subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation \(Was semantic problem with the term\)"

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> 1) You write that 'chance isn't separate from Thirdness'. I think it is. 
> Chance/Firstness is a basic modal category; it's not part of Thirdness.
> 
> 2) I don't read Peirce's view as Neoplatonism ..i.e., that the  first 
> principle is 'the One'. I see Peirce's first principle as Mind.
> 

How do you read his long cosmological writings? That is, while I understand why 
you’d want to read him this way, and it may be more fruitful, it seems you have 
to exclude some pretty key texts.

Anyway, I’m not saying firstness is part of thirdness in any strong sense. 
Thirdness is a kind of mediate between firstness as chance and secondness as 
law. Also while Peirce has some neoplatonic tendencies I think the One and 
Matter are eliminated as “false categories” or merely limits of thought.

The process he discusses in CP 6.215-220 or CP 1.407-15 is the origin of the 
universe. So when we talk of the universe those are already all in place. 
Further Peirce himself calls this platonic. 

The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing 
universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have 
become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194)

Again I think there are compelling reasons to doubt Peirce here so we have to 
distinguish between what Peirce thought and our own analysis of what we might 
say he should have thought. 

I probably won’t be able to write more until next week.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I don't see that 'repetition depends on chance'. I think that you are 
> ignoring that Thirdness [the action of developing and taking habits] is 
> primordial and not a result of another modal category, i.e., Firstness. [I 
> think that all three modes are primordial; others see only Thirdness as 
> primordial]
> 
> 

Just to add to this, I probably should add a bit more defense to anticipate 
some arguments. I’m here thinking of the following quote:

Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third (CP: 6.32, 
1891)

again

Three elements are active in the world: first, chance; second, law; and third, 
habit taking (CP 1.409, 1888)

That is we must distinguish law from the tendency to take habits. There is I 
think some potential inconsistencies here in Peirce over time. So noting the 
time with our quotes is important. My sense is that Peirce was conflicted from 
thinking through this from a perspective of human psychology versus his more 
mathematical and physical drives and experiments. Fundamentally this tendency 
to acquire habits is learning, love, or aesthetics. Habit formation is the 
generalization of belief and habit privation is the generalization of doubt to 
the categories in general.

Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind 
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and like 
other habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its 
dissolution) perfectly satisfied. Doubt is of an altogether contrary genus. It 
is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. Now a privation of a habit, in 
order to be anything at all, must be a condition of erratic activity that in 
some way must get superseded by a habit. (CP: 5.417, 1905)

But this tendency is the law of mind which makes something more likely to 
arise, but which Peirce conceives of in some early form of statistical 
mechanics, perhaps arising out of Boltzmann’s thermodynamics. (As John noted 
Peirce doesn’t appear to have a full understanding of statistical mechanics, 
although one shouldn’t dismiss the possibility of reading Gibbs)

I think the key text here is “The Architecture of Theories” from 1891. In that 
thirdness is the mediating between firstness and secondness as end.

The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in the 
character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an 
exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces into a motion a component 
motion to be combined with the rest by the parallelogram of forces; but the 
component motion must actually take place exactly as required by the law of 
force. On the other hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law. 
Nay, exact conformity would be in downright conflict with the law ; since it 
would instantly crystallise thought and prevent all further formation of habit. 
The law of mind only makes a given feeling more likely to arise. It thus 
resembles the “non-conservative” forces of physics, such as viscosity and the 
like, which are due to statistical uniformities in the chance encounters of 
trillions of molecules.

So what he wants is something between pure chance and pure law which is the 
statistical tendency.
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-07 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Clark, list -

1) You write that 'chance isn't separate from Thirdness'. I think it
is. Chance/Firstness is a basic modal category; it's not part of
Thirdness.

2) I don't read Peirce's view as Neoplatonism ..i.e., that the
first principle is 'the One'. I see Peirce's first principle as Mind.

Peirce does consider all three categories as universal [5.43 and
on]..and considers that they are 'simple and irreducible..and real
constituents of the universe. 5.82. He considers that all three are
each 'irreducible and unanalyzable conceptions' ..5.88. 5.91-92. That
is, Firstness can be separate from Thirdness.

"What is required for the idea of a genuine Thirdness is an
independent solid Secondness and not a Secondness that is a mere
corollary of an unfounded and inconceivable Thirdness; and a similar
remark may be made in reference to Firstness. 5.91.

Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 4:23 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
"We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only
within a limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for
an element of pure spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at
least must be supposed to mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover,
conformity with law is a fact requiring to be explained; and since
Law in general cannot be explained by any law in particular, the
explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of pure
chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy . (“A Guess at the
Riddle”,

My reading of the above is that all three modes are primordial.
Chance or Firstness 'mingles' with Thirdness because all three modes
are primordial [in my view] but this correlation doesn't mean that
Chance CAUSES Thirdness. It co-exists with it and enables new laws to
emerge and develop. I don’t quite understand that reading I confess.
Chance isn’t separate from thirdness. This is really explicit in the
other quotes I gave from Peirce’s cosmology. Again, I don’t think
we have to agree with Peirce there. I have my doubts. But I’m not
quite sure I see how to read him as asserting what you are claiming.
Particularly when he explains the origin of firstness, secondness and
thirdness out of “the womb of indeterminacy.”
If law were primordial it wouldn’t need to be explained whereas
Peirce is explicit that it must be explained. Now I’m more with you
in that I’m not sure I buy Peirce’s neoplatonism here. I’d much
rather favor the three be primordial and irreducible. That makes far
more sense to me. But that doesn’t appear to be Peirce’s
position.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> "We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a 
> limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure 
> spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be supposed to 
> mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a fact 
> requiring to be explained; and since Law in general cannot be explained by 
> any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is 
> developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (“A Guess at 
> the Riddle”,
> 
> My reading of the above is that all three modes are primordial. Chance or 
> Firstness 'mingles' with Thirdness because all three modes are primordial [in 
> my view] but this correlation doesn't mean that Chance CAUSES Thirdness. It 
> co-exists with it and enables new laws to emerge and develop.
> 
I don’t quite understand that reading I confess. Chance isn’t separate from 
thirdness. This is really explicit in the other quotes I gave from Peirce’s 
cosmology. Again, I don’t think we have to agree with Peirce there. I have my 
doubts. But I’m not quite sure I see how to read him as asserting what you are 
claiming. Particularly when he explains the origin of firstness, secondness and 
thirdness out of “the womb of indeterminacy.”

If law were primordial it wouldn’t need to be explained whereas Peirce is 
explicit that it must be explained. Now I’m more with you in that I’m not sure 
I buy Peirce’s neoplatonism here. I’d much rather favor the three be primordial 
and irreducible. That makes far more sense to me. But that doesn’t appear to be 
Peirce’s position.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-07 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 
 Clark, list - but the breaking up of old habits and the development
of new habits are two separate actions. It could conceivably happen
that the old habits might dissipate - and no 'chance' occurrences
took place to enable new habits [that would be entropic ...and I
posit doesn't happen that often..]

Habits are not merely regularities of belief and behaviour, but
generalizations of belief and behaviour - such that a certain amount
of flexibility of Token [particular instantiation] can take place
without nullifying the Type and its habits.

I don't see that 'repetition depends on chance'. I think that you
are ignoring that Thirdness [the action of developing and taking
habits] is primordial and not a result of another modal category,
i.e., Firstness. [I think that all three modes are primordial; others
see only Thirdness as primordial]

With regard to your quote:

"We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within
a limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an
element of pure spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at
least must be supposed to mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover,
conformity with law is a fact requiring to be explained; and since 
Law in general cannot be explained by any law in particular, the
explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of pure
chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (“A Guess at the
Riddle”,

My reading of the above is that all three modes are primordial.
Chance or Firstness 'mingles' with Thirdness because all three modes
are primordial [in my view] but this correlation doesn't mean that
Chance CAUSES Thirdness. It co-exists with it and enables new laws to
emerge and develop.

Edwina
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 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
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 On Fri 07/04/17  2:15 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
 On Apr 7, 2017, at 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up 
old habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to
occur
 Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation. The key
point of habit is repetition. But the repetition itself depends upon
chance. This is best seen at the cosmological level where Peirce
makes this argument explicitly.
  Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have
come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a
flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in
some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there
would have come other successions ever more and more closely
connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound
together into something like a continuous flow.  
 The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially
from time in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a
single stream. Different flashes might start different streams,
between which there should be no relations of contemporaneity or
succession. So one stream might branch into two, or two might
coalesce. But the further result of habit would inevitably be to
separate utterly those that were long separated, and to make those
which presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect union.
Those that were completely separated would be so many different
worlds which would know nothing of one another; so that the effect
would be just what we actually observe. (CP 1.412) 
 This habit taking is later explained.
 all things have a tendency to take habits. . . . [For] every
conceivable real object, there is a greater probability of acting as
on a former like occasion than otherwise. This tendency itself
constitutes a regularity, and is continually on the increase. . . .
It is a generalizing tendency; it causes actions in the future to
follow some generalizations of past actions; and this tendency itself
is something capable of similar generalizations; and thus, it is
self-generative. (CP 1.409 emphasis mine) 
 Quoting Kelly Parker on this point:
 The character of such things, and consequently the relations and
modes of interaction among them, would be extremely irregular at
first. The principle of habit-taking has the effect of making events
in the Universe of Actuality more stable and regular. It underlies
the emergence of permanent substances, as we have seen. Beyond this,
it has the effect of stabilizing the kinds of reaction which tend to
occur among different substances. Nothing forces there to be a
tendency toward regularity in the Universe of Actuality, for the
notion of force implies necessity, an advanced variety of the
regularity we are trying to explain (CP 1.407). Regularity, like
possibility and particularity, must appear in the evolving cosmos by
chance. But just

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-07 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I
don't see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of
different habits.

But habit-taking is primordial. My only difference is that I think
that the tendency to behave within Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness  - each of which are different behaviours - all three are
primordial. I don't see that Thirdness is privileged in this set;
i.e., First-in-line.

Edwina
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 On Fri 07/04/17  1:58 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Clark, Jon S, Gary F, Edwina, John S, list,
 This is a most interesting discussion, but for now I'd like only to
repeat a point which, as I recall, Jon S recently made in response to
you. You wrote:
 It’s also the case that chance creates habit.
 But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up
old habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to
occur--but I don't see that "chance creates habit" either in Peirce's
early cosmological musings, nor once *this* universe--our universe--is
underway. The habit-taking tendency (3ns) is there from the get-go,
either as primordial (in the sense that all three categories are) or,
to put it somewhat differently and with a different emphasis, in the
sense that one can derive monadic and dyadic relations from triadic
ones, but that stringing together monads and dyads (although properly
speaking monads can't even be strung together) could  never produce
triads (nor a fortiori produce all higher -adities according to
Peirce's 'reduction thesis').
 While some would disagree, Jon S and I have argued here near the
close of last year that the 'black board' metaphor in the final
lecture of RLT strongly suggests that if one associates continuity
with 3ns (which Peirce in places explicitly does), then continuity
(so 3ns) is primal and the two other categories are either derived
from--or inscribed upon--that ur-continuity or, in some obscure way
contained within it (potentially) from the outset--although this last
matter remains quite unclear to me at present (alathough I think Jon S
might say 'inscribed upon it'). 
 But, again, my present question is, why do you continue to say that
"chance creats habit"?
 Best,
 Gary R
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New YorkC 745718
482-5690 
 On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
 On Apr 5, 2017, at 10:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 I would suggest that 1ns is better characterized as spontaneity,
life, and freedom than as pure chance in the sense of randomness,
especially as it relates to mind as 3ns.
 I’ve been trying to think the best way to get into this subject. I
recognize it’ll diverge from Edwina’s discussion so I’m changing
the subject. It’ll definitely get into ontology and a careful
analysis of terminology which I know Edwina doesn’t enjoy so
that’ll help keep the discussions separate. 
 The question ends up being even if we can make a distinction between
the terms what the cash value is. That is if meaning is given by a
careful application of the pragmatic maxim, what does it mean here? 
 First off I’m not sure there’s as big a divide as you think in
those quoted texts. Particulary this one.
 Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term  to
express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity.
(CP 6.201; 1898)
 I think that while Peirce may not have been familiar with Gibb’s
development over Boltzmann of statistical mechanics and
thermodynamics, he did have pretty clear and particular views on what
the mathematics of chance was. That is he was a frequentist and
thought the outward aspect mathematically was this frequentist
conception. The inner aspect is feeling. 
 Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion
feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that
which within itself is feeling.[—]…diversification is the vestige
of chance-spontaneity; and wherever diversity is increasing, there
chance must be operative. On the other hand, wherever uniformity is
increasing, habit must be operative. (“Man’s Glassy Essence”,
CP 6.265-6, 1892) 
 Chance […] as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a
distribution. That is to say, there is a large collection consisting,
say, of colored things and of white things. Chance is a particular
manner of distribution of color among all the things. But in order
that this phrase should have any meaning, it must refer to some
definite arrangement of all the things. (“Reasoning and the Logic
of Things”, CP 6.74, 1898) 
 Given this, while I understand the desire to distinguish spontaneity
from chance as Peirce uses it they are synonymous. That means that the
distinction you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-07 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear all,



“Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation.”



So what is chance doing, breaking up habits or creating new ones?

Is the habit stable or unstable?

Which habit, the broken up one or the newly created one?



What is the start; a condition of disorder or a condition of ordered
disorder?

What is the state after the transition;

ordered or disordered with respect to the next transition?



What Universe do you imagine when talking about the start of the Universe,
something like the big bang, the birth of a newborn or the start of a new
day?


So, what do *you* think?

Is that what *we* think?



Best,
J

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may *break up* old
> habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur
>
>
> Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation. The key point
> of habit is repetition. But the repetition itself depends upon chance. This
> is best seen at the cosmological level where Peirce makes this argument
> explicitly.
>
> Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come
> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then
> by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time
> would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the
> first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other
> successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the
> tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would
> have been bound together into something like a continuous flow.
>
> The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from
> time in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream.
> Different flashes might start different streams, between which there should
> be no relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one stream might
> branch into two, or two might coalesce. But the further result of habit
> would inevitably be to separate utterly those that were long separated, and
> to make those which presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect
> union. Those that were completely separated would be so many different
> worlds which would know nothing of one another; so that the effect would be
> just what we actually observe. (CP 1.412)
>
>
> This habit taking is later explained.
>
> all things have a tendency to take habits. . . . [For] every conceivable
> real object, there is a *greater probability of acting as on a former
> like occasion than otherwise*. This tendency itself constitutes a
> regularity, and is continually on the increase. . . . It is a generalizing
> tendency; it causes actions in the future to follow some generalizations of
> past actions; and this tendency itself is something capable of
> similar generalizations; and thus, it is self-generative. (CP 1.409
> emphasis mine)
>
> Quoting Kelly Parker on this point:
>
> The character of such things, and consequently the relations and modes of
> interaction among them, would be extremely irregular at first.
> The principle of habit-taking has the effect of making events in the
> Universe of Actuality more stable and regular. It underlies the emergence
> of permanent substances, as we have seen. Beyond this, it has the effect of
> stabilizing the kinds of reaction which tend to occur among
> different substances. Nothing forces there to be a tendency toward
> regularity in the Universe of Actuality, for the notion of force implies
> necessity, an advanced variety of the regularity we are trying to explain
> (CP 1.407). Regularity, like possibility and particularity, must appear in
> the evolving cosmos by chance. But just as we have seen the tendency to
> take habits operate on Firstness to establish the Universe of Ideas and
> on Secondness to establish the universe of Actuality, so does it operate on
> Thirdness, on itself, to establish a universe dominated by
> Thirdness, lawfulness, order, and reasonableness.
>
> Law is habit and Peirce is explicit in “A Guess at the Riddle” that law
> comes out of chance.
>
> We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a
> limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of
> pure spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be
> supposed to mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a
> fact requiring to be explained; and since *Law in general cannot be
> explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing
> how law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy*.
> (“A Guess at the Riddle”,  CP 1.407)
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up old 
> habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur

Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation. The key point of 
habit is repetition. But the repetition itself depends upon chance. This is 
best seen at the cosmological level where Peirce makes this argument explicitly.

Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come 
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by 
the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would 
not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because 
resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and 
more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into 
something like a continuous flow. 

The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from time 
in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. Different 
flashes might start different streams, between which there should be no 
relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one stream might branch into 
two, or two might coalesce. But the further result of habit would inevitably be 
to separate utterly those that were long separated, and to make those which 
presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect union. Those that were 
completely separated would be so many different worlds which would know nothing 
of one another; so that the effect would be just what we actually observe. (CP 
1.412)

This habit taking is later explained.

all things have a tendency to take habits. . . . [For] every conceivable real 
object, there is a greater probability of acting as on a former like occasion 
than otherwise. This tendency itself constitutes a regularity, and is 
continually on the increase. . . . It is a generalizing tendency; it causes 
actions in the future to follow some generalizations of past actions; and this 
tendency itself is something capable of similar generalizations; and thus, it 
is self-generative. (CP 1.409 emphasis mine)

Quoting Kelly Parker on this point:

The character of such things, and consequently the relations and modes of 
interaction among them, would be extremely irregular at first. The principle of 
habit-taking has the effect of making events in the Universe of Actuality more 
stable and regular. It underlies the emergence of permanent substances, as we 
have seen. Beyond this, it has the effect of stabilizing the kinds of reaction 
which tend to occur among different substances. Nothing forces there to be a 
tendency toward regularity in the Universe of Actuality, for the notion of 
force implies necessity, an advanced variety of the regularity we are trying to 
explain (CP 1.407). Regularity, like possibility and particularity, must appear 
in the evolving cosmos by chance. But just as we have seen the tendency to take 
habits operate on Firstness to establish the Universe of Ideas and on 
Secondness to establish the universe of Actuality, so does it operate on 
Thirdness, on itself, to establish a universe dominated by Thirdness, 
lawfulness, order, and reasonableness.

Law is habit and Peirce is explicit in “A Guess at the Riddle” that law comes 
out of chance.

We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a limited 
range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure 
spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be supposed to 
mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a fact requiring 
to be explained; and since Law in general cannot be explained by any law in 
particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of 
pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (“A Guess at the Riddle”,  CP 
1.407)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:50 PM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though 
> it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex 
> planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many French theorists 
> rejected it because atoms and molecules were not observables.

Ah. I should have guessed. I was reading it as Standard Model and was getting 
thoroughly confused. LOL.

To the issue of Peirce and statistical mechanics as a foundation for 
thermodynamics that article by Andrew Reynolds discusses it a bit. Here’s the 
full reference:

Reynolds, Andrew "Peirce's Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics," 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), 
pp. 403-423

He discusses Peirce’s use of Boltzman although he never mentions Gibbs who I 
believe is the first to coin the term statistical mechanics. While Peirce 
mentions Clausius that’s not really statistical.

I found one other article that I’d not read before. “Peirce as a Participant in 
the Bohr-Einstein Discussion.” by Peder Christiansen in Charles S. Peirce and 
the Philosophy of Science pg 222. He argues that his five Monist papers was 
largely how Peirce engaged in the discussion with Boltzmann and his opponents. 
Although he also notes that Peirce’s papers were largely unknown by the main 
figures in the debate.

https://books.google.com/books?id=0SV6CgAAQBAJ=PA223=PA223#v=onepage=false

Anyway, while he doesn’t mention it explicitly, the way Peirce discusses 
Boltzmann makes me think he had read "On the Relation Between the Second Law of 
the Mechanical Theory of Heat and the Probability Calculus with Respect to the 
Theorems on Thermal Equilibrium” which was Boltzmann’s statistical formulation 
of the second law.

> I think that for some time now most physicists have agreed that order emerges 
> from disorder, along the lines outlined by Prigogine (he won the Nobel prize, 
> after all).

Yes, and Peirce’s arguments are pretty similar to Prigogine’s. Prigogine as I 
understand it was actually fairly familiar with Peirce. Indeed he quotes Peirce 
on the heat death of the universe. (Going from my notes here - but it’s 
relevant to the current discussion)

We may say that we know enough of the forces at work in the universe to know 
that there is none that can counteract this tendency away from every definite 
end but death. But although no force can counteract this tendency, chance may 
and will have the opposite influence. Force is in the long run dissipative; 
chance is in the long run concentrative. The dissipation of energy by the 
regular laws of nature is by those very laws accompanied by circumstances more 
and more favorable to its reconcentration by chance. (W 4: 551)

> Entropy production is behind the formation of order; order doesn’t just 
> happen on its own. The chance aspects of entropy production are crucial to 
> the emergence of order, but the overall trend is always to increasing 
> disorder.

Right, but it’s worth asking again about Peirce’s view of heat death here.

> Personally, I think that all thirdness originates this way, through symmetry 
> breaking, and I wrote an article on that Information Originates in Symmetry 
> Breaking (1996). I did not see it as confirming Peirce’s ideas about habit 
> formation, and I am still very doubtful that he didn’t just goof on this 
> whole issue because of a lack of understanding of SM.

Well my problem ultimately is over statistical mechanics and the eventual death 
of the universe which Peirce pretty well denies seeing it merely as an issue of 
heat inefficiencies which he thinks chance avoids.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that adaptation and evolution are 
> due to randomness and Natural Selection. I think that adaptation and 
> evolution are actions of Mind; that is, the biological systems adapt to 
> environmental realities - not randomly - but as INFORMED systems.

Well that might put a bit of an impasse since I tend to accept normal 
evolutionary theories and mechanisms. But more what I’m getting at is how 
chance (speaking broadly here in a fashion that might include randomness and 
spontaneity) combined with more determinate structures can lead to mind. Put an 
other way, I see mind as informed mind as more an emergent or higher order 
phenomena. But it’s a phenomena that arises out of habit and chance.

My sense, perhaps incorrect, is that you want spontaneity within mind to be a 
kind of informed deliberation not reducible to its parts (including chance).

> By entropy I am referring to the nature of a biological system that 'holds' 
> or binds energy as matter within its morphological nature. So, a particular 
> biological species that changes its capacity to hold onto this matter-and its 
> metabolic transformation, and it might to this for any number of reasons - 
> might release energy/matter to the 'world', which is then rapidly made use of 
> by another biological system. So, we will see an increasing complexity in an 
> ecosystem. A swamp with myriad grasses might see the development of more 
> 'individualistic grasses' which function only in a narrow range of the swamp, 
> BUT, this might lead to a proliferation of more diverse grasses and plants; 
> more diverse insects and birds - some at the periphery of the swamp, some in 
> the mainstream. 
> 

I’m trying to wrap my mind around that sense of entropy and relate it more to 
the sense in traditional thermodynamics. This seems a much, much, narrower use 
although maybe I’m just missing something since I’m not familiar with this use. 
(John - you mentioned your experience with thermodynamics. Any help here?)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Clark:

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 3:02 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying universally 
> because they only applied to determinate systems. He also saw entropy as a 
> statistical measure. The question is whether his semiotics violates the laws 
> of thermodynamics and he explicitly saw that they did. The question then 
> becomes how contemporary understanding of thermodynamics in science would see 
> it. Most contemporary science sees thermodynamics as unbreakable. In that 
> case if the universe is getting more ordered that violates the second law of 
> thermodynamics. 

Given the historical development of the concepts of thermodynamics, I was 
surprised by these comments.

Very curious about the citations and the years involved.

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Jerry Rhee

Edwina, list:

“We didn't sit down and forge a synthesis. We all knew each other's
writings; all spoke with each other. We all had the same goal, which was
simply to understand fully the evolutionary process...By combining our
knowledge, we managed to straighten out all the conflicts and disagreements
so that finally a united picture of evolution emerged. The theory of
evolution is quite rightly called the greatest unifying theory in biology.”
~Ernst Mayr,

“C.H. Waddington’s isolation and irritation when he made his famous comment
on the limitations of population genetics (Waddington, 1967), and won
admiration for his panache but no consideration for his content: “The whole
real guts of evolution- which is, how do you come to have horses and
tigers, and things- is outside the mathematical theory.”
~Stephen Jay Gould

This isn’t all of it.  It is only a selected microcosm of an old pattern of
conflict that results when one asks what suffices as an explanation (*aitia*).
For instance, what does Mayr mean by “understand fully”?

It is not to merely label Mayr as a reductionist (neoDarwinist, the term is
associated with the meeting at Princeton, ~1940), or Waddington as a
holist.  Yet, there is a lot in this narrative from which one can get a
better awareness of the difference of expression between “scientific” and
“philosophical” desires (different types of *orexis*).

For instance, compare Mayr and Provine’s “The Evolutionary Synthesis:
Perspectives on the Unification of Biology” with Waddington’s “Towards a
Theoretical Biology”.  Each gives a personal perspective in their
respective books.  I would also recommend beginning with Hamburger’s essay
in the former.

Hth,

Jerry R

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jerry - is there much difference between standard Darwinism and
> Neo-Darwinism with regard to how adaptation and evolution emerges and
> develops?
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Thu 06/04/17 2:51 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina,
>
>
>
> I put myself forth as a biologist before anything else and I object to
> your classification of mutation/natural selection (rather, descent with
> modification) as a neoDarwinian hypothesis.  That’s just terrible.
>
>
>
> There is a lot that has been contemplated about chance/spontaneity in
> evolutionary processes.  Goldschmidt’s hopeful monsters and Waddington’s
> epigenetic landscape and atavism come to mind (cf., Baldwin effect).
>
>
>
> From a quick glance of the introduction of Brooks/Wiley book, I suspect
> there ought to be no contradictions between these since it was Waddington
> who organized the Bellagio conference.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Clark, list:
>>
>> 1) First - I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that adaptation and
>> evolution are due to randomness and Natural Selection. I think that
>> adaptation and evolution are actions of Mind; that is, the biological
>> systems adapt to environmental realities - not randomly - but as INFORMED
>> systems. That is, to leave adaptation up to randomness - would effectively
>> mean extinction for the species - since a 'lucky guess' coming along 'just
>> in time' is as specious a hope as my winning the lottery [sigh]. I consider
>> that biological systems as semiosic are informationally networked with
>> their environment and therefore, develop a number of potential responses to
>> environmental stresses. Any one of these potential responses would be
>> functional. The selection of ONE of these potential responses MIGHT
>> be 'random' but again, any one of these potential responses would have been
>> functional.
>>
>> As has been pointed out by several of us, chance is not the same as
>> randomness. Change/spontaneity is an action of freedom-to-develop; in this
>> case, a freedom to develop a new morphological nature as an INFORMED
>> response to environmental realities. This is NOT a random action but a free
>> action, based on informed knowledge of 'what's going on out there'. A
>> common example is where a bird will develop a harder beak as the seeds in
>> the environment develop harder shells. This is NOT random, which means
>> UNINFORMED and pure 'lottery-win' [though I have my doubts about the
>> randomness of lottery wins...mutter, mutter...]
>>
>> That is, - and this is found in a number of modern biologists - [see
>> Daniel Brooks: Evolution as Entropy] - this view rejects equilibrium
>> between organisms and their environment; rejects randomness as the cause of
>> new morphologies; rejects natural selection as the ultimate cause; rejects
>> optimality theory; rejects independent evolution of each species.
>>
>> By entropy I am referring to the nature of a biological system that
>> 'holds' or binds energy

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jerry - is there much difference between standard Darwinism and
Neo-Darwinism with regard to how adaptation and evolution emerges and
develops?

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 06/04/17  2:51 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Edwina,  
I put myself forth as a biologist before anything else and I object
to your classification of mutation/natural selection (rather, descent
with modification) as a neoDarwinian hypothesis.  That’s just
terrible.  
There is a lot that has been contemplated about chance/spontaneity
in evolutionary processes.  Goldschmidt’s hopeful monsters and
Waddington’s epigenetic landscape and atavism come to mind (cf.,
Baldwin effect).
From a quick glance of the introduction of Brooks/Wiley book, I
suspect there ought to be no contradictions between these since it
was Waddington who organized the Bellagio conference.   
Best,
 Jerry R  
 On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 Clark, list:

1) First - I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that
adaptation and evolution are due to randomness and Natural Selection.
I think that adaptation and evolution are actions of Mind; that is,
the biological systems adapt to environmental realities - not
randomly - but as INFORMED systems. That is, to leave adaptation up
to randomness - would effectively mean extinction for the species -
since a 'lucky guess' coming along 'just in time' is as specious a
hope as my winning the lottery [sigh]. I consider that biological
systems as semiosic are informationally networked with their
environment and therefore, develop a number of potential responses to
environmental stresses. Any one of these potential responses would be
functional. The selection of ONE of these potential responses MIGHT
be 'random' but again, any one of these potential responses would
have been functional. 

As has been pointed out by several of us, chance is not the same as
randomness. Change/spontaneity is an action of freedom-to-develop; in
this case, a freedom to develop a new morphological nature as an
INFORMED response to environmental realities. This is NOT a random
action but a free action, based on informed knowledge of 'what's
going on out there'. A common example is where a bird will develop a
harder beak as the seeds in the environment develop harder shells.
This is NOT random, which means UNINFORMED and pure 'lottery-win'
[though I have my doubts about the randomness of lottery
wins...mutter, mutter...] 

That is, - and this is found in a number of modern biologists - [see
Daniel Brooks: Evolution as Entropy] - this view rejects equilibrium
between organisms and their environment; rejects randomness as the
cause of new morphologies; rejects natural selection as the ultimate
cause; rejects optimality theory; rejects independent evolution of
each species. 

By entropy I am referring to the nature of a biological system that
'holds' or binds energy as matter within its morphological nature.
So, a particular biological species that changes its capacity to hold
onto this matter-and its metabolic transformation, and it might to
this for any number of reasons - might release energy/matter to the
'world', which is then rapidly made use of by another biological
system. So, we will see an increasing complexity in an ecosystem. A
swamp with myriad grasses might see the development of more
'individualistic grasses' which function only in a narrow range of
the swamp, BUT, this might lead to a proliferation of more diverse
grasses and plants; more diverse insects and birds - some at the
periphery of the swamp, some in the mainstream.  

In each of these new types of organic systems, a new 'habit of
existence and continuity' will develop.

I don't know if this helps. I suspect that it's not really
clarifying your questions.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Thu 06/04/17  1:45 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com [3] sent:
 On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them -
and since chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so
to speak, necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are
primordial; just as differentiation into discrete instantiations is
primordial..
 Could you clarify this? Are you speaking of biological systems at a
starting point where our analysis presumes they already are there?
(Say a swamp in the year 2000 as the starting point - there are
already habitual behaviors in place) 
 The question I have is that I assume you think new habits can
develop. While this isn’t purely random due

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Jerry Rhee

Edwina,



I put myself forth *as* a biologist before anything else and I object to
your classification of mutation/natural selection (rather, descent with
modification) as a *neoDarwinian hypothesis*.  That’s just terrible.



There is a lot that has been contemplated about chance/spontaneity in
evolutionary processes.  Goldschmidt’s hopeful monsters and Waddington’s
epigenetic landscape and atavism come to mind (cf., Baldwin effect).



From a quick glance of the introduction of Brooks/Wiley book, I suspect
there ought to be no contradictions between these since it was Waddington
who organized the Bellagio conference.



Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Clark, list:
>
> 1) First - I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that adaptation and
> evolution are due to randomness and Natural Selection. I think that
> adaptation and evolution are actions of Mind; that is, the biological
> systems adapt to environmental realities - not randomly - but as INFORMED
> systems. That is, to leave adaptation up to randomness - would effectively
> mean extinction for the species - since a 'lucky guess' coming along 'just
> in time' is as specious a hope as my winning the lottery [sigh]. I consider
> that biological systems as semiosic are informationally networked with
> their environment and therefore, develop a number of potential responses to
> environmental stresses. Any one of these potential responses would be
> functional. The selection of ONE of these potential responses MIGHT
> be 'random' but again, any one of these potential responses would have been
> functional.
>
> As has been pointed out by several of us, chance is not the same as
> randomness. Change/spontaneity is an action of freedom-to-develop; in this
> case, a freedom to develop a new morphological nature as an INFORMED
> response to environmental realities. This is NOT a random action but a free
> action, based on informed knowledge of 'what's going on out there'. A
> common example is where a bird will develop a harder beak as the seeds in
> the environment develop harder shells. This is NOT random, which means
> UNINFORMED and pure 'lottery-win' [though I have my doubts about the
> randomness of lottery wins...mutter, mutter...]
>
> That is, - and this is found in a number of modern biologists - [see
> Daniel Brooks: Evolution as Entropy] - this view rejects equilibrium
> between organisms and their environment; rejects randomness as the cause of
> new morphologies; rejects natural selection as the ultimate cause; rejects
> optimality theory; rejects independent evolution of each species.
>
> By entropy I am referring to the nature of a biological system that
> 'holds' or binds energy as matter within its morphological nature. So, a
> particular biological species that changes its capacity to hold onto this
> matter-and its metabolic transformation, and it might to this for any
> number of reasons - might release energy/matter to the 'world', which is
> then rapidly made use of by another biological system. So, we will see an
> increasing complexity in an ecosystem. A swamp with myriad grasses might
> see the development of more 'individualistic grasses' which function only
> in a narrow range of the swamp, BUT, this might lead to a proliferation of
> more diverse grasses and plants; more diverse insects and birds - some at
> the periphery of the swamp, some in the mainstream.
>
> In each of these new types of organic systems, a new 'habit of existence
> and continuity' will develop.
>
> I don't know if this helps. I suspect that it's not really clarifying your
> questions.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Thu 06/04/17 1:45 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
>
>
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them - and
> since chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so to speak,
> necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are primordial; just
> as differentiation into discrete instantiations is primordial..
>
>
> Could you clarify this? Are you speaking of biological systems at a
> starting point where our analysis presumes they already are there? (Say a
> swamp in the year 2000 as the starting point - there are already habitual
> behaviors in place)
>
> The question I have is that I assume you think new habits can develop.
> While this isn’t purely random due to selection, surely chance is a major
> component to developing new habits.
>
> John, list - I agree with you that Firstness, in itself, is not entropic -
> since it also operates within a stable system as vagueness, openness. But
> Firstness as spontaneity, within that vagueness, can lead as Peirce pointed
> out to minute changes in the form of the system, which can be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread John Collier

SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though 
it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex 
planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many French theorists 
rejected it because atoms and molecules were not observables.

I think that for some time now most physicists have agreed that order emerges 
from disorder, along the lines outlined by Prigogine (he won the Nobel prize, 
after all). David Layzer’s 1990Cosmogenesis makes the idea pretty clear on a 
cosmic scale. I applied the idea to biological information systems in the first 
paper in the journal Biology and Philosophy in 1986. At the time it was a bit 
adventurous, but not especially so. Entropy production is behind the formation 
of order; order doesn’t just happen on its own. The chance aspects of entropy 
production are crucial to the emergence of order, but the overall trend is 
always to increasing disorder. Personally, I think that all thirdness 
originates this way, through symmetry breaking, and I wrote an article on that 
Information Originates in Symmetry Breaking (1996). I did not see it as 
confirming Peirce’s ideas about habit formation, and I am still very doubtful 
that he didn’t just goof on this whole issue because of a lack of understanding 
of SM.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 06 April 2017 7:39 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:03 AM, John Collier 
> > wrote:
>
> There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the 
> fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say 
> that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound.

I’d tend to agree that reconciling QM to TD hasn’t been well thought through. 
I’m not sure that entails TD doesn’t apply (not that you are making that claim 
- just emphasizing the distinction)

What do you mean by SM?

> I don’t think I agree with Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some 
> cases it can be.

I took her to just be making that claim in a narrow area of inquiry.

> I think it is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce 
> focuses on chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, 
> such as when we have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in 
> either of our determining that we will be in the store at that time is 
> coordinated with our friend’s determinants except that these determinants 
> become coordinated when we meet. Without both stories together, the meeting 
> is chance, but not random in the technical sense, since the stories together 
> can be compressed to mark our meeting. I call situations like this relative 
> randomness: two histories are not sufficient individually to predict a common 
> event – they don’t contain enough information to compute this event, but the 
> stories together do, assuming determinism.

This is more or less what I was getting at. The combination of 
chance/determinism can lead to unique situations, such as Peirce argues happens 
with mind. I want to address Jon’s point about distinguishing between chance 
and what we might call variants of agency. I think a fair bit of work has been 
done on that in the free will literature. I’m not sure though that Peirce draws 
the distinctions that we’ve seen in the last 20-30 years of that literature. 
(Not that we should expect him to)

I’ll probably not get to Jon’s answer until later though.

> In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of 
> the concept of entropy.
>

Not quite sure what you mean by that. I was just speaking of how the universe 
crystalizes into a system of higher information than was there at the beginning 
for Peirce. Peirce’s solution is just to say that TD only applies to the 
determinate part of a system. That is he doesn’t see entropy as an universal 
law, but a much more limited law. Is that more or less what you’re agreeing 
with or are you agreeing with me that such a claim is problematic for most 
physicists? Could you clarify a bit here?

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 
 Clark, list:

1) First - I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that
adaptation and evolution are due to randomness and Natural Selection.
I think that adaptation and evolution are actions of Mind; that is,
the biological systems adapt to environmental realities - not
randomly - but as INFORMED systems. That is, to leave adaptation up
to randomness - would effectively mean extinction for the species -
since a 'lucky guess' coming along 'just in time' is as specious a
hope as my winning the lottery [sigh]. I consider that biological
systems as semiosic are informationally networked with their
environment and therefore, develop a number of potential responses to
environmental stresses. Any one of these potential responses would be
functional. The selection of ONE of these potential responses MIGHT
be 'random' but again, any one of these potential responses would
have been functional.

As has been pointed out by several of us, chance is not the same as
randomness. Change/spontaneity is an action of freedom-to-develop; in
this case, a freedom to develop a new morphological nature as an
INFORMED response to environmental realities. This is NOT a random
action but a free action, based on informed knowledge of 'what's
going on out there'. A common example is where a bird will develop a
harder beak as the seeds in the environment develop harder shells.
This is NOT random, which means UNINFORMED and pure 'lottery-win'
[though I have my doubts about the randomness of lottery
wins...mutter, mutter...]

That is, - and this is found in a number of modern biologists - [see
Daniel Brooks: Evolution as Entropy] - this view rejects equilibrium
between organisms and their environment; rejects randomness as the
cause of new morphologies; rejects natural selection as the ultimate
cause; rejects optimality theory; rejects independent evolution of
each species. 

By entropy I am referring to the nature of a biological system that
'holds' or binds energy as matter within its morphological nature.
So, a particular biological species that changes its capacity to hold
onto this matter-and its metabolic transformation, and it might to
this for any number of reasons - might release energy/matter to the
'world', which is then rapidly made use of by another biological
system. So, we will see an increasing complexity in an ecosystem. A
swamp with myriad grasses might see the development of more
'individualistic grasses' which function only in a narrow range of
the swamp, BUT, this might lead to a proliferation of more diverse
grasses and plants; more diverse insects and birds - some at the
periphery of the swamp, some in the mainstream. 

In each of these new types of organic systems, a new 'habit of
existence and continuity' will develop.

I don't know if this helps. I suspect that it's not really
clarifying your questions.

Edwina
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 On Thu 06/04/17  1:45 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
 On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them -
and since chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so
to speak, necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are
primordial; just as differentiation into discrete instantiations is
primordial..
 Could you clarify this? Are you speaking of biological systems at a
starting point where our analysis presumes they already are there?
(Say a swamp in the year 2000 as the starting point - there are
already habitual behaviors in place) 
 The question I have is that I assume you think new habits can
develop. While this isn’t purely random due to selection, surely
chance is a major component to developing new habits. 
John, list - I agree with you that Firstness, in itself, is not
entropic - since it also operates within a stable system as
vagueness, openness. But Firstness as spontaneity, within that
vagueness, can lead as Peirce pointed out to minute changes in the
form of the system, which can be accepted within Thirdness and lead
to new habits of formation and interaction. 

I also agree that randomness and spontaneity are not identical - and
that Firstness is 'spontaneity'.
 I’ll hold off for now discussing the distinction between
spontaneity, chance and randomness. I do think if we use the terms we
need to be clear what we mean by them since they are all ambiguous
terms. 
 The problem I have here is what you mean by entropy and change.
After all change can happen that doesn’t increase entropy. While
change typically increases entropy of the system of course it can
reduce the entropy of the subsystem (as is common in evolutionary
change). So I’m not quite sure relative to your topic of biological
creatures what you mean by entropy. Could you clarify a little? (Sorry
as my training just isn’t in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:03 AM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the 
> fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say 
> that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound.

I’d tend to agree that reconciling QM to TD hasn’t been well thought through. 
I’m not sure that entails TD doesn’t apply (not that you are making that claim 
- just emphasizing the distinction)

What do you mean by SM?

> I don’t think I agree with Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some 
> cases it can be. 

I took her to just be making that claim in a narrow area of inquiry.

> I think it is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce 
> focuses on chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, 
> such as when we have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in 
> either of our determining that we will be in the store at that time is 
> coordinated with our friend’s determinants except that these determinants 
> become coordinated when we meet. Without both stories together, the meeting 
> is chance, but not random in the technical sense, since the stories together 
> can be compressed to mark our meeting. I call situations like this relative 
> randomness: two histories are not sufficient individually to predict a common 
> event – they don’t contain enough information to compute this event, but the 
> stories together do, assuming determinism.

This is more or less what I was getting at. The combination of 
chance/determinism can lead to unique situations, such as Peirce argues happens 
with mind. I want to address Jon’s point about distinguishing between chance 
and what we might call variants of agency. I think a fair bit of work has been 
done on that in the free will literature. I’m not sure though that Peirce draws 
the distinctions that we’ve seen in the last 20-30 years of that literature. 
(Not that we should expect him to)

I’ll probably not get to Jon’s answer until later though.

> In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of 
> the concept of entropy.
> 

Not quite sure what you mean by that. I was just speaking of how the universe 
crystalizes into a system of higher information than was there at the beginning 
for Peirce. Peirce’s solution is just to say that TD only applies to the 
determinate part of a system. That is he doesn’t see entropy as an universal 
law, but a much more limited law. Is that more or less what you’re agreeing 
with or are you agreeing with me that such a claim is problematic for most 
physicists? Could you clarify a bit here?

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them - and since 
> chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so to speak, 
> necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are primordial; just as 
> differentiation into discrete instantiations is primordial..

Could you clarify this? Are you speaking of biological systems at a starting 
point where our analysis presumes they already are there? (Say a swamp in the 
year 2000 as the starting point - there are already habitual behaviors in place)

The question I have is that I assume you think new habits can develop. While 
this isn’t purely random due to selection, surely chance is a major component 
to developing new habits. 
> John, list - I agree with you that Firstness, in itself, is not entropic - 
> since it also operates within a stable system as vagueness, openness. But 
> Firstness as spontaneity, within that vagueness, can lead as Peirce pointed 
> out to minute changes in the form of the system, which can be accepted within 
> Thirdness and lead to new habits of formation and interaction.
> 
> I also agree that randomness and spontaneity are not identical - and that 
> Firstness is 'spontaneity'.
> 
> 

I’ll hold off for now discussing the distinction between spontaneity, chance 
and randomness. I do think if we use the terms we need to be clear what we mean 
by them since they are all ambiguous terms. 

The problem I have here is what you mean by entropy and change. After all 
change can happen that doesn’t increase entropy. While change typically 
increases entropy of the system of course it can reduce the entropy of the 
subsystem (as is common in evolutionary change). So I’m not quite sure relative 
to your topic of biological creatures what you mean by entropy. Could you 
clarify a little? (Sorry as my training just isn’t in biology but physics. I 
recognize I’m bringing a set of expectations that perhaps don’t apply.)

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - actually, I agree with everything you have said below
EXCEPT for the notion of 'God'.

That is - I certainly agree that:

- chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them -
and since chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so
to speak, necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are
primordial; just as differentiation into discrete instantiations is
primordial..

- I do agree that the Universe is a 'vast purpose' but in place of
Peirce's and your term of 'God', I use Peirce's other term of 'Mind'.
Pure Mind - also known in other circles by the less mythic and
semantically heavy term of Reason, Energy or whatever. And - the only
purpose I see is the materialization of energy into matter. I admit
this removes the nobility of the notion of 'God's Purpose' but - I'm
afraid I can't insert anthropomorphic intentionality to Mind.

Edwina

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 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
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 On Wed 05/04/17 10:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Clark, List:
 CG:  For Peirce chance both forms habits but also allows breaks from
habit.
 As I understand him, especially in his late writings, for Peirce
chance does not form habits, it only facilitates breaking them; e.g.,
small deviations from the laws of nature.  The habit-taking tendency
(3ns) is "original," rather than a spontaneous development brought
about by chance (1ns).  According to my reading of CP 6.490 in
particular, super-order is a  prerequisite for being.
 CG:  Again for Peirce the universe as a whole can be considered mind
and the universe is thus a kind of argument that is preceding by
thinking itself.
 As I understand him, for Peirce the universe as a whole is indeed an
argument, "a vast representamen, a great symbol  [3ns] of God's
purpose," which (like every symbol) has "organically attached to it,
its Indices of Reactions [2ns] and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]" (CP
5.119; 1903).  So the one doing the thinking is not the universe 
itself, but God as "Pure mind, creative of thought" (CP 6.490). 
God's purpose, which the universe represents, is the summum
bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to
create (CP 1.615; 1903).
 Of course, I acknowledge that Edwina strongly disagrees with me on
most or all of this.  We have reached significant consensus on
interpreting certain aspects of Peirce's semeiotic, but our
interpretations of his metaphysics presumably remain very different. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 3:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
 On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [4]> wrote:
I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation,
except that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that
standpoint, uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic
in nature. The question really is of chance. For Peirce chance both
forms habits but also allows breaks from habit. Mind is the capacity
to form habits but habits can be long term habits or short term
habits. Again for Peirce the universe as a whole can be considered
mind and the universe is thus a kind of argument that is preceding by
thinking itself. However that means the universe is at odds with
thermodynamics, which Peirce thought applied only to mechanistic
deterministic systems. 
 What Edwina is more or less saying (if I have her right) is that
thinking of all this in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That
is we should appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way. I
don’t have any problem with that, I should add. I think Peirce’s
cosmology has always been problematic. Both in terms of his arguments
for his cosmology but also it’s simply a view I think few people are
comfortable with. There’s a reason why platonism is often used
disparagingly. I think appropriating Peirce and his semiotics in a
more narrow way is completely fine. We can talk about signs quite
well without buying into his objective idealism. Although there will
be places where this will cause problem precisely because Peirce saw
an unity to his own thought. 
 I suspect the differences between you and Edwina in other contexts
ultimately is a manifestation of to what degree are we using Peirce
and to what degree are we attempting to understand Peirce on his own
terms. I think Edwina (and correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) gets
frustrated in the list is because there’s often been so much focus
on Peirce’s ontology and terminology related to that ontology
rather than on application (where the ontology matters far less).
 So

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-06 Thread John Collier

A few points. Thermodynamics is a specialty of mine since I was an 
undergraduate, especially the statistical version. I don’t think I agree with 
Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some cases it can be. In other 
cases it is just something like form considered in isolation. I take it that 
the senses (qualia on some  accounts) start with this, but there is typically a 
good deal more going on outside of this firstness that would lead me not to 
call it entropic. However I would also say that there are events that we 
perceive that are not coordinated with previous experience, and that these can 
lead to habits to accommodate future similar events. See my Dealing with the 
Unexpected (CASYS 2000) 
for an account of how this can happen in a complex system like the mind, though 
I see no reason why this need be a mental process, and could apply to 
interacting complex processes in general, leading to habits in the broad sense. 
In my paper I use the idea to explain Piaget’s asdsimi9lation and 
accommodation, which is, of course, a generalization process, but a novel one, 
not preprogramed.


There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the fact 
that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say that 
QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound. I think it 
is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce focuses on 
chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, such as when we 
have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in either of our 
determining that we will be in the store at that time is coordinated with our 
friend’s determinants except that these determinants become coordinated when we 
meet. Without both stories together, the meeting is chance, but not random in 
the technical sense, since the stories together can be compressed to mark our 
meeting. I call situations like this relative randomness: two histories are not 
sufficient individually to predict a common event – they don’t contain enough 
information to compute this event, but the stories together do, assuming 
determinism.

In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of the 
concept of entropy.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 05 April 2017 8:43 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)


On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:

Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the 
ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward 
more differentiation but towards more generality.
What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic 
dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce
Hopefully you saw that subsequent post where I noted not everyone agreed with 
the article I was using. Although I think in terms of Peirce’s conception of 
why thermodynamics doesn’t apply it’s pretty on the ball. My sense (perhaps 
wrong) is that the differences tend to be tied to terminology.

To the above, I agree habits are introducing more and more generality. However 
as they become more and more habitual they come more and more to take the 
character of substance. That is substance/matter is simply a reflection of a 
lack of variation from the habit. Peirce saw in the long run that these habits 
would crystalize in some sense.

Now from the perspective of a habit, any variation is a swerve. Peirce in 
various places appears to have since qualia or feeling as firstness as the 
inner view of swerve that he picks up (in a somewhat distorted fashion) from 
the Epircureans. So to that degree that swerve or chance is a break from habit 
I fully agree with you. That’s entropy, formally considered. The problem is 
that Peirce’s conception of the in the long run means habits become more set 
which is anti-entropic.

The question though is what happens when habits form. Peirce sees that 
formation as also occurring out of chance. That’s why I think we can’t only say 
that chance/feeling is entropy. What Peirce sees as entropy proper is purely in 
terms of deterministic mechanics and the Boltzmann statistical view of entropy. 
So here we’re distinguishing between the law of entropy and the measure of 
entropy. That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Chance as a break 
from habit increases the measure of entropy. But it does not affect the law of 
entropy which is purely a law of physical necessary motion.

The reason this is difficult to wrap our mind around is because we’re all used 
to quantum mechanics with it’s notion of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

CG:  For Peirce chance both forms habits but also allows breaks from habit.

As I understand him, especially in his late writings, for Peirce chance *does
not* form habits, it *only* facilitates breaking them; e.g., small
deviations from the laws of nature.  The habit-taking tendency (3ns) is
"original," rather than a spontaneous development brought about by chance
(1ns).  According to my reading of CP 6.490 in particular, super-order
is a *prerequisite
*for being.

CG:  Again for Peirce the universe as a whole can be considered mind and
the universe is thus a kind of argument that is preceding by thinking
itself.

As I understand him, for Peirce the universe as a whole is indeed an
argument, "a vast representamen, a great symbol  [3ns] of God's purpose,"
which (like every symbol) has "organically attached to it, its Indices of
Reactions [2ns] and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]" (CP 5.119; 1903).  So the
one doing the thinking is not the universe *itself*, but God as "Pure mind,
creative of thought" (CP 6.490).  God's purpose, which the universe
represents, is the *summum bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is
the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created
and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).

Of course, I acknowledge that Edwina strongly disagrees with me on most or
all of this.  We have reached significant consensus on interpreting certain
aspects of Peirce's semeiotic, but our interpretations of his metaphysics
presumably remain very different.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 3:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except
> that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint,
> uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in nature.
>
> The question really is of chance. For Peirce chance both forms habits but
> also allows breaks from habit. Mind is the capacity to form habits but
> habits can be long term habits or short term habits. Again for Peirce the
> universe as a whole can be considered mind and the universe is thus a kind
> of argument that is preceding by thinking itself. However that means the
> universe is at odds with thermodynamics, which Peirce thought applied only
> to mechanistic deterministic systems.
>
> What Edwina is more or less saying (if I have her right) is that thinking
> of all this in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should
> appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way. I don’t have any problem
> with that, I should add. I think Peirce’s cosmology has always been
> problematic. Both in terms of his arguments for his cosmology but also it’s
> simply a view I think few people are comfortable with. There’s a reason why
> platonism is often used disparagingly. I think appropriating Peirce and his
> semiotics in a more narrow way is completely fine. We can talk about signs
> quite well without buying into his objective idealism. Although there will
> be places where this will cause problem precisely because Peirce saw an
> unity to his own thought.
>
> I suspect the differences between you and Edwina in other contexts
> ultimately is a manifestation of to what degree are we using Peirce and to
> what degree are we attempting to understand Peirce on his own terms. I
> think Edwina (and correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) gets frustrated in the
> list is because there’s often been so much focus on Peirce’s ontology and
> terminology related to that ontology rather than on application (where the
> ontology matters far less).
>
> So for example if I’m talking about semiotics within chemistry Peirce’s
> cosmology likely rarely matters. Ditto if I’m talking about systems
> programming or AI. My guess is that Edwina wants to talk about firstness as
> entropy because she’s limiting the discussion to a more narrow area.
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-05 Thread Jerry Rhee

Clark, Edwina, list:



If you know that “Local entropy can (and often does) decrease whereas the
universal entropy increases”



then perhaps you thought to place this law in context of entities with
permeable membranes.  It seems to me an important matter to consider if one
is going to talk about biology and physics.



Best,

J

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Clark-list; I'm not saying that biology is reducible to physics
> Physics doesn't have that self-organization or 'negentropy that biology has.
>
> I don't see how or where I am rejecting Peirce's views. I don't see that
> chance 'enables habit'; it breaks up some habits and allows for different
> habits to develop. As Peirce writes.."non-habitual reactions take place;
> and these tend to weaken the habit" 6.264.  I see the non-habitual as
> Firstness/chance - which 'tend to weaken the habit'.
>
> I think that a decrease in entropy, DOES matter, for it means that a
> particular ecosystem is losing its capacity for diversity and novelty. A
> peat bog, for instance, has a very low 'diversity-count', while a meadow
> has a huge range of diversity of plant and insect/animal life.
>
> Edwina
>
>
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> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 05/04/17 4:25 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
>
>
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> Clark- but isn't the reality of the biological realm, which introduces
> the non-isolation of a system and self-organization and thus, works against
> entropy - a natural action? After all, the basic mode of action of semiosis
> is its non-isolation - and the transformation of energy from one to another
> mode.
>
> Is the universe growing more reasonable according to Peirce? Or more
> complex? I don't see how the universe is growing more ordered IF that same
> universe maintains its three categories: Firstness rejects order.
> Secondness fights against similarities. Thirdness inserts order.
>
> Again- I might be missing something in your outline
>
>
> Let me start by saying not all biologists accept physicalism, materialism
> or other range of views which I think most assume it ought take. If we take
> biology to be in some sense reducible to physics, then the fact biology
> isn’t isolated (and can’t be) then local entropy decrease doesn’t matter.
> Put simply the earth isn’t a closed system so there is no global second law
> for that system. This is important since of course Creationists often bring
> up the second law relative to biology but that’s simply because they don’t
> understand how it works.
>
> As for the universe, more or less you’re just rejecting Peirce’s view
> there. Which again is fine. The reason Peirce saw the universe as getting
> more complex is precisely because he saw chance both enabling habit and
> varying from habit. So how you are using firstness and chance is just not
> the same as Peirce, although it may well make perfect sense in the
> particular arena you’re applying it.
>
>
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

Clark-list; I'm not saying that biology is reducible to physics
Physics doesn't have that self-organization or 'negentropy that
biology has.

I don't see how or where I am rejecting Peirce's views. I don't see
that chance 'enables habit'; it breaks up some habits and allows for
different habits to develop. As Peirce writes.."non-habitual
reactions take place; and these tend to weaken the habit" 6.264. I
see the non-habitual as Firstness/chance - which 'tend to weaken the
habit'.

I think that a decrease in entropy, DOES matter, for it means that a
particular ecosystem is losing its capacity for diversity and novelty.
A peat bog, for instance, has a very low 'diversity-count', while a
meadow has a huge range of diversity of plant and insect/animal life.

Edwina
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On Wed 05/04/17 4:25 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Clark- but isn't the reality of the biological realm, which
introduces the non-isolation of a system and self-organization and
thus, works against entropy - a natural action? After all, the basic
mode of action of semiosis is its non-isolation - and the
transformation of energy from one to another mode.

Is the universe growing more reasonable according to Peirce? Or
more complex? I don't see how the universe is growing more ordered IF
that same universe maintains its three categories: Firstness rejects
order. Secondness fights against similarities. Thirdness inserts
order.

Again- I might be missing something in your outline
Let me start by saying not all biologists accept physicalism,
materialism or other range of views which I think most assume it
ought take. If we take biology to be in some sense reducible to
physics, then the fact biology isn’t isolated (and can’t be) then
local entropy decrease doesn’t matter. Put simply the earth isn’t
a closed system so there is no global second law for that system.
This is important since of course Creationists often bring up the
second law relative to biology but that’s simply because they
don’t understand how it works.
As for the universe, more or less you’re just rejecting Peirce’s
view there. Which again is fine. The reason Peirce saw the universe as
getting more complex is precisely because he saw chance both enabling
habit and varying from habit. So how you are using firstness and
chance is just not the same as Peirce, although it may well make
perfect sense in the particular arena you’re applying it.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:16 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> “So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe is 
> growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics. Clearly 
> it is. 
> 
>  
> Hmmm… then what’s the semiotic answer to why spirals in BZ reaction?  
> 
> What did people say of Belousov's initial assertion?
> 
Local entropy can (and often does) decrease whereas the universal entropy 
increases.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark, list: Hmm - it's always interesting to read how others view oneself. 
> 
> I hadn't thought that I was saying that " that thinking of all this in the 
> idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should appropriate Peirce more 
> in a materialistic way"
> 
> I don't know what the above actually means - 'idealist' and 'materialist 
> way'. 
> 
> My frustration on this list often comes because of the focus on 'pure 
> philosophy' so to speak - and I see Peircean semiosis as operating in the 
> material as well as the conceptual world. What interests me is 'how does a 
> morphological organism develop and function in this world' - and I consider 
> that it does so by Peircean semiosic principles. That is, I think we can 
> understand how plants interact and informationally network with each other - 
> by semiosis - and thus are not simple mechanical systems. 
> 
> 

Right. More or less all I’m saying is you can do the analysis you want to but 
that the ontological questions (which Peirce was emphatically interested in) 
don’t apply. The reason I think you get frustrated with what you see as 
terminological issues is simply because Peirce often was speaking of ontology. 
When you try and relate these ontological uses of the terminology to your own 
project problems results.

Really all I’m doing is explaining why there are these terminological issues. 
That is when one is talking about human concepts, one is no longer speaking of 
ontology and we have to be careful not to appply ontological passages. Likewise 
once we’re talking about substances, such as in biology, we’re no longer doing 
ontology.

Most of the disagreements ultimately are just taking passages that are 
extremely general or even ontological and applying them inappropriately. I 
think this leads people to talk past one an other. As I’ve been at pains to 
point out, we have to be clear about the type of analysis we’re doing. Often 
that changes how we talk about it.

So I’m really just trying to clear for you a space of why your terminology 
works. But I had be sure what you’re talking about. That was why I originally 
asked about entropy. You’re using firstness in a much more narrow sense for a 
particular phenomena in biology.

I’ll probably go quiet again for a little bit — but I am reading an enjoying 
the discussion.
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

Clark, list: Hmm - it's always interesting to read how others view
oneself.

I hadn't thought that I was saying that " that thinking of all this
in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should
appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way"

I don't know what the above actually means - 'idealist' and
'materialist way'.

My frustration on this list often comes because of the focus on
'pure philosophy' so to speak - and I see Peircean semiosis as
operating in the material as well as the conceptual world. What
interests me is 'how does a morphological organism develop and
function in this world' - and I consider that it does so by Peircean
semiosic principles. That is, I think we can understand how plants
interact and informationally network with each other - by semiosis -
and thus are not simple mechanical systems.

I'm not sure if entropy is limited to a more narrow area...

Edwina
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On Wed 05/04/17 4:13 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation,
except that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that
standpoint, uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic
in nature.

The question really is of chance. For Peirce chance both forms
habits but also allows breaks from habit. Mind is the capacity to
form habits but habits can be long term habits or short term habits.
Again for Peirce the universe as a whole can be considered mind and
the universe is thus a kind of argument that is preceding by thinking
itself. However that means the universe is at odds with
thermodynamics, which Peirce thought applied only to mechanistic
deterministic systems.
What Edwina is more or less saying (if I have her right) is that
thinking of all this in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That
is we should appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way. I
don’t have any problem with that, I should add. I think Peirce’s
cosmology has always been problematic. Both in terms of his arguments
for his cosmology but also it’s simply a view I think few people are
comfortable with. There’s a reason why platonism is often used
disparagingly. I think appropriating Peirce and his semiotics in a
more narrow way is completely fine. We can talk about signs quite
well without buying into his objective idealism. Although there will
be places where this will cause problem precisely because Peirce saw
an unity to his own thought.
I suspect the differences between you and Edwina in other contexts
ultimately is a manifestation of to what degree are we using Peirce
and to what degree are we attempting to understand Peirce on his own
terms. I think Edwina (and correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) gets
frustrated in the list is because there’s often been so much focus
on Peirce’s ontology and terminology related to that ontology
rather than on application (where the ontology matters far less).
So for example if I’m talking about semiotics within chemistry
Peirce’s cosmology likely rarely matters. Ditto if I’m talking
about systems programming or AI. My guess is that Edwina wants to
talk about firstness as entropy because she’s limiting the
discussion to a more narrow area.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

Clark- but isn't the reality of the biological realm, which
introduces the non-isolation of a system and self-organization and
thus, works against entropy - a natural action? After all, the basic
mode of action of semiosis is its non-isolation - and the
transformation of energy from one to another mode.

Is the universe growing more reasonable according to Peirce? Or more
complex? I don't see how the universe is growing more ordered IF that
same universe maintains its three categories: Firstness rejects
order. Secondness fights against similarities. Thirdness inserts
order.

Again- I might be missing something in your outline.

Edwina
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On Wed 05/04/17 4:02 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
So- I don't see how Peirce's view is incompatible with the current
view - but I might be missing what you are trying to explain.
Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying
universally because they only applied to determinate systems. He also
saw entropy as a statistical measure. The question is whether his
semiotics violates the laws of thermodynamics and he explicitly saw
that they did. The question then becomes how contemporary
understanding of thermodynamics in science would see it. Most
contemporary science sees thermodynamics as unbreakable. In that case
if the universe is getting more ordered that violates the second law
of thermodynamics.
So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the
universe is growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with
thermodynamics. Clearly it is.
I don’t think that says much about the utility of semiotics. It
does raise serious questions about his cosmology though for many
people.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-05 Thread Jerry Rhee

Edwina, Clark, list:



Clark, you said:

“So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe
is growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics.
Clearly it is.



Hmmm… then what’s the semiotic answer to why spirals in BZ reaction?

What did people say of Belousov's initial assertion?



Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 3:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except
> that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint,
> uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in nature.
>
>
> The question really is of chance. For Peirce chance both forms habits but
> also allows breaks from habit. Mind is the capacity to form habits but
> habits can be long term habits or short term habits. Again for Peirce the
> universe as a whole can be considered mind and the universe is thus a kind
> of argument that is preceding by thinking itself. However that means the
> universe is at odds with thermodynamics, which Peirce thought applied only
> to mechanistic deterministic systems.
>
> What Edwina is more or less saying (if I have her right) is that thinking
> of all this in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should
> appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way. I don’t have any problem
> with that, I should add. I think Peirce’s cosmology has always been
> problematic. Both in terms of his arguments for his cosmology but also it’s
> simply a view I think few people are comfortable with. There’s a reason why
> platonism is often used disparagingly. I think appropriating Peirce and his
> semiotics in a more narrow way is completely fine. We can talk about signs
> quite well without buying into his objective idealism. Although there will
> be places where this will cause problem precisely because Peirce saw an
> unity to his own thought.
>
> I suspect the differences between you and Edwina in other contexts
> ultimately is a manifestation of to what degree are we using Peirce and to
> what degree are we attempting to understand Peirce on his own terms. I
> think Edwina (and correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) gets frustrated in the
> list is because there’s often been so much focus on Peirce’s ontology and
> terminology related to that ontology rather than on application (where the
> ontology matters far less).
>
> So for example if I’m talking about semiotics within chemistry Peirce’s
> cosmology likely rarely matters. Ditto if I’m talking about systems
> programming or AI. My guess is that Edwina wants to talk about firstness as
> entropy because she’s limiting the discussion to a more narrow area.
>
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except 
> that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint, 
> uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in nature.
> 

The question really is of chance. For Peirce chance both forms habits but also 
allows breaks from habit. Mind is the capacity to form habits but habits can be 
long term habits or short term habits. Again for Peirce the universe as a whole 
can be considered mind and the universe is thus a kind of argument that is 
preceding by thinking itself. However that means the universe is at odds with 
thermodynamics, which Peirce thought applied only to mechanistic deterministic 
systems.

What Edwina is more or less saying (if I have her right) is that thinking of 
all this in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should 
appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way. I don’t have any problem with 
that, I should add. I think Peirce’s cosmology has always been problematic. 
Both in terms of his arguments for his cosmology but also it’s simply a view I 
think few people are comfortable with. There’s a reason why platonism is often 
used disparagingly. I think appropriating Peirce and his semiotics in a more 
narrow way is completely fine. We can talk about signs quite well without 
buying into his objective idealism. Although there will be places where this 
will cause problem precisely because Peirce saw an unity to his own thought.

I suspect the differences between you and Edwina in other contexts ultimately 
is a manifestation of to what degree are we using Peirce and to what degree are 
we attempting to understand Peirce on his own terms. I think Edwina (and 
correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) gets frustrated in the list is because there’s 
often been so much focus on Peirce’s ontology and terminology related to that 
ontology rather than on application (where the ontology matters far less).

So for example if I’m talking about semiotics within chemistry Peirce’s 
cosmology likely rarely matters. Ditto if I’m talking about systems programming 
or AI. My guess is that Edwina wants to talk about firstness as entropy because 
she’s limiting the discussion to a more narrow area.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> So- I don't see how Peirce's view is incompatible with the current view - but 
> I might be missing what you are trying to explain.
> 

Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying universally 
because they only applied to determinate systems. He also saw entropy as a 
statistical measure. The question is whether his semiotics violates the laws of 
thermodynamics and he explicitly saw that they did. The question then becomes 
how contemporary understanding of thermodynamics in science would see it. Most 
contemporary science sees thermodynamics as unbreakable. In that case if the 
universe is getting more ordered that violates the second law of 
thermodynamics. 

So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe is 
growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics. Clearly it 
is. 

I don’t think that says much about the utility of semiotics. It does raise 
serious questions about his cosmology though for many people.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

 

Yes - I saw your second post after I had replied...

You wrote, with regard to habits:

"However as they become more and more habitual they come more and
more to take the character of substance. That is substance/matter is
simply a reflection of a lack of variation from the habit. Peirce saw
in the long run that these habits would crystalize in some sense. "

My view on the above is that habits cannot exist except as
substance; that is, I am not a Platonist and the habits or laws don't
exist 'per se'. Peirce was Aristotelian, therefore, that habits exist
as rules that form substance. I don't think a situation exists where
habits = substance [Thirdness=Secondness].

You wrote: "That is substance/matter is simply a reflection of a
lack of variation from the habit".  I don't see this; my view is that
substance/matter is an expression of habit. So, the habits-that-form
an insect enable that insect TYPE to continue on reproducing as that
type of insect. This doesn't mean that substance/matter is a 'lack of
variation from the habit'; it means that the habits enable the
continuity of this type of matter and prevent its dissipation into
random chaos.

Habits are stabilizing and therefore anti-entropic. But there are
THREE basic universal modes: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. So,
habits [Thirdness] promotes stability of morphological type but
Firstness [chance] introduces minute deviations from the norm. That's
entropy. And that's Peirce.

So- I don't see how Peirce's view is incompatible with the current
view - but I might be missing what you are trying to explain.

Edwina
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 On Wed 05/04/17  2:43 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
 On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears
to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits
don't move toward more differentiation but towards more generality.

What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus,
entropic dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of
matter. Peirce  Hopefully you saw that subsequent post where I noted
not everyone agreed with the article I was using. Although I think in
terms of Peirce’s conception of why thermodynamics doesn’t apply
it’s pretty on the ball. My sense (perhaps wrong) is that the
differences tend to be tied to terminology.
 To the above, I agree habits are introducing more and more
generality. However as they become more and more habitual they come
more and more to take the character of substance. That is
substance/matter is simply a reflection of a lack of variation from
the habit. Peirce saw in the long run that these habits would
crystalize in some sense.  
 Now from the perspective of a habit, any variation is a swerve.
Peirce in various places appears to have since qualia or feeling as
firstness as the inner view of swerve that he picks up (in a somewhat
distorted fashion) from the Epircureans. So to that degree that swerve
or chance is a break from habit I fully agree with you. That’s
entropy, formally considered. The problem is that Peirce’s
conception of the in the long run means habits become more set which
is anti-entropic. 
 The question though is what happens when habits form. Peirce sees
that formation as also occurring out of chance. That’s why I think
we can’t only say that chance/feeling is entropy. What Peirce sees
as entropy proper is purely in terms of deterministic mechanics and
the Boltzmann statistical view of entropy. So here we’re
distinguishing between the law of entropy and the measure of entropy.
That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Chance as a break
from habit increases the  measure of entropy. But it does not affect
the law of entropy which is purely a law of physical necessary
motion.
 The reason this is difficult to wrap our mind around is because
we’re all used to quantum mechanics with it’s notion of
randomness of a sort. Even people who don’t accept ontological
chance still talk of randomness. Yet we apply thermodynamics to
quantum mechanics all the time. So to us  thermodynamics isn’t only
a law of determinative mechanics. 
 So when I asked you to unpack what you mean by entropy, more or less
what I’m getting at is whether you are talking about
  1. the measure of entropy  2. the law of entropy in general   3. a
tendency to increase entropy
 The problem is that I think most of us who don’t see
thermodynamics in terms only of Newtonian mechanics just
fundamentally see Peirce’s use as wrong. So please be aware what
I’m getting at here is how Peirce saw it, not what the right way of
seeing it is. At a bare minimum Peirce’s use is incompatible with
contemporary use in most cases. (We’ll ignore the Bohmian mechanics
proponents for the moment)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

CG:  I suppose this is a very long way of saying that I think signs are
only the same sign when both the immediate interpretant and immediate
object are the same.


I think that Edwina and I came to the same conclusion over the course of
our discussion in this thread.  We agreed that the Sign proper is the
internal triad consisting of the Immediate Object, the Representamen, and
the Immediate Interpretant; and that every such Sign must be both
determined by an external Dynamic Object and *capable *of determining an
external Dynamic Interpretant, although it is *not *necessary that the
latter ever be *actualized*.

This model raises a few interesting questions that I have started to
explore in my own mind.

   - Should we consider using different terms for the three modes of a
   Representamen (e.g., Mark/Token/Type) vs. the three modes of a Sign (e.g.,
   Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign)?
   - If so, what is the relation between the mode of one and the mode of
   the other?
   - Are there any obvious examples where Oi, R, and Ii are in *different *
   modes?
   - If not--i.e., if they are typically all in the same mode--can they be
   grouped into a single trichotomy, reducing the total number of Sign classes
   from 66 to 45?
   - If they remain separate, should the Oi, R, and Ii trichotomies be kept
   together in the order of determination, rather than inserting the S-Od
   relation between S and Ii as is often done?

Any thoughts?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 1:30 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Mar 31, 2017, at 3:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> It turns out that Short "counts" different Signs based on different
> *Immediate *Interpretants, but not based on different *Dynamic *
> Interpretants.  This makes sense, given that the Immediate Interpretant
> is *internal *to the Sign, while the Dynamic Interpretant is *external *to
> it; especially since each occurrence of the latter is *distinct*, even for
> the same Sign.  So I wonder--does this "counting" principle also apply to
> Immediate (internal) vs. Dynamic (external) *Objects*?  Maybe so; in
> Short's example, the puffs of smoke would seem to constitute the same
> *Dynamic *Object, but have different *Immediate *Objects as a Sign of
> fire vs. a Sign of Apaches on the warpath.
>
> This leads to my suggestion that every Sign has an Immediate Object and
> Immediate Interpretant that are real possibilities internal to it, thus
> forming a triad; but a Sign may or may not have a Dynamic Object and a
> Dynamic Interpretant that are actualities external to it, as three
> correlates of a triadic relation.  Again, what do you think?
>
> I’m reading (slowly) through the messages. I wanted to comment on this
> though. My personal view (which may be wrong) is that what counts to equate
> signs are the immediate interpretant, sign vehicle, immediate object
> trichotomy. That is what is internal to the sign. While that’s close to
> what you have Short saying, I think I see the immediate object is quite
> important. Where I think I’m differing is that Short is counting what I’m
> calling the sign-vehicle as part of the immediate object.
>
> So I’d see smoke as a sign for apaches and smoke as a sign for fire as
> different simply because one is more general. That is smoke *in general* is
> a sign for fire. Smoke *here and now* thus signifies fire. But there’s
> also the general sign *smoke in this part of Arizona* is a sign for
> possible apaches*. *So to me the immediate objects really aren’t the same
> even though the dynamic object is the same (the particular smoke). However
> that’s different from the immediate object due to the smoke. (A subtle
> point, but keep with me)
>
> (Sorry if others already responded to this)
>
> This gets back to our discussion of averageness we had here last June. I’d
> been relating Heidegger’s phenomenological principle to Peirce at that
> point you might recall. Unfortunately the terms weren’t quite ideal
> (averageness a pretty vague term).
>
> The idea is that the dynamic object *virtually* contains the immediate
> object (due to it containing virtually all the possible significations).
> Peirce’s term “dynamic” actually comes out of Platonism. So in The Sophist
> Plato talks of the lively possibility (*dunamis*) of being. The same
> notion gets taken up by Aristotle in his distinction between potential and
> actual. So the dynamic contains within itself the possibility of being
> represented.
>
> The immediate object is thus the set of possibilities in which an object
> is determined for us by its sign. That set of possibilities within the
> immediate object is what I mean by averageness or everydayness. That is the
> ways in which our encountering the sign could be interpreted.
>
> Getting back to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the 
> ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward 
> more differentiation but towards more generality.
> 
> What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic 
> dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce 
> 
Hopefully you saw that subsequent post where I noted not everyone agreed with 
the article I was using. Although I think in terms of Peirce’s conception of 
why thermodynamics doesn’t apply it’s pretty on the ball. My sense (perhaps 
wrong) is that the differences tend to be tied to terminology.

To the above, I agree habits are introducing more and more generality. However 
as they become more and more habitual they come more and more to take the 
character of substance. That is substance/matter is simply a reflection of a 
lack of variation from the habit. Peirce saw in the long run that these habits 
would crystalize in some sense. 

Now from the perspective of a habit, any variation is a swerve. Peirce in 
various places appears to have since qualia or feeling as firstness as the 
inner view of swerve that he picks up (in a somewhat distorted fashion) from 
the Epircureans. So to that degree that swerve or chance is a break from habit 
I fully agree with you. That’s entropy, formally considered. The problem is 
that Peirce’s conception of the in the long run means habits become more set 
which is anti-entropic.

The question though is what happens when habits form. Peirce sees that 
formation as also occurring out of chance. That’s why I think we can’t only say 
that chance/feeling is entropy. What Peirce sees as entropy proper is purely in 
terms of deterministic mechanics and the Boltzmann statistical view of entropy. 
So here we’re distinguishing between the law of entropy and the measure of 
entropy. That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Chance as a break 
from habit increases the measure of entropy. But it does not affect the law of 
entropy which is purely a law of physical necessary motion.

The reason this is difficult to wrap our mind around is because we’re all used 
to quantum mechanics with it’s notion of randomness of a sort. Even people who 
don’t accept ontological chance still talk of randomness. Yet we apply 
thermodynamics to quantum mechanics all the time. So to us thermodynamics isn’t 
only a law of determinative mechanics. 

So when I asked you to unpack what you mean by entropy, more or less what I’m 
getting at is whether you are talking about

1. the measure of entropy 
2. the law of entropy in general 
3. a tendency to increase entropy

The problem is that I think most of us who don’t see thermodynamics in terms 
only of Newtonian mechanics just fundamentally see Peirce’s use as wrong. So 
please be aware what I’m getting at here is how Peirce saw it, not what the 
right way of seeing it is. At a bare minimum Peirce’s use is incompatible with 
contemporary use in most cases. (We’ll ignore the Bohmian mechanics proponents 
for the moment)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)