RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

2021-09-29 Thread gnox
Gary R, I see what you mean, but as far as I know Peirce’s “phaneroscopy” (just 
like his “phenomenology”) included analysis and generalization as well as 
observation. In R 318 (1907) he wrote, “Everybody recognizes that it is no 
inconsiderable art, this business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one 
frames a scientific definition” (EP2:403) — which seems to make phaneroscopy 
both an art and a science! Anyway, given my own emphasis on practice-perception 
cycles <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#meancyc> , I prefer to think of 
observation and generalization as parts of a continuous process rather than 
dividing them into separate activities, so I don’t see a need to differentiate 
the science into branches.

 

Re slide 48: In my mild disapproval of wine-tasting as André’s example, I was 
forgetting that a practice (art? science?) such as that would indeed be good 
training for focussing on the material elements of the phaneron. Peirce 
indicates in a couple of texts that the “material categories” could be picked 
out phaneroscopically as well as the “universal categories,” but that he didn’t 
have much success at making a list of them, so he chose to focus on the formal 
elements of the phaneron instead (CP 1.284). 

 

Gary f.

 

} Drawing nearer to take our slant at it (since after all it has met with 
misfortune while all underground), let us see all there may remain to be seen. 
[Finnegans Wake 113] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 29-Sep-21 01:06
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

 

Gary F, List,

 

GF: "I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific." 

 

Yet Peirce positions it as First cenoscopic science. I have long held the view 
that since the observational practice of phaneroscopy is indeed 
"pre-scientific," yet it is necessary as the first stage/branch in the 
development of a phenomenological science, one which will require at least one, 
and perhaps two, additional branches in order to become a fully developed 
science. 

 

So, despite Peirce's late terminology valorizing "Phaneroscopy" as the name of 
the science, I tend to think that it is better to think of the First cenoscopic 
science taken as a whole -- which is to say, were it to be fully developed --  
as Phenomenology, and its pre-scientific, first observational branch as 
Phaneroscopy. 

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

2021-09-28 Thread Gary Richmond
Gary F, List,

GF: "I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific."

Yet Peirce positions it as First cenoscopic science. I have long held the
view that since the observational practice of phaneroscopy is indeed
"pre-scientific," yet it is necessary as the first stage/branch in the
development of a phenomenological science, one which will require at least
one, and perhaps two, additional branches in order to become a fully
developed science.

So, despite Peirce's late terminology valorizing "Phaneroscopy" as the name
of the science, I tend to think that it is better to think of the First
cenoscopic science *taken as a whole* -- which is to say, *were* it to be
fully developed --  as Phenomenology, and its pre-scientific, first
observational branch as Phaneroscopy.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 1:30 PM  wrote:

> Jerry R,
>
> The slow read is not *quite* concluded: there are still two more slides
> to go. Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you
> ask here; the last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical
> portrait of a science-egg (with its various parts labelled).
>
> As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with
> their own answers (or else leave the questions open). I’ve given some hints
> of my own answers along the way, and back in June I submitted a paper on
> the subject which is due to be published later this year as part of a
> collection edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Mohammad Shafiei. Nothing
> has been said during the slow read that would persuade me to make
> substantial changes to that paper, so I’m content to let it speak for me.
>
> I wouldn’t have written such a paper if I hadn’t paid very close attention
> to Peirce’s writings that *explicitly deal with phenomenology and
> phaneroscopy*. Some of the most vociferous opinions expressed during the
> slow read came from people who consider themselves experts but obviously
> have *not* paid close attention to what *Peirce* said on the subject, and
> have even objected to Peirce’s writings on the subject being posted to the
> list (instead of his writings on mathematics, for instance). Some of these
> opinions were clearly motivated by a hostile reading
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#hxrd> of ADT’s slides. I think any
> readers who still have open minds regarding phaneroscopy owe it to
> themselves to at least read everything in EP2 on the subject, if not some
> of the harder-to-find texts like R 645
> <https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm> (which is now on my website).
>
> If someone has paid close attention to the *practice* of phaneroscopy as
> described in concrete detail by Peirce, and has tried it out for himself
> (as Peirce insisted one must in order to draw any conclusions from it),
> *then* he can form and express a valid opinion about its scientific value
> (or lack thereof), as R.K. Atkins did in his book about it. I don’t believe
> that any opinions about it which *aren’t* based on such a study are worth
> arguing about. I also believe that opinions about Peirce’s philosophy which
> ignore his phenomenology/phaneroscopy are just as liable to distortion as
> opinions which ignore his mathematics or his semeiotics.
>
> I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific. I don’t
> have a more direct answer to your question, so this will have to do.
>
> Gary f.
>
> } Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
> enough names. One must know when to stop. [*Tao Te Ching* 32
> (Feng/English)] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jerry Rhee
> *Sent:* 16-Sep-21 13:56
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49
>
>
>
> Dear Gary, list:
>
>
>
> Since the slow read has concluded,
>
> I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial
> announcement
>
> (on June 11).
>
>
>
> “My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that
>
> Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.
>
> That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy
>
> merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)
>
> and not systematically- as a true science.”
>
>
>
> So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?
>
>
>
> *Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

2021-09-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List

I think that Robert Marty's just posted paper: A critical analysis
of Belluci's paper - answers your questions. 

Edwina
 On Sun 19/09/21  9:02 PM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net
sent:
 Gary F,   Thank you for doing the work of extracting all the slides
and transcribing them to text that can be copied and discussed.   Now
that each slide has been discussed separately, it would be useful to
scroll forward and backward through them and discuss their
relationships to one another, to Peirce's writings, and to writings
by other  authors during the century after Peirce.  It would be
useful to have an HTML file with each slide followed by the
transcription.   But it would also be useful to have a pointer
following each slide to a recording of  De Tienne's presentation. 
After reading a slide, it would be good to jump to the recording to
hear what he said to the audience at the presentation.   Do you have
any thoughts or plans about that?   I admit that I have criticized
some of his comments.  I certainly admit that he has a very strong
background in his long-term study of Peirce's writings and the years
of publications during the past century.  But his final comments
about the science egg raise serious questions:1. Does Peirce mean
that phaneroscopy is only nascent as a science,
 and not yet a full-blown one?  But clearly phaneroscopy is no
ordinary
 science.  And yet he is sure that it is at once necessary and
 fundamental ...   2. Is it a call for a community of phaneroscopists
to gather and start
 institutionalizing the theory and practice of phaneroscopy?   3. Is
it because phaneroscopy is the first positive science that it is a
science-egg and will always be a science-egg?   4. Is it because the
ever-streaming Phaneron encloses EVERY
 possibility, every actuality, every generality as firsts?   5. Is it
because it originates any inquiry in any domain?  Is it the egg from
which all sciences get hatched?  Does it need to be
 fertilized?  By what?   6. Can we break that egg?  Is it good?  Does
it have a sunny side or
 is it hopelessly scrambled?   These are important issues to discuss.
  John  
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

2021-09-20 Thread gnox
John, thanks for your continued interest in ADT’s talk! It was originally
given as a Zoom webinar, and the recording of it can be played from the
University of Milan website: André De Tienne: The Role and Relevance of
Phaneroscopy for inquiry | Dipartimento di Filosofia - DIPAFILO (unimi.it)
<http://www.dipafilo.unimi.it/ecm/home/aggiornamenti-e-archivi/tutte-le-noti
zie/content/andre-de-tienne-the-role-and-relevance-of-phaneroscopy-for-inqui
ry..UNIMIDIRE-90701> . I must say it is not easy listening, given
André’s vocal style and accent, and I think it assumes a graduate-level
acquaintance with Peirce’s writings. But it does explain the content of the
slides more fully.

 

I’m attaching a text file (UTF encoding, so it includes some non-ASCII
characters, but no italic or bold formatting) of all the transcriptions I
did from the slides; at the top of it is the link to the IUPUI page where
the slides can be viewed in order (forward or reverse). I guess a single
HTML file putting it together with the slide images would be possible, but
not sure whether it would be worth the time it would take, and I would want
to ask André’s permission first.

 

About the questions that you say are important issues to discuss, I don’t
have anything much to say at the moment, but I’m open to hearing what you or
other list members might say about them. 

 

Gary f.

 

} For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.
[Wittgenstein] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: sowa @bestweb.net  
Sent: 19-Sep-21 21:02
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

 

Gary F,

 

Thank you for doing the work of extracting all the slides and transcribing
them to text that can be copied and discussed.

 

Now that each slide has been discussed separately, it would be useful to
scroll forward and backward through them and discuss their relationships to
one another, to Peirce's writings, and to writings by other  authors during
the century after Peirce.  It would be useful to have an HTML file with each
slide followed by the transcription.

 

But it would also be useful to have a pointer following each slide to a
recording of  De Tienne's presentation.  After reading a slide, it would be
good to jump to the recording to hear what he said to the audience at the
presentation.

 

Do you have any thoughts or plans about that?

 

I admit that I have criticized some of his comments.  I certainly admit that
he has a very strong background in his long-term study of Peirce's writings
and the years of publications during the past century.  But his final
comments about the science egg raise serious questions:

 

1. Does Peirce mean that phaneroscopy is only nascent as a science,
and not yet a full-blown one?  But clearly phaneroscopy is no ordinary
science.  And yet he is sure that it is at once necessary and
fundamental ...

 

2. Is it a call for a community of phaneroscopists to gather and start
institutionalizing the theory and practice of phaneroscopy?

 

3. Is it because phaneroscopy is the first positive science that it is

a science-egg and will always be a science-egg?

 

4. Is it because the ever-streaming Phaneron encloses EVERY
possibility, every actuality, every generality as firsts?

 

5. Is it because it originates any inquiry in any domain?  Is it the

egg from which all sciences get hatched?  Does it need to be
fertilized?  By what?

 

6. Can we break that egg?  Is it good?  Does it have a sunny side or
is it hopelessly scrambled?

 

These are important issues to discuss.

 

John

https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations

Title slide [1]:  The Role and Relevance of Phaneroscopy for Inquiry
André De Tienne, IUPUI
Seminar presentation (University of Milan, Italy)
Philosophy as a Method of Thinking Practices: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and 
Post-Structuralism in the Light of Pragmatism
8 April 2021


[2] Plan of talk
• 1. Phaneroscopy may be mystifying but is no mystery
• 2. Reminders about Peirce's theory of three categories
• 3. The place of phaneroscopy in Peirce's mature classification of sciences
• 4. From mathematics to phaneroscopy
• 5. Phaneroscopy as Inquiry into the positiveness of experience
• 6. The Phaneron and its ingredients
• 7. How to scope the phaneron and why
• 8. Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry
• Conclusion: Phaneroscopy as a science-egg


[3] Phaneroscopy is a sort of white elephant in Peirce studies. 

Most scholars are familiar with Peirce's seminal theory of categories and its 
association with multiple research areas in his philosophy, logic, semiotics, 
and evolutionary metaphysics. 

They are also familiar with that theory's association with what Peirce ended up 
calling “phaneroscopy.” But as to what phanero

re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

2021-09-19 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Gary F,
  
 Thank you for doing the work of extracting all the slides and transcribing 
them to text that can be copied and discussed.
  
 Now that each slide has been discussed separately, it would be useful to 
scroll forward and backward through them and discuss their relationships to 
one another, to Peirce's writings, and to writings by other  authors during 
the century after Peirce.  It would be useful to have an HTML file with 
each slide followed by the transcription.
  
 But it would also be useful to have a pointer following each slide to a 
recording of  De Tienne's presentation.  After reading a slide, it would be 
good to jump to the recording to hear what he said to the audience at the 
presentation.
  
 Do you have any thoughts or plans about that?
  
 I admit that I have criticized some of his comments.  I certainly admit 
that he has a very strong background in his long-term study of Peirce's 
writings and the years of publications during the past century.  But his 
final comments about the science egg raise serious questions:
  
  1. Does Peirce mean that phaneroscopy is only nascent as a science,
and not yet a full-blown one?  But clearly phaneroscopy is no ordinary
science.  And yet he is sure that it is at once necessary and
fundamental ...
  
 2. Is it a call for a community of phaneroscopists to gather and start
institutionalizing the theory and practice of phaneroscopy?
  
 3. Is it because phaneroscopy is the first positive science that it is
 a science-egg and will always be a science-egg?
  
 4. Is it because the ever-streaming Phaneron encloses EVERY
possibility, every actuality, every generality as firsts?
  
 5. Is it because it originates any inquiry in any domain?  Is it the
 egg from which all sciences get hatched?  Does it need to be
fertilized?  By what?
  
 6. Can we break that egg?  Is it good?  Does it have a sunny side or
is it hopelessly scrambled?
  
 These are important issues to discuss.
  
 John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-17 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

The problem I have with your outline . is that it seems to focus on
viewing Peirce's texts as akin to scriptural purity  and seems to
consider the words in the text as inviolate -- such that any use of a
different term to mean the same thing is almost a violation of the
sacred..

JAS: "My point is simply that one cannot claim Peirce's endorsement
for characterizing the object, the sign, and the interpretant as
"phases" of a semiosic process. It is a further development inspired
by his thought, rather than a repetition of his own ideas. "

I am not claiming Peirce's endorsement. I am claiming that the
semiosic process is not one of scriptural iconicity but is an
interpretive process. That's why it is triadic; moving from
DO-IIwhich is the 'input data'...to the mediative process of
R...to multiple Interpretants of II and DI.

Your  insistence that, eg, 'Peirce did not use the term of
'process';  Peirce did not use the term of 'input' and so
on...ignores that any reading of Peirce's texts [and this includes
your own readings]  is an interpretation. It cannot be otherwise,
since the actual semiosic process functions to enable and permit not
simply iconicity [the simplest, most mechanical interaction] but
unanticipated reaction and even - diverse deviations. 

I don't think that Peircean studies should be simply a liturgical
repetition of 'This is What Peirce Said'. It's a study of the
conceptual infrastructure of his work - and the use of that
infrastructure to examine our real today-world! 

Therefore - the fact that I use the terms of 'input/output'...to
explain the 'prebits' or 'data' or DO and IO...; the fact that I use
the term 'function' to outline the full semiosic triad; the fact that
I use the term of 'process' - should not be defined as 'Not Peirce'
but as acceptable interpretations of the Peircean conceptual
infrastructure and terminology. Therefore, such actions ARE Peircean.

Edwina
 On Fri 17/09/21 11:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various
actions - and not lump all into 'science'.
 That is fine. My point is simply that Peirce's definition of
"science" is broader than this, such that it is sufficient for a
field of study to be descriptive or classificatory. He does not
require it to be nomological in order to qualify as a science. 
 ET: I think that mathematics IS an analytic process because it DOES
analyze relations and therefore qualifies as a science.
 My objection was not about whether mathematics analyzes relations,
but about whether it does so "within a whole function or semiosic
process." In accordance with Peirce's definitions and classification
of the sciences, mathematics does not concern itself with "semiosic
process," and neither do phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
Nevertheless, as I already said in my reply to John Sowa this
morning, Peirce would have been the first to insist upon his own
fallibility, and reasonable people can disagree about whether this
aspect of his mature classification is "correct" or useful. 
 ET: The fact that Peirce does not use the term 'phases' of a
semiosic process does NOT mean that these relations cannot be
described as such!
 I agree. My point is simply that one cannot claim Peirce's
endorsement for characterizing the object, the sign, and the
interpretant as "phases" of a semiosic process. It is a further
development inspired by his thought, rather than a repetition of his
own ideas. Again, reasonable people can disagree about whether his
specific terminology is "correct" or useful, but there should be a
solid consensus on what those terms and definitions are. 
 ET: And for you to repeatedly fall back on Sowa's request for
textual references is a red herring- when in my view he did not mean
treating Peirce's texts and words as gospel but as grounding one's
interpretations in Peirce's work.
 This is a false dichotomy since John Sowa clearly did not mean
either of these things. "For any claims about what Peirce believed,
please give exact quotations" ( 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00146.html [1]).
It is not about "treating Peirce's texts and words as gospel," nor
about "grounding one's interpretations in Peirce's work." It is about
only ascribing views to Peirce himself that he explicitly professed to
believe, and about not ascribing views to Peirce himself that he
explicitly rejected. Peirce might be wrong about phaneroscopy being a
science, distinct from semeiotic such that the latter depends on the
former for principles and not vice versa; but according to his own
testimony, that is  what he believed. Peirce might be wrong about God
as traditionally defined being the real, personal, and transcendent
(non-immanent) creator of the universe; but according to his own
testimony, that is wha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-17 Thread Jerry Rhee
Dear JAS Edwina list,


JAS said:


*  ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions -
and not lump all into 'science'.*


*  That is fine. My point is simply that **Peirce's definition of "science"
is broader than this**, *

*  such that it is sufficient for a field of study to be descriptive or
classificatory. *

*  He does not require it to be nomological in order to qualify as a
science.*


So we’re now questioning what ‘science’ means and that Peirce somehow had a
clear notion of it that is ‘broader’ than this?

It is obvious to me that what is more likely is that JAS has a clear notion
of what he thinks Peirce understood ‘science’ to be,

*and that we ought to have it too, amirite?*


So where, in all this, is the science?

What expertise does Peirce claim to teach?


Btw, I came across an unexpected discussion on ‘wind-eggs’ with a simple
google search.

I’m sure we all could have done this about as quickly and easily as
flipping through Peirce quotes and deciding which ones to fling at one
another.

But then again, what would be the fun in it, *amirite*?

I mean, how else could we fulfill this *need* that is a part of our nature?


*But come now, let us examine your utterance together, *

*and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere **wind**-**egg**. *

*Perception, you say, is knowledge? * (151e)


Moreover, if this definition of ‘wind-egg’ existed in the way it does
without my prior knowledge,

and given it was I who was first to call phaneroscopy a mere ‘wind-egg’ and
not a ‘science-egg’,

does the law state that this definition of ‘wind-egg’ ought to remain
merely ‘unfertilized egg’ forever and ever,

with *no* possibility of them ever merging in the future?

I mean, isn't this how signs work?

That they remain calcified with only JAS having access to them?


Those of you who remember the *Crito* will remember that in a crucial
passage there,

this substitution of the human beings for the law saves the credit of the
law in this very difficulty argument.


You know Socrates was condemned to death.

A terrible injustice has been committed.


But Socrates says:

No, you can’t blame the law for that,

you have to blame the human beings who apply the law.

And so the authority of the law is saved.


Something similar is going on here.

But that is of course not sufficient.

It is only an attempt to restore the distinction

between discovery of being and an attempt or a wish to discover being.


But could one not say also this:

that if law is essentially an attempt,

law is never a success?

And therefore no law which was ever established anywhere really does what
law wishes to do; therefore all laws are imperfect.


Is this not implied, if it is essentially a wish for something,

an attempt and not the fulfillment?


Socrates, I believe, tries to avoid this by making here this distinction
between law and human beings,

which in its suggestive character

(which does not quite jibe with what is explicitly said)

would mean this:

the law is the truth, but the human beings do not always know the truth.



*Thereforeergohence*, let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in
fact.

But we must now ask: *how*?


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 17, 2021 at 10:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions -
> and not lump all into 'science'.
>
>
> That is fine. My point is simply that *Peirce's *definition of "science"
> is broader than this, such that it is sufficient for a field of study to be
> descriptive or classificatory. He does not require it to be nomological in
> order to qualify as a science.
>
> ET: I think that mathematics IS an analytic process because it DOES
> analyze relations and therefore qualifies as a science.
>
>
> My objection was not about whether mathematics analyzes relations, but
> about whether it does so "within a whole function or semiosic process." In
> accordance with *Peirce's *definitions and classification of the
> sciences, mathematics does not concern itself with "semiosic process," and
> neither do phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics. Nevertheless, as I already
> said in my reply to John Sowa this morning, Peirce would have been the
> first to insist upon his own fallibility, and reasonable people can
> disagree about whether this aspect of his mature classification is
> "correct" or useful.
>
> ET: The fact that Peirce does not use the term 'phases' of a semiosic
> process does NOT mean that these relations cannot be described as such!
>
>
> I agree. My point is simply that one cannot claim *Peirce's *endorsement
> for characterizing the object, the sign, and the interpretant as "phases"
> of a semiosic process. It is a further development inspired by his thought,
> rather than a repetition of his own ideas. Again, reasonable people can
> disagree about whether his specific terminology is "correct" or useful, but
> there should be a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-17 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions -
and not lump all into 'science'.


That is fine. My point is simply that *Peirce's *definition of "science" is
broader than this, such that it is sufficient for a field of study to be
descriptive or classificatory. He does not require it to be nomological in
order to qualify as a science.

ET: I think that mathematics IS an analytic process because it DOES analyze
relations and therefore qualifies as a science.


My objection was not about whether mathematics analyzes relations, but
about whether it does so "within a whole function or semiosic process." In
accordance with *Peirce's *definitions and classification of the sciences,
mathematics does not concern itself with "semiosic process," and neither do
phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics. Nevertheless, as I already said in my
reply to John Sowa this morning, Peirce would have been the first to insist
upon his own fallibility, and reasonable people can disagree about whether
this aspect of his mature classification is "correct" or useful.

ET: The fact that Peirce does not use the term 'phases' of a semiosic
process does NOT mean that these relations cannot be described as such!


I agree. My point is simply that one cannot claim *Peirce's *endorsement
for characterizing the object, the sign, and the interpretant as "phases"
of a semiosic process. It is a further development inspired by his thought,
rather than a repetition of his own ideas. Again, reasonable people can
disagree about whether his specific terminology is "correct" or useful, but
there should be a solid consensus on what those terms and definitions are.

ET: And for you to repeatedly fall back on Sowa's request for textual
references is a red herring- when in my view he did not mean treating
Peirce's texts and words as gospel but as grounding one's interpretations
in Peirce's work.


This is a false dichotomy since John Sowa clearly did not mean either of
these things. "For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact
quotations" (
 https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00146.html
). It is
not about "treating Peirce's texts and words as gospel," nor about
"grounding one's interpretations in Peirce's work." It is about *only
*ascribing
views to Peirce himself that he *explicitly professed* to believe, and
about *not *ascribing views to Peirce himself that he *explicitly rejected*.
Peirce might be wrong about phaneroscopy being a science, distinct from
semeiotic such that the latter depends on the former for principles and not
vice versa; but according to his own testimony, that is *what he believed*.
Peirce might be wrong about God as traditionally defined being the real,
personal, and transcendent (non-immanent) creator of the universe; but
according to his own testimony, that is *what he believed*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 17, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] I think that your classification-by-name is obscuring the specific
> functionality of these practices. Again, my view is that phaneroscopy is a
> classificatory process and goes no further; i.e., if I refer to the
> scientific method as an infrastructure for defining a process as a
> 'science', then, phaneroscopy lacks the mediative analytic process.
>
> I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions - and
> not lump all into 'science'.
>
> 2] I think that mathematics IS an analytic process because it DOES analyze
> relations and therefore qualifies as a science.
>
>  [Oh, and do you think that you could, in the spirit of discussion, insert
> that this view that mathematics does NOT analyze relations is YOUR view?]
>
> 3] The fact that Peirce does not use the term 'phases' of a semiosic
> process does NOT mean that these relations cannot be described as such! I
> consider that the whole point of studying Peirce is not to repeat his texts
> like some kind of holy mantra but to understand them, to see how their
> concepts can be used to examine our real world.
>
> And for you to repeatedly fall back on Sowa's request for textual
> references is a red herring- when in my view he did not mean treating
> Peirce's texts and words as gospel but as grounding one's interpretations
> in Peirce's work. And my interpretation of the semiosic relations between
> the DO-IO-R-II-DI is that these are indeed 'phases' of data processing to
> interpretation. Now, if you view such an outline in horror because Peirce
> 'never used the word' but instead used the word 'correlate'I'd say you
> are moving out of contact with using Peirce in the real world -and into
> the seminar room. You are totally ignoring the functionality of the process
> - and whether they are called

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: To me, that is not a science but a process of classification of
experience.


Peirce identifies three kinds of sciences--descriptive, classificatory, and
nomological--so according to him, the fact that phaneroscopy is
classificatory does not disqualify it from being a science. The first two
branches of semeiotic are largely classificatory regarding signs in general
(speculative grammar) and arguments in particular (logical critic).

ET: It doesn't move from categorizing this input data into any analysis of
the relations of the modes of the data within a whole function or semiosic
process.


Neither does mathematics, esthetics, or ethics. Does that disqualify them
from being sciences, as well?

ET: It would be like, in a lab, labelling the different insect larvae - and
even, labelling their phases of growth. But there would be no analysis of
the processes-of-morphological change.


This sounds like the practice of a descriptive and classificatory science
rather than a nomological science, but it is still a science. Peirce
suggests that over time, descriptive sciences tend to become
classificatory, and classificatory sciences tend to become nomological (CP
7.85, 1902).

ET: That is, no movement from the DO-IO phase into the R analytic phase and
the resultant Interpretant phase.


This would be an application of speculative grammar rather than
phaneroscopy, but where does Peirce ever explicitly state (or even imply)
that the object, the representamen, and the interpretant are "phases"? As
John Sowa requested, "For any claims about what Peirce believed, please
give exact quotations" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00146.html). According
to Peirce, "A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*" (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903).

ET: I think that this gathering and labelling of data about the environment
is a vital process in the carrying out of science - but- on its own, I
don't see it as science.


Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 7:57 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> You are ignoring that I said that phaneroscopy is the reception of data
> [i.e., in the DO, IO phase of interaction with the environment] AND
> that the person in this phase then experiences and acknowledges the
> categorical distinctions of this data, within the categorical modes of
> quality, reaction, continuity, or 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.
>
> To me, that is not a science but a process of classification of
> experience.  It doesn't move from categorizing this input data [oh dear, a
> heretical word 'input'] into any analysis of the relations of the modes of
> the data within a whole function or semiosic process. It would be like, in
> a lab, labelling the different insect larvae - and even, labelling their
> phases of growth. But there would be no analysis of the
> processes-of-morphological change. That is, no movement from the DO-IO
> phase into the R analytic phase and the resultant Interpretant phase.
>
> I think that this gathering and labelling of data about the environment is
> a vital process in the carrying out of science - but- on its own, I don't
> see it as science...which, in my view, requires the mediation of the R
> phase.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 16/09/21 8:44 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> John, List:
>
> What Peirce actually says in R 645 (https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm,
> 1909-10) is that phaneroscopy is "still in the condition of a science-egg,
> hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to
> assure the student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to
> enjoy, if the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future
> become a strong and beneficient science." Moreover, there are plenty of
> other passages where he straightforwardly refers to phaneroscopy (or
> phenomenology) as a science, and of course he includes it as a distinct
> branch in his mature classification of the sciences.
>
> Edwina claims that phaneroscopy is merely "the reception of data." For
> Peirce, there is much more to it than that.
>
> CSP: What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the
> direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations,
> signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features
> of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that
> no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite
> disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list
> comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and
> finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
> principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, 1904)
>
>
> That certainly sounds like a science to me.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schm

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: OMG - I disagreed with Peirce.


As I have said repeatedly, anyone is free to disagree with Peirce,
especially when this is honestly acknowledged. The problem is when someone
ascribes views to Peirce that conflict with his own explicit statements.
For example, an atheist clearly disagrees with Peirce about the reality of
God, and a pantheist clearly disagrees with Peirce about the personality
and non-immanence of God.

ET: To suggest that something is a PHASE of semiosis, is not the same as
reducing it to semiosis ...


I did not say anything about reducing something to semiosis. I said
that *phaneroscopy
*is not reducible to *semeiotic*, i.e., the study of whatever is or could
be present to the mind is not reducible to the study of signs.

ET: ... I stand by my view [my view!] that the experience of the phaneron,
is a phase of the semiosic process of DO-IO-R-II, DI.


Okay, as long as there is honest acknowledgment that this was not *Peirce's
*view. Where does he ever explicitly state (or even imply) "that the
experience of the phaneron, is a phase of the semiosic process"? As John
Sowa requested, "For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give
exact quotations" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00146.html).

ET: And I totally disagree with your reduction of semiosis to Thirdness.


It is not my reduction, it is Peirce's definition. Within phaneroscopy, 1ns
is quality, 2ns is reaction, and 3ns is representation/mediation. Within
the normative sciences, 1ns is feeling, 2ns is action, and 3ns is
thought/semiosis. The constituents of the three Universes of Experience are
Ideas (1ns), Brute Actuality (2ns), and Signs (3ns). Every sign is in a
genuine *triadic *relation with its object and its interpretant (3ns),
while billiard balls colliding are in a *dyadic *relation with each other
(2ns), and the color red in itself--apart from any physical embodiment
thereof--is a *monadic *possibility (1ns).

ET: Please remember his ten classes of Signs ...


I am well aware of them. Peirce's 1903 classification of signs employs
phaneroscopic *principles*, but it is an *application *of them within
speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as
semeiotic.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 6:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> OMG - I disagreed with Peirce. Heresy. Another example of my heretical
> nature.
>
> And I said it is a PHASE of  semiosis. To suggest that something is a
> PHASE of semiosis, is not the same as reducing it to semiosis - but - I
> stand by my view [my view!] that the experience of the phaneron, is a phase
> of the semiosic process of DO-IO-R-II, DI.
>
> And I totally disagree with your reduction of semiosis to Thirdness.
> Please remember his ten classes of Signs, 2.243-
>
>  A Sinsign, for example, is in a mode of Secondness...and he says so" "is
> an actual existent thing or event which is a sign". 2.245. my emphasis.
> Gosh - are you disagreeing with Peirce???
>
> On another note, do you think it is possible, in the spirit of discussion
> rather than debate, if you would, instead of saying:
>
> "No, it is not"...could you say: 'I think that it is not; 'or..' in my
> analysis, it is not'. Or..'In my view it is not'.
>
> Your authoritarian assertion ignores that your comment is YOUR
> Interpretatioon - and might differ from someone else's. And it isn't up to
> you to judge which is 'right'; that task belongs to the community of
> scholars. Not to an individual person' [and such thoughts are also FROM
> Peirce'.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 16/09/21 6:24 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
>
>
> Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.
>
> ET: He [De Tienne] sets up this phase of semiosis - and it IS a phase of
> semiosis ...
>
>
> No, it is not. Phaneroscopy is not reducible to semeiotic. All thought is
> in signs, but not everything that is or could be present to the mind is a
> sign. That is why there are three categories, only one of which (3ns)
> corresponds to signs/representation/mediation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 4:15 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
>>
>> I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object
>> interacting with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data. [And I
>> think that Peirce used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.
>>
>> It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three modes:
>> quality/reaction/continuity.
>>
>> And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its
>> categorical modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the Representamen
>> node...which must add some scientific analytic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

You are ignoring that I said that phaneroscopy is the reception of
data [i.e., in the DO, IO phase of interaction with the environment]
AND that the person in this phase then experiences and acknowledges
the categorical distinctions of this data, within the categorical
modes of quality, reaction, continuity, or 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.

To me, that is not a science but a process of classification of
experience.  It doesn't move from categorizing this input data [oh
dear, a heretical word 'input'] into any analysis of the relations of
the modes of the data within a whole function or semiosic process. It
would be like, in a lab, labelling the different insect larvae - and
even, labelling their phases of growth. But there would be no
analysis of the processes-of-morphological change. That is, no
movement from the DO-IO phase into the R analytic phase and the
resultant Interpretant phase. 

I think that this gathering and labelling of data about the
environment is a vital process in the carrying out of science - but-
on its own, I don't see it as science...which, in my view, requires
the mediation of the R phase.

Edwina
 On Thu 16/09/21  8:44 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 What Peirce actually says in R 645
(https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm [1], 1909-10) is that
phaneroscopy is "still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any
details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure
the student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to
enjoy, if the human culture continues long, it surely will in the
future become a strong and beneficient science." Moreover, there are
plenty of other passages where he straightforwardly refers to
phaneroscopy (or phenomenology) as a science, and of course he
includes it as a distinct branch in his mature classification of the
sciences. 
 Edwina claims that phaneroscopy is merely "the reception of data."
For Peirce, there is much more to it than that.
 CSP: What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the
direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations,
signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the
features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed
together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their
characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a
certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of
phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and
difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those
categories. (CP 1.286, 1904) 
 That certainly sounds like a science to me.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
-  twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
 On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 5:40 PM sowa @bestweb.net [4]  wrote:
  Edwina, Jon AS, List,   Peirce himself said that Phaneroscopy was
still a science egg, it had not yet become an embryo.   ET: My own
view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.  JAS: Another example
of disagreeing with Peirce.Since an egg that has not yet begun to
grow is not usually considered a member of its species, Edwina's view
is not much different from Peirce's view.   John


Links:
--
[1] https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://bestweb.net
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
John, List:

What Peirce actually says in R 645 (https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm,
1909-10) is that phaneroscopy is "still in the condition of a science-egg,
hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to
assure the student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to
enjoy, if the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future
become a strong and beneficient science." Moreover, there are plenty of
other passages where he straightforwardly refers to phaneroscopy (or
phenomenology) as a science, and of course he includes it as a distinct
branch in his mature classification of the sciences.

Edwina claims that phaneroscopy is merely "the reception of data." For
Peirce, there is much more to it than that.

CSP: What I term *phaneroscopy *is that study which, supported by the
direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations,
signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features
of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that
no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and
finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, 1904)


That certainly sounds like a science to me.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 5:40 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon AS, List,
>
> Peirce himself said that Phaneroscopy was still a science egg, it had not
> yet become an embryo.
>
> ET: My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
>
> JAS: Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.
>
> Since an egg that has not yet begun to grow is not usually considered a
> member of its species, Edwina's view is not much different from Peirce's
> view.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F

That's hardly an argument either rejecting my view or supporting De
Tienne. It's just simple malice.

I think the evidence for De Tienne having no understanding of the
categories is obvious from his slides on wine tasting.

And what evidence do you provide that I have no understanding of the
categories?

Edwina
 On Thu 16/09/21  7:01 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
ET: … and frankly, from these slides, he [ADT] doesn't seem to
have any understanding of the categories.
 Those Who Know All about the categories have thereby spoken!
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: 16-Sep-21 17:16
 To: jawb...@att.net; jerryr...@gmail.com
 Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read 
List

My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.

 I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object
interacting with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data.
[And I think that Peirce used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.

It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three
modes: quality/reaction/continuity. 

And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its
categorical modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the
Representamen node...which must add some scientific analytic method,
ie, mathematics, in order to interpret this data. 

But I consider De Tienne's outline ambiguous and unclear. He sets up
this phase of semiosis - and it IS a phase of semiosis - as some kind
of New Age campfire experience...and doesn't show us how it fits into
a scientific analysis.

and frankly, from these slides, he doesn't seem to have any
understanding of the categories.

Edwina
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

OMG - I disagreed with Peirce. Heresy. Another example of my
heretical nature. 

And I said it is a PHASE of  semiosis. To suggest that something is
a PHASE of semiosis, is not the same as reducing it to semiosis - but
- I stand by my view [my view!] that the experience of the phaneron,
is a phase of the semiosic process of DO-IO-R-II, DI.

And I totally disagree with your reduction of semiosis to Thirdness.
 Please remember his ten classes of Signs, 2.243-

 A Sinsign, for example, is in a mode of Secondness...and he says
so" "is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign". 2.245. my
emphasis. Gosh - are you disagreeing with Peirce???

On another note, do you think it is possible, in the spirit of
discussion rather than debate, if you would, instead of saying: 

"No, it is not"...could you say: 'I think that it is not; 'or..' in
my analysis, it is not'. Or..'In my view it is not'.

Your authoritarian assertion ignores that your comment is YOUR
Interpretatioon - and might differ from someone else's. And it isn't
up to you to judge which is 'right'; that task belongs to the
community of scholars. Not to an individual person' [and such
thoughts are also FROM Peirce'.

Edwina
 On Thu 16/09/21  6:24 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
 Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.
 ET: He [De Tienne] sets up this phase of semiosis - and it IS a
phase of semiosis ... 
 No, it is not. Phaneroscopy is not reducible to semeiotic. All
thought is in signs, but not everything that is or could be present
to the mind is a sign. That is why there are three categories, only
one of which (3ns) corresponds to signs/representation/mediation.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 4:15 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.

I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object
interacting with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data.
[And I think that Peirce used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.

It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three
modes: quality/reaction/continuity. 

And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its
categorical modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the
Representamen node...which must add some scientific analytic method,
ie, mathematics, in order to interpret this data. 

But I consider De Tienne's outline ambiguous and unclear. He sets up
this phase of semiosis - and it IS a phase of semiosis - as some kind
of New Age campfire experience...and doesn't show us how it fits into
a scientific analysis.

and frankly, from these slides, he doesn't seem to have any
understanding of the categories.

Edwina  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread gnox
ET: … and frankly, from these slides, he [ADT] doesn't seem to have any 
understanding of the categories.

 

Those Who Know All about the categories have thereby spoken!

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 16-Sep-21 17:16
To: jawb...@att.net; jerryr...@gmail.com
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

 

List

My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.

 I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object interacting 
with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data. [And I think that Peirce 
used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.

It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three modes: 
quality/reaction/continuity. 

And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its categorical 
modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the Representamen node...which 
must add some scientific analytic method, ie, mathematics, in order to 
interpret this data.

But I consider De Tienne's outline ambiguous and unclear. He sets up this phase 
of semiosis - and it IS a phase of semiosis - as some kind of New Age campfire 
experience...and doesn't show us how it fits into a scientific analysis.

and frankly, from these slides, he doesn't seem to have any understanding of 
the categories.

Edwina




 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Edwina, Jon AS, List,
  
 Peirce himself said that Phaneroscopy was still a science egg, it had not 
yet become an embryo.
  
 ET: My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
 
 JAS: Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.

  
 Since an egg that has not yet begun to grow is not usually considered a 
member of its species,
 Edwina's view is not much different from Peirce's view.
  
 John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

2021-09-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.


Another example of disagreeing with Peirce.

ET: He [De Tienne] sets up this phase of semiosis - and it IS a phase of
semiosis ...


No, it is not. Phaneroscopy is not reducible to semeiotic. All *thought *is
in signs, but not everything that is or could be *present to the mind* is a
sign. That is why there are *three *categories, only one of which (3ns)
corresponds to signs/representation/mediation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 4:15 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.
>
> I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object
> interacting with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data. [And I
> think that Peirce used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.
>
> It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three modes:
> quality/reaction/continuity.
>
> And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its
> categorical modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the Representamen
> node...which must add some scientific analytic method, ie, mathematics, in
> order to interpret this data.
>
> But I consider De Tienne's outline ambiguous and unclear. He sets up this
> phase of semiosis - and it IS a phase of semiosis - as some kind of New Age
> campfire experience...and doesn't show us how it fits into a scientific
> analysis.
>
> and frankly, from these slides, he doesn't seem to have any understanding
> of the categories.
>
> Edwina
>
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► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

2021-09-16 Thread Jerry Rhee
Dear Gary, list:


You said:


*As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with
their own answers (or else leave the questions open).*

*Nothing has been said during the slow read that would persuade me to make
substantial changes to that paper, so I’m content to let it speak for me.*



I have heard similar laments in the recent and long-forgotten past

   - and some of them very damning to our current democratic condition,

  that is, to our general (275e) political condition.



Do you ask me to prove this?

If so, you must be a rationalist, indeed.


I can prove it

-- but *only by assuming a logical principle *

 of the demonstration of which I shall give a hint in the next lecture.


With best wishes,
Jerry R


PS.


Tao Te Ching 32..

That is a wonderful recommendation that I whole-heartedly endorse.

I mean what does ephectic desire have to do with anything, *amirite*?

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 2:30 PM  wrote:

> Jerry R,
>
> The slow read is not *quite* concluded: there are still two more slides
> to go. Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you
> ask here; the last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical
> portrait of a science-egg (with its various parts labelled).
>
> As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with
> their own answers (or else leave the questions open). I’ve given some hints
> of my own answers along the way, and back in June I submitted a paper on
> the subject which is due to be published later this year as part of a
> collection edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Mohammad Shafiei. Nothing
> has been said during the slow read that would persuade me to make
> substantial changes to that paper, so I’m content to let it speak for me.
>
> I wouldn’t have written such a paper if I hadn’t paid very close attention
> to Peirce’s writings that *explicitly deal with phenomenology and
> phaneroscopy*. Some of the most vociferous opinions expressed during the
> slow read came from people who consider themselves experts but obviously
> have *not* paid close attention to what *Peirce* said on the subject, and
> have even objected to Peirce’s writings on the subject being posted to the
> list (instead of his writings on mathematics, for instance). Some of these
> opinions were clearly motivated by a hostile reading
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#hxrd> of ADT’s slides. I think any
> readers who still have open minds regarding phaneroscopy owe it to
> themselves to at least read everything in EP2 on the subject, if not some
> of the harder-to-find texts like R 645
> <https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm> (which is now on my website).
>
> If someone has paid close attention to the *practice* of phaneroscopy as
> described in concrete detail by Peirce, and has tried it out for himself
> (as Peirce insisted one must in order to draw any conclusions from it),
> *then* he can form and express a valid opinion about its scientific value
> (or lack thereof), as R.K. Atkins did in his book about it. I don’t believe
> that any opinions about it which *aren’t* based on such a study are worth
> arguing about. I also believe that opinions about Peirce’s philosophy which
> ignore his phenomenology/phaneroscopy are just as liable to distortion as
> opinions which ignore his mathematics or his semeiotics.
>
> I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific. I don’t
> have a more direct answer to your question, so this will have to do.
>
> Gary f.
>
> } Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
> enough names. One must know when to stop. [*Tao Te Ching* 32
> (Feng/English)] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jerry Rhee
> *Sent:* 16-Sep-21 13:56
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49
>
>
>
> Dear Gary, list:
>
>
>
> Since the slow read has concluded,
>
> I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial
> announcement
>
> (on June 11).
>
>
>
> “My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that
>
> Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.
>
> That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy
>
> merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)
>
> and not systematically- as a true science.”
>
>
>
> So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?
>
>
>
> *Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*
>
>
>
> ___
>
>
>
> If, as Peirce says
>
>   *Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg,*
>
>   *hardly any details of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

2021-09-16 Thread gnox
Jerry R,

The slow read is not quite concluded: there are still two more slides to go. 
Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you ask here; the 
last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical portrait of a 
science-egg (with its various parts labelled). 

As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with their 
own answers (or else leave the questions open). I’ve given some hints of my own 
answers along the way, and back in June I submitted a paper on the subject 
which is due to be published later this year as part of a collection edited by 
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Mohammad Shafiei. Nothing has been said during the 
slow read that would persuade me to make substantial changes to that paper, so 
I’m content to let it speak for me.

I wouldn’t have written such a paper if I hadn’t paid very close attention to 
Peirce’s writings that explicitly deal with phenomenology and phaneroscopy. 
Some of the most vociferous opinions expressed during the slow read came from 
people who consider themselves experts but obviously have not paid close 
attention to what Peirce said on the subject, and have even objected to 
Peirce’s writings on the subject being posted to the list (instead of his 
writings on mathematics, for instance). Some of these opinions were clearly 
motivated by a hostile reading <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#hxrd>  of 
ADT’s slides. I think any readers who still have open minds regarding 
phaneroscopy owe it to themselves to at least read everything in EP2 on the 
subject, if not some of the harder-to-find texts like R 645 
<https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm>  (which is now on my website). 

If someone has paid close attention to the practice of phaneroscopy as 
described in concrete detail by Peirce, and has tried it out for himself (as 
Peirce insisted one must in order to draw any conclusions from it), then he can 
form and express a valid opinion about its scientific value (or lack thereof), 
as R.K. Atkins did in his book about it. I don’t believe that any opinions 
about it which aren’t based on such a study are worth arguing about. I also 
believe that opinions about Peirce’s philosophy which ignore his 
phenomenology/phaneroscopy are just as liable to distortion as opinions which 
ignore his mathematics or his semeiotics.

I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific. I don’t have a 
more direct answer to your question, so this will have to do.

Gary f.

} Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already enough 
names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32  (Feng/English)] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jerry Rhee
Sent: 16-Sep-21 13:56
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

 

Dear Gary, list:

 

Since the slow read has concluded, 

I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial announcement 

(on June 11).

 

“My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that 

Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.  

That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy 

merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily) 

and not systematically- as a true science.”

 

So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?

 

Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?

 

___

 

If, as Peirce says

  Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, 

  hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, 

  though enough to assure the student of it that … 

  it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficent science. (R 
645:2, 1909)

 

And if, as Gary says

  In these letters (between Peirce and William James, 1898) 

  Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls 

  “conservative sentimentalism” or “sentimental conservatism.” 

  The basic idea is that in the conduct of everyday social life, 

  when it comes to making crucial decisions, 

  we ought to trust our instinctive or “gut feelings” 

  rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical theories..

 

I hardly see any reason why we ought to take him seriously.

That is, it is impossible for me to believe a man, 

who puts himself forth genuinely as logician, 

that he would prescribe such an immature belief.

 

That he has the belief is not surprising, but there is something obvious that 
is missing here.  

For have you forgotten the old decree?

 

  Believest thou that he there spake the truth? 

  Why dost thou believe it?"

 

  The disciple answered: "I believe in Zarathustra." 

 

  But Zarathustra shook his head and smiled.

  -- Belief doth not sanctify me, said he, 

  least of all the belief in myself. 

 

  But granting that some one did say in all seriousness 

  that the poets lie too much: he was right

 —WE do

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 49

2021-09-16 Thread Jerry Rhee
Dear Jon, list,

Thank you for this note ("I know you meant it in the nicest possible
way..").
I believe *that* is the only meaning for 'wind-egg' that I know or have
ever heard of..

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 1:24 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Hi Jerry,
>
> I remember that ... because I was not familiar with the term “wind-egg”
> and had to look it up ... one meaning being an unfertilized egg ... and
> though I thought that just a little bit snarky at the time, I know you
> meant it in the nicest possible way ... and now I'd have say it makes
> a kind of sense if I view in light of my usual first approximation to
> Peirce's Calcification Of Sciences (COS), to wit, the following Fig.
>
> Peirce Syllabus
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
>
> For without the fertilization by Mathematics
> the Oöscience of Phaneroscopy will forever
> remain an armchair wannabe science.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jon
>
> On 9/16/2021 1:55 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> > Dear Gary, list:
> >
> >
> > Since the slow read has concluded,
> >
> > I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial
> announcement
> >
> > (on June 11).
> >
> >
> > “My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption
> that
> >
> > Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.
> >
> > That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy
> >
> > merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)
> >
> > and not systematically- as a true science.”
> >
> >
> > So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?
> >
> >
> > *Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*
> >
> >
> > ___
> >
> >
> > If, as Peirce says
> >
> > *  Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, *
> >
> > *  hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, *
> >
> > *  though enough to assure the student of it that … *
> >
> >*it **surely** will in the future become a strong and beneficent
> science.*
> > (R 645:2, 1909)
> >
> >
> > And if, as Gary says
> >
> > *  In these letters (between Peirce and William James, 1898) *
> >
> > *  Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls *
> >
> > *  “conservative sentimentalism” or “sentimental conservatism.” *
> >
> > *  The basic idea is that in the conduct of everyday social life, *
> >
> > *  when it comes to making crucial decisions, *
> >
> > *  we ought to trust our instinctive or “gut feelings” *
> >
> > *  rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical
> theories..*
> >
> >
> > I hardly see any reason why we ought to take him seriously.
> >
> > That is, it is *impossible* for me to believe a man,
> >
> > who puts himself forth genuinely *as logician*,
> >
> > that he would *prescribe* such an immature belief.
> >
> >
> > That he *has* the belief is not surprising, but there is something
> *obvious*
> > that is missing here.
> >
> > For have you forgotten the old decree?
> >
> >
> >Believest thou that he there spake the truth?
> >
> >Why dost thou believe it?"
> >
> >
> >The disciple answered: "I believe in Zarathustra."
> >
> >
> >But Zarathustra shook his head and smiled.
> >
> >-- Belief doth not sanctify me, said he,
> >
> >least of all the belief in myself.
> >
> >
> >But granting that some one did say in all seriousness
> >
> >that the poets lie too much: he was right
> >
> >   —WE do lie too much.
> >
> >
> > Moreover, when Peirce admits
> >
> >
> > *in all the works on pedagogy that ever I read,- and they have been many,
> > big, and heavy,-*
> >
> > *I don’t remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by
> > practical jokes..  *
> >
> > *That however, describes the method of our great teacher, Experience.
> She
> > says*
> >
> >
> > *Open your mouth and shut your eyes*
> >
> > *And I’ll give you something to make you wise;*
> >
> >
> > Would you be prepared to do this action because Peirce said “*Believe
> me!*’?
> >
> >
> > Would you want Experience to keep her promise-
> >
> > to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us?
> >
> >
> > I mean, *what was our experience during this slow read*?
> >
> >
> > As to what is missing,
> >
> > *  A Little Known Argument for the Being of God*
> >
> > *  A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God*
> >
> >
> > That. is (~CP 2.116),
> >
> > *We know **already** how we must proceed *
> >
> > in order to determine* what the meaning of the question is. *
> >
> > *Our sole guide must be the consideration of the use to which the answer
> is
> > to be put  *
> >
> > *--not necessarily the practical application, *
> >
> > *but in what way it is to subserve the summum bonum. *
> >
> >
> > *It is absolutely impossible that the word "Being" should bear any
> meaning
> > whatever *
> >
> > *except with reference to the summum bonum..*
> >
> >
> > *We sketch out the method and apply it to a few metaphysical conceptions,
> > such as Reality, Necessity, etc.*
> >
> > *(And then CP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 49

2021-09-16 Thread Jon Awbrey

Hi Jerry,

I remember that ... because I was not familiar with the term “wind-egg”
and had to look it up ... one meaning being an unfertilized egg ... and
though I thought that just a little bit snarky at the time, I know you
meant it in the nicest possible way ... and now I'd have say it makes
a kind of sense if I view in light of my usual first approximation to
Peirce's Calcification Of Sciences (COS), to wit, the following Fig.

Peirce Syllabus
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg

For without the fertilization by Mathematics
the Oöscience of Phaneroscopy will forever
remain an armchair wannabe science.

Cheers,

Jon

On 9/16/2021 1:55 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Dear Gary, list:


Since the slow read has concluded,

I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial announcement

(on June 11).


“My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that

Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.

That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy

merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)

and not systematically- as a true science.”


So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?


*Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*


___


If, as Peirce says

*  Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, *

*  hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, *

*  though enough to assure the student of it that … *

   *it **surely** will in the future become a strong and beneficent science.*
(R 645:2, 1909)


And if, as Gary says

*  In these letters (between Peirce and William James, 1898) *

*  Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls *

*  “conservative sentimentalism” or “sentimental conservatism.” *

*  The basic idea is that in the conduct of everyday social life, *

*  when it comes to making crucial decisions, *

*  we ought to trust our instinctive or “gut feelings” *

*  rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical theories..*


I hardly see any reason why we ought to take him seriously.

That is, it is *impossible* for me to believe a man,

who puts himself forth genuinely *as logician*,

that he would *prescribe* such an immature belief.


That he *has* the belief is not surprising, but there is something *obvious*
that is missing here.

For have you forgotten the old decree?


   Believest thou that he there spake the truth?

   Why dost thou believe it?"


   The disciple answered: "I believe in Zarathustra."


   But Zarathustra shook his head and smiled.

   -- Belief doth not sanctify me, said he,

   least of all the belief in myself.


   But granting that some one did say in all seriousness

   that the poets lie too much: he was right

  —WE do lie too much.


Moreover, when Peirce admits


*in all the works on pedagogy that ever I read,- and they have been many,
big, and heavy,-*

*I don’t remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by
practical jokes..  *

*That however, describes the method of our great teacher, Experience.  She
says*


*Open your mouth and shut your eyes*

*And I’ll give you something to make you wise;*


Would you be prepared to do this action because Peirce said “*Believe me!*’?


Would you want Experience to keep her promise-

to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us?


I mean, *what was our experience during this slow read*?


As to what is missing,

*  A Little Known Argument for the Being of God*

*  A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God*


That. is (~CP 2.116),

*We know **already** how we must proceed *

in order to determine* what the meaning of the question is. *

*Our sole guide must be the consideration of the use to which the answer is
to be put  *

*--not necessarily the practical application, *

*but in what way it is to subserve the summum bonum. *


*It is absolutely impossible that the word "Being" should bear any meaning
whatever *

*except with reference to the summum bonum..*


*We sketch out the method and apply it to a few metaphysical conceptions,
such as Reality, Necessity, etc.*

*(And then CP 5.53)..*

*Everybody** should be competent to answer that of himself..*


(I would recommend looking up this section, “Everybody..”, on page 161,

edited by Turrisi in *Method of Right Thinking.  *

There is an interesting framing there in bold, which is not present in
Collected Papers.  Hope that helps!)


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 8:08 AM  wrote:


Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André
De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
 site. *Conclusion:
Phaneroscopy as a “science-egg”*

Gary f.





Text:

Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any
details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the
student of it that ... it surely will in the future becom

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 48

2021-09-15 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 
 List

I continue to reject the slides of De Tienne that tell us that a
certain taste or odour is '2-1' or whatever; that one is 'lost' and
'floating in the phaneron'...and so on. This is hardly a methodology.
And the conclusions are arbitrary - and bizarre. 

I think that a constructive outline of the method could be dealt
with by just outlining the actual experience that you have with a
mode-of-being in Firstness [that whole quality-of-feeling]; the
actual experience of a mode of being in Secondness [that brute
physical action/reaction on your person; and the mode of being in
Thirdness which gives a sense of continuity and relations. 

You could give, as examples - the experience of hitting one's hand
with a hammer; that first enveloping feeling of Firstness; that
reaction of awareness of pain that is Secondness; and..Thirdness
requires time..that awareness that a bruise will usually develop as
the Law-of-physiology.

Another example: the walking into a factory with a huge machine;
that first experience of overwhelming sound; that reactive experience
where one separates the sound from oneself and sees it as 'other'
[from a machine]. and then, the sense that this is a part of a wider
system, the factory. 

That is - the method of dealing with the phaneron is to break down
one's experiences into the three modes; quality, reaction,
continuity. This is accomplished by awareness of those experiences.  

There's nothing lost or floating..

Edwina
 On Wed 15/09/21  1:42 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
List,

In the preceding series of slides, ADT has given some concrete
examples of the practice of phaneroscopy. I would have preferred
examples that focus more on “phenomena which lie open to the
observation of every man, every day and hour” (CP 7.526), rather
than the specialized observational practice of wine-tasting, but at
least that practice directs our attention to experiences other than
the  visual, which tends to dominate discussions of sense perception.

This slide gives more general advice to practitioners of Peircean
phaneroscopy, but those who have forgotten (or never paid much
attention to) Peirce’s own descriptions of the practice are likely
to find them baffling. Here I’ll simply repeat some of those
particularly relevant to ADT’s points in slide 48, including some
which have been quoted here before, for the benefit of those willing
to try the actual practice of this pre-logical and pre-semiotic
“science.” In Peirce’s words, anyone willing to learn such a
practice “must actually repeat my observations and experiments for
himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than
if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration to a man
congenitally blind” (CP 1.286).  
CSP: Now the science of Phenomenology asserts that every man who is
sufficiently intelligent to testify to the matter at all will testify
that whatever is at any time before his mind has certain features
which it describes, and that it is not possible to think these
features are not in what is before one's own mind. If anybody finds
that he cannot doubt this, as far as his own mind is concerned,— as
well as he can discover,— and that he does not seem to have any real
doubt of the matter's being the same in other minds, he may as well
admit that, for him, there is no doubt about it.  

I must say, however, that all these reflections about possible
doubts originate rather with the logician when it is a question of
appealing to phenomenology than in any emphatic assertions of the
phenomenologist himself. Phenomenology, which, according to our
Table, stands just upon the borders of the purely hypothetical
science of mathematics, hardly makes any explicit assertions. What
phenomenology does is to distinguish certain very general elements of
phenomena, render them distinct, and study their possible modes. It
does not need particularly to insist upon their universality, since
this is evident to everybody, who knows by his own portion of human
experience something of what human experience generally is like. The
work of discovery of the phenomenologist, and most difficult work it
is, consists in disentangling, or drawing out, from human thought,
certain threads that run through it, and in showing what marks each
has that distinguishes it from every other.  (NEM 4, 196) 
CSP: For an example of Firstness, look at anything red. That redness
is positively what it is. Contrast may heighten our consciousness of
it; but the redness is not relative to anything; it is absolute, or
positive. If one imagines or remembers red, his imagination will be
either vivid or dim; but that will not, in the least, affect the
quality of the redness, which may be brilliant or dull, in either
case. The vividness is the degree of our consciousness of it, its
reaction on us. The quality in itself has no vividness or dimness. In
itself, then, it canno

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 48

2021-09-15 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

I consider that this slide continues the bizarre of the last few
slides...

How does one practice 'being the inquiry itself"?  It sounds like
something one does at a New Age campfire.

How does the phaneron 'guide you'?

How can you identify categorical patterns if you are 'lost' and
'floating' within the phaneron?

Bizarre.

Edwina
 On Wed 15/09/21  8:13 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. 

Gary f.
Text: 

•  Train yourself in the logical and observational art of
abstractive PRESCISSION.

 •  Look for non-reciprocal dependencies among phaneral
prebits.

•  Forget about the noumenon/phenomenon ad-hoc dual
distinction!

•  Learn to forget you are an inquiring subject: be the
inquiry itself, merge yourself with the phaneron, lose your self into
it, stop being aware that you are observing, merely float in
awareness, where the manifesting and the manifested are one. 

•  Yet, be attentive, persistent, and direct. Don't talk,
don't hypothesize, don't assume. Don't question the reality of what
seems. Let the “phaneral” surprise you. Welcome all of its forms.
Let it guide you.

•  Identify categorial patterns, predict seemings
accordingly, test.  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
I was referring to papers in the computer science literature, as well as papers 
from philosophers, from Portugal, Italy and Finland.
These papers draw on abductive reasoning as well as classification techniques.  
Of Brazilians are also contributing.

The quality of the works from the University of Indiana speak for themselves.

Cheers
Jerry




> On Sep 14, 2021, at 4:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am curious, could you please identify a few members of the "new generation 
> of CSP scholars emerging in Europe" that you have in mind?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:44 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List, Edwina:
> 
> The disconnect is not complete.
> The signs for firstness, secondness, etc are preserved.
> 
> Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?
> 
> A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
List, Edwina:

The disconnect is not complete.
The signs for firstness, secondness, etc are preserved.

Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?

A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.

Cheers
Jerry



> On Sep 14, 2021, at 8:08 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> List
> 
> And as I've previously said - I consider these De Tienne descriptions as 
> absolutely bizarre.
> 
> I don't see that they have a thing to do with the Peircean categories - and 
> frankly, show a huge misunderstanding of those categories.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Tue 14/09/21 8:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca  sent:
> 
> Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
> Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
>  site. Slide 46 is 
> a continuation of 45.
> 
> Gary f.
>  
> 
>  
>  
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Jerry, list

 I certainly agree with you on the work being done, using Peirce, in
computer science and AI - and would add, from Germany, Denmark,
Belgium, Estonia...and of course, the work being done in Biosemiotics
in Europe. 

I would also note that they do not shy away from using the
terminology of their disciplines to show how, despite the different
terms, the conceptual infrastructure is Peircean.

Edwina
 On Tue 14/09/21  7:29 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent:
 I was referring to papers in the computer science literature, as
well as papers from philosophers, from Portugal, Italy and
Finland.These papers draw on abductive reasoning as well as
classification techniques.  Of Brazilians are also contributing.
  The quality of the works from the University of Indiana speak for
themselves.
 Cheers
 Jerry
 On Sep 14, 2021, at 4:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Jerry, List:
 I am curious, could you please identify a few members of the "new
generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe" that you have in mind?
 Thanks,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
 On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:44 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com [4]> wrote:
 List, Edwina:
 The disconnect is not complete.The signs for firstness, secondness,
etc are preserved.
 Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?
 A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.
 CheersJerry  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 45

2021-09-14 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Jon AS, List,,
  
 I stated my point very precisely.  Phaneroscopy is the first step that 
derives a representation.  Methodeuric is the next step that evalluates it: 
  
 JFS: The goal of phaneroscopy is to analyze experience and represent the 
results in a diagram or other hypoicon that can be evaluated by methodeutic 
and used for (1) doing something, (2) saying something, or (3) further 
reasoning that might eventually lead to #1 or #2.

   
 JAS:  phaneroscopy according to Peirce ... studies phenomena in 
themselves, not in relation to ends like doing something, saying something, 
or further reasoning.
  
 Yes.  That is exactly what I said.   Normaive sciences, especially 
methodeutic, do the evaluation for whatever purposes might be intended.
  
 CSP: For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in 
their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, 
treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.Normative Science treats of the laws 
of the relation of phenomena to ends, that is, it treats of Phenomena in 
their Secondness. (CP 5.122-123, EP 2:197, 1903)
  
 JFS: Slide 45 doesn't say anything about the role of phaneroscopy in 
relating perception to action.

   
 JAS: That is decidedly not the role of phaneroscopy according to Peirce. 
For one thing, it encompasses not only perception, but also imagination. 
For another, his famous statement relating perception to action is an 
expression of his pragmatism and thus falls under methodeutic, not 
phaneroscopy.
  
 This is a discussion group, not a debating group.  I have discussed 
imagination in many notes to P-list and in many of my slides and 
publications that I have cited (with URLs).  We expect participants in 
P-list to support,not attack each other.
  
 As a more appropriate response, I suggest: "That's true, John, but Andre 
was only discussing phaneroscopy.  He was not discussing the stages that 
follow."
  
 In that case, I would have replied "I agree.  But a tutorial on 
phaneroscopy that ignores what follows leaves the reader hanging in 
suspense.   Just a brief comment about what the subsequent stages do would 
clarify the purpose of the first stage."
  

 John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Jerry, List:

I am curious, could you please identify a few members of the "new
generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe" that you have in mind?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:44 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Edwina:
>
> The disconnect is not complete.
> The signs for firstness, secondness, etc are preserved.
>
> Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?
>
> A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon

Yes! Yes! You got it! Those are the categories!

Many thanks.

Edwina
 On Tue 14/09/21  9:40 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Dear Edwina, I got your categories right here: 
 The 1st Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine! 
 The 2nd Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine! 
 The 3rd Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine! 
 Cheers, 
 Jon 
 On 9/14/2021 9:08 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 >  List 
 >  
 >  And as I've previously said - I consider these De Tienne 
 > descriptions as absolutely bizarre. 
 >  
 >  I don't see that they have a thing to do with the Peircean 
 > categories - and frankly, show a huge misunderstanding of those 
 > categories. 
 >  
 >  Edwina 
 >   On Tue 14/09/21  8:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: 
 >  Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide
of 
 > André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition
Project 
 > (iupui.edu) [1]  site. Slide 46 is a continuation of 45. 
 >  
 >  Gary f. 
 >  
 >  
 > Links: 
 > -- 
 > [1] https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations [2] 
 >  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Jon Awbrey

Dear Edwina, I got your categories right here:

The 1st Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine!
The 2nd Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine!
The 3rd Rule of the Winoscopy Club is Don't Swallow the Wine!

Cheers,

Jon

On 9/14/2021 9:08 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

List

And as I've previously said - I consider these De Tienne
descriptions as absolutely bizarre.

I don't see that they have a thing to do with the Peircean
categories - and frankly, show a huge misunderstanding of those
categories.

Edwina
  On Tue 14/09/21  8:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. Slide 46 is a continuation of 45.

Gary f.


Links:
--
[1] https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

2021-09-14 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

And as I've previously said - I consider these De Tienne
descriptions as absolutely bizarre.

I don't see that they have a thing to do with the Peircean
categories - and frankly, show a huge misunderstanding of those
categories. 

Edwina
 On Tue 14/09/21  8:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. Slide 46 is a continuation of 45.

Gary f.


Links:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 45

2021-09-13 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
John, List:

JFS: The goal of phaneroscopy is to analyze experience and represent the
results in a diagram or other hypoicon that can be evaluated by methodeutic
and used for (1) doing something, (2) saying something, or (3) further
reasoning that might eventually lead to #1 or #2.


That is decidedly *not *the goal of phaneroscopy according to Peirce. It
studies phenomena *in themselves*, not in relation to ends like doing
something, saying something, or further reasoning.

CSP: For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in
their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus,
treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.
Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends,
that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness. (CP 5.122-123, EP
2:197, 1903)


Methodeutic is the third branch of the *normative science* of logic as
semeiotic, which depends on phaneroscopy (among other sciences) for its
principles, not the other way around.

JFS: Slide 45 doesn't say anything about the role of phaneroscopy in
relating perception to action.


That is decidedly *not *the role of phaneroscopy according to Peirce. For
one thing, it encompasses not only perception, but also imagination. For
another, his famous statement relating perception to action is an
expression of his pragmatism and thus falls under methodeutic, not
phaneroscopy.

CSP: The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate
of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason. (CP 5.212, EP 2:241, 1903)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Sep 12, 2021 at 9:45 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Gary F, Edwina, List,
>
> I agree with Edwina:
>
> ET: I personally find these classifications arbitrary and frankly, without
> meaning.
>
> To be meaningful, it must show its passport at the gates of perception and
> action.  It's plausible that the cloud of words in slide 45 is related to
> perception, but there is no evidence that it leads to any action, physical
> or verbal.
>
> I'll summarize my earlier comments:  The goal of phaneroscopy is to
> analyze experience and represent the results in a diagram or other hypoicon
> that can be evaluated by methodeutic and used for (1) doing something, (2)
> saying something, or (3) further reasoning that might eventually lead to #1
> or #2.
>
> Slide 45 doesn't say anything about the role of phaneroscopy in relating
> perception to action.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 45

2021-09-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

Again, I find this slide baffling.

My view is that all interactions are triadic; ie, X
person/thing..interacts with their environment in a semiosic or
triadic process, of O-R-I. This slide ignores this process.

For example, the way I understand it, if I am a winetaster
[Me??!!]..the interaction would be, that the wine and I interact such
that the wine is a DO and IO. Then, my Representamen/Sign process
kicks in, with both its already learned knowledge base of 'what is a
wine'...and my sensate capacities for taste, smell, etc.  Then...the
results are the II and DI...the Interpretants.

Everything that De Tienne notes..except for that weird 'Balance' is,
to me, an Interpretant.. And has moved through a full triadic semiosic
process to get there. Everything from the Qualisign first feeling, to
the Iconic Sinsign,  to what I think is the sign type of most of
these interpretants; the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. I don't see how
De Tienne can come up with these what are really Interpretant results
except by going through a full triadic semiosic process.

But if I understand it correctly the phaneron experience is just the
first step...the Do and IO phase...where the Representamen is
learning, examiningpossibly just those first two phases
[Qualisign, Iconic Sinsign]…Even these - are triadic. 

Again - I find this whole slide baffling and don't understand how he
can labels these experiences the way he does.

Edwina
 On Sun 12/09/21 10:45 PM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net
sent:
 Gary F, Edwina, List,I agree with Edwina:   ET: I personally
find these classifications arbitrary and frankly, without meaning. 

To be meaningful, it must show its passport at the gates of
perception and action.  It's plausible that the cloud of words in
slide 45 is related to perception, but there is no evidence that it
leads to any action, physical or verbal. 

I'll summarize my earlier comments:  The goal of phaneroscopy is to
analyze experience and represent the results in a diagram or other
hypoicon that can be evaluated by methodeutic and used for (1) doing
something, (2) saying something, or (3) further reasoning that might
eventually lead to #1 or #2. 

Slide 45 doesn't say anything about the role of phaneroscopy in
relating perception to action. 

John  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 45

2021-09-12 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Gary F, Edwina, List,
  
  I agree with Edwina:
  
 ET: I personally find these classifications arbitrary and frankly, without 
meaning.

To be meaningful, it must show its passport at the gates of perception and 
action.  It's plausible that the cloud of words in slide 45 is related to 
perception, but there is no evidence that it leads to any action, physical 
or verbal.  

I'll summarize my earlier comments:  The goal of phaneroscopy is to analyze 
experience and represent the results in a diagram or other hypoicon that 
can be evaluated by methodeutic and used for (1) doing something, (2) 
saying something, or (3) further reasoning that might eventually lead to #1 
or #2.  

Slide 45 doesn't say anything about the role of phaneroscopy in relating 
perception to action.  

John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 45

2021-09-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

I personally find these classifications arbitrary and frankly,
without meaning. 

For example. 'Balance' -  to which he assigns the mode-of-being of
Thirdness, because he says that it has 'three components working in
harmony with one another'. But is this a definition of Thirdness? To
my understanding, Thirdness is a 'mode of being'..which brings "a
second and third into relation to each other". 8.329. As such,
Thirdness is an action that functions to develop common habits such
that a 'second and third' can, by virtue of these common habits, come
together as a 'whole'. 

But De Tienne's three components, fruit, alcohol and acid, i.e.,
here we have three distinct  Objects in interaction with each other.
Where and what is the generalizing component that TRANSFORMS all
three into a unified whole? Just because you have three objects
doesn't mean that Thirdness is involved. 

I can understand 'Body' of the wine in interaction with the mouth,
as an action of Secondness- not necessarily just the 'weight' but the
actual interaction of  wine-with-mouth.

But the rest of his classifications are, to me, arbitrary and
puzzling.

Edwina
 On Sun 12/09/21 10:39 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. Here he sorts out various oenoscopic terms
according to the categories and subcategories to which he would
assign them.

Gary f.


Links:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

2021-09-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Phyllis, List:

I am basically suggesting that formal logic = mathematical logic = *logica
utens*, while normative logic = semeiotic (speculative grammar + critic +
methodeutic) = *logica docens*. I have in mind Peirce's distinction in CP
2.439 (1902) between mathematics as the science which *draws* necessary
conclusions (strictly deductive) and logic as the science of *drawing*
conclusions (abductive/retroductive, deductive, and inductive).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 5:52 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
> normative differently.
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
>> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
>> formal logic.
>>
>> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
>> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
>> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
>> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
>> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
>> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
>> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
>> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
>> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
>> utens*.
>>
>> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
>> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
>> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
>> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
>> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
>> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
>> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
>> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
>> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
>> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
>> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
>> 2.192, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> John, Phyllis,
>>>
>>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>>> docens*.
>>>
>>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>>> part of it.
>>>
>>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a 
>>> *logica
>>> utens*? What do you think?
>>>
>>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

2021-09-11 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
normative differently.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
> formal logic.
>
> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>
>
> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
> utens*.
>
> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
> 2.192, 1902)
>
>
> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>
>> John, Phyllis,
>>
>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>> docens*.
>>
>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>> part of it.
>>
>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
>> utens*? What do you think?
>>
>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

2021-09-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Gary F., List:

As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
formal logic.

CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)


Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and thus
requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
utens*.

CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
2.192, 1902)


Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:

> John, Phyllis,
>
> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
> docens*.
>
> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
> with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
> upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical logic*.
> Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that would seem
> to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential part of it.
>
> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
> utens*? What do you think?
>
> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>
> Gary f.
>
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

2021-09-11 Thread gnox
John, Phyllis,

I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic is
a logica utens or a logica docens. Since you teach the subject yourself,
John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires explicit
instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s “Logic of
Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its reasonings by a
logica utens which it develops for itself, and has no need of any appeal to
a logica docens.” Unless he changed his mind about this after c. 1896 (which
I doubt), the implication is that the logic of mathematics is a logica utens
while mathematical logic is a logica docens.

If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
upon for principles is the logic of mathematics or mathematical logic. Since
phaneroscopy is cenoscopic, according to Peirce, that would seem to rule out
any special logica docens being an essential part of it.

Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
mathematics involved is really the logic of relatives, which (being
mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical logic.)
Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a logica utens?
What do you think?

By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 11-Sep-21 15:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

 

Gary F,

 

That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There
are many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out
the vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy
is more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing
the experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping
them to a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and
interrelationships. 

 

In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience
to words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to
Peirce's methodeutic.

 

John

 

 

 

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
<https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations>  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

2021-09-11 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Gary F,

 That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There are 
many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out the 
vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy is 
more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing the 
experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping them to 
a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and 
interrelationships.

 In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy 
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience to 
words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to Peirce's 
methodeutic.

 John





 From: g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne's slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site.

Gary f.






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 43

2021-09-09 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
Yes.  Language is incapable of expressing all of experience. Peirce's
emphasis on sensory experience is well taken. I always used actual
materials when working with young children. I should have done so with
older ones as well.

On Thu, Sep 9, 2021, 9:33 AM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Gary F, Phyllis, List,
>
> I agree with Phylls:
>
> PC: This  is very effective for teaching rich language skills to young
> children.
>
> But adults, especially anyone who is trying to understand what Peirce meant
> by phaneroscopy, would need more information about how to represent
> whatever
> one discovers by doing those exercises.  The slide (copied below) says
> nothing
> about the representation.
>
> The book by Albert  Upton used descriptions in English.  That is useful,
> but
> English is incapable of describing what an artist sees.  IFor example,
> consider
> the complex perspectives discovered by the Renaissance painters or the
> very complex configurations by Picasso.
>
> In one of his examples, Peirce considered the subtle changes of color in
> a snow covered scene when directly illuminated by the sun (bluish) vs
> in the shadow (yelllowish).  Those are issues that Peirce discussed in
> his book, Photometric Researches.   He used special instruments to get
> precise measures of the spectrum.  But he also was very sensitive to
> the features that could be observed by careful analysis without special
> instruments.
>
> The mapping to language occurs late in the process.  A mapping to diagrams
> (or other hypoiccons) occurs much earlier.
>
> John
> __
>
> From the slide:
>
>
> *How does one become a phaneroscopist? *
>
> *How to train oneself?*
>
> There are a myriad ways of learning the trade.
>
> •  Study how oenologists train themselves to taste and describe
> wines. Study how perfume makers describe scents.
>
> •  Observe abstract paintings and create for each of them a list
> of titles plausible to you.
>
> •  Bring yourself to perceive new qualia and to isolate (prescind)
> them.
>
> •  Draw, paint, write poetry: don't pretend to be an artist, just
> a mere phaneroscopist - though an extraordinarily assiduous one.
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Dear John,

I actually like the sound (if not the fuzy) of “prebit”,
there's a lot of potential for playing off QM's “qubit”,
and I once coined the term “ambit” for an ambiguous bit.

But seriously, Folks, my tone may be comic ironic but the underlying
sentiment is straightforward enough.  I've been consistent in the way
I read Peirce since my first encounters with his work over 50 years ago,
the same way I read every other mathematician or scientist worth reading,
doyen or pioneer or otherwise.  Of all the things they say or write, some
things can be proven logically, some things can be supported experimentally,
and then there's a host of approximations, beliefs, conjectures, hypotheses,
impressions, popular expositions, rhetorical parables, speculations, ad inf.

If the thinker in question is worth reading at all then all of that is worth
reading in the proper light, but it takes the due sort of intellectual prism
to sort it all out.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/3/2021 12:31 PM, sowa @bestweb.net wrote:

Jon A,

  I  detect a prebit of irony in your note.

  Although I respect Peirce's ethics of terminology and observe his
  recommendations when they are appropriate and realistic, I also
  know that most of them have died on the vine of common sense.

  If Peirce had owned an automobile, he would have called it an
  autokineto.  Greece is the only country in the world that uses
  the word 'autokineto'.

  John.


  From: "Jon Awbrey" 
Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 12:01 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
every available opportunity and strove to attain the
Purity Of Thoughtlessness. And yes, a bit or prebit
of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
But been there then, did that when, and I know where
it ends - the science unsigned is not a true science.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/3/2021 10:11 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne's 
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
<https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site. It is mostly a 
gloss on the term Prebit introduced by Peirce late in 1909 (previous slide).

Gary f.


Text:

. Prebit comes from praebitum < praebere in Latin, which is a contraction of praehabere 
(and of course habere gives habitum, whence "habit").

. Praebere means to give, grant, fumish, supply; to occasion, exhibit. A 
praebitum or prebit is something like the datum, a term Peirce mentioned but 
did not want to use because it was already too loaded with undesired meanings.

. He thought prebit was superior to phaneron (in the particular sense) because 
he came to realize that there were certain elements of experience that could 
not be said to be manifest in any legitimate way (such as certain mathematical 
entities) even though they were part and parcel of what experience supplied.

. Once could also reason that prebit is a pre-habitum: the datum one has not 
become used to yet, before it has turned into, or been submitted to, a 
filtering habit.

IMPORTANTLY: The Prebit is NOT A SIGN!

The Phaneron is NOT A SIGN!

Yet, . Signs are phaneral!

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread gnox
I wonder whether Peirce was being ironic when he wrote in R 645 of Phaneroscopy 
being “still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being 
as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under 
the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues 
long, it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science.”

In the light of what’s been said about it by its vociferous opponents on 
peirce-l, the part about “fostering care” sounds ironic to the point of 
sarcasm. But then again, the long continuation of “human culture” is, in our 
time, a bigger IF than ever. When we see the overwhelming ecological facts 
being ignored by the Powers that Be, it seems extremely unlikely that the 
“beneficient” potential of any science like Phaneroscopy will ever be developed.

Well, if you want to make an Anthropocene, you gotta break some science-eggs.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 3-Sep-21 13:27
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

 

JA: "not everything under construction is a science."

 

True. But I'd suggest that there is no good reason to block the way of inquiry 
of those who think that phaneroscopy, for example, may prove to be a science 
even if, at present, it remains in my view but a science egg. That it is not 
yet clear whether it can be fully developed as a science (I believe that there 
is good to think that it can) is, for me at least, one of the reasons why we're 
having this slow read.

 

So, those who think phaneroscopy (involving the doctrine of categories) is 
worth looking further into include not only Andre De Tienne, but to cite again 
a recent book on the topic, Richard Kenneth Atkins', 2018 monograph, Charles S. 
Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness 

https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.001.0001/oso-9780190887179

 

 GR

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Jon Awbrey

Dear Gary,

You know me well enough to know I have nothing against neologisms —
I used to coin 5 or 6 every morning before breakfast … but I'm much
better now — and don't get me wrong, I fully sympathize with Peirce's
desire to distinguish his take on phenomenology from Hegel's mistakes.
And I'm totally copacetic with using the word “inquiry” to describe any
activity aimed at fixing belief, at least, in broad brush among friends.
But it's one toke over the line if we call any form of inquiry a science,
for then we'd have Tenacioscopy, Authorioscopy, Apriorioscopy to counter
on a recurring basis, not that we don't already have to deal with them
under hosts and legions of the usual suspect old-fangled paleologisms.

So it's gotta stop somewhere — and for that we have to acknowledge
critical criteria in our critique of what makes inquiry scientific.

I see I'm one neologism short of my old quota —
but I'll save oöscience for next time …

Regards,

Jon

On 9/3/2021 1:26 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

JA: "not everything under construction is a science."

True. But I'd suggest that there is no good reason to block the way of
inquiry of those who think that phaneroscopy, for example, *may* prove to
be a science even if, at present, it remains in my view but a science egg.
That it is not yet clear whether it can be fully developed as a science (I
believe that there is good to think that it can) is, for me at least, one
of the reasons why we're having this slow read.

So, those who think phaneroscopy (involving the doctrine of categories) is
worth looking further into include not only Andre De Tienne, but to cite
again a recent book on the topic, Richard Kenneth Atkins', 2018
monograph, *Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness *
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.001.0001/oso-9780190887179

  GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 1:06 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Well, it's true, all science is under construction.
But not everything under construction is a science.

Jon

On 9/3/2021 12:37 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

JA: " the science unsigned is not a true science."

Rather, the science undeveloped is not a true science.

GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 12:00 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:



Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
every available opportunity and strove to attain the
Purity Of Thoughtlessness.  And yes, a bit or prebit
of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
But been there then, did that when, and I know where
it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.

Regards,

Jon







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

I heartily agree. Sometimes Peirce's terms are 'a bit much'.

I prefer 'data' or 'input data' to 'prebit'. My agenda is to EXPAND
the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure beyond his pages and
beyond the elites happily immersed in his works - and see how that
infrastructure can explain the 'Real World'. To do that, we have to
use common terms.

Edwina
 On Fri 03/09/21 12:31 PM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net
sent:
 Jon A,   I  detect a prebit of irony in your note.   Although I
respect Peirce's ethics of terminology and observe his
recommendations when they are appropriate and realistic,I also know
that most of them have died on the vine of common sense.   If Peirce
had owned an automobile, he would have called it an autokineto. 
Greece is the only country in the world that uses the word
'autokineto'.   John. 
-
 From: "Jon Awbrey" 
 Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 12:01 PM
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39   
 Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
 I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
 when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
 every available opportunity and strove to attain the
 Purity Of Thoughtlessness. And yes, a bit or prebit
 of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
 But been there then, did that when, and I know where
 it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.
 Regards,
 Jon
 On 9/3/2021 10:11 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 > Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide
of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition
Project (iupui.edu)  site. It is mostly a gloss on the term Prebit
introduced by Peirce late in 1909 (previous slide).
 >
 > Gary f.
 >
 >
 > Text:
 >
 > • Prebit comes from praebitum < praebere in Latin, which is a
contraction of praehabere (and of course habere gives habitum, whence
“habit”).
 >
 > • Praebere means to give, grant, fumish, supply; to occasion,
exhibit. A praebitum or prebit is something like the datum, a term
Peirce mentioned but did not want to use because it was already too
loaded with undesired meanings.
 >
 > • He thought prebit was superior to phaneron (in the particular
sense) because he came to realize that there were certain elements of
experience that could not be said to be manifest in any legitimate way
(such as certain mathematical entities) even though they were part and
parcel of what experience supplied.
 >
 > • Once could also reason that prebit is a pre-habitum: the datum
one has not become used to yet, before it has turned into, or been
submitted to, a filtering habit.
 >
 > IMPORTANTLY: The Prebit is NOT A SIGN!
 >
 > The Phaneron is NOT A SIGN!
 >
 > Yet, … Signs are phaneral!
 >
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Gary Richmond
JA: "not everything under construction is a science."

True. But I'd suggest that there is no good reason to block the way of
inquiry of those who think that phaneroscopy, for example, *may* prove to
be a science even if, at present, it remains in my view but a science egg.
That it is not yet clear whether it can be fully developed as a science (I
believe that there is good to think that it can) is, for me at least, one
of the reasons why we're having this slow read.

So, those who think phaneroscopy (involving the doctrine of categories) is
worth looking further into include not only Andre De Tienne, but to cite
again a recent book on the topic, Richard Kenneth Atkins', 2018
monograph, *Charles
S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness *
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.001.0001/oso-9780190887179

 GR



GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 1:06 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Well, it's true, all science is under construction.
> But not everything under construction is a science.
>
> Jon
>
> On 9/3/2021 12:37 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
> > JA: " the science unsigned is not a true science."
> >
> > Rather, the science undeveloped is not a true science.
> >
> > GR
> >
> > “Let everything happen to you
> > Beauty and terror
> > Just keep going
> > No feeling is final”
> > ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> >
> > *Gary Richmond*
> > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> > *Communication Studies*
> > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 12:00 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
> >> I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
> >> when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
> >> every available opportunity and strove to attain the
> >> Purity Of Thoughtlessness.  And yes, a bit or prebit
> >> of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
> >> But been there then, did that when, and I know where
> >> it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Jon Awbrey

Well, it's true, all science is under construction.
But not everything under construction is a science.

Jon

On 9/3/2021 12:37 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

JA: " the science unsigned is not a true science."

Rather, the science undeveloped is not a true science.

GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 12:00 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:



Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
every available opportunity and strove to attain the
Purity Of Thoughtlessness.  And yes, a bit or prebit
of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
But been there then, did that when, and I know where
it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.

Regards,

Jon

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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Gary Richmond
JA: " the science unsigned is not a true science."

Rather, the science undeveloped is not a true science.

GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 12:00 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

>
> Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
> I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
> when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
> every available opportunity and strove to attain the
> Purity Of Thoughtlessness.  And yes, a bit or prebit
> of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
> But been there then, did that when, and I know where
> it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 9/3/2021 10:11 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> > Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
> André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (
> iupui.edu) 
> site. It is mostly a gloss on the term Prebit introduced by Peirce late in
> 1909 (previous slide).
> >
> > Gary f.
> >
> >
> > Text:
> >
> > •  Prebit comes from praebitum < praebere in Latin, which is a
> contraction of praehabere (and of course habere gives habitum, whence
> “habit”).
> >
> > •  Praebere means to give, grant, fumish, supply; to occasion,
> exhibit. A praebitum or prebit is something like the datum, a term Peirce
> mentioned but did not want to use because it was already too loaded with
> undesired meanings.
> >
> > •  He thought prebit was superior to phaneron (in the particular
> sense) because he came to realize that there were certain elements of
> experience that could not be said to be manifest in any legitimate way
> (such as certain mathematical entities) even though they were part and
> parcel of what experience supplied.
> >
> > •  Once could also reason that prebit is a pre-habitum: the
> datum one has not become used to yet, before it has turned into, or been
> submitted to, a filtering habit.
> >
> > IMPORTANTLY: The Prebit is NOT A SIGN!
> >
> > The Phaneron is NOT A SIGN!
> >
> > Yet, … Signs are phaneral!
> >
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread sowa @bestweb.net
Jon A,

 I  detect a prebit of irony in your note.

 Although I respect Peirce's ethics of terminology and observe his
 recommendations when they are appropriate and realistic,I also
 know that most of them have died on the vine of common sense.

 If Peirce had owned an automobile, he would have called it an
 autokineto.  Greece is the only country in the world that uses
 the word 'autokineto'.

 John.


 From: "Jon Awbrey" 
Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 12:01 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
every available opportunity and strove to attain the
Purity Of Thoughtlessness. And yes, a bit or prebit
of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
But been there then, did that when, and I know where
it ends - the science unsigned is not a true science.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/3/2021 10:11 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
> Tienne's slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
> <https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site. It is mostly 
> a gloss on the term Prebit introduced by Peirce late in 1909 (previous slide).
>
> Gary f.
>
>
> Text:
>
> . Prebit comes from praebitum < praebere in Latin, which is a contraction of 
> praehabere (and of course habere gives habitum, whence "habit").
>
> . Praebere means to give, grant, fumish, supply; to occasion, exhibit. A 
> praebitum or prebit is something like the datum, a term Peirce mentioned but 
> did not want to use because it was already too loaded with undesired meanings.
>
> . He thought prebit was superior to phaneron (in the particular sense) 
> because he came to realize that there were certain elements of experience 
> that could not be said to be manifest in any legitimate way (such as certain 
> mathematical entities) even though they were part and parcel of what 
> experience supplied.
>
> . Once could also reason that prebit is a pre-habitum: the datum one has not 
> become used to yet, before it has turned into, or been submitted to, a 
> filtering habit.
>
> IMPORTANTLY: The Prebit is NOT A SIGN!
>
> The Phaneron is NOT A SIGN!
>
> Yet, . Signs are phaneral!
>

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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

2021-09-03 Thread Jon Awbrey


Yes, yes, the tao that is signed is not the true tao ...
I have the fondest nostalgia for my Be Here Now days
when we all cleansed the Doors Of Our Perceptions at
every available opportunity and strove to attain the
Purity Of Thoughtlessness.  And yes, a bit or prebit
of meditation now and again makes for a healthy mind.
But been there then, did that when, and I know where
it ends — the science unsigned is not a true science.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/3/2021 10:11 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s 
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. It is mostly 
a gloss on the term Prebit introduced by Peirce late in 1909 (previous slide).

Gary f.


Text:

•  Prebit comes from praebitum < praebere in Latin, which is a 
contraction of praehabere (and of course habere gives habitum, whence “habit”).

•  Praebere means to give, grant, fumish, supply; to occasion, exhibit. 
A praebitum or prebit is something like the datum, a term Peirce mentioned but 
did not want to use because it was already too loaded with undesired meanings.

•  He thought prebit was superior to phaneron (in the particular sense) 
because he came to realize that there were certain elements of experience that 
could not be said to be manifest in any legitimate way (such as certain 
mathematical entities) even though they were part and parcel of what experience 
supplied.

•  Once could also reason that prebit is a pre-habitum: the datum one 
has not become used to yet, before it has turned into, or been submitted to, a 
filtering habit.

IMPORTANTLY: The Prebit is NOT A SIGN!

The Phaneron is NOT A SIGN!

Yet, … Signs are phaneral!




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-03 Thread gnox
Thanks for your comments, Jon!

What I posted yesterday was only the first few pages of R 645. Reading the rest 
of it yesterday, I realized that it reveals quite a lot about the theory and 
practice of Peirce’s phaneroscopy, that it has not been published in the 
standard primary sources, and that I couldn’t find a complete transcription of 
it on the web. So I made one and put it on my website: How to Define 
(gnusystems.ca) <https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm> . (“How to Define” is 
Peirce’s title for it, which is interesting in itself.) I highly recommend it 
to those who wish to clarify the concept of phaneroscopy by reading Peirce 
himself rather than peirce-l posts and other secondary sources. It also 
includes some autobiographical asides— perhaps the reason why Ketner included 
most of it in his “Autobiography of Charles Sanders Peirce,” His Glassy 
Essence— which are relevant to his own practice, both of phaneroscopy and 
writing.

Gary f.

 

} Now listed to one aneither and liss them down and smoothen out your leaves of 
rose. [Finnegans Wake 101] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 2-Sep-21 18:27
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

 

Gary F., List:

 

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three studies 
is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.

 

As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire 
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different 
purposes. It is not a matter of how people identify themselves, professionally 
or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to learn by embarking upon a 
particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and then drawing necessary 
conclusions from them, is acting as a mathematician. Someone observing whatever 
is or could be present to the mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its 
irreducible elements, is acting as a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the 
distinction between truth and falsity, along with the theory of how to attain 
the former and avoid the latter, is acting as a logician. Someone investigating 
the actual workings of embodied minds is acting as a psychologist.

 

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of 
consciousness.

 

This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing the 
phaneron as whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way. Moreover, 
as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not just concerned with our 
individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's much more general sense. In R 
645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he equates "consciousness" with this 
broader notion of unmediated presence to the mind--immediate consciousness 
rather than self-consciousness or cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense 
rather than altersense or medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 
2ns or 3ns. From this standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even 
individual atoms are "conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree 
(CP 6.201, 1898).

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread Ben Udell

Dear all,

In the case of the three science 'branches' (discovery, review, 
practice), Peirce calls the difference a difference of purpose. But for 
more subdivisive classification he refers to differences of kind of 
observation, etc.  See table "Taxa of scientific departments" in


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce) 



Best, Ben

On 9/2/2021 6:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Gary F., List:

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three
studies is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.


As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different
*purposes*. It is not a matter of how people *identify *themselves,
professionally or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to *learn *by
embarking upon a particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and
then drawing necessary conclusions from them, is *acting as* a
mathematician. Someone observing whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its irreducible elements,
is *acting
as* a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the distinction between truth and
falsity, along with the theory of how to attain the former and avoid the
latter, is *acting as* a logician. Someone investigating the actual
workings of embodied minds is *acting as* a psychologist.

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of
consciousness.


This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing
the phaneron as whatever is *or could be* present to the mind in any way.
Moreover, as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not
just concerned with our individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's
much more general sense. In R 645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he
equates "consciousness" with this broader notion of *unmediated *presence
to the mind--immediate consciousness rather than self-consciousness or
cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense rather than altersense or
medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 2ns or 3ns. From this
standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even individual atoms are
"conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree (CP 6.201, 1898).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 9:21 AM  wrote:
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Gary F., List:

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three
studies is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.


As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different
*purposes*. It is not a matter of how people *identify *themselves,
professionally or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to *learn *by
embarking upon a particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and
then drawing necessary conclusions from them, is *acting as* a
mathematician. Someone observing whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its irreducible elements,
is *acting
as* a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the distinction between truth and
falsity, along with the theory of how to attain the former and avoid the
latter, is *acting as* a logician. Someone investigating the actual
workings of embodied minds is *acting as* a psychologist.

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of
consciousness.


This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing
the phaneron as whatever is *or could be* present to the mind in any way.
Moreover, as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not
just concerned with our individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's
much more general sense. In R 645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he
equates "consciousness" with this broader notion of *unmediated *presence
to the mind--immediate consciousness rather than self-consciousness or
cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense rather than altersense or
medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 2ns or 3ns. From this
standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even individual atoms are
"conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree (CP 6.201, 1898).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 9:21 AM  wrote:

> List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make
> an amendment to Ketner’s transcription.
>
> One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions
> of what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no
> reasoning.” But it seems to me that this description fits *phaneroscopy*
> and not psychology. In the source manuscript (page 4 as numbered by
> Peirce), the entire sentence after the word “Psychology” is crossed out,
> and the following words, which are *not* crossed out, continue the
> sentence: “endeavours to make known the positive facts of the workings of
> the mind.” (This obviously *does* refer to Psychology, but is omitted
> from Ketner’s transcription.) The last sentence on the page which is not
> crossed out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must follow in
> hypothetical cases.”
>
> So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text below, in a
> way better reflects the manuscript (and makes more sense):
>
>
>
> CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded:
> Phaneroscopy (as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology
> Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that
> is Psychology Proper. One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it
> still lacks that considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods
> acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push
> research still on and on, and turning out new discoveries at a healthy
> rate; all of which I take to be essential to a developed science. The third
> is Phaneroscopy, still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any
> details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the
> student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if
> the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a
> strong and beneficient science.
>
> By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and
> growths of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in
> which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of
> Physiology of the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction
> between Truth and Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former
> together with all that the investigator of that theory must make it his
> business to probe. It comes, in my opinion, in the present state of
> science, to a study of the general nature of Signs and the leading kinds of
> Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever consciousness puts into
> one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in other words, the study of
> whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For such Direct objects
> of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some may think this
> word would idly cumber the dictionary i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

What I find disturbing in this compartmentalization of empirical and
analytic explorations of our reality is precisely that: its
compartmentalization. What happens if a scientist, engaged in
examining the phaneron of, let's say, the X-gang in a modern inner
city, ALSO ventures into the realm of psychology to explore the gang
behaviour. Does this bewildered scientist disappear in a puff of
smoke, for violating the purity of each particular science?

Edwina
 On Thu 02/09/21 10:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need
to make an amendment to Ketner’s transcription. 

One sentence in the 3 rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with
questions of what we are directly conscious of, and involves very
little or no reasoning.” But it seems to me that this description
fits phaneroscopy and not psychology. In the source manuscript (page
4 as numbered by Peirce), the entire sentence after the word
“Psychology” is crossed out, and the following words, which are
not crossed out, continue the sentence: “endeavours to make known
the positive facts of the workings of the mind.” (This obviously 
does refer to Psychology, but is omitted from Ketner’s
transcription.) The last sentence on the page which is not crossed
out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must follow in
hypothetical cases.” 

So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text
below, in a way better reflects the manuscript (and makes more
sense):
CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded:
Phaneroscopy (as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology
Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful and immature;
that is Psychology Proper. One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic,
because it still lacks that considerable body of well-drilled workers
pursuing methods acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one
another's discoveries to push research still on and on, and turning
out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in
the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that,
under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human
culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a strong
and beneficient science.  

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings
and growths of Minds and their relations to the animal or other
organisms in which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it
is a sort of Physiology of the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the
distinction between Truth and Falsity, and the theory of how to attain
the former together with all that the investigator of that theory must
make it his business to probe. It comes, in my opinion, in the present
state of science, to a study of the general nature of Signs and the
leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever
consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or
in other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of
in itself. For such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin
the term “Prebits.” Some may think this word would idly cumber the
dictionary in the unlikely contingency of its ever coming into use.
They will regard it as a superfluous synonym of “appearances,” or
“phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that “datum” might
do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those
more special meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for
example, to denote any fact that consists in the uniformity with
which something peculiar and perceptible to the senses (without or
with instrumental aid) will result from the fulfillment of certain
definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated indefinitely.
Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite,
etc. provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft
surface of suitable material with a harder backing is one single
phenomenon, while the fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few
other substances will attract small filings or other bits of iron, as
magnetite, etc. is a different single phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I
do not mean anything of that nature, but a single Object of immediate
consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for the word
“Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call
Prebits. Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an
example that will bring the truth of this home to him. In the above
Definition of “Prebit,” the adjective “Immediate” is not to
be understood in a Properly Psychologica

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread gnox
List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make an 
amendment to Ketner’s transcription. 

One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions of 
what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning.” 
But it seems to me that this description fits phaneroscopy and not psychology. 
In the source manuscript (page 4 as numbered by Peirce), the entire sentence 
after the word “Psychology” is crossed out, and the following words, which are 
not crossed out, continue the sentence: “endeavours to make known the positive 
facts of the workings of the mind.” (This obviously does refer to Psychology, 
but is omitted from Ketner’s transcription.) The last sentence on the page 
which is not crossed out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must 
follow in hypothetical cases.” 

So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text below, in a way 
better reflects the manuscript (and makes more sense):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the divers

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Thank you, Gary, for providing a substantial excerpt from Peirce himself,
shorn of of all the zoomy kibitzing from a secondary source.  I only wish
more of our close readings would begin that way.

Regards

Jon

On 9/2/2021 8:13 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences 
between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic,
some readers may be interested in the context of the quotation from R 645 
(1909) which occupies most of slide 38.
Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book His Glassy 
Essence (1998):



CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology),
Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful 
and immature; that is Psychology Proper.
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers
pursuing methods acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one another's 
discoveries to push research still on and on,
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The
third is Phaneroscopy, still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any 
details of it being as yet
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy,
if the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a 
strong and beneficient science.

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the
animal or other organisms in which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In 
short, it is a sort of Physiology of the
Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and Falsity, 
and the theory of how to attain the
former together with all that the investigator of that theory must make it his 
business to probe. It comes, in my
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs.
By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever consciousness puts into one's 
Immediate and Complete possession, or in
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness
I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some may think this word would idly 
cumber the dictionary in the unlikely
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or
“phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that “datum” might do. But then many 
other things are called “data”; as for
the word “phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more 
special meanings to which it is usually
restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact that consists in the uniformity 
with which something peculiar and
perceptible to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from 
the fulfillment of certain definite
conditions, especially if it can be repeated indefinitely. Thus, the fact that 
small bits of paper or anything else
that is light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, 
etc. provided this has just before been
briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of suitable material with a harder backing 
is one single phenomenon, while the
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as
magnetite, etc. is a different single phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean 
anything of that nature, but a single
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be
stretched in an inconvenient and quite unexpected way if it would be applied to 
some of the objects I call Prebits.
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In
the above Definition of “Prebit,” the adjective “Immediate” is not to be 
understood in a Properly Psychological
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware
of another thing, whether Prebit or not; but what I do mean is that once I do 
become aware of the Prebit, I am aware
not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, vicar, 
attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or
representative of it, but am put facie ad faciem before the very Prebit itself.

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the diversity of their
general aims. Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of consciousness. 
Psychology deals with questions of what
we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning. Logic 
involves no more observation than Pure
Mathematics itself, and is entirely occupied with necessary reasoning. Logic 
inquires into the theory of what must
follow or is likely, or a warrantable assumption in hypothetical c

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

2021-09-02 Thread gnox
Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences 
between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic, some readers may be interested in 
the context of the quotation from R 645 (1909) which occupies most of slide 38. 
Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book His Glassy 
Essence (1998):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the diversity of their general aims. Phaneroscopy asks what are the 
possibilities of consciousness. Psychology deals with questions of what we are 
directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning. Logic involves 
no more observation than Pure Mathematics itself, and is entirely occupied with 
necessary reasoning. Logic inquires into the theory of what must follow or is 
likely, or a warrantable assumption in hypothetical cases. Psychology reunites 
in itself all the methods and all the difficulties of the other Empirical 
Sciences; it endeavors to make known the positive facts of the workings of the 
mind. 

In the Second place, the methods of the three inq

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
List:

> On Aug 24, 2021, at 11:39 AM, 
> 
> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not semeiotic.

This sentence is a remarkable example of how emotional rhetorical thrusts 
generate the thoughts  that make no sense in the language of CSP.

Units of thoughts have units of meaning.   These two concepts are inseparable.

In the engineering sciences, especially the epistemology and ontology of 
pragmatic necessities, the connections between phaneroscopy and semiotics are 
essential to ethical actions.

The graphic diagrams that illustrate the iconic forms of engineering work 
connect, necessarily, the semeiotic with the phaneroscopy. Indeed, the 
connections of symbols with the indices of the diagrams derived from semiotic 
and phaneroscopy could be a central thesis of engineering sciences. 

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Gary Richmond
y. …
>
> Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one
> you send me is the first, will prove to be that it shows so clearly that
> phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. I know
> that you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing between one
> science and another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to
> any progress. The standards of certainty must be different in different
> sciences, the principles to which one science appeals altogether different
> from those of the other. From the point of view of logic and methodical
> development the distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has
> no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary,
> logic must be founded on phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes
> the same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not *observe* the same
> facts. It looks upon the same world; — the same world that the astronomer
> looks at. But what it *observes* in that world is different. Psychology
> of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician,
> which he makes by the aid of the phenomenologist.
>
> I am not sure that it will do to call this science *phenomenology* owing
> to Hegel's *Phänomenologie* being somewhat different. But I am not sure
> that Hegel ought not to have it named after his attempt. …
>
> My “phenomenon” for which I must invent a new word is very near your “pure
> experience” but not quite since I do not exclude time and also speak of
> only *one* “phenomenon.”
>
>
>
> GF: The “new word” he invented was, of course, “phaneron.” To contrast it
> with Peirce’s usage of “experience,” the first thing I’d say is that
> “phaneron” refers to the collective total of whatever is or (can be)
> *experienced*, rather than the *experience* itself (considered as
> something that happens or occurs to a “subject of experience”). But Peirce
> also says that the practice of phenomenology/ phaneroscopy itself does not
> assume a distinction between *experience* and *what is experienced*, or
> between “subjective” and “objective” experience — or, as he put it
> elsewhere, between *consciousness *and the “*contents of consciousness.*”
>
> Anyway, we’ll have to sort this out in more detail later, with direct
> quotations if necessary. We will no doubt continue to get alternative
> interpretations posted by others, who are welcome to post them, but unless
> they are based directly on something Peirce actually wrote about the
> subject, I don’t see much point in arguing for or against them.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 24-Aug-21 13:00
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> GF: Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the
> key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he renamed it
> “phaneroscopy”) is *experience*.
>
> Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of 
> *experience
> *is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce,
> experience is strictly *cognitive *(i.e., semiosic) and *involuntary*,
> constraints that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole.
>
>
>
> CSP: But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those
> observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can
> only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes
> interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense. Even more
> truly, since this matter of sense is a hypothetical something which we
> never can seize as such, free from all interpretative working over. (CP
> 7.538, 1899)
>
>
>
> CSP: What is experience? It is the resultant ideas that have
> been forced upon us. We find we cannot summon up what images we like. Try
> to banish an idea and it only comes home with greater violence later.
> Hence, we find the only wisdom is to accept, at once, the ideas that sooner
> or later we must accept; and we even go to work solicitous to find out what
> are the ideas which are going ultimately to be forced upon us. Three such
> ideas are the three categories; and it will be wise to pitch overboard
> promptly the metaphysics which preaches against them.(CP 4.318, 1902)
>
>
>
> CSP: Experience of the unexpected forces upon us the idea of duality. Will
> you say, "Yes, the idea is forced upon us, but it is not directly
> experienced, because only what is within is directly experienced"? The
> reply is that *experience *means nothing but just that of
> a cognitive nature which the history of our 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread gnox
Jon A.S., John S., list,

Perhaps we are making some progress in this reading of ADT’s talk, if John is 
ready to admit that Peirce’s phenomenology is a separate science from 
mathematics, that it occupies a place in the hierarchy below mathematics but 
above all other sciences, and that its focus on experience makes it different 
from any other science. (I think you must be ready to admit this, John, since 
you took it as an insult when I said that you haven’t admitted it before!) 

GF (previously): Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear 
that the key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he 
renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is experience.

JAS: Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of 
experience is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, 
experience is strictly cognitive (i.e., semiosic) and involuntary, constraints 
that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole.

GF: Yes, the time has come for examining the relation between experience and 
the phaneron. André mentions in slide 32 (already posted) that “the term 
phaneron was coined in late October 1904 after an exchange with William James.” 
To provide more context for this discussion, I’ll post here some excerpts from 
that “exchange,” quoting those parts of the letter to James (CP 8.286-301) 
where Peirce writes explicitly about phenomenology. 

 

CSP: … As I understand you, then, the proposition which you are arguing is a 
proposition in what I have called phenomenology, that is, just the analysis of 
what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives, (whether these 
be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of 
philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked upon almost 
as much as I have upon logic. It has nothing to do with psychology. …

Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one you 
send me is the first, will prove to be that it shows so clearly that 
phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. I know that 
you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing between one science 
and another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to any progress. 
The standards of certainty must be different in different sciences, the 
principles to which one science appeals altogether different from those of the 
other. From the point of view of logic and methodical development the 
distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has no right to appeal 
to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on 
phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as 
phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the 
same world; — the same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes 
in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of 
the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the 
phenomenologist.

I am not sure that it will do to call this science phenomenology owing to 
Hegel's Phänomenologie being somewhat different. But I am not sure that Hegel 
ought not to have it named after his attempt. …

My “phenomenon” for which I must invent a new word is very near your “pure 
experience” but not quite since I do not exclude time and also speak of only 
one “phenomenon.”

 

GF: The “new word” he invented was, of course, “phaneron.” To contrast it with 
Peirce’s usage of “experience,” the first thing I’d say is that “phaneron” 
refers to the collective total of whatever is or (can be) experienced, rather 
than the experience itself (considered as something that happens or occurs to a 
“subject of experience”). But Peirce also says that the practice of 
phenomenology/ phaneroscopy itself does not assume a distinction between 
experience and what is experienced, or between “subjective” and “objective” 
experience — or, as he put it elsewhere, between consciousness and the 
“contents of consciousness.” 

Anyway, we’ll have to sort this out in more detail later, with direct 
quotations if necessary. We will no doubt continue to get alternative 
interpretations posted by others, who are welcome to post them, but unless they 
are based directly on something Peirce actually wrote about the subject, I 
don’t see much point in arguing for or against them.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 24-Aug-21 13:00
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

 

Gary F., List:

GF: Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the key 
word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he renamed it 
“phaneroscopy”) is experience.

Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of experience 
is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, experience is 
strictly cognitive (i.e., 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I don't conflate phenomenology with mathematics or with semiotics! I
gave a clear quotation about the difference between experience and
analysis:

--

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must
discriminate "between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of
the facts of human life. We have seen that every fact requires two
kinds of explanation; the one proceeds by induction to replace its
subject by a wider one, the other proceeds by hypothesis to replace
its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these two
explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581 

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the
action within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as
outlined in 7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the
'percepts', and associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics
provides the hypothetical explanations, which makes them
'teleological or purposive.7.570.


-

The difference of opinion I am having with JAS has nothing to do
with the above differentiation between 'inductive and hypothetic
explanations'.  Instead, it's a difference of opinion about the
nature of 'that which is experienced'. I am saying that 'that which
is experienced' functions within a triadic interaction of
O-R-I...where O is that phaneron, and R is 'me' as
He-Who-Experiences-Oand I would be II. So, an example would be a
Qualisign, or any of the SinSigns.  I consider that these experiences
- that pure feeling found within the Qualisign, that brute reaction
found within a Sinsign - are experiences within the phaneron. And
triadic. 

JAS seems to be saying that any and all triadic interactions include
3ns..and I disagree.

That's where it's at. An, as usual, great difference between JAS and
myself - 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21  2:17 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, List,
 ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything
functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic.
  This is a clear example of what I've called the conflation and
attempted reduction of phenomenology to logic as semiotic. The
examples of signs which Edwina gives are found and developed in
semeiotic grammar (the first of the three branches of the
classificatory later science of logic as semeiotic) based on the
phaneroscopic findings of categoriality in phenomenology. This would
seem to put the cart before the horse.
  But this has been argued to death; and it would appear that those
who would conflate phenomenology with mathematics and/or semeiotic
appear unable or unwilling to imagine a phaneroscopic science such as
that conceived of by Peirce. It appears that they would either reduce
phenomenology to a kind of mathematics or semeiotics or they would
attempt to eliminate it altogether.
 Best, 
 Gary R
 “LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
 ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York 
 On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 1:08 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything
functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic. 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
 On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present
to the mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also
Ideas/quality (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 
 On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since
all experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience'
provided by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual,
unique, non-analyzed...then, th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, I think a more accurate statement would be

In my opinion...the statements below exhibit confusion..etc etc.

In other words - this is YOUR opinion. It would be 'nice' if you
would acknowledge that YOU have an opinion, and oddly enough, other
people have different opinions!! Instead, you write as if YOUR
opinion is the ultimate truth!

 I have a different analysis, and I disagree that 'all semiosis
"involves 3ns which is mediation as distinguished from reaction..et. 

I consider that all sensate interaction is triadic - as I said; for
example - a Qualsign and the Sinsigns. And I disagree that all
genuine triadic relations are 'manifestations of 3ns'. 

So, as I said - we'll simply have to disagree.

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21  1:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 The statements below exhibit confusion of the categories themselves
as discovered in phaneroscopy with "categorical modes" as employed in
speculative grammar for sign classification. All semiosis involves
3ns, which is mediation as distinguished from reaction (2ns) and
quality (1ns). All genuine triadic relations, including any sign
(qualisign/sinsign/legisign) representing its object
(iconically/indexically/symbolically) for its interpretant (as a
rheme/dicisign/argument), are manifestations of 3ns. On the other
hand, all "sensate interaction" is dyadic, not triadic. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:34 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS

We'll just have to disagree.

I acknowledge the Qualisign - which is pure Firstness - and is
triadic and is NOT cognitive. There is no Thirdness involved. Same
with a Dicent Sinsign - which is pure Secondness and is triadic and
is NOT cognitive. No Thirdness involved.

That is - the semiosic triad of O-R-I does not always mean that
cognition [Thirdness] is involved. But, all sensate interaction
between X and Y is triadic [O-R-I] .

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21  1:20 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. ... If anything functions as a stimulus - then it is
triadic.
 Not according to Peirce. 1ns and 2ns are certainly present to the
mind as quality/feeling and reaction/effort, yet in themselves they
are decidedly  not triadic/semiosic; i.e., cognitive.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything
functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic. 

Edwina 

On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
 On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present
to the mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also
Ideas/quality (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 
 On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since
all experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience'
provided by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual,
unique, non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.

But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the
interaction, involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical
and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23 

Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we
go from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis
of Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his
synechism, Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what
WE experience but within that objective reality with which we
interact. 

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Gary Richmond
Edwina, Jon, List,

ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything functions
as a stimulus - then it is triadic.

This is a clear example of what I've called the conflation and attempted
reduction of *phenomenology* to *logic as semiotic*. The examples of signs
which Edwina gives are found and developed in *semeiotic grammar* (the
first of the three branches of the classificatory later science of *logic
as semeiotic*) *based on the phaneroscopic findings of categoriality
in phenomenology*. This would seem to put the cart before the horse.

But this has been argued to death; and it would appear that those who would
conflate phenomenology with mathematics and/or semeiotic appear unable or
unwilling to imagine a phaneroscopic science such as that conceived of by
Peirce. It appears that they would either reduce phenomenology to a kind of
mathematics or semeiotics or they would attempt to eliminate it altogether.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 1:08 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e., semiotic.
> As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a rhematic
> sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything functions as a
> stimulus - then it is triadic.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>
>
> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
> semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present to the
> mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also Ideas/quality
> (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
>> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
>> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since all
>> experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience' provided
>> by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual, unique,
>> non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.
>>
>> But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
>> Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the interaction,
>> involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical and psychical
>> phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23
>>
>> Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we go
>> from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis of
>> Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his synechism,
>> Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what WE experience but
>> within that objective reality with which we interact.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
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> message and nothing in the body.  More at
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> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

The statements below exhibit confusion of the categories themselves as
discovered in phaneroscopy with "categorical modes" as employed in
speculative grammar for sign classification. All semiosis involves 3ns,
which is mediation as distinguished from reaction (2ns) and quality (1ns).
All genuine triadic relations, including any sign
(qualisign/sinsign/legisign) representing its object
(iconically/indexically/symbolically) for its interpretant (as a
rheme/dicisign/argument), are manifestations of 3ns. On the other hand, all
"sensate interaction" is dyadic, not triadic.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:34 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS
>
> We'll just have to disagree.
>
> I acknowledge the Qualisign - which is pure Firstness - and is triadic and
> is NOT cognitive. There is no Thirdness involved. Same with a Dicent
> Sinsign - which is pure Secondness and is triadic and is NOT cognitive. No
> Thirdness involved.
>
> That is - the semiosic triad of O-R-I does not always mean that cognition
> [Thirdness] is involved. But, all sensate interaction between X and Y is
> triadic [O-R-I] .
>
> Edwina
>
> On Tue 24/08/21 1:20 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
> semiotic. ... If anything functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic.
>
>
> Not according to Peirce. 1ns and 2ns are certainly present to the mind as
> quality/feeling and reaction/effort, yet in themselves they are decidedly not
> triadic/semiosic; i.e., cognitive.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e., semiotic.
>> As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a rhematic
>> sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything functions as a
>> stimulus - then it is triadic.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
>> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
>> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>>
>>
>> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
>> semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present to the
>> mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also Ideas/quality
>> (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> List
>>>
>>> It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
>>> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
>>> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since all
>>> experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience' provided
>>> by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual, unique,
>>> non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.
>>>
>>> But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
>>> Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the interaction,
>>> involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical and psychical
>>> phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23
>>>
>>> Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we go
>>> from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis of
>>> Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his synechism,
>>> Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what WE experience but
>>> within that objective reality with which we interact.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS

We'll just have to disagree.

I acknowledge the Qualisign - which is pure Firstness - and is
triadic and is NOT cognitive. There is no Thirdness involved. Same
with a Dicent Sinsign - which is pure Secondness and is triadic and
is NOT cognitive. No Thirdness involved.

That is - the semiosic triad of O-R-I does not always mean that
cognition [Thirdness] is involved. But, all sensate interaction
between X and Y is triadic [O-R-I] .

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21  1:20 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. ... If anything functions as a stimulus - then it is
triadic.
 Not according to Peirce. 1ns and 2ns are certainly present to the
mind as quality/feeling and reaction/effort, yet in themselves they
are decidedly  not triadic/semiosic; i.e., cognitive.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything
functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic. 

Edwina 

On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
 On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present
to the mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also
Ideas/quality (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 
 On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since
all experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience'
provided by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual,
unique, non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.

But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the
interaction, involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical
and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23 

Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we
go from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis
of Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his
synechism, Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what
WE experience but within that objective reality with which we
interact. 

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. ... If anything functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic.


Not according to Peirce. 1ns and 2ns are certainly *present *to the mind as
quality/feeling and reaction/effort, yet in themselves they are decidedly *not
*triadic/semiosic; i.e., cognitive.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e., semiotic.
> As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a rhematic
> sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything functions as a
> stimulus - then it is triadic.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>
>
> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
> semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present to the
> mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also Ideas/quality
> (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
>> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
>> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since all
>> experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience' provided
>> by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual, unique,
>> non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.
>>
>> But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
>> Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the interaction,
>> involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical and psychical
>> phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23
>>
>> Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we go
>> from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis of
>> Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his synechism,
>> Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what WE experience but
>> within that objective reality with which we interact.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

If anything is present to the mind - then it is triadic, i.e.,
semiotic. As I've said, it could be a qualisign, an iconic sinsign, a
rhematic sinsign, a dicent sinsign [brute actuality]. If anything
functions as a stimulus - then it is triadic. 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
 On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present
to the mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also
Ideas/quality (1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since
all experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience'
provided by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual,
unique, non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.

But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the
interaction, involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical
and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23 

Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we
go from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis
of Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his
synechism, Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what
WE experience but within that objective reality with which we
interact. 

Edwina   


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.


On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not
semeiotic. The phaneron encompasses whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way--not just Signs/mediation (3ns), but also Ideas/quality
(1ns) and Brute Actuality/reaction (2ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 11:59 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
> experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or Iconic
> Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since all
> experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience' provided
> by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual, unique,
> non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.
>
> But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
> Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the interaction,
> involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical and psychical
> phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23
>
> Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we go
> from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis of
> Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his synechism,
> Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what WE experience but
> within that objective reality with which we interact.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

The phrase that 'experience is our only teacher' 5.50 is, to me, an
acknowledgement of the fact that we, as 'entities' or 'things' are in
sensate interaction with other entities or 'things'. This is
experience; the realm of our reception of the external world as the
Dynamic Object. But this perception, which is experience, is not the
same as learning. The teacher provides the Dynamic Objects - but we
must interpret them and learn. That's a second step. 
As I commented before -

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only
to reflect that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not
learning. That is only something from which something can be learned,
by interpreting it. The interpretation is the learning" 7.536 

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling,
Altersense and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but
these are not acts of learning. Consciousness can classify, by
grouping perceptions within the element of  Medisense, but can it
Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must
discriminate "between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of
the facts of human life. We have seen that every fact requires two
kinds of explanation; the one proceeds by induction to replace its
subject by a wider one, the other proceeds by hypothesis to replace
its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these two
explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581 

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the
action within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as
outlined in 7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the
'percepts', and associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics
provides the hypothetical explanations, which makes them
'teleological or purposive.7.570.

That is - I'm sure that many people live completely within the realm
of pure phenomenology or 'experience'  and even move on to the
classifying actions of induction and even, take its percepts as
'knowledge' [see Peirce's Fixation of Belief by tenacity, authority,
a priori] and do not move on to scientific analysis and
interpretation. That is, knowledge or learning requires two steps;
experience or data-gathering and analysis or hypothetic
interpretation. 

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am
'misinterpreting' him. 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21 10:33 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the
key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he
renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is experience. For that reason I
included in a previous post links to Peirce’s remarks on  direct
experience [1] and to the chapter of my book [2] which deals more
generally with experience. That chapter quotes Peirce’s categorical
statement that “Experience is our only teacher” (CP 5.50,
EP2:153). I thought these might be useful supplements to Peirce’s
basic texts on phenomenology such as EP2:267-72. John Sowa, however,
has completely ignored  all of those sources in his argument that
“diagram” should be the key word in De Tienne’s slides about
phenomenology.


Links:
--
[1] https://gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp
[2] https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-24 Thread John F. Sowa


Gary F, List,

Please don't attribute anything to me that I did
not say.  I totally
agree with the following point.

GF: 
Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that
the
key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he
renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is experience.

Experience in the
phaneron is the starting point of phenomenology for
Peirce,
Aristotle, Hegel, Husserl...  Aristotle's term, "pathemata tes
psyches", can be translated directly to "experience in the
phaneron".
That is from the first paragraph of On
Interpretation, which was a
critical text for the scholastics
Peirce admired.

GF:  John Sowa, however, has completely ignored
all of those sources
in his argument that “diagram” should be the key
word in De Tienne’s
slides about phenomenology.

No.  I
showed how ADT's slide 25 could be stated more clearly and
precisely
by using the word 'diagram'.  I also said that he should
continue to
use that word in later slides, but certainly not to the
exclusion of
other words that Peirce explicitly used.

We were having a
friendly discussion of these issues.  Why did you
suddenly turn it
into a blatant insult?

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

2021-08-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

It seems to me that De Tienne is here referring to the
experience/consciousness that can be understood as a Qualisign, or
Iconic Sinsign or even a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.  That is - since
all experience is triadic - and since the descriptions of 'experience'
provided by De Tienne seem to emphasize their being individual,
unique, non-analyzed...then, there is no Thirdness involved.

But, the Peircean notion of synechism/continuity suggests that
Thirdness/generality/Mind..is somehow, at some time in the
interaction, involved. "The synechist will not admit that physical
and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct" 1893 EP2.23

Bringing in Robert Marty's 'Five Paths'...one wonders: 'where do we
go from here'? After all, we are here involved purely in the semiosis
of Firstness and Secondness and yet, as Peirce argues within his
synechism, Mind or Thirdness has to be involved within not only what
WE experience but within that objective reality with which we
interact. 

Edwina
 On Mon 23/08/21 10:11 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. 

Gary f.
Text: 

Note that this understanding of experience is not equivalent to what
will become the phaneron. But importantly Peirce has the clear idea
that such experience is disconnected from previously assimilated
knowledge.  It is experience uninterpreted, and thus the very
unfolding of the initial interpretation – the interpretation of
unconditional living, the very reality of it detached from prior
inquiry. 


Links:
--
[1] https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

2021-08-22 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F, list

I think that IF one is suggesting that earlier posts by Peirce are
less valid explanations of his thought than later posts - I think
that such an assertion requires evidence. 

I don't see how the 7.581 quotation contradicts Peirce's later
outlines of the 'order' of experience and learning.

Edwina
 On Sun 22/08/21  4:34 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, I think we should note that De Tienne follows chronological
order in his presentation of Peirce quotes in this part of his talk,
but the chapter of CP 7 that you are quoting from strings together a
number of texts from widely separated periods in Peirce’s life, and
in complete disregard of chronology. CP 7.581 (near the end of your
post) is from Lecture XI of Peirce’s Lowell Lectures (W1:493) dated
November 1866, so it is even earlier than his “New List of
Categories” (1867). Peirce’s ideas (and of course his
terminology) changed considerably over the following 30-odd years,
and we can’t ignore this if we want to properly interpret what he
wrote about phenomenology and phaneroscopy from 1902 onward. As
always, context matters. 
Gary f.
From:  peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: 22-Aug-21 10:19
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30
List

To my understanding, what De Tienne seems to be  talking about in
this and subsequent slides [and I don't think one can separate them],
 with his reference to  Experience is what Peirce refers to as
Consciousness. He also writes that 'consciousness is also used to
denote what I call feeling" 7.586 and 'man's feelings are
perceptions, he is affected by objects' 7.587, and "Perception is the
possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more". That is, of
learning. 

What is learning?

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only
to reflect that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not
learning. That is only something from which something can be learned,
by interpreting it. The interpretation is the learning" 7.536 

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling,
Altersense and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but
these are not acts of learning. Consciousness can classify, by
grouping perceptions within the element of  Medisense, but can it
Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must
discriminate "between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of
the facts of human life. We have seen that every fact requires two
kinds of explanation; the one proceeds by induction to replace its
subject by a wider one, the other proceeds by hypothesis to replace
its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these two
explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581 

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the
action within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as
outlined in 7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the
'percepts', and associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics
provides the hypothetical explanations, which makes them
'teleological or purposive.7.570.

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am
'misinterpreting' him.  

Edwina
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

2021-08-22 Thread gnox
Edwina, I think we should note that De Tienne follows chronological order in 
his presentation of Peirce quotes in this part of his talk, but the chapter of 
CP 7 that you are quoting from strings together a number of texts from widely 
separated periods in Peirce’s life, and in complete disregard of chronology. CP 
7.581 (near the end of your post) is from Lecture XI of Peirce’s Lowell 
Lectures (W1:493) dated November 1866, so it is even earlier than his “New List 
of Categories” (1867). Peirce’s ideas (and of course his terminology) changed 
considerably over the following 30-odd years, and we can’t ignore this if we 
want to properly interpret what he wrote about phenomenology and phaneroscopy 
from 1902 onward. As always, context matters.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 22-Aug-21 10:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

 

List

To my understanding, what De Tienne seems to be  talking about in this and 
subsequent slides [and I don't think one can separate them],  with his 
reference to Experience is what Peirce refers to as Consciousness. He also 
writes that 'consciousness is also used to denote what I call feeling" 7.586 
and 'man's feelings are perceptions, he is affected by objects' 7.587, and 
"Perception is the possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more". That 
is, of learning. 

What is learning?

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only to reflect 
that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not learning. That is only 
something from which something can be learned, by interpreting it. The 
interpretation is the learning" 7.536

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but these are not acts of 
learning. Consciousness can classify, by grouping perceptions within the 
element of  Medisense, but can it Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must discriminate 
"between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of the facts of human life. 
We have seen that every fact requires two kinds of explanation; the one 
proceeds by induction to replace its subject by a wider one, the other proceeds 
by hypothesis to replace its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these 
two explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the action 
within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as outlined in 
7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the 'percepts', and 
associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics provides the hypothetical 
explanations, which makes them 'teleological or purposive.7.570.

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am 
'misinterpreting' him. 

Edwina



 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

2021-08-22 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

To my understanding, what De Tienne seems to be  talking about in
this and subsequent slides [and I don't think one can separate them],
 with his reference to Experience is what Peirce refers to as
Consciousness. He also writes that 'consciousness is also used to
denote what I call feeling" 7.586 and 'man's feelings are
perceptions, he is affected by objects' 7.587, and "Perception is the
possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more". That is, of
learning. 

What is learning?

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only
to reflect that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not
learning. That is only something from which something can be learned,
by interpreting it. The interpretation is the learning" 7.536

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling,
Altersense and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but
these are not acts of learning. Consciousness can classify, by
grouping perceptions within the element of  Medisense, but can it
Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must
discriminate "between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of
the facts of human life. We have seen that every fact requires two
kinds of explanation; the one proceeds by induction to replace its
subject by a wider one, the other proceeds by hypothesis to replace
its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these two
explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the
action within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as
outlined in 7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the
'percepts', and associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics
provides the hypothetical explanations, which makes them
'teleological or purposive.7.570.

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am
'misinterpreting' him. 

Edwina
 On Sun 22/08/21  8:43 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. This slide continues from slide 29, just
posted, and continues the Peirce quotation in it.

Gary f.
Text: 

And that MISSING LINK has to do with EXPERIENCE:  

CP 7.527: What is the experience upon which high philosophy is
based? For any one of the special sciences, experience is that which
the observational art of that science directly reveals. This is
connected with and assimilated to knowledge already in our possession
and otherwise derived, and thereby receives an interpretation, or
theory. 

 But in philosophy there is no SPECIAL observational art, and there
is no knowledge antecedently acquired in the light of which
experience is to be interpreted. The interpretation itself is
experience. [ ... ] In high philosophy, experience is the entire
cognitive result of living, and illusion is, for its purposes, just
as much experience as is real perception. 


Links:
--
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-20 Thread gnox
Thanks Jon, this does clarify the matter, especially the definitions of 
Firstness where Peirce uses phrases such as “positive suchness” and “positive 
possibility.” It’s yet another reminder of the importance of context in 
determining the meaning of a word. I think it was Comte who first used the term 
“positive science,” and I think Peirce was just following his lead in opposing 
it to hypothetical science; but his other uses of “positive” do not refer to 
actuality as opposed to possibility, or to Secondness as opposed to Firstness. 
Anyway there’s no perfect choices when it comes to naming such things. As long 
as a word is used to denote anything real, its inherent vagueness is 
incorrigible; only a nonverbal index can make a real connection to the dynamic 
object. Nevertheless we try (Peirce certainly tried) to weed out the choices 
most likely to cause confusion, and trust the interpreter to pay close 
attention to the context.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Aug-21 14:21
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.”

 

I previously highlighted another usage by Peirce in which "possibility implies 
a relation to what exists," namely, in accordance with his pragmaticism 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00228.html). I went on to 
suggest in that post that only possibilities that can become actual are 
relevant to practitioners of the positive sciences, a limitation that does not 
apply to the hypothetical science of pure mathematics. This seems to be 
consistent with how Peirce spells out what he means by "positive" vs. 
"hypothetical" in his classification of the sciences, where he affirms again 
the dependence of phaneroscopy on pure mathematics for principles.

 

CSP: This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the 
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any 
other positive science. By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for 
positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may conveniently be 
expressed in a categorical proposition. Logic and the other normative sciences, 
although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, nevertheless are positive 
sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are 
able to show that what they call good really is so; and the right reason, right 
effort, and right being, of which they treat, derive that character from 
positive categorical fact.

Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science which 
should not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I 
reply that it is not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such 
science exists and flourishes, and Phenomenology, which does not depend upon 
any other positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly 
grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of 
Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things actually are, 
but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some 
other. A Phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science 
hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful 
club-footed affair that Hegel produced. (CP 5.39-40, EP 2:144, 1903)

 

The knowledge discovered in the positive sciences is properly expressed in 
categorical propositions, while the knowledge discovered in pure mathematics as 
a hypothetical science are properly expressed in conditional propositions. Note 
also that since Peirce considers the normative sciences to be positive 
sciences, he explicitly rejects the modern "is-ought" problem.

 

GF: Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization.

 

Indeed, Peirce's first universe encompasses whatever is "capable of being so 
present [to one consciousness] in its entire Being" (EP 2:479, 1908); or as he 
puts it elsewhere, "anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for 
getting fully represented," i.e., "their Being consists in mere capability of 
getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them" (CP 6.452&455, EP 
2:434&435, 1908).

 

GF: I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though.

 

I agree, since phaneroscopy is a positive science and yet is not confined to 
the study of actuality and 2ns. In fact, it is not concerned at all with 
distinguishing actuality from possibility and necessity, and it is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Gary F., List:

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that *in ordinary English usage*,
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.”


I previously highlighted another usage by Peirce in which "possibility
implies a relation to what exists," namely, in accordance with his
pragmaticism (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00228.html). I went on
to suggest in that post that *only *possibilities that can become actual
are relevant to practitioners of the *positive *sciences, a limitation that
does not apply to the *hypothetical *science of pure mathematics. This
seems to be consistent with how Peirce spells out what he means by
"positive" vs. "hypothetical" in his classification of the sciences, where
he affirms again the dependence of phaneroscopy on pure mathematics for
principles.

CSP: This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any
other *positive science*. By a *positive *science I mean an inquiry which
seeks for positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may
conveniently be expressed in a *categorical proposition*. Logic and the
other normative sciences, although they ask, not what *is *but what *ought
to be*, nevertheless are positive sciences since it is by asserting
positive, categorical truth that they are able to show that what they call
good really is so; and the right reason, right effort, and right being, of
which they treat, derive that character from positive categorical fact.
Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science
which should not aim to declare that something is positively or
categorically true. I reply that it is not only possible to conceive of
such a science, but that such science exists and flourishes, and
Phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other *positive science*,
nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon
the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of *Pure Mathematics*, whose only
aim is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might be
supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some other. A Phenomenology
which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science hardly come to years
of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful club-footed affair
that Hegel produced. (CP 5.39-40, EP 2:144, 1903)


The knowledge discovered in the *positive *sciences is properly expressed
in *categorical *propositions, while the knowledge discovered in pure
mathematics as a *hypothetical *science are properly expressed in *conditional
*propositions. Note also that since Peirce considers the *normative *sciences
to be *positive *sciences, he explicitly rejects the modern "is-ought"
problem.

GF: Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of
vagueness in order to show that *in the language of exact logic* (as
opposed to ordinary English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability
of actualization.


Indeed, Peirce's first universe encompasses whatever is "capable of being
so present [to one consciousness] in its entire Being" (EP 2:479, 1908); or
as he puts it elsewhere, "anything whose Being consists in its mere
capacity for getting fully represented," i.e., "their Being consists in
mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking
them" (CP 6.452&455, EP 2:434&435, 1908).

GF: I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of *positivity *with *actuality
*and *Secondness *is more problematic, though.


I agree, since phaneroscopy is a *positive *science and yet is not confined
to the study of *actuality *and *2ns*. In fact, it is not concerned at all
with *distinguishing *actuality from possibility and necessity, and it is
where 2ns is *discovered *by prescission from 3ns.

GF: ... Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own
kind of reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s
text, so I don’t intend to argue the point.


On the contrary, Peirce *repeatedly *includes the notion of "positivity" in
his various definitions of 1ns (
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/firstness). He seems to be invoking
it as an antonym of "negativity," since the latter requires comparison with
something else and thus intrinsically corresponds to 2ns. As I understand
it, 1ns as possibility is *pure *possibility, not possibility *as opposed
to* actuality or necessity.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 8:31 AM  wrote:

> Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …
>
>
>
> In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of
> Firstness can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same
> lecture, he says this:
>
>
>
> CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the
> very 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-20 Thread gnox
Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …

 

In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness 
can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he 
says this:

 

CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very 
being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility 
implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of 
being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, 
“possibility” would have answered the purpose.

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since existence involves 
Secondness, that renders the word “possibility” unfit for rendering the concept 
named “Firstness.” In order to consistently use “qualitative possibility” in 
reference to Firstness, it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary 
implication which connects the word to Secondness. This is what Peirce does in 
the bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

 

CSP: One of these [three] Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe 
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability 
of actualization. 

 

GF: The quote is continued below by Robert (who omitted the first two sentences 
given above).

Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization. This 
effectively cancels, in the logical context, the objection which prevented him 
(in the Lowell Lecture) from using “possibility” as another name for 
“Firstness,” justifies Peirce’s use of “qualitative possibility” in reference 
to Firstness, and gives us De Tienne (and the rest of us) license to use 
“possibility” in that way. 

 

I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though. Peirce’s statement in a 1904 letter to 
Welby that “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328) suggests that 
Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own kind of 
reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s text, so I 
don’t intend to argue the point.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 19-Aug-21 09:51
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is su

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread robert marty
Edwina, List
It is very clear ... for Gary F., tribalism is the others!
R M
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 19 août 2021 à 16:06, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Gary F, list
>
> 1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
> as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
> by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is that this
> perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all, we, for the most
> part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are caused by germs. Does
> this mean that the scientists who hold this view do so because the
> Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are members of a tribe'?
>
> 2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
> idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
>  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean quote on the other
> hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being' and points out
> that 'life' includes all three - and they are not operationally separate.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 19/08/21 9:50 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of
> what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe
> opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and
> duelistic) practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s
> capitalization) something about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to
> define “tribalism” differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about
> terminology.) By the way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of
> the root problem with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for
> insisting on what is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading
> of what ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear,
> so I won’t comment on it here.
>
> The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your
> highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other
> tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in
> Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look
> if we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d
> like to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is
> from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the
> third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here:
> https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The question about “possibility”
> arises in the second paragraph of this selection:
>
>
>
> CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which
> affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it
> does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where
> you have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you
> have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not
> of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
> Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and
> such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as
> the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness
> and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get
> the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
> (thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving to
> apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that is what
> Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness. …
>
> A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is
> perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus
> the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That
> wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of
> Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies
> a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being
> of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise,
> “possibility” would have answered the purpose. …
>
> To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of
> mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as
> any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of
> Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from
> applying Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for
> them: primity, secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of robert marty
> Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03
>
>
>
> List,
>
> No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT
> supporters.
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27. Needed correction.

2021-08-19 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
Edwina:

> On Aug 18, 2021, at 12:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
>  I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an open free 
> force-to-be-actualized ..

Why?

I concur that CSP’s notion of first-ness should not be transitioned into an 
ideal form such as an eager and scientifically illiterate 
mathematically-oriented philosophy could be tempted to contemplate.  Such 
scientifically ignorant philosophers could be further tempted to wander 
helter-skelter over a random dictionary of semantic synonyms in order to 
justify a perverse philosophy of nature, Ladyman-like. 

But, I have no idea how a “force” can be “to be”.

This is a strange bit of physics.

Logically, the norm for the usual literate physical thought is that of force as 
a consequent. (At least, the physical symbols of Newton and Coulomb were / are 
/ will be so deployed.)

I would suggest that the conversations be initiated in the notion of first-ness 
as a logical antecedent. This is formal ground of the logic of graph theory and 
the logical connectivity of nature. 

Such conversations can be modally potentiated to transverse to secondness by 
syndication with the possibility of remaining open to reversing the meaning 
from consequence to the antecedent (retroduction).

For example, Sodium can be transformed in Sodium Chloride by pragmatic 
syntropization without invoking any abstract theories or laws.

Mother Nature does the work spontaneously without any formal theoretical 
mathematical underpinnings of work and energy.

My argument is directly related to CSP’s generative logic of the trichotomy.  
The “one-ness” of a logical term as a unit of meaning and it modality as a 
sin-sign and as independent notation for a syntactical object (icon?) are 
essential to the generalization of the formal logic of the trichotomy. 

Does this rhetorical form (formulation) satisfy essential / critical 
anthropological yearnings?
(I am implying that invoking logical Skolenization would not be welcomed into 
CSP’s notions of relational logics because the semantic name “sodium” is a 
unitary predicate with a fixed position in a predecessor-sucessor sequence of 
natural numbers.)

:-). 

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27. Needed correction.

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Jerry, list

Here's Peirce's definition of Firstness:

"Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else" 8.328.

Now, since I also ascribe to the interpretation of Peirce's view of
matter and mind - from 6.24, that their relation is 'monist' or one
of hylopathy, where the two are correlates, then, I don't see
Firstness as separate from matter or mind or the other two categories
- either in time or space.

So, I see it as 'matter and mind' that is in a pre-existent mode of
being[understanding 'existent' to refer to individualization or
the particular, the actual discrete unit]. What is pre-existent
'matter and mind'?  What does pre-existent mean? Since Firstness is
not a distinct, separate in time and space action, but is correlated
with the other two modes - then..it, to me, refers to a 'mode of
being' that is non-actual, non-specific and yet connected to
that-which-is actual. 

Some of Peirce's descriptions are 'the original, elemental tendency
of things to acquire determinate properties. EP 1.243

Or 'indeterminacy' 1.405feeling/quality, chance,
freedom...vague..possibility..

BUT since this 'mode of being' is NOT separate from Mind or Matter,
then, I see it as a vague indeterminate possibility-to-be Mind and
Matter.

You've been to enough of Daniel Dubois Conferences on Anticipation
to understand ...I see Firstness as related to anticipation.

And yes - I'd see it as you say - the generative logic of the
trichotomy.

Edwina.
 On Thu 19/08/21 12:00 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent:
 Edwina:
 On Aug 18, 2021, at 12:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
  I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an open
free force-to-be-actualized ..
 Why?
 I concur that CSP’s notion of first-ness should not be
transitioned into an ideal form such as an eager and scientifically
illiterate mathematically-oriented philosophy could be tempted to
contemplate.  Such scientifically ignorant philosophers could be
further tempted to wander helter-skelter over a random dictionary of
semantic synonyms in order to justify a perverse philosophy of
nature, Ladyman-like.  
 But, I have no idea how a “force” can be “to be”.
 This is a strange bit of physics.
 Logically, the norm for the usual literate physical thought is that
of force as a consequent. (At least, the physical symbols of Newton
and Coulomb were / are / will be so deployed.)
 I would suggest that the conversations be initiated in the notion of
first-ness as a logical antecedent. This is formal ground of the logic
of graph theory and the logical connectivity of nature.  
 Such conversations can be modally potentiated to transverse to
secondness by syndication with the possibility of remaining open to
reversing the meaning from consequence to the antecedent
(retroduction).
 For example, Sodium can be transformed in Sodium Chloride by
pragmatic syntropization without invoking any abstract theories or
laws.
 Mother Nature does the work spontaneously without any formal
theoretical mathematical underpinnings of work and energy. 
 My argument is directly related to CSP’s generative logic of the
trichotomy.  The “one-ness” of a logical term as a unit of
meaning and it modality as a sin-sign and as independent notation for
a syntactical object (icon?) are essential to the generalization of
the formal logic of the trichotomy. 
 Does this rhetorical form (formulation) satisfy essential / critical
anthropological yearnings? (I am implying that invoking logical
Skolenization would not be welcomed into CSP’s notions of
relational logics because the semantic name “sodium” is a unitary
predicate with a fixed position in a predecessor-sucessor sequence of
natural numbers.)
 :-). 
 CheersJerry  


Links:
--
[1]
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 
 JAS, list

"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. then, the question arises
whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the
other are to be taken___ " etc. 6.24 my emphasis]

Hylopathy and hylomorphism are, according to various dictionaries 
related. 

I note -  Peirce believed in MONISM - and his question was how the
two 'laws' relate to each other. 

I'm not going to get into another debate with you about his answer,
since you and I totally disagree in our interpretation of what Peirce
wrote in this section. But to my mind, he rejected neutralism and
also, that one or the other are primordial. He specifically said:
Hylopathy- which is also hylomorphism. 

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21 10:12 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind
and Matter.
 That is not what it means to be an idealist, at least according to
Peirce's definitions. Instead, someone who separates mind and matter
is either a dualist or a neutralist, and someone who treats mind and
matter as continuous is either a materialist or an idealist. 
 CSP: The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises
whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the
other are to be taken-- (a) as independent, a doctrine often called
monism, but which I would name neutralism; or,
 (b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone
as primordial, which is materialism; or,
 (c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone
as primordial, which is idealism. (CP 6.24, 1891)
 An idealist is thus someone who holds that mind is more fundamental 
than matter, such that "matter is a peculiar sort of mind" (R 936:3,
no date).
 ET: This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.
 As far as I know, Peirce never describes his own position as
"hylomorphism." Instead, he states the following (bold added). 
 CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of
objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws. (CP 6.25, 1891)
 CSP: ... if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete
mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act
with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of
forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating
theory of  idealism. (R 936:3, no date)
 CSP: I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and
of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a
Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere
specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, 1892) 
 If André is an idealist in this sense, then he is in good company
with Peirce himself.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Robert, list

Thanks for the quotations. 

My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've
no idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's
hylomorphism.

Edwina  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Thank you for your detailed response about idealism - but- we are
not all undergraduates on this list!

I was specifically asking Helmut why HE - not Peirce - but HELMUT,
differentiated between Platonic idealism and Platonic realism.

As for De Tienne, my interpretation of HIS outline is that it is not
the same as Peirce's; therefore, your quotations from Peirce don't
deal with my concerns. 

Equally - I didn't ask about Peirce's theories of evolution - and he
does agree with evolution. My question concerned PLATO'S views on
evolution. 

With regard to Peirce's 'careful terminology' - I don't see this
followed in De Tienne's outline. 

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Helmut, List:
 ET: The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a pre-existent
Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and is then
articulated within existential material reality.
 Where does André state or imply that a form  exists prior to and
apart from its actualization? On the contrary, in accordance with
Peirce's careful terminology, existence and actuality are
coextensive--a form does not exist unless and until it is actualized,
but some forms are real by virtue of merely being capable of
actualization. Moreover, everything that does exist is an
instantiation of such forms.
  ET: I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and
Platonic realism.
 Peirce helpfully explains it.
 CSP: In the usual sense of the word reality, therefore, Berkeley's
doctrine is that the reality of sensible things resides only in their
archetypes in the divine mind. This is Platonistic, but it is not
realistic. On the contrary, since it places reality wholly out of the
mind in the cause of sensations, and since it denies reality (in the
true sense of the word) to sensible things in so far as they are
sensible, it is distinctly nominalistic. Historically there have been
prominent examples of an alliance between nominalism and Platonism.
(CP 8.30, 1871) 
 Berkeley was an idealist, but a nominalist rather than a realist. He
affirmed that mind is more fundamental than matter, but went a step
farther by effectively denying that matter is real at all. That is
why he is properly classified as a subjective idealist, while Peirce
describes himself as an objective idealist, as well as an extreme
scholastic realist.
  HR: Did he [Peirce] say that all abstract forms too are due to
evolution, or only some natural laws?
 ET: And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution.
 Peirce's cosmology indeed explicitly includes the evolution of
"Platonic forms," as well as the emergence of our existing universe
as an instantiation of an entire "Platonic world." 
 CSP: From this point of view we must suppose that the existing
universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or
an arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world;
not that our superior logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of
forms to which the real universe, with its feebler logic, was
inadequate. (CP 6.192, 1898)
 CSP: The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of
the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic
forms themselves have become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194,
1898)
 CSP: In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe,
that locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the
whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is
evolutionary in its origin, too. (CP 6.200, 1898) 
 CSP: At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the
order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of
which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both
coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally out of one
of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual
universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 6.208, 1898) 
 The positive sciences seek to understand our existing universe,
while the hypothetical science of pure mathematics seeks to
understand those Platonic worlds.
 CSP: True, in the world of real experience, "never" has at least an
approximate meaning. But in the Platonic world of pure forms with
which mathematics is always dealing, "never" can only mean "not
consistently with ___." (CP 4.118, 1893) 
 CSP: All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world
affords no parallel, each man arbitrarily following his own sweet
will, are, as we now begin to discern, gradually uncovering one great
cosmos of forms, a world of potential being. The pure mathematician
himself feels that this is so. ... But if you enjoy the good fortune
of talking with a number of mathematicia

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
by a number of people.


As I understand it, tribalism in this context is a sociological phenomenon
in which people affirm or deny statements by others primarily based on
whether or not the person making them is perceived to be a member of the
same "tribe," rather than the substance of the statements themselves.

ET: The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
 realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy.


Where does André *even once* use the terminology of mind and matter in
distinguishing mathematics and phaneroscopy? As I have noted previously (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00144.html), the
modern distinction between *mind *and matter does not even arise in these
sciences, only in metaphysics and the special sciences (psychical and
physical). However, as I have also noted previously (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00157.html), the
Aristotelian distinction between *form *and matter is relevant because the
phaneroscopist is *applying *mathematics when representing and drawing
necessary conclusions from an idealized form whose matter is supposed to be
something that is present to the mind in some way.

ET: The Peircean quote on the other hand refers to the categories or 'modes
of being' and points out that 'life' includes all three - and they are not
operationally separate.


No one is claiming that Peirce's three universal categories are
"operationally separate," only affirming--as he did in the quoted passage
and elsewhere--that they can be prescinded from each other in just one
direction; namely, 2ns from 3ns, and 1ns from both 2ns and 3ns.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 9:06 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary F, list
>
> 1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
> as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
> by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is that this
> perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all, we, for the most
> part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are caused by germs. Does
> this mean that the scientists who hold this view do so because the
> Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are members of a tribe'?
>
> 2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
> idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
>  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean quote on the other
> hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being' and points out
> that 'life' includes all three - and they are not operationally separate.
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List:

ET: My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter.


That is not what it means to be an idealist, at least according to Peirce's
definitions. Instead, someone who *separates *mind and matter is either
a dualist or a neutralist, and someone who treats mind and matter as
continuous is either a materialist or an idealist.

CSP: The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly
find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of
hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises whether
physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be
taken--
(a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name
*neutralism*; or,
(b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as
primordial, which is *materialism*; or,
(c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
primordial, which is *idealism*. (CP 6.24, 1891)


An idealist is thus someone who holds that mind is *more fundamental* than
matter, such that "*matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind*" (R 936:3, no
date).

ET: This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.


As far as I know, Peirce *never *describes his own position as
"hylomorphism." Instead, he states the following (bold added).

CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
*idealism*, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical
laws. (CP 6.25, 1891)

CSP: ... if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so
completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect
regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we
are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism*. (R 936:3, no date)

CSP: I have begun by showing that *tychism *must give birth to an
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind
are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned
*idealism *which
holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102,
1892)


If André is an idealist in this sense, then he is in good company with
Peirce himself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Robert, list
>
> Thanks for the quotations.
>
> My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
> Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've no
> idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F, list

1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means,
as far as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective
that is held by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is
that this perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all,
we, for the most part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are
caused by germs. Does this mean that the scientists who hold this
view do so because the Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are
members of a tribe'?

2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two
'scientific'  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean
quote on the other hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being'
and points out that 'life' includes all three - and they are not
operationally separate.

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  9:50 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another
example of what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group
of people as a tribe opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I
suppose). This dualistic (and  duelistic) practice overrides the
“Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something about
phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism”
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the
way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem
with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what
is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what
ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear,
so I won’t comment on it here.  

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than
your highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons
against the other tribe. Specifically, the relation between
“possibility” and “Firstness” in Peirce’s actual usage of
those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if we want to
learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like
to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is
from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context,
namely the third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here: 
https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 [1] . The question about
“possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:
CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction
which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness
more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the
circumstance that where you have a triplet  ∴ you have 3 pairs; and
where you have a pair, you have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an
essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is
an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is
such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness
of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no
Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the
purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
(thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving
to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that
is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness.
… 

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It
is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its
quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor
sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal
Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it,
except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while
universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have
answered the purpose. … 

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color
of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as
good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three
kinds of Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality,
resulting from applying Firstness to the three categories. We might
strike new words for them: primity, secundity, tertiality. [end CSP
quote] 
Gary f.
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of robert marty
 Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03
List,

 No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from
ADT supporters.
  ADT >

•   The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

 •  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of
the classification of the sciences is a scientifi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, Helmut, List:

ET: The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it seems
to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a pre-existent Form
'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and is then articulated
within existential material reality.


Where does André state or imply that a form *exists *prior to and apart
from its actualization? On the contrary, in accordance with Peirce's
careful terminology, existence and actuality are coextensive--a form does
not *exist *unless and until it is actualized, but some forms are *real *by
virtue of merely being *capable *of actualization. Moreover, everything
that *does *exist is an *instantiation *of such forms.

ET: I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and Platonic
realism.


Peirce helpfully explains it.

CSP: In the usual sense of the word *reality*, therefore, Berkeley's
doctrine is that the reality of sensible things resides only in their
archetypes in the divine mind. This is Platonistic, but it is not
realistic. On the contrary, since it places reality wholly out of the mind
in the cause of sensations, and since it denies reality (in the true sense
of the word) to sensible things in so far as they are sensible, it is
distinctly nominalistic. Historically there have been prominent examples of
an alliance between nominalism and Platonism. (CP 8.30, 1871)


Berkeley was an idealist, but a nominalist rather than a realist. He
affirmed that mind is more fundamental than matter, but went a step farther
by effectively denying that matter is real at all. That is why he is
properly classified as a *subjective *idealist, while Peirce describes
himself as an *objective *idealist, as well as an extreme scholastic
realist.

HR: Did he [Peirce] say that all abstract forms too are due to evolution,
or only some natural laws?


ET: And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution.


Peirce's cosmology indeed explicitly includes the evolution of "Platonic
forms," as well as the emergence of our existing universe as an
instantiation of an entire "Platonic world."

CSP: From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe,
with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior
logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real
universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate. (CP 6.192, 1898)


CSP: The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of
the *existing
universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves
have become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194, 1898)

CSP: In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that
locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole
Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its
origin, too. (CP 6.200, 1898)

CSP: At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of
the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be. (CP 6.208, 1898)


The *positive *sciences seek to understand our existing universe,
while the *hypothetical
*science of pure mathematics seeks to understand those Platonic worlds.

CSP: True, in the world of real experience, "never" has at least an
approximate meaning. But in the Platonic world of pure forms with which
mathematics is always dealing, "never" can only mean "not consistently with
___." (CP 4.118, 1893)

CSP: All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world affords
no parallel, each man arbitrarily following his own sweet will, are, as we
now begin to discern, gradually uncovering one great cosmos of forms, a
world of potential being. The pure mathematician himself feels that this is
so. ... But if you enjoy the good fortune of talking with a number of
mathematicians of a high order, you will find that the typical pure
mathematician is a sort of Platonist. Only, he is [a] Platonist who
corrects the Heraclitan error that the eternal is not continuous. The
eternal is for him a world, a cosmos, in which the universe of actual
existence is nothing but an arbitrary locus. The end that pure mathematics
is pursuing is to discover that real potential world. (CP 1.646, 1898)


Platonic worlds are *potential*, not *actual*; and some of them are *real*,
but none of them *exist *except as instantiated in our particular universe.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:24 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> I'm not sure of the dif

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread gnox
Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation), what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness — that is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of 
Thirdness. …

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of 
King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new 
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the 
purpose. …

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of 
mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, 
poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, 
qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from applying 
Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: primity, 
secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03



 

List,

No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT supporters.

 

 ADT >

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the actualization 
of a special form, which can be rendered into the term positiveness, an 
abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the 
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will explore that 
resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 CSP >

 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles,although the 
latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary 
as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect 
actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For 
that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially 
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now since 
every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to exist as 
boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the place common to three 
bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or liquid is merely the place at 
which its forces of cohesion are neither very great nor very small, which is 
essentially vague, it is plain that the idea is essentially vague or 
indefinite. Moreover, suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

Thanks for the quotations. 

My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've
no idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's
hylomorphism.

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  5:03 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
List,

 No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from
ADT supporters.
 ADT >
•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization. 

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization). 

 CSP >
 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or
Possibles,although the latter designation does not imply capability
of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a
universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on
account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that
which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now
since every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to
exist as boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the
place common to three bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or
liquid is merely the place at which its forces of cohesion are
neither very great nor very small, which is essentially vague, it is
plain that the idea is essentially vague or indefinite. Moreover,
suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are wood,
water, and air, then a whole space including this line is at every
point either wood, water, or air; and neither wood and water, nor
wood and air, nor water and air can together occupy any place. Then
plainly the principle of contradiction, were it applicable, would be
violated in the idea of a place where wood, water, and air, come
together. Similar antinomies affect all Ideas. We can only reason
about them in respects which the antinomies do not affect, and often
by arbitrarily assuming what upon closer examination is found to be
absurd. There is this much truth in Hegel's doctrine, although he is
frequently in error in applying the principle." (EP2 479) [emphasize
mine]
  
  
  

 "But, further, although usually appearances are either only
confirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain
remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by
testimony. These are those predicates which we know to be emotional,
but which he distinguishes by their connection with the movements of
that central person, himself (that the table wants moving, etc.)
These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has
reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are
quite denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of
appearance as the actualization of fact, the conception of it as
something private and valid only for one body. In short, error
appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is
fallible."(CP 5.234)[ Peirce emphasize italic words; emphasize by
bold mine] 

NB by RM  >  

None of the terms, "positivization" and "secondization" appears in
CP, EP2, NEM III/2, NEM 4.   

 Regards, 

Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; Ph.D. Mathematics ; Ph.D.
Philosophy 
 fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty [1]
 https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ [2]
 Le mer. 18 août 2021 à 16:20,  a écrit :
 Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [4] site. 

Gary f.
 Text:   Toward Positiveness

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

 •  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of
the classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization).

•  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually  MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?”

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to structure the dough, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Helmut, list

I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and
Platonic realism.

And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution. 

Edwina
 On Wed 18/08/21 11:49 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, List   I think it is not platonic idealism or platonism,
but platonic realism, which suggests abstract forms as preexisting
ideas or universals, but not blueprints for existing objects or
ethical and esthetical matters, which too Platon claimed to be
preexisting ideas.   About the tribalistic question, whether Peirce
was a platonic realist or not: I dont know: Did he say that all
abstract forms too are due to evolution, or only some natural laws?
Anyway, he must have known, that this theory (natural laws being due
to evoluton) is not treatable with the scientific method, is
speculation. Why this speculation? Maybe he wanted to distinguish
himself from the platonic tribe, and start his own tribe?Best,
Helmut   18. August 2021 um 19:27 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

List 

The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a
pre-existent Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and
is then articulated within existential material reality. That's not
Peirce's hylomorphism which doesn't separate Mind and Matter --- 

Secondly I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an
open free force-to-be-actualized but itself lacking the format of
that actualization, because actualization within a stable Form only
materializes within Thirdness. 

What does mathematics do, in my understanding of the Peircean
analysis? It is a rational action where the mathematician, after
observing the phaneron, analyzes 'what's going on' and develops
formulae, diagrams, relational maps...to explain these actualities.
And then, as any good scientist would do, he tests these analyses
within the actualities of the phaneron, to see whether his formulae
do actually explain 'what's going on'. 

De Tienne seems to have a different perspective. As I read or
misunderstand his post, he sees that what I am calling 'formulae' are
actual Forms that exist as some kind of non-material idea per se and
then, 'become positive' or actual. That's Platonic idealism. I don't
see this as Peirce. 

Edwina 
 On Wed 18/08/21 10:19 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site.  

Gary f. 
Text:   Toward Positiveness 

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form , which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from  positivization. 

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization). 

•  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?” 

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to  structure the dough, not of this or that in experience,
but of “experiencing” itself (the experiencing of experience)?   
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-18 Thread John F. Sowa



Gary F, List,

That's a good summary of what ADT wrote.  But
good examples are far
more important than more jargon.  I can't see
any justification for
ADT's jargon.

GF:  But De Tienne
chooses to emphasize the primacy of mathematics,
and thus presents
“positiveness” as a result of a process that started
with mathematics
(form “structures the dough,” as he puts it.  He
calls the process
“secondization” not only because it introduces the
element of
Secondness,

I liked your cedar tree because it enables us to
talk about concrete
experience instead of jargon.

In my
earlier note I showed the huge amount of experience in your
phaneron,
of which the cedar tree was just a part.  And no where did
it show
any need to go beyond mathematics.

Can you or anybody else show
what ADT is talking about in terms of the
cedar tree?
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

2021-08-18 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

List

The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a
pre-existent Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and
is then articulated within existential material reality. That's not
Peirce's hylomorphism which doesn't separate Mind and Matter --- 

Secondly I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an
open free force-to-be-actualized but itself lacking the format of
that actualization, because actualization within a stable Form only
materializes within Thirdness.

What does mathematics do, in my understanding of the Peircean
analysis? It is a rational action where the mathematician, after
observing the phaneron, analyzes 'what's going on' and develops
formulae, diagrams, relational maps...to explain these actualities.
And then, as any good scientist would do, he tests these analyses
within the actualities of the phaneron, to see whether his formulae
do actually explain 'what's going on'.

De Tienne seems to have a different perspective. As I read or
misunderstand his post, he sees that what I am calling 'formulae' are
actual Forms that exist as some kind of non-material idea per se and
then, 'become positive' or actual. That's Platonic idealism. I don't
see this as Peirce.

Edwina
 On Wed 18/08/21 10:19 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. 

Gary f.
Text:   Toward Positiveness

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form , which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 •  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?”

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to  structure the dough, not of this or that in experience,
but of “experiencing” itself (the experiencing of experience)? 


Links:
--
[1] https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-17 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Gary F, list

It is commendable that you have removed Bernard Morand as a tribal
member - and are willing to engage with him as an individual  - but
this still leaves the problem of the existence, as you outline, of
others " who have demonstrated the tribalistic tendencies ". 

That is, your post still asserts the existence of tribes on the
list.

 I'd like to know: what are the attributes, according to you, of
'tribalistic tendencies'? 

Surely you can't be saying that IF X person agrees with Y person,
then, the two are members of the same tribe. 

Or is it, IF X person disagrees with Z person - then, the two are
members of different tribes?

Edwina
 On Tue 17/08/21  5:11 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
List, before even looking at what’s been posted since my own post
below, I feel I should apologize to Bernard Morand for saying that
“the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your
philosophy of language,” based solely on the two-sentence statement
that I quoted from his previous post. I should have asked him to
clarify that statement instead of jumping to such a general
conclusion from it. Even worse, my post could have been uncharitably
read as lumping him in with those who have demonstrated the
tribalistic tendencies I described (which would thus be taken as
evidence of my own descent into tribalism). Of course that was not my
intention, but my unwarranted remark about Bernard’s “philosophy
of language” was totally irresponsible, and I do apologize for
that. 
Now I’ll get caught up on yesterday’s list activity and see
whether there’s a need for further comment on slides 25-6.
 Gary f.
}  {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ living the time
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
 Sent: 16-Aug-21 11:10
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25 
Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment
about the “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was
completely wrong. Indeed you’ve shown that the concept of a
“dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy of language.

 BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in
any language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and
also in formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use
even in scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended
signification, then the usual necessary reference to its inventor as
well as definitions and references to their authors.

 GF: What’s missing from this account is the denotation of the
word, as opposed (by Peirce) to its signification. I think this
approach to language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty
in this bit of dialogue from Lewis Carroll:

‘When  I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither
more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words
mean so many different things.’

 ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master
– that's all.’

GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular
posters on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat
it as an “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where
other posters are typecast as either allies or enemies, and the
response to a post depends not on what has been said but on who said
it, i.e. which tribe they have been assigned to. Indeed this pattern
seems to be taking over most public discourse these days, so the
Peirce list is not unusual in this respect. 

The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a
symbol which is all signification and no denotation is a symbol
devoid of information, as the “logical product” defined by the
formula Breadth × Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the
denotation (extension, breadth) of a term is zero, the product
(information) is also zero. In other words, you can’t get
information from a symbol that lacks  indexicality. Of course, as
Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names and
pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience
and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) [2]). And as you say, any attempt to
convey experientially what Peirce meant in his reference to a
“process of thought” by which the elements of experience “must
be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter”
is doomed to failure. 

But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we
pay any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or
phaneroscopy) than to anyone else’s?

Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [3]  On Behalf Of Bernard
Morand
 Sent: 16-Aug-21 05:53
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]
 Subject: 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-17 Thread gnox
List, before even looking at what’s been posted since my own post below, I feel 
I should apologize to Bernard Morand for saying that “the concept of a “dynamic 
object” plays no part in your philosophy of language,” based solely on the 
two-sentence statement that I quoted from his previous post. I should have 
asked him to clarify that statement instead of jumping to such a general 
conclusion from it. Even worse, my post could have been uncharitably read as 
lumping him in with those who have demonstrated the tribalistic tendencies I 
described (which would thus be taken as evidence of my own descent into 
tribalism). Of course that was not my intention, but my unwarranted remark 
about Bernard’s “philosophy of language” was totally irresponsible, and I do 
apologize for that.

 

Now I’ll get caught up on yesterday’s list activity and see whether there’s a 
need for further comment on slides 25-6.

 

Gary f.

 

}  {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 16-Aug-21 11:10
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the 
“dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed you’ve 
shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy 
of language.

BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any language 
except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in formal 
languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in scientific 
exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the usual necessary 
reference to its inventor as well as definitions and references to their 
authors.

GF: What’s missing from this account is the denotation of the word, as opposed 
(by Peirce) to its signification. I think this approach to language use is very 
concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of dialogue from Lewis Carroll:

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's all.’

GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters on 
this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an “arena” (his 
word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are typecast as either 
allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends not on what has been said 
but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have been assigned to. Indeed this 
pattern seems to be taking over most public discourse these days, so the Peirce 
list is not unusual in this respect.

The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol which is 
all signification and no denotation is a symbol devoid of information, as the 
“logical product” defined by the formula Breadth × Depth = Information (Peirce, 
W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth) of a term is zero, the product 
(information) is also zero. In other words, you can’t get information from a 
symbol that lacks indexicality. Of course, as Peirce pointed out, words in 
themselves (other than proper names and pronouns) are quite poor in 
indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) 
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob> ). And as you say, any attempt to 
convey experientially what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process of 
thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked out of the 
fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to failure.

But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay any 
more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy) than to 
anyone else’s?

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 16-Aug-21 05:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Gary F., list

Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  a écrit :

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but 
unfortunately I don’t have that ability.

BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the dynamic object 
of that sign — is what it i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
List, Edwina:

First, Edwina, I will not answer directly your question about allowances on 
this list.
In my experiences here on this list, I fear for my freedom to continue to 
express my analysis of the ontology and epistemology of the chemical sciences.  

As for the connections between the trichotomy (the nine terms that CSP used to 
express his feelings about the connections between mathematics and chemistry as 
well as an unrestricted number of other disciplines), it appears to me that CSP 
was clear about the nature of his beliefs about assertions (5.269-70).

 A valid inference is either complete or incomplete. An incomplete inference is 
one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in the 
premisses. This implied fact might have been stated as a premiss, and its 
relation to the conclusion is the same whether it is explicitly posited or not, 
since it is at least virtually taken for granted; so that every valid 
incomplete argument is virtually complete. Complete arguments are divided into 
simple and complex. A complex argument is one which from three or more 
premisses concludes what might have been concluded by successive steps in 
(W2.215) <> reasonings each of which is simple. Thus, a complex inference comes 
to the same thing in the end as a succession of simple inferences.
(CP5.270) <>  A complete, simple, and valid argument, or syllogism, is 
either apodictic or probable. An apodictic or deductive syllogism is one whose 
validity depends unconditionally upon the relation of the fact inferred to the 
facts posited in the premisses. A syllogism whose validity should depend not 
merely upon its premisses, but upon the existence of some other knowledge, 
would be impossible; for either this other knowledge would be posited, in which 
case it would be a part of the premisses, or it would be implicitly assumed, in 
which case the inference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose validity 
depends partly upon the non-existence of some other knowledge, is a probable 
syllogism.

( In order to facilitate a reading of the basis for existential graphs, I have 
placed a number in brackets for each of the nine  “simple” “incomplete” 
trichotomistic  terms that are composed into the assertions in the sentences 
below.)

:  My assertion is that syllogisms about the graphic connections among  
>  "  the fragments of the sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign in the 
> formal logic of the species of sin-signs.).”  (2)
> 

may require a substantial numbers of mathematical calculations to connect the 
measurements determining the icons (4) to the rhema.(7)

Of course, these numerous calculations would require knowledge of the chemical 
table of elements and numerous facts that are part of the epistemology and 
ontology of the chemical sciences.(quali-signs (1)) 

The term “index” (5) in the trichotomy can be construed as a collection of 
arithmetic mathematical operations associated with the atomic numbers as well 
lists of attributes of matter associated with the mathematical operations on 
thermodynamic parameters, such as the gas laws. 

These indices are necessary to inform the dicisigns(8) that are components of 
arguments(9) that generate the scientific symbols (6) expressed in the 
semantics of the legi-signs (3).  

In modern logical terms, the trichotomy forms a semantic base upon which rests 
the implicative structure of a family of facts that connect mathematical, 
physical and chemical facts of the vincula.

In this regard, to 'transition out of mathematics’ infers, from the perception 
chemical signs, transitioning out of Peirce. 

Cheers

Jerry 





> On Aug 15, 2021, at 12:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list
> 
> That's an interesting comparison.
> 
> So- if the first view is "closely associated with the methodology of 
> mathematics."- then, doesn't this suggest, if we are following the strictures 
> of De Tienne, that we should be seeking to 'transition out of mathematics'!!! 
>  Is this 'allowed' on this List?
> 
> [and yes, I agree with you that we should preserve "  the fragments of the 
> sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign in the formal logic of the 
> species of sin-signs.)."
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun 15/08/21 12:16 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com 
> sent:
> 
> List:
> 
>> On Aug 15, 2021, at 10:06 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote:
>> 
>> Now - what is the point of the first view, other than a taxonomic focus on 
>> terms - and what is the point of the second view - which to me at least, 
>> seems to be to examine that 'general rule' as it articulates itself within 
>> the individual instantiations of the Real World’.
> 
> A very simple and direct response can be given to this question from the 
> dictionary of CSP’s (unrelenting!) terminology. 
> 
> The second view differs from first in the sense of C P Snow’s two cultures 
> (1958).
> 
> The first view is closely associated with the methodology of mathematics

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Jerry, list

I like your outline of the nine terms and the graphic connections.
I'm not a chemist and your outline is 'packed' with meaning, but, I
agree with your conclusion, that " to 'transition out of
mathematics’ infers, from the perception chemical signs,
transitioning out of Peirce. "

Edwina
 On Mon 16/08/21  8:51 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent:
 List, Edwina:
 First, Edwina, I will not answer directly your question about
allowances on this list.In my experiences here on this list, I fear
for my freedom to continue to express my analysis of the ontology and
epistemology of the chemical sciences.   
 As for the connections between the trichotomy (the nine terms that
CSP used to express his feelings about the connections between
mathematics and chemistry as well as an unrestricted number of other
disciplines), it appears to me that CSP was clear about the nature of
his beliefs about assertions (5.269-70).
   A valid inference is either complete or incomplete.  An incomplete
inference is one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not
contained in the premisses. This implied fact might have been stated
as a premiss, and its relation to the conclusion is the same whether
it is explicitly posited or not, since it is at least virtually taken
for granted; so that every valid incomplete argument is virtually
complete. Complete arguments are divided into  simple and complex. A
complex argument is one which from three or more premisses concludes
what might have been concluded by successive steps in  (W2.215)
reasonings each of which is simple. Thus, a complex inference comes
to the same thing in the end as a succession of simple inferences.
(CP5.270)  A complete, simple, and valid argument, or syllogism,
is either apodictic  or probable. An apodictic or deductive syllogism
is one whose validity depends unconditionally upon the relation of the
fact inferred to the facts posited in the premisses. A syllogism whose
validity should depend not merely upon its premisses, but upon the
existence of some other knowledge, would be impossible; for either
this other knowledge would be posited, in which case it would be a
part of the premisses, or it would be implicitly assumed, in which
case the inference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose
validity depends partly upon the  non-existence of some other
knowledge, is a probable  syllogism.
 ( In order to facilitate a reading of the basis for existential
graphs, I have placed a number in brackets for each of the nine 
“simple” “incomplete” trichotomistic  terms that are composed
into the assertions in the sentences below.) 
 :  My assertion is that syllogisms about the graphic connections
among  

 "  the fragments of the sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical
Legi-sign in the formal logic of the species of sin-signs.).” 
(2)may require a substantial numbers of mathematical calculations to
connect the measurements determining the icons (4) to the rhema.(7) 
 Of course, these numerous calculations would require knowledge of
the chemical table of elements and numerous facts that are part of
the epistemology and ontology of the chemical sciences.(quali-signs
(1)) 
 The term “index” (5) in the trichotomy can be construed as a
collection of arithmetic mathematical operations associated with the
atomic numbers as well lists of attributes of matter associated with
the mathematical operations on thermodynamic parameters, such as the
gas laws.  
 These indices are necessary to inform the dicisigns(8) that are
components of arguments(9) that generate the scientific symbols (6)
expressed in the semantics of the legi-signs (3).  
 In modern logical terms, the trichotomy forms a semantic base upon
which rests the implicative structure of a family of facts that
connect mathematical, physical and chemical facts of the vincula. 
 In this regard, to 'transition out of mathematics’ infers, from
the perception chemical signs, transitioning out of Peirce. 
 Cheers
 Jerry 
  On Aug 15, 2021, at 12:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry, list

That's an interesting comparison.

So- if the first view is "closely associated with the methodology of
mathematics."- then, doesn't this suggest, if we are following the
strictures of De Tienne, that we should be seeking to 'transition out
of mathematics'!!!  Is this 'allowed' on this List? 

[and yes, I agree with you that we should preserve "  the fragments
of the sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign in the formal
logic of the species of sin-signs.)."

Edwina
 On Sun 15/08/21 12:16 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com [2] sent:
 List:
 On Aug 15, 2021, at 10:06 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 Now - what is the point of the first view, other than a taxonomic
focus on terms - and what is the point of the second view - which to
me at least, seems to be to examine that 'general rule' as it
articulates itself within the indiv

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Robert Marty
In English :
Where do you get this position of power on this list that allows you to
choose very biased ADT slides, to supposedly put them up for debate, to set
yourself up as a vigilante when participants argue disagreements and to
pass judgement on them? Edwina has long experienced this and I myself have
been called a post-Peircian! Mind you, maybe I should take it as a
compliment! 😊

Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:54, Robert Marty  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :
>
>> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about
>> the “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong.
>> Indeed you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in
>> your philosophy of language.
>>
>> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
>> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
>> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
>> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
>> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
>> references to their authors.
>>
>> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
>> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
>> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
>> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>>
>> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
>> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
>> less.’
>>
>> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so
>> many different things.’
>>
>> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
>> all.’
>>
>> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
>> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
>> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
>> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
>> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
>> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
>> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>>
>> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
>> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
>> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
>> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
>> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
>> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
>> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
>> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7:
>> Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca)
>> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>). And as you say, any attempt
>> to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant in his reference to a
>> “process of thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked
>> out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to
>> failure.
>>
>> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
>> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
>> than to anyone else’s?
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F. ,
>>
> d'où tenez vous sur cette liste cette position de pouvoir sur qui vous
> permet de choisir des slides de ADT très tendancieux , de les mettre
> soi-disant en débat, de vous ériger en justicier lorsque des participants
> argumentent des désaccords et de porter des jugements sur eux ? Edwina en a
> fait depuis longtemps l'expérience et moi-même je me suis vu traité de post
> peircien ! Remarquez que je dois peut-être le prendre comme un comp
>
>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> *On Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
>> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F., list
>>
>> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>>
>> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
>> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>>
>> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
>> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Robert Marty
Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :

> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the
> “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed
> you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your
> philosophy of language.
>
> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
> references to their authors.
>
> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>
> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
> less.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so many
> different things.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
> all.’
>
> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>
> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience
> and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>).
> And as you say, any attempt to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant
> in his reference to a “process of thought” by which the elements of
> experience “must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
> scatter” is doomed to failure.
>
> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
> than to anyone else’s?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> Gary F. ,
>
d'où tenez vous sur cette liste cette position de pouvoir sur qui vous
permet de choisir des slides de ADT très tendancieux , de les mettre
soi-disant en débat, de vous ériger en justicier lorsque des participants
argumentent des désaccords et de porter des jugements sur eux ? Edwina en a
fait depuis longtemps l'expérience et moi-même je me suis vu traité de post
peircien ! Remarquez que je dois peut-être le prendre comme un comp

> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>
>
>
> Gary F., list
>
> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>
> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>
> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father.
> Surely we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas
> on what he called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.
>
> GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the *dynamic
> object* of that sign — *is what it is* independently of anything Peirce
> said about it. Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or
> “synechism”? I find this a very odd way of using technical terms,
> especially those invented by an expert lexicographer like Peirce.
>
> After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,”
> and finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter
> name change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that *type*
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Robert Marty
Gary F,
Soyez persuadé que je ne cesserai pas de lut

Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :

> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the
> “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed
> you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your
> philosophy of language.
>
> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
> references to their authors.
>
> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>
> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
> less.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so many
> different things.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
> all.’
>
> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>
> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience
> and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>).
> And as you say, any attempt to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant
> in his reference to a “process of thought” by which the elements of
> experience “must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
> scatter” is doomed to failure.
>
> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
> than to anyone else’s?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>
>
>
> Gary F., list
>
> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>
> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>
> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father.
> Surely we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas
> on what he called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.
>
> GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the *dynamic
> object* of that sign — *is what it is* independently of anything Peirce
> said about it. Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or
> “synechism”? I find this a very odd way of using technical terms,
> especially those invented by an expert lexicographer like Peirce.
>
> After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,”
> and finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter
> name change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that *type*
> of investigation, and it didn’t seem right to call it “phaneroscopy”
> because that would claim its exact *identity* with what Peirce called by
> that name. So I chose a different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the *Century
> Dictionary* definition of it (Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca)
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm>). There is in fact no definition of
> “phaneroscopy” in eit

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread gnox
Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the 
“dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed you’ve 
shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy 
of language.

BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any language 
except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in formal 
languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in scientific 
exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the usual necessary 
reference to its inventor as well as definitions and references to their 
authors.

GF: What’s missing from this account is the denotation of the word, as opposed 
(by Peirce) to its signification. I think this approach to language use is very 
concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of dialogue from Lewis Carroll:

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's all.’

GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters on 
this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an “arena” (his 
word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are typecast as either 
allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends not on what has been said 
but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have been assigned to. Indeed this 
pattern seems to be taking over most public discourse these days, so the Peirce 
list is not unusual in this respect.

The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol which is 
all signification and no denotation is a symbol devoid of information, as the 
“logical product” defined by the formula Breadth × Depth = Information (Peirce, 
W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth) of a term is zero, the product 
(information) is also zero. In other words, you can’t get information from a 
symbol that lacks indexicality. Of course, as Peirce pointed out, words in 
themselves (other than proper names and pronouns) are quite poor in 
indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) 
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob> ). And as you say, any attempt to 
convey experientially what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process of 
thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked out of the 
fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to failure.

But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay any 
more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy) than to 
anyone else’s?

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 16-Aug-21 05:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Gary F., list

Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  a écrit :

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but 
unfortunately I don’t have that ability.

BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the dynamic object 
of that sign — is what it is independently of anything Peirce said about it. 
Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or “synechism”? I find this a 
very odd way of using technical terms, especially those invented by an expert 
lexicographer like Peirce. 

After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,” and 
finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter name 
change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that type of 
investigation, and it didn’t seem right to call it “phaneroscopy” because that 
would claim its exact identity with what Peirce called by that name. So I chose 
a different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the Century Dictionary definition of it 
(Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca) 
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm> ). There is in fact no definition of 
“phaneroscopy” in either the Century Dictionary or the current Oxford English 
Dictionary, which indicates to me that it is indeed a technical term of 
philosophy, defined by its inventor, rather than a standard English term. Maybe 
in French you treat such terms differently, but in English I think we are bound 
to use it, if at all, as a technical term that is not independent of Peirce’s 
usage of it. We are of course free to disagree with Peirce’s “ethics of 
terminology” on this point, I’m just giving my ow

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

2021-08-16 Thread Bernard Morand

Gary F., list

Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :


Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in 
French, but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.


BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are 
attaching to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not 
God the Father. Surely we have to refer to his rights as first 
inventor but then, our ideas on what he called phaneroscopy can / have 
to be freely expressed and spread.


GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the 
/dynamic object/ of that sign — /is what it is/ independently of 
anything Peirce said about it. Would you also say that about 
“pragmaticism,” or “synechism”? I find this a very odd way of using 
technical terms, especially those invented by an expert lexicographer 
like Peirce.


After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then 
“phenomenology,” and finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit 
reasons for the latter name change, I decided to venture forth on my 
own practice of that /type/ of investigation, and it didn’t seem right 
to call it “phaneroscopy” because that would claim its exact 
/identity/ with what Peirce called by that name. So I chose a 
different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the /Century Dictionary/ 
definition of it (Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca) 
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm>). There is in fact no definition 
of “phaneroscopy” in either the /Century Dictionary/ or the current 
/Oxford English Dictionary/, which indicates to me that it is indeed a 
technical term of philosophy, defined by its inventor, rather than a 
standard English term. Maybe in French you treat such terms 
differently, but in English I think we are bound to use it, if at all, 
as a technical term that is /not/ independent of Peirce’s usage of it. 
We are of course free to disagree with Peirce’s “ethics of 
terminology” on this point, I’m just giving my own reasons for 
agreeing with it.


To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any 
language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also 
in formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in 
scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then 
the usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and 
references to their authors.


I notice you didn’t comment on the “Macbeth” scenario I offered as a 
possible example of what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process 
of thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked out of 
the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter.” Since you are, as 
you said, primarily interested in the /practice/ of phaneroscopy, I’d 
like to know (in more concrete terms) how you interpret Peirce’s 
statement about that.


Yes I was embarassed by your example built from scratch. To be of 
service as experiment of something, an example need to be squared with a 
precise protocol the aim of which is to prevent the observer to 
intervene into what there is to observe. To make it short: an example 
proves nothing, at best it may "illustrate".


The "process of thought" in Peirce terms is a continuous flow of 
thoughts which can't be stopped on demand in order to examine it. This 
is at least what the passage you are quoting reminds me: examinations of 
thoughts requires scattering them with reason. Remember the well known 
assertion: "Thoughts are not in us but we are in thoughts" 
(approximation from my memory).


Regards

Bernard


Gary f.

*From:*peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
 *On Behalf Of *Bernard Morand

*Sent:* 14-Aug-21 09:35
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

Gary F, list

Le 13/08/2021 à 15:41, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
a écrit :


Bernard, list,

BM: I have no definitive opinion on the validy of this later
arrangement but I note that 1) hierarchical structures emblematic
of the gender / species distinction can be superseded by network
structures …

GF: I assume you mean /genera/species distinction/, and yes, we do
need to pay more attention to network structures than Peirce did.
I have no personal interest in the Comtean classification of
sciences, but it is so deeply intertwined with Peirce’s definition
of phaneroscopy that we can’t ignore it when we focus on that
subject. And if we’re going to develop our practice of
/phaneroscopy/, it’s /Peirce’s/ phaneroscopy that we have to focus
on, because it was Peirce who originated and named this “science”
(which is /not/ the case with /mathematics/). So it’s /his/ verbal
definitions and /his/ descriptions of the practice of it that we
have to take as “given,” not our own ideas (or even Peirce’s
ideas) about mathematics or logic.

Apologies for the confusion about gender, a trap installed by 

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