Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jerry R.:

My concern was the nature of infinity relative to the nature of theology.

Is it possible you mis-undeerstood my intended meaning?

Cheers

jerry c



> On Feb 16, 2017, at 2:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> Jerry C, Stephen, list:
> 
>  
> When you ask such questions:
> 
> “If triadic thinking is infinitely superior to binary thinking.
> 
> should tetradic thinking be infinitely superior to “triadic" thinking.
> 
> and should pentadic thinking be infinitely superior to tetradic thinking?”
> 
>  
> in response to Stephen’s assertion that:
> 
> “more imperative than ever that a way be found to make the triadic mode more 
> understandable and to say why it is infinitely superior to binary thinking. 
> Without it we perish. This is NOT an academic matter,”
> 
>  
> you are taking the problem to the clowns.  That is, the preamble for why 
> three and not two or four or five or myriad creatures have been addressed 
> many times over.  That is, you are rubbing out the work of great men who have 
> urged a specific course of action.  You do this, in spite of your clear 
> awareness of Peirce’s work and why three (cf., Letter to Lady Welby). 
> 
>  
> Therefore, I must think that you do this not out of immorality but because 
> you want to bring attention to a particular matter. 
> 
>  
> So, why three?  Why not because there are three parts to the soul?  Why not 
> because a syllogism requires three and only three terms?  Why not because an 
> enthymeme utilizes the structure of syllogism and its quality is judged by 
> the artfulness by which an audience is engaged to fill in the incompleteness? 
> 
>  
> Or, rather simply, why not CP 5.189? 
> 
>  
> “The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it 
> is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great.
> 
>  
> So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always 
> attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are 
> possessed by one person alone-these last are more readily remembered than 
> others.” ~Aristotle, Rhetoric
> 
>  
> “But I seem to myself to be the sole depository at present of the completely 
> developed system, which all hangs together and cannot receive any proper 
> presentation in fragments.” ~ Peirce, Letter to William James
> 
>  
> 
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
> 
> 
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Steven, List :
> 
>> On Feb 10, 2017, at 8:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose > > wrote:
>> 
>> Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make the 
>> triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely superior to 
>> binary thinking. Without it we perish. This is NOT an academic matter.
> 
> I would contradict your conclusion.
> 
> My logic is relatively simple:
> 
> Transitivity of meaning is intrinsic to the ordering of the terms.
> If triadic thinking is
> 
>> infinitely superior to binary thinking.
> 
> should tetradic thinking be 
>> infinitely superior to “triadic" thinking.
> and should pentadic thinking be
>> infinitely superior to tetradic thinking?.
> 
> Ben has explored the tetradic  pathways of thinking.
> I have found it enormously useful to explore the pentadic pathways of 
> thinking.
> And, occacionally septiadic (7) pathways of speculation.
> 
> The deeper question is, 
> When is the fullness of the thought expressible in logic terms such that 
> inference can be made?
> 
> From your perspectives,
> do any thoughts exist that can not be expressed in three terms?
> 
> The question is, did CSP basically argue that any logical conclusion required 
> three sentences?
> Or, did CSP basically argue that any logical conclusion required three 
> connected terms?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Steven, List :

> On Feb 10, 2017, at 8:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make the 
> triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely superior to 
> binary thinking. Without it we perish. This is NOT an academic matter.

I would contradict your conclusion.

My logic is relatively simple:

Transitivity of meaning is intrinsic to the ordering of the terms.
If triadic thinking is

> infinitely superior to binary thinking.

should tetradic thinking be 
> infinitely superior to “triadic" thinking.
and should pentadic thinking be
> infinitely superior to tetradic thinking?.

Ben has explored the tetradic  pathways of thinking.
I have found it enormously useful to explore the pentadic pathways of thinking.
And, occacionally septiadic (7) pathways of speculation.

The deeper question is, 
When is the fullness of the thought expressible in logic terms such that 
inference can be made?

From your perspectives,
do any thoughts exist that can not be expressed in three terms?

The question is, did CSP basically argue that any logical conclusion required 
three sentences?
Or, did CSP basically argue that any logical conclusion required three 
connected terms?

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

Saying reality is all does not mean everything is real. A unicorn is real
only because of the role he or she plays in reality. Reality has no borders
-- it is everything. Without an everything to designate with a word we are
prey to binary or dualistic thinking which might be fine for some things
but not for reaching ethical judgments and particularly not for actions
that require years to develop and implement. A Trump lie is very real
though it may be merely air and false and have no real object.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> Right, that ambiguity surfaces in the two sentences that I initially
> mentioned a few days ago.
>
>- A unicorn has one horn.
>- Unicorns are real.
>
> The object of "unicorn" in the first sentence is the *idea *of a unicorn,
> and that is what makes it true, along with the fact that a universal
> proposition does not assert the *existence *of anything.  The object of
> "unicorns" in the second sentence is the collection of *actual *animals
> that are unicorns, and that is what makes it false.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
>> calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
>> *exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the
>> speaker and his/her auditor.
>>
>>
>> This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say
>> “phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the
>> phoenix (and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is
>> false and thus has no referent).
>>
>> The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I
>> refer to the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea
>> of them since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since
>> the indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of
>> icons or indices or gesture to indicate indexically.
>>
>> I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because
>> our words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.
>> By simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems
>> disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s
>> always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object
>> and interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle
>> functions.
>>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

Right, that ambiguity surfaces in the two sentences that I initially
mentioned a few days ago.

   - A unicorn has one horn.
   - Unicorns are real.

The object of "unicorn" in the first sentence is the *idea *of a unicorn,
and that is what makes it true, along with the fact that a universal
proposition does not assert the *existence *of anything.  The object of
"unicorns" in the second sentence is the collection of *actual *animals
that are unicorns, and that is what makes it false.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
> calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
> *exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the
> speaker and his/her auditor.
>
>
> This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say
> “phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the
> phoenix (and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is
> false and thus has no referent).
>
> The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I
> refer to the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea
> of them since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since
> the indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of
> icons or indices or gesture to indicate indexically.
>
> I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because
> our words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.
> By simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems
> disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s
> always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object
> and interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle
> functions.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that 
> calls up the idea of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really exists, 
> real descriptions of the unicorn are well known to the speaker and his/her 
> auditor.

This is why I said I thought things depend upon equivocation. When we say 
“phoenix” it’s not clear if we’re intending to refer to the idea of the phoenix 
(and thus a real general) or the phoenix in the world (which is false and thus 
has no referent).

The question is what type of object we’re referring to. Of course if I refer to 
the existing object of say “trucks” I’m also referring to the idea of them 
since that is partially how I refer. I refer by giving hints since the 
indexical link can’t be directly shared. Instead I share replicants of icons or 
indices or gesture to indicate indexically. 

I’m of the opinion much of this is an artifact of language simply because our 
words are often ambiguous regarding the sense in which we intend them.  By 
simply making clear how we intend to use a word a lot of the problems 
disappear. I wouldn’t go so far as to say all of them do of course. There’s 
always that gap between dynamic and immediate object and immediate object and 
interpretant. Not to mention ambiguity over how the sign-vehicle functions.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Ben, Clark, List:

Peirce's comments about the phoenix do indeed seem relevant to the unicorn
example and the nature of labels in general.

CSP:  A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica
calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or
dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a General Concept. In this it differs from other
Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns, including those which are Replicas of Rhematic
Indexical Legisigns. Thus, the demonstrative pronoun "that" is a Legisign,
being a general type; but it is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a
general concept. Its Replica draws attention to a single Object, and is a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of
camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes,
even if this one is not individually known to the auditor; and it is
through such real connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a
camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For although no
phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to
the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the
Object denoted. (CP 2.261; 1903)


A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that
calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really
*exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the speaker
and his/her auditor.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Clark, list,
>
> I haven't read very much on the problem of reference and generality with
> respect to fictional characters, so I'm reluctant to say that it usually
> comes down to equivocation over terms. Also I have in mind Peirce's
> comment, I don't remember where, that the object determines the sign, even
> when the sign in some sense brings the object into being (as with fictional
> characters). There seems there something more in the problematics than a
> routine equivocation problem. So I'm feeling cautious on the subject.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 2/14/2017 12:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>>
>>> You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think
>>> most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."
>>>
>>> Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the
>>> particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting kind
>>> of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is okay,
>>> sinking is not so good.)
>>>
>>> I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with
>> respect to fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an opinion
>> on? As I said I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution here. Although
>> that too has some oddities in how Peirce applied it. (Thinking here of his
>> example of the Phoenix)
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

I haven't read very much on the problem of reference and generality with 
respect to fictional characters, so I'm reluctant to say that it usually 
comes down to equivocation over terms. Also I have in mind Peirce's 
comment, I don't remember where, that the object determines the sign, 
even when the sign in some sense brings the object into being (as with 
fictional characters). There seems there something more in the 
problematics than a routine equivocation problem. So I'm feeling 
cautious on the subject.


Best, Ben

On 2/14/2017 12:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think 
most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."


Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in 
the particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes 
tempting kind of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. 
(Diving is okay, sinking is not so good.)


I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with 
respect to fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an 
opinion on? As I said I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution 
here. Although that too has some oddities in how Peirce applied it. 
(Thinking here of his example of the Phoenix)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

Yes, the different kinds of universe of discourse is indeed a "tricky 
bit" as you put it. If the sign's object is ultimately the universe of 
which the special object is a member, or part, then is there any reason 
for the sign not to be the universe of signs of which the special sign 
is a member or part?


I guess that as a practical matter a given universe of signs would be a 
system of signs shared by utterer and interpreter. But how would it be 
picked out? A universe of objects is indicated, if not by an index in a 
proposition itself, still by an index in the environment, said Peirce. 
Then there is also the universe of marks a.k.a. characters. I guess 
various universes or systems of signs would be reduced versions of 
Peirce's third universe of experience. What about a univese of 
interpretants? Would this just be a universe of signs in a different 
relation? At least sometimes it could be a different system of signs. In 
"A Neglected Argument..." Peirce says, "The third Universe comprises 
everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections 
between different objects, especially between objects in different 
Universes."


You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think 
most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."


Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the 
particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting 
kind of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is 
okay, sinking is not so good.)


On 2/13/2017 6:54 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

On Feb 11, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


On the sign's object as ultimately the universe of discourse of the 
(more explicit) object, I was discussing Peirce's view.


1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:492 
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-william-james-6


A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
(i.e., specialized, _/bestimmt/_) by something other than itself,
called its Object (or, in some cases, as if the Sign be the
sentence “Cain killled Abel,” in which Cain and Abel are equally
Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that that which
determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial
Objects. And in every case the Object is accurately the Universe
of which the Special Object is member, or part), while, on the
other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the
determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the
Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately
by the Object.
[End quote]

For example, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto, 
but not only about Pluto.


This gets at the importance of a kind of holism for Peirce that 
surprisingly doesn’t get remarked upon as much as Quine’s. (Even 
though people pointed out the parallel to Quine who then wrote a paper 
about his ignorance of Peirce)


The tricky bit is really the different types of universes of 
discourses. We talked about that just a few weeks ago so I’ll not 
bring it up again. But I completely agree with you that we can’t 
really separate out the type of generality and reality without talking 
about these universes. Like you I tend to think most of the debate on 
all this depends upon equivocation over terms. That’s why the 
pragmatic maxim comes in handy as it cuts confusion between say an 
unicorn of a novel’s fictional world from an unicorn in the regular 
world by asking how we’d measure it.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Benjamin Udell]

Mike, list,

You wrote,

   I think this does place Horace before Descartes.

I can't beat that. If somebody says it's a bad pun, I say /the worse, 
the better/.  Even Jon Awbrey ought to be impressed. You wouldn't 
believe the elaborate puns he used to do here, only problem was that one 
needed to be pretty familiar with physicists' names and old American 
animated cartoons and the like in order to get them.  I think many 
didn't even realize what he was up to.


I think that you do get the ideas that I was trying to convey. There's 
just to be careful to avoid making it sound like the real depends on our 
particular opinions, though it does depend on representability in 
general, because that's part of what it is. I feel kind of weird, a 
semi-Peircean laying down the Peircean line. I feel like I ought to 
suggest or discern fruitful lines for further discussion rather than 
just "setting people straight". I've a notion that the general and the 
relations among experiences are "more" real in a Peircean sense than the 
individual, subjective perspective, but I don't know whether I'll end up 
saying anything definite about it. Joe Ransdell, who founded and long 
managed and moderated peirce-l, was good at going beyond "correcting". 
Ah well, I have to say something because I've gotten too delayed on this.


Best, Ben

On 2/11/2017 2:43 PM, Mike Bergman wrote:


Hi Ben, List,

Thanks for the thought and effort you put into this response. Your 
argument makes sense to me and is consistent with what else I know. I 
will definitely keep this response, which clears up many confusions 
that I had a part in this thread in perpetuating.


This argument, your argument summarizing your understanding of Peirce, 
strikes me as a likely true proposition and therefore real. The 
implication of the argument is that a something which is logical and 
not known to be false may be real. A unicorn or unicorns in general 
are not real. (The thought of a unicorn is real, but what is real is 
the thought, not the unicorn.) However, were we to encounter a unicorn 
in the woods, that would be a surprising fact that would cause us to 
re-assess that reality.


Another implication is that any supposition understood as logical with 
what else we know to be true for which we have no falsifying evidence 
is (may be) also real. I presume, prior to testing, that any 
legitimate abductive hypothesis would also be real (or should be, else 
we pose a false hypothesis). Testing may surface new falsities, which 
would cause cause the hypothesis to be rejected and then seen as not real.


Still another implication seems to be that reality should be treated 
in a similar way to how Peirce handles truth. That is, as limit 
functions; we may never be able to have absolute confidence. Only 
falsity or errors in logic can render something as not real, though 
our confidence in actual reality is dependent on the preponderance of 
evidence.


Do those implications sound about right?

So, I am satisfied that your argument fits within my understanding of 
fallibilism and Peirce's emphasis on the scientific method. Thanks for 
helping to clarify my thinking! I think this does place Horace before 
Descartes.


Best, Mike

On 2/11/2017 12:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Mike, list,

I think that you're putting the cart before the unicorn. The idea of 
the unreal a.k.a. fictitious in Peirce begins as the idea of the 
object of a false proposition, an idea rooted, for Peirce, not in 
ontology but in logic and its presuppositions, to which ontology is 
posterior. There are true general propositions if and only if there 
are real generals. There are false general propositions if and only 
if there are fictitious, a.k.a. unreal, generals. If there were no 
false general propositions, then science would have little if any 
purpose, since it would be unable to err about generals even if it 
wanted to. No more proofs by reduction to absurdity. The object of a 
sign is ultimately the universe of discourse of said object. If it is 
false that there has existed a unicorn, then a universe of discourse 
in which there has existed a unicorn is an unreal, fictitious 
universe of discourse. For Peirce, logic and reason presuppose that, 
for a proposition to be true, it must not depend on what we think of 
it, likewise for its object to be real, it must not depend on what we 
think of it; for it to be real, it must also be cognizable, such that 
sufficient inquiry would find it inevitably, sooner or later. The 
presuppositions of fallibilism and cognizabilism are both needed in 
order to keep the way of inquiry unbarred.


After that, we can bring all kinds of nuances in, e.g., a universe of 
discourse that is at least a coarse-grained version of our actual 
world in the vast majority of respects, except in containing a 
unicorn. People could argue about whether a unicorn's evolution is 
feasible or probable. If it were significantly feasible or probable, 
we could say 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[John Collier]

Stephen, if you change the definitions (I specifically used the Catholic case), 
then you can say whatever you want. I have no idea what you are talking about 
with square circles. I had a sculpturist student once who thought he could 
square the circle. Under the usual assumptions of what this means it is 
logically impossible.

My point was exactly that the interpretants matter. You have actually confirmed 
my point here that real and unreal are not binaries in their essence.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 11 February 2017 5:11 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI 
perspective

A square circle is real in many possible ways. Evil is not absence it is 
tangible harm mental or physical and its ethical status depends on whether it 
is consciously intended. Evil does ultimately vanish as we conscious sorts over 
time leech it out of ourselves either here or beyond if there is a beyond which 
makes sense mainly in terms of the  possibility that a review of our lives here 
might induce some repentance and reformation.Nothing I have said is in 
disagreement I think with either Peirce or Wittgenstein who seem to me together 
to be the sentinels at the gare of the natural sconce's primacy in validating 
anything that is not presupposition. In Wittgenstein's terms I talk nonsense. 
Though I do not think calling a circle square is supposition.  Cheers, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose<http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose>

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 9:57 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Square circles aren’t real, and there are some much more subtle cases involving 
failure of reference. I am sure you know that evil is regarded by the Catholic 
Church as an absence, I suppose this could be real, but considered as a 
positive force it would not be real.

I don’t think the logic is binary. The interpretant matters in such cases. 
Where there is none, there is no reality, so thirdness is essential to reality 
and for distinguishing it.

Regards,
John

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com<mailto:stever...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Friday, 10 February 2017 1:04 PM
To: Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>; Jon 
Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI 
perspective

A distinction between real and anything is to me a binary notion which may be 
useful but is ultimately confusing. To say that everything is real is to say 
that reality is the whole kahuna of everything within which there is good and 
evil, falsity and truth, and so forth. I know that Peirce makes distinctions 
but I think the entire tendency of his thinking tends toward the result of 
thinking when it deems reality as being all. S  Best. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose<http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose>

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:59 PM, Mike Bergman 
<m...@mkbergman.com<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote:

Hi Jon,

Thanks for commenting. Please see below:
On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:

I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and found 
them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My first 
introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that used it to 
identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking, which appealed 
to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also because I have long 
desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way of thinking that we 
engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of articles on "The Logic of 
Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final installment (Part 4, "Beyond 
Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next month.

However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your last 
message.

MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of concepts 
to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also take the 
fictional to be real, but not actual.

While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being 
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually 
thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not that 
all generals are real, only that some of them are.

CSP:  Consequently, some ge

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

A square circle is real in many possible ways. Evil is not absence it is
tangible harm mental or physical and its ethical status depends on whether
it is consciously intended. Evil does ultimately vanish as we conscious
sorts over time leech it out of ourselves either here or beyond if there is
a beyond which makes sense mainly in terms of the  possibility that a
review of our lives here might induce some repentance and
reformation.Nothing I have said is in disagreement I think with either
Peirce or Wittgenstein who seem to me together to be the sentinels at the
gare of the natural sconce's primacy in validating anything that is not
presupposition. In Wittgenstein's terms I talk nonsense. Though I do not
think calling a circle square is supposition.  Cheers, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 9:57 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> Square circles aren’t real, and there are some much more subtle cases
> involving failure of reference. I am sure you know that evil is regarded by
> the Catholic Church as an absence, I suppose this could be real, but
> considered as a positive force it would not be real.
>
>
>
> I don’t think the logic is binary. The interpretant matters in such cases.
> Where there is none, there is no reality, so thirdness is essential to
> reality and for distinguishing it.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, 10 February 2017 1:04 PM
> *To:* Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset"
> from AI perspective
>
>
>
> A distinction between real and anything is to me a binary notion which may
> be useful but is ultimately confusing. To say that everything is real is to
> say that reality is the whole kahuna of everything within which there is
> good and evil, falsity and truth, and so forth. I know that Peirce makes
> distinctions but I think the entire tendency of his thinking tends toward
> the result of thinking when it deems reality as being all. S  Best. S
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:59 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Jon,
>
> Thanks for commenting. Please see below:
>
> On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Mike, List:
>
>
>
> I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and
> found them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My
> first introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that
> used it to identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking,
> which appealed to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also
> because I have long desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way
> of thinking that we engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of
> articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final
> installment (Part 4, "Beyond Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next
> month.
>
>
>
> However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your
> last message.
>
>
>
> MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of
> concepts to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also
> take the fictional to be real, but not actual.
>
>
>
> While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being
> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
> thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not
> that *all *generals are real, only that *some *of them are.
>
>
>
> CSP:  Consequently, *some *general objects are real. (Of course, nobody
> ever thought that *all* generals were real; but the scholastics used to
> assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no,
> experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay just
> there, and not in holding that generals could be real.) (CP 5.430; 1905)
>
>
> Good point, and thanks for this reference. However, I have to say, I'm not
> sure I either understand or agree with why some generals are real while
> others are not. As best as I can tell, Peirce maintains that certain
> (undefined or unspecified) opinions are the ones that are not real. That
> strikes me as arbitrary, and an argument of degree not kind. My thinking
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

Everything is real including unreality, fiction, laundry bags, ideas,
muses, thoughts, coughs. There is nothing that is not real. At some point
maybe I will go through Peirce and see if I can find the premises that back
this up. Of course I will find his binary use of the term but I cannot
believe his Scholastic thinking did not go beyond the equation of real with
ideal to the equation of real with what can be felt and sensed and thought
about and loved and so forth and so on.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Mike, List:
>
> I suspect that the questions of whether all generals are real and whether
> the fictional is real are connected.  If some generals are fictional, and
> nothing fictional is real, then some generals are not real.  As an example,
> "unicorn" is a general term for something that is fictional, and most
> people would probably say that "a unicorn has one horn" is a true
> proposition.  Does this mean that unicorns are real?  Most people would
> presumably deny this.
>
> I keep coming back to Peirce's definitions of "real" and "fictive" that I
> quoted previously.  The distinction is whether the characters of the object
> in question depend on what a person or finite group of people thinks about
> them.  A unicorn has one horn only because people have agreed to this as
> part of the definition for a certain kind of imaginary (i.e., non-existent)
> thing.  By contrast, an Indian rhinoceros has one horn regardless of what
> anyone thinks about it.  People having thoughts about unicorns does not
> make them real, and the Indian rhinoceros would be real even if no one ever
> actually had any thoughts about it.
>
> As for fallibility, our current inability to be absolutely certain about
> the reality of something has no bearing on whether it is, in fact, real.
>
> Thanks for the additional comments on indexicals; again, interesting stuff!
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>> Thanks for commenting. Please see below:
>> On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>
>> Mike, List:
>>
>> I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and
>> found them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My
>> first introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that
>> used it to identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking,
>> which appealed to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also
>> because I have long desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way
>> of thinking that we engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of
>> articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final
>> installment (Part 4, "Beyond Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next
>> month.
>>
>> However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your
>> last message.
>>
>> MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of
>> concepts to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also
>> take the fictional to be real, but not actual.
>>
>>
>> While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being
>> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
>> thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not
>> that *all *generals are real, only that *some *of them are.
>>
>> CSP:  Consequently, *some *general objects are real. (Of course, nobody
>> ever thought that *all* generals were real; but the scholastics used to
>> assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no,
>> experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay just
>> there, and not in holding that generals could be real.) (CP 5.430; 1905)
>>
>> Good point, and thanks for this reference. However, I have to say, I'm
>> not sure I either understand or agree with why some generals are real while
>> others are not. As best as I can tell, Peirce maintains that certain
>> (undefined or unspecified) opinions are the ones that are not real. That
>> strikes me as arbitrary, and an argument of degree not kind. My thinking
>> has been that all thoughts, once thought, become instantiated and thus
>> real. Types, which Peirce described as subjective generalities, I think he
>> considers to be real. Are you aware of any better bright lines that Peirce
>> offers for when some generals are not real?
>>
>> My logic is that anything that can be conceived becomes real once thought
>> of or considered, including how we naturally class individual particulars
>> into types. All thoughts have characters. I understand the arguments Peirce
>> makes for why *some* (his qualifier) generals are real, but I don't see
>> where the converse gets argued (that is, that some generals are not real)
>> and why.
>>
>> I also have a hard time squaring the assertion that some generals are 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon,
Not to carry this thread beyond some useful threshold, see below:

On 2/10/2017 7:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
  wrote:


  Mike, List:


I suspect that the questions of whether all generals are
  real and whether the fictional is real are connected.  If some
  generals are fictional, and nothing fictional is real, then
  some generals are not real.  As an example, "unicorn" is a
  general term for something that is fictional, and most people
  would probably say that "a unicorn has one horn" is a true
  proposition.  Does this mean that unicorns are real?  Most
  people would presumably deny this.


I keep coming back to Peirce's definitions of "real" and
  "fictive" that I quoted previously.  The distinction is
  whether the characters of the object in question depend on
  what a person or finite group of people thinks about them.  A
  unicorn has one horn only because people have agreed to this
  as part of the definition for a certain kind of imaginary
  (i.e., non-existent) thing.  By contrast, an Indian rhinoceros
  has one horn regardless of what anyone thinks about it. 
  People having thoughts about unicorns does not make them real,
  and the Indian rhinoceros would be real even if no one ever
  actually had any thoughts about it.
  


Unicorns are the perfect case! We have never actually seen one. But,
we can describe one, perhaps write long, learned articles about
them, render them so their icon is clear, and even discuss them in
this thread. That is real. Now, the character of this unicorn thing
is that it has many characteristics of cloved mammals, but also has
a nasal horn, perhaps twisted, and lives in the forest. And, oh, by
the way, this thing is not actual or has not been known to tangibly
exist. In short, we can call this character either fictive or
imaginary.

The way to break through this understanding is to see the term
"unicorn" as the mere token, or "unicorns" as the type. The "idea of
a unicorn" is real, perhaps in a related way to why the "idea of
gravity" is real. The habitual aspect of gravity may be stronger
than unicorns, but a lot of consensus has gone into deciding what
all of this means. That strikes me as real, and if I asked CSP about
it he would agree, but he would also point out subtleties that I
glaringly missed. I might smile or not in reaction.


  


As for fallibility, our current inability to be absolutely
  certain about the reality of something has no bearing on
  whether it is, in fact, real.
  


Sorry, I probably was not clear. I was bringing up the question of
fallibility in terms of the "some generals are not real"
discussion, not as you refer.

I'm happy to let this thread dye. Thanks for your input!

Mike

  


Thanks for the additional comments on indexicals; again,
  interesting stuff!


Regards,


Jon S.

  
  On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Mike
Bergman 
wrote:

  
Hi Jon,
Thanks for commenting. Please see below:

On
  2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


  Mike, List:


I read your linked article and the earlier one
  that it referenced, and found them very
  interesting, especially the whole notion of
  "mindset."  My first introduction to Peirce's
  thought was a doctoral dissertation that used it
  to identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran
  way of thinking, which appealed to me not only
  because I am a Lutheran myself, but also because I
  have long desired to identify and explicate the
  distinctive way of thinking that we engineers
  employ in doing our jobs.  My series of articles
  on "The Logic of Ingenuity" was the outcome, and
  the final installment (Part 4, "Beyond
  Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next
  month.


However, I disagree with a couple of things
  that you mentioned in your last message.



  MB:  I take ideas 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Mike, List,

Before trying to address metaphysical questions, why not start with some 
semiotic questions. Let's start with two simple conceptions:

1. Quarter Horse
2. Unicorn

What sorts of answers seem to follow if we consider the different kinds of 
relations that hold between objects, signs and interpretants and ask:  in what 
sense are we dealing with a general that is or isn't real in some respect?

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 6:18 PM
To: Mike Bergman
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI 
perspective

Mike, List:

I suspect that the questions of whether all generals are real and whether the 
fictional is real are connected.  If some generals are fictional, and nothing 
fictional is real, then some generals are not real.  As an example, "unicorn" 
is a general term for something that is fictional, and most people would 
probably say that "a unicorn has one horn" is a true proposition.  Does this 
mean that unicorns are real?  Most people would presumably deny this.

I keep coming back to Peirce's definitions of "real" and "fictive" that I 
quoted previously.  The distinction is whether the characters of the object in 
question depend on what a person or finite group of people thinks about them.  
A unicorn has one horn only because people have agreed to this as part of the 
definition for a certain kind of imaginary (i.e., non-existent) thing.  By 
contrast, an Indian rhinoceros has one horn regardless of what anyone thinks 
about it.  People having thoughts about unicorns does not make them real, and 
the Indian rhinoceros would be real even if no one ever actually had any 
thoughts about it.

As for fallibility, our current inability to be absolutely certain about the 
reality of something has no bearing on whether it is, in fact, real.

Thanks for the additional comments on indexicals; again, interesting stuff!

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Mike Bergman 
<m...@mkbergman.com<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote:

Hi Jon,

Thanks for commenting. Please see below:

On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:

I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and found 
them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My first 
introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that used it to 
identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking, which appealed 
to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also because I have long 
desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way of thinking that we 
engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of articles on "The Logic of 
Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final installment (Part 4, "Beyond 
Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next month.

However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your last 
message.

MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of concepts 
to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also take the 
fictional to be real, but not actual.

While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being 
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually 
thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not that 
all generals are real, only that some of them are.
CSP:  Consequently, some general objects are real. (Of course, nobody ever 
thought that all generals were real; but the scholastics used to assume that 
generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no, experiential evidence 
to support their assumption; and their fault lay just there, and not in holding 
that generals could be real.) (CP 5.430; 1905)
Good point, and thanks for this reference. However, I have to say, I'm not sure 
I either understand or agree with why some generals are real while others are 
not. As best as I can tell, Peirce maintains that certain (undefined or 
unspecified) opinions are the ones that are not real. That strikes me as 
arbitrary, and an argument of degree not kind. My thinking has been that all 
thoughts, once thought, become instantiated and thus real. Types, which Peirce 
described as subjective generalities, I think he considers to be real. Are you 
aware of any better bright lines that Peirce offers for when some generals are 
not real?

My logic is that anything that can be conceived becomes real once thought of or 
considered, including how we naturally class individual particulars into types. 
All thoughts have characters. I understand the arguments Peirce makes for why 
some (his qualifier) generals are real, but I don't see where 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jerry Rhee]

On “'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?'



It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually
advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose
oracle everyone inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot,
without gaining a single step.”

~Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*



“If the experts should but cannot advise in the Athenian assembly about
harbors and walls, it would seem that the instructional persuasion they
have is not and cannot be persuasive before a crowd, and the rhetorician
should have the knowledge of how to *adapt* the knowledge of others *into a
form that wins the trust of assemblies*.



Why, however, cannot the experts themselves do the necessary adaptation?”



~Benardete, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy*

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Thread:
> JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00094.html
> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00098.html
> JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00100.html
>
> JA:
>
>> As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously.
>> Some people use them to mean syntactic elements, in the S & I domains.
>> Some people use them to mean objective elements, in the Object domain.
>> In a sign relational setting we need to admit both types of elements
>> and we need to be clear about their distinctive roles in the triadic
>> sign relation at hand.
>>
>> It can help to use a tactic that is common in computer science, simply
>> tack the epithet "expression" or "name" on the end of the formal object
>> name you have in mind in order to denote the associated semiotic entity,
>> e.g., function / function expression, predicate / predicate expression,
>> proposition / propositional expression, and so on. In many contexts one
>> can then use the terms equivocally in the usual way, adding the epithet
>> only when necessary to focus on the syntax.
>>
>
> On 2/10/2017 2:14 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
>> JA: As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies
>> promiscuously.
>>
>> JFS: Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words.
>
> Well, no, they aren't.  Most logicians and other perfectly
> sensible folks are hardly even consistent in the way they
> use those words within a single context, much less across
> the whole wide literature and history of logic.  And yet
> there are sensible ways of resolving the resulting Babel.
> That is a big part of what the sign relational framework
> is for.
>
> By the way, it isn't what one calls the syntactic structures --
> expressions, graphs, propositions, rhemes, sentences, whatever --
> that makes one a nominalist, it is the claim that the syntactic
> entities are sufficient.
>
> If syntactic entities are not sufficient then there must be
> other sorts of objective entities that the syntactic entities
> denote.  In many cases of practical interest we can recover the
> isomorphic structure of the object domain as equivalence classes
> of the syntactic entities.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00094.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00098.html
JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00100.html

JA:

As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously.
Some people use them to mean syntactic elements, in the S & I domains.
Some people use them to mean objective elements, in the Object domain.
In a sign relational setting we need to admit both types of elements
and we need to be clear about their distinctive roles in the triadic
sign relation at hand.

It can help to use a tactic that is common in computer science, simply
tack the epithet "expression" or "name" on the end of the formal object
name you have in mind in order to denote the associated semiotic entity,
e.g., function / function expression, predicate / predicate expression,
proposition / propositional expression, and so on. In many contexts one
can then use the terms equivocally in the usual way, adding the epithet
only when necessary to focus on the syntax.


On 2/10/2017 2:14 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

JA: As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously.


JFS: Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words.

Well, no, they aren't.  Most logicians and other perfectly
sensible folks are hardly even consistent in the way they
use those words within a single context, much less across
the whole wide literature and history of logic.  And yet
there are sensible ways of resolving the resulting Babel.
That is a big part of what the sign relational framework
is for.

By the way, it isn't what one calls the syntactic structures --
expressions, graphs, propositions, rhemes, sentences, whatever --
that makes one a nominalist, it is the claim that the syntactic
entities are sufficient.

If syntactic entities are not sufficient then there must be
other sorts of objective entities that the syntactic entities
denote.  In many cases of practical interest we can recover the
isomorphic structure of the object domain as equivalence classes
of the syntactic entities.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  The third row (predicate, proposition, argument) is the *formal*
triad.  A predicate is a symbol of some relation.  A proposition is a
symbol that asserts the relation.


But the third row does not apply only to symbols.  What do we call an icon
or index that Peirce further classified as a rheme or dicent sign?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 1:14 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Stephen, Jon A.S., Jon A., list
>
> ET
>
>> I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in
>> analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that
>> vital mediation,  and the concept of the three modal categories. Both
>> seem very hard for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the
>> simplistic binarism of Saussurian semiology
>>
>
> I agree that the concept of triadic semiosis is the critical issue.
> But expressing it in words that students have never heard, seen, or
> used, is a barrier to learning and adoption.
>
> SCR
>
>> Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make
>> the triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely
>> superior to binary thinking.
>>
>
> I've found that the best starting point is the dyadic type-token
> distinction.  That's widely known and accepted in linguistics and
> computer science -- even by people who have never heard of Peirce.
>
> And those people are always surprised when you tell them that
> token and type are the second and third terms of a triad.
> For the first term, Peirce used the words 'tone' and 'mark'.
>
> Of those two, tone is hard for people to generalize.  A pure tone
> is rare, even in music.  But mark is the obvious choice for images,
> and students can quickly generalize it to any sensation.
>
> You can start with Peirce's example of tokens of the type 'the'.
> CSP mentioned the many tokens on a printed page.  The next step is
> to point out that vocal tokens of 'the' are also marks that can be
> interpreted as tokens of that same type.
>
> JAS
>
>> I have no problem with mark/token/type, but "predicate" and
>> "proposition" usually designate symbols.
>>
>
> That point leads to the question why the "triple trichotomy" has
> three rows.  The first row (mark token type) is the *material*
> triad:  A mark is an uninterpreted sign of some observable
> material.  A token is an interpretation of that material.  And
> a type is a habit or law that determines the interpretation.
>
> The second row (icon index symbol) is the *relational* triad:
> An icon is a token of some observable pattern among its parts.
> An index is a sign of a causal relation among the parts.  And a
> symbol is a sign of some habit or law that determines the cause.
>
> The third row (predicate, proposition, argument) is the *formal*
> triad.  A predicate is a symbol of some relation.  A proposition
> is a symbol that asserts the relation.  And an argument is a
> symbol (one or more propositions) that justifies the assertion.
>
> JA
>
>> As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously.
>>
>
> Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words.  And their
> usage corresponds to the way that Peirce used the terms 'rhema' and
> 'dicent sign'.   Nominalists like Quine may prefer the word 'sentence'
> to 'proposition', but a sentence is definitely a dicent sign.
>
> A predicate or rhema has one or more slots or pegs (in CSP's diagrams)
> or variables (in the linear notations by CSP and his successors).
> Since the referents of the slots or variables are not specified,
> the predicate cannot make an assertion.  It has no truth value.
>
> A proposition or dicent sign has all the slots or variables replaced
> by signs that designate referents.  In a context in which a proposition
> is asserted, it has a truth value.  In a 3-valued logic, 'unknown' is
> a possible truth value.  Peirce also discussed issues of vagueness,
> which raise further questions.  But they don't affect the distinction
> between predicates and propositions.
>
> John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Edwina Taborsky]

I have my doubts about that - i.e., that the 'binary would turn deism itself 
into a binary, while the triadic form ..clears the space..

The explosion of nominalism in the 13th c was a binaristic rejection of 
triadism, with the 'mediation force' defined by the Church as an essentialist a 
priori deterministic deity about which only the Church had access to define and 
teach. The Peircean triad is completely different, for the mediative Force, 
let's say of Thirdness,  is a vital part of the existential entity and not 
separate - even though it cannot itself be 'existential'. This is very hard for 
the non-scientific mindset to deal with.

Binarism is political, in that it is either This Force or That Force that is in 
power...and both are existential, in various modes of Secondness, [2-2, 
2-1]..and can readily be fought against/for.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List 
  Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 10:16 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from 
AI perspective


  THat's a big issue but at least we're talking about it. I would siumply say 
that the binary zeitgeist turns deism itself into a binary either while a 
triadic form would clear some space for the consideration that Peirce felt was 
so vital to the actual betterment of people -- the son he never had fr example. 


  Peirce: “If I had a son, I should instill into him this view of morality 
(that is, that Ethics is the science of the method of bringing Self-Control to 
bear to gain satisfaction) and force him to see that there is but one thing 
that raises one individual animal above another, — Self-Mastery; and should 
teach him that the Will is free only in the sense that, by employing the proper 
appliances, he can make himself behave in the way he really desires to behave. 
As to what one ought to desire, it is, I should teach him, what he will desire 
if he sufficiently considers it, and that will be to make his life beautiful, 
admirable. Now the science of the Admirable is true Esthetics.” (As quoted in 
Brent, Peirce: A Life, p49).



  amazon.com/author/stephenrose



  On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 9:29 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

I don't think it's that apocalyptic a scenario. Certainly in the sciences, 
such as biology and physics, the triadic mode of functioning is vital and I 
think we are seeing a lot of research that acknowledges this - even if it isn't 
referenced to Peirce. But I don't see such a mindset moving that rapidly into 
the humanities or social science areas.  They will remain rather firmly binary.

Binary thinking is simple, it is mechanistic, and after all, one of the 
dangers of a triadic format in these areas is that the mediation function 
becomes , so to speak, into a theistic essentialism.

Same with the categories: Thirdness becomes transformed into a theistic 
force.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List 
  Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 9:04 AM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" 
from AI perspective


  Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make the 
triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely superior to 
binary thinking. Without it we perish. This is NOT an academic matter.


  amazon.com/author/stephenrose



  On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 8:51 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:

I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in 
analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that vital 
mediation,  and the concept of the three modal categories. Both seem very hard 
for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the simplistic binarism 
of Saussurian semiology, which focuses only on individual units, and searches 
for their 'hidden', almost Freudian meanings of 'This'..Stands For..That'.

Edwina


- Original Message - From: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 9:23 PM
    Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" 
from AI perspective 




  On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

The three triads of CSP,
   qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
   icon, index, symbol;
   rhema, dicisign, argument,
can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
(strange) words of this table is that only the last word, 
“argument” is
used in logic. The other eight words are merely d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those five
words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:
   mark, token, type;
   icon, index, symbol;
   predicate, proposition, argument.


I have no problem with mark/token/type, but "predicate" and "proposition"
usually designate symbols.  What would be some examples of a predicate that
is an icon or an index, or a proposition that is an index?  Demonstrative
pronouns like "this" or "that" are usually classified as rhematic indexical
legisigns, but it seems odd to call them "predicates" when their only
function is to pick out subjects.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 8:52 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> This is a salient post. I think icon, index, symbol is the most useful of
> the nominated survivors though my own adaptation reality ethics aesthetics
> suits me as a sort of every-person triad for use in a daily discipline of
> conscious thinking which is what I have been working to put forward. I
> think "triadic thinking" is also a perfectly good term to set against
> binary thinking.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 9:23 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>>
>>> The three triads of CSP,
>>>qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
>>>icon, index, symbol;
>>>rhema, dicisign, argument,
>>> can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
>>> association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
>>> consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
>>> (strange) words of this table is that only the last word, “argument” is
>>> used in logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
>>> Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists in these three
>>> 19th Century triads.
>>>
>>
>> I have discussed, written about, and lectured on Peirce's semiotic
>> to various audiences -- mostly in AI and cognitive science.  His
>> terminology is indeed a deterrent for many people.
>>
>> One wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted.
>>>
>>
>> The words qualisign, sinsign, legisign, rhema, and dicisign have
>> no chance of being accepted.  Even Peirce scholars use them only
>> when discussing Peirce's writings.
>>
>> The triad of icon, index, and symbol is the most widely recognized,
>> cited, and used -- partly because the words are more common.  Peirce's
>> terms 'type' and 'token' are widely used even by people who have no
>> idea where they came from.  And the words 'predicate' and 'proposition'
>> are common in logic.
>>
>> For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those
>> five words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:
>>
>>mark, token, type;
>>icon, index, symbol;
>>predicate, proposition, argument.
>>
>> See Figure 2, page 5 of "Signs and reality":
>> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
>>
>> For example, consider an index of species.
>>>
>>> Is it real?
>>> Or, ideal?
>>>
>>
>> For both a nominalist and a realist, an index is something
>> observable:  a pointing finger, a pronoun in speech or writing,
>> or a physical occurrence of some kind.
>>
>> But a species is a type, which is determined by some law
>> of nature.  A realist would say that the law is real.
>> But a nominalist would say that a law is merely a pattern
>> of words that summarize some observational data.
>>
>> In short, both nominalists and realists could use the nine
>> terms above in practical applications.  They would often
>> reach the same conclusions, but they would disagree about
>> the existence of referents for the words in the third column.
>>
>> John
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make the
triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely superior
to binary thinking. Without it we perish. This is NOT an academic matter.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 8:51 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in
> analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that
> vital mediation,  and the concept of the three modal categories. Both seem
> very hard for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the
> simplistic binarism of Saussurian semiology, which focuses only on
> individual units, and searches for their 'hidden', almost Freudian meanings
> of 'This'..Stands For..That'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> - Original Message - From: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
> To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 9:23 PM
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset"
> from AI perspective
>
>
>
> On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>>
>>> The three triads of CSP,
>>>qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
>>>icon, index, symbol;
>>>rhema, dicisign, argument,
>>> can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
>>> association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
>>> consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
>>> (strange) words of this table is that only the last word, “argument” is
>>> used in logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
>>> Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists in these three
>>> 19th Century triads.
>>>
>>
>> I have discussed, written about, and lectured on Peirce's semiotic
>> to various audiences -- mostly in AI and cognitive science.  His
>> terminology is indeed a deterrent for many people.
>>
>> One wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted.
>>>
>>
>> The words qualisign, sinsign, legisign, rhema, and dicisign have
>> no chance of being accepted.  Even Peirce scholars use them only
>> when discussing Peirce's writings.
>>
>> The triad of icon, index, and symbol is the most widely recognized,
>> cited, and used -- partly because the words are more common.  Peirce's
>> terms 'type' and 'token' are widely used even by people who have no
>> idea where they came from.  And the words 'predicate' and 'proposition'
>> are common in logic.
>>
>> For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those
>> five words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:
>>
>>mark, token, type;
>>icon, index, symbol;
>>predicate, proposition, argument.
>>
>> See Figure 2, page 5 of "Signs and reality":
>> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
>>
>> For example, consider an index of species.
>>>
>>> Is it real?
>>> Or, ideal?
>>>
>>
>> For both a nominalist and a realist, an index is something
>> observable:  a pointing finger, a pronoun in speech or writing,
>> or a physical occurrence of some kind.
>>
>> But a species is a type, which is determined by some law
>> of nature.  A realist would say that the law is real.
>> But a nominalist would say that a law is merely a pattern
>> of words that summarize some observational data.
>>
>> In short, both nominalists and realists could use the nine
>> terms above in practical applications.  They would often
>> reach the same conclusions, but they would disagree about
>> the existence of referents for the words in the third column.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>
> 
> 
>
>
>
>
>> -
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Edwina Taborsky]

I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in 
analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that vital 
mediation,  and the concept of the three modal categories. Both seem very 
hard for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the simplistic 
binarism of Saussurian semiology, which focuses only on individual units, 
and searches for their 'hidden', almost Freudian meanings of 'This'..Stands 
For..That'.


Edwina


- Original Message - 
From: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>

To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 9:23 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from 
AI perspective




On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

The three triads of CSP,
   qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
   icon, index, symbol;
   rhema, dicisign, argument,
can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
(strange) words of this table is that only the last word, “argument” is
used in logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists in these three
19th Century triads.


I have discussed, written about, and lectured on Peirce's semiotic
to various audiences -- mostly in AI and cognitive science.  His
terminology is indeed a deterrent for many people.


One wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted.


The words qualisign, sinsign, legisign, rhema, and dicisign have
no chance of being accepted.  Even Peirce scholars use them only
when discussing Peirce's writings.

The triad of icon, index, and symbol is the most widely recognized,
cited, and used -- partly because the words are more common.  Peirce's
terms 'type' and 'token' are widely used even by people who have no
idea where they came from.  And the words 'predicate' and 'proposition'
are common in logic.

For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those
five words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:

   mark, token, type;
   icon, index, symbol;
   predicate, proposition, argument.

See Figure 2, page 5 of "Signs and reality":
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf


For example, consider an index of species.

Is it real?
Or, ideal?


For both a nominalist and a realist, an index is something
observable:  a pointing finger, a pronoun in speech or writing,
or a physical occurrence of some kind.

But a species is a type, which is determined by some law
of nature.  A realist would say that the law is real.
But a nominalist would say that a law is merely a pattern
of words that summarize some observational data.

In short, both nominalists and realists could use the nine
terms above in practical applications.  They would often
reach the same conclusions, but they would disagree about
the existence of referents for the words in the third column.

John









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

A distinction between real and anything is to me a binary notion which may
be useful but is ultimately confusing. To say that everything is real is to
say that reality is the whole kahuna of everything within which there is
good and evil, falsity and truth, and so forth. I know that Peirce makes
distinctions but I think the entire tendency of his thinking tends toward
the result of thinking when it deems reality as being all. S  Best. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:59 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> Thanks for commenting. Please see below:
> On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Mike, List:
>
> I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and
> found them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My
> first introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that
> used it to identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking,
> which appealed to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also
> because I have long desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way
> of thinking that we engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of
> articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final
> installment (Part 4, "Beyond Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next
> month.
>
> However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your
> last message.
>
> MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of
> concepts to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also
> take the fictional to be real, but not actual.
>
>
> While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being
> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
> thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not
> that *all *generals are real, only that *some *of them are.
>
>
> CSP:  Consequently, *some *general objects are real. (Of course, nobody
> ever thought that *all* generals were real; but the scholastics used to
> assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no,
> experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay just
> there, and not in holding that generals could be real.) (CP 5.430; 1905)
>
>
> Good point, and thanks for this reference. However, I have to say, I'm not
> sure I either understand or agree with why some generals are real while
> others are not. As best as I can tell, Peirce maintains that certain
> (undefined or unspecified) opinions are the ones that are not real. That
> strikes me as arbitrary, and an argument of degree not kind. My thinking
> has been that all thoughts, once thought, become instantiated and thus
> real. Types, which Peirce described as subjective generalities, I think he
> considers to be real. Are you aware of any better bright lines that Peirce
> offers for when some generals are not real?
>
> My logic is that anything that can be conceived becomes real once thought
> of or considered, including how we naturally class individual particulars
> into types. All thoughts have characters. I understand the arguments Peirce
> makes for why *some* (his qualifier) generals are real, but I don't see
> where the converse gets argued (that is, that some generals are not real)
> and why.
>
> I also have a hard time squaring the assertion that some generals are not
> real with these two statements:
>
> "Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere
> individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
> nullity." (CP 5.431)
>
> "That which any true proposition asserts is *real*, in the sense of being
> as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it." (CP 5.432)
>
> If I try to tease out what CSP is trying to say in these sections, I
> interpret he is saying that only generals that are true, are destined, or
> have ultimate fixity (perhaps all saying the same thing) are real. Generals
> not meeting those conditions would therefore not be real. But this is hard
> to square with fallibilism since we can not know absolute truth, only
> approach it as a limit function. When does the determination occur that one
> opinion is real while another is not?
>
> Perhaps under this calculus we could say that false or disproven
> assertions are not real, but that also seems a slippery yardstick to me.
> Again, if anyone on the list can help on this question I'd love to see the
> CSP citations or hear the arguments. From these passages, I'm not sure that
> Peirce has made the compelling counter argument that some generals are not
> real.
>
>
> Peirce also made a sharp distinction between the real and the fictional.
>
> CSP:  That is *real *which has such and such characters, whether anybody
> thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, that is the sense
> in which the pragmaticist uses the word. (CP 5.430; 1905)
>
>
> CSP:  For the *fictive *is that whose 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Stephen C. Rose]

This is a salient post. I think icon, index, symbol is the most useful of
the nominated survivors though my own adaptation reality ethics aesthetics
suits me as a sort of every-person triad for use in a daily discipline of
conscious thinking which is what I have been working to put forward. I
think "triadic thinking" is also a perfectly good term to set against
binary thinking.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 9:23 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>
>> The three triads of CSP,
>>qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
>>icon, index, symbol;
>>rhema, dicisign, argument,
>> can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
>> association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
>> consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
>> (strange) words of this table is that only the last word, “argument” is
>> used in logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
>> Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists in these three
>> 19th Century triads.
>>
>
> I have discussed, written about, and lectured on Peirce's semiotic
> to various audiences -- mostly in AI and cognitive science.  His
> terminology is indeed a deterrent for many people.
>
> One wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted.
>>
>
> The words qualisign, sinsign, legisign, rhema, and dicisign have
> no chance of being accepted.  Even Peirce scholars use them only
> when discussing Peirce's writings.
>
> The triad of icon, index, and symbol is the most widely recognized,
> cited, and used -- partly because the words are more common.  Peirce's
> terms 'type' and 'token' are widely used even by people who have no
> idea where they came from.  And the words 'predicate' and 'proposition'
> are common in logic.
>
> For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those
> five words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:
>
>mark, token, type;
>icon, index, symbol;
>predicate, proposition, argument.
>
> See Figure 2, page 5 of "Signs and reality":
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
>
> For example, consider an index of species.
>>
>> Is it real?
>> Or, ideal?
>>
>
> For both a nominalist and a realist, an index is something
> observable:  a pointing finger, a pronoun in speech or writing,
> or a physical occurrence of some kind.
>
> But a species is a type, which is determined by some law
> of nature.  A realist would say that the law is real.
> But a nominalist would say that a law is merely a pattern
> of words that summarize some observational data.
>
> In short, both nominalists and realists could use the nine
> terms above in practical applications.  They would often
> reach the same conclusions, but they would disagree about
> the existence of referents for the words in the third column.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[John F Sowa]

On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

The three triads of CSP,
   qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
   icon, index, symbol;
   rhema, dicisign, argument,
can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
consequences (legisigns))  What I find exceedingly curious about the
(strange) words of this table is that only the last word, “argument” is
used in logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists in these three
19th Century triads.


I have discussed, written about, and lectured on Peirce's semiotic
to various audiences -- mostly in AI and cognitive science.  His
terminology is indeed a deterrent for many people.


One wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted.


The words qualisign, sinsign, legisign, rhema, and dicisign have
no chance of being accepted.  Even Peirce scholars use them only
when discussing Peirce's writings.

The triad of icon, index, and symbol is the most widely recognized,
cited, and used -- partly because the words are more common.  Peirce's
terms 'type' and 'token' are widely used even by people who have no
idea where they came from.  And the words 'predicate' and 'proposition'
are common in logic.

For teaching Peirce's semiotic, I therefore recommend that those
five words should be replaced with terms that CSP himself used:

   mark, token, type;
   icon, index, symbol;
   predicate, proposition, argument.

See Figure 2, page 5 of "Signs and reality":
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf


For example, consider an index of species.

Is it real?
Or, ideal?


For both a nominalist and a realist, an index is something
observable:  a pointing finger, a pronoun in speech or writing,
or a physical occurrence of some kind.

But a species is a type, which is determined by some law
of nature.  A realist would say that the law is real.
But a nominalist would say that a law is merely a pattern
of words that summarize some observational data.

In short, both nominalists and realists could use the nine
terms above in practical applications.  They would often
reach the same conclusions, but they would disagree about
the existence of referents for the words in the third column.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I am not seeking another debate, just making a good-faith effort to
understand.

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon- I've said before that I don't find it fruitful to engage in debate
> with you, so, I'll just repeat:
>
> My use of the term *triadic relations* was straight from Peirce and I
> don't see the point of your first paragraph below. The trichotomies divide
> ALL correlates/relations of the triad into the three modal categories.
> Exactly as i've said before.
>
> Your interest in my papers is fascinating, but you misunderstand the
> informational term of 'node' and 'horizon of influence' - which is not the
> same as an interaction between two separate existential entities.
>
> That's all.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 09, 2017 10:57 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset"
> from AI perspective
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> CP 2.233-242 discusses *triadic relations* and identifies
> Representamen/Object/Interpretant as a paradigmatic example of one.
> Peirce also states, "A *Sign *is a representamen of which some
> interpretant is a cognition of a mind"--not a triadic entity, but "the
> First Correlate of a triadic relation."  CP 2.243-253 then discusses the
> three *trichotomies*, which do not divide "triadic relations" in general,
> but Signs in particular--"first, according as the sign in itself is a mere
> quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as
> the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some
> character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in
> its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant
> represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of
> reason."  CP 2.254-264 then presents the ten Sign *classifications*.
>
> I recently re-read a couple of your online papers in an effort to
> understand your model better.  My suggestion that it treats the three
> relations as dyadic comes from "The Methodology of Semiotic Morphology:  An
> Introduction" (http://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol5-2/Taborsky.htm).
>
> ET:  A relation is a dyadic string, a primitive morphology of
> in­teraction, where two nodes functioning as horizons of influence connect
> to provide within that range a measured configuration of data, information
> or knowledge functioning within time and space – and mode.
>
>
> This seems to be saying that *all *relations are dyadic and function
> within time and space (i.e., exist).  Am I misunderstanding, or has your
> view perhaps changed since writing that piece?  Note that CP 2.283 states,
> "A genuine Index and its Object must be existent individuals (whether
> things or facts), and its immediate Interpretant must be of the same
> character."  It does not say that *all *dyadic relations require both
> correlates to be existents; after all, *any *relation that has only two
> correlates--whether Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants--is dyadic by
> definition.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - I am using Peirce's term of *triadic relations*. See his Division
>> of Sign, eg, 2.233 and all through that section. He uses the term of
>> 'trichotomy' referring to whether the triadic relations are divisible by
>> the three model categories. See. 2.238.
>>
>> I disagree with your view that my model sees them as *dyadic relations*.
>> A dyadic relation can only be between two existential entities, and 'my
>> model', as you refer to it, does not see the Representamen-Object
>> interaction as between two existential entities. Same with the
>> R-Interpretant, or R-Rthese are NOT dyadic relations. See note to
>> 2.239, which specifically says that a dyadic relation requires that both
>> its correlates are existents. 2.283. I've explained this repeatedly to you
>> before
>>
>> 'My model' as you refer to it [suggesting that it is not also that of
>> Peirce??] does not view the Object as an object until it is in a triadic
>> semiosic relation. Same with the Representamen and Interpretant. And as
>> i've said, a triad of O-R-I can have that Interpretant functioning at the
>> same time as an Object Relation in another triad. That's part of the
>> Peircean networking.
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon- I've said before that I don't find it fruitful to engage in debate with 
you, so, I'll just repeat: 

My use of the term triadic relations was straight from Peirce and I don't see 
the point of your first paragraph below. The trichotomies divide ALL 
correlates/relations of the triad into the three modal categories. Exactly as 
i've said before.

Your interest in my papers is fascinating, but you misunderstand the 
informational term of 'node' and 'horizon of influence' - which is not the same 
as an interaction between two separate existential entities.

That's all.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 10:57 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from 
AI perspective


  Edwina, List:


  CP 2.233-242 discusses triadic relations and identifies 
Representamen/Object/Interpretant as a paradigmatic example of one.  Peirce 
also states, "A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a 
cognition of a mind"--not a triadic entity, but "the First Correlate of a 
triadic relation."  CP 2.243-253 then discusses the three trichotomies, which 
do not divide "triadic relations" in general, but Signs in particular--"first, 
according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is 
a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object 
consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential 
relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, 
according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a 
sign of fact or a sign of reason."  CP 2.254-264 then presents the ten Sign 
classifications.


  I recently re-read a couple of your online papers in an effort to understand 
your model better.  My suggestion that it treats the three relations as dyadic 
comes from "The Methodology of Semiotic Morphology:  An Introduction" 
(http://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol5-2/Taborsky.htm).


ET:  A relation is a dyadic string, a primitive morphology of in­teraction, 
where two nodes functioning as horizons of influence connect to provide within 
that range a measured configuration of data, information or knowledge 
functioning within time and space – and mode.


  This seems to be saying that all relations are dyadic and function within 
time and space (i.e., exist).  Am I misunderstanding, or has your view perhaps 
changed since writing that piece?  Note that CP 2.283 states, "A genuine Index 
and its Object must be existent individuals (whether things or facts), and its 
immediate Interpretant must be of the same character."  It does not say that 
all dyadic relations require both correlates to be existents; after all, any 
relation that has only two correlates--whether Possibles, Existents, or 
Necessitants--is dyadic by definition.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon - I am using Peirce's term of triadic relations. See his Division of 
Sign, eg, 2.233 and all through that section. He uses the term of 'trichotomy' 
referring to whether the triadic relations are divisible by the three model 
categories. See. 2.238. 

I disagree with your view that my model sees them as dyadic relations. A 
dyadic relation can only be between two existential entities, and 'my model', 
as you refer to it, does not see the Representamen-Object interaction as 
between two existential entities. Same with the R-Interpretant, or R-Rthese 
are NOT dyadic relations. See note to 2.239, which specifically says that a 
dyadic relation requires that both its correlates are existents. 2.283. I've 
explained this repeatedly to you before

'My model' as you refer to it [suggesting that it is not also that of 
Peirce??] does not view the Object as an object until it is in a triadic 
semiosic relation. Same with the Representamen and Interpretant. And as i've 
said, a triad of O-R-I can have that Interpretant functioning at the same time 
as an Object Relation in another triad. That's part of the Peircean networking.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce List 
      Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 10:05 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" 
from AI perspective


  Edwina, List: 


  Is it right to say that the nine terms in Peirce's three trichotomies are 
"triadic relations"?  It seems to me that even in your model, they correspond 
to dyadic relations--the Representamen with itself, with its Object, and with 
its Interpretant.  There is only one triadic relation in a given Sign, and it 
is not reducible to these three dyadic relations.  In that sense, it is the ten 
Sign c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

CP 2.233-242 discusses *triadic relations* and identifies
Representamen/Object/Interpretant as a paradigmatic example of one.  Peirce
also states, "A *Sign *is a representamen of which some interpretant is a
cognition of a mind"--not a triadic entity, but "the First Correlate of a
triadic relation."  CP 2.243-253 then discusses the three *trichotomies*,
which do not divide "triadic relations" in general, but Signs in
particular--"first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is
an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the
relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some
character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in
its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant
represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of
reason."  CP 2.254-264 then presents the ten Sign *classifications*.

I recently re-read a couple of your online papers in an effort to
understand your model better.  My suggestion that it treats the three
relations as dyadic comes from "The Methodology of Semiotic Morphology:  An
Introduction" (http://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol5-2/Taborsky.htm).

ET:  A relation is a dyadic string, a primitive morphology of in­teraction,
where two nodes functioning as horizons of influence connect to provide
within that range a measured configuration of data, information or
knowledge functioning within time and space – and mode.


This seems to be saying that *all *relations are dyadic and function within
time and space (i.e., exist).  Am I misunderstanding, or has your view
perhaps changed since writing that piece?  Note that CP 2.283 states, "A
genuine Index and its Object must be existent individuals (whether things
or facts), and its immediate Interpretant must be of the same character."
 It does not say that *all *dyadic relations require both correlates to be
existents; after all, *any *relation that has only two correlates--whether
Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants--is dyadic by definition.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - I am using Peirce's term of *triadic relations*. See his Division
> of Sign, eg, 2.233 and all through that section. He uses the term of
> 'trichotomy' referring to whether the triadic relations are divisible by
> the three model categories. See. 2.238.
>
> I disagree with your view that my model sees them as *dyadic relations*.
> A dyadic relation can only be between two existential entities, and 'my
> model', as you refer to it, does not see the Representamen-Object
> interaction as between two existential entities. Same with the
> R-Interpretant, or R-Rthese are NOT dyadic relations. See note to
> 2.239, which specifically says that a dyadic relation requires that both
> its correlates are existents. 2.283. I've explained this repeatedly to you
> before
>
> 'My model' as you refer to it [suggesting that it is not also that of
> Peirce??] does not view the Object as an object until it is in a triadic
> semiosic relation. Same with the Representamen and Interpretant. And as
> i've said, a triad of O-R-I can have that Interpretant functioning at the
> same time as an Object Relation in another triad. That's part of the
> Peircean networking.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 09, 2017 10:05 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset"
> from AI perspective
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Is it right to say that the nine terms in Peirce's three trichotomies are
> "triadic relations"?  It seems to me that even in your model, they
> correspond to *dyadic *relations--the Representamen with itself, with its
> Object, and with its Interpretant.  There is only one *triadic *relation
> in a given Sign, and it is not reducible to these three dyadic relations.
> In that sense, it is the ten Sign classifications--rather than the nine
> terms in three trichotomies--that characterize the triadic relation; i.e.,
> a Qualisign has a different triadic relation than a Rhematic Indexical
> Legisign, which has a different triadic relation than an Argument, etc.  On
> the other hand, in Peirce's later ten-trichotomy scheme, there is a
> specific division "According to the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its
> Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (CP 8.344; 1908), which is
> associated with "the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance:  assurance
> of Instinct; assurance of Experience; assurance of Form&q

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jerry,
Thanks for your comments, though I did not honestly
understand what you were trying to tell me from the perspective
of trans-disciplinarity. I'd like to better understand what this
perspective means from your own perspective.
I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea
of concepts to represent ideas. I think this is supported by
Peirce. I also take the fictional to be real, but not actual.
But I also take all names and labels to be indexicals, about
which they refer. This is also Peirce's view, I believe. Indexes
can be analyzed, but not reasoned over via inference. 
  
Peirce's arguments against nominalism were, I think, undercut
by his prissiness about terminology. He invested too much into
the label. But, whatever.
My key point in my "strong assertion" is that it is the
underlying realness that is the appropriate focus in our quest
for truth. Names and labels are merely pointers, though with
perhaps some informational value. Again, in the sem Web, those
who see it this way call it "things, not strings". That is the
sense to which I "concurred".
  
It was clear that Peirce lived through words (okay, right,
actually symbols), especially given his thousands of hours spent
on definitions. I think his metaphysics were definitely on the
side of realism, but his love of words (I suspect a stimulus for
his sign interests in part) caused him to take pride in nomen.
There is maybe a little irony there.
  
 The logic of realism that I have found closest to my own
experience and thinking is Peirce's pragmatism. Like many scientists,
I worship at the altar of the scientific method. 
  
I probably should have better defined "mindset" from my
perspective. Peirce maintained that what we know is based on
what we believe, which is fed by information. I think this
insight is forceful. Mindset is perhaps the ultimate of
Thirdness with respect to thought, also an ultimate of
Thirdness, and it is comprised of the universe of beliefs held
by the agent. Some may be believed more strongly than others,
and thus win out when there are conflicts for what we perceive.
One needs to try to "live" within the ideas of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness (note I used different predicates) in
order to find the processes and belief that then allow them to
contribute some different sets of beliefs and processes to a
revised mindset. I believe we can learn to think with different
perspectives, and Peirce's universal categories are a powerful
lens.
  
All thinking and reasoning is symbolic. By virtue of thinking
at all, we have already proceeded through the other necessary
signs.
  
Like I said in the article, I don't know if Peirce would
necessarily buy everything I was saying or not, here or in my
article. But, in the true sense of Thirdness, there is a process
underlying pragmatic thinking that is much deserving of
inspection.
Thanks, Mike


On 2/8/2017 11:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
  wrote:


  
  List, Mike:
  
  
  Your essay is framed in the context of “AI”
(computations), a very wide framework indeed!  Nothing is
excluded from AI is it?
  I will be only slightly more focal in responding to
your call for comments. 
  You write in your article:
  
  
  "Concepts attempt to embody ideas, and while
  it is useful to express those concepts with clear, precise and
  correct terminology, it is the idea that is real, not the
  label. In Peirce’s worldview, the label is only an index. I
  concur."
  

  My questions
  emerge from considerations of your essay from the perspective
  of trans-disciplinarity (multiple symbol systems).  I will
  make four relevant comments before coming to the questions
  about your essay.
  

  1. The three
  triads of CSP, 
  	qualisign,
  sinsign, legisign;
  	icon,
  index, symbol;
  	rhema,
  dicisign, argument,
  can be,
  in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the
  logical association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns
  with logical consequences (legisigns))  What I find
  exceedingly curious about the (strange) words of this
  table is that only the last word, “argument” is used in
  logic. The other eight words are merely dictionary words.
   Clearly, some similarity
  with 21 st Century AI exists in these three 19th Century
  triads. 
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Mike:

Your essay is framed in the context of “AI” (computations), a very wide 
framework indeed!  Nothing is excluded from AI is it?
I will be only slightly more focal in responding to your call for comments. 
You write in your article:

"Concepts attempt to embody ideas, and while it is useful to express those 
concepts with clear, precise and correct terminology, it is the idea that is 
real, not the label. In Peirce’s worldview, the label is only an index. I 
concur."

My questions emerge from considerations of your essay from the perspective of 
trans-disciplinarity (multiple symbol systems).  I will make four relevant 
comments before coming to the questions about your essay.

1. The three triads of CSP, 
qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
icon, index, symbol;
rhema, dicisign, argument,
can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical association 
of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical consequences (legisigns))  
What I find exceedingly curious about the (strange) words of this table is that 
only the last word, “argument” is used in logic. The other eight words are 
merely dictionary words.  Clearly, some similarity with 21 st Century AI exists 
in these three 19th Century triads. 

2.  I strongly suspect that CSP arranged these words in such a manner that his 
meaning very loosely corresponded with his understanding of chemical ‘proof of 
structures’ (graph theory) as it existed in the second half of the 19th 
Century.  I had earlier posts on some chemical aspects of the meanings in 
selected subsets of the terms.  And, I have posted critical comments on 
non-chemical interpretations of the meaning of these three triads, for example, 
that proposed by Frederik Stjernfelt.  

3. Yet, CSP’s “mindset” is such that he asserts that the eight semantic objects 
are NECESSARY to form an argument. It is as if the three triads are an 
antecedent to the concept of induction and modality. This approach to 
generating conclusions (scientific knowledge) has not been widely accepted.  I 
further note that the eight words do not denote mathematical concepts. One 
wonders why CSP’s three triads have not been adopted. 

4. Five of these nine terms are introduced from CSP’s “mindset”, whatever that 
may have been. 

Returning to your very strong assertion, it is unclear to me what you are 
concurring with.  More specifically, how does your essay relate the the logics 
of realism?

For example, consider an index of species.

Is it real?   
Or, ideal?

Allow me to rephrase this extremely convoluted issue that is related to several 
perplex disciplines.  In what sense is a "mindset" illative of representational 
competencies?  Is an individual mindset generated and maintained by the 
knowledge of the symbol systems that one knows?

 
Cheers

jerry



> On Feb 7, 2017, at 11:29 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi List,
> 
> I thought perhaps some on the list might be interested in my latest article 
> on Peirce and knowledge representation:
> 
> http://www.mkbergman.com/2020/being-informed-by-peirce/ 
> 
> Thanks! (and feel free to also give me comments offline).
> 
> 
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> 
> 
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