Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List

 

Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error?

 

Best

Helmut

 

 

 
 

21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 





Helmut, 

 

You wrote: "I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the primisense."

 

I believe that it has already been posited that primisense (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'_expression_' of not one but of three categories.

 

Best,

 

Gary R
















 

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 


















 


On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




List,

Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed again in altersense and medisense.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

21. Juni 2021 um 19:19 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

 



Gary R., List:
 




GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is not Peirce's term but your invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.




 

Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP 8.303) and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use of "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of the two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier definition of "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter ... the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the consciousness of means," as well as its division into "three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).

 




GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations between them.




 

The difference is that "qualisense" is still Peirce's term, and at least arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it some 13 years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as reflecting his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on the same occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of exertion of any kind" (CP 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as well as "a double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all quite consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle between self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he never uses "sinsense" or "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing prefixes from speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For one thing, I notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than "legisense" in this quoted statement.

 

Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal letters, so it seems hars

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed again in altersense and medisense.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

21. Juni 2021 um 19:19 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 



Gary R., List:
 




GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is not Peirce's term but your invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.




 

Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP 8.303) and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use of "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of the two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier definition of "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter ... the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the consciousness of means," as well as its division into "three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).

 




GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations between them.




 

The difference is that "qualisense" is still Peirce's term, and at least arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it some 13 years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as reflecting his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on the same occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of exertion of any kind" (CP 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as well as "a double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all quite consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle between self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he never uses "sinsense" or "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing prefixes from speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For one thing, I notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than "legisense" in this quoted statement.

 

Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:35 AM Gary Richmond  wrote:








Jon, Gary F, List,

 













JAS: I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it runs the risk of fostering such conflation.
















 

GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that it's a slight risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots ("sense" and "sign") not only make it quite unlikely that the terms will be conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation between those trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective sciences, viz., phenomenology and logic as semeiotic. 

 

Below you yourself suggest a trade off of terminology from one trichotomy to another. But first:
















 















Jon quoted me:















 















GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Helmut Raulien]

e utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different _expression_ for the same fact, what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, so far as I am concerned.]]

 

If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in Turning Signs 5: Inside Out (gnusystems.ca).

 

Gary f

 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 19-Jun-21 07:32
To: a.bree...@upcmail.nl
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4



 



List



 



Here again the maybe most frequently used quote about "phaneron", from the Commens Dictionary:



"




1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | CP 1.284



Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.

"

Due to this quote I was wondering, why Peirce in other places speaks of multiple "phanerons", or of "a phaneron". To me there are two possible explanations:

1. "Never having entertained a doubt" is two weak negations, that make a merely weak definition, i.e. a possibility. So he did not exclude the other possibility, that there may be distinct phanerons.

2. The phaneron is spatially total, but temporally separable, though, due to the continuity-claim, blurredly separable.

I like number 1 better.

Another question by me is, that "quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" does not exclude the possibility, that it does correspond to a real thing, i.e. include a dynamic object, i.e. be semiotic. Claiming regardlessness to me sounds rather like a scientific method to better focus on the phaneron alone, than like a completely distinct science. But I dont know the exact definition of "science", so ok, I guess, phaneroscopy may be called a science. Setting closer borders of "regard" helps to not miss something.

Did I get everything ok?

Best

Helmut





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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Helmut Raulien]

List

 

Here again the maybe most frequently used quote about "phaneron", from the Commens Dictionary:

"


1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | CP 1.284


Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.

"

Due to this quote I was wondering, why Peirce in other places speaks of multiple "phanerons", or of "a phaneron". To me there are two possible explanations:

1. "Never having entertained a doubt" is two weak negations, that make a merely weak definition, i.e. a possibility. So he did not exclude the other possibility, that there may be distinct phanerons.

2. The phaneron is spatially total, but temporally separable, though, due to the continuity-claim, blurredly separable.

I like number 1 better.

Another question by me is, that "quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" does not exclude the possibility, that it does correspond to a real thing, i.e. include a dynamic object, i.e. be semiotic. Claiming regardlessness to me sounds rather like a scientific method to better focus on the phaneron alone, than like a completely distinct science. But I dont know the exact definition of "science", so ok, I guess, phaneroscopy may be called a science. Setting closer borders of "regard" helps to not miss something.

Did I get everything ok?

Best

Helmut




 

 19. Juni 2021 um 11:33 Uhr
 "Auke van Breemen" 
wrote:

 


John,

Good points. You might be interested in Ramchandran and Hirstein's : Three laws of Qualia.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233684568_Three_laws_of_qualia_What_neurology_tells_us_about_the_biological_functions_of_consciousness 

Auke

Op 19 juni 2021 om 5:36 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
 
Gary F> For me at least, �veracity� only applies to stories or propositions that are publicly verifiable. 

But a huge amount of information that we get every day is reported by people whose observations cannot be  verified by any other sources.  When your friends or family discuss their experiences, they rarely have photographic evidence or other confirming sources about what they did or saw.

Over time, we learn that some people are more reliable or truthful than others.  We also learn that people whose reports are usually truthful may hide or distort some issues that may be painful or embarrassing.

For dreams and feelings, the subject's introspective reports are the only sources for the details.  But neuroscientists have found those reports to be extremely valuable for interpreting the data they receive from brain scans.

Modern technology can provide important resources for enhancing the science of phaneroscopy.

John
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, Auke, List

 

I think there are different definitions (of truth and reality), without being contradictionary definitions. I dont think that "one definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation", that would be anthropocentric / nominalistic. Peirce wrote it in the "would-be"- form: It is not the result, but it "would be" the result of an impossible thought-experiment. Reality is independent of humans, but if humans were almighty (infinite inquiry, infinite group of inquirers), what they are not, then it would be the result, which it is not. So in reality reality is independent.

 

Best

Helmut

 

17. Juni 2021 um 16:34 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:




List

What disagreement with Peirce? My point was to examine the quotes by Peirce, selected by both JAS and Auke. They focused on different definitions of reality and truth.

I don't think that the differences can be defined as between 'those which are verbal' vs 'those which are pragmatic'. Both acknowledge that a real object is 'real' - regardless of 'what you or I may think about it' 5.432. So, how do I see the difference?

The JAS selections focus on the requirement, I think, for an additional step to define 'the real'; namely, an investigation, 'by all who investigate',  that concludes that this object is truthfully represented 'in this opinion'.

The quotes provided by JAS are indicative of the scientific method .The intentionality, if I may use the term,  of dealing with these objects rests within the mankind-who-investigate. Reality is defined as that-which is-true after our investigations.

But Auke's quotes show us a different aspect of reality, apart from its being, after investigation, defined as true. His quotes - and I emphasize that both JAS and Auke provided Peircean quotes ... puts some intentionality - an inaccurate word I admit - upon reality; namely, that 'the reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition'.

That's what is interesting in these definitions of reality; one definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation and our evaluation of these investigations; the other definition defines it as the result of the external world's persistence in interaction with us.

Both are obviously valid. I'm not sure how I would term or define the two approaches.

Edwina

 



 

On Thu 17/06/21 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:



Edwina, Auke, List:

 

I appreciate the honest acknowledgment of disagreement with Peirce. However, nothing that I quoted from him "relies on man to define truth." There is no inconsistency whatsoever between his definitions of reality at the second and third grades of clarity, which I summarize as follows.



	Verbal definition of reality - that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
	Pragmatistic definition of reality - that which would be affirmed in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.




Note that the latter describes a regulative ideal, not an actual achievement, so it does not rely on man to define truth (or reality) at all. It simply expresses the "cheerful hope" that our investigations of reality, if carried out far enough in a sincere spirit of seeking the truth, would eventually be self-correcting. For more on this, I once again highly recommend Robert Lane's recent book,  Peirce on Realism and Idealism (https://books.google.com/books/about/Peirce_on_Realism_and_Idealism.html?id=yKpCDwAAQBAJ).

 

As for Auke's post quoted below, I agree completely with Gary F.'s response (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-06/msg00126.html ).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 8:12 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


List

I think that Auke has brought up a vital analysis of 'what is reality'.

JAS provided us with Peirce quotations that asserted that 'what is true' is reality. I have a problem with such a definition, because it relies on man to define truth and I consider allotting mankind such a role is problematic. [indeed, dare I say, almost nominalistic].

I prefer the Peirce quotations selected by Auke, which put reality out of the control of man's thoughts and return it to the external world.

And as Auke added: "Real is that what is independent of individual thought" [And I'd even add, of many individual thoughts for the collective can be wrong]. Auke adds: "it is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a phanerosocpic exercise".

Agreed; thanks.

Edwina

On Thu 17/06/21 2:08 AM , "Auke van Breemen"  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:


Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Helmut Raulien]

 


List,

 

the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop.

I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch into essentialism.

 

Best

Helmut

 

 17. Juni 2021 um 03:41 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Gary R., List:
 



CT: As I was contemplating whether or not I was in the right place by having joined the list, someone then used the term embodied, and that made my mind up for me.  .  The term 'embodied' is now a red flag for me."

GR: I may have used it in commenting on Merleau-Ponty, but I don't just now recall.



 

For the record, there were three posts yesterday that included the term "embodied," and none of them were yours.

 



JAS: In accordance with CP 2.276 (quoted below), I understand "hypoicon" to be Peirce's term for any embodied sign that is primarily iconic, a sinsign/token that represents its object by qualitatively resembling it and does not otherwise indicate what that object is.

 



JAS: These are distinctions between different classes of hypoicons--images, diagrams, and metaphors, respectively--rather than having anything to do with distinguishing a hypoicon from an icon. Again, my understanding of the latter is that a hypoicon is simply an embodied iconic sign.

 



ET: Firstness doesn't function per se but refers to an interactional stimulus that has to be embodied, as a 'mode of being', even though it is completely without awareness or consciousness. ..which would bring in Secondness.



 

Cathy did not disclose which of these (perhaps all of them) she found so problematic, but Peirce himself frequently employs "embodied" or "embodiment"--a total of 63 times in CP. That being the case, why would anyone who is genuinely seeking to understand and apply his thought consider it to be a "red flag," let alone evidence supporting the allegation that "Plato and Descartes influences" are "a little too entrenched here"? I asked Cathy off-List first thing this morning if she would mind elaborating on what she meant by that on-List remark, and she replied that she would do so "as time permits," but so far I have not received any further clarification.



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:31 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:









Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and gives their reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining why she left the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you turn her comments into a rather vicious attack on me.

GR: What vicious attack? The thrust of my earlier post was this: "It is you [Edwina] who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false." It is your comment, "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked," which prompted my response. What 'critique'? She didn't support reason -- such as it was -- with any explanation, argumentation; she didn't cite messages which had led her to that view, etc. And so, I decided not to overlook why she left so abruptly after such a promising start.

Edwina: Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?

GR: (1) I did indeed ask her to expand on why she decided to leave the List in several off List exchanges today (see brief excerpts below); (2) I didn't "brush her off" at all. What a weird and, if not exactly 'vicious', certainly baseless and untoward thing to say. And I don't believe anyone else has ever accused me of being vicious (I am not vicious) -- it seems to me that making such accusations is your way of dealing with virtually any criticism coming your way; (3) I don't "brush you off" and, my engaging you in this exchange is an _expression_, if not exactly, proof of that. I do tend to disagree with you on many phenomenological, semeiotic, pragmatic, and metaphysical positions yo

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

Hi Mauro,

 

sorry, I dont know this notation with "!", "&&", and "II". Is it taught somewhere in the internet?

In your example, I would substitute "IF b THEN c ELSE d" and "IF e THEN f ELSE g".

We have twice two = 2 + 2 = 4 possibilities?

 
Helmut

 04. Juni 2021 um 08:54 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
more difficult:

IF a THEN
IF b THEN c
ELSE d
ELSE
IF e THEN f
ELSE g

(a && b && c&&!d&&!e&&!f&&!g)||(a&&!b&&!c&&d&&!e&&!f&&!g) ||(!a&&!b&&!c&&!d&&e&&f&&!g)||(!a&&!b&&!c&&!d&&!e&&!f&&g)

 

https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=%28a+%26%26+b+%26%26+c%26%26%21d%26%26%21e%26%26%21f%26%26%21g%29%7C%7C%28a%26%26%21b%26%26%21c%26%26d%26%26%21e%26%26%21f%26%26%21g%29+%7C%7C%28%21a%26%26%21b%26%26%21c%26%26%21d%26%26e%26%26f%26%26%21g%29%7C%7C%28%21a%26%26%21b%26%26%21c%26%26%21d%26%26%21e%26%26%21f%26%26g%29

 

7 variabili, 2 valori-> 2^7:128 possibilità

2^128: 340282366920938463463374607431768211456 possibili combinazioni

 

I think that It would be the propositional calculus of causality. Jon, what do you think about this idea?

Mauro

 

 


On Fri, 4 Jun 2021 at 06:10, Mauro Bertani <bertanima...@gmail.com> wrote:


Hi Helmut,
the secret of propositional calculus with 3 variables is behind this four number:

2 3 8 256

3 variable : {a,b,c}

2 value per variable : {0,1} or {T,F}

the combination of 2 value for 3 variable are 2^3 = 8 rows:



	
		
			a
			b
			c
			 
		
		
			F
			F
			F
			 
		
		
			F
			F
			T
			 
		
		
			F
			T
			F
			 
		
		
			F
			T
			T
			 
		
		
			T
			F
			F
			 
		
		
			T
			F
			T
			 
		
		
			T
			T
			F
			 
		
		
			T
			T
			T
			 
		
	

Now came in action theVenn Diagram: for 3 variable the space is divided in 8 parts: each part is  tuple of 3 variables when the tupla began true for the evaluation of a proposition.

For example here the tupla (a&&b&&c):

https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=%28a%26%26b%26%26c%29

For example here the two tuple   (a&&b&&c) e (a&&!b&&c):

https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=%28a%26%26b%26%26c%29+%7C%7C+%28a%26%26%21b%26%26c%29

In fact the venn diagram has two parts colored and the truth table has two rows that evaluate a true.

8 variables that can be coloured or less is the same as 8 variables with two values. so 2^8=256 combinations.

Now we can express 256 concepts with three variables, but there are many more prepositions that express this concept. This is due to the use of different operators and the number of operators. Born abstract algebra.

The last step is to order the 256 concept. Also in this case there are many ways to do this. This creates a lattice

I'm not sure but we come into group theory.

I hope I help you

Mauro

 


On Thu, 3 Jun 2021 at 19:27, Mauro Bertani <bertanima...@gmail.com> wrote:


Hi Helmut,
Tonight I rethink what you say and tomorrow I write you what I think about it. But just now I can say that the case (a&&b&&c) is wrong.

 

Mauro

 


Il gio 3 giu 2021, 19:07 Mauro Bertani <bertanima...@gmail.com> ha scritto:



I havn't cc peirce-L
 

Il gio 3 giu 2021, 19:03 Mauro Bertani <bertanima...@gmail.com> ha scritto:


Hi Hermut,
This is the sentence:

 

( a &&b && !c ) || ( a &&b&&c) || (!a &&b &&c) || (!a &&!b&&c)

 

https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=%28+a+%26%26b+%26%26+%21c+%29+%7C%7C+%28+a+%26%26b%26%26c%29+%7C%7C+%28%21a+%26%26b+%26%26c%29+%7C%7C+%28%21a+%26%26%21b%26%26c%29

 

But i think that isn't the if then else clause.

 

Mauro

 


Il gio 3 giu 2021, 18:22 Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> ha scritto:




Hi Mauro,

 

first of all, forget everything I posted before, it is full of mistakes. Now I have thought, that it may be necessary, to include the possible trues. We have two claims: "If A then B", and "if not A then C". But which is the operator to combine these two claims? I think, neither "or", nor "xor" works. In the end we must have a situation, that still supports the two claims. I have made a new PDF. I hope, it is not completely wrong again.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 03. Juni 2021 um 15:01 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" <bertanima...@gmail.com>
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
I find this way of solution that is more useful also for other cases.

The First step is to find all the variables of the situation.

IF a THEN b ELSE c

So the variables are a,b,c

The second step is to find the case that evaluates to true ours sentences.

IF a=true THEN b= true, c=false --- 1 case

ELSE a=false,b=false,c=true ---  2 case

the Third step is to conjunct the variabile and disjunct the c

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 
 


 
 

Sorry again, the formula is wrong somehow, now I cannot think anymore about this.

 

Sorry, the aka was wrong. Here the corrected PDF.

 



Hi Mauro, Jon, List


 

please look at the PDF attached (Venn diagrams).

 

Best

Helmut

 

03. Juni 2021 um 11:21 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi jon,Helmut,list,
I have discover that with the Disjunctive normal form (DNF) I can represent all true table:

This is an example:

I want a truth table be true if: a,b,c is true or if a,c is true and b false

(a&&b&&c) || (a&&!b&&c) 



	
		
			a
			b
			c
			((a ∧ (b ∧ c)) ∨ (a ∧ (¬b ∧ c)))
		
		
			F
			F
			F
			F
		
		
			F
			F
			T
			F
		
		
			F
			T
			F
			F
		
		
			F
			T
			T
			F
		
		
			T
			F
			F
			F
		
		
			T
			F
			T
			T
		
		
			T
			T
			F
			F
		
		
			T
			T
			T
			T
		
	

Now also  truth for: a,b,c false

  (a&&b&&c) || (a&&!b&&c)||(!a&&!b&&!c)   



	
		
			a
			b
			c
			((a ∧ (b ∧ c)) ∨ ((a ∧ (¬b ∧ c)) ∨ (¬a ∧ (¬b ∧ ¬c
		
		
			F
			F
			F
			T
		
		
			F
			F
			T
			F
		
		
			F
			T
			F
			F
		
		
			F
			T
			T
			F
		
		
			T
			F
			F
			F
		
		
			T
			F
			T
			T
		
		
			T
			T
			F
			F
		
		
			T
			T
			T
			T
		
	



so my hierarchy was:


For example:

__ philosophy - a

|        | epistemology -- c

|        | analogy   d

|__ natural Science -- b

         | algebra--- e

         | cosmogony - f


 

(a&&!b&&c&&!d&&!e&&!f)||(a&&!b&&!c&&d&&!e&&!f)||(!a&&b&&!c&&!d&&e&&!f)||(!a&&b&&!c&&!d&&!e&&f)

 

It's more power this DNF

Thanks in advance

 


On Wed, 2 Jun 2021 at 23:00, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/822702

Dear John, Lyle,

See: Ampheck https://oeis.org/wiki/Ampheck

Peirce discovered this about 1880 but did not publish it,
leaving it to be claimed by Sheffer at a much later date.
In one place he used simple concatenation for the abstract
operation which can be interpreted in either one of two ways:
Both Not (joint denial, NNOR) or Not Both (alternate denial, NAND).
In the passage linked above he uses a symbol for NNOR whose closest
HTML facsimiles are ⋏ ⋏ or ⥿ ⥿, with a bar over it
for NAND.  He gave 2 × 2 matrix forms for all 16 boolean operators
representing their truth tables, then converted those matrices into
cursive symbols for the operators.  Warren S. McCulloch mentioned
Peirce's discovery and his matrices, referring to NAND and NNOR
collectively as “amphecks” on account of their abstract duality.

Regards,

Jon
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--

"[..] events are primarily linguistic or cognitive in nature. That is, the world does not really contain events. Rather, events are the way by which agents classify certain useful and relevant patterns of change."
Allen and Fergusson
 

"No, no. History of Eternity. At first I wanted to find every single one of the buyers to apologize because of the book and also to thank them for what they had done. There is an explanation for that. If you think of thirty-seven people—those people are real, I mean every one of them has a face of his own, a family, he lives on his own particular street. Why, if you sell, say two thousand copies, it is the same thing as if you had sold nothing at all because two thousand is too vast—I mean, for the imagination to grasp. While thirty-seven people—perhaps thirty-seven are too many, perhaps seventeen would have been better or even seven—but still thirty-seven are still within the scope of one's imagination."

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Suppsuppsupp:

What I had written was based on the assumption, that "If A then B, else C" would mean, that it is either B or C. But this I am doubting now. "Else" perhaps does not refer to "either B or C", but to "either A or not A". In this case it may be, that the C includes the common set of C and B that is not A. So, sorry, all I wrote was wrong maybe, and everything is much more complicated. Now I again donot feel like pursuing the matter, but that may change. And, NSA watching, I have nothing against cops, I do must have to add.



 

 
 

Suppsupp: Sorry, I have mixed up some letters. Here is the corrected version:



 

 
 

Supplement: Now I have felt like it:

"If A then B, else C" = "(A xor C) and (B xor C)",

with "U xor V" = "(U or V) and (not U or not V)"

and with "X or Y" = "not ( not X and not Y)", for having only ands and nots to write an EG:

"(A xor C) and (B xor C)", resp. "If A then B, else C" =

= "not (not A and not C) and not (A and C) and not (not B and not C) and not (B and C)".

In EG with brackets instead of ellipses (scrolls) this is:

" ((A)(C)) (AC) ((B)(C)) (BC) "

Best

Helmut

 



Hi Mauro,

 

sorry, my "(A and B) xor C" for "If A then B, else C" was wrong. In the Venn-diagram it looks simple, but to express it with Peirce-EGs is complicated. It is in Boole e.g. "(A xor C) and (B xor C)". I hope it is correct now. Is it? To replace "xor"s with nots and ands for writing an EG would become complicated I guess. I dont feel like doing so in the moment, maybe later.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 01. Juni 2021 um 12:34 Uhr
"Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
I think that with the xor we go out by the paradisiacal logic. We say that  if a then not b or if not a then b. We go out by the heavens and we go into the  hierarchies, into the trees where we don't know the value of the variable. If in paradisiacal logic, with the and, we reason on definition, with the xor we reason on indetermination.

For example:

__ philosophy - a

|        | epistemology -- c

|        | analogy   d

|__ natural Science -- b

         | algebra--- e

         | cosmogony - f

 

If we don't know if a is true or if b is true but not both, but we know that if a is true then it will be or c or d but not both. If b is true than it will be or e or f but not both, we write this:

 

((a&&!b&&((c&&!d)||(!c&&d))&&!e&&!f)||(b&&!a&&((e&&!f)||(!e&&f))&&!c&&!d))

 

With indetermination we need the operator not, but here we are out from paradisiacal logic. It's similar to determining f=1/x for x=0.

But if I know that my book is about epistemology I can write c&&(c->a). I don't need either not or xor. In paradisiacal logic we can only talk about the determined and independently of our proposition there is always the limit case where the truth of our proposition is the conjunction of the variable. The hypothetical necessitates negation. Discovering necessitates negation.

 

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 


On Mon, 31 May 2021 at 22:41, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Dear Mauro, List

 

I think, that has nothing to do with "if then else", and my opinion was false, I had later in the thread corrected it due to the "ex falso quod libet" rule.

 

If I have understood "If A then B else C" correctly ("else" meaning either B or C, not both), it implies that A = B, and is equal with "(A and B) xor C".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 31. Mai 2021 um 11:26 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" <bertanima...@gmail.com>
wrote:


Dear Jon,
with the construct of Lyle Anderson we can say:

1.    (a=>(b=>(c))) & (not(a)=>0) & (not(b)=>0)= (a&b&c)    - link

but I prefer the opinion of Helmut (link):

2.    (a=>b) &a = (a&b)

and for 3 variable:

3.    (a=>(b=>(c))) &a &b = (a&b&c)  - link

Where = is a metalogical symbol representing "can be replaced in a proof with".

The 2. formula don't need the use of negation and it seems to imply the truth of a.

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 

 


On Sun, 30 May 2021 at 17:45, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:

Cf: Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/05/30/logical-graphs-truth-tables-venn-diagrams-3/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/82270207
::: John Mingers ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/273 )
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/275 )

Dear John, Lyle,

There is nothing simple about the int

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Suppsupp: Sorry, I have mixed up some letters. Here is the corrected version:



 

 
 

Supplement: Now I have felt like it:

"If A then B, else C" = "(A xor C) and (B xor C)",

with "U xor V" = "(U or V) and (not U or not V)"

and with "X or Y" = "not ( not X and not Y)", for having only ands and nots to write an EG:

"(A xor C) and (B xor C)", resp. "If A then B, else C" =

= "not (not A and not C) and not (A and C) and not (not B and not C) and not (B and C)".

In EG with brackets instead of ellipses (scrolls) this is:

" ((A)(C)) (AC) ((B)(C)) (BC) "

Best

Helmut

 



Hi Mauro,

 

sorry, my "(A and B) xor C" for "If A then B, else C" was wrong. In the Venn-diagram it looks simple, but to express it with Peirce-EGs is complicated. It is in Boole e.g. "(A xor C) and (B xor C)". I hope it is correct now. Is it? To replace "xor"s with nots and ands for writing an EG would become complicated I guess. I dont feel like doing so in the moment, maybe later.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 01. Juni 2021 um 12:34 Uhr
"Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
I think that with the xor we go out by the paradisiacal logic. We say that  if a then not b or if not a then b. We go out by the heavens and we go into the  hierarchies, into the trees where we don't know the value of the variable. If in paradisiacal logic, with the and, we reason on definition, with the xor we reason on indetermination.

For example:

__ philosophy - a

|        | epistemology -- c

|        | analogy   d

|__ natural Science -- b

         | algebra--- e

         | cosmogony - f

 

If we don't know if a is true or if b is true but not both, but we know that if a is true then it will be or c or d but not both. If b is true than it will be or e or f but not both, we write this:

 

((a&&!b&&((c&&!d)||(!c&&d))&&!e&&!f)||(b&&!a&&((e&&!f)||(!e&&f))&&!c&&!d))

 

With indetermination we need the operator not, but here we are out from paradisiacal logic. It's similar to determining f=1/x for x=0.

But if I know that my book is about epistemology I can write c&&(c->a). I don't need either not or xor. In paradisiacal logic we can only talk about the determined and independently of our proposition there is always the limit case where the truth of our proposition is the conjunction of the variable. The hypothetical necessitates negation. Discovering necessitates negation.

 

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 


On Mon, 31 May 2021 at 22:41, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Dear Mauro, List

 

I think, that has nothing to do with "if then else", and my opinion was false, I had later in the thread corrected it due to the "ex falso quod libet" rule.

 

If I have understood "If A then B else C" correctly ("else" meaning either B or C, not both), it implies that A = B, and is equal with "(A and B) xor C".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 31. Mai 2021 um 11:26 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" <bertanima...@gmail.com>
wrote:


Dear Jon,
with the construct of Lyle Anderson we can say:

1.    (a=>(b=>(c))) & (not(a)=>0) & (not(b)=>0)= (a&b&c)    - link

but I prefer the opinion of Helmut (link):

2.    (a=>b) &a = (a&b)

and for 3 variable:

3.    (a=>(b=>(c))) &a &b = (a&b&c)  - link

Where = is a metalogical symbol representing "can be replaced in a proof with".

The 2. formula don't need the use of negation and it seems to imply the truth of a.

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 

 


On Sun, 30 May 2021 at 17:45, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:

Cf: Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/05/30/logical-graphs-truth-tables-venn-diagrams-3/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/82270207
::: John Mingers ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/273 )
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/275 )

Dear John, Lyle,

There is nothing simple about the interpretation of If-Then-Else constructions in ordinary language as they combine the
equivocation between formal and material implication at the outset with the vacillation between exclusive and inclusive
disjunction at the final Or-Else.

Nor is there anything straightforward about the implementation of If-Then-Else clauses in half-functional
half-procedural programming languages like Pascal.  In settings like that they do not render as pure boolean expressions
but as boolean tests determining a choice between procedural branches.  Multiply that by the diversity of evaluation
strategies for 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: Now I have felt like it:

"If A then B, else C" = "(A xor C) and (B xor C)",

with "U xor V" = "(U or V) and (not U or not V)"

and with "X or Y" = "not ( not X and not Y)", for having only ands and nots to write an EG:

"(A xor C) and (B xor C)", resp. "If A then B, else C" =

= "not (not A and not B) and not (A and C) and not (not B and not C) and not (B and C)".

In EG with brackets instead of ellipses (scrolls) this is:

" ((A)(B)) (AC) ((B)(C)) (BC) "

Best

Helmut

 



Hi Mauro,

 

sorry, my "(A and B) xor C" for "If A then B, else C" was wrong. In the Venn-diagram it looks simple, but to express it with Peirce-EGs is complicated. It is in Boole e.g. "(A xor C) and (B xor C)". I hope it is correct now. Is it? To replace "xor"s with nots and ands for writing an EG would become complicated I guess. I dont feel like doing so in the moment, maybe later.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 01. Juni 2021 um 12:34 Uhr
"Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
I think that with the xor we go out by the paradisiacal logic. We say that  if a then not b or if not a then b. We go out by the heavens and we go into the  hierarchies, into the trees where we don't know the value of the variable. If in paradisiacal logic, with the and, we reason on definition, with the xor we reason on indetermination.

For example:

__ philosophy - a

|        | epistemology -- c

|        | analogy   d

|__ natural Science -- b

         | algebra--- e

         | cosmogony - f

 

If we don't know if a is true or if b is true but not both, but we know that if a is true then it will be or c or d but not both. If b is true than it will be or e or f but not both, we write this:

 

((a&&!b&&((c&&!d)||(!c&&d))&&!e&&!f)||(b&&!a&&((e&&!f)||(!e&&f))&&!c&&!d))

 

With indetermination we need the operator not, but here we are out from paradisiacal logic. It's similar to determining f=1/x for x=0.

But if I know that my book is about epistemology I can write c&&(c->a). I don't need either not or xor. In paradisiacal logic we can only talk about the determined and independently of our proposition there is always the limit case where the truth of our proposition is the conjunction of the variable. The hypothetical necessitates negation. Discovering necessitates negation.

 

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 


On Mon, 31 May 2021 at 22:41, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Dear Mauro, List

 

I think, that has nothing to do with "if then else", and my opinion was false, I had later in the thread corrected it due to the "ex falso quod libet" rule.

 

If I have understood "If A then B else C" correctly ("else" meaning either B or C, not both), it implies that A = B, and is equal with "(A and B) xor C".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 31. Mai 2021 um 11:26 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" <bertanima...@gmail.com>
wrote:


Dear Jon,
with the construct of Lyle Anderson we can say:

1.    (a=>(b=>(c))) & (not(a)=>0) & (not(b)=>0)= (a&b&c)    - link

but I prefer the opinion of Helmut (link):

2.    (a=>b) &a = (a&b)

and for 3 variable:

3.    (a=>(b=>(c))) &a &b = (a&b&c)  - link

Where = is a metalogical symbol representing "can be replaced in a proof with".

The 2. formula don't need the use of negation and it seems to imply the truth of a.

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 

 


On Sun, 30 May 2021 at 17:45, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:

Cf: Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/05/30/logical-graphs-truth-tables-venn-diagrams-3/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/82270207
::: John Mingers ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/273 )
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/275 )

Dear John, Lyle,

There is nothing simple about the interpretation of If-Then-Else constructions in ordinary language as they combine the
equivocation between formal and material implication at the outset with the vacillation between exclusive and inclusive
disjunction at the final Or-Else.

Nor is there anything straightforward about the implementation of If-Then-Else clauses in half-functional
half-procedural programming languages like Pascal.  In settings like that they do not render as pure boolean expressions
but as boolean tests determining a choice between procedural branches.  Multiply that by the diversity of evaluation
strategies for boolean expressions — (complete|partial), (eager|greedy|lazy), etc. — and the possibiliti

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

Hi Mauro,

 

sorry, my "(A and B) xor C" for "If A then B, else C" was wrong. In the Venn-diagram it looks simple, but to express it with Peirce-EGs is complicated. It is in Boole e.g. "(A xor C) and (B xor C)". I hope it is correct now. Is it? To replace "xor"s with nots and ands for writing an EG would become complicated I guess. I dont feel like doing so in the moment, maybe later.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 01. Juni 2021 um 12:34 Uhr
"Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Hi Helmut,
I think that with the xor we go out by the paradisiacal logic. We say that  if a then not b or if not a then b. We go out by the heavens and we go into the  hierarchies, into the trees where we don't know the value of the variable. If in paradisiacal logic, with the and, we reason on definition, with the xor we reason on indetermination.

For example:

__ philosophy - a

|        | epistemology -- c

|        | analogy   d

|__ natural Science -- b

         | algebra--- e

         | cosmogony - f

 

If we don't know if a is true or if b is true but not both, but we know that if a is true then it will be or c or d but not both. If b is true than it will be or e or f but not both, we write this:

 

((a&&!b&&((c&&!d)||(!c&&d))&&!e&&!f)||(b&&!a&&((e&&!f)||(!e&&f))&&!c&&!d))

 

With indetermination we need the operator not, but here we are out from paradisiacal logic. It's similar to determining f=1/x for x=0.

But if I know that my book is about epistemology I can write c&&(c->a). I don't need either not or xor. In paradisiacal logic we can only talk about the determined and independently of our proposition there is always the limit case where the truth of our proposition is the conjunction of the variable. The hypothetical necessitates negation. Discovering necessitates negation.

 

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 


On Mon, 31 May 2021 at 22:41, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Dear Mauro, List

 

I think, that has nothing to do with "if then else", and my opinion was false, I had later in the thread corrected it due to the "ex falso quod libet" rule.

 

If I have understood "If A then B else C" correctly ("else" meaning either B or C, not both), it implies that A = B, and is equal with "(A and B) xor C".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 31. Mai 2021 um 11:26 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" <bertanima...@gmail.com>
wrote:


Dear Jon,
with the construct of Lyle Anderson we can say:

1.    (a=>(b=>(c))) & (not(a)=>0) & (not(b)=>0)= (a&b&c)    - link

but I prefer the opinion of Helmut (link):

2.    (a=>b) &a = (a&b)

and for 3 variable:

3.    (a=>(b=>(c))) &a &b = (a&b&c)  - link

Where = is a metalogical symbol representing "can be replaced in a proof with".

The 2. formula don't need the use of negation and it seems to imply the truth of a.

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 

 


On Sun, 30 May 2021 at 17:45, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:

Cf: Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/05/30/logical-graphs-truth-tables-venn-diagrams-3/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/82270207
::: John Mingers ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/273 )
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/275 )

Dear John, Lyle,

There is nothing simple about the interpretation of If-Then-Else constructions in ordinary language as they combine the
equivocation between formal and material implication at the outset with the vacillation between exclusive and inclusive
disjunction at the final Or-Else.

Nor is there anything straightforward about the implementation of If-Then-Else clauses in half-functional
half-procedural programming languages like Pascal.  In settings like that they do not render as pure boolean expressions
but as boolean tests determining a choice between procedural branches.  Multiply that by the diversity of evaluation
strategies for boolean expressions — (complete|partial), (eager|greedy|lazy), etc. — and the possibilities are legion.
That is all well and good, those are just the choices that are out there, and we can work with anyone's understanding of
If-Then-Else as a boolean function so long as they give us their intended truth table so we don't have to guess what
they have in mind.

I'll touch on If-Then-Else again when we turn to what I regard as the proper handling of Case Analysis in the systems of
logical graphs evolving from the work of C.S. Peirce and Spencer Brown.

As it happens, I did once write out all 256 boolean functions on three variables in cactus syntax several years ago —

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear Mauro, List

 

I think, that has nothing to do with "if then else", and my opinion was false, I had later in the thread corrected it due to the "ex falso quod libet" rule.

 

If I have understood "If A then B else C" correctly ("else" meaning either B or C, not both), it implies that A = B, and is equal with "(A and B) xor C".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 31. Mai 2021 um 11:26 Uhr
 "Mauro Bertani" 
wrote:


Dear Jon,
with the construct of Lyle Anderson we can say:

1.    (a=>(b=>(c))) & (not(a)=>0) & (not(b)=>0)= (a&b&c)    - link

but I prefer the opinion of Helmut (link):

2.    (a=>b) &a = (a&b)

and for 3 variable:

3.    (a=>(b=>(c))) &a &b = (a&b&c)  - link

Where = is a metalogical symbol representing "can be replaced in a proof with".

The 2. formula don't need the use of negation and it seems to imply the truth of a.

Thanks in advance

Mauro

 

 


On Sun, 30 May 2021 at 17:45, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

Cf: Logical Graphs, Truth Tables, Venn Diagrams • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/05/30/logical-graphs-truth-tables-venn-diagrams-3/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/logical_graphs_truth_tables/82270207
::: John Mingers ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/273 )
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/275 )

Dear John, Lyle,

There is nothing simple about the interpretation of If-Then-Else constructions in ordinary language as they combine the
equivocation between formal and material implication at the outset with the vacillation between exclusive and inclusive
disjunction at the final Or-Else.

Nor is there anything straightforward about the implementation of If-Then-Else clauses in half-functional
half-procedural programming languages like Pascal.  In settings like that they do not render as pure boolean expressions
but as boolean tests determining a choice between procedural branches.  Multiply that by the diversity of evaluation
strategies for boolean expressions — (complete|partial), (eager|greedy|lazy), etc. — and the possibilities are legion.
That is all well and good, those are just the choices that are out there, and we can work with anyone's understanding of
If-Then-Else as a boolean function so long as they give us their intended truth table so we don't have to guess what
they have in mind.

I'll touch on If-Then-Else again when we turn to what I regard as the proper handling of Case Analysis in the systems of
logical graphs evolving from the work of C.S. Peirce and Spencer Brown.

As it happens, I did once write out all 256 boolean functions on three variables in cactus syntax several years ago —
pursuant to discussions in Stephen Wolfram's New Kind of Science (NKS) Forum regarding Elementary Cellular Automaton
Rules (ECARs), which are in effect just that set of boolean functions.  I'll have to dig up a passel of ancient links
from the WayBack Machine, but see the following archive page for a hint of how it went.

• Cactus Rules
( https://web.archive.org/web/20041025093703/http://forum.wolframscience.com/archive/topic/256-1.html )

To be continued …

Jon

References
==

• “Number of Boolean Functions Distinct under Complementation/Permutation”,
   A000370 ( https://oeis.org/A000370 ), N.J.A. Sloane (ed.),
   The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences ( https://oeis.org ).

• “The If..then..else statement”
   ( https://www.freepascal.org/docs-html/ref/refsu57.html ),
   in Michaël Van Canneyt (May 2021), Free Pascal Reference Guide
   ( https://www.freepascal.org/docs-html/ref/ref.html ).
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--

"[..] events are primarily linguistic or cognitive in nature. That is, the world does not really contain events. Rather, events are the way by which agents classify certain useful and relevant patterns of change."
Allen and Fergusson
 

"No, no. History of Eternity. At first I wanted to find every single one of the buyers to apologize because of the book and also to thank them for what they had done. There is an explanation for that. If you think of thirty-seven people—those people are real, I mean every one of them has a face of his own, a family, he lives on his own particular street. Why, if you sell, say two thousand copies, it is the same thing as if you had sold nothing at all because two thousand is too vast—I mean, for the imagination to grasp. While thirty-seven people—perhaps thirty-seven are too many, perhaps seventeen would have been better or even seven—but still thirty-seven are still within the scope of one

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., Jon, Jon, List

 

Now I think, that Peirce is right, and my temporality-hypothesis is not necessary: If the term "If A then (if A the B)" can be reduced to "if A then B", the latter can be expanded to the former as well. So "Every unicorn is pink" can be said as "for every unicorn counts, that every unicorn is pink", and that Santa Claus is my uncle, and that all cats are dogs, because, as there is no unicorn, the term says: "For no unicorn it counts, that every unicorn is pink, all wheels are square, and Jah Pastafa created the universe". Of course this is true, because there is no unicorn for whom it could count. Logic gets on nerves. Let´s hope, they don´t crispr a unicorn.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

23. Mai 2021 um 18:13 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Helmut, my book has a lot to say about relations between time and logic, but probably the most relevant to your question is here: Objecting and Realizing (TS ·12) (gnusystems.ca) . Actually there’s more of Peirce than of me in it, but I hope there’s no objection to that.

 

Gary f.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 23-May-21 11:50
 





Gary F., List



 



Yes, but I don´t know if I am right. It would mean, that temporality is something more than causality: Mere causality in the present would be symbolized with another implication: "If A then (if A then B)". But this term reduces to "if A Then B", when you write it with Boolean "not"s  or an EG. But only if you separate the past (the premiss) from the present, you get the contradiction "A and not A" in it (in the past). So yes, it is a disagreement with 

‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

because it is the hypothesis, that it is not the same thing. But I don´t feel competent of disagreeing, so it is not my well-fermented opinion, but rather a question: Might it be like that, and what do you think?



Best



 



Helmut



  


  



23. Mai 2021 um 13:06 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:





Helmut, on this point you seem to disagree with Peirce about logical relations. Peirce in 1880 (W4:170) identified illation as the basic or ‘primitive’ logical relation, and in his 1906 ‘PAP’ (MS 293) he identified it with ‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

Gary f.

 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 22-May-21 18:13
  








Supplement: The logical connection between premiss and rule cannot be symbolized with logical notation including EGs. It is a temporal connection, a relation between past and present. Logic notation merely notes the status of the present. Implication implies this temporal relation, and "not (A and not B)" doesn´t. So both are different, but this difference doesn´t show in logical notation.













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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., List

 

Yes, but I don´t know if I am right. It would mean, that temporality is something more than causality: Mere causality in the present would be symbolized with another implication: "If A then (if A then B)". But this term reduces to "if A Then B", when you write it with Boolean "not"s  or an EG. But only if you separate the past (the premiss) from the present, you get the contradiction "A and not A" in it (in the past). So yes, it is a disagreement with
‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

because it is the hypothesis, that it is not the same thing. But I don´t feel competent of disagreeing, so it is not my well-fermented opinion, but rather a question: Might it be like that, and what do you think?


Best

 

Helmut

 
 

23. Mai 2021 um 13:06 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Helmut, on this point you seem to disagree with Peirce about logical relations. Peirce in 1880 (W4:170) identified illation as the basic or ‘primitive’ logical relation, and in his 1906 ‘PAP’ (MS 293) he identified it with ‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

 

Gary f.

 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 22-May-21 18:13
  








Supplement: The logical connection between premiss and rule cannot be symbolized with logical notation including EGs. It is a temporal connection, a relation between past and present. Logic notation merely notes the status of the present. Implication implies this temporal relation, and "not (A and not B)" doesn´t. So both are different, but this difference doesn´t show in logical notation.



 





Jon, Jon, List



 



Wikipedia says there are two kinds of "ex falso quod libet": First the contradiction "A and not A", and secondly the counterfactual material implication "If A then B" with A being false. From "every unicorn is pink" follows, that this is true, and anything else also is. These two kinds of quodlibet seem different, but I think they can be connected, by which a hypothesis about implication in general occurs:



 



Maybe "If A then B" is not only a rule, but also a case, meaning, it includes a premiss: A exists. So "If A then B" does not mean "A exists and if A then B", but it means "If A then B, on the premiss that A is true". Now, if A is false, unicorns donot exist, this falsity also is part of the premiss. The case-part of implication, that part that is not part of the rule, now has a backwards-effect on the premiss. The complete premiss now is: "A exists, and A does not exist", or "A is both true and false". This is the contradictional "ex falso quodlibet", which makes the rule-part´s, the implication´s result true, like anything else as well.



 



I think, this quibbly argument has the benefit, that one can understand the counterfactual-material-implication-qoudlibet ("Every unicorn is pink" being true), which intuitively is not as easy to understand as the contradiction-quodlibet ("if one nonsense is true, all sense is lost anyway, then say what you want, all is true.": Easy to understand.).



 



The hypothesis about implication is, that though it is only one term, it adds something to the premiss of itself. Maybe that is what distinguishes "if A then B" from "not (A and not B)".



 



Best



Helmut



  


  



20. Mai 2021 um 01:39 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:





Jon A., List: 


 



Technically, yes, at least in classical logic. Nevertheless, according to Peirce, "it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true" (CP 4.580, 1906).



 



Regards,



  







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA



Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian



www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt











On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 6:13 PM Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:




FYI — 


 



“Every unicorn 🦄 is pink” is true.



 



Jon
  


http://inquiryintoinquiry.com







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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: The logical connection between premiss and rule cannot be symbolized with logical notation including EGs. It is a temporal connection, a relation between past and present. Logic notation merely notes the status of the present. Implication implies this temporal relation, and "not (A and not B)" doesn´t. So both are different, but this difference doesn´t show in logical notation.

 



Jon, Jon, List

 

Wikipedia says there are two kinds of "ex falso quod libet": First the contradiction "A and not A", and secondly the counterfactual material implication "If A then B" with A being false. From "every unicorn is pink" follows, that this is true, and anything else also is. These two kinds of quodlibet seem different, but I think they can be connected, by which a hypothesis about implication in general occurs:

 

Maybe "If A then B" is not only a rule, but also a case, meaning, it includes a premiss: A exists. So "If A then B" does not mean "A exists and if A then B", but it means "If A then B, on the premiss that A is true". Now, if A is false, unicorns donot exist, this falsity also is part of the premiss. The case-part of implication, that part that is not part of the rule, now has a backwards-effect on the premiss. The complete premiss now is: "A exists, and A does not exist", or "A is both true and false". This is the contradictional "ex falso quodlibet", which makes the rule-part´s, the implication´s result true, like anything else as well.

 

I think, this quibbly argument has the benefit, that one can understand the counterfactual-material-implication-qoudlibet ("Every unicorn is pink" being true), which intuitively is not as easy to understand as the contradiction-quodlibet ("if one nonsense is true, all sense is lost anyway, then say what you want, all is true.": Easy to understand.).

 

The hypothesis about implication is, that though it is only one term, it adds something to the premiss of itself. Maybe that is what distinguishes "if A then B" from "not (A and not B)".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

20. Mai 2021 um 01:39 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Jon A., List:
 

Technically, yes, at least in classical logic. Nevertheless, according to Peirce, "it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true" (CP 4.580, 1906).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 6:13 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:


FYI —
 

“Every unicorn 🦄 is pink” is true.

 

Jon
 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com





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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, Jon, List

 

Wikipedia says there are two kinds of "ex falso quod libet": First the contradiction "A and not A", and secondly the counterfactual material implication "If A then B" with A being false. From "every unicorn is pink" follows, that this is true, and anything else also is. These two kinds of quodlibet seem different, but I think they can be connected, by which a hypothesis about implication in general occurs:

 

Maybe "If A then B" is not only a rule, but also a case, meaning, it includes a premiss: A exists. So "If A then B" does not mean "A exists and if A then B", but it means "If A then B, on the premiss that A is true". Now, if A is false, unicorns donot exist, this falsity also is part of the premiss. The case-part of implication, that part that is not part of the rule, now has a backwards-effect on the premiss. The complete premiss now is: "A exists, and A does not exist", or "A is both true and false". This is the contradictional "ex falso quodlibet", which makes the rule-part´s, the implication´s result true, like anything else as well.

 

I think, this quibbly argument has the benefit, that one can understand the counterfactual-material-implication-qoudlibet ("Every unicorn is pink" being true), which intuitively is not as easy to understand as the contradiction-quodlibet ("if one nonsense is true, all sense is lost anyway, then say what you want, all is true.": Easy to understand.).

 

The hypothesis about implication is, that though it is only one term, it adds something to the premiss of itself. Maybe that is what distinguishes "if A then B" from "not (A and not B)".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

20. Mai 2021 um 01:39 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Jon A., List:
 

Technically, yes, at least in classical logic. Nevertheless, according to Peirce, "it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true" (CP 4.580, 1906).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 6:13 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:


FYI —
 

“Every unicorn 🦄 is pink” is true.

 

Jon
 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com





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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: A third way of classically synchronizing the two propositions may be the counterfactual material implication, the "ex falso quodlibet" in a broader sense. Then "if it is a unicorn, it is pink" is true, and also "If it is a unicorn, it is pink, all cats are dogs, Santa Claus is my uncle, and there is no unicorn that is not pink". Now there are three ways of classical synchronization, but they are all completely different, and counterdict each other, because in two of them both propositions are false, and in one both are true. Is that a problem or not?



List,

 

Does anybody know an example which justifies intuitionistic logic, so in which classical logic fails? I think Jon, A.S., you once gave me the following example:

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, but "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is true.

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, because it means "If it is a unicorn, then it is pink", and "If it is a unicorn" implies, that unicorns exist. So it is equal with "Unicorns exist, and if it is a unicorn, it is pink". Because unicorns donot exist, the proposition is false.

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" sounds true, because there are no unicorns at all, so there are no non-pink unicorns too. But if it would be so, that this form of proposition too implied the existence-claim, it would be false as well. Is that so? Is in classical logic "There is no unicorn that is not pink" equal with "Unicorns exist, and there is no unicorn that is not pink"?

 

This might be so e.g. due to the fact alone, that the term "Unicorn" has been mentioned. For EGs, it would mean, that every term written in any place is a possible too in the blank sheet. Meaning, that it generally exists. Otherwise it would not signify anything, it would e.g. be like "NOT &/(", senseless. But this would mean, that the term "existential" in "Existential Graphs" means, that only existing things are allowed in them.

 

Another way to classically synchronize the two propositions might be to say, that if a term signifies a nonexistent thing, it automatically signifies its phantasy-concept instead. Then "Every unicorn is pink" is false, because in some animated movie by Disney occurs a white unicorn. "There is no unicorn that is not pink" then is false for the same reason. This explanation is somewhat smoother than the first, but requires this said automatism: If A does not physically exist, then A is the existing concept of A.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

19. Mai 2021 um 06:58 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Gary R,

I'm glad you asked.
GR> Please explain how this "blocks the way of inquiry" for folk like me who are apparently radically deficient in mathematics and logic so simply can't see it as such. 


Intuitionistic logic is a restriction on the permissible rules of inference. That makes it impossible to use many widely accepted theories of mathematics -- among them, the theory that there are hierarchies of infinities. 

 

Peirce was one of the mathematicians who discovered a proof of that point independently of Georg Cantor.  And it's the foundation for his theory of continuity -- which Abraham Robinson proved was consistent in 1960.

In applications to science and engineering, especially computer science, nobody uses intuitionistic logic. The reason why is that it "blocks the way" of using the most convenient, efficient, and flexible methods of reasoning. 

The mainstream mathematicians don't stop intuitionists from developing their own pet theories.  They just ignore them.

John

 
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

Does anybody know an example which justifies intuitionistic logic, so in which classical logic fails? I think Jon, A.S., you once gave me the following example:

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, but "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is true.

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, because it means "If it is a unicorn, then it is pink", and "If it is a unicorn" implies, that unicorns exist. So it is equal with "Unicorns exist, and if it is a unicorn, it is pink". Because unicorns donot exist, the proposition is false.

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" sounds true, because there are no unicorns at all, so there are no non-pink unicorns too. But if it would be so, that this form of proposition too implied the existence-claim, it would be false as well. Is that so? Is in classical logic "There is no unicorn that is not pink" equal with "Unicorns exist, and there is no unicorn that is not pink"?

 

This might be so e.g. due to the fact alone, that the term "Unicorn" has been mentioned. For EGs, it would mean, that every term written in any place is a possible too in the blank sheet. Meaning, that it generally exists. Otherwise it would not signify anything, it would e.g. be like "NOT &/(", senseless. But this would mean, that the term "existential" in "Existential Graphs" means, that only existing things are allowed in them.

 

Another way to classically synchronize the two propositions might be to say, that if a term signifies a nonexistent thing, it automatically signifies its phantasy-concept instead. Then "Every unicorn is pink" is false, because in some animated movie by Disney occurs a white unicorn. "There is no unicorn that is not pink" then is false for the same reason. This explanation is somewhat smoother than the first, but requires this said automatism: If A does not physically exist, then A is the existing concept of A.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

19. Mai 2021 um 06:58 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Gary R,

I'm glad you asked.
GR> Please explain how this "blocks the way of inquiry" for folk like me who are apparently radically deficient in mathematics and logic so simply can't see it as such. 


Intuitionistic logic is a restriction on the permissible rules of inference. That makes it impossible to use many widely accepted theories of mathematics -- among them, the theory that there are hierarchies of infinities. 

 

Peirce was one of the mathematicians who discovered a proof of that point independently of Georg Cantor.  And it's the foundation for his theory of continuity -- which Abraham Robinson proved was consistent in 1960.

In applications to science and engineering, especially computer science, nobody uses intuitionistic logic. The reason why is that it "blocks the way" of using the most convenient, efficient, and flexible methods of reasoning. 

The mainstream mathematicians don't stop intuitionists from developing their own pet theories.  They just ignore them.

John

 
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [ontolog-forum] Hierarchy, a la Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 

The Salthe- linkl I gave shows the search.  I meant this, I hope it works now:

 

https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=partner-pub-3911921815512938:0761176136&q=https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/3/3/23/pdf&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiX_Onw0ZnvAhWuVBUIHTzJCsIQFjAHegQIAxAC&usg=AOvVaw0WB_2kUkqcIVPLzcqpzyeA

 
 

 



List,

 

some time ago I have been inspired by Stanley N. Salthe´s work about compositional and subsumtion hierachy as the two main types of system hierarchy, here is a link:

 

https://cse.google.com/cse?cx=partner-pub-3911921815512938%3A0761176136&ie=UTF-8&q=salthe+axiomathes&sa=Search&sitesearch=

 

then I wrote something in the internet, but took it out again later. It is too little founded, maybe, and contains a questionable interpretation of Peirce´s categories, and maybe is totally false. Anyway, here it is, pdfized, in the attachment. Because it is not in HTML, clicking does not work, so to read it in English, please scroll down about half of it.

 

Best, Helmut


 05. März 2021 um 14:47 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


List, Mike, Bruce

Thanks to Mike and Bruce for these comments on hierarchies - and - the triadic infrastructure that enables hierarchies - and - as Mike points out, the three Peircean categories that are the foundation of the triad. I think that not enough attention is paid to this infrastructure of triad-and-categories. They are not just descriptions; they are the 'how' of reality, i.e., how matter is formed. [chance, actuality, continuity are the 'how' forces']

Bruce writes: " Recent research suggests possible mechanisms for the emergence of natural hierarchies involving the nexus of chance, evolution, entropy, free energy, and information theory."

Exactly - the reality of free energy and entropy within the formation of matter [whether physical unit or conceptual unit] is vital. There is no way that adaptation and evolution can take place except within a triadic categorical infrastructure. This results in what is known as a 'complex adaptive system' - which is both hierarchical and networked.

And I note that Peirce did not refer to his work as 'idealism' but as 'objective idealism' - and that's very, very different from 'idealism'; it acknowledges both Secondness and Thirdness.

Edwina


 

On Thu 04/03/21 11:23 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:


Hi Bruce,

I am glad this is a line of discourse you want to pursue (and have pursued since at least 1994 as your link indicates). I'm happy to engage on any questions or topics; there are many other Peirce afficiandos on these lists that also have helpful insights. For now, I only comment on one of your points below:

On 3/4/2021 9:31 AM, bruceschu...@cox.net wrote:




Wow.  I love this.  I've been writing on this subject forever -- saying more or less the same things and citing the same authors -- e.g.,  Herbert Simon.  I'm going to print your article, Mike, and take a close look at it.  Back in the early days, I bought every book there was on Hierarchy.  You make basic points in your opening that I’d say pave the way towards a very powerful general theory of epistemology.

 

The basic themes you outline in this article are at the essence of my notion of “Closed Loop Interval Ontology” – which is hierarchical exactly as you describe, with the addition that the framework is defined as a closed loop interconnecting these “levels” into a single closed mathematical structure.

 

My early stuff on this subject is here: http://originresearch.com

 

The trick here seems to be – that this thesis is so powerful, it becomes combinatorically explosive – heading towards the fabled “theory of everything” – maybe in explicit epistemological detail.

 

Interesting that you say that “natural hierarchies are real” – which opens the way to some additional complexity or levels of inclusion.  Maybe there is a “hierarchical relationship” across levels of reality, such that the kind of practical-real-world “reality” defined by Barry Smith can be mapped directly into an absolutely abstract model which I would say is a “science of the artificial”, as Herbert Simon might have described it.  “Does absolute abstraction exist in nature”?



My own view is that Peirce's universal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness provide this level of "absolute abstraction [that] exists in nature". I don't know if you realize that some of your earlier references to Ogden and Richards were actually a paraphrase of Peirce's insights. My own research focus has been on trying to understand the 'mindset' of Peirce's universal categories, expressed in perhaps a 100 different ways in his writings, that sets a frame of reference for tackling knowledge representation (epistemological) questions at virtually any level. Ogden and Richards picked up on one with respect to meaning, but there are other examples galore across Peirce's writings.

What Peirce really offers, IMO, is a way to break away from either-or Cartesian mindsets tha

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Semantic Externalism

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jon, Daniel, List,

 

I think there are two kinds of extension: Of the mind and of the memory. Peirce´s inkstand is an extension of the mind. A map or an encyclopedy is an extension of the memory. Over both one has control, ownership and direct access without other minds participating. Tools are extensions of the mind. When extensions are digital, the control is lost. If they are online, they dont even belong to you. You are using tools that work by algorithms you don´t know, and you neither know who else is using these tools at the same time for manipulating you, while you are thinking that you are using tools. Digital memory you neither own. It is given to you after a process of filtration. People often are inside a filter bubble, not knowing that they are: Qanon, conspiration theorists, Amazon customers, Twitter followers... So, ok, your mind and memory may be extended a bit, but at the same time other, much more powerful minds than yours are extended into your mind, into your brain. How manipulated people can get: It can lead to painting the face blue, attaching cowhorns to the head, going into the capitol, and screaming stuff. We are just at the beginning of the digital era, but the results are already like glimpses into a dystopy like the "Borg" in "Star-Trek".

 

What can we do against it? I propose an initiative claiming that apps must be voluntary and optional. It must be possible to do everything without a smartphone: Banking, shopping, booking a hotel or a taxi, travelling... I have purchased a prepaid Visa-card for online shopping, but now an app is required. Moia-group-taxi drives are only bookable with an app, and for the month-ticket in the underground subway you get a rebate if you use an app. Many more examples. in Sweden there is effectively no cash money usable anymore. If you buy alcohol or cigarettes, your health insurance will know. Not to talk about China. No illicit work will be possible anymore, and no free speech. The world is becoming the Benthamian Panopticum prison. There has got to be a law against forced interconnectedness, and forced smartphones. A smartphone sends every two minutes your position and what you are buying and doing to the devil knows whom. I am angry, especially that people don´t seem to resist.

 

Best, Helmut

 

27. Februar 2021 um 17:43 Uhr
"Daniel L. Everett" 
wrote:

Yes, I have raised Peirce’s inkstand example with several extended mind advocates. Very cool example,

Thanks for the additional reference.

Although Putnam’s externalism is relevant and somewhat related to the extended mind idea, it is the idea that the meanings of words are not in our heads that is particularly interesting from a semiotic perspective.

All best,

Dan

> On Feb 27, 2021, at 11:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
> Dear Dan, All ...
>
> We all know Peirce's parable of the inkstand
> • https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320779?seq=1
> so I don't have to do more than mention that,
> but here's a related tidbit my extended mind
> recently reminded me of ...
>
> ❝The well-known capacity that thoughts have — as doctors have discovered —
> for dissolving and dispersing those hard lumps of deep, ingrowing, morbidly
> entangled conflict that arise out of gloomy regions of the self probably
> rests on nothing other than their social and worldly nature, which links
> the individual being with other people and things; but unfortunately what
> gives them their power of healing seems to be the same as what diminishes
> the quality of personal experience in them.❞
>
> 🙞 Robert Musil • The Man Without Qualities
> https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_and_Dynamic_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_4#Digression_:_Reflection_on_Use_and_Mention
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 2/23/2021 2:45 PM, Daniel L. Everett wrote:
>> As you will be aware, there is a veritable industry on semantic externalism as a result of Putnam’s Twin Earth
>> thought experiment. But it also fits my own experiences in field research. For example, although every speaker I have
>> ever encountered in an Amazonian language knows the names of all flora and fauna in their environment, my own
>> vocabulary with respect to flora in particular is limited. Most trees I know simply by the name “tree.”
>> Amazonian friends therefore think that English is an extremely impoverished language. But, I tell them, I can find
>> out what each tree is called not only in popular vernacular or with botanical precision by consulting an expert. Much
>> of my semantics is stored externally (semantic externalism is compatible with Clark’s “extended mind” hypothesis as
>> well).
>> This is an interesting fact about human cognition, culture, and semantics that is not found in other species, what
>> one might refer to as enthymemetical semiotics in each individual.
>> Though I have done my own searches, I was wondering if anyone on this list is aware of research on Peircean
>> semeiotics and semantic externalism.
>> Dan
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Semantic Externalism

[Helmut Raulien]

Daniel, List,

 

I think, this topic is very interesting especially in our digital era. When, long time ago, I had served army-replacement duty as a driver for handicapped children, and I first was a co-driver, I could never at all remember the routes. Only when I had to check them out on a map by myself, I could. When now I go somewhere by car or bicycle, I always use a map, not an electronic navigator device. i wonder whether digital natives nowadays, using only navigator devices, some despising everything made of paper, ever really know where they are, and how they could cope with a magnetic outbreak from the sun paralysing the internet.

 

I have read, dont know whether to believe it or not, that before the invention of scripture, people could remember lessons and what would be whole books by heart word for word, e.g. the pupils of Buddha. Anyway, I would not call external storage "extended mind", but rather "outsorced" or "replaced" mind, and I suspect, the Amazonians are right to use the word "impoverished".

 

It has to do with Hebbian Learning, synapses and so on, if with Peirce, i dont know.


 

Best,

Helmut

 

23. Februar 2021 um 20:45 Uhr
 "Daniel L. Everett" 
wrote:

As you will be aware, there is a veritable industry on semantic externalism as a result of Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment. But it also fits my own experiences in field research. For example, although every speaker I have ever encountered in an Amazonian language knows the names of all flora and fauna in their environment, my own vocabulary with respect to flora in particular is limited. Most trees I know simply by the name “tree.”

Amazonian friends therefore think that English is an extremely impoverished language. But, I tell them, I can find out what each tree is called not only in popular vernacular or with botanical precision by consulting an expert. Much of my semantics is stored externally (semantic externalism is compatible with Clark’s “extended mind” hypothesis as well).

This is an interesting fact about human cognition, culture, and semantics that is not found in other species, what one might refer to as enthymemetical semiotics in each individual.

Though I have done my own searches, I was wondering if anyone on this list is aware of research on Peircean semeiotics and semantic externalism.

Dan_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Multi-value logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: I guess, these are strong kinds of middle value, and possibility or vagueness are weak kinds, because you can put "possibly" or "vaguely" outside the brackets, and then calculate classically without the middle.



John, List,

 

Maybe there are at least two kinds of middle value: Overmeaning and undermeaning, as I have called them. Or maybe it should be overfication and underfication, as in verification and falsification. Please look at the attached pdf, I have illustrated them with Venn-diagrams.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 
 

16. Februar 2021 um 06:42 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:

Dan, Jon AS, Jon A, List,

Your recent notes raised issues about Peirce's writings that can be
clarified by information from the century after Peirce.  The 600-page
book cited by Dan shows the enormous range of issues about negation.
The ones that arise in formal logic are a small fraction of those
that arise in ordinary language.

The modern term 'multi-value logic' shows that a single middle
value between T and F is often insufficient.  Susan Haack wrote that
truth does not have degrees, but there may be degrees of certainty,
vagueness, difference of context, insufficient information,
probabilities...

In fact, Peirce's letter L231 contains his best treatment of both
two-valued reasoning (his 1911 EGs) and multi-valued reasoning (his
writings on probability).  Today, probabilities and various methods
for computing them are by far the most widely used methods for
dealing with middle terms between T and F.

When discussing issues about a middle value between T and F,
intuitionistic logic is a special case that arises *only* in the
philosophy of mathematics.  It's irrelevant to 99.999%. of all
cases where a middle term might arise.  That's about one in a
billion.  The reason for my estimate:  there are billions of people
in the world who frequently run into middle terms, and only a tiny
fraction of them have ever heard of intuitionistic logic.

One popular system has three kinds of middle values:  Certainly true,
true by default, unknown, false by default, certainly false.  Swans
in Europe, for example, are white by default, and swans in Australia
are black by default.  But an occasional swan might be imported at
any location.

Defaults are just one way to deal with context or lack of
information.  Another method is to distinguish "closed world
databases" vs "open world databases".  In a closed world, it's
sufficient for a database (or a Sheet of Assertion) to store just the
true cases because absence of a graph or relation implies that it's
false.  But in an open world, absence implies false or unknown.

Peirce's semantics for EGs, as determined by endoporeutic (the
dialogue between Graphist and Grapheus), is a closed world.  It
implies that for any given Sheet of Assertion, any EG can be
evaluated to T or F in terms of that SA.

Any subject that depends on observation is usually a mixture of open
and closed aspects (AKA databases).  For example, a list of people in
a single room at a single moment can be determined by observation.
In a large building, a list of people is hard to determine, but a
list of elephants in much easier -- a default value of zero is
usually sufficient.

Lotfi Zadeh (1965) developed a theory of fazzy sets, with a
membership function that has a continuous range of values from +1
(definitely yes) to 0 (unknown) to -1 (definitely no).  He later
extended it to a fuzzy range of values.  I was invited to contribute
an article to a Festschrift for his 90th birthday.  To avoid making
sharp criticisms, I compared issues about fuzzy sets to Peirce's
comments about vagueness:  "What is the source of fuzziness",
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf .

As usual, there is much more that could be said about all these
issues.

John
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Synechistic Graphs (was Synechistic Existential Graphs)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

with equivalent I meant: "definite (so that no assertion can be both true and false of it)": NOT (A AND NOT A), "individual (so that any assertion is either true or false of it)": A XOR NOT A = (A OR NOT A) AND NOT (A AND NOT A) = NOT (NOT A AND NOT NOT A) AND NOT (A AND NOT A) = NOT ( NOT A AND A) AND NOT (NOT A AND NOT A) = (repetition) = NOT (A AND NOT A).

So, in classical logic both claims are equivalent. They are the negations of Nagarjuna´s two kinds of (for him not-) excluded middles "both true and false", "neither true nor false". I was thinking, Nagarjuna was wrong, because they are equivalent. But for Peirce they aren´t either, at least not their negations. I don´t know what to make of it, but find it interesting.

 

Regarding the other topic, yes, I have mixed up existence with reality again.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

14. Februar 2021 um 19:53 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Helmut, List:
 




HR: thank you, Jon, for always presenting overwiews and summaries that help even people like me to gain more insight.




 

I am glad that you find such posts beneficial. Writing them is often how I organize my own thinking.

 




HR: I find it interesting, that here Peirce distinguished between two traits of a universe, definite and individual, which two traits are equivalent in classical logic ...




 

The two traits are not equivalent in classical logic, but they are both assumed by classical logic. In Peirce's words, "anything is general [not individual] in so far as the principle of excluded middle does not apply to it and is vague [not definite] in so far as the principle of contradiction does not apply to it" (CP 5.448, EP 2:351, 1905). Hence the two principles together apply only to that which is individual and definite--i.e., that which (strictly speaking) exists. Again, intuitionistic logic retains non-contradiction, but not excluded middle.

 




HR: In my understanding, the term "proof" contains the concept of a mind-independent existence.




 

That is not how mathematicians in general and intuitionists in particular define "proof," since only Platonists claim that mathematical objects have a mind-independent existence. The "proof" of the Pythagorean theorem does not require reference to any actual right triangles because it pertains to every possible right triangle. Perhaps a more appropriate term from your point of view would be "demonstration."

 




HR: So I, again, do not understand, what this "intuitionalism" is about at all.




 

I highly recommend reading the paper that I linked previously (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252676808_Conceptions_of_truth_in_intuitionism). The Wikipedia article on "Intuitionism" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuitionism) might also be helpful, along with the SEP article on "Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Sun, Feb 14, 2021 at 11:11 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




List,

 

thank you, Jon, for always presenting overwiews and summaries that help even people like me to gain more insight. I refer to:

 

"CSP: The sheet on which the graphs are written (called the sheet of assertion), as well as each portion of it, is a graph asserting that a recognized universe is definite (so that no assertion can be both true and false of it), individual (so that any assertion is either true or false of it), and real (so that what is true or false of it is independent of any judgment of man or men, unless it be that of the creator of the universe, in case this is fictive); any graph written upon this sheet is thereby asserted of that universe; and any multitude of graphs written disconnectedly upon the sheet are all asserted of the universe. (R 491:29, 1903)"

 

I find it interesting, that here Peirce distinguished between two traits of a universe, definite and individual, which two traits are equivalent in classical logic, but not e.g. in Nagarjuna´s tetralemma. Whose two kinds of nonexcluded middles he however excluded, but nevertheless mentioned for two different kinds (of exclusion). Next:

 

"PR: Namely, a characteristic feature of intuitionism is the requirement that the notion of truth of a proposition should be explained in terms of the notion of proof, or verification, rather than as correspondence with some sort of mind-independent realm of mathematical objects; from this one concludes that not every sentence is either true or false. Analogously, the existence of mathematical objects is analysed in terms of mental constructions rather than understood as some kind of mind-independen

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Synechistic Graphs (was Synechistic Existential Graphs)

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

thank you, Jon, for always presenting overwiews and summaries that help even people like me to gain more insight. I refer to:

 

"CSP: The sheet on which the graphs are written (called the sheet of assertion), as well as each portion of it, is a graph asserting that a recognized universe is definite (so that no assertion can be both true and false of it), individual (so that any assertion is either true or false of it), and real (so that what is true or false of it is independent of any judgment of man or men, unless it be that of the creator of the universe, in case this is fictive); any graph written upon this sheet is thereby asserted of that universe; and any multitude of graphs written disconnectedly upon the sheet are all asserted of the universe. (R 491:29, 1903)"

 

I find it interesting, that here Peirce distinguished between two traits of a universe, definite and individual, which two traits are equivalent in classical logic, but not e.g. in Nagarjuna´s tetralemma. Whose two kinds of nonexcluded middles he however excluded, but nevertheless mentioned for two different kinds (of exclusion). Next:

 

"PR: Namely, a characteristic feature of intuitionism is the requirement that the notion of truth of a proposition should be explained in terms of the notion of proof, or verification, rather than as correspondence with some sort of mind-independent realm of mathematical objects; from this one concludes that not every sentence is either true or false. Analogously, the existence of mathematical objects is analysed in terms of mental constructions rather than understood as some kind of mind-independent existence. (pp. 1-2)"

 

This for me, maybe due to my naivety, sounds like nonsense. In my understanding, the term "proof" contains the concept of a mind-independent existence. "Proof" is a concept that refers to two things: An actual and a general, or an instantiation and a law, or something that is in some mind, and something independent of its. To say, that something is constructed by a proof is not knowing what "proof" means. A proof does not construct, but reconstruct. The same is with "verification". This too is a concept that requires a universal reference. Constructivists like Varela and Maturana do not say "truth", "verification", or "proof", but speak instead of "viability". So I, again, do not understand, what this "intuitionalism" is about at all.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 

 
 

 13. Februar 2021 um 15:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



List, All:

 

Peirce famously invented dual versions of a diagrammatic syntax for studying logic, which he eventually named Entitative Graphs (EnG) and Existential Graphs (EG). Why did he choose these particular labels for them?

 


CSP: Two efficient systems of logical graphs are known to me. They are intimately allied. One of these I slightly sketched in The Monist, Vol. VII, pp. 168-186 (Jan. 1897). I call it the System of Entitative Graphs, because its fundamental symbol expresses an entitative relation. The other is the system herein described. I call it the system of Existential Graphs, because its fundamental symbol expresses the relation of existence. I speak of existence as a relation, because it consists in the occurrence of a nature among a collection of individual objects of experience,--not necessarily all actually experienced, but all destined to be experienced, could the experience be rounded out to completion. (R 485:1, LF 1:312, 1897-8)


 

The "fundamental symbol" in both cases is the juxtaposition of graphs on the sheet, which signifies inclusive disjunction (also called alternation) in EnG and conjunction in EG. For classical logic, Peirce associates the former with "an entitative relation"--a relation of being, which "involves necessarily the truth of the description"--and the latter with "the relation of existence," such that when we scribe a graph in EG, "we assert that to something in the universe that picture or description applies. We aver that such a thing exists" (R 513:17-18, LF 1:316-317, 1898). Consequently, unshaded areas correspond to a universe of actuality, and he eventually recognizes that shaded areas correspond to a universe of possibility (CP 4.576-581, 1906).

 

In EnG, the blank sheet "had to be interpreted as an absurdity" (CP 4.434, 1903). By contrast, in EG it "may be considered as the _expression_ of whatever must be well-understood" by anyone scribing or reading graphs on it--namely, "an arbitrarily hypothetical universe," which "acquires being, that is, perfect definiteness" at each stage of its creation and "acquires existence, that is, entire determinateness, in the sense that nothing remains undecided" upon its completion (CP 4.431, 1903).

 


CSP: The sheet on which the graphs are written (called the sheet of assertion), as well as each portion of it, is a graph asserting that a recognized universe is definite (so that no assertion can be both true and false of it), individual (so that any as

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Resending

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

 

is it agreed, that there is a clear distinction between primitives and not-primitives? Or is there a scale of primitivity? E.g. I would say, that amongst operators for one item you might say, that the exists- operator is either the most primitive one, or you might also say, that it does not exist, because it is redundant: "A exists" is the same as "A". So, is the NOT- operator the ultimate primitive? Or is it redundant as well, as "NOT A" is the same as " "?

But " " does not adress the item "A". Therefore it is not redundant, but necessary for adressing, other than "exists". Between two items, the "AND"- and the "OR"- operators obviously are of same primitivity, as both are translateable to each other by using the same number (three) of "NOT"-operators. So none of them is primitive, both are mutually depending on each other.


So, is the "NOT"-operator the only primitive?

 

Best, Helmut

 

10. Februar 2021 um 06:25 Uhr
"John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon AS and Jerry LRC,

JAS> Indeed, his "only" comments in favor of the scroll are in numerous passages from his extensive writings about EGs between late 1896 and June 1911.

That is indeed true.  In choosing a symbol for if-then as a logical primitive, Peirce was in good company.  Frege, Whitehead, Russell, and Gentzen made the same mistake.  And for each of them, that choice made their proof procedures more complex, less efficient, and less general.

O. H. Mitchell gets the credit for informing Peirce of that point,
and I have been writing an article with examples from all of the
above.  I'll send a copy to the P-list in the next few days.

JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in all contexts without any change in meaning.

JLRC> Really?

Yes, indeed.  As Casey Stengel used to say, "Ya could look it up."

John
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Follow-up:

I think "implication" is not the proper term, but "requirement" is. A consequence-operator requires the antedecent, and maybe too the consequent, to be physically existing, or possibly physically existing, for not to commit a performative contradiction. But there may be more "or"s, I don´t know now, my hypothesis is not complete yet. Have you got any ideas?

And is it requirement, which, if not given, produces unverification, or is it even "meaning": A-->B = PEp(A) AND PEp(B) AND (NOT (A AND NOT B)) with PEp(x) = "x possibly physically exists"? If it is this meaning, failing it does not produce unverification (NOT A AND NOT NOT A), but falsity, and it is not a non-classical logic (with not-excluded middle) anymore, but a corrected kind of classical logic.

I just am seeing, that there are too many open questions, and mistakes I always make, so I will write no more follow-ups. I think, many examples should be analysed to solve all this, which takes some time. Also, I guess that somebody else has already done all that.

Best, Helmut



List,

 

I have to enlarge my claim towards an intransparent universe, because this universe is partially intransparent. For example, there are animal species, of which we do not know, whether they are extinct or not. I said partially, because other things we know, e.g. that unicorns do not exist. The universe of hypothesis on the other hand is a completely intransparent universe, as a hypothesis is never verified, otherwise it would not be one.

 

What I am talking about is possibility of physical existence. This possibility is something different from other kinds of possibility, e.g. the possibility of throwing a "6" at dices. I call possibility  of physical existence PEp(A). Instead of using modal logic, you can always substitute B = PEp(A) OR A, or leave out "OR A", because A is included in its possibility, so: B=PEp(A), and calculate on classically. Rules for resubstitution I don´t know now.

 

Now my hypothesis, extended for a partially intransparent universe is, that a consequence implies, that the antedecent has the possibility to physically exist. (or physically exists, but that does not have to be extra mentioned). The same accounts for the consequent, I think, but am not sure now.

 

Implication means, that if you use a consequence-operator for something definitely not physically existing, you commit a performative contradiction, and your proposition is unverified: Neither true nor false.

 

It might be also possible to claim, that a consequence-operator not only implies, but means it. Then it would not just be unverified, but false, and we are completely in the area of classical logic, though a corrected edition of its.

 

This (Lukasiewizc-) kind of possibility to me seems a very weak form of not-excluded middle, if it is one at all, as it is subsitutable.

 

Other (strong) kinds of not-excluded middle are those stated by Nagarjuna: "Both true and false", "neither true nor false". In classical logic, these two are equivalent, but effectively they are not: "Neither true nor false" is, as I said, e.g. provided by unverification, performative contradiction. "Both true and false" I think is e.g. provided by a self-referential paradoxon.

 

Regardless of how many mistakes I have made now, I feel that I am starting to find logic more and more interesting, and am amazed, that somebody out of the far past, like Nagarjuna, has had so modern ideas.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 
 

 06. Februar 2021 um 02:26 Uhr
 "Helmut Raulien" 
wrote:



 
 



Suppsupplement: The performative contradiction in step 2 is a bit more tricky than I have written: As "Every B" means "Every B there is", "If B" does not mean "If there is a B", but "If it is one of the Bs there are", or "If one of the physically existing Bs is adressed". The same counts for "Then": Both parts of a consequence have to physically exist. The image of a unicorn in "If you have the idea of a unicorn, it has a virtual horn" physically exists too, in all cases, e.g. as circulating impulses between synapses.


 

Supplement: I forgot to adress Auke, and I forgot to add the verifcation, falsification, and unverification. Unverification is the not-excluded middle between true and false, provided by performative contradiction:

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink" is unverified in Step 2, by the performative contradiction of using a consequence-operator for something that not physically exists.

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" is verified with "there is no unicorn", regardless of any further limitations such as the actual "that is not pink".



 


Edwina, Jon A.S, List,

 

Now I think that the difference between consequence and double negation can be 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

I have to enlarge my claim towards an intransparent universe, because this universe is partially intransparent. For example, there are animal species, of which we do not know, whether they are extinct or not. I said partially, because other things we know, e.g. that unicorns do not exist. The universe of hypothesis on the other hand is a completely intransparent universe, as a hypothesis is never verified, otherwise it would not be one.

 

What I am talking about is possibility of physical existence. This possibility is something different from other kinds of possibility, e.g. the possibility of throwing a "6" at dices. I call possibility  of physical existence PEp(A). Instead of using modal logic, you can always substitute B = PEp(A) OR A, or leave out "OR A", because A is included in its possibility, so: B=PEp(A), and calculate on classically. Rules for resubstitution I don´t know now.

 

Now my hypothesis, extended for a partially intransparent universe is, that a consequence implies, that the antedecent has the possibility to physically exist. (or physically exists, but that does not have to be extra mentioned). The same accounts for the consequent, I think, but am not sure now.

 

Implication means, that if you use a consequence-operator for something definitely not physically existing, you commit a performative contradiction, and your proposition is unverified: Neither true nor false.

 

It might be also possible to claim, that a consequence-operator not only implies, but means it. Then it would not just be unverified, but false, and we are completely in the area of classical logic, though a corrected edition of its.

 

This (Lukasiewizc-) kind of possibility to me seems a very weak form of not-excluded middle, if it is one at all, as it is subsitutable.

 

Other (strong) kinds of not-excluded middle are those stated by Nagarjuna: "Both true and false", "neither true nor false". In classical logic, these two are equivalent, but effectively they are not: "Neither true nor false" is, as I said, e.g. provided by unverification, performative contradiction. "Both true and false" I think is e.g. provided by a self-referential paradoxon.

 

Regardless of how many mistakes I have made now, I feel that I am starting to find logic more and more interesting, and am amazed, that somebody out of the far past, like Nagarjuna, has had so modern ideas.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 
 

 06. Februar 2021 um 02:26 Uhr
 "Helmut Raulien" 
wrote:



 
 



Suppsupplement: The performative contradiction in step 2 is a bit more tricky than I have written: As "Every B" means "Every B there is", "If B" does not mean "If there is a B", but "If it is one of the Bs there are", or "If one of the physically existing Bs is adressed". The same counts for "Then": Both parts of a consequence have to physically exist. The image of a unicorn in "If you have the idea of a unicorn, it has a virtual horn" physically exists too, in all cases, e.g. as circulating impulses between synapses.


 

Supplement: I forgot to adress Auke, and I forgot to add the verifcation, falsification, and unverification. Unverification is the not-excluded middle between true and false, provided by performative contradiction:

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink" is unverified in Step 2, by the performative contradiction of using a consequence-operator for something that not physically exists.

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" is verified with "there is no unicorn", regardless of any further limitations such as the actual "that is not pink".



 


Edwina, Jon A.S, List,

 

Now I think that the difference between consequence and double negation can be explained with classical logic, or, if my explanation is not classical logic, at least intuitionalism as constructivistic theory is not necessary, and neither the Peircean categories. What is needed, is a close analysis of the operators, using Tarski´s meta-language, and  the concept of performative contradiction. Operators, both in spoken and in mathematical languages, imply steps of meta-language:


 

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink":

 

Step 1: Both "unicorn" and "pink" are concepts, terms with meanings. To e.g. utter "If it is a §$%, it is pink", or "If it is a unicorn, it is $%&" would be performative contradiction, because this is nonsense, and to utter nonsense is a contradiction, as any utterance is meant and claims to convey meaning (see e.g. Karl Otto Apel)

 

Step 2: Both unicorn and pink physically exist, otherwise it would be a performative contradiction to say "there is". "If A then B" literally contains no "There is", but this "There is" is implied in the "If-then" oprerator. "If-

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

 



 

 
 

Suppsupplement: The performative contradiction in step 2 is a bit more tricky than I have written: As "Every B" means "Every B there is", "If B" does not mean "If there is a B", but "If it is one of the Bs there are", or "If one of the physically existing Bs is adressed". The same counts for "Then": Both parts of a consequence have to physically exist. The image of a unicorn in "If you have the idea of a unicorn, it has a virtual horn" physically exists too, in all cases, e.g. as circulating impulses between synapses.

 

Supplement: I forgot to adress Auke, and I forgot to add the verifcation, falsification, and unverification. Unverification is the not-excluded middle between true and false, provided by performative contradiction:

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink" is unverified in Step 2, by the performative contradiction of using a consequence-operator for something that not physically exists.

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" is verified with "there is no unicorn", regardless of any further limitations such as the actual "that is not pink".



 


Edwina, Jon A.S, List,

 

Now I think that the difference between consequence and double negation can be explained with classical logic, or, if my explanation is not classical logic, at least intuitionalism as constructivistic theory is not necessary, and neither the Peircean categories. What is needed, is a close analysis of the operators, using Tarski´s meta-language, and  the concept of performative contradiction. Operators, both in spoken and in mathematical languages, imply steps of meta-language:


 

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink":

 

Step 1: Both "unicorn" and "pink" are concepts, terms with meanings. To e.g. utter "If it is a §$%, it is pink", or "If it is a unicorn, it is $%&" would be performative contradiction, because this is nonsense, and to utter nonsense is a contradiction, as any utterance is meant and claims to convey meaning (see e.g. Karl Otto Apel)

 

Step 2: Both unicorn and pink physically exist, otherwise it would be a performative contradiction to say "there is". "If A then B" literally contains no "There is", but this "There is" is implied in the "If-then" oprerator. "If-then" means "If there is, then". Also "Every" implies it. "Every B" means "Every B there is". Any operator indicating consequence requires physical existence. To say "Every unicorn has one horn" would be false, it should be "Every image of a unicorn has the image of a horn". "Image" may be a mental or language- image too.

 

Step 3 is the consequence from unicorn to pink.

 

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink":

 

Step 1: The same as above.

 

Step 2: Other than above, this step is missing. Physical existence is not needed in a negation.

 

Step 3: This is missing too. Without physical existence no consequence.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 04. Februar 2021 um 10:42 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca, a.bree...@upcmail.nl, "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth



 


Edwina, List,

 

uh, language is very inaccurate and tricky. I have made some mistakes in my previous post. I have to reformulate it all, paying attention to formulations. For example, "The class of tigers does physically exist" is perhaps not equivalent with "A tiger exists", but


"some tiger exists", and not to "tigers exist", because this means that two tigers exist (plural), but with one tiger alone existing, the class would physically exist. And so on. But until then, I am glad that you see what I am getting at.

 

Best, Helmut


 04. Februar 2021 um 01:37 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut,  - I think I see what you are getting at - but I'm not sure that the term of 'ALL' , a universal, can be understood as a laq [3ns] while the negative universal term 'NO' - is reduced to 2ns.

If I were to say: 'All water transforms to ice at minus 20 degrees Celsius'  - well, I'd say that was a normal law, 3ns.

And if I were to say: 'No ice can be formed at plus 35 degrees Celsius '  I'd say that was also a normal law; 3ns.

To write " A Tasmanian tiger does not exist' is NOT a universal or valid form. It refers to only one tiger.  So, it is in 2ns. To write the universal correctly, it would be: NO Tasmanian tigers exist - and that's a universal, a 3ns.

I'm not sure of the point of your double negation.

Edwina

 

On Wed 03/02/21 6:21 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, List,

 

Ok, "A 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: I forgot to adress Auke, and I forgot to add the verifcation, falsification, and unverification. Unverification is the not-excluded middle between true and false, provided by performative contradiction:

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink" is unverified in Step 2, by the performative contradiction of using a consequence-operator for something that not physically exists.

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" is verified with "there is no unicorn", regardless of any further limitations such as the actual "that is not pink".



 


Edwina, Jon A.S, List,

 

Now I think that the difference between consequence and double negation can be explained with classical logic, or, if my explanation is not classical logic, at least intuitionalism as constructivistic theory is not necessary, and neither the Peircean categories. What is needed, is a close analysis of the operators, using Tarski´s meta-language, and  the concept of performative contradiction. Operators, both in spoken and in mathematical languages, imply steps of meta-language:


 

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink":

 

Step 1: Both "unicorn" and "pink" are concepts, terms with meanings. To e.g. utter "If it is a §$%, it is pink", or "If it is a unicorn, it is $%&" would be performative contradiction, because this is nonsense, and to utter nonsense is a contradiction, as any utterance is meant and claims to convey meaning (see e.g. Karl Otto Apel)

 

Step 2: Both unicorn and pink physically exist, otherwise it would be a performative contradiction to say "there is". "If A then B" literally contains no "There is", but this "There is" is implied in the "If-then" oprerator. "If-then" means "If there is, then". Also "Every" implies it. "Every B" means "Every B there is". Any operator indicating consequence requires physical existence. To say "Every unicorn has one horn" would be false, it should be "Every image of a unicorn has the image of a horn". "Image" may be a mental or language- image too.

 

Step 3 is the consequence from unicorn to pink.

 

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink":

 

Step 1: The same as above.

 

Step 2: Other than above, this step is missing. Physical existence is not needed in a negation.

 

Step 3: This is missing too. Without physical existence no consequence.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 04. Februar 2021 um 10:42 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca, a.bree...@upcmail.nl, "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth



 


Edwina, List,

 

uh, language is very inaccurate and tricky. I have made some mistakes in my previous post. I have to reformulate it all, paying attention to formulations. For example, "The class of tigers does physically exist" is perhaps not equivalent with "A tiger exists", but


"some tiger exists", and not to "tigers exist", because this means that two tigers exist (plural), but with one tiger alone existing, the class would physically exist. And so on. But until then, I am glad that you see what I am getting at.

 

Best, Helmut


 04. Februar 2021 um 01:37 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut,  - I think I see what you are getting at - but I'm not sure that the term of 'ALL' , a universal, can be understood as a laq [3ns] while the negative universal term 'NO' - is reduced to 2ns.

If I were to say: 'All water transforms to ice at minus 20 degrees Celsius'  - well, I'd say that was a normal law, 3ns.

And if I were to say: 'No ice can be formed at plus 35 degrees Celsius '  I'd say that was also a normal law; 3ns.

To write " A Tasmanian tiger does not exist' is NOT a universal or valid form. It refers to only one tiger.  So, it is in 2ns. To write the universal correctly, it would be: NO Tasmanian tigers exist - and that's a universal, a 3ns.

I'm not sure of the point of your double negation.

Edwina

 

On Wed 03/02/21 6:21 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, List,

 

Ok, "A exists" is too general, it can be understood as both particular and universal. I meant "A" as a variable for a universal class, like a unicorn or unicorns or a tasman tiger or a human. I have left away the quotation marks to not let these examples be misunderstood for conceptual entities.

 

I am talking about the difference between the NOT- operator and positive operators, both used for universal propositions. My hypothesis is, that a (universal) proposition containing the NOT- operator is 2ns, and that a (universal too) proposition using a positive universal operator like EXISTS or EVERY, without a NOT-o

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, Jon A.S, List,

 

Now I think that the difference between consequence and double negation can be explained with classical logic, or, if my explanation is not classical logic, at least intuitionalism as constructivistic theory is not necessary, and neither the Peircean categories. What is needed, is a close analysis of the operators, using Tarski´s meta-language, and  the concept of performative contradiction. Operators, both in spoken and in mathematical languages, imply steps of meta-language:


 

"If there is a unicorn, it is pink":

 

Step 1: Both "unicorn" and "pink" are concepts, terms with meanings. To e.g. utter "If it is a §$%, it is pink", or "If it is a unicorn, it is $%&" would be performative contradiction, because this is nonsense, and to utter nonsense is a contradiction, as any utterance is meant and claims to convey meaning (see e.g. Karl Otto Apel)

 

Step 2: Both unicorn and pink physically exist, otherwise it would be a performative contradiction to say "there is". "If A then B" literally contains no "There is", but this "There is" is implied in the "If-then" oprerator. "If-then" means "If there is, then". Also "Every" implies it. "Every B" means "Every B there is". Any operator indicating consequence requires physical existence. To say "Every unicorn has one horn" would be false, it should be "Every image of a unicorn has the image of a horn". "Image" may be a mental or language- image too.

 

Step 3 is the consequence from unicorn to pink.

 

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink":

 

Step 1: The same as above.

 

Step 2: Other than above, this step is missing. Physical existence is not needed in a negation.

 

Step 3: This is missing too. Without physical existence no consequence.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 04. Februar 2021 um 10:42 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca, a.bree...@upcmail.nl, "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth



 


Edwina, List,

 

uh, language is very inaccurate and tricky. I have made some mistakes in my previous post. I have to reformulate it all, paying attention to formulations. For example, "The class of tigers does physically exist" is perhaps not equivalent with "A tiger exists", but


"some tiger exists", and not to "tigers exist", because this means that two tigers exist (plural), but with one tiger alone existing, the class would physically exist. And so on. But until then, I am glad that you see what I am getting at.

 

Best, Helmut


 04. Februar 2021 um 01:37 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut,  - I think I see what you are getting at - but I'm not sure that the term of 'ALL' , a universal, can be understood as a laq [3ns] while the negative universal term 'NO' - is reduced to 2ns.

If I were to say: 'All water transforms to ice at minus 20 degrees Celsius'  - well, I'd say that was a normal law, 3ns.

And if I were to say: 'No ice can be formed at plus 35 degrees Celsius '  I'd say that was also a normal law; 3ns.

To write " A Tasmanian tiger does not exist' is NOT a universal or valid form. It refers to only one tiger.  So, it is in 2ns. To write the universal correctly, it would be: NO Tasmanian tigers exist - and that's a universal, a 3ns.

I'm not sure of the point of your double negation.

Edwina

 

On Wed 03/02/21 6:21 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, List,

 

Ok, "A exists" is too general, it can be understood as both particular and universal. I meant "A" as a variable for a universal class, like a unicorn or unicorns or a tasman tiger or a human. I have left away the quotation marks to not let these examples be misunderstood for conceptual entities.

 

I am talking about the difference between the NOT- operator and positive operators, both used for universal propositions. My hypothesis is, that a (universal) proposition containing the NOT- operator is 2ns, and that a (universal too) proposition using a positive universal operator like EXISTS or EVERY, without a NOT-operator, is 3ns. So "A tasman tiger exists" is 3ns, a sort of law, in this case an expired law, while "A tasman tiger does not exist" is 2ns, and not a law.

 

I f we compare "unicorns don´t exist" with "tasman tigers don´t exist", we see, that, more or less automatically, the question about the reason for the nonexistence (the NOT- operator) arises, because the reasons can be, and are different: Unicorns have never existed, are just an idea, and tasman tigers have existed, but are extinct.

 

With "An A exists", or "Class A phys

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, List,

 

uh, language is very inaccurate and tricky. I have made some mistakes in my previous post. I have to reformulate it all, paying attention to formulations. For example, "The class of tigers does physically exist" is perhaps not equivalent with "A tiger exists", but


"some tiger exists", and not to "tigers exist", because this means that two tigers exist (plural), but with one tiger alone existing, the class would physically exist. And so on. But until then, I am glad that you see what I am getting at.

 

Best, Helmut


 04. Februar 2021 um 01:37 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut,  - I think I see what you are getting at - but I'm not sure that the term of 'ALL' , a universal, can be understood as a laq [3ns] while the negative universal term 'NO' - is reduced to 2ns.

If I were to say: 'All water transforms to ice at minus 20 degrees Celsius'  - well, I'd say that was a normal law, 3ns.

And if I were to say: 'No ice can be formed at plus 35 degrees Celsius '  I'd say that was also a normal law; 3ns.

To write " A Tasmanian tiger does not exist' is NOT a universal or valid form. It refers to only one tiger.  So, it is in 2ns. To write the universal correctly, it would be: NO Tasmanian tigers exist - and that's a universal, a 3ns.

I'm not sure of the point of your double negation.

Edwina

 

On Wed 03/02/21 6:21 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, List,

 

Ok, "A exists" is too general, it can be understood as both particular and universal. I meant "A" as a variable for a universal class, like a unicorn or unicorns or a tasman tiger or a human. I have left away the quotation marks to not let these examples be misunderstood for conceptual entities.

 

I am talking about the difference between the NOT- operator and positive operators, both used for universal propositions. My hypothesis is, that a (universal) proposition containing the NOT- operator is 2ns, and that a (universal too) proposition using a positive universal operator like EXISTS or EVERY, without a NOT-operator, is 3ns. So "A tasman tiger exists" is 3ns, a sort of law, in this case an expired law, while "A tasman tiger does not exist" is 2ns, and not a law.

 

I f we compare "unicorns don´t exist" with "tasman tigers don´t exist", we see, that, more or less automatically, the question about the reason for the nonexistence (the NOT- operator) arises, because the reasons can be, and are different: Unicorns have never existed, are just an idea, and tasman tigers have existed, but are extinct.

 

With "An A exists", or "Class A physically exists",  such as "A human exists" or "humans exist", no such question quasi-automatically arises. They exist because they do. Ok, you may ask, do they exist due to evolution or due to creation. But this question is not a question concerning the class of humans alone, but theology and science as a whole. Or you may just accept that they exist, like saying, they exist because that is a fact. If you say "A vaccine against malaria does not exist on the market", well, that is a fact too, but in this proposition the vaccine against malaria is mentioned, so why is it mentioned, and why do pharmacies not sell it? Do they not, because it is too hard to develop, or is a good vaccine already developed, but producing does not pay off, as people with malaria are mostly poor? So the question would not be about the vaccine alone, but about... no, not about that again.

 

Anyway, I think, the NOT- operator produces merely 2ns- propositions, which are not laws, but only instants of laws. These laws are either, that the class of the term that is adressed by the NOT-operator exists, either physically, or formerly physically, or just as an idea.

 

To conclude from a consequence (IF-THEN) to a double negation is always valid. To conclude from a double negation to a consequence is merely valid, if the class whose existence is negated physically exists: Classical logic. But if the class only formerly physically existed, or has just been an idea from the start, the said conclusion is not guaranteedly valid: Intuitionistic logic.

 
Best, Helmut

02. Februar 2021 um 18:35 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut, list

To say that 'A exists' - can be translated, I think, into a syllogistic sentence of, for example: All men are biological organisms.  [with 'biological organism' understood as 'existing'.

So, that's a universal, ie, a law.

But, to declare that 'No men are biological organisms' [which is the form of 'A doesn't exist'... is also a valid universal. It's unsound because it's false, but it's still valid logically.

--

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

 

Ok, "A exists" is too general, it can be understood as both particular and universal. I meant "A" as a variable for a universal class, like a unicorn or unicorns or a tasman tiger or a human. I have left away the quotation marks to not let these examples be misunderstood for conceptual entities.

 

I am talking about the difference between the NOT- operator and positive operators, both used for universal propositions. My hypothesis is, that a (universal) proposition containing the NOT- operator is 2ns, and that a (universal too) proposition using a positive universal operator like EXISTS or EVERY, without a NOT-operator, is 3ns. So "A tasman tiger exists" is 3ns, a sort of law, in this case an expired law, while "A tasman tiger does not exist" is 2ns, and not a law.

 

I f we compare "unicorns don´t exist" with "tasman tigers don´t exist", we see, that, more or less automatically, the question about the reason for the nonexistence (the NOT- operator) arises, because the reasons can be, and are different: Unicorns have never existed, are just an idea, and tasman tigers have existed, but are extinct.

 

With "An A exists", or "Class A physically exists",  such as "A human exists" or "humans exist", no such question quasi-automatically arises. They exist because they do. Ok, you may ask, do they exist due to evolution or due to creation. But this question is not a question concerning the class of humans alone, but theology and science as a whole. Or you may just accept that they exist, like saying, they exist because that is a fact. If you say "A vaccine against malaria does not exist on the market", well, that is a fact too, but in this proposition the vaccine against malaria is mentioned, so why is it mentioned, and why do pharmacies not sell it? Do they not, because it is too hard to develop, or is a good vaccine already developed, but producing does not pay off, as people with malaria are mostly poor? So the question would not be about the vaccine alone, but about... no, not about that again.

 

Anyway, I think, the NOT- operator produces merely 2ns- propositions, which are not laws, but only instants of laws. These laws are either, that the class of the term that is adressed by the NOT-operator exists, either physically, or formerly physically, or just as an idea.

 

To conclude from a consequence (IF-THEN) to a double negation is always valid. To conclude from a double negation to a consequence is merely valid, if the class whose existence is negated physically exists: Classical logic. But if the class only formerly physically existed, or has just been an idea from the start, the said conclusion is not guaranteedly valid: Intuitionistic logic.

 
Best, Helmut

02. Februar 2021 um 18:35 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut, list

To say that 'A exists' - can be translated, I think, into a syllogistic sentence of, for example: All men are biological organisms.  [with 'biological organism' understood as 'existing'.

So, that's a universal, ie, a law.

But, to declare that 'No men are biological organisms' [which is the form of 'A doesn't exist'... is also a valid universal. It's unsound because it's false, but it's still valid logically.

--

If you instead switched to the particular where you say, for 'A exists'  then this is the format for the sentence of 'Henry is a biological organism'... well, I don't think this is a law. It only refers to Henry. So, it's in 2ns. Same with 'A doesn't exist'..which could translate to 'Henry is not a biological organism'and this too  is particular and in 2ns.

-

The conceptual image of a unicorn does exist - we see it in so many paintings. But biologically, no such animal exists.



I consider that the DO does not exist apart from the semiosic process. That is, when the Object - the external Object which exists outside of our interaction with it - when this external Object is 'grabbed' by the semiosic process, it becomes, then, the Dynamic Object. Its data as received [by my semiosic process] is the Immediate Object. My capacity for receiving the input data may be limited, so my Immediate Object data is quite specific to my capabilities to understand it.

Edwina

 

On Tue 02/02/21 11:18 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 


Edwina, List,

 


with "universally valid law " I meant the universe as domain, especially for the example, that "A exists" has the property of a law, 3ns, but "A doesn´t exist" does not have this property, is merely 2ns.

 

About the object you are right, and I was wrong. The dynamic object preexists, but not the immedi

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, List,

 


with "universally valid law " I meant the universe as domain, especially for the example, that "A exists" has the property of a law, 3ns, but "A doesn´t exist" does not have this property, is merely 2ns.

 

About the object you are right, and I was wrong. The dynamic object preexists, but not the immediate. The interaction starts with 1, and the determination with the DO (2?).

 

About the unicorn I think, that "Unicorn" (put in quotation marks) exists, but not a unicorn.

 

Best, Helmut

 


01. Februar 2021 um 20:16 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut, list

1] I'm not sure what a 'universally valid law' means. After all, 'laws' in themselves, are evolved habits, both in the natural world and in the conceptual world. Therefore, a conceptual belief, whether operative in a sect, religion, or myth, is as much a 'law' or 'habit-of-belief/behaviour' as in the natural realm.  Such laws are not universal but are valid within a domain - only the most basic physical laws are universal and even then, restrictions apply. Or do you mean logical principles, such as cause and effect?

2] I don't think that the 'particular' is an 'illusion or collusion' - but these two terms need to be defined. As Peirce pointed out, the objective world exists, regardless of what anyone thinks of it...Therefore, I do think that the object exists 'before it is denoted'. To consider that objects only exist when denoted [by someone?] is..nominalism.

3] With regard to the process of semiosis, you could check Robert Marty's lattice, which shows, quite clearly, how semiosic interactions begin with the sensate stimuli of 1ns.

4] With regard to your question about unicorns - whether they 'exist' or are 'real' - again, both terms would have to be defined.

But in my view, unicorns most certainly exist. They exist in the conceptual realm - but not in the biological realm. I don't think that our world can be confined only to physico-chemical or biological existents; our concepts and thoughts are also existent. I would define a universal, such as 'goodness' or 'beauty' as 'real', whereas a particular object, even if conceptual such as a unicorn or Zeus, would, in my view, be defined as 'existent'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 01/02/21 1:15 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: With "law" I was meaning "universally valid law", not a law stated by a sect, religion, or myth. These would not concern the difference between the NOT- operator and the EXIST- operator, as both are universal, none of them is particularistic. Particularistic "laws" I would not call "laws", but illusions or collusions.



Edwina,

I find it interesting, that you think, that the semiosic process begins with 1ns, I originally think so too. That is, because in my opinion, the object does not exist before it is denoted. The sign/representamen makes something (a subject?) an object. I only wrote "2-1-3" to not raise a discussion about sequence, as most others always vote for "2-1-3".

 

Regarding the other points, maybe I have not used the proper terms "exist" and "real", or haven´t you, in this case? Isnt it so, that unicorns don´t exist, but are real? Or have I mixed it up again? Anyways, can anybody see through all the mistakes I have written that what I was meaning to tell, whether it is all bull or there is something about it? I thought having refuted the "transparent-world"-hypothesis and tried to show an alternative.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 01. Februar 2021 um 18:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - a few comments:

1] I think the semiosic process begins with 1ns, a sensation...and moves into awareness [2ns]..

2] With regard to your statement 'There is no unicorn that is not pink' - I think that this is what is known as an 'E' or negative form. Essentially you are saying: 'No unicorn is X.  And the 'X' happens to be a description which is, 'not pink'. This is not a negative, merely a term that includes of ALL colours that are 'not pink'. It's a law, a major premiss..  Same as the universal positive of 'Every unicorn is pink'.  [And this is NOT an illation but an assertion, a major premiss.

3] Laws are not always developed from external actual experience; they can develop within the mind as purely mental assertions [think of myths, of religions].

4] I would also say that Unicorns DO 'exist'. They are mental constructs and we see their images in paintings and artwork all over the world. I don't think we can confine 'existence' to physical/biological forms; I think we have to include conceptual forms as well. After all don'

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: With "law" I was meaning "universally valid law", not a law stated by a sect, religion, or myth. These would not concern the difference between the NOT- operator and the EXIST- operator, as both are universal, none of them is particularistic. Particularistic "laws" I would not call "laws", but illusions or collusions.



Edwina,

I find it interesting, that you think, that the semiosic process begins with 1ns, I originally think so too. That is, because in my opinion, the object does not exist before it is denoted. The sign/representamen makes something (a subject?) an object. I only wrote "2-1-3" to not raise a discussion about sequence, as most others always vote for "2-1-3".

 

Regarding the other points, maybe I have not used the proper terms "exist" and "real", or haven´t you, in this case? Isnt it so, that unicorns don´t exist, but are real? Or have I mixed it up again? Anyways, can anybody see through all the mistakes I have written that what I was meaning to tell, whether it is all bull or there is something about it? I thought having refuted the "transparent-world"-hypothesis and tried to show an alternative.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 01. Februar 2021 um 18:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - a few comments:

1] I think the semiosic process begins with 1ns, a sensation...and moves into awareness [2ns]..

2] With regard to your statement 'There is no unicorn that is not pink' - I think that this is what is known as an 'E' or negative form. Essentially you are saying: 'No unicorn is X.  And the 'X' happens to be a description which is, 'not pink'. This is not a negative, merely a term that includes of ALL colours that are 'not pink'. It's a law, a major premiss..  Same as the universal positive of 'Every unicorn is pink'.  [And this is NOT an illation but an assertion, a major premiss.

3] Laws are not always developed from external actual experience; they can develop within the mind as purely mental assertions [think of myths, of religions].

4] I would also say that Unicorns DO 'exist'. They are mental constructs and we see their images in paintings and artwork all over the world. I don't think we can confine 'existence' to physical/biological forms; I think we have to include conceptual forms as well. After all don't symbols 'exist'?

Edwina



 

On Mon 01/02/21 11:03 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,

 

I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ example is valid in a transparent universe too: From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think the following makes sense:

 

I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.

 The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you think?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

01. Februar 2021 um 13:07 Uhr
"Auke van Breemen"
wrote:


John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better understood as an
inductive rather

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I find it interesting, that you think, that the semiosic process begins with 1ns, I originally think so too. That is, because in my opinion, the object does not exist before it is denoted. The sign/representamen makes something (a subject?) an object. I only wrote "2-1-3" to not raise a discussion about sequence, as most others always vote for "2-1-3".

 

Regarding the other points, maybe I have not used the proper terms "exist" and "real", or haven´t you, in this case? Isnt it so, that unicorns don´t exist, but are real? Or have I mixed it up again? Anyways, can anybody see through all the mistakes I have written that what I was meaning to tell, whether it is all bull or there is something about it? I thought having refuted the "transparent-world"-hypothesis and tried to show an alternative.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 01. Februar 2021 um 18:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - a few comments:

1] I think the semiosic process begins with 1ns, a sensation...and moves into awareness [2ns]..

2] With regard to your statement 'There is no unicorn that is not pink' - I think that this is what is known as an 'E' or negative form. Essentially you are saying: 'No unicorn is X.  And the 'X' happens to be a description which is, 'not pink'. This is not a negative, merely a term that includes of ALL colours that are 'not pink'. It's a law, a major premiss..  Same as the universal positive of 'Every unicorn is pink'.  [And this is NOT an illation but an assertion, a major premiss.

3] Laws are not always developed from external actual experience; they can develop within the mind as purely mental assertions [think of myths, of religions].

4] I would also say that Unicorns DO 'exist'. They are mental constructs and we see their images in paintings and artwork all over the world. I don't think we can confine 'existence' to physical/biological forms; I think we have to include conceptual forms as well. After all don't symbols 'exist'?

Edwina



 

On Mon 01/02/21 11:03 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,

 

I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ example is valid in a transparent universe too: From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think the following makes sense:

 

I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.

 The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you think?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

01. Februar 2021 um 13:07 Uhr
"Auke van Breemen"
wrote:


John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better understood as an
inductive rather than a deductive science, for the ampliative work of inductive inference
better exemplifies, in a richer, fuller sense, the illative, ecstatic essence of inference per
se. While deduction still stands as essential and irreplaceable aspect of logic, it remains a
purely formal and hence more abstract (and more ‘degenerate’) _expression_ of the illative
essence of inference (and argumentatio

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

[Helmut Raulien]

Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,

 

I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ example is valid in a transparent universe too: From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think the following makes sense:

 

I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.

 The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you think?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

01. Februar 2021 um 13:07 Uhr
"Auke van Breemen" 
wrote:


John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better understood as an
inductive rather than a deductive science, for the ampliative work of inductive inference
better exemplifies, in a richer, fuller sense, the illative, ecstatic essence of inference per
se. While deduction still stands as essential and irreplaceable aspect of logic, it remains a
purely formal and hence more abstract (and more ‘degenerate’) _expression_ of the illative
essence of inference (and argumentation) in its fullest sense.

---

You keep assuming that Jon is talking about logic as a calculus in a transparant logical universe. But in this respect he never denied negation its role. As far as I get it, Jon's attempt can be seen as a diagrammatical calculus in the way of its development, but not for logic in the sense you take it, but as a dia-logical calculus. And in dialogues we ought to be interested in the reasons for the negation. Proof must be constructive.

The shaded ovals are interesting, especially in combination with the sheets and the lines of identity running on (self conversation) and through different sets of them (comminication or dialogue). 

It is as if you at the end of your carreer are diving in the method of tenacity.

Best,

Auke

Op 1 februari 2021 om 5:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
 
Edwina,

Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the subject line to the title of https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=ossaarchive

The full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce�s ecstatic logic of illation", and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about illation as a process, not as a particular sign for if-then,

The Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' is the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus' is the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.

When Peirce said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that signals the end of a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of inference' for what Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle suggests one step of a continuing process.

The article makes some good points, but it should not be considered as an argument for the scroll as a logical primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in every version of EGs from 1897 to the end) depend only insertions and deletions in negative or positive areas. 

A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in R670, a scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and later, he raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any suggestion that the scroll shape had any significance.  

There is, of course, more to say.

John
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, thank you! A very good example. "There is not a unicorn that is not pink" is true, but "Every unicorn is pink" is not true. This example at last has made me a believer in the relevance of intuitionistic logic.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

30. Januar 2021 um 20:58 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Helmut, Edwina, List:
 

There are at least three different ways of translating the natural-language sentence, "a human is a featherless biped," into a proposition in formal logic.



	Some human is a featherless biped.
	Every human is a featherless biped = if something is a human then it is a featherless biped.
	Every human is a featherless biped and every featherless biped is a human = something is a human if and only if it is a featherless biped.



#1 is a "singular description," #2 is a general assertion, and #3 is an _expression_ of complete equivalence. #2 is merely a partial definition since it allows for the possibility of featherless bipeds that are not humans, which are presumably distinguished in some other way; it is only falsified by the existence of a human who is not a featherless biped. Of course, the same is true of "there is not a human who is not a featherless biped," which is why this (scribed as nested ovals) is equivalent to #2 (scribed as a scroll) in classical logic.

 

However, that is not the case in intuitionistic logic--from "if human then featherless biped" we can infer "not both human and not featherless biped," but not the other way around. Why? If there were no actual humans, then the latter would be true but not necessarily the former. For example, it is true that "there is not a unicorn that is not pink" because there are no actual unicorns, but we cannot infer from this that "every unicorn is pink." On the other hand, since by definition "every unicorn has a single horn," it does follow that "there is not a unicorn that does not have a single horn."

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 2:54 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




 


Edwina,

yes, "a human is a featherless biped" might be understood as singular description. I meant it as definition, so it is better to say "a human is defined as featherless biped", which is a proposition, a description of a status, and not yet a law. The semiosis of habit-formation goes 1-2-3, and the semiosis of reflexion the other way, so, yes, I agree, that it neither is correct  that 2ns is more fundamental than 3ns, nor the other way. But I think logic is reflexion, so in this case 3ns (law, conclusion, the scroll) is primary to 2ns (actuality, proposition, nested ovals). With "more fundamental" I just was refering to the question in this thread about what is primary to what. I still am quibbling with the reason for intuitionalistic logic. But it is somwhat hard to show a primarity that cannot be illustrated with examples, as there is no loss or gain in meaning, merely a by me suspected academic rule, that logic is reflexion, and in reflexion 3ns comes before 2ns. But all in all I am merely suspecting and tentatively trying this and that.

 

Best, Helmut



29. Januar 2021 um 18:19 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:


Helmut - if you read Peirce's cosmological outlines [6.203 and 1.412], he begins with 1ns, moves on to the instantiations of 2ns, and then, into the developing habits of 3ns. So, the 'actualization' of the modes in spatiotemporal existence is linear.

But - all three modes are potential and necessary, therefore, I don't think that one can say that any one of them is 'more fundamental'.

And I'm not sure how a singular description of a variable [A human is a featherless biped] can be transformed into a sound deductive argument [IF it is a featherless biped THEN it is human]. As you point out, the connection of the attribute [featherless biped] might not always apply to the variable of 'human'.

Edwina

On Fri 29/01/21 11:02 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



All,


 

I think, the difference is not the meaning, but what it is. Though the double negation´s meaning is the same as the conclusion´s meaning, the double negation has the form of a proposition, or a definition, which is secondness: "There is not a featherless biped that is not a human" may be classificationally instantated from exclusion of exclusion to definition: "A human is a featherless biped". The conclusion "If it is a featherless biped then it is a human" may be individually instantated to an argument; "It is a human because it is a featherless biped". It is thirdness, a rule or law. Which 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina,

yes, "a human is a featherless biped" might be understood as singular description. I meant it as definition, so it is better to say "a human is defined as featherless biped", which is a proposition, a description of a status, and not yet a law. The semiosis of habit-formation goes 1-2-3, and the semiosis of reflexion the other way, so, yes, I agree, that it neither is correct  that 2ns is more fundamental than 3ns, nor the other way. But I think logic is reflexion, so in this case 3ns (law, conclusion, the scroll) is primary to 2ns (actuality, proposition, nested ovals). With "more fundamental" I just was refering to the question in this thread about what is primary to what. I still am quibbling with the reason for intuitionalistic logic. But it is somwhat hard to show a primarity that cannot be illustrated with examples, as there is no loss or gain in meaning, merely a by me suspected academic rule, that logic is reflexion, and in reflexion 3ns comes before 2ns. But all in all I am merely suspecting and tentatively trying this and that.

 

Best, Helmut

 

29. Januar 2021 um 18:19 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - if you read Peirce's cosmological outlines [6.203 and 1.412], he begins with 1ns, moves on to the instantiations of 2ns, and then, into the developing habits of 3ns. So, the 'actualization' of the modes in spatiotemporal existence is linear.

But - all three modes are potential and necessary, therefore, I don't think that one can say that any one of them is 'more fundamental'.

And I'm not sure how a singular description of a variable [A human is a featherless biped] can be transformed into a sound deductive argument [IF it is a featherless biped THEN it is human]. As you point out, the connection of the attribute [featherless biped] might not always apply to the variable of 'human'.

Edwina

 

On Fri 29/01/21 11:02 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 


All,

 

I think, the difference is not the meaning, but what it is. Though the double negation´s meaning is the same as the conclusion´s meaning, the double negation has the form of a proposition, or a definition, which is secondness: "There is not a featherless biped that is not a human" may be classificationally instantated from exclusion of exclusion to definition: "A human is a featherless biped". The conclusion "If it is a featherless biped then it is a human" may be individually instantated to an argument; "It is a human because it is a featherless biped". It is thirdness, a rule or law. Which of both is more fundamental? Both mean the same, so if one changes, the other changes too. But which is more likely to change? The law "If it is a featherless biped then it is a human" cannot change just so, by itself. But the situation, the secondness, the truth of the proposition "There is not a featherless biped that is not a human" can easily change, and make the law obsolete, e.g. if an ape quits using its arms for walking, or if a dog sadly has two legs amputated, or if a chicken, due to a mutation, is born without feathers. So, is the double negation more fundamental, because it breaks the law? People will say, that the ape is just stupid, the chicken and the dog are just handicapped, exceptions only corrobate the rule, and all people who claim that the law is no longer in charge are heretics. A law (3ns) is more tenacious than actualities (2ns), that first have to prove worthwile one by one to add up to a certain measure, so is it more fundamental?


 

Helmut


Freitag, 29. Januar 2021 um 00:49 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:



John, List, All:
 

In this post, I will simply respond to the numbered items below rather than quoting them.

 

1. I am not aware of any evidence that Peirce ever explicitly denied that illation is essential for deduction or rejected the use of the scroll for that purpose in EGs. The absence of these specific terms in his relatively sparse writings during the last 34 months of his life does not outweigh their abundance in his voluminous output over the preceding decades. Again, my hypothesis is that in June 1911 he merely decided to simplify his presentation of EGs for the uninitiated by omitting the derivation of negation (oval) from consequence (scroll).

 

2. The psychological process of noticing a difference or distinction in perception does seem to be more primitive than the linguistic process of verbalizing the inference of modus ponens, but as Peirce repeatedly affirmed, the logical relation of negation is absolutely not more primitive than the logical relation of consequence. Moreover, "We do not derive these notions [universal elementary relations of logic] from observation, nor by any sense of being opposed, but from our own reason" (CP 8.352, EP 2:485, 1908).

 

3. I have repeatedly acknowledged that in cl

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


All,

 

I think, the difference is not the meaning, but what it is. Though the double negation´s meaning is the same as the conclusion´s meaning, the double negation has the form of a proposition, or a definition, which is secondness: "There is not a featherless biped that is not a human" may be classificationally instantated from exclusion of exclusion to definition: "A human is a featherless biped". The conclusion "If it is a featherless biped then it is a human" may be individually instantated to an argument; "It is a human because it is a featherless biped". It is thirdness, a rule or law. Which of both is more fundamental? Both mean the same, so if one changes, the other changes too. But which is more likely to change? The law "If it is a featherless biped then it is a human" cannot change just so, by itself. But the situation, the secondness, the truth of the proposition "There is not a featherless biped that is not a human" can easily change, and make the law obsolete, e.g. if an ape quits using its arms for walking, or if a dog sadly has two legs amputated, or if a chicken, due to a mutation, is born without feathers. So, is the double negation more fundamental, because it breaks the law? People will say, that the ape is just stupid, the chicken and the dog are just handicapped, exceptions only corrobate the rule, and all people who claim that the law is no longer in charge are heretics. A law (3ns) is more tenacious than actualities (2ns), that first have to prove worthwile one by one to add up to a certain measure, so is it more fundamental?


 

Helmut


Freitag, 29. Januar 2021 um 00:49 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



John, List, All:
 

In this post, I will simply respond to the numbered items below rather than quoting them.

 

1. I am not aware of any evidence that Peirce ever explicitly denied that illation is essential for deduction or rejected the use of the scroll for that purpose in EGs. The absence of these specific terms in his relatively sparse writings during the last 34 months of his life does not outweigh their abundance in his voluminous output over the preceding decades. Again, my hypothesis is that in June 1911 he merely decided to simplify his presentation of EGs for the uninitiated by omitting the derivation of negation (oval) from consequence (scroll).

 

2. The psychological process of noticing a difference or distinction in perception does seem to be more primitive than the linguistic process of verbalizing the inference of modus ponens, but as Peirce repeatedly affirmed, the logical relation of negation is absolutely not more primitive than the logical relation of consequence. Moreover, "We do not derive these notions [universal elementary relations of logic] from observation, nor by any sense of being opposed, but from our own reason" (CP 8.352, EP 2:485, 1908).

 

3. I have repeatedly acknowledged that in classical logic, which is what Peirce obviously had in mind in 1911, a scroll is indeed equivalent to a nest of two ovals. Although he anticipated intuitionistic logic in several remarkable ways, including his explicit statements in R 300 (1908) that analyzing a consequence as a composite of two negations is erroneous, unfortunately he did not take the additional steps that would have been necessary to formalize it. Otherwise, we might today be calling it synechistic logic instead.

 

4. According to Peirce, "I have a complete theory of this process [logical analysis], including its methodeutic, which I base upon my existential graphs which is my chef d'oeuvre" (NEM 3:885, 1908). Whether it was logical analysis or EGs that he considered to be his masterpiece, it is clear that they are closely linked. In the context of logical analysis, he repeatedly defines "more analytical" as "breaking up inferences into the greatest possible number of steps" (CP 4.373, 1902). In every single classical or intuitionistic proof that involves negation, deriving it from a consequence with "the essence of falsity" as its consequent is technically a necessary additional step. As Bellucci and Pietarinen rightly put it, "Taking the idea of negation as primary is philosophically inaccurate."

 

5. Peirce was obviously not advocating that we add unnecessary steps, and he generally sought to minimize the number of axioms. For example, he eagerly embraced non-Euclidean geometry as demonstrating that the parallel postulate is not essential for a consistent system. I believe that he likewise would have endorsed intuitionistic logic as demonstrating that excluded middle and its corollaries are not essential for a consistent system, had he managed to work out the details himself--or had he lived to see Brouwer and Heyting do so, despite undoubtedly disagreeing with them about the philosophical motivations. In that sense, non-Euclidean geometry is more analytical than Euclidean geometry and intuitionistic logic is more analytical than classical logic, because in each case the former requir

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory

[Helmut Raulien]

John,

 

yes, but isn´t it so, that in mathematics and symbolic logic, if the extension is known i.e. covered by proofs, an intensional term can be equivalent with an extensional one, and this is called "classical logic"? That is, if I am right, that e.g. "NOT (A AND NOT B)" is extensional, and means the same as "IF A THEN B", which is intensional? I just am still trying to understand the reason for intuitionistic logic, and with your hint towards intension/extension, I suspect having come a bit closer to this quest for understanding: Is it so, that in intuitionistic logic intensional and extensional terms are not equivalent, and it is applied for those cases in which the extension is vague, unknown, or not proved? And what about "NOT A OR B": Is this term also purely extensional, or a bit intensional? I mean, can we classify operators in a scale between intensional and extensional? Like, the "IF-THEN"- operator would be intensional, the "AND"- operator extensional, and the "OR"- operator somewhere between? Though the "OR"- operator may be completely extensional too, I am not sure.

 

I also think, that intension and extension has to do with Salthe`s distinction between composition and subsumption (classification). If some operators are extensional and this would mean compository, and others intensional, and this would mean classificatory, perhaps there could not be an operator such as "OR" somewhere between, because composition and subsumption are two distinct ways of putting systems in a hierarchy- though there are cases called holarchy, in which both applies, but then in opposite hierarchic subset-directions towards each other. Maybe the "OR"- operator is such a thing?

 

Warning: I am a-frayed I was thinking while writing, so what I wrote is not an elaborated hypothesis.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 17. Januar 2021 um 06:43 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Helmut,

The distinction between intesion and extension is important for every version of logic since antiquity.  The oldest example is "rational animal" vs. "featherless biped" -- those are two terms with different intensions, but the same extension. Diogenes the Cynic plucked a chicken and threw it into Plato's Academy while shouting "Here is Plato's man."

Alonzo Church, who wrote that excerpt I cited, had been the editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic for many years.

It's just as important for the latest work in computer science for both theory and applications.

John




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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, John,

 

just a thought: Might it be, that in classical mathematics and logic there is not distinguished between intension and extension, and in intuitionistic logic there is? For example, "NOT (A AND NOT B)" is an extensionistic proposition, or the extension of the relation, but "IF A THEN B" is an intensionistic proposition, or the intension of the relation? For classical logic, both are the same, but for intuitionistic logic not, for some reason I dont understand. I mean, I understand the difference between extension and intension, but I also understand, why for classical (exact) logic the difference does not matter. In a reasonable universe of discourse that is. So, is intuitionistic logic designed for a not-reasonable universe? But why? What would a not-reasonable universe be like then, and why would anybody want to try to reason in such a universe, casting pearls before the swine? On the other hand I think, it is quite a honest thing to do, to try to refute Adorno´s saying, that there is no right life in the wrong life.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

16. Januar 2021 um 18:02 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A,

It's important to distinguish the intension and the extension of a function or relation.  The *intension* is its definition by a rule or set of axioms.  The *extension* is the set of instances in some domain or universe of discourse:

JA> We can now define a “relation” L as a subset of a cartesian product.

That is a purely extensional definition.  If we're talking about a database, for example, the extension may be constantly changing, but the intension may be the same for all the variations in extension

For the distinction between extensions and intensions, see the discussion by Alonzo Church:  http://jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm .

John
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

this outcome; namely, "that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true." In a world where it is really possible for a man to go bankrupt but it just so happens that no man ever actually does so, this alone does not make it true that some such incident would have led another man, or even the same man, to commit suicide. In the latter case, the fact that this particular man never actually goes bankrupt, even while others do so, does not make it true that he would have committed suicide had he done so.


 

The disconnect comes from neglecting the fundamental asymmetry of inference, which is captured by the unsymmetrical relation of consequence but not by the symmetrical relation of negation. There must be "a real movement of thought in the mind" from antecedent to consequent, since it would be "absurd to say that a real change of A into a sequent B consists in a state of things that should consist in there not being an A without a B. For in such a state of things there would be no change at all" (R 300:49[48], 1908). In other words, the conditional proposition is only true if the reason why some man would commit suicide is because some man--perhaps the same man himself--goes bankrupt. As Frederik Stjernfelt puts it, "There is a link, a 'real possibility' connecting bankruptcy and suicide that is not addressed if you adopt the 'strange rule'" (http://frederikstjernfelt.dk/Peirce/Optimal%20and%20operational%20iconicity.%202011%3A2014.pdf, p. 23).

 

This also serves as a good illustration of the point about abduction/retroduction that first prompted me to resume this thread a couple of weeks ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg4.html). A man committing suicide is a surprising fact that calls for an explanation. Another man going bankrupt seems unlikely to fit the bill except under relatively unusual circumstances, while the same man going bankrupt is a plausible hypothesis from which the surprising fact could be expected to follow as a matter of course. By deduction we ascertain that the man's financial records would reveal his net worth, and by induction we then investigate accordingly. If the evidence indicates solvency, then the hypothesis is falsified; but if the man did go broke, then it is rendered much more plausible--perhaps even probable--though still not certain since there might be other circumstances such that his bankruptcy is a secondary factor or even coincidental.





 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Sat, Dec 26, 2020 at 12:13 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:







Supplement: The attachment has arrived, with Johns post, sorry.

I am afraid, that in my example a weak negation is blended in, so the example doesn´t count. You cannot say "NOT possibly female", but have to say instead "possibly not female". The adverb, I think, indicates the weak negation, which does not include a NOT-operator, I think. The weak negation is the only way to negate a weak affirmation like "possibly is female". The strong affirmation (resp. its negation) "is a possible female" is absurd, it would mean, that the dodo has the choice of its gender, or its gender changes from time to time (resp. NOT).

Is that what intuitionism is about? Negating a weak affirmation, not noticing, that this negation is weak too, and applying nevertheless the NOT-operator?

Or can somebody give a better example?

Jon, List,



The attachment has not arrived. I have tried the reversion including possibility with an example:

 

Let a dodo be a animal close to extinction, of which we only know about its extinction status, that maybe all still living dodos are male, maybe females still exist too. We have a blurred photograph (sex not visible) of a dodo:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN it is possibly female."-- is still correct, because it merely is a possibility, that the last ones are all male.

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT possibly female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is false.

 

BUT: If we do not subsume "not-knowing" under "possibility", as in fact it is something quite different from the possibility of something being one case of existing cases, then the reversion works:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN we donot know, if it possibly is female"-- is correct

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT so, that we donot know, if it possibly is female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is correct, though in this case not helpful.

 

Has anybody got other examples?

 

Best, Helmut










CSP: I soon discovered, upon a critical analysis, that it was absolutely necessary to insist upon and bring to the front, the truth that a mere possibility may be q

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: The attachment has arrived, with Johns post, sorry.

I am afraid, that in my example a weak negation is blended in, so the example doesn´t count. You cannot say "NOT possibly female", but have to say instead "possibly not female". The adverb, I think, indicates the weak negation, which does not include a NOT-operator, I think. The weak negation is the only way to negate a weak affirmation like "possibly is female". The strong affirmation (resp. its negation) "is a possible female" is absurd, it would mean, that the dodo has the choice of its gender, or its gender changes from time to time (resp. NOT).

Is that what intuitionism is about? Negating a weak affirmation, not noticing, that this negation is weak too, and applying nevertheless the NOT-operator?

Or can somebody give a better example?

 

 



Jon, List,

 

The attachment has not arrived. I have tried the reversion including possibility with an example:

 

Let a dodo be a animal close to extinction, of which we only know about its extinction status, that maybe all still living dodos are male, maybe females still exist too. We have a blurred photograph (sex not visible) of a dodo:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN it is possibly female."-- is still correct, because it merely is a possibility, that the last ones are all male.

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT possibly female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is false.

 

BUT: If we do not subsume "not-knowing" under "possibility", as in fact it is something quite different from the possibility of something being one case of existing cases, then the reversion works:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN we donot know, if it possibly is female"-- is correct

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT so, that we donot know, if it possibly is female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is correct, though in this case not helpful.

 

Has anybody got other examples?

 

Best, Helmut

 

 
 
 

26. Dezember 2020 um 02:44 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



John, Helmut, List:
 


I agree with John's additional remarks about intuitionistic logic. Addressing Helmut's worry, it does not "blur" the concept of truth; on the contrary, there is a sense in which it establishes a higher standard than classical logic because it requires constructive proofs by denying that non-falsity always entails truth.

 







JFS: For an explanation and demonstration of that point, see the attached file NatDeduction.pdf--it's just one page from an article I'm writing.







 

The attachment mentions "automated reasoning," which brings to my mind this passage by Peirce, portions of which I have quoted before

 






CSP: I soon discovered, upon a critical analysis, that it was absolutely necessary to insist upon and bring to the front, the truth that a mere possibility may be quite real. That admitted, it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true ...

[T]he verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs represents a universe of possibilities. This, taken in connection with other premisses, led me back to the same conclusion to which my studies of Pragmatism had already brought me, the reality of some possibilities. This is a striking proof of the superiority of the System of Existential Graphs to either of my algebras of logic. For in both of them the incongruity of this strange rule is completely hidden behind the superfluous machinery which is introduced in order to give an appearance of symmetry to logical law, and in order to facilitate the working of these algebras considered as reasoning machines. I cannot let this remark pass without protesting, however, that in the construction of no algebra was the idea of making a calculus which would turn out conclusions by a regular routine other than a very secondary purpose. (CP 4.580-581, 1906)






 

The "machinery" necessary for "making a calculus" that facilitates the operation of "reasoning machines" is "superfluous" and obscures the fact that the alleged "symmetry" (i.e., reversibility) of "logical law" is merely "an appearance." This is the case not only for Peirce's two logical algebras as he confesses here, but also for existential graphs when shading/unshading is defined as (symmetrical) negation and treated as if it were a logical primitive.

 

Again, I readily acknowledge that the resulting system is simpler and more iconic for that specific purpose, but at the cost of being less analytical than the alternative of recognizing the unsymmetrical relation of consequence as a logical primitive and deriving negation from it. If we could simply agree on that much, I would be glad to stop belaboring the point.






 



Merry Christmas,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Struc

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

The attachment has not arrived. I have tried the reversion including possibility with an example:

 

Let a dodo be a animal close to extinction, of which we only know about its extinction status, that maybe all still living dodos are male, maybe females still exist too. We have a blurred photograph (sex not visible) of a dodo:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN it is possibly female."-- is still correct, because it merely is a possibility, that the last ones are all male.

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT possibly female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is false.

 

BUT: If we do not subsume "not-knowing" under "possibility", as in fact it is something quite different from the possibility of something being one case of existing cases, then the reversion works:

 

"If this is a dodo, THEN we donot know, if it possibly is female"-- is correct

 

Reversion:

 

"If it is NOT so, that we donot know, if it possibly is female, THEN this is NOT a dodo"-- is correct, though in this case not helpful.

 

Has anybody got other examples?

 

Best, Helmut

 

 
 
 

26. Dezember 2020 um 02:44 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



John, Helmut, List:
 


I agree with John's additional remarks about intuitionistic logic. Addressing Helmut's worry, it does not "blur" the concept of truth; on the contrary, there is a sense in which it establishes a higher standard than classical logic because it requires constructive proofs by denying that non-falsity always entails truth.

 







JFS: For an explanation and demonstration of that point, see the attached file NatDeduction.pdf--it's just one page from an article I'm writing.







 

The attachment mentions "automated reasoning," which brings to my mind this passage by Peirce, portions of which I have quoted before

 






CSP: I soon discovered, upon a critical analysis, that it was absolutely necessary to insist upon and bring to the front, the truth that a mere possibility may be quite real. That admitted, it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be realized is true ...

[T]he verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs represents a universe of possibilities. This, taken in connection with other premisses, led me back to the same conclusion to which my studies of Pragmatism had already brought me, the reality of some possibilities. This is a striking proof of the superiority of the System of Existential Graphs to either of my algebras of logic. For in both of them the incongruity of this strange rule is completely hidden behind the superfluous machinery which is introduced in order to give an appearance of symmetry to logical law, and in order to facilitate the working of these algebras considered as reasoning machines. I cannot let this remark pass without protesting, however, that in the construction of no algebra was the idea of making a calculus which would turn out conclusions by a regular routine other than a very secondary purpose. (CP 4.580-581, 1906)






 

The "machinery" necessary for "making a calculus" that facilitates the operation of "reasoning machines" is "superfluous" and obscures the fact that the alleged "symmetry" (i.e., reversibility) of "logical law" is merely "an appearance." This is the case not only for Peirce's two logical algebras as he confesses here, but also for existential graphs when shading/unshading is defined as (symmetrical) negation and treated as if it were a logical primitive.

 

Again, I readily acknowledge that the resulting system is simpler and more iconic for that specific purpose, but at the cost of being less analytical than the alternative of recognizing the unsymmetrical relation of consequence as a logical primitive and deriving negation from it. If we could simply agree on that much, I would be glad to stop belaboring the point.






 



Merry Christmas,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 10:38 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




 


John, Jon,

 

Thank you! My first idea is, that to negate each step and reverse the order only is valid with the excluded middle, so exclusion of the  middle should be necessary for both ways of proof too. But I will read your links, thank you for your patience! I think, the concept of truth is somewhat holy for me, and I saw it being blasphemically blurred by intuitionism, or something like that. But it is all about formalism, OK!

 

Happy Christmas, Helmut



 25. Dezember 2020 um 06:16 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
wrote:


Helmut,

I basically agree with the short summary by JAS in his last note, but there are some relat

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, the story of my life is, that I frequently want  things that donot emerge due to my wanting. But I agree. At least I am a mechanic, so I can know something.

Best, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 20:27 Uhr

"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - I don't think that we can 'want' both democracy and capitalism. Neither emerges due to our 'wanting'.

Capitalism is an economic mode that enables a growth economy and population growth. No other economic mode enables either. And democracy is simply a political system that privileges the majority, which in the case of capitalism, means the majority of the population who, in this economy, are engaged in its wealth production. .

I think that knowledge is incomplete. I can certainly understand the rule that knowledge is incomplete of the system of which we are a part, but, isn't it also incomplete of external systems. We can certainly know everything about a simple mechanical system, but, in more complex systems, which is what the world really is - I don't know that knowledge can ever be complete, since the system is, itself, never complete.

Edwina

 

On Fri 25/12/20 2:15 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

so, if we want both democracy and capitalism, we should support individual private enterprises, I agree. And for companies bigger than an individual co-operatives. Otherwise the business-owners cannot become majority.

I don´t think, that all knowledge is incomplete. Due to Goedel, as far as I have understood, merely the knowledge about a system of which the knower is part of, is.

Best, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 19:10 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - No, I don't think that Godel's incompleteness theory has anything to do with democracy. After all, if we take as a given, that all knowledge is incomplete [and Peirce would be the first to say this!], then, we'd have to question other historical forms of governance - such as a hereditary leadership, or small-group consensus.

Democracy, like the other forms of governance, is based around economics. Which ever section of the population ensures the economic productive capacity of the population - also must be the section of the population that gets to make the rules for the society.

Democracy is found within capitalism, an economic mode based around individual private enterprise. When this section of the population becomes the dominant and most numerous economic mode - then, democracy becomes the political mode, because it 'privileges' the majority.

Edwina

 

On Fri 25/12/20 12:41 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Jon,

 

you wrote "except as...", yes, these exceptions are what I was talking about. I think, Goedel´s Incompleteness Theorem even is the justification for democracy: No king can have complete information about the system he governs, because he is part of it. Incomplete information is not-knowledge is belief. Belief has to be handled democraticly, because the belief of one person may be erratic. Isn´t that great, to have a relevant mathematical piece of advice for politics??  Happy Christmas, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 03:09 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:



Helmut, List:
 

I am still having trouble following you here. Intuitionistic logic does not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as a formal system for drawing valid deductive inferences such that the conclusion is true as long as the premisses are true. Its main difference from classical logic is that the negation of a false proposition is not necessarily true, such that proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum ) is invalid. Again, Gödel's theorems also do not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as demonstrations that certain kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal system.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 3:50 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Jon, List,

 

the fallacy of intuitionistic logic in my hypothesis is, that it first includes belief into the concept of truth, then sees, that belief is not two-valued, and then denies the law of the excluded middle for both. But the NOT-operator can only be applied for truth-problems, and so for knowledge-problems, not for belief-problems. It is meant like that.

 

The fallacy is based on the hypothesis, that truth in general is not detectable. But I think, that Steven has shown with Goedel, that there is a clear, noncontinuous distinction between belief and truth, meaning, that truth exists, the only thing, that the NOT-operator applies to, due to the agreement about this symbol.

 

The clear distinction -mathematically proven by Goedel-  between belief and trut

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

so, if we want both democracy and capitalism, we should support individual private enterprises, I agree. And for companies bigger than an individual co-operatives. Otherwise the business-owners cannot become majority.

I don´t think, that all knowledge is incomplete. Due to Goedel, as far as I have understood, merely the knowledge about a system of which the knower is part of, is.

Best, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 19:10 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - No, I don't think that Godel's incompleteness theory has anything to do with democracy. After all, if we take as a given, that all knowledge is incomplete [and Peirce would be the first to say this!], then, we'd have to question other historical forms of governance - such as a hereditary leadership, or small-group consensus.

Democracy, like the other forms of governance, is based around economics. Which ever section of the population ensures the economic productive capacity of the population - also must be the section of the population that gets to make the rules for the society.

Democracy is found within capitalism, an economic mode based around individual private enterprise. When this section of the population becomes the dominant and most numerous economic mode - then, democracy becomes the political mode, because it 'privileges' the majority.

Edwina

 

On Fri 25/12/20 12:41 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Jon,

 

you wrote "except as...", yes, these exceptions are what I was talking about. I think, Goedel´s Incompleteness Theorem even is the justification for democracy: No king can have complete information about the system he governs, because he is part of it. Incomplete information is not-knowledge is belief. Belief has to be handled democraticly, because the belief of one person may be erratic. Isn´t that great, to have a relevant mathematical piece of advice for politics??  Happy Christmas, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 03:09 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:



Helmut, List:
 

I am still having trouble following you here. Intuitionistic logic does not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as a formal system for drawing valid deductive inferences such that the conclusion is true as long as the premisses are true. Its main difference from classical logic is that the negation of a false proposition is not necessarily true, such that proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum) is invalid. Again, Gödel's theorems also do not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as demonstrations that certain kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal system.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 3:50 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Jon, List,

 

the fallacy of intuitionistic logic in my hypothesis is, that it first includes belief into the concept of truth, then sees, that belief is not two-valued, and then denies the law of the excluded middle for both. But the NOT-operator can only be applied for truth-problems, and so for knowledge-problems, not for belief-problems. It is meant like that.

 

The fallacy is based on the hypothesis, that truth in general is not detectable. But I think, that Steven has shown with Goedel, that there is a clear, noncontinuous distinction between belief and truth, meaning, that truth exists, the only thing, that the NOT-operator applies to, due to the agreement about this symbol.

 

The clear distinction -mathematically proven by Goedel-  between belief and truth is, that, if the proposition is about a system the propositioner is part of, it must be belief, and therefore (I think), if the propositioner is not part of the proposition´s object, the proposition may be true or false, such as: "This bucket is made of zinc.". 

 

Even if it was so, that intuitionalistic logic would admit, that it throws belief and knowledge (of truth) in one basket, this would be a performative fallacy, because, since there is a clear distinction between both, and both exist, blending both together, and widening the symbolic meaning of the NOT-operator, is an unnecessary, confusing thing to do.

At least, they should not use the NOT-operator, but invent a new one, such as MNOT (maybe not), like Peirce has done with not using the normal cut, but a dotted cut for insecurity-problems.

 

Best, Helmut















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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon,

 

you wrote "except as...", yes, these exceptions are what I was talking about. I think, Goedel´s Incompleteness Theorem even is the justification for democracy: No king can have complete information about the system he governs, because he is part of it. Incomplete information is not-knowledge is belief. Belief has to be handled democraticly, because the belief of one person may be erratic. Isn´t that great, to have a relevant mathematical piece of advice for politics??  Happy Christmas, Helmut

 
 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 03:09 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Helmut, List:
 

I am still having trouble following you here. Intuitionistic logic does not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as a formal system for drawing valid deductive inferences such that the conclusion is true as long as the premisses are true. Its main difference from classical logic is that the negation of a false proposition is not necessarily true, such that proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum) is invalid. Again, Gödel's theorems also do not have anything to do with belief or truth, except as demonstrations that certain kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal system.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Dec 24, 2020 at 3:50 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Jon, List,

 

the fallacy of intuitionistic logic in my hypothesis is, that it first includes belief into the concept of truth, then sees, that belief is not two-valued, and then denies the law of the excluded middle for both. But the NOT-operator can only be applied for truth-problems, and so for knowledge-problems, not for belief-problems. It is meant like that.

 

The fallacy is based on the hypothesis, that truth in general is not detectable. But I think, that Steven has shown with Goedel, that there is a clear, noncontinuous distinction between belief and truth, meaning, that truth exists, the only thing, that the NOT-operator applies to, due to the agreement about this symbol.

 

The clear distinction -mathematically proven by Goedel-  between belief and truth is, that, if the proposition is about a system the propositioner is part of, it must be belief, and therefore (I think), if the propositioner is not part of the proposition´s object, the proposition may be true or false, such as: "This bucket is made of zinc.". 

 

Even if it was so, that intuitionalistic logic would admit, that it throws belief and knowledge (of truth) in one basket, this would be a performative fallacy, because, since there is a clear distinction between both, and both exist, blending both together, and widening the symbolic meaning of the NOT-operator, is an unnecessary, confusing thing to do.

At least, they should not use the NOT-operator, but invent a new one, such as MNOT (maybe not), like Peirce has done with not using the normal cut, but a dotted cut for insecurity-problems.

 

Best, Helmut









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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 


John, Jon,

 

Thank you! My first idea is, that to negate each step and reverse the order only is valid with the excluded middle, so exclusion of the  middle should be necessary for both ways of proof too. But I will read your links, thank you for your patience! I think, the concept of truth is somewhat holy for me, and I saw it being blasphemically blurred by intuitionism, or something like that. But it is all about formalism, OK!

 

Happy Christmas, Helmut

 

 25. Dezember 2020 um 06:16 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Helmut,

I basically agree with the short summary by JAS in his last note, but there are some related issues that I'd like to add.

The first point is that Brouwer, the founder of intuitionistic logic, was a mathematician, and he did not generalize his arguments beyond formal mathematical issues.  For all the gory details and citations, see the Stanford article: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/ 

Second, intuitionism is a special case of constructivism:  the preference for a constructive proof that begins with a hypothesis and some appropriate axioms and constructs a proof.

The opposite of a constructive proof is a proof by contradiction:  start with the proposed theorem, negate it, and derive a contradiction.  Most mathematicians will accept a proof by contradiction, but they prefer a constructive proof.

One of the very nice properties of Peirce's rules of inference, as he stated them in 1911 is that every proof by contradiction can be converted to a constructive proof by a very simple method:  negate each step of the proof and reverse the order.

For an explanation and demonstration of that point, see the attached file NatDeduction.pdf  -- it's just one page from an article I'm writing.

That page is from Section 6 of an article that says a lot more about Peirce's EGs and rules of inference.  Anyone who would like a review of those issues, see the tutorial http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf .

That file has 53 slides, but the first 10 slides are sufficient for an overview of the notation.  If you're already familiar with the notation, skip to slide 31 through 35.  That is sufficient background to understand the one-page discussion in NatDeduction.pdf.

And by the way, this example is just one of many reasons for preferring Peirce's 1911 version of EGs.  It has just 3 pairs of rules of inference, which are very easily reversible.  In 1906, he stated 11 rules, for which reversibility is possible, but only with a great deal of complexity.

John

 




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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

uiry. The dynamical object of that "ultimate interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904) is reality, that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. Also, fuzzy logic is not the same as intuitionistic logic, it ventures even farther away from classical logic by positing multiple truth values rather than merely omitting excluded middle.

 




HR: So I, up to now, assume, that intuitionistic logic is a fallacy.




 

What would it mean for intuitionistic logic to be a fallacy? In accordance with what presumed standard of valid reasoning? No one disputes that it does not conform to classical logic since that is pretty much the whole point of it. It might help for you to spell out how you are defining "intuitionistic logic" in this context.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 12:35 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:






Correction: I guess I meant "operator" instead of "quantor". I am not a certified logician.



Steven,

 

yes, I nearly totally agree. Interesting, that Goedel said that. An observer cannot know the onologic state of a system the observer is part of. Then calling it knowledge is false, it is belief. Truth can only justifiedly be assumed about a system the observer is not part of, like a thing. This can be analysed. A system the observer is part of can not be merely analysed by him, any investigation partially is a synthesis too. This cannot lead to truth, but only to belief, that can be more and more fixated with the ways Peirce showed. One exception, according to Kant, might be some synthetic statements a-priori, like the Categorical Imperative. This is an open question.

 

I think, belief and truth are two different either-or-categories, so there is no percentage of truth. A hypothesis about a system the observer is part of, must be falsifiable, said Popper too. Either it is belief or truth. To apply the NOT-quantor for belief, is a fallacy. It only applies to truth. "believes that" must not be a quantor or a cut, but written between them as text, is what I think. So I, up to now, assume, that intuitionistic logic is a fallacy.

 

Best, Helmut



 23. Dezember 2020 um 17:07 Uhr
 "Skaggs,Steven" <s.ska...@louisville.edu>


Helmut,

 

I think I follow. You guys are clearly expert logicians, but it is easy to get so far into the weeds the way out is lost forever.

 

Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. 

 

Yes. Logic can kill you. About the world we live in, we're all "believers that" and "knowers not" even if we think and say we are "knowers that”. (Where “belief” is an understanding one's prepared to act on.)

 

Here’s how I think of it… the word “to know” is already assuming some position, from an imputed independent vantage point, outside the system. But with big questions, how do you step outside the system (reality) to make the judgement? One can never know with infallibility the state of ontology if the knower is within the system ("that what is") under consideration, right? I think that was shown by Goedel, right? 

 

In terms of logic and the big questions, don’t we live more in a state of "fuzzy logic" where things have likelihoods — percentages of truth? And then things begin to feel pretty intuitionistic.

 

SxS

 



On Dec 23, 2020, at 9:05 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:








Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups: Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class, weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong negation makes deniers a class. The knowledge values classify three groups too: Affirmation makes knowers a class, weak negation not-knowers, and strong negation knowers-that-not. With knowledge to each value is assigned one group each, while with belief, to the weak negation two groups are assigned. Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. About one certain object there can be only either affirmation-knowers, and weak negation-not-knowers (e.g. about the colour red), or weak-negation-not-knowers, and strong-negation-knowers-that-not (e.g. about unicorns). So, knowledge is, other than belief, in general three-valued, but for an instance two-valued. Therefore it is closer than belief related with truth, which is two-valued both in general and in the instances.

List,



 

For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitioni

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Correction: I guess I meant "operator" instead of "quantor". I am not a certified logician.



Steven,

 

yes, I nearly totally agree. Interesting, that Goedel said that. An observer cannot know the onologic state of a system the observer is part of. Then calling it knowledge is false, it is belief. Truth can only justifiedly be assumed about a system the observer is not part of, like a thing. This can be analysed. A system the observer is part of can not be merely analysed by him, any investigation partially is a synthesis too. This cannot lead to truth, but only to belief, that can be more and more fixated with the ways Peirce showed. One exception, according to Kant, might be some synthetic statements a-priori, like the Categorical Imperative. This is an open question.

 

I think, belief and truth are two different either-or-categories, so there is no percentage of truth. A hypothesis about a system the observer is part of, must be falsifiable, said Popper too. Either it is belief or truth. To apply the NOT-quantor for belief, is a fallacy. It only applies to truth. "believes that" must not be a quantor or a cut, but written between them as text, is what I think. So I, up to now, assume, that intuitionistic logic is a fallacy.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Dezember 2020 um 17:07 Uhr
 "Skaggs,Steven" 
 


Helmut,

 

I think I follow. You guys are clearly expert logicians, but it is easy to get so far into the weeds the way out is lost forever.

 

Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. 

 

Yes. Logic can kill you. About the world we live in, we're all "believers that" and "knowers not" even if we think and say we are "knowers that”. (Where “belief” is an understanding one's prepared to act on.)

 

Here’s how I think of it… the word “to know” is already assuming some position, from an imputed independent vantage point, outside the system. But with big questions, how do you step outside the system (reality) to make the judgement? One can never know with infallibility the state of ontology if the knower is within the system ("that what is") under consideration, right? I think that was shown by Goedel, right? 

 

In terms of logic and the big questions, don’t we live more in a state of "fuzzy logic" where things have likelihoods — percentages of truth? And then things begin to feel pretty intuitionistic.

 

SxS

 

 

 

 


 
On Dec 23, 2020, at 9:05 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



CAUTION: This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the contents are safe.

 



 

 
 

Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups: Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class, weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong negation makes deniers a class. The knowledge values classify three groups too: Affirmation makes knowers a class, weak negation not-knowers, and strong negation knowers-that-not. With knowledge to each value is assigned one group each, while with belief, to the weak negation two groups are assigned. Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. About one certain object there can be only either affirmation-knowers, and weak negation-not-knowers (e.g. about the colour red), or weak-negation-not-knowers, and strong-negation-knowers-that-not (e.g. about unicorns). So, knowledge is, other than belief, in general three-valued, but for an instance two-valued. Therefore it is closer than belief related with truth, which is two-valued both in general and in the instances.

 



List,

 

For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout handling concepts?

 

If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And it can easily, by induction, be refuted: Nature has worked due to natural laws based on mathematic laws before these laws have been proved by humans or aliens, yet at a time before there were stars and possibility of life of e.g. mathematicians concerned with proofs. You can see that with a telescope.

 

If it is the weak negation, I think it can be shown, that the weak negation applies to e.g. belief or knowledge, but not to existence or nonexistence, that is truth or falsity. What is true, is true throughout the whole universe, and what is not true, is false. "I don´t believe that A exists" (weak negation) is not the same as "I believe, that A does not exist" (strong negation). B

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

Steven,

 

yes, I nearly totally agree. Interesting, that Goedel said that. An observer cannot know the onologic state of a system the observer is part of. Then calling it knowledge is false, it is belief. Truth can only justifiedly be assumed about a system the observer is not part of, like a thing. This can be analysed. A system the observer is part of can not be merely analysed by him, any investigation partially is a synthesis too. This cannot lead to truth, but only to belief, that can be more and more fixated with the ways Peirce showed. One exception, according to Kant, might be some synthetic statements a-priori, like the Categorical Imperative. This is an open question.

 

I think, belief and truth are two different either-or-categories, so there is no percentage of truth. A hypothesis about a system the observer is part of, must be falsifiable, said Popper too. Either it is belief or truth. To apply the NOT-quantor for belief, is a fallacy. It only applies to truth. "believes that" must not be a quantor or a cut, but written between them as text, is what I think. So I, up to now, assume, that intuitionistic logic is a fallacy.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Dezember 2020 um 17:07 Uhr
 "Skaggs,Steven" 
 


Helmut,

 

I think I follow. You guys are clearly expert logicians, but it is easy to get so far into the weeds the way out is lost forever.

 

Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. 

 

Yes. Logic can kill you. About the world we live in, we're all "believers that" and "knowers not" even if we think and say we are "knowers that”. (Where “belief” is an understanding one's prepared to act on.)

 

Here’s how I think of it… the word “to know” is already assuming some position, from an imputed independent vantage point, outside the system. But with big questions, how do you step outside the system (reality) to make the judgement? One can never know with infallibility the state of ontology if the knower is within the system ("that what is") under consideration, right? I think that was shown by Goedel, right? 

 

In terms of logic and the big questions, don’t we live more in a state of "fuzzy logic" where things have likelihoods — percentages of truth? And then things begin to feel pretty intuitionistic.

 

SxS

 

 

 

 


 
On Dec 23, 2020, at 9:05 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



CAUTION: This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the contents are safe.

 



 

 
 

Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups: Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class, weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong negation makes deniers a class. The knowledge values classify three groups too: Affirmation makes knowers a class, weak negation not-knowers, and strong negation knowers-that-not. With knowledge to each value is assigned one group each, while with belief, to the weak negation two groups are assigned. Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. About one certain object there can be only either affirmation-knowers, and weak negation-not-knowers (e.g. about the colour red), or weak-negation-not-knowers, and strong-negation-knowers-that-not (e.g. about unicorns). So, knowledge is, other than belief, in general three-valued, but for an instance two-valued. Therefore it is closer than belief related with truth, which is two-valued both in general and in the instances.

 



List,

 

For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout handling concepts?

 

If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And it can easily, by induction, be refuted: Nature has worked due to natural laws based on mathematic laws before these laws have been proved by humans or aliens, yet at a time before there were stars and possibility of life of e.g. mathematicians concerned with proofs. You can see that with a telescope.

 

If it is the weak negation, I think it can be shown, that the weak negation applies to e.g. belief or knowledge, but not to existence or nonexistence, that is truth or falsity. What is true, is true throughout the whole universe, and what is not true, is false. "I don´t believe that A exists" (weak negation) is not the same as "I believe, that A does not exist" (strong negation). But there is no difference between "A is not true" and "A is false".

 

If it is about handling concepts, the 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups: Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class, weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong negation makes deniers a class. The knowledge values classify three groups too: Affirmation makes knowers a class, weak negation not-knowers, and strong negation knowers-that-not. With knowledge to each value is assigned one group each, while with belief, to the weak negation two groups are assigned. Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic. About one certain object there can be only either affirmation-knowers, and weak negation-not-knowers (e.g. about the colour red), or weak-negation-not-knowers, and strong-negation-knowers-that-not (e.g. about unicorns). So, knowledge is, other than belief, in general three-valued, but for an instance two-valued. Therefore it is closer than belief related with truth, which is two-valued both in general and in the instances.

 



List,

 

For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout handling concepts?

 

If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And it can easily, by induction, be refuted: Nature has worked due to natural laws based on mathematic laws before these laws have been proved by humans or aliens, yet at a time before there were stars and possibility of life of e.g. mathematicians concerned with proofs. You can see that with a telescope.

 

If it is the weak negation, I think it can be shown, that the weak negation applies to e.g. belief or knowledge, but not to existence or nonexistence, that is truth or falsity. What is true, is true throughout the whole universe, and what is not true, is false. "I don´t believe that A exists" (weak negation) is not the same as "I believe, that A does not exist" (strong negation). But there is no difference between "A is not true" and "A is false".

 

If it is about handling concepts, the justification of intuitionstic logic would be a misunderstanding due to inaccurate language: "For atheists, God does not exist" is inaccurate. It means: "For atheists, it seems, that God does not exist". This is not existence, but belief. "For cows, the concept of the colour red does not exist" means: "Cows do not share the concept of the colour red", or "Cows don´t know the concept of the colour red". This does not mean, that the shape of a cow has got the ability to punch a hole out of the colour-concept´s existence domain, which is the universe. This example too is not about existence, but in this case about knowledge.

 

The example I earlier gave, about somebody talking about a concept in another universe, is absurd, because information cannot travel between universes.

 

So I wonder, what justifies intuitionistic logic.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Dezember 2020 um 05:37 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon, List, 

I have a high regard for the work that Ahti and Francesco have been doing, and I read the article you cited (copy of the reference below).  They have been doing meticulous scholarship on the development of Peirce's EGs up to 1911. But unfortunately, they overlooked the implications of those five MSS from 1911.

While Peirce was writing the three EG rules of inference around 8 pm on 2 June 1911, he suddenly realized that the rules depend *only* on whether an area is positive or negative.  There is nothing special about a scroll.

To see the difference, do a detailed comparison of R669 and R670.    After June 2, everything depends on whether an area is shaded or unshaded.  In R670, the primitives are existence, conjunction, and negation,  The scroll is just a convenient way to draw two ovals without raising the pen.

There is much more to say, but I'm short on time.

John

---

JAS> I have been thinking about writing an article on this topic myself, but it turns out that Bellucci and Pietarinen already covered a lot of the relevant ground in a 2016 paper (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275038453_Existential_Graphs_as_an_Instrument_of_Logical_Analysis_Part_1_Alpha). Here are a few especially pertinent excerpts, which are entirely consistent with what I have been advocating all along.

 









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[PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic, WAS: Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout handling concepts?

 

If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And it can easily, by induction, be refuted: Nature has worked due to natural laws based on mathematic laws before these laws have been proved by humans or aliens, yet at a time before there were stars and possibility of life of e.g. mathematicians concerned with proofs. You can see that with a telescope.

 

If it is the weak negation, I think it can be shown, that the weak negation applies to e.g. belief or knowledge, but not to existence or nonexistence, that is truth or falsity. What is true, is true throughout the whole universe, and what is not true, is false. "I don´t believe that A exists" (weak negation) is not the same as "I believe, that A does not exist" (strong negation). But there is no difference between "A is not true" and "A is false".

 

If it is about handling concepts, the justification of intuitionstic logic would be a misunderstanding due to inaccurate language: "For atheists, God does not exist" is inaccurate. It means: "For atheists, it seems, that God does not exist". This is not existence, but belief. "For cows, the concept of the colour red does not exist" means: "Cows do not share the concept of the colour red", or "Cows don´t know the concept of the colour red". This does not mean, that the shape of a cow has got the ability to punch a hole out of the colour-concept´s existence domain, which is the universe. This example too is not about existence, but in this case about knowledge.

 

The example I earlier gave, about somebody talking about a concept in another universe, is absurd, because information cannot travel between universes.

 

So I wonder, what justifies intuitionistic logic.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Dezember 2020 um 05:37 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon, List, 

I have a high regard for the work that Ahti and Francesco have been doing, and I read the article you cited (copy of the reference below).  They have been doing meticulous scholarship on the development of Peirce's EGs up to 1911. But unfortunately, they overlooked the implications of those five MSS from 1911.

While Peirce was writing the three EG rules of inference around 8 pm on 2 June 1911, he suddenly realized that the rules depend *only* on whether an area is positive or negative.  There is nothing special about a scroll.

To see the difference, do a detailed comparison of R669 and R670.    After June 2, everything depends on whether an area is shaded or unshaded.  In R670, the primitives are existence, conjunction, and negation,  The scroll is just a convenient way to draw two ovals without raising the pen.

There is much more to say, but I'm short on time.

John

---

JAS> I have been thinking about writing an article on this topic myself, but it turns out that Bellucci and Pietarinen already covered a lot of the relevant ground in a 2016 paper (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275038453_Existential_Graphs_as_an_Instrument_of_Logical_Analysis_Part_1_Alpha). Here are a few especially pertinent excerpts, which are entirely consistent with what I have been advocating all along.

 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ â–º PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . â–º To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . â–º PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

 



 

 
 

Supp-supplement: Sorry, in my previous two posts I had gotten confused. I try again (everybody may try three times, isnt it?)

Quotation marks indicate a concept, minusses indicate a quotation. About his own universe, a propositioner cannot justifiedly, nonparadoxically, say: -There is no "no A"-, because by having uttered this, the concept "no A" does exist in his universe.

But, if he talks about another universe he does not live in, in which neither horses, nor the concept of them exist, he may truly say: -There is no "no horses"-.

If there, in that remote universe, the concept "B" does not exist, neither B can exist, because if B would exist, the concept "B" too would exist, at least for this universe (universes have minds, and thus concepts about all that they consist of). So from -There is no "no horses"- (with "no horses" being "B") follows -There is no no horses-. In classical logic this would mean, that there are horses. But there are not. So, in this case, with the propositioner speaking of a universe he does not live in, the double negation is something else than affirmation.

I wonder, is this an example of intuitive versus classical logic, or have I only blended in something like the difference between passive and active negation?

Please forget the rest, from here on

---

Supplement: My deduction in the middle of the second paragraph is false. It is only true, if we assume, that a concept is constructed by existence- or by making up: It might be, that in the universe in which no horses exist, people have made up the concept of them nayway, as it might be, that another universe exists, in which unicorns exist. So the claim is, that in the universe in talk neither horses, nor a made-up concept of them exist. But the basic claim is, that a concept, an idea, merely exists, if it is constructed. But another view is thinkable, a quasi-Platonian one: It would say, that all ideas exist, as think-possibilities. This is becoming quite complicated, and I am losing the oveall view.



 


Jon, Gary, List,

 

I didnt get a feeling so far about intuistic logic, the not excluded middle and the double negation being something else than the non-existent negation. All I can do, is reconstruct these ideas with my own thoughts, otherwise I cannot understand them. I am very interested in your opinions whether my thoughts are in accordance with yours or Peirce´s:

 

If the proposer exists in a universe, in which the concept of A exists, the middle is excluded, and the double negation is the same as no negation. But if the proposer talks about a universe he does not live in, but knows, that in that universe a concept "A" of A, let´s say "horses" does not exists, if he says "There is no horses", that is true, but if he says "There is no "no horses"", that is false, because, as there is no concept of horses, there cannot be a concept of no horses. Something, of which no concept exists, can itself not exist, because existence is self-conceptualizing: At least the universe itself has a concept of something that exists in it. So from "There is no "no horses"" follows "there is not not horses", but this second proposition cannot mean that there are horses, because there aren´t. So, to talk about a universe the proposer does not live in requires intuistic logic, and classical logic does not apply.

 

So, a complete logic would require quotation marks. Only in classical logic, which applies to the universe the proposer lives in, these can be left out. But the consequence is, that classical logic is a subset of intuistic logic, and not the other way round, as I have understood it from Wikipedia.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

21. Dezember 2020 um 06:35 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Gary F, List,

Peirce's immense volume of writings is a mixture of systematic developments in the sciences (which include philosophy) and many
"occasional" remarks that can be as puzzling as Zen koans.

GF> Consequence comes before negation.

That is a technical point from one stage in the development of Peirce's systems of logic.

GF> I hadn’t really considered that a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. . I wonder which
case applies to this early (18) remark
of Peirce’s: “The individual man, since his separate existence is
manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart
from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a
negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317). Either? Both? Neither?

A dyadic logical operator (And, Or, If) can be symmetric or asymmetric.  But the criteria for symmetry are not meaningful for a monadic operator such as Not.

But when a logical operator is applied to people, as in the quotation from EP 1:55, it is a metaphor whose interpretation depends entirely on the context of the text and Peirce's thoughts at the moment.

But context is also important for interpreting Peirce's scientific w

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: My deduction in the middle of the second paragraph is false. It is only true, if we assume, that a concept is constructed by existence- or by making up: It might be, that in the universe in which no horses exist, people have made up the concept of them nayway, as it might be, that another universe exists, in which unicorns exist. So the claim is, that in the universe in talk neither horses, nor a made-up concept of them exist. But the basic claim is, that a concept, an idea, merely exists, if it is constructed. But another view is thinkable, a quasi-Platonian one: It would say, that all ideas exist, as think-possibilities. This is becoming quite complicated, and I am losing the oveall view.



 


Jon, Gary, List,

 

I didnt get a feeling so far about intuistic logic, the not excluded middle and the double negation being something else than the non-existent negation. All I can do, is reconstruct these ideas with my own thoughts, otherwise I cannot understand them. I am very interested in your opinions whether my thoughts are in accordance with yours or Peirce´s:

 

If the proposer exists in a universe, in which the concept of A exists, the middle is excluded, and the double negation is the same as no negation. But if the proposer talks about a universe he does not live in, but knows, that in that universe a concept "A" of A, let´s say "horses" does not exists, if he says "There is no horses", that is true, but if he says "There is no "no horses"", that is false, because, as there is no concept of horses, there cannot be a concept of no horses. Something, of which no concept exists, can itself not exist, because existence is self-conceptualizing: At least the universe itself has a concept of something that exists in it. So from "There is no "no horses"" follows "there is not not horses", but this second proposition cannot mean that there are horses, because there aren´t. So, to talk about a universe the proposer does not live in requires intuistic logic, and classical logic does not apply.

 

So, a complete logic would require quotation marks. Only in classical logic, which applies to the universe the proposer lives in, these can be left out. But the consequence is, that classical logic is a subset of intuistic logic, and not the other way round, as I have understood it from Wikipedia.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

21. Dezember 2020 um 06:35 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Gary F, List,

Peirce's immense volume of writings is a mixture of systematic developments in the sciences (which include philosophy) and many
"occasional" remarks that can be as puzzling as Zen koans.

GF> Consequence comes before negation.

That is a technical point from one stage in the development of Peirce's systems of logic.

GF> I hadn’t really considered that a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. . I wonder which
case applies to this early (18) remark
of Peirce’s: “The individual man, since his separate existence is
manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart
from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a
negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317). Either? Both? Neither?

A dyadic logical operator (And, Or, If) can be symmetric or asymmetric.  But the criteria for symmetry are not meaningful for a monadic operator such as Not.

But when a logical operator is applied to people, as in the quotation from EP 1:55, it is a metaphor whose interpretation depends entirely on the context of the text and Peirce's thoughts at the moment.

But context is also important for interpreting Peirce's scientific writings. The idea that consequence comes before negation happened to be the original insight for the scroll in the initial development of entitative and existential graphs (1896-1897).

He toyed with that idea for a few years.  But in June 1911, he switched his choice of logical primitives to And, Not, and Existence. The symmetric operator And can be combined with Not to define the asymmetric If-Then:  "If p then q" is identical to "Not(p And (Not q))".

There was a long thread about these issues a few months ago.  For a summary, see the attached file eg1911x.pdf.  That is a screen shot from an article I'm writing.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ â–º PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . â–º To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . â–º PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.




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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jon, Gary, List,

 

I didnt get a feeling so far about intuistic logic, the not excluded middle and the double negation being something else than the non-existent negation. All I can do, is reconstruct these ideas with my own thoughts, otherwise I cannot understand them. I am very interested in your opinions whether my thoughts are in accordance with yours or Peirce´s:

 

If the proposer exists in a universe, in which the concept of A exists, the middle is excluded, and the double negation is the same as no negation. But if the proposer talks about a universe he does not live in, but knows, that in that universe a concept "A" of A, let´s say "horses" does not exists, if he says "There is no horses", that is true, but if he says "There is no "no horses"", that is false, because, as there is no concept of horses, there cannot be a concept of no horses. Something, of which no concept exists, can itself not exist, because existence is self-conceptualizing: At least the universe itself has a concept of something that exists in it. So from "There is no "no horses"" follows "there is not not horses", but this second proposition cannot mean that there are horses, because there aren´t. So, to talk about a universe the proposer does not live in requires intuistic logic, and classical logic does not apply.

 

So, a complete logic would require quotation marks. Only in classical logic, which applies to the universe the proposer lives in, these can be left out. But the consequence is, that classical logic is a subset of intuistic logic, and not the other way round, as I have understood it from Wikipedia.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

21. Dezember 2020 um 06:35 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Gary F, List,

Peirce's immense volume of writings is a mixture of systematic developments in the sciences (which include philosophy) and many
"occasional" remarks that can be as puzzling as Zen koans.

GF> Consequence comes before negation.

That is a technical point from one stage in the development of Peirce's systems of logic.

GF> I hadn’t really considered that a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. . I wonder which
case applies to this early (18) remark
of Peirce’s: “The individual man, since his separate existence is
manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart
from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a
negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317). Either? Both? Neither?

A dyadic logical operator (And, Or, If) can be symmetric or asymmetric.  But the criteria for symmetry are not meaningful for a monadic operator such as Not.

But when a logical operator is applied to people, as in the quotation from EP 1:55, it is a metaphor whose interpretation depends entirely on the context of the text and Peirce's thoughts at the moment.

But context is also important for interpreting Peirce's scientific writings. The idea that consequence comes before negation happened to be the original insight for the scroll in the initial development of entitative and existential graphs (1896-1897).

He toyed with that idea for a few years.  But in June 1911, he switched his choice of logical primitives to And, Not, and Existence. The symmetric operator And can be combined with Not to define the asymmetric If-Then:  "If p then q" is identical to "Not(p And (Not q))".

There was a long thread about these issues a few months ago.  For a summary, see the attached file eg1911x.pdf.  That is a screen shot from an article I'm writing.

John
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

supplement: The missing line break has been there before, I think. So, I guess, that I should delete the impressum copies except the first?



 

(test2:) Oh no, deleting both impressum tails leads to no line break! Now I have only deleted the second impressum tail, the one that my post has caused.
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Dezember 2020 um 10:52 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: baud...@gmail.com
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)



Thank you, Ben! This is just a test, to see, whether it is my email program, that produces the junk-stuff.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. Dezember 2020 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Ben Udell" 
An: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)


Hi, all.  Here's an example. I've pruned off all the extra stuff (most of the 439 KB of the previous message).  Please continue from here.  

Best regards,
Ben Udell
Co-manager with Gary Richmond
PEIRCE-L

On 12/17/2020 3:55 PM, Skaggs,Steven wrote:


H&E,

Differences in how far we extend words and categories and metaphorical uses of them is often a problem in discourse. Perhaps we experience some of that here?

I really appreciate Helmut’s contributions as he tries to reconcile E and my views. Perhaps we are not complete antagonists, just have different thresholds for the use of certain terms.

SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 1:40 PM, Skaggs,Steven <s.ska...@louisville.edu> wrote:


Thanks, Edwina. A lot of the problem has to do with discerning scales and other kinds of boundaries, i.e. phylogenic from ontogenic. The division of scales of any sort, even splitting the rainbow into 4, 6 or 8 colors, is difficult. I agree with what you're saying about adaptation, a word that sits more comfortably for me here than inductive reasoning. It is local in the sense of being an interactive feedback response between organism and environmental context, both of which may change through time. Don’t know about "reject random mutation as a means of dealing with environmental challenge", though. Seems that pressure from threatening conditions would greatly favor those individuals that differ in ways that defer or blunt the pressure. And, short of conscious agency (for example, on the part of social groups who could indeed use inference), most biological forms would probably blindly fall into the sweet spot — or become extinct. —SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 12:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.













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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

(test2:) Oh no, deleting both impressum tails leads to no line break! Now I have only deleted the second impressum tail, the one that my post has caused.
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Dezember 2020 um 10:52 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: baud...@gmail.com
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)



Thank you, Ben! This is just a test, to see, whether it is my email program, that produces the junk-stuff.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. Dezember 2020 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Ben Udell" 
An: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)


Hi, all.  Here's an example. I've pruned off all the extra stuff (most of the 439 KB of the previous message).  Please continue from here.  

Best regards,
Ben Udell
Co-manager with Gary Richmond
PEIRCE-L

On 12/17/2020 3:55 PM, Skaggs,Steven wrote:


H&E,

Differences in how far we extend words and categories and metaphorical uses of them is often a problem in discourse. Perhaps we experience some of that here?

I really appreciate Helmut’s contributions as he tries to reconcile E and my views. Perhaps we are not complete antagonists, just have different thresholds for the use of certain terms.

SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 1:40 PM, Skaggs,Steven <s.ska...@louisville.edu> wrote:


Thanks, Edwina. A lot of the problem has to do with discerning scales and other kinds of boundaries, i.e. phylogenic from ontogenic. The division of scales of any sort, even splitting the rainbow into 4, 6 or 8 colors, is difficult. I agree with what you're saying about adaptation, a word that sits more comfortably for me here than inductive reasoning. It is local in the sense of being an interactive feedback response between organism and environmental context, both of which may change through time. Don’t know about "reject random mutation as a means of dealing with environmental challenge", though. Seems that pressure from threatening conditions would greatly favor those individuals that differ in ways that defer or blunt the pressure. And, short of conscious agency (for example, on the part of social groups who could indeed use inference), most biological forms would probably blindly fall into the sweet spot — or become extinct. —SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 12:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.








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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

(test:) Yes, it always adds the impressum tail again. Now I have deleted both impressum tails before sending. Should I always do so?

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Dezember 2020 um 10:52 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
An: baud...@gmail.com
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)



Thank you, Ben! This is just a test, to see, whether it is my email program, that produces the junk-stuff.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. Dezember 2020 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Ben Udell" 
An: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)


Hi, all.  Here's an example. I've pruned off all the extra stuff (most of the 439 KB of the previous message).  Please continue from here.  

Best regards,
Ben Udell
Co-manager with Gary Richmond
PEIRCE-L

On 12/17/2020 3:55 PM, Skaggs,Steven wrote:


H&E,

Differences in how far we extend words and categories and metaphorical uses of them is often a problem in discourse. Perhaps we experience some of that here?

I really appreciate Helmut’s contributions as he tries to reconcile E and my views. Perhaps we are not complete antagonists, just have different thresholds for the use of certain terms.

SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 1:40 PM, Skaggs,Steven <s.ska...@louisville.edu> wrote:


Thanks, Edwina. A lot of the problem has to do with discerning scales and other kinds of boundaries, i.e. phylogenic from ontogenic. The division of scales of any sort, even splitting the rainbow into 4, 6 or 8 colors, is difficult. I agree with what you're saying about adaptation, a word that sits more comfortably for me here than inductive reasoning. It is local in the sense of being an interactive feedback response between organism and environmental context, both of which may change through time. Don’t know about "reject random mutation as a means of dealing with environmental challenge", though. Seems that pressure from threatening conditions would greatly favor those individuals that differ in ways that defer or blunt the pressure. And, short of conscious agency (for example, on the part of social groups who could indeed use inference), most biological forms would probably blindly fall into the sweet spot — or become extinct. —SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 12:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:












_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Ben! This is just a test, to see, whether it is my email program, that produces the junk-stuff.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. Dezember 2020 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Ben Udell" 
An: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)


Hi, all.  Here's an example. I've pruned off all the extra stuff (most of the 439 KB of the previous message).  Please continue from here.  

Best regards,
Ben Udell
Co-manager with Gary Richmond
PEIRCE-L

On 12/17/2020 3:55 PM, Skaggs,Steven wrote:


H&E,

Differences in how far we extend words and categories and metaphorical uses of them is often a problem in discourse. Perhaps we experience some of that here?

I really appreciate Helmut’s contributions as he tries to reconcile E and my views. Perhaps we are not complete antagonists, just have different thresholds for the use of certain terms.

SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 1:40 PM, Skaggs,Steven  wrote:


Thanks, Edwina. A lot of the problem has to do with discerning scales and other kinds of boundaries, i.e. phylogenic from ontogenic. The division of scales of any sort, even splitting the rainbow into 4, 6 or 8 colors, is difficult. I agree with what you're saying about adaptation, a word that sits more comfortably for me here than inductive reasoning. It is local in the sense of being an interactive feedback response between organism and environmental context, both of which may change through time. Don’t know about "reject random mutation as a means of dealing with environmental challenge", though. Seems that pressure from threatening conditions would greatly favor those individuals that differ in ways that defer or blunt the pressure. And, short of conscious agency (for example, on the part of social groups who could indeed use inference), most biological forms would probably blindly fall into the sweet spot — or become extinct. —SxS

On Dec 17, 2020, at 12:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I suggest leaving the question about mutation to the biologists. I mean the vast majority of them, which is not the creationist fraction, and also not the only-lamarckist-anti-darwinist fraction or whoever. Mind appears in the work of bees and crystals, but it is not the single bee´s or the single crystal´s mind. If there is abduction, it is weak emergence, universal mind, which you can always suggest. Induction has to do with counting, numerical, graduality, like a beak becoming bigger. Abduction is not gradual, but saltatory, like a completely new, not just amplified, hypothesis about something really (saltatorily too) surprising, not about something that merely gradually increases, like the hardness of seed shells. I think, consciousness is required for abduction. If the acting individual is the one who abducts, it has consciousness and a brain or at least some neurons, and it is strong-emergence-abduction. To investigate how mind works, and how and where it is being individuated, it is not helpful to always answer, that mind is there everywhere anyway, and so it is futile to have a closer look at it. It is everywhere OK, but nevertheless is it not a sin against the universe or against Peirce to want to get a more detailed analysis.

Best, Helmut

 
 

17. Dezember 2020 um 20:22 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Steven - I don't consider that adaptation is akin to induction. It's akin to abduction.

1] And I disagree with your comment about random mutation - which you seem to suggest is sufficient to provide a species with an adaptive capacity. As I pointed out, for the reasons of both statistical viability and conservation of energy, I consider that random offerings, so to speak, are insufficient and indeed, even dangerous, as a means of dealing with environmental pressures.

2] I will repeat yet again, Peirce's dictum. 4.551

"thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world".

that is - my point is that the biological organism - without a brain - let's just say a paramecium, much less a bird - is in informational interaction with its environment - and as such, comes up with constructive solutions to environmental challenges, within its organic and inorganic composition.

3] And no- this is not consciousness. Again, as Peirce pointed out, "consciousness is a special and not a universal, accompaniment of mind" 7.366

4]What is Mind?

"Mind has its universal mode of action, namely by final causationthe motions of a little creature show any purpose. If so, there is mind there. 1.269 

I note that there is no concept here of 'consciousness'. Rather, Peirce continues: "Passing from the little to the large, natural selection is the theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that is, to be governed by a quasi purpose. It suggests a machinery of efficiency to bring about the end"...and this end is the purpose or final cause.

That is, my view is that ALL matter [and I include the physic-chemical realm, but will refer here only to the biological']  functions within MIND, which is to say - matter functions logically, rationally, with a purpose, which is...to be matter, to not dissipate, to increase in complexity and diversity.

Therefore - adaptation and evolution are not random happenings, but MIND-produced actions, produced by local organisms in informational interaction with their local environment, to enable constructive continuity of that matter - whether in that particular form or in another form. Informational interaction does not require a brain nor consciousness. After all, trees are in constant informational interaction with their environment, producing pheromones when, for example, attacked by pests, that will attract birds etc to come to attack those pests. Producing sap to close water evaporation gaps, and so on.

Adaptive responses, requiring deeper biological changes, are, in my view, the result of information interactions with the environment, where the species will produce a new form - not randomly which is a waste of time and energy - but functionally, ie, one that will fulfil that 'final cause' function - and thus, change the beak size.

Edwina



 

On Thu 17/12/20 6:40 PM , "Skaggs,Steven" s.ska...@louisville.edu sent:

Thanks, Edwina. A lot of the problem has to do with discerning scales and other kinds of boundaries, i.e. phylogenic from ontogenic. The division of scales of any sort, even splitting the rainbow into 4, 6 or 8 colors, is difficult. I agree with what you're saying about adaptation, a word that sits more comfortably for me here than inductive reasoning. It is local in the sense of being an interactive feedback response between organism and environmental context, both of which may change through time. Don’t know about "reject random mutation as a means of dealing with environmental challenge", though. Seems that pressure from threatening conditions would greatly favor those individ

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 the concept might be stretched. 

 

Abduction is a hunch, an hypothesis. It focuses a set of tests, or it is a tentative, suggested solution to a problem, a reaching out and grasping at a potentially successful explanation. It is a Case in search of a Paradigm.

 

An example with beans. 

 

1) I’m a beanologist: I know what beans are. I’ve never seen a blue one before, but here is something in front of me that has a bean structure but is blue. Note that as a beanologist I hold the color to be an accidental trait of beans, and structure to be essential. So I deduce without doubt that the object in front of me is a bean. 

 

2) I’m not a beanologist: I have seen a lot of things in my lifetime called beans, but none of them have ever been blue. This object in front of me is like a bean (similarity) but also unlike a bean (it is blue). Using inductive reasoning, I expand my sense of bean-ness to include blue beans. 

 

3) I’m a gourmand chef and I love beans. In the market I am confronted by an unlabeled bin full of objects that look somewhat beanlike but do not smell or taste like beans I’ve had — and they’re blue. I abduce that they are a new food item grown only locally and I name them “Bleans”, take them back to New York and make a fortune at my restaurant!

 

 I will say that taking the development of a thicker bill to crack seeds is stretching my notion of abduction. 

 

Steven S.

 

 

 


 
On Dec 16, 2020, at 11:18 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



CAUTION: This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the contents are safe.

 



 


Edwina, I think this view (intelligent response, informed interacton) is called Lamarckism, has been refuted for a long time by Darwinism, but is since shortly restored in a weak form with the discovery of epigenetics.

With "perceived similarity" I meant a knowledge about similarity or identity of a thing that surprises, and another thing or class of things known. For example, in Peirces example, the similarity expressed with the name "beans" between the seen white beans, and the beans known to be in the bag.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 15. Dezember 2020 um 21:47 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 


Helmut - No, the beak is a NEW form, not the old form of the beak, and it developed in 'intelligent' response to the NEW harder seed shell. This is novelty; this is abduction.

Yes, mutations [new forms]  are the results of abduction.  And mutations are not necessarily random, but can be the new form developed as a result of 'informed interaction' by the organism with the environment.

I don't understand what you mean by 'perceived similarity' with regard to abduction.

Please remember that Peirce understood 'Mind' as operating within all of the Universe, both the inorganic and organic - and most certainly not confined to human beings.

Edwina



 

On Tue 15/12/20 3:20 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 


Edwina, ok, thoug I would say, the strengthening of the beak might also be seen as a kind of induction, because both the seed shell, and the beak have been there before, so there is no complete novelty nor total surprise. Maybe mutations are part of abduction? Though abduction might be seen as a guess with a reason, a hypothesis based on a real perceived similarity, while a mutation is rather a wild guess without a hypothesis? If in a forest there surprisingly occur carnivores that live on the ground, and a squirrel has due to a mutation a skin between its arms and legs, so it can glide from one tree to the other without going to the ground, it has an advantage. But the mutation is random. But maybe on a slow evolutuionary scale this might be interpreted as hypothesis? Or would such an interpretation be anthropo- or neurocentrism?

Best, Helmut

 

14. Dezember 2020 um 21:12 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - the point of abduction is the appearance of a novel situation - and the adjustment by an organism to that novelty by its development of a new hypothesis or law.

The organism - and I maintain this can be a plant, a cell, an insect, a human...interacting with the environment, receives input data that is novel to its system.[surprising fact is observed].  So- it adapts; it develops a new set of habits[ new hypothesis]  such that it can continue to live in that environment with that novel situation.

So- a bird adapts to new seeds that have developed harder shells by itself developing a harder beak.

I don't see that abduction means an 'awareness of resemblance'.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 14/12/20 2:46 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

t: I have seen a lot of things in my lifetime called beans, but none of them have ever been blue. This object in front of me is like a bean (similarity) but also unlike a bean (it is blue). Using inductive reasoning, I expand my sense of bean-ness to include blue beans. 

 

3) I’m a gourmand chef and I love beans. In the market I am confronted by an unlabeled bin full of objects that look somewhat beanlike but do not smell or taste like beans I’ve had — and they’re blue. I abduce that they are a new food item grown only locally and I name them “Bleans”, take them back to New York and make a fortune at my restaurant!

 

 I will say that taking the development of a thicker bill to crack seeds is stretching my notion of abduction. 

 

Steven S.

 

 

 


 
On Dec 16, 2020, at 11:18 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



CAUTION: This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the contents are safe.

 



 


Edwina, I think this view (intelligent response, informed interacton) is called Lamarckism, has been refuted for a long time by Darwinism, but is since shortly restored in a weak form with the discovery of epigenetics.

With "perceived similarity" I meant a knowledge about similarity or identity of a thing that surprises, and another thing or class of things known. For example, in Peirces example, the similarity expressed with the name "beans" between the seen white beans, and the beans known to be in the bag.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 15. Dezember 2020 um 21:47 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 


Helmut - No, the beak is a NEW form, not the old form of the beak, and it developed in 'intelligent' response to the NEW harder seed shell. This is novelty; this is abduction.

Yes, mutations [new forms]  are the results of abduction.  And mutations are not necessarily random, but can be the new form developed as a result of 'informed interaction' by the organism with the environment.

I don't understand what you mean by 'perceived similarity' with regard to abduction.

Please remember that Peirce understood 'Mind' as operating within all of the Universe, both the inorganic and organic - and most certainly not confined to human beings.

Edwina



 

On Tue 15/12/20 3:20 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 


Edwina, ok, thoug I would say, the strengthening of the beak might also be seen as a kind of induction, because both the seed shell, and the beak have been there before, so there is no complete novelty nor total surprise. Maybe mutations are part of abduction? Though abduction might be seen as a guess with a reason, a hypothesis based on a real perceived similarity, while a mutation is rather a wild guess without a hypothesis? If in a forest there surprisingly occur carnivores that live on the ground, and a squirrel has due to a mutation a skin between its arms and legs, so it can glide from one tree to the other without going to the ground, it has an advantage. But the mutation is random. But maybe on a slow evolutuionary scale this might be interpreted as hypothesis? Or would such an interpretation be anthropo- or neurocentrism?

Best, Helmut

 

14. Dezember 2020 um 21:12 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - the point of abduction is the appearance of a novel situation - and the adjustment by an organism to that novelty by its development of a new hypothesis or law.

The organism - and I maintain this can be a plant, a cell, an insect, a human...interacting with the environment, receives input data that is novel to its system.[surprising fact is observed].  So- it adapts; it develops a new set of habits[ new hypothesis]  such that it can continue to live in that environment with that novel situation.

So- a bird adapts to new seeds that have developed harder shells by itself developing a harder beak.

I don't see that abduction means an 'awareness of resemblance'.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 14/12/20 2:46 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction or awareness of resemblance. Please give me one example, in which this occurs besides the action of a neuronic network.



Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abdu

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, I think this view (intelligent response, informed interacton) is called Lamarckism, has been refuted for a long time by Darwinism, but is since shortly restored in a weak form with the discovery of epigenetics.

With "perceived similarity" I meant a knowledge about similarity or identity of a thing that surprises, and another thing or class of things known. For example, in Peirces example, the similarity expressed with the name "beans" between the seen white beans, and the beans known to be in the bag.

 

Best, Helmut

 

 15. Dezember 2020 um 21:47 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut - No, the beak is a NEW form, not the old form of the beak, and it developed in 'intelligent' response to the NEW harder seed shell. This is novelty; this is abduction.

Yes, mutations [new forms]  are the results of abduction.  And mutations are not necessarily random, but can be the new form developed as a result of 'informed interaction' by the organism with the environment.

I don't understand what you mean by 'perceived similarity' with regard to abduction.

Please remember that Peirce understood 'Mind' as operating within all of the Universe, both the inorganic and organic - and most certainly not confined to human beings.

Edwina



 

On Tue 15/12/20 3:20 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 


Edwina, ok, thoug I would say, the strengthening of the beak might also be seen as a kind of induction, because both the seed shell, and the beak have been there before, so there is no complete novelty nor total surprise. Maybe mutations are part of abduction? Though abduction might be seen as a guess with a reason, a hypothesis based on a real perceived similarity, while a mutation is rather a wild guess without a hypothesis? If in a forest there surprisingly occur carnivores that live on the ground, and a squirrel has due to a mutation a skin between its arms and legs, so it can glide from one tree to the other without going to the ground, it has an advantage. But the mutation is random. But maybe on a slow evolutuionary scale this might be interpreted as hypothesis? Or would such an interpretation be anthropo- or neurocentrism?

Best, Helmut

 

14. Dezember 2020 um 21:12 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - the point of abduction is the appearance of a novel situation - and the adjustment by an organism to that novelty by its development of a new hypothesis or law.

The organism - and I maintain this can be a plant, a cell, an insect, a human...interacting with the environment, receives input data that is novel to its system.[surprising fact is observed].  So- it adapts; it develops a new set of habits[ new hypothesis]  such that it can continue to live in that environment with that novel situation.

So- a bird adapts to new seeds that have developed harder shells by itself developing a harder beak.

I don't see that abduction means an 'awareness of resemblance'.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 14/12/20 2:46 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction or awareness of resemblance. Please give me one example, in which this occurs besides the action of a neuronic network.



Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abduction, where an aberration from the norm appears, and the Mind [and I consider that all matter including the inorganic,  functions within Mind] - can develop a new habit that incorporates this aberration as 'normal'. This has nothing to do with uncertainty. And nothing to do with 'need' [whatever that means].

I don't see induction as requiring final causality. I see induction merely as pure observation of 'what is existent'. Nothing to do with any 'need'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:55 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a netwo

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: Oops, my example was not good, because a squirrel has a brain. On the other hand, mutations are not controlled by the brain, as far as people know. But you cannot completely exclude, that epigenes, which are altered py the psyche, have an effect on mutations. Nobody claims so, I guess, but why not, to be found out later, it is not impossible. Anyway, in the plant realm there also are mutations and surprising facts, like a new bee suddenly appearing, and an orchid flower looking like this bee, due to a random mutation.



 


Edwina, ok, thoug I would say, the strengthening of the beak might also be seen as a kind of induction, because both the seed shell, and the beak have been there before, so there is no complete novelty nor total surprise. Maybe mutations are part of abduction? Though abduction might be seen as a guess with a reason, a hypothesis based on a real perceived similarity, while a mutation is rather a wild guess without a hypothesis? If in a forest there surprisingly occur carnivores that live on the ground, and a squirrel has due to a mutation a skin between its arms and legs, so it can glide from one tree to the other without going to the ground, it has an advantage. But the mutation is random. But maybe on a slow evolutuionary scale this might be interpreted as hypothesis? Or would such an interpretation be anthropo- or neurocentrism?

Best, Helmut

 

14. Dezember 2020 um 21:12 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - the point of abduction is the appearance of a novel situation - and the adjustment by an organism to that novelty by its development of a new hypothesis or law.

The organism - and I maintain this can be a plant, a cell, an insect, a human...interacting with the environment, receives input data that is novel to its system.[surprising fact is observed].  So- it adapts; it develops a new set of habits[ new hypothesis]  such that it can continue to live in that environment with that novel situation.

So- a bird adapts to new seeds that have developed harder shells by itself developing a harder beak.

I don't see that abduction means an 'awareness of resemblance'.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 14/12/20 2:46 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction or awareness of resemblance. Please give me one example, in which this occurs besides the action of a neuronic network.



Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abduction, where an aberration from the norm appears, and the Mind [and I consider that all matter including the inorganic,  functions within Mind] - can develop a new habit that incorporates this aberration as 'normal'. This has nothing to do with uncertainty. And nothing to do with 'need' [whatever that means].

I don't see induction as requiring final causality. I see induction merely as pure observation of 'what is existent'. Nothing to do with any 'need'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:55 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a network of neurons, or maybe with a single neuron, or two of them, I dont know, but anyway with neurons, is what I think.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - you are ignoring the role of Firstness, or chance, within the inanimate and animate world.

Chance, spontaneity are vital actions enabling adaptive and evolutionary capacities - and these two actions are obviously not found only within the human realm.  But also within the 'inanimate' and 'animate'.

I'd say that abduction is the Mind process of Firstness - and found in all forms of existence.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:29 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, ok, thoug I would say, the strengthening of the beak might also be seen as a kind of induction, because both the seed shell, and the beak have been there before, so there is no complete novelty nor total surprise. Maybe mutations are part of abduction? Though abduction might be seen as a guess with a reason, a hypothesis based on a real perceived similarity, while a mutation is rather a wild guess without a hypothesis? If in a forest there surprisingly occur carnivores that live on the ground, and a squirrel has due to a mutation a skin between its arms and legs, so it can glide from one tree to the other without going to the ground, it has an advantage. But the mutation is random. But maybe on a slow evolutuionary scale this might be interpreted as hypothesis? Or would such an interpretation be anthropo- or neurocentrism?

Best, Helmut

 

14. Dezember 2020 um 21:12 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - the point of abduction is the appearance of a novel situation - and the adjustment by an organism to that novelty by its development of a new hypothesis or law.

The organism - and I maintain this can be a plant, a cell, an insect, a human...interacting with the environment, receives input data that is novel to its system.[surprising fact is observed].  So- it adapts; it develops a new set of habits[ new hypothesis]  such that it can continue to live in that environment with that novel situation.

So- a bird adapts to new seeds that have developed harder shells by itself developing a harder beak.

I don't see that abduction means an 'awareness of resemblance'.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 14/12/20 2:46 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction or awareness of resemblance. Please give me one example, in which this occurs besides the action of a neuronic network.



Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abduction, where an aberration from the norm appears, and the Mind [and I consider that all matter including the inorganic,  functions within Mind] - can develop a new habit that incorporates this aberration as 'normal'. This has nothing to do with uncertainty. And nothing to do with 'need' [whatever that means].

I don't see induction as requiring final causality. I see induction merely as pure observation of 'what is existent'. Nothing to do with any 'need'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:55 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a network of neurons, or maybe with a single neuron, or two of them, I dont know, but anyway with neurons, is what I think.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - you are ignoring the role of Firstness, or chance, within the inanimate and animate world.

Chance, spontaneity are vital actions enabling adaptive and evolutionary capacities - and these two actions are obviously not found only within the human realm.  But also within the 'inanimate' and 'animate'.

I'd say that abduction is the Mind process of Firstness - and found in all forms of existence.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:29 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient causation occurs, in animate nature (organisms) also induction/final causation, and in neuro-nature (brain animals) also abduction/example causation. To suggest that a molecule does abduction, would in my concept be illegitimate anthropocentrism. But all that is just my ideas, you know I have some of them, maybe all wrong. Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 18:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:



List: 

 
I am uncertain as to the semantic, syntactical, formal and CSP textual sources of meanings of the term “ampliative” as used in th

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: Abduction means, that something is recognized (truly or falsely doesnt matter) as seeming like something other. That is depiction or awareness of resemblance. Please give me one example, in which this occurs besides the action of a neuronic network.



Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abduction, where an aberration from the norm appears, and the Mind [and I consider that all matter including the inorganic,  functions within Mind] - can develop a new habit that incorporates this aberration as 'normal'. This has nothing to do with uncertainty. And nothing to do with 'need' [whatever that means].

I don't see induction as requiring final causality. I see induction merely as pure observation of 'what is existent'. Nothing to do with any 'need'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:55 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a network of neurons, or maybe with a single neuron, or two of them, I dont know, but anyway with neurons, is what I think.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - you are ignoring the role of Firstness, or chance, within the inanimate and animate world.

Chance, spontaneity are vital actions enabling adaptive and evolutionary capacities - and these two actions are obviously not found only within the human realm.  But also within the 'inanimate' and 'animate'.

I'd say that abduction is the Mind process of Firstness - and found in all forms of existence.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:29 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient causation occurs, in animate nature (organisms) also induction/final causation, and in neuro-nature (brain animals) also abduction/example causation. To suggest that a molecule does abduction, would in my concept be illegitimate anthropocentrism. But all that is just my ideas, you know I have some of them, maybe all wrong. Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 18:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:



List: 

 
I am uncertain as to the semantic, syntactical, formal and CSP textual sources of meanings of the term “ampliative” as used in these two sentences.

 

On Dec 14, 2020, at 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 

In logical terms, the key is that excluded middle is a principle only of  deductive  reasoning, not of  ampliative reasoning, which always comes first in any   inquiry;



Jon had written:

"That is why it is ampliative rather than merely explicative, with the tradeoff that its inferences are merely plausible rather than certain."

 

 

 Note that ampliative reasoning can be used to infer the necessary connections between atoms and molecules as many to one mappings from parts to the wholes. That is, for a collection of atoms to become a single molecule, it is necessary that new relations must be specified that show the differences between the individuals and the collective, the emergent whole with a new name that specifies its uniqueness. 

 

In other words, what is being “ampliated" in this usage of the term “ampliative”? 

 

(I vaguely recall reading a CSP passage that used the term but can not locate it now.)

 

Secondly, why is the form of term such a radical departure from the common form of terminology of logics, such as abductive, adductive, deductive, inductive, productive, retroductive, (synductive), and transductive.  

 

(The term “synductive” was coined in my 2008 paper to enumerate the logic of forming a whole from atomic parts by matching all  parts to another to form the molecular network, that is, the pattern of relations that quantifies the relationships between the qualisigns and the legisigns of sin-signs.)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this messag

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I seem to not come through. I dont know, chance is something quite trivial for me, and abduction something more complex. To mentally abduct something means to copy it. Chance is just incertainty. Incertainty occurs in the physicochemical realm, but the ability of copying something reqires neurons. I dont know what is wrong with that. Sorry, best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 20:08 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - we'll just have to disagree!

I consider that chance is a basic attribute of abduction, where an aberration from the norm appears, and the Mind [and I consider that all matter including the inorganic,  functions within Mind] - can develop a new habit that incorporates this aberration as 'normal'. This has nothing to do with uncertainty. And nothing to do with 'need' [whatever that means].

I don't see induction as requiring final causality. I see induction merely as pure observation of 'what is existent'. Nothing to do with any 'need'.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:55 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a network of neurons, or maybe with a single neuron, or two of them, I dont know, but anyway with neurons, is what I think.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:


Helmut - you are ignoring the role of Firstness, or chance, within the inanimate and animate world.

Chance, spontaneity are vital actions enabling adaptive and evolutionary capacities - and these two actions are obviously not found only within the human realm.  But also within the 'inanimate' and 'animate'.

I'd say that abduction is the Mind process of Firstness - and found in all forms of existence.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:29 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient causation occurs, in animate nature (organisms) also induction/final causation, and in neuro-nature (brain animals) also abduction/example causation. To suggest that a molecule does abduction, would in my concept be illegitimate anthropocentrism. But all that is just my ideas, you know I have some of them, maybe all wrong. Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 18:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:



List: 

 
I am uncertain as to the semantic, syntactical, formal and CSP textual sources of meanings of the term “ampliative” as used in these two sentences.

 

On Dec 14, 2020, at 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 

In logical terms, the key is that excluded middle is a principle only of  deductive  reasoning, not of  ampliative reasoning, which always comes first in any   inquiry;



Jon had written:

"That is why it is ampliative rather than merely explicative, with the tradeoff that its inferences are merely plausible rather than certain."

 

 

 Note that ampliative reasoning can be used to infer the necessary connections between atoms and molecules as many to one mappings from parts to the wholes. That is, for a collection of atoms to become a single molecule, it is necessary that new relations must be specified that show the differences between the individuals and the collective, the emergent whole with a new name that specifies its uniqueness. 

 

In other words, what is being “ampliated" in this usage of the term “ampliative”? 

 

(I vaguely recall reading a CSP passage that used the term but can not locate it now.)

 

Secondly, why is the form of term such a radical departure from the common form of terminology of logics, such as abductive, adductive, deductive, inductive, productive, retroductive, (synductive), and transductive.  

 

(The term “synductive” was coined in my 2008 paper to enumerate the logic of forming a whole from atomic parts by matching all  parts to another to form the molecular network, that is, the pattern of relations that quantifies the relationships between the qualisigns and the legisigns of sin-signs.)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at ht

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I agree, that in inanimate world there is chance, due to the Heisenberg incertainty and to incertainty as calculated by chaos theory. But I doubt, that this has to do with induction or abduction, or with final or example causation. I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. Abduction, example cause, requires a structure that can recognize or copy a pattern. This is only doable with a network of neurons, or maybe with a single neuron, or two of them, I dont know, but anyway with neurons, is what I think.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - you are ignoring the role of Firstness, or chance, within the inanimate and animate world.

Chance, spontaneity are vital actions enabling adaptive and evolutionary capacities - and these two actions are obviously not found only within the human realm.  But also within the 'inanimate' and 'animate'.

I'd say that abduction is the Mind process of Firstness - and found in all forms of existence.

Edwina

 

On Mon 14/12/20 1:29 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient causation occurs, in animate nature (organisms) also induction/final causation, and in neuro-nature (brain animals) also abduction/example causation. To suggest that a molecule does abduction, would in my concept be illegitimate anthropocentrism. But all that is just my ideas, you know I have some of them, maybe all wrong. Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 18:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:



List: 

 
I am uncertain as to the semantic, syntactical, formal and CSP textual sources of meanings of the term “ampliative” as used in these two sentences.

 

On Dec 14, 2020, at 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 

In logical terms, the key is that excluded middle is a principle only of  deductive reasoning, not of  ampliative reasoning, which always comes first in any  inquiry;



Jon had written:

"That is why it is ampliative rather than merely explicative, with the tradeoff that its inferences are merely plausible rather than certain."

 

 

 Note that ampliative reasoning can be used to infer the necessary connections between atoms and molecules as many to one mappings from parts to the wholes. That is, for a collection of atoms to become a single molecule, it is necessary that new relations must be specified that show the differences between the individuals and the collective, the emergent whole with a new name that specifies its uniqueness. 

 

In other words, what is being “ampliated" in this usage of the term “ampliative”? 

 

(I vaguely recall reading a CSP passage that used the term but can not locate it now.)

 

Secondly, why is the form of term such a radical departure from the common form of terminology of logics, such as abductive, adductive, deductive, inductive, productive, retroductive, (synductive), and transductive.  

 

(The term “synductive” was coined in my 2008 paper to enumerate the logic of forming a whole from atomic parts by matching all  parts to another to form the molecular network, that is, the pattern of relations that quantifies the relationships between the qualisigns and the legisigns of sin-signs.)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

I have to ponder your posts, because up to now my idea has been, that in inanimate nature merely deduction/efficient causation occurs, in animate nature (organisms) also induction/final causation, and in neuro-nature (brain animals) also abduction/example causation. To suggest that a molecule does abduction, would in my concept be illegitimate anthropocentrism. But all that is just my ideas, you know I have some of them, maybe all wrong. Best, Helmut

 
 

14. Dezember 2020 um 18:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
wrote:



List: 

 
I am uncertain as to the semantic, syntactical, formal and CSP textual sources of meanings of the term “ampliative” as used in these two sentences.

 

On Dec 14, 2020, at 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 

In logical terms, the key is that excluded middle is a principle only of deductive reasoning, not of ampliative reasoning, which always comes first in any inquiry;



Jon had written:

"That is why it is ampliative rather than merely explicative, with the tradeoff that its inferences are merely plausible rather than certain."

 

 

 Note that ampliative reasoning can be used to infer the necessary connections between atoms and molecules as many to one mappings from parts to the wholes. That is, for a collection of atoms to become a single molecule, it is necessary that new relations must be specified that show the differences between the individuals and the collective, the emergent whole with a new name that specifies its uniqueness. 

 

In other words, what is being “ampliated" in this usage of the term “ampliative”? 

 

(I vaguely recall reading a CSP passage that used the term but can not locate it now.)

 

Secondly, why is the form of term such a radical departure from the common form of terminology of logics, such as abductive, adductive, deductive, inductive, productive, retroductive, (synductive), and transductive.  

 

(The term “synductive” was coined in my 2008 paper to enumerate the logic of forming a whole from atomic parts by matching all  parts to another to form the molecular network, that is, the pattern of relations that quantifies the relationships between the qualisigns and the legisigns of sin-signs.)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

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Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

pying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here:


Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.


 



And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here:https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle



 



Charles Pyle 



 





From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> 
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
To: Charles Pyle <char...@pyle.tv>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic





 





Charles,





wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space?





I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional".





 





Best, Helmut





 




 





22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr
 "Charles Pyle" <char...@pyle.tv>
wrote:







Helmut,



 



Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken.



 



--begin quote from Helmut--



The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that.



--end quote from Helmut---



 



To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would pronounce Filipino as Pilipino.



 



So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation to politics or morality.



 



Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the reverse is not true. And in keeping with this self-evident character of numerology there has been found to be a universal of language, an empirical claim supported by lots of evidence, that if a language has grammatical singular and plural, then the singular is unmarked and the plural is marked. (And, by the way, if that language has also dual, it is twice marked in relation to singuil

Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

n of falsity.

 

Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here:

Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.

 

And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle

 

Charles Pyle

 



From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
To: Charles Pyle
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic



 



Charles,



wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space?



I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional".



 



Best, Helmut



  


  



22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr
 "Charles Pyle" <char...@pyle.tv>
wrote:





Helmut,

 

Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken.

 

--begin quote from Helmut--

The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that.

--end quote from Helmut---

 

To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would pronounce Filipino as Pilipino.

 

So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation to politics or morality.

 

Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the reverse is not true. And in keeping with

Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Charles, Edwina, List,

 

I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth.

 

I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter.

 

So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:



Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations..

I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea.

Edwina
 

On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:




Hi Helmut,

 

Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  

 

The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  

 

In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.

 

Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity.

 

Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here:

Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.

 

And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle

 

Charles Pyle

 



From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
To: Charles Pyle
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic



 



Charles,



wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

ed with evil or dirtiness and right with cleanness and good.

 

There are also cases where the asymmetry goes contrary to what is conventionally believed. For example, the conventional view holds that the past is first, the present it next, and then comes the future. But to the contrary language presupposes that the present is first and the past is second. This contrary view does make sense, however, in that we experience things first in the present, and then they become past. We take a picture in the present, but it instantly becomes past. In keeping with this experiential view the language universal is that the past is marked in relation to the present. Thus look vs look+ed.

 

Obviously the male-female and black-white oppositions, and indeed the true-false opposition, have become the locus of a raging power struggle in western society. In service of this struggle we might want to try to modify the logic and semantics of these fundamental pairs of words, but it would not help that endeavor to suppose such changes are merely going to be resisted by political or morally conservative people. The resistance is embodied in the very fabric of language. Perhaps we need to deconstruct language itself, but you cannot just deconstruct a few pairs of words without attacking the logic underlying them.

 

Charles Pyle

https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle

 

 

 

 

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 11:00 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic



 



List,



 



As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities.



 



I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence.



 



A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia:



 



The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that.



 



The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic.



 



I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades.



 



Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too.



 



Best,



Helmut



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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I see. I think, I mistakenly have compared the thing I was talking about with semiotics. Maybe it might better refer to LOR. I guess, the triadic sign is something too special to be suggested for model in this respect. The triadicity in the Logic Of Relatives probably suits better to the emergence hypothesis, that binarities may create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to binarities.

The sexuality-example can only be understood with the hypothesis, that culture, habits, feelings are not something self-created, but are due to logic, which is universal. Meaning, yes, a human may, with some empathy, roughly know what it is like to be a bat, and in an alien culture 2000 light years away they have similar social problems like we have.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

22. November 2020 um 18:18 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut

My apologies - I see your point against the yes-no-maybe. But I don't think that the middle action of mediation emerges from the interaction of polarities. This is almost a type of 'averaging' where all individual units partake of 'some' of each other.

The middle term is a set of 'normative habits of organization' - That's not the same as that 'dilution of types'. The mediative process is extremely powerful in moving data from original sensate input [Dynamic Object] to resultant specific Interpretant [Dynamic Interpretant]. ..whether that Interpretant is the meaning of a word or a nutrient transformed into a healthy cell.

Edwina

 



 

On Sun 22/11/20 12:05 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina,

Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. " But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz.

So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplemetarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:



Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap.

The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.

And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. 

Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all.

Edwina
 

On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

 

As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities.

 

I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence.

 

A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia:

 

The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way t

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option." But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz.

So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplementarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing?

 

Best,

Helmut


 
 

22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:



Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap.

The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.

And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. 

Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all.

Edwina
 

On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



List,

 

As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities.

 

I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence.

 

A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia:

 

The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that.

 

The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic.

 

I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades.

 

Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too.

 

Best,

Helmut



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sol

[PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities.

 

I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence.

 

A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia:

 

The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that.

 

The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic.

 

I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades.

 

Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too.

 

Best,

Helmut
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Problems In Philosophy

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

I think, an aspect of the distinction between normative and descriptive sciences is, whether the scientist belongs to the object of inquiry or not. If he*she belongs to the object, he*she on one hand is influenced by it, and on the other hand influences it, has a responsibility for it. This responsibility makes the inquiry (which too influences) normative. With this view, logic is a normative science. On the other hand, logic may seem to be something clear and provable, like mathematics, not due to speculation and discussion, like ethics is. So one might claim it to be purely descriptive: It seemingly can be described with no doubts left. But I think, that, due to the fact that the observer is part of the logic-system, the more elaborate the inquiry gets, the more new questions arise, in the form of paradoxons out of self-reference. There is no clear rule or law, how to deal with paradoxons: Should they be avoided, tried to solve, or let unfold and be oserved? This is an ought-matter, so logic even has a connection with ethics.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

07. November 2020 um 21:15 Uhr
 "Jon Awbrey" 
wrote:

Cf: Problems In Philosophy • 10
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/11/07/problems-in-philosophy-10/

Re: Ontolog Forum
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/ontolog-forum/xwFwCa0j8qI/overview
::: David Whitten
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/xwFwCa0j8qI/KAd-jNr_CAAJ

DW: Why does classical tradition or any tradition consider logic to be a normative science?

Dear David,

A science is called that because it deals in knowledge (Latin:
"scientia"). Knowing "what is the case" in a given domain of
experience may be distinguished from knowing "what ought to be"
in a given set of circumstances, and people who think in threes,
like Kant and Peirce and me, add knowing "what may be hoped" to
the mix.

In the quest to understand how science works a praxis/pragmatist
like myself gives the process, inquiry, equal billing with the
product, knowledge. People have gotten used to seeing sciences
as "bodies of ostensible knowledge" (BOOKs) and taking their
analysis as a matter of assigning them distinctive catalogue
numbers and sorting them to the indicated library shelves.
That is all well and good but it leaves an all too static
impression of science if we settle for that.

Here are capsule summaries on the "Sciences of Is" and
the "Sciences of Ought" from the Wikiversity articles
on Descriptive Science and Normative Science.

Descriptive Science
===

A "descriptive science", or a "special science", is a form of inquiry,
typically involving a community of inquiry and its accumulated body
of provisional knowledge, which seeks to discover what is true about
a recognized domain of phenomena.

Normative Science
=

A "normative science" is a form of inquiry, typically involving a community
of inquiry and its accumulated body of provisional knowledge, which seeks
to discover good ways of achieving recognized aims, ends, goals, objectives,
or purposes.

The three normative sciences, according to traditional conceptions in philosophy,
are aesthetics, ethics, and logic.

Resources
=

• Inquiry
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry )

• Descriptive Science
( https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Descriptive_science )

• Normative Science
( https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Normative_science )

• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
( https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems )
• Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics
( https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Aesthetics )

Regards,

Jon
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Problems In Philosophy

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: On the other hand, if ants or bees would evolve to intelligent species, I find it likely, that with intelligence would come individualism.



Jon, List,

 

Minimum suffering can be achieved with two different principles, the categorical imperative, and the utilitaristic principle. In real situations, applying both often leads to contradiction. So, to get from is to ought, there has to be an agreement, which of both principles is the more essential one. I think, this agreement would be due to human species history. Humans are rather individualists, every life counts, no one wants to be treated for a means, but rather for an end, so I think, that the categorical imperative is more essential, comers first, and merely is moderated by the utilitaristic principle. If ants or bees, who are much more collectivistic than individulistic, would evolve to intelligent species, I guess for them the utilitaristic principle would be more essential.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

05. November 2020 um 18:40 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" 
wrote:

Cf: Problems In Philosophy • 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/11/05/problems-in-philosophy-9/

Many good questions from Richard Saunders ...

Re: FB | Ecology Of Systems Thinking
https://www.facebook.com/groups/ecologyofsystemsthinking/permalink/3460818670663919/
::: Richard Saunders
https://www.facebook.com/groups/ecologyofsystemsthinking/permalink/3460818670663919/?comment_id=3461102183968901

RS:
Hume's is/ought dichotomy: are these as Gould said “non-overlapping
magisteria” or are they concentric domains? Is a science of aesthetics
at the core? If memory serves it seems like that was what Wittgenstein
suggested at the end of “Tractatus”. In “The Moral Landscape”, Harris
narrows the aesthetic focus to a distinction between the minimum and
maximum suffering of all sentient beings. Maximum suffering is bad
or ugly and minimum suffering is good or beautiful. The relationship
of conduct to result is the subject of consequentialism, isn't it?
Isn't that also the subject of science?

JA: I know a lot of people see a cut and dried dichotomy here
and conventional wit says you can't derive Ought from Is.
My tracings of the boundaries though tend to find them
recursively entangled.

RS:
Recursively entangled is a nice phrase, like the the chicken and the egg.
But I'm still wondering about the catch-22. On what general axiom is
aesthetics/ethics/logic based? Harris suggests it's minimizing net
suffering. (That doesn't imply the elimination of suffering,
because some suffering has a net positive result.)

JA: I got no absolutes here. I have my personal aesthetic, but
a personal aesthetic is the moral equivalent of a religion,
and folks are pretty free about that.

JA: I'll have more to say about my personal aesthetic … all in good time.

Resources
=

• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems
• Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Aesthetics

• Wikiversity :

• Descriptive Science
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Descriptive_science
• Normative Science
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Normative_science

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Problems In Philosophy

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

Minimum suffering can be achieved with two different principles, the categorical imperative, and the utilitaristic principle. In real situations, applying both often leads to contradiction. So, to get from is to ought, there has to be an agreement, which of both principles is the more essential one. I think, this agreement would be due to human species history. Humans are rather individualists, every life counts, no one wants to be treated for a means, but rather for an end, so I think, that the categorical imperative is more essential, comers first, and merely is moderated by the utilitaristic principle. If ants or bees, who are much more collectivistic than individulistic, would evolve to intelligent species, I guess for them the utilitaristic principle would be more essential.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

05. November 2020 um 18:40 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" 
wrote:

Cf: Problems In Philosophy • 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/11/05/problems-in-philosophy-9/

Many good questions from Richard Saunders ...

Re: FB | Ecology Of Systems Thinking
https://www.facebook.com/groups/ecologyofsystemsthinking/permalink/3460818670663919/
::: Richard Saunders
https://www.facebook.com/groups/ecologyofsystemsthinking/permalink/3460818670663919/?comment_id=3461102183968901

RS:
Hume's is/ought dichotomy: are these as Gould said “non-overlapping
magisteria” or are they concentric domains? Is a science of aesthetics
at the core? If memory serves it seems like that was what Wittgenstein
suggested at the end of “Tractatus”. In “The Moral Landscape”, Harris
narrows the aesthetic focus to a distinction between the minimum and
maximum suffering of all sentient beings. Maximum suffering is bad
or ugly and minimum suffering is good or beautiful. The relationship
of conduct to result is the subject of consequentialism, isn't it?
Isn't that also the subject of science?

JA: I know a lot of people see a cut and dried dichotomy here
and conventional wit says you can't derive Ought from Is.
My tracings of the boundaries though tend to find them
recursively entangled.

RS:
Recursively entangled is a nice phrase, like the the chicken and the egg.
But I'm still wondering about the catch-22. On what general axiom is
aesthetics/ethics/logic based? Harris suggests it's minimizing net
suffering. (That doesn't imply the elimination of suffering,
because some suffering has a net positive result.)

JA: I got no absolutes here. I have my personal aesthetic, but
a personal aesthetic is the moral equivalent of a religion,
and folks are pretty free about that.

JA: I'll have more to say about my personal aesthetic … all in good time.

Resources
=

• Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems
• Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Aesthetics

• Wikiversity :

• Descriptive Science
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Descriptive_science
• Normative Science
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Normative_science

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The simplest model for the ten classes of signs

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: There is one thing I have written about, I dont understand: I wrote I had read somewhere, that potential energy is negative and has the same amount in the universe as all other energies and masses, so the sum of energy would be zero. But in thermodynamics, potential energy is not negative. So this zero-energy model is either a hoax, or an uncommon, maybe pseudo-scientific way of calculation? I dont know. Does anybody?



Edwina, List,

 

I consider the universe closed in the way, that entropy increases, but not in the way, that, because of this, the ratio between exergy and anergy too increases. But it only is a crude hypothetic attempt to combine cosmology, semiotics, and thermodynamics. In real processes, exergy, the energy that is able to do work, is partly changed to anergy, the useless part of energy. Only in ideal model processes exergy may be completely conserved. These processes are called reversible processes. If the universe is closed or not, nobody knows, I think. I donot think, that thirdness holds energy from being dissipated. On the contrary, the more (semiotically) happens, the more dissipation happens. The more dissipation, the more exergy is changed to anergy, and entropy produced. As a counterpart to this anergy production I see the accelerating expansion of space, producing potential energy (exergy). Maybe black holes change anergy to exergy? They consume, besides solid mass, also gases with equalized temperature (anergy), and heat it up and concentrate it. But nobody knows what happens next with this mass and energy: Does it pop up elsewhere, maybe refill the virtual sphere, from which new particles appear? Cosmology is mainly speculation, I think. My speculation I have chosen in the way I like it best: No big chill.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 24. Oktober 2020 um 00:53 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut -

I'm not sure if I understand your analogies, but entropy only increases in a closed system. Do you consider the Universe closed?

And I consider that Firstness is dissipation of energy, eg, the energy stored in a cell dissipates over time unless that cell introduces more matter/energy , while Secondness is an enclosed 'bit/unit' of energy, and Thirdness is the organizational pattern that 'holds' that energy to counter dissipation.

I don't understand your comment about exergy- for it, to my understanding, refers to an irreplaceable loss of energy, while the triadic system is geared to prevent such a total dissipation. That is - a cell, which operates within a triadic process,  - this triadic process is not reversible - as it is in exergy.

An open system is a triadic semiosic process - geared to prevent total dissipation and to enable adaptation and avolution.

So- I don't compare exergy to Firstness - because the categorical modes do not operate in a non-triadic system...and Firstness functions within a triad.

Equally- I don't understand your comment that entropy is connected with Thirdness. The function of Thirdness within the triad is to introduce a continuity of morphology such that entropy cannot become dominant.

Edwina

 

On Fri 23/10/20 4:13 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, Robert, List,

 

I think that information aka negentropy is not a counterweight to entropy, because it depends on dissipation, and the amount of produced information cannot exceed the amount of entropy produced with its production.

I think, the counterweight for entropy is the accelerated expansion of the universe, which makes masses get further apart from each other, by which potential energy is increased. Potential energy is exergy, and i guess, that this way the ratio between exergy and anergy possibly is kept constant, though entropy constantly rises.

If exergy is connected with firstness, and the production of entropy with thirdness, and if the source of firstness is on the universal scale (accelerated expansion of the universe), I think that the whole semiotic process all in all is one of down- and upscaling. In the beginning something (triadic) happens in the universe, and in the end it happens between people or particles. The ratio between firstness and thirdness is the same in big and in small scales, firstness is provided in the biggest scale and handed or conveyed down to small ones, information is a part of that, and thirdness in the form of entropy is conveyed the other way, each small action contributing to the "big chill", which I guess will never happen.

Can the universe expand forever? Maybe it separates, calves?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Oktober 2020 um 16:40 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:




I think that's a key notion - the necessity for a triplet, which is an intellectual construct, to become a triad, a morphological construct.

The reason for this is that basic "permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of th

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The simplest model for the ten classes of signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

 

I consider the universe closed in the way, that entropy increases, but not in the way, that, because of this, the ratio between exergy and anergy too increases. But it only is a crude hypothetic attempt to combine cosmology, semiotics, and thermodynamics. In real processes, exergy, the energy that is able to do work, is partly changed to anergy, the useless part of energy. Only in ideal model processes exergy may be completely conserved. These processes are called reversible processes. If the universe is closed or not, nobody knows, I think. I donot think, that thirdness holds energy from being dissipated. On the contrary, the more (semiotically) happens, the more dissipation happens. The more dissipation, the more exergy is changed to anergy, and entropy produced. As a counterpart to this anergy production I see the accelerating expansion of space, producing potential energy (exergy). Maybe black holes change anergy to exergy? They consume, besides solid mass, also gases with equalized temperature (anergy), and heat it up and concentrate it. But nobody knows what happens next with this mass and energy: Does it pop up elsewhere, maybe refill the virtual sphere, from which new particles appear? Cosmology is mainly speculation, I think. My speculation I have chosen in the way I like it best: No big chill.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 24. Oktober 2020 um 00:53 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut -

I'm not sure if I understand your analogies, but entropy only increases in a closed system. Do you consider the Universe closed?

And I consider that Firstness is dissipation of energy, eg, the energy stored in a cell dissipates over time unless that cell introduces more matter/energy , while Secondness is an enclosed 'bit/unit' of energy, and Thirdness is the organizational pattern that 'holds' that energy to counter dissipation.

I don't understand your comment about exergy- for it, to my understanding, refers to an irreplaceable loss of energy, while the triadic system is geared to prevent such a total dissipation. That is - a cell, which operates within a triadic process,  - this triadic process is not reversible - as it is in exergy.

An open system is a triadic semiosic process - geared to prevent total dissipation and to enable adaptation and avolution.

So- I don't compare exergy to Firstness - because the categorical modes do not operate in a non-triadic system...and Firstness functions within a triad.

Equally- I don't understand your comment that entropy is connected with Thirdness. The function of Thirdness within the triad is to introduce a continuity of morphology such that entropy cannot become dominant.

Edwina

 

On Fri 23/10/20 4:13 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, Robert, List,

 

I think that information aka negentropy is not a counterweight to entropy, because it depends on dissipation, and the amount of produced information cannot exceed the amount of entropy produced with its production.

I think, the counterweight for entropy is the accelerated expansion of the universe, which makes masses get further apart from each other, by which potential energy is increased. Potential energy is exergy, and i guess, that this way the ratio between exergy and anergy possibly is kept constant, though entropy constantly rises.

If exergy is connected with firstness, and the production of entropy with thirdness, and if the source of firstness is on the universal scale (accelerated expansion of the universe), I think that the whole semiotic process all in all is one of down- and upscaling. In the beginning something (triadic) happens in the universe, and in the end it happens between people or particles. The ratio between firstness and thirdness is the same in big and in small scales, firstness is provided in the biggest scale and handed or conveyed down to small ones, information is a part of that, and thirdness in the form of entropy is conveyed the other way, each small action contributing to the "big chill", which I guess will never happen.

Can the universe expand forever? Maybe it separates, calves?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Oktober 2020 um 16:40 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:




I think that's a key notion - the necessity for a triplet, which is an intellectual construct, to become a triad, a morphological construct.

The reason for this is that basic "permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of the very being of energy". This means that the semiosic triad and process is not a human, so to speak, intellectual exercise, but is a physico-chemical/biological reality - which we humans then intellectually analyze. - and can do so, mathematically as evidence of this natural reality.

Edwina



 

On Fri 23/10/20 9:32 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:


Thank you Edwina ...it seems to me that you encapsulate the concepts of

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The simplest model for the ten classes of signs

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: I want to add, that the universe´s density might not decrease due to its expansion, because with the increase of potential energy, new mass particles come out of the virtuality. The potential energy of the universe has the same amount as all other energy, including mass, so I have read somewhere. Potential energy is negative, all other energy positive, so its sum is exactly 0. The net energy of the universe is zero, if there was a big bang, no energy was necessary for it. All that was needed, was and is information. Information, like entropy, is not energy. Entropy is heat (transferred heat energy) divided by temperature.



Edwina, Robert, List,

 

I think that information aka negentropy is not a counterweight to entropy, because it depends on dissipation, and the amount of produced information cannot exceed the amount of entropy produced with its production.

I think, the counterweight for entropy is the accelerated expansion of the universe, which makes masses get further apart from each other, by which potential energy is increased. Potential energy is exergy, and i guess, that this way the ratio between exergy and anergy possibly is kept constant, though entropy constantly rises.

If exergy is connected with firstness, and the production of entropy with thirdness, and if the source of firstness is on the universal scale (accelerated expansion of the universe), I think that the whole semiotic process all in all is one of down- and upscaling. In the beginning something (triadic) happens in the universe, and in the end it happens between people or particles. The ratio between firstness and thirdness is the same in big and in small scales, firstness is provided in the biggest scale and handed or conveyed down to small ones, information is a part of that, and thirdness in the form of entropy is conveyed the other way, each small action contributing to the "big chill", which I guess will never happen.

Can the universe expand forever? Maybe it separates, calves?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Oktober 2020 um 16:40 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:




I think that's a key notion - the necessity for a triplet, which is an intellectual construct, to become a triad, a morphological construct.

The reason for this is that basic "permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of the very being of energy". This means that the semiosic triad and process is not a human, so to speak, intellectual exercise, but is a physico-chemical/biological reality - which we humans then intellectually analyze. - and can do so, mathematically as evidence of this natural reality.

Edwina



 

On Fri 23/10/20 9:32 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:


Thank you Edwina ...it seems to me that you encapsulate the concepts of dissipation/morcellization/regularity with the three universal categories which have no real existence since they result from triadic reduction, an operation of pure form on the space of the n-adic relations they allow to generate. So encapsulation makes the simple triplet a triad, which makes regularity appear as a necessity produced by the permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of the very being of energy. So could we then see in it yet another illustration of the role that mathematics can play, even at this level?    
RM 




Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

 






 


Le jeu. 22 oct. 2020 à 16:08, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :


A great paper.

My focus is, however, on WHY our universe operates within a triadic process and WHY there are three modal categories.

My simplistic answer to both is: the preservation of energy.

That is - if one posits that our universe is made up of energy - then, the agenda of the universe 'ought' to be its preservation. It first does this -[ as Peirce pointed out in 1.411-] without some regularity, that is - energy transforms rapidly into finite bits of matter. These 'bits' hold energy, so to speak.  But the fact of dissipation, aka, Firstness, means that these finite bits would, in a nanosecond, dissolve into less complex forms of energy.  The dissipation of energy would reduce the universe to nothing. How can we define this dissipation? That is - how is the domination of Firstness -  prevented?

The easiest method is, of course, that action of Secondness, which simply moves energy into those closed units-of-matter. But again, as Peirce pointed out, without regularity, these 'bits' would rapidly dissipate back to - Firstness.

Therefore, we find the need for the third category for the organization of energy: Thirdness, which provides a regularity of habit, a continuity of form and behaviour by which those Bits-of-Matter can be organized. This introduction of Mind is the most powerful method of combating the ever-present actions of dissipat

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The simplest model for the ten classes of signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, Robert, List,

 

I think that information aka negentropy is not a counterweight to entropy, because it depends on dissipation, and the amount of produced information cannot exceed the amount of entropy produced with its production.

I think, the counterweight for entropy is the accelerated expansion of the universe, which makes masses get further apart from each other, by which potential energy is increased. Potential energy is exergy, and i guess, that this way the ratio between exergy and anergy possibly is kept constant, though entropy constantly rises.

If exergy is connected with firstness, and the production of entropy with thirdness, and if the source of firstness is on the universal scale (accelerated expansion of the universe), I think that the whole semiotic process all in all is one of down- and upscaling. In the beginning something (triadic) happens in the universe, and in the end it happens between people or particles. The ratio between firstness and thirdness is the same in big and in small scales, firstness is provided in the biggest scale and handed or conveyed down to small ones, information is a part of that, and thirdness in the form of entropy is conveyed the other way, each small action contributing to the "big chill", which I guess will never happen.

Can the universe expand forever? Maybe it separates, calves?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 23. Oktober 2020 um 16:40 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:




I think that's a key notion - the necessity for a triplet, which is an intellectual construct, to become a triad, a morphological construct.

The reason for this is that basic "permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of the very being of energy". This means that the semiosic triad and process is not a human, so to speak, intellectual exercise, but is a physico-chemical/biological reality - which we humans then intellectually analyze. - and can do so, mathematically as evidence of this natural reality.

Edwina



 

On Fri 23/10/20 9:32 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:


Thank you Edwina ...it seems to me that you encapsulate the concepts of dissipation/morcellization/regularity with the three universal categories which have no real existence since they result from triadic reduction, an operation of pure form on the space of the n-adic relations they allow to generate. So encapsulation makes the simple triplet a triad, which makes regularity appear as a necessity produced by the permanent confrontation between entropy and negentropy, which would be constitutive of the very being of energy. So could we then see in it yet another illustration of the role that mathematics can play, even at this level?    
RM 




Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

 






 


Le jeu. 22 oct. 2020 à 16:08, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :


A great paper.

My focus is, however, on WHY our universe operates within a triadic process and WHY there are three modal categories.

My simplistic answer to both is: the preservation of energy.

That is - if one posits that our universe is made up of energy - then, the agenda of the universe 'ought' to be its preservation. It first does this -[ as Peirce pointed out in 1.411-] without some regularity, that is - energy transforms rapidly into finite bits of matter. These 'bits' hold energy, so to speak.  But the fact of dissipation, aka, Firstness, means that these finite bits would, in a nanosecond, dissolve into less complex forms of energy.  The dissipation of energy would reduce the universe to nothing. How can we define this dissipation? That is - how is the domination of Firstness -  prevented?

The easiest method is, of course, that action of Secondness, which simply moves energy into those closed units-of-matter. But again, as Peirce pointed out, without regularity, these 'bits' would rapidly dissipate back to - Firstness.

Therefore, we find the need for the third category for the organization of energy: Thirdness, which provides a regularity of habit, a continuity of form and behaviour by which those Bits-of-Matter can be organized. This introduction of Mind is the most powerful method of combating the ever-present actions of dissipation/Firstness.

But- we should acknowledge the necessity of Firstness. Without its 'attacks' on continuity [which attacks usually take place at the periphery of a system] - the system would freeze into a cement of habits. Firstness enables not only adaptive robustness but also, an increase in complexity and diversity of forms.

What about that triad? What is its function? If we posit a universe made up of 'bits of energy-as-matter', then, these bits presumably interact. If we have only a direct 'hit' between two 'bits-of-matter', then this mechanical process would enhance entropy. And again - we acknowledge the reality of Thirdness - which media

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical evolution

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List,

 

I think, that the quote by Ghandi: "Gandhi, in commenting on the Gita, says ‘If we wish to give up sin, we should give up virtue too.", is as false as Adorno claiming that there is no right life within the false one ("Minima Moralia"). To focus on higher wisdom alone solves no problems, because the problems are mostly petty ones, not handleable with higher wisdom alone. They have to be handled with too-petty means. But these means have to be counterchecked with higher wisdom: May I apply them or not? Virtue is based on values, and values are either instructions to solve a problem, or to avoid a problem-pattern. Problems and their patterns exist. Ignoring them is just getting out of the way, like a coward. It is not wise.

Your onion-picture I like very muchly. The layers of the onion are separated by spatiotemporal scales. To take all of them into account, and to mentally cross and connect them is our sorry plight we are not allowed to avoid. If we do not obey this plight, and just act out of higher wisdom, things like in the Baghavad-Gita happen: In the battle og Kuruksetra, all except Krishna and Arjuna were killed. The oh-so-peaceful Buddhism has lost its virginity in modern times again as it has before too, in the far past, now in Myanmar.

To switch to nowadays, I want to mention the Antifa. Yesterday I have seen a talk show on TV, with a guest from USA invited. It seems, that for Republicans, the Antifa is a big bogeyman. Well, in Germany the Antifa are just groups of quite intelligent young grownups, who are doing something against fascism. They really are paying attention not to become like their counteragents themselves. They mentally cross and compare the onion scales thoroughly, before they take any action. They would never kill people, are not terrorists, mainly write texts, and organize counter-demonstrations against right-wing demonstrations, but rather only shout, not beating people up.

 

I hope, that Trump will not act like Cesar, and abolish democracy. In this case, a rule will come into the game, which e.g. is part of Germany´s constitution: The right to resist. If unjustice becomes justice, resistance becomes duty. And this duty, sadly, does not exclude the use of violence. Like it or not, in this case, Gandhi and Adorno will be right, but then it is too late. Nobody will care about Gandhi or Adorno, no wisdom, but only weapons speak. This situation has to be avoided.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 25. August 2020 um 19:03 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




This newly revised patch from Turning Signs may be of interest concerning relations between mathematics and experience, in a biosemiotic context. It contains a 3-paragraph Peirce quote plus a number of links to other quotes: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xrp.htm#x23 .

Gary F.

 

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The periodic table and other wallcharts in the teaching of chemistry in St Andrews, 1884–1919

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jerry, List,

 

is the difference, that in modern physics it is commonly agreed, that the reason for the elements to have come into being is a set of natural constants, necessarily very precise, and therefore extremely unlikely, that have made the cascade of fusion in stars, supernovae etc. a necessary consequence, while Purdie has the hypothesis of an evolution of elements, comparable with Darwinian evolution of species? In modern physics, the unlikeliness is either explained with extremely many universes, this high number making one universe with the proper set of constants likely, or a mind behind it, like in theology (God), or pantheism, like the universe would have a mind. In Purdie´s hypothesis it rather seems, that the mind behind it is not a central one, but that every particle, atom, etc. has a mind to join in an evolutionary competition. Was Purdie just impressed by Darwin, or did he think about the consequences too? As Atoms do not interbreed like species members do, they must have another way of passing on their evolutionary successes, e.g. like in Sheldrake´s hypothesis of the morphogenetic field.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 24. August 2020 um 18:49 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
wrote:


List:
 

As a courtesy to the list members that are seeking to place CSP writings in historical context, the following recently published paper (a remarkably detailed first person look at the philosophy of chemistry as it was pragmatically practiced in the later part of CSP lifetime)  is posted below.  Do these lecture notes illustrate the vast diversity of the “bedrocks” of CSP's mental processes?

 

Analytically, logically, mathematically and philosophically, the prime issue is the role of chemical thought in CSP thought at that period in scientific history, well over a century ago.

 

In my personal efforts to understand the formal logics of the chemical sciences and how these logics support the pragmatic success of atomic theory in modern medicine (as well as the chemical industry), one facet of this historical paper stands out.  

 

That is, the commentary of Prof. Purdie on the success of his lectures!  

 

Do these commentaries justify CSP’s focus on the “line of identity” in his interpretations of his personal experiences as a chemist?  If so, how and why?

 

A second facet of substantial interest is logical diagram of the elemental chemical relatives, published in Vienna.

 

I would be astounded if anyone on this list could identify the critical logical distinction that separates this philosophical view of chemistry from the modern notions of physics!

 

Anyone up to finding this historical ignorance of a fact of great scientific important that eventually altered the basic history of physics, and subsequently many concepts of nature and of the pragmatic and ethical role of science in society today? 

 

As some list readers are curious about the possible meanings of how CSP used (deployed, abused, depended on?) the terms, icon, index and symbol, how can one fit Prof. Purdie’s usage of chemical symbols into CSP’s propositional logic that links qualisign, sinsign, and legisign? 

 

This set of theoretical chemical sorites leads to simple question relevant to the current discussion, Is the concept of chemical identity related to CSP’s “line of identity”?

 

Have fun!

 

Cheers

 

Jerry 

 

 



Opinion piece

The periodic table and other wallcharts in the teaching of chemistry in St Andrews, 1884–1919




R. Alan Aitken
 and 

M. Pilar Gil





Published:17 August 2020https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2019.0299







 


 

Abstract


The teaching of the chemistry of the elements at the University of St Andrews by Professor Thomas Purdie FRS is examined with reference to selections from a collection of recently discovered historic wallcharts and extracts from his detailed hand-written lecture notes. Together these reveal a comprehensive and exciting programme of lectures incorporating numerous practical demonstrations which were continually updated to reflect the latest state of knowledge in what was a rapidly changing field.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Mendeleev and the periodic table’.

 




 



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[PEIRCE-L] Nagarjunas Tetralemma in EGs (WAS Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs))

[Helmut Raulien]

List, I am posting it again now, with the WAS- stuff underneath, so you can read what at all I am talking about.

 

Perhaps you have seen, that I have pondered how to express possibility with alpha-graphs. I still suspect, that my result "A(A(A))" is erratic somehow: Why not just write "A" to indicate, that A is part of the universe of discourse, and thus a possibility. But being a part of the universe of discourse means being a general possibility: It exists in it. If on the other hand there are cuts or a scroll in it, I think, that some actual possibility is indicated, is that so?

 

Anyway, the buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna said, that there are four forms of existence:

 

1. A exists

 

2. A does not exist

 

3. A both exists and does not exist

 

4. A neither exists nor does not exist.

 

An analysis with alpha-graphs has the result, that case 3. and 4. are logically the same: "A(A)". With the rule of insertion you may write it "A(A(A))". If I am right, that this means possibility, Nagarjuna´s Tetralemma just says, that something either does exist, or does not exist, or does possibly exist. Well, who would deny that? But sadly there is not much of a mystery or wisdom left, being boiled down this way.

 

Nagarjuna said, there is a fifth form too, in which all the four forms are combined, and also the negation of the result of that. But I am too disillusioned at the moment to look at that, maybe later. Maybe not at all, when you will have shown me my faults, which I am expecting due to a noncomplete (glimmer of hope) induction.

 

Best,

Helmut



 
 



 

WAS:
 

 



Supp-supp-supplement: But it would mean, that the rule of erasure must be abandoned, if you want to deal with fuzzy logic such as possibility. Of course "A(A)" does not mean "A is possible", or does it?  On the other hand, maybe it does??? I donot think so, unless the meaning of the "AND"- symbol should be discussed about.

 
 


Supp-supplement: But this problem might be solved by just writing the possible into the sheet of assertion, to say, that such a thing generally exists. So: "A(A(A))" would mean: "Possibly A" or "A is possible". Or not again? I am suspecting everything.
 
 

Supplement: No, Stop! I wrote no good! " "Unicorns exist" XOR NOT "Unicorns exist" ", and "If unicorns exist, unicorns exist", are both true, but "Possibly unicorns exist" is false. So my XOR-translation to alpha-graphs is false, and broken cuts are justified. Sorry.

 



John, List,

 

I mistakenly mentioned the shading. The shading is just making the alpha-graph clearer. To express insecurity, Peirce uses tincture, and broken cuts. I am wondering what is better to express "It possibly rains": To just let the variable stand for, resp. the ingredient be "It possibly rains", or to have a broken cut around "It rains", or to write in Boolean: "It rains" XOR NOT "It rains", which in EG-Boolean (only NOTs and ANDs) would be: NOT ("It rains AND NOT "It rains"). In EG: ("It rains" ("It rains")). This obviously is "If it rains, it rains". But does that mean, that it possibly rains? Maybe, why not? But if it is, why did Peirce introduce the broken cut?

 

I just am wondering, what are the advantages and disadvantages of expressing possibility either in the ingredient (or what the variable stands for), or with a broken cut, or by translating it via XOR to alpha-graphs. Given, my XOR-translation proposal is correct for possibility. For probability it is much more complicated, I think, because probability, other than possibility, has a value. How might this be handled with graphs?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

12. August 2020 um 05:44 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A, Helmut R, Terry R, Jon AS, List,

JA> I can't imagine why anyone would bother with Peirce's logic if it's just Frege and Russell in another syntax, which has been the opinion I usually get from FOL fans.

That is true.  But the EG structure and rules of inference are elegant, and the
algebraic structure is klutzy.  For a mathematician, that is a huge difference..
What makes EGs elegant is the simplicity of the structure, minimum of primitives, and symmetry of the rules. 

As a result of that structure, note how eg1911 generalizes and relates Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction and sequent calculus.  As a result, an unsolved research problem from 1988 is almost trivial in terms of the EG rules. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

JA> Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives is already far in advance of anything we'd see again for a century, in principle in most places, in practice in many others, chock full of revolutionary ideas...

I agree.  But those ideas are part of the ontology rather than the logic.

HR> I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables

I agree that variables are problematical.  Three-dimensional graphs show direct connections.  But 2-D graphs are forced to use klutzy features like selective

[PEIRCE-L] Nagarjuna´s Tetralemma in EGs

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

Perhaps you have seen, that I have pondered how to express possibility with alpha-graphs. I still suspect, that my result "A(A(A))" is erratic somehow: Why not just write "A" to indicate, that A is part of the universe of discourse, and thus a possibility. But being a part of the universe of discourse means being a general possibility: It exists in it. If on the other hand there are cuts or a scroll in it, I think, that some actual possibility is indicated, is that so?

 

Anyway, the buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna said, that there are four forms of existence:

 

1. A exists

 

2. A does not exist

 

3. A both exists and does not exist

 

4. A neither exists nor does not exist.

 

An analysis with alpha-graphs has the result, that case 3. and 4. are logically the same: "A(A)". With the rule of insertion you may write it "A(A(A))". If I am right, that this means possibility, Nagarjuna´s Tetralemma just says, that something either does exist, or does not exist, or does possibly exist. Well, who would deny that? But sadly there is not much of a mystery or wisdom left, being boiled down this way.

 

Nagarjuna said, there is a fifth form too, in which all the four forms are combined, and also the negation of the result of that. But I am too disillusioned at the moment to look at that, maybe later. Maybe not at all, when you will have shown me my faults, which I am expecting due to a noncomplete (glimmer of hope) induction.

 

Best,

Helmut
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

 



Supp-supp-supplement: But it would mean, that the rule of erasure must be abandoned, if you want to deal with fuzzy logic such as possibility. Of course "A(A)" does not mean "A is possible", or does it?  On the other hand, maybe it does??? I donot think so, unless the meaning of the "AND"- symbol should be discussed about.

 
 


Supp-supplement: But this problem might be solved by just writing the possible into the sheet of assertion, to say, that such a thing generally exists. So: "A(A(A))" would mean: "Possibly A" or "A is possible". Or not again? I am suspecting everything.
 
 

Supplement: No, Stop! I wrote no good! " "Unicorns exist" XOR NOT "Unicorns exist" ", and "If unicorns exist, unicorns exist", are both true, but "Possibly unicorns exist" is false. So my XOR-translation to alpha-graphs is false, and broken cuts are justified. Sorry.

 



John, List,

 

I mistakenly mentioned the shading. The shading is just making the alpha-graph clearer. To express insecurity, Peirce uses tincture, and broken cuts. I am wondering what is better to express "It possibly rains": To just let the variable stand for, resp. the ingredient be "It possibly rains", or to have a broken cut around "It rains", or to write in Boolean: "It rains" XOR NOT "It rains", which in EG-Boolean (only NOTs and ANDs) would be: NOT ("It rains AND NOT "It rains"). In EG: ("It rains" ("It rains")). This obviously is "If it rains, it rains". But does that mean, that it possibly rains? Maybe, why not? But if it is, why did Peirce introduce the broken cut?

 

I just am wondering, what are the advantages and disadvantages of expressing possibility either in the ingredient (or what the variable stands for), or with a broken cut, or by translating it via XOR to alpha-graphs. Given, my XOR-translation proposal is correct for possibility. For probability it is much more complicated, I think, because probability, other than possibility, has a value. How might this be handled with graphs?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

12. August 2020 um 05:44 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A, Helmut R, Terry R, Jon AS, List,

JA> I can't imagine why anyone would bother with Peirce's logic if it's just Frege and Russell in another syntax, which has been the opinion I usually get from FOL fans.

That is true.  But the EG structure and rules of inference are elegant, and the
algebraic structure is klutzy.  For a mathematician, that is a huge difference..
What makes EGs elegant is the simplicity of the structure, minimum of primitives, and symmetry of the rules. 

As a result of that structure, note how eg1911 generalizes and relates Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction and sequent calculus.  As a result, an unsolved research problem from 1988 is almost trivial in terms of the EG rules. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

JA> Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives is already far in advance of anything we'd see again for a century, in principle in most places, in practice in many others, chock full of revolutionary ideas...

I agree.  But those ideas are part of the ontology rather than the logic.

HR> I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables

I agree that variables are problematical.  Three-dimensional graphs show direct connections.  But 2-D graphs are forced to use klutzy features like selectives or bridges.  The word 'cut' by itself is not bad.  But it is a reminder of the recto/verso terminology, which Peirce said was "as bad as it could be".

In eg191, Peirce talks about 'shading'.  Although that word takes six letters, the people who the read and write EGs should forget the words and think directly in terms of the diagrams.  When doing subtraction, for example, nobody thinks of the words 'minuend' and 'subtrahend'.  The words are useful for talking about math, but they should never intrude on the structure of the math.

TR> FOL doesn’t accommodate possible-world semantics, which is necessary (and sufficient) to resolve the paradoxes of material conditionality that persist in FOL.  Moreover, possible-world semantics for modalities (necessity, possibility) and intensional (vs. extensional) conditionality are prerequisites for expressing causal laws.

That's true.  For the semantics of modal logic, an ontology about possible worlds or something like Peirce's three universes (possibilities, actualities, and the necessitated) must be added.  Work on modal semantics during the century after Peirce shows that FOL can be used to define such theories.  See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf and http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

Peirce was not happy with the earlier versions of his modal EGs.  What he intended for Delta graphs is unknown, but any version of FOL  (including eg1911) could be used to state a theory of possible worlds that is sufficent to specify a semantics for Delta graphs.whatever that might be.

JAS> As Peirce explains in R 490...  "if A then B" i

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 


Supp-supplement: But this problem might be solved by just writing the possible into the sheet of assertion, to say, that such a thing generally exists. So: "A(A(A))" would mean: "Possibly A" or "A is possible". Or not again? I am suspecting everything.
 
 

Supplement: No, Stop! I wrote no good! " "Unicorns exist" XOR NOT "Unicorns exist" ", and "If unicorns exist, unicorns exist", are both true, but "Possibly unicorns exist" is false. So my XOR-translation to alpha-graphs is false, and broken cuts are justified. Sorry.

 



John, List,

 

I mistakenly mentioned the shading. The shading is just making the alpha-graph clearer. To express insecurity, Peirce uses tincture, and broken cuts. I am wondering what is better to express "It possibly rains": To just let the variable stand for, resp. the ingredient be "It possibly rains", or to have a broken cut around "It rains", or to write in Boolean: "It rains" XOR NOT "It rains", which in EG-Boolean (only NOTs and ANDs) would be: NOT ("It rains AND NOT "It rains"). In EG: ("It rains" ("It rains")). This obviously is "If it rains, it rains". But does that mean, that it possibly rains? Maybe, why not? But if it is, why did Peirce introduce the broken cut?

 

I just am wondering, what are the advantages and disadvantages of expressing possibility either in the ingredient (or what the variable stands for), or with a broken cut, or by translating it via XOR to alpha-graphs. Given, my XOR-translation proposal is correct for possibility. For probability it is much more complicated, I think, because probability, other than possibility, has a value. How might this be handled with graphs?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

12. August 2020 um 05:44 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A, Helmut R, Terry R, Jon AS, List,

JA> I can't imagine why anyone would bother with Peirce's logic if it's just Frege and Russell in another syntax, which has been the opinion I usually get from FOL fans.

That is true.  But the EG structure and rules of inference are elegant, and the
algebraic structure is klutzy.  For a mathematician, that is a huge difference..
What makes EGs elegant is the simplicity of the structure, minimum of primitives, and symmetry of the rules. 

As a result of that structure, note how eg1911 generalizes and relates Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction and sequent calculus.  As a result, an unsolved research problem from 1988 is almost trivial in terms of the EG rules. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

JA> Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives is already far in advance of anything we'd see again for a century, in principle in most places, in practice in many others, chock full of revolutionary ideas...

I agree.  But those ideas are part of the ontology rather than the logic.

HR> I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables

I agree that variables are problematical.  Three-dimensional graphs show direct connections.  But 2-D graphs are forced to use klutzy features like selectives or bridges.  The word 'cut' by itself is not bad.  But it is a reminder of the recto/verso terminology, which Peirce said was "as bad as it could be".

In eg191, Peirce talks about 'shading'.  Although that word takes six letters, the people who the read and write EGs should forget the words and think directly in terms of the diagrams.  When doing subtraction, for example, nobody thinks of the words 'minuend' and 'subtrahend'.  The words are useful for talking about math, but they should never intrude on the structure of the math.

TR> FOL doesn’t accommodate possible-world semantics, which is necessary (and sufficient) to resolve the paradoxes of material conditionality that persist in FOL.  Moreover, possible-world semantics for modalities (necessity, possibility) and intensional (vs. extensional) conditionality are prerequisites for expressing causal laws.

That's true.  For the semantics of modal logic, an ontology about possible worlds or something like Peirce's three universes (possibilities, actualities, and the necessitated) must be added.  Work on modal semantics during the century after Peirce shows that FOL can be used to define such theories.  See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf and http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

Peirce was not happy with the earlier versions of his modal EGs.  What he intended for Delta graphs is unknown, but any version of FOL  (including eg1911) could be used to state a theory of possible worlds that is sufficent to specify a semantics for Delta graphs.whatever that might be.

JAS> As Peirce explains in R 490...  "if A then B" is not logically equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".

No.  Don Roberts (1973:154) defined a scroll as "Two cuts, one within the other".  That makes it exactly equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".  That is the way Jay Zeman, Ahti, and many others have defined it, and every EG proof that Peirce wrote is based  on that definition.  Any ambig

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: No, Stop! I wrote no good! " "Unicorns exist" XOR NOT "Unicorns exist" ", and "If unicorns exist, unicorns exist", are both true, but "Possibly unicorns exist" is false. So my XOR-translation to alpha-graphs is false, and broken cuts are justified. Sorry.

 



John, List,

 

I mistakenly mentioned the shading. The shading is just making the alpha-graph clearer. To express insecurity, Peirce uses tincture, and broken cuts. I am wondering what is better to express "It possibly rains": To just let the variable stand for, resp. the ingredient be "It possibly rains", or to have a broken cut around "It rains", or to write in Boolean: "It rains" XOR NOT "It rains", which in EG-Boolean (only NOTs and ANDs) would be: NOT ("It rains AND NOT "It rains"). In EG: ("It rains" ("It rains")). This obviously is "If it rains, it rains". But does that mean, that it possibly rains? Maybe, why not? But if it is, why did Peirce introduce the broken cut?

 

I just am wondering, what are the advantages and disadvantages of expressing possibility either in the ingredient (or what the variable stands for), or with a broken cut, or by translating it via XOR to alpha-graphs. Given, my XOR-translation proposal is correct for possibility. For probability it is much more complicated, I think, because probability, other than possibility, has a value. How might this be handled with graphs?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

12. August 2020 um 05:44 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A, Helmut R, Terry R, Jon AS, List,

JA> I can't imagine why anyone would bother with Peirce's logic if it's just Frege and Russell in another syntax, which has been the opinion I usually get from FOL fans.

That is true.  But the EG structure and rules of inference are elegant, and the
algebraic structure is klutzy.  For a mathematician, that is a huge difference..
What makes EGs elegant is the simplicity of the structure, minimum of primitives, and symmetry of the rules. 

As a result of that structure, note how eg1911 generalizes and relates Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction and sequent calculus.  As a result, an unsolved research problem from 1988 is almost trivial in terms of the EG rules. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

JA> Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives is already far in advance of anything we'd see again for a century, in principle in most places, in practice in many others, chock full of revolutionary ideas...

I agree.  But those ideas are part of the ontology rather than the logic.

HR> I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables

I agree that variables are problematical.  Three-dimensional graphs show direct connections.  But 2-D graphs are forced to use klutzy features like selectives or bridges.  The word 'cut' by itself is not bad.  But it is a reminder of the recto/verso terminology, which Peirce said was "as bad as it could be".

In eg191, Peirce talks about 'shading'.  Although that word takes six letters, the people who the read and write EGs should forget the words and think directly in terms of the diagrams.  When doing subtraction, for example, nobody thinks of the words 'minuend' and 'subtrahend'.  The words are useful for talking about math, but they should never intrude on the structure of the math.

TR> FOL doesn’t accommodate possible-world semantics, which is necessary (and sufficient) to resolve the paradoxes of material conditionality that persist in FOL.  Moreover, possible-world semantics for modalities (necessity, possibility) and intensional (vs. extensional) conditionality are prerequisites for expressing causal laws.

That's true.  For the semantics of modal logic, an ontology about possible worlds or something like Peirce's three universes (possibilities, actualities, and the necessitated) must be added.  Work on modal semantics during the century after Peirce shows that FOL can be used to define such theories.  See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf and http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

Peirce was not happy with the earlier versions of his modal EGs.  What he intended for Delta graphs is unknown, but any version of FOL  (including eg1911) could be used to state a theory of possible worlds that is sufficent to specify a semantics for Delta graphs.whatever that might be.

JAS> As Peirce explains in R 490...  "if A then B" is not logically equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".

No.  Don Roberts (1973:154) defined a scroll as "Two cuts, one within the other".  That makes it exactly equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".  That is the way Jay Zeman, Ahti, and many others have defined it, and every EG proof that Peirce wrote is based  on that definition.  Any ambiguous comments about scrolls are irrelevant.

It's true that in some MSS, Peirce used a horribly contorted definition of negation in terms of a scroll.  But in June 1911 (R670), he remembered that his permissions (rules of inference) depend only on whether an 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

 

I mistakenly mentioned the shading. The shading is just making the alpha-graph clearer. To express insecurity, Peirce uses tincture, and broken cuts. I am wondering what is better to express "It possibly rains": To just let the variable stand for, resp. the ingredient be "It possibly rains", or to have a broken cut around "It rains", or to write in Boolean: "It rains" XOR NOT "It rains", which in EG-Boolean (only NOTs and ANDs) would be: NOT ("It rains AND NOT "It rains"). In EG: ("It rains" ("It rains")). This obviously is "If it rains, it rains". But does that mean, that it possibly rains? Maybe, why not? But if it is, why did Peirce introduce the broken cut?

 

I just am wondering, what are the advantages and disadvantages of expressing possibility either in the ingredient (or what the variable stands for), or with a broken cut, or by translating it via XOR to alpha-graphs. Given, my XOR-translation proposal is correct for possibility. For probability it is much more complicated, I think, because probability, other than possibility, has a value. How might this be handled with graphs?

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

12. August 2020 um 05:44 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" 
wrote:


Jon A, Helmut R, Terry R, Jon AS, List,

JA> I can't imagine why anyone would bother with Peirce's logic if it's just Frege and Russell in another syntax, which has been the opinion I usually get from FOL fans.

That is true.  But the EG structure and rules of inference are elegant, and the
algebraic structure is klutzy.  For a mathematician, that is a huge difference..
What makes EGs elegant is the simplicity of the structure, minimum of primitives, and symmetry of the rules. 

As a result of that structure, note how eg1911 generalizes and relates Gentzen's two systems of natural deduction and sequent calculus.  As a result, an unsolved research problem from 1988 is almost trivial in terms of the EG rules. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

JA> Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives is already far in advance of anything we'd see again for a century, in principle in most places, in practice in many others, chock full of revolutionary ideas...

I agree.  But those ideas are part of the ontology rather than the logic.

HR> I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables

I agree that variables are problematical.  Three-dimensional graphs show direct connections.  But 2-D graphs are forced to use klutzy features like selectives or bridges.  The word 'cut' by itself is not bad.  But it is a reminder of the recto/verso terminology, which Peirce said was "as bad as it could be".

In eg191, Peirce talks about 'shading'.  Although that word takes six letters, the people who the read and write EGs should forget the words and think directly in terms of the diagrams.  When doing subtraction, for example, nobody thinks of the words 'minuend' and 'subtrahend'.  The words are useful for talking about math, but they should never intrude on the structure of the math.

TR> FOL doesn’t accommodate possible-world semantics, which is necessary (and sufficient) to resolve the paradoxes of material conditionality that persist in FOL.  Moreover, possible-world semantics for modalities (necessity, possibility) and intensional (vs. extensional) conditionality are prerequisites for expressing causal laws.

That's true.  For the semantics of modal logic, an ontology about possible worlds or something like Peirce's three universes (possibilities, actualities, and the necessitated) must be added.  Work on modal semantics during the century after Peirce shows that FOL can be used to define such theories.  See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf and http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf .

Peirce was not happy with the earlier versions of his modal EGs.  What he intended for Delta graphs is unknown, but any version of FOL  (including eg1911) could be used to state a theory of possible worlds that is sufficent to specify a semantics for Delta graphs.whatever that might be.

JAS> As Peirce explains in R 490...  "if A then B" is not logically equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".

No.  Don Roberts (1973:154) defined a scroll as "Two cuts, one within the other".  That makes it exactly equivalent to "not (A and not-B)".  That is the way Jay Zeman, Ahti, and many others have defined it, and every EG proof that Peirce wrote is based  on that definition.  Any ambiguous comments about scrolls are irrelevant.

It's true that in some MSS, Peirce used a horribly contorted definition of negation in terms of a scroll.  But in June 1911 (R670), he remembered that his permissions (rules of inference) depend only on whether an area is shaded or unshaded.  Since a scroll is limited to two levels, it's just a special case.  In R670, he wrote that Figure 10 with scrolls is identical to Figure 11 with nested areas.  In L231 and later, he never mentioned the word 'scroll'.  The word 'scroll' is just a redunda

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jon, John, List,

 

I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables. Are they thoroughly cecked out premisses, or not? If the object does not affect the interpreter, they may be, then it is analysis, and the inquiry is deduction. If the object of inquiry affects the interpreter, it is partially synthesis, premisses are not completely checked out for their truth, and the cascade of abduction-deduction-induction is applied. Because usually an induction is incomplete, a residue of "implication, imagination, or belief" remains, without making the process nonscientific at all.

 

But I admit, that I have not yet understood, why Peirce pulls this remaining insecurity out of the variables, and puts it into the symbols, such as the shading.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 11. August 2020 um 02:58 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



John, All:

 


JFS:  As Peirce showed in R670, a scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of two ovals.



 

As Peirce explains in R 490, the truth of that statement depends on how we interpret a nest of two ovals, since "if A then B" is not logically equivalent to "not (A and not-B)" when we recognize that a shaded area represents a kind of possibility (Gamma), not just the denial of actuality (Alpha and Beta).

 




JFS:  AS Peirce said in NEM 3:140, a scientific notation should leave as little as possible to implication, imagination, or belief.




 

As Peirce confesses in RS 30, for that very reason (and others) the derivation of negation from the primitive relation of consequence should always be preserved in EGs by including a small blackened circle in any shaded area that does not otherwise have an inner close.

 




JFS:  If you have any further questions, please study the progression from R669 to R670, L231, L378, and L376 and my commentary about them.




 

If you have any further questions, please study R 490, RS 30, and my commentary about them.

 




JFS:  Unless any MSS later than December 1911 are found which say anything to the contrary, the version in L231 must  be considered definitive.




 

No one has the unilateral authority to declare that anything Peirce wrote "must be considered definitive," especially when the text of the manuscript in question includes no such claim for itself.

 

Besides, as I already pointed out, Peirce begins his December 1911 letter to Risteen (RL 376) by stating, "I mentioned to you, while you were [here] last year, that I have a diagrammatic syntax which analyzes the syllogism into no less than six inferential steps. I now describe its latest state of development for the first time" (R 500:1, bold added).  This suggests that he made additional adjustments during the five-plus months after writing RL 231 in June (and two-plus months after writing RL 378 in September), but unfortunately the extant text of RL 376 breaks off without getting much into the details of EGs.  Hopefully the rest of the pages will turn up someday and shed further light.

 

Moreover, as I also already pointed out, in the same letter Peirce explicitly references the 1903 Lowell Lectures and accompanying Syllabus as "the better exposition" than what he provided in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," not RL 231 (or RL 378).  Consequently, if any explanation of EGs could properly "be considered definitive" from Peirce's standpoint, it would have to be that one.

 

In summary, I believe that we must carefully take all of Peirce's writings about EGs into account rather than privileging any one article, letter, or manuscript.  Thanks to Dr. Pietarinen, the three volumes of Logic of the Future will greatly facilitate this.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Sun, Aug 9, 2020 at 10:30 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:


Jon AS,

In NEM 3:140, Peirce made a clear distinction between the vague words of ordinary language, and the precise terminology of science:

CSP>  The language and symbols of ordinary life are short, defective and figurative.  As little as possible is spoken, as much as possible is left to implication, imagination and belief.  But scientific symbols and methods should be complete.  As little as possible should be left to implication, imagination and belief.

By these criteria, eg1911, as specified in L231, is complete.  It is logically equivalent to every version of classical first-order logic from Frege (1879) and Peirce (1885) to the present.  Nothing is left to implication, imagination, or belief.

As Peirce showed in R670, a scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of two ovals.  AS Peirce said in NEM 3:140, a scientific notation should leave as little as possible to implication, imagination, or belief.  That implies that there is no room for any residual meaning for a scroll that is in 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Gary, Jon, List,

 

I would say, and I think it does not contradict Peirce, that a law is a rule that is valid in a certain region: A juristic law in a county or state, a natural law in the universe, a law of logic or mathematics perhaps in every universe, though we cannot check that. So a law is there just so, by being stated, by whom or what whatever. A principle is there for some reason, as purpose, to achieve something. A principle may include a law by using, taking advantage of it. This harnessing includes representation, but is more than representation.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

09. August 2020 um 14:30 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jon AS, you quoted me at the end of your post, but now I’d like to qualify what I said there by quoting Peirce: “we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean.” Here’s the context:

 

[[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective generalization taking place in time. It is the fundamental logical law in course of realization. When I call it objective, I do not mean to say that there really is any difference between the objective and the subjective, except that the subjective is less developed and as yet less generalized. It is only a false word which I insert because after all we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean. ] ‘Abstract of 8 lectures’ (NEM IV, 140)]

 

Gary f.

 


From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 8-Aug-20 16:36
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)


 



Jeff, List:


 






JD:  Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws.






 



I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law."



 






JD:  Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point.






 



Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below).



 






JD:  See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc.



 







CSP:  4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. ...







5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06&page=294&query=principle)






 



There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th.



 






CSP:  2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way ultimately determined or regulated. ...







"Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations






 



Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something else depends," such as "an original law."  The 4th sense similarly defines it as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived."  The 5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system."  In any case, Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the contrary ...



 






JD:  Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term.



 







CSP:  3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which events really tend to conform. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04&page=705&query=l

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Methodology

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: Thank you, Jon, for this great metaphor of the two bins! I guess that a lot of "living experience"-affairs may be handled (I wont say analyzed) by applying this metaphor. But how is it logically? With mutually exclusive bins it is easy. It is XOR. XOR is "NOT (A AND B)", if you want to express it with EGs. Mutually nonexclusive bins on the other hand may be OR, AND, or Subset of one´s of the other. To express it with EGs becomes a bit complicated. Conclusion: Trying to abstract living experience with logic is hard and complicated somehow, but not doing it, avoiding it, is hazardous, because one will easily be a victim of one or the other fallacy. Fallacies are the most dangerous things at all, I think, because they are the fancy dresses common sense and populism are made of. Avoiding fallacies would make the world a better place, to put it pathetically. Pathos, however, is not illogical. Feeling does not work without logic: Both are not different categories, though they are two bins: 1ns and 3ns, but 1ns and 3ns are not two mutually exclusive bins... blahblahblah, bin the bin, or can the can (Suzie Quatro)...



Dear Jon, List,

 

I think, classification is justified, if the pair of bins really consists of two mutually exclusive bins. My bins "analysis" and "synthesis" really are mutually exclusive, I think. The hazard is on, I think, when two non-exclusive bins are treated like mutually exclusive ones. This is done all the time, here two examples: A young beautiful woman marries an old, rich guy. Now people argue, that she only marries him because of the money. But the bins "love" and "money" are not mutually exclusive, so nobody can justifiedly suggest, that she does not love him for real. Other example: The "Frontex" policy leads to the situation, that refugees in rubber boats are not rescued from the mediterranian sea, and drown. Politicians claim, that rather the reasons for fleeing should be overcome. But these bins are not mutually exclusive: On one bin is written: "Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible". On the other bin is written: "Fleeing resons must be fought, but if people are rescued, more people will flee". But, as these bins are not mutually exclusive, a situation may fill both bins at the same time, and what happens in the second bin, does not make the first bin redundant. Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible, period. Keeping people fom going into rubber boats must be achieved with other means than not rescuing. These examples show that it is ok to have two mutually exclusive bins: In one bin there are the pairs of mutually exclusive bins ("tertium non datur", classification), and in the other bin there are the pairs of mutually not exclusive bins (graduality, composition).

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 03. August 2020 um 23:00 Uhr
 "Jon Awbrey" 
wrote:

Dear Helmut,

It's one of the occupational hazards of the classifying mind
that one can start out consciously characterizing aspects of
real situations and end up unwittingly thinking we've gotten
everything under the sun sorted into mutually exclusive bins.

Once the idols of compartmentality and the illusions of autonomous
abstraction get their hold on our minds it is almost impossible to
reconstitute or synthesize what we've torn asunder, if only in our
own minds. The ounce of prevention here is always keeping in mind
that from which all abstractions are abstracted, living experience.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/3/2020 1:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also
> all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis
> versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical
> or synthetical, I??d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is
> part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have
> theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide
> et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is
> part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and
> the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.
> If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate
> change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify
> sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly
> analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic.
> Semiotics is kind of both, I think.
> I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways
> analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for
> fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in t

[PEIRCE-L] Aw: Re: Peirce's Methodology

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear Jon, List,

 

I think, classification is justified, if the pair of bins really consists of two mutually exclusive bins. My bins "analysis" and "synthesis" really are mutually exclusive, I think. The hazard is on, I think, when two non-exclusive bins are treated like mutually exclusive ones. This is done all the time, here two examples: A young beautiful woman marries an old, rich guy. Now people argue, that she only marries him because of the money. But the bins "love" and "money" are not mutually exclusive, so nobody can justifiedly suggest, that she does not love him for real. Other example: The "Frontex" policy leads to the situation, that refugees in rubber boats are not rescued from the mediterranian sea, and drown. Politicians claim, that rather the reasons for fleeing should be overcome. But these bins are not mutually exclusive: On one bin is written: "Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible". On the other bin is written: "Fleeing resons must be fought, but if people are rescued, more people will flee". But, as these bins are not mutually exclusive, a situation may fill both bins at the same time, and what happens in the second bin, does not make the first bin redundant. Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible, period. Keeping people fom going into rubber boats must be achieved with other means than not rescuing. These examples show that it is ok to have two mutually exclusive bins: In one bin there are the pairs of mutually exclusive bins ("tertium non datur", classification), and in the other bin there are the pairs of mutually not exclusive bins (graduality, composition).

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 03. August 2020 um 23:00 Uhr
 "Jon Awbrey" 
wrote:

Dear Helmut,

It's one of the occupational hazards of the classifying mind
that one can start out consciously characterizing aspects of
real situations and end up unwittingly thinking we've gotten
everything under the sun sorted into mutually exclusive bins.

Once the idols of compartmentality and the illusions of autonomous
abstraction get their hold on our minds it is almost impossible to
reconstitute or synthesize what we've torn asunder, if only in our
own minds. The ounce of prevention here is always keeping in mind
that from which all abstractions are abstracted, living experience.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/3/2020 1:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also
> all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis
> versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical
> or synthetical, I??d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is
> part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have
> theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide
> et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is
> part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and
> the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.
> If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate
> change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify
> sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly
> analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic.
> Semiotics is kind of both, I think.
> I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways
> analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for
> fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in the wrong
> way, without me knowing yet, what in this respect a wrong and a justified way
> would be.
> I think, for example, that natural fallacy is something like that: First
> analysing a phenomenon, and then synthesizing the analysed parts as a rule.
> In mathematics, a synthesis has to be corrobated by a proof. In other sciences,
> this is not so easy.
> To keep my post Peirce-related, here a quote from the Commens Dictionary:
> "
> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:372-3
>
> /Two meanings of the term ???philosophy???/ call for our particular notice. The two
> meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive, that is in making it
> a knowledge of things real, in opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is
> knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses; and they further agree in
> making philosophical truth extremely general. But in other respects they differ
> as widely as they well could. For one of them, which is better entitled (except
> by usage) to being distinguished as /philosophia prima/ than is ontology,
> embraces all that positive science which rest

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical or synthetical, I´d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.

If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic. Semiotics is kind of both, I think.

I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in the wrong way, without me knowing yet, what in this respect a wrong and a justified way would be.

I think, for example, that natural fallacy is something like that: First analysing a phenomenon, and then synthesizing the analysed parts as a rule.

In mathematics, a synthesis has to be corrobated by a proof. In other sciences, this is not so easy.

To keep my post Peirce-related, here a quote from the Commens Dictionary:

"



1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:372-3


Two meanings of the term ‘philosophy’ call for our particular notice. The two meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive, that is in making it a knowledge of things real, in opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses; and they further agree in making philosophical truth extremely general. But in other respects they differ as widely as they well could. For one of them, which is better entitled (except by usage) to being distinguished as philosophia prima than is ontology, embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience and does not search out occult or rare phenomena; while the other, which has been called philosophia ultima, embraces all that truth which is derivable by collating the results of the different special sciences, but which is too broad to be perfectly established by any one of them. The former is well named by Jeremy Bentham’s term cenoscopy […], the latter goes by the name of synthetic philosophy.




"

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 03. August 2020 um 18:17 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jon et al.,

The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its dynamic object “in view” only by means of the indexical function of the sign, which connects it to actual experience. Diagrammatic signs are not so good at that.

The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic reasoning is only a mathematical procedure, it leaves out the experiential element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism. 

Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls real relations as opposed to relations of reason (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a positive science thus must employ a genuine Index, as opposed to a degenerate index such as ‘the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram’ (EP2:172).

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey 
Sent: 3-Aug-20 11:35
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragma, Pragmata, Pragmatitude!

 

Dear Gary, All ...

 

I was obviously having a lot more fun with words in those days ...

sigh, good times ... the point of it all being I always see the whole complex of meanings associated with the Greek root "pragma, pragmata" through the more threadbare veil of the Latin "object".

That complex contains all the senses of aims, concerns, ends, goals, intentional objects, and purposes we tend to express more obliquely through the use of "object" to mean "objective".  Still, the latter use does have some currency in cybernetics, operations research, and systems theory, so it's a handy sense to keep in mind.

 

Cf: Liddell & Scott

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma

 

Regards,

 

Jon

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 


 
 
 

Supp-supplement: And I think, this is the core of the natural fallacy: That you cannot conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, the natural fallacy does not exist, it only is a fallacy, if you do not regard the "Want", the voluntarity. Ethics are not based on "Ought", but about "Want", volition. If you take the bypass over "Want", the individual volitions, you can conclude from "Is" to "Ought", I think.

Best, Helmut

Supplement: And about ethics, I think, that not only the aim plays a role, but also the history. For example, somebody observes people working together, which works very well, and they seem happy. So he says: "Working together is good". Then he becomes a politician in North Korea, and forces people to work together building a statue of Kim Jong Un. Then he wonders, why these people are not happy, and are not working effectively. He did not look at the history, that the people he first had observed, have worked together voluntarily, and were interested in the result of their work. The same counts for lifelong marriage: Conservative religious functionaries probably have observed happy couples who have stayed together all their lives. Next they forbade divorce. The result is unhappiness, violence, and traumatized children. This way "The way to hell is paved with good intentions".

Best, Helmut



Jon, Gary, Gary, List,

 

I merely want to talk about the quote "there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness" (Peirce). How did he mean that? Did he mean, that there is no universal esthetic good- or badness? Maybe, but I think, that there is esthetic good- and badness that counts alike for all humans. I guess that almost every human finds a sunflower beautiful (if not conditioned against it, by e.g. allergy or trauma like having been forced to harvest sunflower seeds as a child), and the smell of rotting meat ugly (if not being necrophil- the exception corrobates the rule). Flies though find this smell delicious. 

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

17. Juli 2020 um 02:42 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Gary R., Gary F., List:

 

Peirce's statement that "there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness" is by no means his final word on the subject, not even in this particular lecture.  In fact, here is what he adds in the very next paragraph.

 




CSP:  But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or against it. ... An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202, 1903)




 

I suggest that esthetics becomes normative as soon as it furnishes its principles to ethics.  As Gary R. already noted, "it is the three normative sciences taken together that makes them normative. Further, that the central science of ethics is, associated as it clearly is with 2ns, is the commanding one of the three."  Peirce goes on to observe that the determination of an ultimate aim does not depend at all on any findings of the special sciences, let alone the practical sciences.

 




CSP:  Accordingly the problem of ethics is to ascertain what end is possible. It might be thoughtlessly supposed that special science could aid in this ascertainment. But that would rest on a misconception of the nature of an absolute aim, which is what would be pursued under all possible circumstances--that is, even though the contingent facts ascertained by special sciences were entirely different from what they are. (CP 5.134, EP 2:202)




 

I suggest that esthetics is normative because it identifies "an absolute aim," the end that ought to be pursued because it is the one that necessarily "would be pursued under all possible circumstances," regardless of the actual "contingent facts."  Peirce then proceeds to fulfill the "excited anticipation" that Gary R. mentioned.

 




CSP:  The importance of the matter for pragmatism is obvious. For if the meaning of a symbol consists in how it might cause us to act, it is plain that this "how" cannot refer to the description of mechanical motions that it might cause, but must intend to refer to a description of the action as having this or that aim. In order to understand pragmatism, therefore, well enough to subject it to intelligent criticism, it is incumbent upon us to inquire what an ultimate aim, capable of being pursued in an indefinitely prolonged course of action, can be. (CP 5.135, EP 2:202)




 

I suggest that according to pragmatism, "the meaning of a symbol" does not consist in efficient causation of "mechanical motions," but rather final causation of purposive action; i.e., self-controlled habits of conduct that ideally are governed by an ultimate aim, which esthetics must supply via ethics.



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: And about ethics, I think, that not only the aim plays a role, but also the history. For example, somebody observes people working together, which works very well, and they seem happy. So he says: "Working together is good". Then he becomes a politician in North Korea, and forces people to work together building a statue of Kim Jong Un. Then he wonders, why these people are not happy, and are not working effectively. He did not look at the history, that the people he first had observed, have worked together voluntarily, and were interested in the result of their work. The same counts for lifelong marriage: Conservative religious functionaries probably have observed happy couples who have stayed together all their lives. Next they forbade divorce. The result is unhappiness, violence, and traumatized children. This way "The way to hell is paved with good intentions".

Best, Helmut



Jon, Gary, Gary, List,

 

I merely want to talk about the quote "there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness" (Peirce). How did he mean that? Did he mean, that there is no universal esthetic good- or badness? Maybe, but I think, that there is esthetic good- and badness that counts alike for all humans. I guess that almost every human finds a sunflower beautiful (if not conditioned against it, by e.g. allergy or trauma like having been forced to harvest sunflower seeds as a child), and the smell of rotting meat ugly (if not being necrophil- the exception corrobates the rule). Flies though find this smell delicious. 

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

17. Juli 2020 um 02:42 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Gary R., Gary F., List:

 

Peirce's statement that "there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness" is by no means his final word on the subject, not even in this particular lecture.  In fact, here is what he adds in the very next paragraph.

 




CSP:  But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or against it. ... An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202, 1903)




 

I suggest that esthetics becomes normative as soon as it furnishes its principles to ethics.  As Gary R. already noted, "it is the three normative sciences taken together that makes them normative. Further, that the central science of ethics is, associated as it clearly is with 2ns, is the commanding one of the three."  Peirce goes on to observe that the determination of an ultimate aim does not depend at all on any findings of the special sciences, let alone the practical sciences.

 




CSP:  Accordingly the problem of ethics is to ascertain what end is possible. It might be thoughtlessly supposed that special science could aid in this ascertainment. But that would rest on a misconception of the nature of an absolute aim, which is what would be pursued under all possible circumstances--that is, even though the contingent facts ascertained by special sciences were entirely different from what they are. (CP 5.134, EP 2:202)




 

I suggest that esthetics is normative because it identifies "an absolute aim," the end that ought to be pursued because it is the one that necessarily "would be pursued under all possible circumstances," regardless of the actual "contingent facts."  Peirce then proceeds to fulfill the "excited anticipation" that Gary R. mentioned.

 




CSP:  The importance of the matter for pragmatism is obvious. For if the meaning of a symbol consists in how it might cause us to act, it is plain that this "how" cannot refer to the description of mechanical motions that it might cause, but must intend to refer to a description of the action as having this or that aim. In order to understand pragmatism, therefore, well enough to subject it to intelligent criticism, it is incumbent upon us to inquire what an ultimate aim, capable of being pursued in an indefinitely prolonged course of action, can be. (CP 5.135, EP 2:202)




 

I suggest that according to pragmatism, "the meaning of a symbol" does not consist in efficient causation of "mechanical motions," but rather final causation of purposive action; i.e., self-controlled habits of conduct that ideally are governed by an ultimate aim, which esthetics must supply via ethics.



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 8:45 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:
















Gary f, List,

 

I've been reflecting on your several posts in the Pragmatic Trivium thread(s) and found them, and especially this one, very useful in beginning to once again try to think through these matters. But, preparing for a medical procedure happening overmorrow (a word