Re: That stupid diary

On 31 July 2016 at 12:25, John Clark wrote: > ​OK stop right there! Bruno says > "*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point > of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense. > It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1

Re: That stupid diary

​O​ n Sat, Jul 30, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote: ​> ​ > You have a set of memories > ​ > about your past that we can refer to as your "diary". ​But there is nothing in the laws of physics to prevent somebody else ​from having those exact same memories. You say that diary

Re: That stupid diary

On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 6:42 PM, John Clark wrote: > For some reason Bruno takes great stock in a written diary "Diary" refers to a set of memories of the past that one recognizes as genuine, independently of how they are recorded. Bruno's argument does not rely on giving

Re: That stupid diary

My question basically took a materialist tack, that at least in principle, it is possible, then to restore things as we restore files (call this my ulterior motive). It may be impossible, or technically, unachievable. Some days I care more than other days, regarding this. Each to their

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: ​> ​ > instead or arguing about whether "personal identity" is an identity (i.e. > reflexive, transitive relation), which it isn't, why not just make up a new > word for the concept that the Wman and the Mman are the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/30/2016 1:14 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 2:30 AM, Brent Meeker >wrote: ​> ​ I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all the memories of that person ​Yes.​ ​> ​ If duplicating

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 2:30 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > ​> ​ > I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all the memories of > that person ​Yes.​ > ​> ​ > If duplicating machines are ever invented ​It's only a matter of time. I'd be amazed if it took less

Re: That stupid diary

On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 3:36 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: Do you have a reason why or how, hypothetically, speaking, that some > magical computer cannot duplicate everything about you? ​No, and magic is not required.​ > ​> ​ > Are you a

Re: That stupid diary

Do you have a reason why or how, hypothetically, speaking, that some magical computer cannot duplicate everything about you? Are you a non-materialist? What reason given sufficient computing magic and the computers ability to do ginormous, research about john clark, forbids it from restoring

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: ​> ​ > That seems to be a perilously dualist position. ​I have a confession to make, I'm a dualist. I believe that nouns and adjectives are two entirely different things. I believe that atoms are nouns and I am

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 30 Jul 2016, at 15:03, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/30/2016 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories

That stupid diary

For some reason Bruno takes great stock in a written diary in his thought experiment, but that evidence is worthless unless the identity of the writer can be unambiguously established after all the duplications and all the visits of various people to various cities is over. But Bruno says that as

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/30/2016 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and hence of his past experience. If it's independent

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

On 29 Jul 2016, at 21:30, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> No idea what " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth knowing. > See preceding posts. I tried that. It didn't help. You might need to be more specific

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 29 Jul 2016, at 08:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 4:30 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: But they are not "one person". Although they share the same memories of before the duplication that have

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 29 Jul 2016, at 08:30, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is one of the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 29 Jul 2016, at 06:20, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote: If computationalism ​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the atoms have the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 29 Jul 2016, at 04:32, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote: If computationalism ​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 29 Jul 2016, at 03:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote: If computationalism ​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-