Dear Richard,
sorry for not getting to your reply earlier than now.
Comments to your email in the text below.
2013/2/17 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org:
On 2/17/2013 12:17 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
2013/2/16 Kristofer Munsterhjelmkm_el...@lavabit.com:
On 02/14/2013 07:07 PM,
On 2/17/2013 12:17 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
2013/2/16 Kristofer Munsterhjelmkm_el...@lavabit.com:
On 02/14/2013 07:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
...
... as in
the top-down method of Otten?
...
... perhaps Peter meant this one?
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE13/P3.HTM
yes, that's the
On 02/14/2013 07:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
... as in
the top-down method of Otten?
I did not find any information about the top-down method of Otten. If
you send me a link to a place that describes it, then I can answer this
part of your question.
I've been really busy lately, so I
On 2/13/2013 4:51 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
2013/2/9 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
...
2013/2/6 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
...
The method consists of running VoteFair _representation_ ranking
calculations. ...
...
Tentatively the five open-list party positions are
2013/2/9 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org:
2013/2/6 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Say twenty, for instance.
To: Peter Zbornik
After
What about this rule, if simplicity is required.
1) Run a standard PR-STV election.
2) If the result violates the criterion
- permanently eliminate the weakest candidate of the over-represented
gender and repeat
The first candidate to be eliminated is weakest and the first
candidate to be
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B to lose (or
variants of this kind of problem). That's
On 02/12/2013 01:42 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech
On 02/12/2013 04:59 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B
On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
2013/2/6 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Say twenty, for instance.
To: Peter Zbornik
After considerable
2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
2013/2/6 Richard
FobesElectionMethods@**votefair.orgelectionmeth...@votefair.org
:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12
On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party
desires it. Then one may make a
On 12.2.2013, at 0.33, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by quoted-in
proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party desires it. Then one
may make a quota proportionality criterion and design methods from the
ground up that
On 12.2.2013, at 1.24, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
(Also, speaking of criteria: if I had enough time, I would try to find a
monotone variant of Schulze STV. I think one can make monotone
Droop-proportional multiwinner methods, since I made a
2013/2/6 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Say twenty, for instance.
To: Peter Zbornik
After considerable thinking about your request, I've come up with a
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 8:24 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Here is an example to illustrate the problem:
Coalition 1: 32: w1w4w3m3
Coalition 2: 33: w1w3w4m4
Coalition 3: 35: w2w5m1m2
Thus, the right distribution, intuitively is:
4th seat - m3
5th seat - w5
Is this a
I think I've figured this out.
Use a quota of 2/11 for normal slots. The quota for quoted slots will be
somewhere between 3/22 and 2/11; thus the remainder will be between 1/11
and 2/11.
When you hit a quoted slot, first see who would win the remaining slots
under normal STV — call that set Ⓐ.
On 7.2.2013, at 20.43, Peter Zbornik wrote:
At second sight, I think that giving different quota weights (V) to
quoted-in candidates would lead to strategic voting leading to the
weaker-gender candidates being placed at the end in order to be
quoted-in, as you mention yourself.
Coming
On 5.2.2013, at 19.50, Peter Zbornik wrote:
i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the
voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at
the same time
50: w1 w2 m1 m2
50: w3 w4 m3 m4
The first seat goes to w1 (lottery). The second seat goes to
On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
James, Jonathan,
I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the
proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed.
James Gilmour has the right idea.
Elect 5 seats, but don't eliminate
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk:
On 5.2.2013, at 19.50, Peter Zbornik wrote:
i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the
voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at
the same time
50: w1 w2 m1 m2
50: w3 w4 m3 m4
The first seat
Dear Juho,
considering your example
50: w1 w2 m1 m2
50: w3 w4 m3 m4
If we say, that a quoted-in candidate has the value and weight of 1/2
of a seat and if we lower the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota accordingly, so
that only half of the number of votes are used, then we actually have
a 4-seat
I try to address the targets one more round without taking position on how the
actual algorithm will work. From this point of view I start from the question,
what is the value of a quoted-in seat. Maybe we can use a constant value (V)
that is smaller that the value of a normal seat (1).
One
I think V should be 3/4 (if quoted-in) or 1 (if would have won that same
seat anyway). Thus, the quota would be 2/11, and the leftover
(unrepresented) quota at the end would be between 1/11 (Hare-like) and 2/11
(Droop-like).
Jameson
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I try to address the
On 7.2.2013, at 19.11, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I think V should be 3/4 (if quoted-in) or 1 (if would have won that same seat
anyway).
Do yu mean that also the weight of a quoted-in seat should grow dynamically to
1 if the algorithm finds out later that the quoted-in candidate would have been
Hi all,
maybe I should specify, that I prefer (although I don't require), that
a top-down approach (Otten, Schulze) to the ordering is applied before
a bottom-up approach (Rosenthiel).
In our party, we will most probably use a top-down approach.
Best regards
Peter Zborník
2013/2/7 Peter Zbornik
Hi Juho,
returning to your original example, again, with slightly modified
number of votes to avoid tie-breaking:
Coalition 1 (C1) - 51: w1 w2 m1 m2
Coalition 2 (C2) - 49: w3 w4 m3 m4
Results:
Seat number, candidate, coalition, quoted in
1. w1, C1, no
2. m3, C2, yes
3. w2, C1, no
4, w3,
On 7.2.2013, at 22.24, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Juho,
returning to your original example, again, with slightly modified
number of votes to avoid tie-breaking:
Coalition 1 (C1) - 51: w1 w2 m1 m2
Coalition 2 (C2) - 49: w3 w4 m3 m4
Results:
Seat number, candidate, coalition, quoted
yes, that's it.
P.
2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com:
On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to
proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates.
For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B,
James, Jonathan,
I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the
proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed.
I think Rosenthiel's approach has the following insufficiencies:
If I elect five women, and then increase the number of elected seats
until two
Kristofer,
to be more exact:
I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e.
meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are
quoted in proportionally within each gender too.
Proportionality within each gender is not needed, if the constraints are met.
Is there a quota or gender requirement or both requirements?
- If we assume that the quota rules are not needed since both genders will get
seats also otherwise, is it ok if one grouping gets 3 women and the other one 2
men?
- Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some
On 6.2.2013, at 12.29, Juho Laatu wrote:
- Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some grouping and
the fifth seat goes to a female candidate of the same grouping?
Clarification: In the second and fifth seats the quota rule forced the sex to
be changed.
Juho
STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin
Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better
than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is
clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore
that
Jameson,
I am not sure if we understand each other here.
I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives
(or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender.
If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the
quoted-in gender will in some cases
Hi Kristofer,
to be even more exact and correct:
I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e.
meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are
quoted in proportionally, i.e. that the quoted-in candidates are
proportionally distributed.
That should be the
2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com
Jameson,
I am not sure if we understand each other here.
I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives
(or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender.
If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2
On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com
Jameson,
I am not sure if we understand each other here.
I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives
(or moves toward) a proportional
No, only one election, please, no meta-elections. Two elections would
take too much time.
Thanks for your understanding.
PZ
2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com:
On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com
Say twenty, for instance.
We might have situations, where we will fill for instance 12 seats
(quotas for each triple of seats) and have 30 candidates, as an
extreme case.
I wanted to focus on the most important case, which is the top five seats.
The 12 seats/30 candidates case is an extreme, if
: James Gilmour [mailto:jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk]
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 11:49 PM
To: 'Jonathan Lundell'; 'Peter Zbornik'
Cc: 'election-meth...@electorama.com'
Subject: RE: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Jonathan Lundell Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 6:40
PM
On 5 Feb 2013, at 9:50 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear all,
We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our
party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party
and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.).
We used
2013/2/5 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com:
On 5 Feb 2013, at 9:50 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear all,
We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our
party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party
and more recently some people to
On 5 Feb 2013, at 10:23 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Say the default proportional ranking method elects women to all five
seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to
satisfy the constraints.
Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be
On 02/05/2013 06:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our
party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party
and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.).
We used standard fractional STV,
On 02/05/2013 06:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows:
We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like
Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using
the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
Hi Kristofer,
I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to
proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates.
For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C.
Coalition A and B get their first place candidate
Coalition C get their second place candidate quoted-in (i.e. they
would
Hi Kristofer,
I am sending a short P.S. to my email below just to clarify the example
In the example in my email below we get the following result:
Seat/place number (ordered) --- Coalition --- quotas apply
1 --- A, B --- no
2 --- C --- yes
3 --- A --- no
4 --- B --- no
5 --- C --- yes
The
Jonathan Lundell Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 6:40 PM
There is, I think, an underlying misconception here, namely
that STV order of election can be interpreted as a ranking of
level of support. It's not, in the general case.
Jonathan is absolutely right. If you want lists ordered by
On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to
proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates.
For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C.
Coalition A and B get their first place candidate
Coalition C get their
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