more 
than once - so, I've left out the vital title and authors. It's in the online 
journal Entropy. The link below should get anyone interested to the site. My 
point is NOT to open discussion on the actual article - but to show how the 
Peircean analytic framework, which to me, consists of that dynamic triad 
[O-R-I] with its subsets and the powerful three categories -  is the basic 
pragmatic infrastructure of our entire world. 

The article below is about information dynamics - and - note the terms of 
'majority-logic decoding' [another term for 3ns???], and 'single unit 
transformations' [2ns???]...and entropy [1ns??] ….And non-equilibrium  dynamics 
[the triadic semiosic process??]

""We investigate the performance of majority-logic decoding in both reversible 
and finite-time information erasure processes performed on macroscopic bits 
that contain N microscopic binary units. While we show that for reversible 
erasure protocols single-unit transformations are more efficient than 
majority-logic decoding, the latter is found to offer several benefits for 
finite-time erasure processes: Both the minimal erasure duration for a given 
erasure and the minimal erasure error for a given erasure duration are 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities...

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon, List,

 

Gary already did a great job in furnishing arguments in favor of keeping in  
mind, that talk about signs of course can be done shorthand, but that it is 
wise to keep in mind the other relata, if the focus is on one of them.

 

Jon, I do not know where your idea comes form, i.e. that talk in terms of sign 
aspects is giving s special value to the first sign trichotomy. The first 
trichotomy only posits the possibility of a sign in actu. In order to have a 
description of a sign in action a pick out of all three trichotomies is needed. 

 

What is the sense of making distinctions between different type of signs on the 
basis of sign aspects (whether kept hidden or spelled out), if those aspects do 
not play a role in the interpretation process? But then we will need them all.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: vrijdag 29 maart 2019 14:35
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was 
Ambiguities...

 

Gary R., List:

 

GR:  Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of 
icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival form 
appears less frequently doesn't address the crucial fact that Peirce 
wrote:"Signs are divisible by three trichotomies ..."

 

But notice what Peirce said all three trichotomies divide--Signs.  A Qualisign 
(Tone) is a Sign, a Sinsign (Token) is a Sign, and a Legisign (Type) is a Sign. 
 An Icon is a Sign, an Index is a Sign, and a Symbol is a Sign.  A Rheme (Seme) 
is a Sign, a Dicisign (Proposition) is a Sign, and an Argument is a Sign.

 

GR:  Again, we all call such signs "Rhemes"--but Rhemes ARE Legisigns.

 

According to the 1903 taxonomy, some Rhemes are Legisigns; others are Sinsigns, 
and still others are Qualisigns.  Likewise, some Rhemes are Symbols; others are 
Indices, and still others are Icons.  Any number of trichotomies can be used to 
classify Signs--the ten from 1906-1908 result in 66 classes of Signs, the three 
from 1903 produce ten classes of Signs, and any one division by itself 
designates three classes of Signs.

 

GR:  So, any and all symbols are legisigns. To paraphrase Tevye in Fiddler on 
the Roof, would it spoil some vast, eternal plan if, when we think of symbols 
we also think that they are all legisigns? But further, that not all legisigns 
are symbols.

 

No one is disputing any of this.  My point--and what I take to be Gary F.'s 
point, as well--is that it is a mistake to overemphasize Peirce's usage of 
adjectives vs. nouns in naming the Sign classes, as if the division according 
to the nature of the Sign itself is somehow more significant than the other 
two.  A Rhematic Indexical Legisign is just as much a Rheme and an Index as it 
is a Legisign.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 8:02 AM Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

List,

 

Before I sign off on this topic (pun intended), I just want to add a little 
something to help, I hope, get at--not what I've been arguing, since in that 
matter I've said pretty much all I can think of to say--but why I've been 
arguing for a thoughtful consideration of what Peirce calls the "the sign in 
itself".

 

Take for example, the symbol. When we refer to a "symbol" we know that it will 
be either a rheme, a dicisign, or an argument. And conversely, and quite 
obviously, when we think of any of these three, at least in the back of our 
minds we're aware that each and all are symbols. Now, in a passage I quoted in 
my last post Peirce states that "any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the 
nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign." So, any and all symbols are 
legisigns. 

 

To paraphrase Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof, would it spoil some vast, eternal 
plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all legisigns?

 

But further, that not all legisigns are symbols. Symbols are, in Peirce's 
parlance, the only "genuine" signs, but some "degenerate" signs are analyzed by 
him as legisigns. I mentioned sign no. 7 in my last message as an example of a 
legisign which is not a symbol: the Dicent Indexical Legisign ("a street cry"). 
But so are signs no. 5 and 6.

 

As I see it, Peirce put a lot of thought and time and meaning into the 
classification of signs which appears in "Nomenclature," and I for one think we 
ought to reflect on why Peirce considered the types of "the sign in itself"  
(which, again, is either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign) as significant. 

 

OK. Now I'll drop the mic--I'm done.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities...

[Auke van Breemen]

John, List,

Regarding:
JAS
> Drawing attention to something actual is denoting that Object, which 
> is the function of an Index (EP 2:306-307; 1904); and a Rheme 
> obviously can be an Index, so it is false that a Rheme "can refer only 
> to possible objects."

No.  A rheme is never an index.

I prefer terms like Rhematic in order to underscore that it always is about 
sign aspects, and if those terms are used pars pro toto, I always take them as 
a short hand for a sign aspect complex that is left indefinite as to its 
constituents.

Although a rheme cannot perform an indexical function, we may single out an 
indexical, rhematical legisign. When we think of a composite sentence like 
"there is a cow". 'there' is the replica index and 'a cow' the symbolical, 
rhematic legisign of the compound forged by the copula. 

I don't see any harm in distinguishing an index as a possible, without actual 
indexical function and an index in actu.

Kind regards,

Auke


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen, Gary F, list,

 

 

In general I agree with your response to John, just a small remark on your 
comment on Gary F.

 

GF:  Peirce never says that Semeiotic is a Normative Science ... there is no 
single context in Peirce where he applies all three of the words Normative, 
Logic and Semeiotic to a single science.

 

But he did say in CP 1.191 that logic is a Normative Science, "may be regarded 
as the science of the general laws of signs," and has three 
branches--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic.  Are you really going 
to quibble over the absence of the word "Semeiotic," when that is 
unquestionably what he had in mind?

--

 

In my opinion critic and methodeutic are normative, I agree to that since it 
draws lines between good and bad in their domain. But speculative grammar just 
sets out the basic make up of signs as they are in themselves: sign definition, 
the three (or later 10 Welby) relations with their trichotomies. Speculative 
grammer mirrors the first sign relation, the relation of sign to object 
introduces truth and falsity (critic), the relation with its interpretant 
effectiveness (methodeutic). The only possible candidate for a normative import 
would be esthetics, but then we already are contemplating the sign in relation 
to a possible interpreter, hence an interpretant thought. I think it is this 
Gary F. is thinking about.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sun, Mar 10, 2019 at 11:12 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Slight correction: Peirce does use the broader sense of “Logic” in CP 1.191 
(EP2:260), in the later part of his “Classification,” but he does not 
distinguish between the two senses, nor does he refer to the broader sense as 
“Semeiotic” (as he does elsewhere). This confuses the two senses, and 
contributes to our confusion about how to incorporate Semiotic into the 
classification. But Peirce can be forgiven because this text is only supposed 
to be an Outline.

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
Sent: 10-Mar-19 11:18

Gary R, Jon, John, list,

I am pretty much in agreement with what John said in his most recent post, but 
I’d like to take a step back a bit and try to explain where this terminological 
tangle is coming from, because some of Peirce’s most important ideas are 
entangled in it. 

The three key words are “logic”, “normative” and “semeiotic.” The first two 
were in common use among philosophers of Peirce’s time, and they involve 
ambiguities which are not problematic in most contexts, but become so when we 
combine them with the word “semeiotic”, which was not commonly used in Peirce’s 
time. So we need to look closely at Peirce’s usage of all three words, one at a 
time, in order to see why the combination “normative logic as semeiotic” did 
not and could not occur in Peirce’s own texts. Only then will we have a clear 
idea of what this phrase can mean for Peirceans.

Let’s start with “logic.” Some of the ambiguities lurking behind this term can 
be glimpsed at the beginning of the article on it in Baldwin’s Dictionary 
(1902, http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Logic):

[[ Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes 
concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. Nearly 
a hundred definitions of it have been given. It will, however, generally be 
conceded that its central problem is the classification of arguments, so that 
all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good 
into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be 
not known whether the arguments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to 
divide good arguments by recognizable marks into those which have different 
orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of 
arguments. 

An approach to such a classification is made by every man whenever he reasons, 
in the proper sense of that term. It is true that the contemplation of a state 
of things believed to be real may cause the contemplator to believe something 
additional, without making any classification of such sequences. But in that 
case he does not criticize the procedure, nor so much as distinctly reflect 
that it is just. He can, consequently, not exercise any control over it. Now, 
that which is uncontrollable is not subject to any normative laws at all; that 
is, it is neither good nor bad; it neither subserves an end nor fails to do so. 
]]

The article goes on to make the distinction between logica utens and logica 
docens, which I will assume is familiar to readers of this thread. But not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem

[Auke van Breemen]

Stephen,

As a cautionary remark. I found there is an astonishing amount of variation 
between people labeled with autism on many different axis. To name just one. 
Some start talking about their interest and do not stop, others remain silent. 
And with the first some concentrate on facts, others on theory. So I find it 
hard to find traits definitely shared by all. 

Thanks for your insightful response. I stressed the way in which attention is 
regulated because I often met people with the power to decide that talked about 
"etching in" more social behavior and stressed the lack of an ability for 
compassion. With both I disagree. First task is to get an interest for what you 
want to make clear. And, because of the variation, the decision taker must have 
attention for the traits of the specific subject (s)he is judging. 

I think both are interrelated. 

Best,

Auke van Breemen

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Stephen Jarosek  
Verzonden: donderdag 21 februari 2019 11:28
Aan: 'Auke van Breemen' ; 'Peirce-L' 

Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy 
problem

>"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that 
>depends on the hypothesis you work with?"

Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes us to 
assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the autistic that 
needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a circuitry fix. But if we 
re-interpret the autistic's perspective as their way of understanding their 
world according to their assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of 
being better able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much 
the same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness, argues 
that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we think it through, 
schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but originating in a 
dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation deficit manifests itself when 
the schizophrenic exits the dysfunctional family context and tries to connect 
with the wider cultural).

It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong or silly 
and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be very sensible and 
logical, and need to be understood in the context in which they were arrived 
at. For example, hyper-rationality... an autistic might dismiss the reading of 
faces and emotions as irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me 
the facts, I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a 
parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that child will 
become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be abnormally hyper-vigilant in 
contexts that are not that big a deal. The self-focus is particularly 
significant, because it predisposes the child to defining things to matter that 
will leave normal people unfazed.

Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic paradigm explains 
it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the right understanding, can be 
negotiated.

Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays an 
important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme family 
context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that matter and this 
wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear fine within the family 
context, but when they try to connect with the wider culture, that's when 
serious problems arise with the cognitive dissonance of the schizophrenic. 
Rockstar psychologist Jordan Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are 
detected by the wider culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by the 
majority, and the isolation feeds isolation to snowball into a logical way of 
thinking that is utterly incomprehensible to the "well-adjusted".

Neural plasticity is an integral part of this narrative, because the functional 
specializations in the brain (how the brain wires itself) relies on the 
experiences with which the autistic/schizophrenic interfaces. Their dysfunction 
does not come from "circuitry" or genes. It relies on how experience wires the 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 2007).

Imitation addresses the entropy problem. Imitation is knowing how to be. 
Imitation is survival. Get your imitation wrong, and it might kill you.

Regards


From: Auke van Breemen [mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl]
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 9:34 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem

List,

Jerry reminded me of:

The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire.
Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished the fire as 
it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could have been so 
quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered:

[. . . ] he  told me that since Mrs. Longfel

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem

[Auke van Breemen]

List,

 

Jerry reminded me of:

 

The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire.

Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished the fire

as it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could have been

so quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered:

 

[. . . ] he  told me that since Mrs. Longfellow's death,

it was that he had often run over in imagination all the details of

what ought to be done in such an emergency. It was a striking

example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination.

CP. 5.487, in the footnote.(See also CP 5.538.) 

 

Note that starting the exercises in the imagination supposes a value

judgment to the extent that a person on fire is an unwholesome state of affairs

which ought to be repaired.

 

Now, imagine you are responsible for a child with autism. The question I raise 
is the following:

 

Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that 
depends on the hypothesis you work with?

 

Case 1: it is a problem with the imagination or mimicking of action

Case 2: it is a problem with the directing of attention

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jerry Rhee  
Verzonden: woensdag 20 februari 2019 23:56
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy 
problem

 

Dear list,

 

Stephen said:

Could imitation be so important, that this is the reason why we don’t recognize 
it?

 

Although Peirce read and thought more about Aristotle than about any other man, 
the Poetry, he knew nothing about.  

That is, Peirce was not Greek-minded.

 

He then turns to a discussion of representation or imitation (μίμησις).

 

Tragedy is, then, a representation of an action that is heroic and complete and 
of a certain magnitude.. And since tragedy represents action and is acted by 
living persons, who must of necessity have certain qualities of character and 
thought— for it is these which determine the quality of an action; 

indeed thought and character are the natural causes of any action and it is in 
virtue of these that all men succeed or fail— 

it follows then that it is the plot which represents the action.

 

By "plot" I mean here the arrangement of the incidents: "character" is that 
which determines the quality of the agents, and "thought" appears wherever in 
the dialogue they put forward an argument or deliver an opinion.

(~1450a, Poetics)

 

No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively - 
to conceived action.

 

For instance, we all know what he meant by conceived action, here.

 

With best wishes,

Jerry R

 

On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 3:24 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

Stephen, list,

 

An interesting question. And an even more interesting approach: But this time, 
applying reverse logic, I asked myself… what are the illnesses that manifest 
because of a patient’s failure to imitate properly? I followed a similar 
strategy and found it most profitable for getting at the finer details of the 
semiotic framework to ask how a-typical behavior and mistakes can be understood 
semiotically.

 

The text 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf 

contains theoretical considerations based on research I did amongst children 
that fall out of the schoolsystem in the Netherlands. Since I started with 
stories from parents, in the majority of cases the blame was put on schools not 
being able to deal with complexities of the child, not on children showing some 
sort of criminal behavior.

 

Two labels were used most for the children that surfaced in the research: 
autism and highly gifted. With an autism - highly gifted ratio higher then 5 - 
1. But one has to take into account that the IQ tests of the majority of autism 
pupils were above average, most of the time with a score on some sub-tests 
considerably higher, then on some other. And that some parents that called 
their children highly gifted based themselves on the average result of the wisc 
test solely. Disregarding enormous discrepancies on sub-tests (on a scale 
length of 19 two lowest score of 5 and two highest of 18, the remainder, if I 
remember correctly above 12) and without recognition of the tri-partite demand 
for highly gifted performance: inborn qualities, character of the child and 
environment.

 

With autism the situation is even more complex regarding the feats that show 
themselves in different cases. Compare the child that does hardly communicate 
with the Asperger diagnosed student that follows multiple studies at the same 
time with good learning results or for that matter with the 18 years old who 
socially communicates on a level comparable in some respects to a 5 years old, 
but that at the same time mastered reading by himself before being 4 years old. 

 

The above is meant to underscore that 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem

[Auke van Breemen]

Stephen, list,

 

An interesting question. And an even more interesting approach: But this
time, applying reverse logic, I asked myself… what are the illnesses that
manifest because of a patient’s failure to imitate properly? I followed a
similar strategy and found it most profitable for getting at the finer
details of the semiotic framework to ask how a-typical behavior and mistakes
can be understood semiotically.

 

The text
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf 

contains theoretical considerations based on research I did amongst children
that fall out of the schoolsystem in the Netherlands. Since I started with
stories from parents, in the majority of cases the blame was put on schools
not being able to deal with complexities of the child, not on children
showing some sort of criminal behavior.

 

Two labels were used most for the children that surfaced in the research:
autism and highly gifted. With an autism - highly gifted ratio higher then 5
- 1. But one has to take into account that the IQ tests of the majority of
autism pupils were above average, most of the time with a score on some
sub-tests considerably higher, then on some other. And that some parents
that called their children highly gifted based themselves on the average
result of the wisc test solely. Disregarding enormous discrepancies on
sub-tests (on a scale length of 19 two lowest score of 5 and two highest of
18, the remainder, if I remember correctly above 12) and without recognition
of the tri-partite demand for highly gifted performance: inborn qualities,
character of the child and environment.

 

With autism the situation is even more complex regarding the feats that show
themselves in different cases. Compare the child that does hardly
communicate with the Asperger diagnosed student that follows multiple
studies at the same time with good learning results or for that matter with
the 18 years old who socially communicates on a level comparable in some
respects to a 5 years old, but that at the same time mastered reading by
himself before being 4 years old. 

 

The above is meant to underscore that I don’t profess to provide an answer,
but only raise an alternative explanation.

 

So, if it is a failure in the ability to mimic (icon based), it is a failure
in some not all domains. This points in the direction of a background
problem with the direction of attention (index based). I regard it feasible
that autism semiotically can be understood by recognizing that a strong
reliance on legisigns (types) and their habitually associated symbols
prevent exploration of the rhematic (combinatoric) possibilities of new
input signs. The adaptability to circumstances is seriously hindered in this
way. And indeed, as you state, it appears as an inability  to mimic social
wished behavior. Until, that is, one succeeds in getting attention for the
social problems, in that case a social scientist may be the result.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

 

Van: Stephen Jarosek  
Verzonden: woensdag 20 februari 2019 7:58
Aan: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy
problem

 

Dear Members,

[This post carries on from our December thread “Systems theory, DNA
entanglement, agents and semiosis”]

I've been trying to put an article together, on imitation, for Gatherings in
Biosemiotics 2019 in Moscow. But I don’t think I can put together anything
of substance, in a format that would interest the gathering. Nonetheless, I
remain of the opinion that imitation as a fundamental principle would
definitely have interested Peirce, especially from the perspective of
pragmatism. Perhaps something to explore at the Gathering?

Google brings up a great many references to imitation, but nothing on
imitation as a fundamental principle. But this time, applying reverse logic,
I asked myself… what are the illnesses that manifest because of a patient’s
failure to imitate properly? I’ve struck pay-dirt, particularly with
reference to autism. Is autism a disease directly attributable to imitation
deficit? Here are some links:

An examination of the imitation deficit in autism:

https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1999-02466-009

The Social Role of Imitation in Autism:

https://depts.washington.edu/isei/iyc/21.2_Ingersoll.pdf

Does Impaired Social Motivation Drive Imitation Deficits in Children with
Autism Spectrum Disorder?
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40489-015-0054-9

A great many references exist on imitation generally, but nothing on
imitation as a principle... for example:
https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2017/personality-traits-contagious-among-child
ren/

Here is a nice overview of imitation from Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imitation


SUMMARY OF SOME CORE ISSUES RELATING TO IMITATION

Autism is not a faulty-wiring/dysfunctional genes problem. AUTISM IS AN
IMITATION-PRAGMATISM PROBLEM. It is not a disease, sickness

RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina,

 

You asked for an application to real world problems of the “endless lists and 
outlines of terminology and rigid definitions of these terms”

 

Here https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf is 
an example.

Fig. 3 is fig. 2 emptied of technical terms. One of the biggest obstacles 
proved to be to find a way to communicate the model with the participants of 
the meetings.

Fig. 5 is placed in its diagrammatic context if you project the ternary plots 
on fig. 3. 

Since in this research I had to deal with responsible agents I decided to 
devote the bottom plot to esthetics, the left and right to state sign and 
effect sign respectively and the top one to the morals that ruled the 
interaction. Note that by taking the Welby correspondence serious, this diagram 
can be improved by adding several plots, since now at the most we have 7 plots 
while 10 relations are distinguished.

 

The Peircean theoretical background for this approach is about 60 pages 
(terminology, secondary literature), so I will not try to summarize that, it 
probably only would lead to misunderstandings.

 

Just one remark in response to your insistence on explanation. In negotiation 
cases like this the stakeholders have two meetings. In the first they are asked 
to score the plot and deliver an explanation for the score. Each explanation is 
the immediate object of one of the stakeholders of the dynamical object, in 
this case a pupil. Now, as a rule in situations of serious conflict, the 
immediate objects will be influenced by the goal of the stake holder, so it is 
not to be expected that in all cases consensus will be reached as to the 
background of the situation. 

So, in a second meeting in disagreement cases the focus is shifted from what do 
you think the causes are for the situation to “Where do we want to get our 
mutual scores in the future?” It proves to be the case that in almost all cases 
although disagreement about the causes keeps existing, about the solution 
agreement can be reached. Different and contradictory explanations can go 
together with a plan for action that delivers a solution.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky  
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 17:06
Aan: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Peirce-L' ; 'Gary Richmond' 
; Auke van Breemen 
Onderwerp: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Auke wrote: RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. 
For me, such an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of 
the dynamical object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to 
come to grips with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, 
although it seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are 
incomplete. It is an aid, not an answer.

Edwina: But 'getting better immediate objects of the DO' IS a mode of 
explanation. And I agree that diagrams, as 'images-of-thought' are excellent 
ANALYTIC AND EXPLANATORY methods. But there's no explanation and no analysis 
going on here - there's just endless lists and outlines of terminology and 
rigid definitions of these terms. What's the function of these terms - if they 
don't explain anything???
 

On Sun 17/02/19 10:50 AM , "Auke van Breemen"  <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> 
a.bree...@chello.nl sent:

Edwina, list,

 

E wrote:

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world. 

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. For me, such 
an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of the dynamical 
object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips 
with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it 
seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is an 
aid, not an answer. 

 

Auke  

 

 

  

Van: Edwina Taborsky 
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 15:44
Aan: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Gary R wrote: 

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no good 
reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, ten-Sign 
taxonomy of 1903."  …

 … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short 
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds 
himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state that 
along 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina, list,

 

E wrote:

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world.

RE: I would formulate the goal not as looking for an explanation. For me, such 
an enterprise ought to aid in getting better immediate objects of the dynamical 
object that is being studied. Diagrams are excellent means to come to grips 
with complex systems by supporting and organizing the analysis, although it 
seems safe to assume they always will lag behind and are incomplete. It is an 
aid, not an answer.

 

Auke  

 

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky  
Verzonden: zondag 17 februari 2019 15:44
Aan: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Gary R wrote:

"At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no good 
reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, ten-Sign 
taxonomy of 1903."  …

 … But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short 
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds 
himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state that 
along with his corrected view (in years past I've offered several examples of 
this). Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take 
an experiment late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken 
earlier and the principles derived from them. "

---

I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an isolate 
framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based around a purely 
intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions 
which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic point of Peircean semiosis - 
which is its capacity to analyze and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living 
infrastructure and processes of the real world. These abstract interactions and 
definitions have, so far, been unable to explain these processes of the real 
world.

Edwina

 



 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

 

You wrote:

1

Like Gary, I am having a hard time understanding exactly what Auke is 
proposing.  In EGs, the Sheet of Assertion itself is a Sign, and everything 
scribed on it is a Sign, including the Spots, Lines of Identity, and Cuts 
involved in the Propositions that are primarily being represented.  As such, 
the Sheet of Assertion is also a semeiotic sheet.

--

 

That is not denied, but it does not present a model/framework of the process of 
semiosis as a sign process. 

 

And:

2

It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on the 
three-trichotomy, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903, since Peirce himself abandoned it 
almost immediately--once he recognized the distinctions between the different 
Objects and Interpretants of the same Sign. 

--

 

I provided a locus in the Welby correspondence in which the small 
classification is part of the Welby classification. Bernard Morand did a great 
job in showing how the later trichotomies append on the  former. The relation 
between the small (3) and the extended (10) is better looked at in my opinion 
as analogous to the relation between propositional logic, predicate logic and 
modal logic. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs
 

With the acceptance of predicate logic one does not abandon propositional 
logic. Besides that in the order of teaching one starts normally with 
propositional logic, adding complexity latter on. Just so, I would advise when 
teaching or studying semiotics to start with getting a good grasp of the small 
classification.

 

As in language learning one first state things without finer nuance. As an 
example. You could have written: 

*   It further puzzles me that so many researchers focus on the 
three-trichotomy.

But choose to write:

*   It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on the 
three-trichotomy.

 

The bold word in the second sentence is not stating something factual, but adds 
a negative judgement.  

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

Although he eventually viewed all ten trichotomies as corresponding to the 
three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants), rather than the three 
Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), there is still a phaneroscopic aspect to at least 
three of them--the Sign itself, its Immediate Object, and its Immediate 
Interpretant are all divided according to their Mode of Presentation.  Arguably 
those for the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant, divided according to 
their Mode of Being, are also phaneroscopic--since "we can directly observe 
[the three modes of being] in elements of whatever is at any time before the 
mind in any way" (CP 1.23; 1903).  Of the six correlates, then, only the Final 
Interpretant, divided according to its Purpose, is clearly normative.

 

As for the relation trichotomies, more recently I have highlighted the six 
possible combinations of those for the Final Interpretant (Nature of Influence) 
and Dynamic Interpretant (Manner of Appeal).  Subjects, Propositions, and 
Arguments can all be presented (Suggestive), such that the Dynamic Interpretant 
is a Feeling; and it seems to me that it is only as they are presented that 
they could be properly studied within Phaneroscopy.  Perhaps a Subject is first 
presented to the mind as quality, a Proposition as relation/reaction, and an 
Argument as representation/mediation.  Normally, though, a Proposition is urged 
(Imperative), attempting to compel some kind of Exertion, whether physical or 
psychical; and an Argument is submitted (Indicative), inviting deliberate 
acceptance of its conclusion, although it can also be urged.  Peirce's account 
of perception seems relevant here.

 

CSP:  The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last 
analysis, the Percept ... That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory 
that seems to me to be beyond dispute ... a Percept is a Seme, while ... the 
Perceptual Judgment ... is a Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of 
the Percept, and of which the Percept is the Dynamical Object ...

How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme, has for its direct Dynamical 
Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the 
usual way with Semes, certainly ...

Suffice it to say that the perceiver is aware of being compelled to perceive 
what he perceives. Now existence means precisely the exercise of compulsion. 
Consequently, whatever feature of the percept is brought into relief by some 
association and thus attains a logical position like that of the observational 
premiss of an explaining Abduction, the attribution of Existence to it in the 
Perceptual Judgment is virtually and in an extended sense, a logical Abductive 
Inference nearly approximating to necessary inference. (CP 4.539-541; 1906)

 

A Percept is a Subject, and a Perceptual Judgment is a Proposition.  How can 
that which is merely pres

RE: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, list,

 

To prevent confusion, two remarks at the outset: 

 

1.  in a sense all sheets (of assertion {EG} of phaneroscopy/phenomenology 
and semiotis) are semiotic sheets in the sense that they model the process of 
semiosis. But each from a different perspective. ‘semiotic sheet’  is for me 
shorthand for the sheet on which the process is modeled in technical semiotic 
terms, including the sign – and the interpretant aspects. The same goes for the 
phaneroscopic/phenomenologic sheet.
2.  I did not in the mail try to promote the semiotic program to which I 
contribute. By means of comparison: I provided a suggestive list of ingredients 
that might contribute to a good meal of a certain type, I did not try to 
present a recipe for a certain meal. Above that it is an incomplete list. 
Vinicius Romanini for instance would add from his Solenoid perspective the 
different types of objects and interpretants.

 

What I would ague for is that the most fruitful way to proceed is to try to 
conceptually co-ordinate the different perspectives on each other. The key to 
that is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign process.

 

Gary, you remarked about my assumed position: (perhaps, as you're 
suggesting, modifying EG notation)

 

Re: most definitely I am not suggesting that. I only suggest to mimic the EG’s 
approach to sheets, but with a broader focus, not just propositions and not 
abstracting from the apprehension of the sign. The concept of a sheet is very 
helpful for that.

 

GR did ask:

Yet perhaps I'm missing something here (again, I'm no expert in EGs). To aid 
our comprehension, could you possibly draw even a crude draft modeling what 
might appear on a "phaneroscopic sheet"? That would certainly be most helpful.

 

Re: First of all I do not profess to mimic the EG in Phenomenology, my interest 
is primary modeling the semiotic process. For me phaneroscopy is helpful for 
thinking about the sign aspects and the relations between them, like with the 
correspondence between feeling and qualisign. I mentioned De Tiene’s suggestion 
for completeness sake. And also since it delivers according to the 
architectonic the principles for semiotics, which is precisely the way I look 
at it.

 

Lets start with your remark: 

 In addition, the application of the phenomenological categories to semeiotics 
(according to the 'principle of principle' recently discussed) frequently 
occurs with no sense of their origins in phenomenology (also, their 
anticipation in the valencies of the simplest math).

 

Indeed thus they deliver in terms of a valency connections categorically 
organized the basic dependency structure for the process of semiosis. The 1.1 
qualisign – 3.3 argument structure of the sign aspects. 

 

 

Hope to have clarified my mail a little.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Gary Richmond  
Verzonden: vrijdag 15 februari 2019 20:20
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy

 

Auke, list,

 

Auke wrote: "You provided an excellent quote to point to the difference between 
sheets of assertion and phaneroscopic or semiotic sheets."

 

I found it difficult to grasp exactly what you're suggesting in this message 
beginning with your distinguishing "between sheets of assertion and 
phaneroscopic or semiotic sheets"

 

This is doubly confusing because sheets of assertion would seem to me to be 
"semiotic sheets" rather than whatever your proposed "phaneroscopic sheets" 
might be. Indeed, the seemingly contradictory language you use appears to me to 
work to conflate phenomenology (the 1st cenoscopic science) with logic as 
semeiotic (3rd branch of the 2nd second cenoscopic science, viz., normative 
science). In a word "phanerocopic" doe not = "semiotic".

 

Expanding on this a little, in my view, the categories of phenomenology are all 
too often also confused/conflated with the metaphysical categories (which, as I 
see it, are the Universal Categories applied--offering principles--to 
metaphysics, perhaps recast at Three Universes of Experience). In addition, the 
application of the phenomenological categories to semeiotics (according to the 
'principle of principle' recently discussed) frequently occurs with no sense of 
their origins in phenomenology (also, their anticipation in the valencies of 
the simplest math).

 

Be that as it may, despite your intriguing comments, it is entirely unclear to 
me what a phaneroscopic (or "semiotic" as your wrote) sheet might look like, 
what its purpose might be, its rules, etc.

 

I'm not an expert in EGs by a long shot, but my earlier stated reservation 
concerning the possible use of EGs within Peirce's science of Phenomenology is 
based exactly on the Peirce quotation I'd earlier given and which you 
reproduced in your message, namely, that "All that existential graphs can 
represent is propositions, on a sin

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

 

I recognized your approach as similar to mine. I will respond short to two 
related issues:

1.  Your diagrammatic approach
2.  The issue of continuity and discrete points

 

André De Tienne suggested to mimic the EG’s in phenomenology, i.e. making 
diagrammatic representations which can be operated upon. I suggest to do the 
same with semiotics, using the semiotic terminology. It is from this 
perspective that I read your point, line, plane, spaces diagram. 

 

Let’s indeed assume the continuity of semiosis and relegate it to the space 
level. And, that we only isolate discrete instances for specific purposes.

This would mean that at the space level nothing is specified for a specific 
purpose yet. So, on the space level we look at the continuous process in very 
general terms, something like input – output. 

If we want to become specific we have to go to the plane on which the 
pheme’s/propositions can be specified, together with the specific purpose that 
guides our interest. At 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf p. 27 
Fig. 3 you will find the way I would organize the plane at the most general 
plane level. At the bottom we have the indication of mayor (state in semiotics) 
and minor (effect in semiotics). At the top we have the specific purpose 
vaguely indicated.

 

We become more specific if we go from the plane to the line and points, see 
Fig. 1 at page 26. In this figure we may relate the plane to the space by 
assuming a line of identity orthogonally running through the index position, 
signifying the continuous input – output relation. On the plane itself we 
measure and become specific. Since Peirce entertains a notion of involvement 
(lower sign types/aspects are involved in the higher) and we are aiming at 
diagramming the doleme, we may assume all sign aspects involved in any doleme. 
Of course only if the specific result is to be reached. If not, some aspects 
will be failing. A case in point would be the occurrence of a type that is not 
familiar to the interpreting state. In this case the process would fail on the 
legisign aspect. Etc.

 

Along these lines, we could build a diagrammatic system that can be of 
practical use and operated upon.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 20:30
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, List:

 

AvB:  What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can 
we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is 
captured in logic by the term argument?

 

I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some suggestions 
that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction; in particular, 
my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines, Phemes/Propositions 
as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous spaces, and Instances as 
discrete points that we mark where these all coincide.  I believe that this 
last aspect conveniently reflects the fundamental unity of connected Signs; 
perhaps it is a corollary of Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" 
that if any Instances are connected, no matter how, the resulting system 
constitutes one Instance.

 

Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the motion 
of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only mark discrete positions 
for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind (i.e., 
semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only isolate discrete Instances for 
specific purposes.  That includes when we decompose a Delome/Argument into 
Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading Principle, and a 
Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a Continuous Predicate.


Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hen

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

In my opinion: Yours is a pretty good indication of what I would regard as the 
hard core of the research program, i.e. the three categories or a triadic 
approach.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 22:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: John F Sowa ; Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, list,

 

I appreciate what you are doing.  

 As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J..  X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc..

 

.. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; 

.. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the 
three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal.

 

One being the form of a simple idea, 

two that of an ordinary relative idea, and 

three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than two 
ideas..

 

I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of 
consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with which I 
succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any fourth 
element. 

 

It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I cannot 
define with this apparatus.(~ CP 8.304)

 

one two three.. C A B.. already written.

 

Best,

Jerry R

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program 
(Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.

I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa 
points in this direction:

JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to 
> accept our disagreement and move on.

John:
That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a 
predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that 
definition.  There is nothing more to say.

(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)

Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his 
considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all 
it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not 
because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a 
semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the 
semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the 
term argument? 

In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find 
many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as 
improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms 
introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both 
possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the 
experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example 
of differences in perspective:

On the terminological level Peirce experimented

He suggested:
A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative 
trichotomy for 
B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also introduced
C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 

In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different 
angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an 
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it 
opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, 
how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the 
phaneroscopic endeavour.

A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange 
Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the 
type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation 
of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in 
tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be 
taken as the same. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program 
(Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.

I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa 
points in this direction:

JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to 
> accept our disagreement and move on.

John:
That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a 
predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that 
definition.  There is nothing more to say.

(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)

Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his 
considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all 
it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not 
because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a 
semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the 
semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the 
term argument? 

In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find 
many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as 
improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms 
introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both 
possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the 
experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example 
of differences in perspective:

On the terminological level Peirce experimented

He suggested:
A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative 
trichotomy for 
B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also introduced
C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 

In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different 
angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an 
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it 
opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, 
how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the 
phaneroscopic endeavour.

A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange 
Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the 
type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation 
of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in 
tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be 
taken as the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written forms. 
Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established law; because two 
different forms raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.



Best,

Auke van Breemen





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS,

 

Between the lines I respond. 

 

AvB:  What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

That is why I suggest calling this the General Object, as distinguished from 
the individual Dynamic Object of a particular Instance.  Since "man" and 
"homme" have the same General Object, they are the same Sign; but because they 
have somewhat different Immediate Objects, they are different Types.

 

RE: A dynamical object needs not to be individual or particular instance. A 
general can be a dynamical object. The absolute individual does not exist 
according to the articles from the Questions claimed for man series.

 

 

AvB:  With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the 
dynamical object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions 
or terms (lexical items), but utterances and communication processes.

 

As far as I can tell, Peirce did not make such a distinction.  An utterance is 
an Instance of a Type.

 

 

RE: I didn’t state that Peirce made that distinction, I just wanted to point 
your attention to a difference in the analysis of cases like you posed 
concerning terms man and homme and the kind of analysis Peirce performs when, 
for instance he discusses the Question: “What is the weather today?”, as posed 
to his wife on an early morning. 

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 10:02 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the dynamical 
object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions or terms 
(lexical items), but utterances and communication processes. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: zaterdag 26 januari 2019 16:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.

*   Every Token has a different Dynamic Object and Dynamic 
Interpretant--whatever it actually does denote and signify, respectively, on 
that particular occasion.
*   Every Type has a different Immediate Object and Immediate 
Interpretant--whatever it possibly could denote and signify, respectively, in 
accordance with the Sign System to which it belongs.
*   Every Sign has a different General Object and Final 
Interpretant--whatever it necessarily would denote and signify, respectively, 
after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.

In other words, two individual Instances of the same Type always have different 
individual Dynamic Objects and different individual Dynamic Interpretants; 
while two different Types of the same Sign always have at least somewhat 
different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants within their different 
Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is also possible for two 
Instances of the same Type to have different Immediate Interpretants, when they 
are accompanied by different Tones--font changes for emphasis, punctuation 
marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if those only affect their different Dynamic 
Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the dynamical 
object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions or terms 
(lexical items), but utterances and communication processes. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: zaterdag 26 januari 2019 16:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.

*   Every Token has a different Dynamic Object and Dynamic 
Interpretant--whatever it actually does denote and signify, respectively, on 
that particular occasion.
*   Every Type has a different Immediate Object and Immediate 
Interpretant--whatever it possibly could denote and signify, respectively, in 
accordance with the Sign System to which it belongs.
*   Every Sign has a different General Object and Final 
Interpretant--whatever it necessarily would denote and signify, respectively, 
after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.

In other words, two individual Instances of the same Type always have different 
individual Dynamic Objects and different individual Dynamic Interpretants; 
while two different Types of the same Sign always have at least somewhat 
different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants within their different 
Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is also possible for two 
Instances of the same Type to have different Immediate Interpretants, when they 
are accompanied by different Tones--font changes for emphasis, punctuation 
marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if those only affect their different Dynamic 
Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

As propositions the three sentences may be the same sign, but here clearly we 
are arguing as logicians about terms and propositions. From a logical 
perspective we can abstract from the apprehension of the sign as an object. Not 
so if we treat the proposition semiotically as it functions in different 
interpretation processes.

 

 

Accordingly, when I say that Existential Graphs put before us moving

pictures of thought, I mean of thought in its essence free from

physiological and other accidents. CP 4.8 1905

It is the purified view of the logician, exemplified by the above remark on the

Existential graphs, that enables Peirce to hold that:

 

It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind;

for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to

a human mind, that mind must _rst apprehend it as an object in

itself, and only after that consider it in its signi_cance; and the like

must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must

begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing

will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign.14 EP 2

p.391 1906

 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: vrijdag 25 januari 2019 23:09
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Jerry C., List:

 

JLRC:  These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the 
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.

 

I agree, as three different Tokens they produce three different Dynamic 
Interpretants; yet Peirce clearly affirmed that they are all the same 
proposition, the same Sign, and thus presumably have the same Final 
Interpretant.  Do they have three different Immediate Interpretants?  Are they 
three different Instances of the same Type, or single Instances of three 
different Types?

 

JAS:  I trust that the reader can imagine how these three sentences would also 
sound quite different when spoken, rather than written.

JLRC:  Certainly not this reader!

 

Really?  If you were to read them aloud, there would be no difference at all in 
how you spoke each sentence?

 

JLRC:  The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are 
semes at the end that are very meaningful.

 

Again, at the moment I am tentatively inclined to treat those punctuation marks 
as different Tones that accompany three different Instances of the same Type, 
rather than additional Semes that make them three different Types.  However, I 
am open to being persuaded otherwise.

 

JLRC:  The meanings of the spoken forms depends on the context of the entire 
situation, especially the tone of voice and interpersonal relationships so it 
is hardly relevant to the semiotic interpretations of the alphabetic forms.

 

I agree, which is one reason why I believe that the spoken forms are different 
Types of the same Sign.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 3:25 PM Jerry LR Chandler mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > wrote:

List, Jon 

On Jan 25, 2019, at 1:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

 

How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same Proposition? 
 For example ...

*   We are going to the restaurant.
*   We are going to the restaurant?
*   We are going to the restaurant!

These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the 
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.

The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the reader 
can imagine how these three sentences would also sound quite different when 
spoken, rather than written. 

Certainly not this reader!

 

The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are semes at 
the end that are very meaningful. The meanings of the spoken forms depends on 
the context of the entire situation, especially the tone of voice and 
interpersonal relationships so it is hardly relevant to the semiotic 
interpretations of the alphabetic forms.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 17:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce, "man" and 
"homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that 
"a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  I understand his emphasis here 
to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real."  My question remains 
whether "man" and "homme" are also one and the same Type, or two different 
Types of the same Sign.

 

Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is "a 
definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least 
approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written 
English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely significant 
Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to 
serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written French.  To me, these 
different specifications for Instances imply different Types.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and 
symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, 
ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of 
interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what 
for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question.

 

So I would substitute on aspect level.

 

Best,

 

Auke van breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question.  
Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of 
"man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different 
_ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the blank?  Again, I am 
not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word 
"man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and 
symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, 
ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of 
interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what 
for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question.

 

So I would substitute on aspect level.

 

Best,

 

Auke van breemen

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question.  
Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of 
"man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different 
_ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the blank?  Again, I am 
not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word 
"man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 
is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on 
a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 
"word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is 
impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any 
voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does 
not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely 
significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once 
and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing 
which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing 
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this 
or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I 
will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be 
embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the 
object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance 
of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. 
(CP 4.537; 1906)

 

Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one 
word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as 
Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years 
earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a 
generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).

 

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of 
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good 
manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other 
language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same 
representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a 
physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only 
in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representam

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 
is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on 
a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 
"word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is 
impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any 
voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does 
not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely 
significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once 
and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing 
which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing 
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this 
or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I 
will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be 
embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the 
object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance 
of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. 
(CP 4.537; 1906)

 

Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one 
word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as 
Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years 
earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a 
generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).

 

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of 
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good 
manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other 
language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same 
representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a 
physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only 
in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which 
should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a 
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented ... "Evil communications 
corrupt good manners" and Φθείρουσιν ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί are one and the 
same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)

 

According to this passage, the same Sign can be written, spoken, or thought in 
a given language; and it can also be written, spoken, or thought in different 
languages.  For example, the written, spoken, and thought versions of "man" in 
English and "homme" in French are six distinct ways of embodying the same Sign. 
 The many individual occasions when and where each is actually written, spoken, 
or thought are clearly Instances of a Type--but are they all Instances of the 
same Type, or Instances of six different Types of the same Sign?

 

I previously thought the former, but now find myself inclined toward the 
latter--which would entail that many of my recent posts require careful 
revision accordingly.  A Sign itself is indifferent to how it is embodied, but 
Peirce described a Type as "a definitely significant Form," which suggests to 
me a certain set of characters that something must possess in order to serve as 
an Instance of the Type within a particular Sign System.  In written Engl

RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

I see that you still put semiotics beneath phenomenology. 
My question: if speculative grammar, with alternative name semiotics is not the 
first of the normative logic branch anymore, what occupies this spot instead?

You seem to argue that because semiotic is not normative it cannot be part of 
normative logic. If this impression is correct I wonder why you argue thus. I 
see no problem in a sub-branch of a normative science that itself cannot 
properly be called normative. 
Normative logic:
1. concerned with study of most general characteristics of signs 
2. concerned with relation of signs and objects
3. concerned with effectiveness of signs

Note the close connection with the sign definition.

Auke


-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa  
Verzonden: vrijdag 14 september 2018 22:32
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should 
semeiotic be classified?

Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,

Peirce answered your questions.  I like his 1903 *outline* because it's a clean 
and simple summary of everything he wrote about the sciences and their 
interrelationships.  But as an outline, it omits nearly all the details.

ET
> I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I 
> consider them debates and not discussions] about classification and 
> terminology

I definitely do not want to debate.  I consider this thread as a *collaborative 
inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said and fill in the gaps.  My 
only goal is to get a clear understanding of that outline and its relationship 
to all of Peirce's writings.

That classification has some very important implications for biology, but I'll 
have to address that separately because it requires more space.

JR
> From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal 
> theory at all.  Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to 
> understand itself.

I agree.  But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that 
mathematics includes all possible theories about anything.  Every theory, 
formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical science is an 
application of some theory of mathematics.

JR
> my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is 
> different from semiotic because of its special focus on living systems 
> (biology, hence biosemiotic).

Semiotic also has a focus on living systems:  human beings.  Peirce himself 
talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals.

JR
> I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind.

The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria, considered 
bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms:
> The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- 
> forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our 
> happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.

Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree.  My only correction 
would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with 'homomorphic' (similar 
form).  This quotation comes from 
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html

At the end of that article are various comments by prominent researchers in 
biology and related fields.  They're helpful for understanding Lynn M's 
contributions.

JAS
> The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves, 
> and cannot be reduced to Signs

I agree.  I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce that clarified 
that issue.

JAS
> Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as 
> Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology.

No.  He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception.
But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments.
Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and narrow" 
point of view.  See CP 1.573.

Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways:
Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without exception.  In 
*every* science, logic is used in the broad sense.
But normative science is an exception:  it's used in a narrow sense.

JLRC
> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
> Mathematics alone is not even logic.

I don't know how you define those terms.  What I've been trying to do is to 
summarize Peirce's classification of the sciences as accurately as possible.  
If you can find any quotations by Peirce that support those two points, please 
let us know.

JLRC
> CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that 
> illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an 
> extraordinary wide sense.

I agree.  He said that linguistics was the best developed of all the psychic 
sciences.  That would probably imply that all the other psychic sciences depend 
on linguistics.  But that does not negate his point that all sciences, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Auke van Breemen]

John, Gary R, List,

There are two possible ways to proceed the discussion. The first is trying to 
prove ones position right, the second is trying to understand why the question 
could appear. Gary's contribution about utens and docens, that I quote, belongs 
for me to the second way, which I like most. 

Gary R.
I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the notion, 
that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering more 
seriously Peirce's distinction between logica utens, the ordinary logic we all 
use and must use, and logica docens, the formal study of logic as a normative 
science.
--

Yes, and we must not forget that all of the theoretical sciences have an utens 
and a docens. With math Peirce explicitly discusses it in his billiard player 
example. I do not recall to have ever found a mention of the utens and docens 
of phenomenology. That need not wondr us too much because although Peirce in 
several places discusses phenomenological issues, he was of the opinion that 
nothing is lost if we do not pay attention to the apprehension of the sign as 
an object.

John:
Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and 
recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.
--

I would argue that:
phenomenology is concerned with what appears,
semiotics with signs. 
>From an analytical point of view. Since the sign evolves what is involved and 
>a sign only can do this by appearing at some point, there seems some overlap 
>between both sciences. But we must not forget that although the material 
>objects may overlap the formal don't.

John, your suggestion:
As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful 
work.
--
is interesting. But I would have written one can use semiotics as a blueprint 
to build a robot. Ronald Stamper, working in the early days of Peirce 
scholarship when almost all had to be gathered from secondary sources and 
Morris was having his influence came a long way in making such a blueprint  for 
information systems by developing his semiotic ladder, which also can be 
regarded as an refinement of Shannon/Weaver's technical, meaning and 
effectiveness levels or also Morris syntax, semantics and pragmatics. The 
interesting issue is that your CG properly belong to the meaning level. For the 
sign aspects pertaining to the sign regarded in itself, for instance, one would 
have to look for other means like pattern recognition techniques. I will not 
extend this line of thought but just suggest that the nine sign aspects point 
the way to what ought to be covered for a robot build according to semiotical 
principles.

Best,

Auke


-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa  
Verzonden: dinsdag 11 september 2018 5:16
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

Jon AS and Gary R,

JAS
> Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with 
> phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative 
> Science?

To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy of 
CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that Peirce placed formal logic under mathematics and 
logic under normative science.  That is two mentions.

He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application under 
mathematics.  Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities.
When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter where 
its variables refer to actualities.  In such an application, it would serve to 
evaluate truth or falsity.

In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines.  But he did not 
mention them in his 1903 classifications.  If he had, he would then place logic 
for theorem proving under a branch of engineering.
That would make three mentions.  In general, there is no limit to the number of 
sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics
-- including practical science (engineering).

JFS
>> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since 
>> every perception involves signs.

GR
> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have 
> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.

That's a critical distinction.  Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would 
also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal.
As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities.

Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and 
recognition of actualities.  But it would make no value judgments.
It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.

To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative value judgment.  
But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like Buddhist meditation.  That is 
phenomenology prior to any intentionality.

As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful 
work.  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

[Auke van Breemen]

John, Frances,

I am puzzled. Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic 
is an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere in the 
classification of the science.


Auke

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa  
Verzonden: maandag 10 september 2018 6:03
Aan: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

On 9/9/2018 9:48 PM, frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
> In his later classification of the sciences Peirce seemingly located
> *formal* *logics* under the mathematical sciences, but he also located 
> *critical logics* and *normal* *logics* as separate normative sciences 
> under the philosophical sciences.

Yes.  That's what Peirce said in his 1903 classification, which I used for the 
CSPsemiotic.jpg diagram (attached).  Note that formal logic is under 
mathematics, and logic is also the third of the normative sciences, as Peirce 
said.

> The curiosity here might be whether semiotics as a science should be 
> somewhat separated from logics

Yes.  Peirce said that logic was a branch of semiotic, but he also said that a 
broader conception of logic would make it identical with semiotic.

> then semiotics is also a defined referential science and an applied 
> instrumental science, so that semiotics aside from being a formal and 
> normal sort of logics might be best located somewhere under 
> phenomenology within the philosophical sciences. Semiotics after all 
> is a vast study of senses and signs and systems

Yes.  That would justify putting Semiotic under Phenomenology, as in 
CSPsemiotic.jpg.

> Any pragmatist classification of the sciences should of course be 
> architectonically consistent with the trichotomic structure of the 
> phenomenal categories. This seems to be an initial task that has yet 
> to be fully done, even before the location of an independent or 
> isolated mathics and logics and semics within that completed structure.

Yes.  1903 is the year that Peirce began his correspondence with Lady Welby.  
During the following decade, he wrote a great deal more about the trichotomic 
structure.  But the currently available manuscripts don't mention how that 
structure might affect his
1903 classification.

Unless and until more MSS are found with new information, the 1903 version be 
the framework into which we could include semiotic.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Auke
> Cees Schuyt, a Dutch Peirce scholar, suggested to distinguish being, 
> existence and reality.

John
Suppose somebody (Euclid for example) said "If there exists a line AB, then 
there exists an equilateral triangle ABC with AB as one side."
Where would the line AB and the triangle ABC exist?

In being?  In existence?  In reality?

In which of those three do we exist?  Is it the same one?
If so, how could we go to that place and look at ABC?
If it's not the same, how does it differ from where we are?
--

This reminds me of a remark by Wittgenstein. From memory: The only unbendable 
strait line is the imaginary straight line. 
It has being but no existence. However that may not suit your iso initiative.

Auke



The proposed ISO standard says that the physical universe is the only thing 
that exists.  It has no room for sign types, just information artifacts.  No 
room for pure mathematics, just embodied or implemented replicas.

What I'm looking for is a clear distinction with a pair of terms that can 
distinguish signs and reality or pure math from applied math.  I proposed 
signs/reality.  But they didn't like that because it's too Peircean.  I like 
the pair logos/physis.  But an English pair, such as Transcendental/Physical, 
may be better.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

You asked:
Does anyone have any preferences for or against the pair 
Transcendental/Physical instead of Mathematical/Physical?
--
 
Against, because it muddles the original question i.e. the relation of math 
with the other sciences (whether theoretical like phenomenology, semiotic and 
methaphisics; physical or psychical). In your point 5 you provide a motive for 
your suggestion:

  5. In his classification of the sciences, Peirce claimed that
 pure mathematics is the only independent science.  Every other
 science, including metaphysics, depends on mathematics.  That
 rules out the option of claiming that mathematics has some
 kind of dependency on what happens to exist in the universe.

Cees Schuyt, a Dutch Peirce scholar, suggested to distinguish being, existence 
and reality. I would suggest this as the background against which to position 
the different sciences. Reality being reserved for what proves true to the 
community of investigators in the long run.

Auke



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

 

Do you mean with the sign itself the replica signsign?

 

The sign in actu addresses an object and raises an interpretant sign. So I 
would say that function is nicely expressed by the sign of teridentity: >-

Object and sign co-determining the interpretant sign. 

 

The triad I find useful to picture the trichotomic distinctions that pertain to 
each of the three correlates. For instance Qualisign, Sinsign and Symbol on the 
corners of a triad located at one of the ends of the fork, etc. As a means to 
picture the sign relation I share your reservations.

 

A dynamical sign like the man-sign mediates burdened with esthetic appetites, 
rooted convictions (loaded with theory) and moral habits or preferences. In 
order to model that a model is needed that portrays a man-sign (or whatever 
interpreting system) that processes a sign to some conclusion.

 

Signing and giving may not be that different.

 

Best, Auke

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: dinsdag 21 augustus 2018 3:02
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

 

Cecile, Edwina, List:

 

The question asked was whether Peirce ever represented a Sign as a Y.  CP 
4.309-310 and 4.317 refer only to a (mathematical) "triad," while CP 1.346-347 
is about Existential Graphs with three tails--both of which are depictions of a 
relation.  As I (and others) have pointed out before, Peirce never called the 
Sign a triad, but rather the first Correlate of a triadic relation; so one 
might be able to use a Y or a three-tailed EG as a diagram of that relation, 
but certainly not of the Sign itself.

 

The main reservation that I have about even this--or the alternative of a 
triangle, for that matter--is that it rather indifferently portrays the three 
Correlates (Sign, Object, Interpretant).  Peirce said as much about the three 
hooks in an EG that represents the triadic relation of giving.

 

CSP:  Consequently, in the system of Existential Graphs, which affords the best 
diagram of thought itself, free from the accidents of mere thinking that has 
ever yet been devised, has but one way of expressing such a fact as that A 
gives B to C. There must be a graph expressive of giving, and this must have 
three hooks for the donor, for the donate, and for the donee. How those are 
placed, whether for example, in clockwise or in anticlockwise succession, makes 
no difference. Whether the donor-hook be above or below, to the right or to the 
left, or obliquely, makes no difference. It is only necessary that the hooks 
for donor, donate, and donee be distinguished in some way. (R 200:E110; 1908)

 

However, the defining characteristic of a Sign is that it mediates between the 
Object and the Interpretant, and I am not sure how to capture this in a 
diagram.  Of course, distinguishing Signs from their Replicas while recognizing 
two Objects and three Interpretants makes it that much more difficult to 
formulate a simple but accurate visualization.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:

Cecile, list:

Yes, Peirce represented the triadic sign as a Y; [also called the triple fork] 
See his discussion in 1.346 where he outlines a 'node connecting three lines of 
identity' and the graph and its extensions  in 1.347. He refers to this latter 
as having 'generative potency'. 4.309. And yes, 4.309/310 show other triads. 
These are examples of chemical atoms, but, after all, an atom is a Sign. 

See also his discussion of the triad in 4.317 "one member is positive, another 
is the opponent of that, a third, intermediate between these two, is 
all-potent. The ideas of our three categories could not be better stated in so 
few words".

I think the 7.426 is not about the Sign.

The Y shape is, in my view, a stronger image than the linear triangle used by 
such as Saussure, Morris, Ogden - for the Y shape shows the ability of 
self-reference to the mediation node - and - the relations with other triads. 
I'd note that Jesper Hoffmeyer, in his Signs of Meaning in the Universe, uses 
the Y shape quite extensively.1996:17-19]. And - of course - I'm do as well. 
And C. W. Spinks, in his Peirce and Triadomania, also outlines this Y shape as 
used by Peirce and rejects the triangle as failing "to give sufficient emphasis 
to the tripartite concepts of the stoics and scholastics that Peirce used in 
his Semiotic"..and..Peirce, in using the triple fork, was straining to a void 
some of the pitfalls of terminology that have plagued sign theory - the primary 
one being, as Peirce's stipulation suggests, to resolve triadic relations into 
dyadic ones" [1991, 11-12]

Edwina 

On Mon 20/08/18 2:32 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon, Edwina, list

 

Yes, they can be regarded different instances/replicas of the same type. But, 
they differ in a different way as two replicas of the written word or the 
spoken word differ amongst each other. The ground for their being of a same 
type (legisign) differs.   We must not only pay attention to the intellectual 
import of a sign but also to how it’s being apprehended if we study semiosis.

 

Auke

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 9 augustus 2018 15:14
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

 

Auke, Edwina, List:

 

I would suggest that the spoken and written (and thought) Tokens of the same 
word(s) are different Instances/Replicas of the same Type/Sign; in fact, Peirce 
explicitly said so, as I quoted earlier in this thread.

 

CSP:  "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or 
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought 
of, it is one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphasis 
added)

 

However, the spoken and written (and thought) Tokens obviously embody very 
different qualities/characters; i.e., different Tones.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:

Auke, list:

The physical or actual existential form of a spoken versus written word does 
differ - but, does the cognitive Interpretant differ? 

 A Legisign to my understanding refers to the mediative sign/representamen 
functioning in a mode of Thirdness. 

Now, Thirdness is indeed a generality, a law, and, if that mediation is also 
interacting with other nodes in non-general modal categories, then, we could 
say that a Type-Token existence is in evidence. For example, as in a a Rhematic 
Indexical Legisign, a Dicent Indexical Legisgn, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign, a 
Rhematic Symbolic Legisign. 

But wouldn't both the written and spoken forms of this word, even though they 
materially differ, be interpreted in a similar way?

Edwina

On Thu 09/08/18 6:14 AM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl 
<mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl>  sent:

Edwina, List,

 

As an example of growth in complexity in networked connections.

I have been pondering the question whether the legisign of the spoken and 
written forms are of one or of two types. We can observe that the tokens of the 
spoken forms differ from the written ones. So they do depend on different 
tokens. My hunch is that from the point of view of the symbolic relation of the 
sign with its object it is the same lagisign but from the point of view of the 
apprehension of the sign they differ. Thus we have two varieties of legisign. 
The first stemming from a token (pattern recognition?) the second stemming from 
habits of interpretation, symbols (imputed). 

 

Auke van Breemen


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina, List,

 

As an example of growth in complexity in networked connections.

I have been pondering the question whether the legisign of the spoken and 
written forms are of one or of two types. We can observe that the tokens of the 
spoken forms differ from the written ones. So they do depend on different 
tokens. My hunch is that from the point of view of the symbolic relation of the 
sign with its object it is the same lagisign but from the point of view of the 
apprehension of the sign they differ. Thus we have two varieties of legisign. 
The first stemming from a token (pattern recognition?) the second stemming from 
habits of interpretation, symbols (imputed). 

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky  
Verzonden: donderdag 9 augustus 2018 3:40
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

 

Gary R, JAS, list

1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its Tokens--past, 
present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond is dependent on its 
ever actually being scratched.  Such is the nature of a Real "would-be."

My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, is most 
certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals do not exist 
except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the experiences of 
the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and enable adaptation 
and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know, growth and increasing 
complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..]

"I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general, which 
does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" 8.313.

That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the instantiation is 
intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word again!].

2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in their 
laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will also suggest 
that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well!

Edwina

 

 



 

On Wed 08/08/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>  sent:

Gary R., List:

 

GR:   ... imagining that the word 'the' was once  first spoken (or written, but 
more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" 
was token of,  where does one locate its  reality?

 

Where does one "locate" the Reality of any general Type?  Every Instance of the 
word "the"--first, last, and each one in between--is a Replica of the same 
Sign.  The Type is not dependent on its Tokens--past, present, or future--any 
more than the hardness of a diamond is dependent on its ever actually being 
scratched.  Such is the nature of a Real "would-be."

 

GR:   Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are rooted?

 

What does it mean in this context to say that "symbols grow"?  In order for 
them to get "larger," we must have a way to "measure" their size.  
Conveniently, Peirce provided one with the concept of Information as 
"area"--the product of a Sign's Logical Breadth and Depth.  I am reminded again 
of Eco's comment that I quoted last week--" from interpretant to interpretant, 
the sign is more and more determined both in its breadth and in its depth."  In 
other words, although every Sign (as a general) is indeterminate to some 
degree, it can "grow"--i.e., approach (however distantly) the ideal state of 
Substantial Information--by becoming more determinate.

 

CSP:  If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the 
beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Not determinately 
nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. 
Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. 
That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. What 
logically follows? ... 

A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that 
seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more 
definite than itself ...

... the interpretant aims at the object more than at the original replica and 
may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very entelechy of being lies in 
being representable ... A symbol is an embryonic reality endowed with power of 
growth into the very truth, the very entelechy of reality. (EP 2:322-324; 1904)

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond  > wrote:

Jon AS, Gary f,

 

Jon wrote: 

 

JAS: I am currently adopting the speci

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry, list,

 

Hence semiotics as the first branch of normative logic. Critic the second and 
methodeutic the third.

 

You may try to force your undifferentiated view of logic on the works of Peirce 
but will find out in the long run that is doesn’t work.

 

Best, Auke

 

Van: Jerry LR Chandler  
Verzonden: zaterdag 28 juli 2018 15:24
Aan: Stephen Curtiss Rose 
CC: John F Sowa ; Peirce List 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

 

List, John, Auke, Gary R., 

 

A remarkably intersting array of remarks related to the remarkable remark of 
CSP.  :-)

 

The following notes may be relevant to at least some readers of this note.

 

1. To me,  the critical word in CSP’s phrase was “represent”.

In my view, the notion of representation must be prior to the application of 
the notion of logos / logic.

 

2. The notion of “normative” is almost meaningless.  The number of definitions 
and the number of different usages is vast. 

 

3. The notion of “normative sciences” has even less meaning to me than the term 
“normative”.  

 

4. The notion that “normative” is somehow related to morals/ethics is 
problematic. 

 

5. The notion of “should”, in this context, is merely a substitute for the 
ethical notion of “ought”.  How can one possibly have an “ought” without the 
prior of a representation?

 

6. The opening phrase, the presupposition for the interpretation of the 
remarkable remark is:

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
conformity of things to ends, 

 

Just what the hell is “the science of laws of conformity of things to ends”?

Is this phrase necessarily syntactically meaningless?   :-)

 

In my opinion, it is even more remarkable than the remarkable closure to the 
quote!

 

Have fun!

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

BTW, Mr. Trump often sounds as if he were a student of CSP!   :-)  

 

 

 

On Jul 28, 2018, at 6:01 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose mailto:stever...@gmail.com> > wrote:

 

Logic is one thing. It is what tends to the good, or enables good. It is like 
many other things a utility. Complexifying it and categorizing it is a 
distraction if its basic function is ignored, and its universality. It is what 
enables most people to guess at the truth and assess the chances of getting 
there. There are defective logics that reason that harm is good. or fail to 
consider ethics and aesthetics as fundamental to accomplishing life's purpose.. 
 I think Peirce agrees after all is said and done.




amazon.com/author/stephenrose  

 

On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 10:16 PM, John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,

HR

what does "normative" mean?


Note what Auke said:

Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. 


See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification
of the sciences.  Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:

 1. On the left, formal logic is a branch of pure mathematics.
In that sense, it is treated as pure theory that is independent
of any application to any subject for any purpose.  It doesn't
make any value judgments about the two truth values {T,F}.

 2. In the middle, logic is used as a normative science to
determine how people should reason in order to distinguish
truth from falsity.

JLRC

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose
ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose
ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent
something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)


This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic
I have ever read!


It would be unusual as a definition of a formal logic.  But Peirce
was discussing normative logic as a subject that depends on ethics
and esthetics to make value judgments about truth and falsity.

HR

what is the separating difference between "relation to ends"
and "reality"


The word 'ends' is ambiguous.  In this use, Peirce is not talking
about a spatial end point, but as the final goal or purpose of
some action.  For a modern audience, it would be better to use
the word 'goal' or 'purpose'.

Re: The distinction of "relation to ends" and "reality":

The natural sciences study reality (what there is).
The normative sciences study goals (what should be).

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Auke van Breemen]

John, (Jerry),

Thanks, I couldn't explain my remark better to Jerry. 

Auke

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa  
Verzonden: zaterdag 28 juli 2018 4:17
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,

HR
> what does "normative" mean?

Note what Auke said:
> Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. 

See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification of the 
sciences.  Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:

  1. On the left, formal logic is a branch of pure mathematics.
 In that sense, it is treated as pure theory that is independent
 of any application to any subject for any purpose.  It doesn't
 make any value judgments about the two truth values {T,F}.

  2. In the middle, logic is used as a normative science to
 determine how people should reason in order to distinguish
 truth from falsity.

JLRC
>> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of 
>> conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose 
>> ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose 
>> ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent 
>> something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)
> 
> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have 
> ever read!

It would be unusual as a definition of a formal logic.  But Peirce was 
discussing normative logic as a subject that depends on ethics and esthetics to 
make value judgments about truth and falsity.

HR
> what is the separating difference between "relation to ends"
> and "reality"

The word 'ends' is ambiguous.  In this use, Peirce is not talking about a 
spatial end point, but as the final goal or purpose of some action.  For a 
modern audience, it would be better to use the word 'goal' or 'purpose'.

Re: The distinction of "relation to ends" and "reality":

The natural sciences study reality (what there is).
The normative sciences study goals (what should be).

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

Don't confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jerry LR Chandler  
Verzonden: donderdag 26 juli 2018 23:55
Aan: Peirce List 
CC: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

 

List:

 

On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

 

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity
of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody
qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and
logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129,
EP 2:196-197&200; 1903) (my emphasis of phrase.)

 

This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have ever
read!

 

In particular, one might compare this definition with the descriptions of
set theory and the predicate logic of mathematics.  

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary,

 

I recall Hulswit had an interest in both. I do think it has helped him in his 
work on (teleological) causation, especially with regard to getting a clear 
sight on the notion of process.

 

Auke 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 20 januari 2018 18:34
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

John, Edwina, list,

 

I've nothing to add at the moment,  I too completely agree with the thrust of 
John's post. Let's hope that some of those untranscribed manuscripts will one 
day yield more relevant material on this topic.

 

In reading Whitehead years ago I too noted many similarities to Peirce's 
thinking. Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the 
thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on this. But 
I'm wondering if there has been any more extensive work in this area?

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 






 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:

John, list

Thank you so much for your perceptive and articulate post. Of course - I 
strongly agree.

And I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex or 
larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro bacterium to 
the plant world to the animal world. And yes, even in the complex adaptive 
multi-unit systems such as human societies. 

 I keep saying that 'plants talk to each other' and we are certainly finding 
out, by research, that they do just that.

However, semiosis is not equivalent to communication - a view that many become, 
I think, entrapped in. My view is that semiosis is morphological; that is, it 
forms matter ...transforming matter from one finite form to another finite form 
- within that semiosic triad.

And of course, this includes the physico-chemical realm where semiosic 
transformation also takes place, albeit at a, [thankfully] slower pace - which 
slow pace maintains the stability of this realm. The biological is a dynamic, 
active, constantly transformative and thus, is a ' productive of diversity'  
realm.

Again - thanks so much for your post.  

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 11:19 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net 
  sent:

Edwina and Gary R, 

I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that 
Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living 
things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: 

CSP, MS 463 (1908) 
> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, 
> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which 
> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately 
> determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop 
> to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception 
> understood. 

I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say more. 
His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human 
mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living 
things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would 
have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy, 
psychology, science, religion, and politics. 

Edwina 
> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual 
> realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my 
> constant reference to 4.551. 

Gary 
> I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have 
> (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work, 
> but none of them are much developed). 

The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to 
throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas 
seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more 
if they were ready to listen. 

For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227: 
> all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, 
> by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. 

That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition 
to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his 
anecdotes about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable 
performances, which implied "scientific intelligence". Although 
he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort 
to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so. 

Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must 
have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that 
to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes, 
crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics. 
He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA 
and the semiosis that 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

You wrote:
Maybe.  But these are issues for which we could benefit from more easily 
accessible resources -- such as well organized and cross referenced 
transcriptions of all of Peirce's MSS.
It would also be useful to have all of the MSS cross linked to everything that 
any and all Peirce scholars have written about any or all the MSS.
John

When a student I bought a reproduction on a second hand market for the picture 
frame only. Since I did not have a fitting image, I decided to keep the image, 
that was and still is in very bad state. After some weeks I knew the image 
would stay for an indefinite time period. Pictured are three women, each with a 
bible. In the middle an intensely, close reading older woman, to her left a 
young lady keeping the book at a distance, as if reading very critical. To her 
right a middle aged woman that looks away from the book into the world, as if 
checking what has been said. I am of the opinion that every serious text 
deserves all three kinds of reading.

Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers a chance to 
check our understanding at some future time, as well of the text as of the 
object  the text tries to understand.

As one may ask whether the ladies primarily want to understand the immediate 
object (the bible book) or the dynamical object, one may ask the same question 
with the work of Peirce. I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to 
be of the opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions after they 
pop up only on the basis that they are written by him. The goal, uncovering the 
dynamical object, in the interrogative mode on all suggestions, carefully 
considering all accessible facts concerning the objects, utilizing the social 
possibilities the community of investigators offers on the subject, will 
determine the conclusions in the end.

Best,

Auke

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Verzonden: maandag 1 januari 2018 5:14
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

Jerry and Auke,

In the Worlds article, my primary goal was to convince readers that a 
definition of modality in terms of laws and facts is more fruitful than a 
definition in terms of possible worlds.

The final paragraph of that article summarizes what I was trying to show.  (See 
below.)  What Peirce himself said about modality and his Gamma graphs is 
fragmentary, and I don't claim to know what he would have said in answer to 
your questions.

JLRC
> Can you provide the names of the four subdivisions of the universe of 
> actualities?

Since Peirce didn't attach any names to those subdivisions, I won't attempt to 
do so.  Don Roberts reproduced Peirce's diagram on p. 94 of his book on 
existential graphs.  But he doesn't name them either.

But by analogy with the labels Peirce assigned to the subdivisions of 
possibilities and necessities, I would guess that the 3rd and 4th subdivisions 
of actualities would represent something actual with respect to an observer or 
to some other person.  Peirce may have had some ideas in mind, but hadn't made 
a final decision.

AvB
> I would say...

Maybe.  But these are issues for which we could benefit from more easily 
accessible resources -- such as well organized and cross referenced 
transcriptions of all of Peirce's MSS.

It would also be useful to have all of the MSS cross linked to everything that 
any and all Peirce scholars have written about any or all the MSS.

John


 From the final paragraph of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf

The combination of semiotics with Dunn's semantics of laws and facts provides a 
theoretical foundation for modality and intentionality that captures more of 
the intended interpretation than a undefinable relation R over an undefined set 
W. An important promise of this combination is the ability to support 
multimodal reasoning as a kind of metalevel reasoning about the source of the 
laws and facts. Instead of complex axioms for each mode with even more complex 
interactions between modes, it enables the laws to be partitioned in a 
hierarchy that represents grades of necessity or levels of entrenchment:  
logical, physical, economic, legal, social, cultural, or personal (Sowa 2003). 
Exploring the full implications of Peirce's semiotics is far beyond the scope 
of this article, but the outline presented here suggests a wealth of resources 
waiting to be developed.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic (was Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry, list,

 

A good question. 

 

Looking in   
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf I find:

 

Existents. This universe includes "Objects whose Being consists in their Brute 
reactions, and of, second, the Facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) 
concerning those Objects Every member of this Universe is either a Single 
Object subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of 
Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a singular 
subject."

 

I would say two are mentioned:

 

2. Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions

3. the Facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects

 

I am inclined to speculate, and welcome alternatives:

1 could be subjective, so feeling

4 operative goals 

 

 

  Possibilitiesactualities  
 necessitated

1.  Subjective possibility  - feeling   
- compelled 
  
2.  Objective possibility   - Objects .. brute reactions
- determined  
3.  Social possibility  - Facts concerning objects  
- commanded
4.  Interrogative mode- goals   
  - rationally necessitated 

 

 

Happy new year!

 

Auke

 

 

Van: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com] 
Verzonden: maandag 1 januari 2018 0:13
Aan: John F Sowa ; Peirce List 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic (was Nativity scenes

 

John:

 

In For a six-page review of these issues with references,

see   http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf .

 

You wrote:

Peirce considered three universes: actualities, possibilities, and the 
necessitated. He subdivided each universe in four ways to define 12 modes. In 
the universe of possibilities, for example, he distinguished objective 
possibility (an alethic mode), subjective possibility (epistemic), social 
possibility (deontic), and an interrogative mode, which corresponds to 
scientific inquiry by hypothesis and experiment. For the necessitated, he 
called the four subdivisions the rationally necessitated, the compelled, the 
commanded, and the determined. Most of his writings on these topics were 
unpublished, and he changed his terminology from one manuscript to the next. 
Peirce admitted that a complete analysis and classification would be “a labor 
for generations of analysts, not for one” (MS 478:165).

 

It provides the subdivisions of two of the three universes. 

Can you provide the names of the four subdivisions of the universe of 
actualities?

 

Thank you 

 

Happy New Year to All!

 

Cheers

Jerry

 

 

On Dec 31, 2017, at 9:04 AM, John F Sowa <  
s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

 

Historical note:  Aristotle claimed that necessity and possibility
are determined by the laws of nature.  Leibniz introduced possible
worlds with necessity as truth in all possible worlds, and
possibility as truth in at least one.

Carnap was a strict nominalist who followed Mach in claiming
that the laws of science are *nothing but* summaries of
observable data.  He even considered *truth* to be outside
the realm of "scientific" method.  But Tarski's model theory
convinced him that truth could be defined in observable terms.
Carnap later (1947) combined Leibniz and Tarski.

Hintikka introduced "model sets", which consisted of sets
of propositions that are true of the possible worlds.  He also
introduced an alternativity relation among model sets.

Kripke went back to sets of worlds and related the accessibility
relation (identical to Hintikka's alternativity) to the axioms
for modality that C. I. Lewis had introduced.

Nominalists preferred sets of worlds to sets of sets of propositions.
But Quine would not accept modality with either version.

But in 1973, Michael Dunn introduced a beautiful solution
that Peirce would love, but the nominalists would hate:
treat each possible world as a pair (facts, laws).

For a six-page review of these issues with references,
see   http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf .

For more detail (26 pages), see   
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

 

 


 

 

Virusvrij.  

 www.avg.com 

 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic (was Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

John,

Thanks, the text behind the links appears to be interesting. Zeman got me 
thinking about tinctures and sheets.  Your http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf 
has a lot to offer.

Best,

Auke

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Verzonden: zondag 31 december 2017 16:05
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic (was Nativity scenes

On 12/31/2017 7:14 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:
> I am unsure about the place of modality, but maybe it just boils down 
> to a firstness and secondness view on the issue.

Historical note:  Aristotle claimed that necessity and possibility are 
determined by the laws of nature.  Leibniz introduced possible worlds with 
necessity as truth in all possible worlds, and possibility as truth in at least 
one.

Carnap was a strict nominalist who followed Mach in claiming that the laws of 
science are *nothing but* summaries of observable data.  He even considered 
*truth* to be outside the realm of "scientific" method.  But Tarski's model 
theory convinced him that truth could be defined in observable terms.
Carnap later (1947) combined Leibniz and Tarski.

Hintikka introduced "model sets", which consisted of sets of propositions that 
are true of the possible worlds.  He also introduced an alternativity relation 
among model sets.

Kripke went back to sets of worlds and related the accessibility relation 
(identical to Hintikka's alternativity) to the axioms for modality that C. I. 
Lewis had introduced.

Nominalists preferred sets of worlds to sets of sets of propositions.
But Quine would not accept modality with either version.

But in 1973, Michael Dunn introduced a beautiful solution that Peirce would 
love, but the nominalists would hate:
treat each possible world as a pair (facts, laws).

For a six-page review of these issues with references, see 
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf .

For more detail (26 pages), see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

John


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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, list,

 

I agree with your general remarks on speculative grammar. However I remain 
unsure about the coverage you assign to it. So, some words on my view on it. If 
you include the wild cultural speculations that passed this list in the 
nativity example I disagree. Those belong sooner to the special sciences (the 
psychical). Semiotics is more formal, its role is akin to the role of logic.

 

Lets start with Hegels erroneous (in our present day eyes) definition of logic: 
it studies the idea in the formal element of thought. In Peirces work the 
formal element is the subject of logic. For the study of the idea (sign would 
have been better) in the formal element Peirce coined semiotics. Some 
interesting parallels may be drawn between logic and semiotic. 

 

Speculative grammar – propositional logic (sub species eternitate, solipsistic)

Critic -   quantification (and modality?) are added. (the idea of worldly 
affairs added)

Speculative Rhetoric – (modality?) approaches like the socratic dialogue, 
medieval obligations, Hintikka’s game theoretical semantics, EG (interaction 
between graphist and interpreter added)

 

I am unsure about the place of modality, but maybe it just boils down to a 
firstness and secondness view on the issue. 

 

Anyhow, if the above makes any sense, then it would follow that Speculative 
Rhetoric would consist in a branch of study that provides a semi-formal study 
of the interaction between two man signs, mediated by all kind of signs, (man 
regarded as a dynamical argument in which all sign aspects are involved) that 
if performed long enough would eventually yield a graphical system akin to EG. 

 

1.  We would have to assume that a man sign (A) being in a state receives 
an effect sign x (In a first approximation one of the ten sign types that 
follow from the small classification, later to be extended into the 66 possible 
signs of the Welby classification).  
2.  The processing of x by A must be pictured in steps that follow the 
triadic structure and be cast in terms of the sign aspects. This hold for x, 
but also for A, but here we might want to take the corresponding interpretant 
aspectual names.
3.  Result of the interpretation process is the utterance of a response on 
x, x´. This x´effects man sign B that also is in a certain state, processes x´ 
and responds x” to A. Etc.

 

Note that the immediate object of A (A being a semiotic sheet comparable to the 
EG sheet), will differ from the immediate object of B. 

The dynamical object is reality. It is to be looked at as the common sheet of 
which the individual sheets are part (truth and falsity being present). One 
could look at the individual sheets as being comprised of Sowa’s conceptual 
graphs as they are realized in that individual and could be taken as a mapping 
of all conceptual content that can be drawn upon by the sheet when entering an 
interpretation process. So, that scheme would go into the index position, each 
item typified according to its sign aspectual possibilities.

 

The state being defined by the currently reigning emotional state (a 
firstness), the conceptual content (a secondness) and the goal (a thirdness) 
that rules sheet A or B at the moment it gets effected. 

 

In the content part of the nativity discussion we have seen this process in 
actu, but very unstructured, it is the task of semiotics to provide tools to 
structure this kind of conversation and to ensure that progress is made in an 
orderly fashion and in such a way that the sheet of A and B, for this issue 
merge. That is why semiotics is a normative science.

 

Best wishes,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zondag 31 december 2017 4:02
Aan: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

 

Peter, Jeff, list,

 

Peter, I too found the various viewpoints expressed in this thread interesting 
and, taken as a whole, valuable in ways which may go beyond your initial 
question. In any case, the discussion certainly in no way disappointed me 
either. 

 

By the way, Peter, I do not believe that I am alone in suggesting that Morris' 
"pragmatics" rather fully distorts Peirce's pragmatism and has led to 
considerable misunderstanding as to what Peirce's views actually were. 
Continuing, Jeff wrote:

 

JD: Peirce provides the resources needed for understanding how a contemporary 
Christian, Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, atheist, etc. might be able to engage in 
fruitful conversation about the nativity scene with the aim of seeking to 
better understand their differing experiences and perspectives on the world.

 

I agree, and would be interested in what other Peircean resources, along with 
the ones you just pointed to (or at least hinted at) you and others might 
imagine contributing to efforts towards bridging the communication gap 
currently prominent not only in religion, 

RE: RE: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Helmut,

 

It is an instance of a legisign.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

Van: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 december 2017 20:45
Aan: a.bree...@chello.nl
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Aw: RE: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

 

Auke,

I see, except, if it is symbolic (convention, as you wrote) mustn´t it be a 
legisign? I agree that it might be just a dicent, and to make an argument of it 
would require additional information.

Best,

Helmut

  

 30. Dezember 2017 um 20:26 Uhr
Von: "Auke van Breemen" <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> >
 

Helmut,

 

It is a replica sinsign (of disputable quality to me).

It can’t be an icon because you need to know the convention that relates it to 
its object. 

I hold it, as it is presented on the list, to be rhematic. Just raises an idea, 
enabling everybody to go his or her way with the interpretation as the 
conversation shows. I can’t judge it in its original location and context, 
where it might appear, but this is just unwarranted speculation, as a dicent 
and maybe as such as a part of an argument. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 december 2017 18:49
Aan: tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> 
CC: tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Ben Novak 
<trevriz...@gmail.com <mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com> >; PEIRCE-L 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >; Auke van Breemen 
<a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> >; Claudio Guerri 
<claudiogue...@gmail.com <mailto:claudiogue...@gmail.com> >
Onderwerp: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

 

Edwina,

I see, and agree. Peirce cannot do much for this example. But how about the 
other way round? If this picture conveys an argument, can we say that it is 
one? If so, it must be symbolic and a legisign. I would find it interesting to 
analyse, in which way a combination of depictions or icons, not containing 
letters or other elements usually known as symbols, suddenly becomes symbolic 
and a legisign.

Best,

helmut

  

 30. Dezember 2017 um 18:06 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
 

Helmut, list

I can't completely reply to your questions - after all, it was Ben who brought 
up the notion of the conquering population that destroys the host's culture.

As for your second point [Christians..refugees]..of course that is an obvious 
interpretation of the refugee-nativity - My point is only that you don't need 
an extensive Peircean semiosic analysis to explain that to anyone.

Edwina

 

On Sat 30/12/17 11:53 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de 
<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>  sent:

Edwina,

Maybe Ben should better have written "One result is that the refugee culture is 
now a continuing source of divinity", instead of "the", but in any case she did 
not say that it is the only source, which would, according to conquerer´s 
logic, give the conquerer the right to conquer. A logic of which I donot think, 
that it is Ben´s logic too. So perhaps you did read too much into something?

And what about me reading the argument "Christians should care about refugees, 
because the holy family were refugees too" into the said piece of art? Do you 
thing that too would be an overinterpretation?

Best,

Helmut

  

30. Dezember 2017 um 17:20 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
 

Ben, list:

Ben - you wrote:


 "The Trondheim Nativity scene may be seen as an attempt to drain the symbol of 
the Holy Family from its original, culturally specific reference to a unique 
event, by appropriating its meaning to the generalized situation of all 
refugees--particularly millions of refugees today. Thus it drastically changes 
the symbol from one of specific meaning and cultural relevance, particularly 
its unique religious importance, to something general and political in nature. 
One result is that the refugee culture is now the continuing source of 
divinity, rather than a singular event in history. One culture appropriating 
the symbol of the Holy Family for itself, disconnected to either its original 
meaning or its original cultural message to a different culture"

The above outline seems to me to be an action of open rejection of the values 
of the host culture, and inserting the refugee population as the 'divine' or 
'to-be-worshipped' culture. Your analogy to conquering cultures destroying the 
culture of the conquered - suggests that the refugees have conquered Christian 
Europe. Is that your analysis?

I think one can read too much into these images...and will stop commenting.

Edwina


 

On Sat 30/12/17 10:56 AM , Ben Novak trevriz...@gmail.com 
<mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com>  sent:

Dear All: 

 

I had really hoped that P

RE: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Helmut,

 

It is a replica sinsign (of disputable quality to me).

It can’t be an icon because you need to know the convention that relates it to 
its object. 

I hold it, as it is presented on the list, to be rhematic. Just raises an idea, 
enabling everybody to go his or her way with the interpretation as the 
conversation shows. I can’t judge it in its original location and context, 
where it might appear, but this is just unwarranted speculation, as a dicent 
and maybe as such as a part of an argument. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 december 2017 18:49
Aan: tabor...@primus.ca
CC: tabor...@primus.ca; Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com>; PEIRCE-L 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>; Claudio 
Guerri <claudiogue...@gmail.com>
Onderwerp: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

 

Edwina,

I see, and agree. Peirce cannot do much for this example. But how about the 
other way round? If this picture conveys an argument, can we say that it is 
one? If so, it must be symbolic and a legisign. I would find it interesting to 
analyse, in which way a combination of depictions or icons, not containing 
letters or other elements usually known as symbols, suddenly becomes symbolic 
and a legisign.

Best,

helmut

  

 30. Dezember 2017 um 18:06 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
 

Helmut, list

I can't completely reply to your questions - after all, it was Ben who brought 
up the notion of the conquering population that destroys the host's culture.

As for your second point [Christians..refugees]..of course that is an obvious 
interpretation of the refugee-nativity - My point is only that you don't need 
an extensive Peircean semiosic analysis to explain that to anyone.

Edwina

 

On Sat 30/12/17 11:53 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de 
<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>  sent:

Edwina,

Maybe Ben should better have written "One result is that the refugee culture is 
now a continuing source of divinity", instead of "the", but in any case she did 
not say that it is the only source, which would, according to conquerer´s 
logic, give the conquerer the right to conquer. A logic of which I donot think, 
that it is Ben´s logic too. So perhaps you did read too much into something?

And what about me reading the argument "Christians should care about refugees, 
because the holy family were refugees too" into the said piece of art? Do you 
thing that too would be an overinterpretation?

Best,

Helmut

  

30. Dezember 2017 um 17:20 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
 

Ben, list:

Ben - you wrote:


 "The Trondheim Nativity scene may be seen as an attempt to drain the symbol of 
the Holy Family from its original, culturally specific reference to a unique 
event, by appropriating its meaning to the generalized situation of all 
refugees--particularly millions of refugees today. Thus it drastically changes 
the symbol from one of specific meaning and cultural relevance, particularly 
its unique religious importance, to something general and political in nature. 
One result is that the refugee culture is now the continuing source of 
divinity, rather than a singular event in history. One culture appropriating 
the symbol of the Holy Family for itself, disconnected to either its original 
meaning or its original cultural message to a different culture"

The above outline seems to me to be an action of open rejection of the values 
of the host culture, and inserting the refugee population as the 'divine' or 
'to-be-worshipped' culture. Your analogy to conquering cultures destroying the 
culture of the conquered - suggests that the refugees have conquered Christian 
Europe. Is that your analysis?

I think one can read too much into these images...and will stop commenting.

Edwina


 

On Sat 30/12/17 10:56 AM , Ben Novak trevriz...@gmail.com 
<mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com>  sent:

Dear All: 

 

I had really hoped that Peirce scholars might help in analyzing this simple 
example, for it is an example of a far larger set of issues.

 

First, why is it, of all the nativity scenes created around the world, that 
this one has received so much attention? 

 

I am particularly interested because I was involved for several years with the 
Austrian Society for the Protection of Cultural Property, and the United 
Nations Treaty for the Protection of Cultural Property, and attended several 
conferences in Vienna on the subject. One observation: in any conflict, the 
destruction of the cultural property of the other side seems to be a major 
objective in most wars, as a means of demoralizing the enemy. As a result, in 
addition to the human casualties, the destruction of cultural property is also 
often a major casualty.

 

Part of any war, whether violently fought, or otherwis

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, Peter, all

 

I did not discuss the scene. I became increasingly surprised by the ‘method’ 
used in discussing the example scenery. 

 

1.  A semiotic discussion of the possibilities of a semiotic analysis of an 
image on the basis of a description in the absence of the sign itself is 
surprising if the sign belongs to the realm of visual arts/communication. 
2.  Peirce somewhere aptly remarks that it is impossible to decide the 
nature of a cloth if you only put your finger on it without moving it.  So, 
either you take a historical or cross cultural sample of images and start 
looking for relevant semiotic differences or you concentrate on the process of 
the making from brief to finished product and ask what semiotic decisions have 
been made in the process of the making and whether those decisions improved the 
effectiveness of the goals aimed at. After all the history of the visual arts 
can be looked at as explorations of the communicative and expressive 
possibilities of signs. 
3.  A Peircean semiotic analysis is only (semi) formal. It may structure a 
cultural exegesis by organizing the topics dealt with, but it must not be 
confused with it for other interests than when looking for changes in sign use 
or communication habits. In this respect its role is similar to the role of 
logic or grammar.

 

My best wishes for 2018 to all,

 

Auke an Breemen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 december 2017 0:32
Aan: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

 

Peter, Ben, Claudio, Edwina, Auke, list,

 

I would tend to agree with you, Peter, that Peircean semiotics may not have too 
much to offer in the analysis of the Nativity scene example; or, perhaps 
better, that what it might have to offer is probably not potentially as 
valuable as other kinds of analyses.

 

I would also tend to agree with you that it is probably desirable to end at 
least the Peirce-L discussion of this example while, of course, folk are always 
free to take the discussion off-list.

 

Finally, thank you for providing the image of the Trondheim nativity scene.

 

May we all have a healthy and productive 2018. Here's one of my favorite New 
Year's quotes.

 

And now we welcome the new year. Full of things that have never been. 

Rainer Maria Rilke

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  
<https://d22r54gnmuhwmk.cloudfront.net/photos/0/ia/il/nnIAIlpwAddaFAz-44x44-cropped.jpg>
 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Skagestad, Peter <peter_skages...@uml.edu 
<mailto:peter_skages...@uml.edu> > wrote:

List,

 

I appreciate Ben's expression of sympathy, but I tend to agree with those who 
have opined that there is just not much to be said, from a Peircean point of 
view, about this analogy.

 

I am not sure of the wisdom of continuing this thread any further, but a couple 
of listers have  requested an image of the Trondheim Nativity scene, so here it 
is, attached.

 

Best,

Peter

  _  

From: Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com <mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com> >
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:13:43 PM
To: Jerry Rhee
Cc: Auke van Breemen; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes 

 

Dear List: 

 

I am a long-time follower of the discussions on Peirce List, and am most 
grateful for some of the discussions of Peirce's thought, which makes me 
continue to read each entry. However, I have long been wondering why there is 
so little discussion of relating Peirce's  concepts and methodologies to 
concrete examples, or other 20th and even 21st century thinkers.

 

The current discussion of Peter Skagestad's simple, practical question about a 
nativity scene in Trondheim, has been disappointing. All he asked was the 
relevance of Peirce's semiotics to a presently existing symbolic 
representation. 

 

The general discussion that has ensued seems to confirm that even the most 
frequent and seemingly most expert expositors of Peirce's thought are stumped 
by Skagestad's simple example, with seemingly little to offer in the way of 
helpful analysis to Skagestad's artist sister. 

 

Poor Peter Skagestad finally had to give up on Peirce, noting that only  
"Gene's references to both Pope Francis and G.H. Mead strike me as highly 
relevant to my question, and I will refer my sister to a few quotes from Mead."

 

If ever there were an example of scholars unable to descend from their ivory 
towers of abstraction to deal with real world examples, this is a classic.

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

Ben Novak

 

 




 

Ben Novak 

5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142

Telephone: (814) 808-5702 <tel:(814)%20808-5702> 


"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Auke van Breemen]

Peter,

 

Did you provide an image of what you described in your original question?

 

I have a somewhat unusual question. My sister is writing an Art History thesis 
on nativity scenes and their contemporary relevance. An example is one at a 
street mission in Trondheim, Norway, depicting the Holy Family as present-day 
refugees from the Middle East. Now the question is what, if anything, might 
semiotics have to say about such depiction? The answer may be obvious, but it 
escapes me, at least for the moment. Any suggestions?

--

 

Seems to me to be relevant for a semiotic art history analysis. Without it, it 
is just idly speculation on a symbol somehow pointing to an image that may or 
may not surprise us semiotically .

 

Best,

Auke van Breemen 

 

 

Claudio, list:

 

I'll continue to disagree. 

The point is - an analogy doesn't conclude that the 'refugees nativity is 'just 
an other nativity'. One can certainly discuss the meaning of Being a Refugee in 
multiple ways - that don't involve a triadic Peircean semiotic approach.

 

I don't agree that symbols/language 'isolate or exclude us from the world' - 
They symbolize the world, but, as Peirce pointed out, we can yet examine the 
hard truth, the objective non-symbolic reality of the world - over time. 

 

I also don't agree that  "The qualities of the world enter into language after 
the language has organized its internal relations". That's smacks of 
sociolinguistics. I think that the realities of the world exist - as Peirce 
said - quite apart from what anyone thinks or says about it..

 

And - my point of view is that Reality 'exists' [not in the sense of Secondness 
but of Thirdness] - and I can no more escape its objective nature than I can 
escape the alphabet of this computer.

 

My point is that a simple analogy of two or more images doesn't need and indeed 
becomes unintelligible by a complex examination by semiotics. 

 

The images of these two sets can be examined without any notion of a triadic 
process; ...indeed...we could end up implying far more into these two images 
than actually objectively exist. We've seen this already on this list, where 
one post made the nonsensical suggestion that IF one does not feel compassion 
by looking at this Refugee Nativity, THEN, one lacks the capacity for 
compassion within oneself. Can such a conclusion be justified by a semiosic 
analysis? Another interpretation could compare the 'holiness' of the Original 
Nativity with..what...an equal holiness of the Refugee Nativity?  The isolation 
of these interpretations from objective reality can only exist in the Seminar 
Room and becomes trite and trivial.

 

A basic analogy format would provide a far more realistic and less 
overly-intellectualized view. What would I suggest as an analytic method? 
Nothing to do with semiotics or even, semiology. I would consider multiple 
nativity scenes from multiple sources over multiple years and even centuries - 
and locate them, not merely within the variables of style, but also content --  
within the economic and political realities of their era. That's all.

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 
<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=emailclient>
 

Virusvrij.  
<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=emailclient>
 www.avg.com 

 


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RE: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Auke van Breemen]

Edwina, Gary’s, list,

 

I wasn’t so much thinking about the reasoning. I started thinking whether a 
difference between life and mind could be pointed down in the trichotomies of 
the Welby classification. For instance in  the sympathetic, shocking and usual 
distinction. 

 

Emotional accompaniments, in Questions concerning, etc, are deemed to be 
contributions of the receptive sheet. The individual life is distinguished from 
the person by being the source of error.  

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

 

Van: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 20:43
Aan: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Onderwerp: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary R - I'd agree with you.

First - I do agree [with Peirce] that Mind [and therefore semiosis] operates in 
the physic-chemical realm. BUT - this realm which provides the planet with 
enormous stability of matter [just imagine if a chemical kept 'evolving' and 
changing!!] - is NOT the same as the biological realm, which has internalized 
its laws within instantiations [Type-Token] and thus, a 'chance' deviation from 
the norm can take place in this one or few 'instantiations' and adapt into a 
different species - without impinging on the continuity of the former species. 
So, the biological realm can evolve and adapt - which provides matter with the 
diversity it needs to fend off entropy.

But AI is not, as I understand it - similar to a biological organism. It seems 
similar to a physico-chemical element. It's a programmed machine with the 
programming outside of its individual control.

 I simply don't see how it can set itself up as a Type-Token, and enable 
productive and collective deviations from the norm. I can see that a 
machine/robot can be semiotically  coupled with its external world. But - can 
it deviate from its norm, the rules we have put in and yes, the adaptations it 
has learned within these rules - can it deviate and set up a 'new species' so 
to speak? 

After all - in the biological realm that new species/Type can only appear if it 
is functional. Wouldn't the same principle hold for AI? 

Edwina

 

On Sat 17/06/17 1:56 PM , Gary Richmond  <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> 
gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Auke, Edwina, Gary F, list,

 

Auke, quoting Gary F, wrote: "Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the 
intimate connection between life and semiosis." Then asked, "What if we insert 
‘mind’ instead of life?"

 

Edwina commented: " Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates 
in the physic-chemical realm as well as the biological."

 

Yet one should as well consider that the bio- in biosemiotics shows that it is 
primarily concerned with the semiosis that occurs in life forms. This is not to 
suggest that mlnd and semiosis don't operate in other realms than the living, 
including the physio-chemical. What I've been saying is that  while I can see 
that AI systems (like the Gobot Gary F cited) can learn "inductively,"  I push 
back against the notion that they could develop certain intelligences as we 
find only in life forms.

 

In my opinion the 'mind' or 'intelligence' we see in machines is what's been 
put in them. As Gary F wrote: 

 

I also think that “machine intelligence” is a contradiction in terms. To me, an 
intelligent system must have an internal guidance system semiotically coupled 
with its external world, and must have some degree of autonomy in its 
interactions with other systems.

 

I fully concur with that statement. But what I can't agree with is his comment 
immediately following this, namely, "I think it’s quite plausible that AI 
systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of 
intelligence   "

 

Computers and robots can already perform certain functions very much better 
than humans. But autonomy? That's another matter. Gary F finds machine autonomy 
(in the sense in which he described it just above) "plausible" while I find it 
highly implausible, Philip K. Dick not withstanding. 

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

 

 






 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 12:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca 
<javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> > wrote:


Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the 
physic-chemical realm as well as the biological.

Edwina
 

On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl 
<javascript:top.opencompose('a.bree...@chello.nl','','','')>  sent:

Gary’s,

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. 

 

What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
<

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary’s,

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis.

 

What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary F,

 

Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that seriously, at least 
as an accusation. But thanks for your thoughfulness in this message.

 

You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a 
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material 
component of an AI."

 

I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in passing 
earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some other arising from 
"a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know 
them on Earth." say, carbon, on some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot 
imagine life forming from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science 
fiction and not science.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  > wrote:

Gary R,

 

Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce would 
have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” 
either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a 
material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material 
component of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a 
“scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not material, in 
order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse 
you of anything.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
To: Peirce-L  >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

 

Gary F,

 

You wrote: 

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic systems can 
develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and serious doubts. So, 
let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet there to decide the question 
one way or the other." But "DNA chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure 
what that means, but apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with 
that.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690  

 

On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  > wrote:

Gary,

 

For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which 
amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs. As he 
says in EP2:309,

“Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must 
conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind 
may compel men to think is not the question.”

 

Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and 
semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing 
against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question 
whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop 
intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the 
evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08

Gary F, list,

 

Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in 
combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article 
continues: 

Human Expertise

AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what does 
not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good as people 
when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A