Hi John:
Sorry this took awhile - I have been very busy.
At 07:49 AM 1/31/2005, you wrote:
Hi, Hal,
I stepped out from this discussion a while ago, because it grew above my
head (or attentional endurance), but I keep reading. Now is a remark of
yours I want to ask about:
I defined information as
Hi All:
As I indicated in my last post I now see choice as an essential part of my
(2). But what do I mean by choice and how does choice operate on the
dynamic?
Speculation:
What is my idea of choice? In my (2) choice is the ability of a kernel
currently having physical reality to select in
At 10:19 01/02/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno writes:
I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs.
I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely
reiterated self-duplications)
and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite
On 1 Feb 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
Here is how I approach it, based on Schmidhuber. Suppose we pick a model
of computation based on a particular Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
Imagine this model being given all possible input tapes. There are an
uncountably infinite number of such tapes, but on
I would like to offer a resolution to my issue with my (2) by indicating
that choice is the essential variable that allows the dynamic of an
evolving Something over kernels within the All to be inconsistent with its
history.
This allows both the appearance of time and the appearance of choice
At 12:51 29/01/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
universes like ours.
Stathis Papaioannou replied:
I don't understand this
Bruno writes:
I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs.
I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely
reiterated self-duplications)
and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite sets of
relative alternative *are*
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Hi Stephen:
At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time
capsules?
I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel
Hi Stephen:
At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time
capsules?
I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.
When I said time in a previous
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its
past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated.
A sequence of kernels may for a number of steps look like one could derive
something
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its
past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated.
Barbour's idea is that there is no sequence to the time capsules at all,
-
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 6:38 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally
implemented as part of another program, would be conscious.
.
.
.
I would approach this from the Schmidhuber perspective that all programs
exist and run, in a Platonic sense, and this
I recently posted that I seemed to have two theories re how my multiverse
might work. These are:
1) Nothing - Something = to completion.
2) {Nothing#(n) + All[(n-1) = evolving Somethings]} -
{Nothing#(n+1) + All[n = evolving
Somethings]} : repeat...
Here:
- is a
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
universes like ours.
Stathis Papaioannou replied:
I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether it
I meant to define the symbol = as:
= is a path over kernels where each new step is inconsistent with prior
steps.
Hal Ruhl
is consistent to some degree /delta with the information available
about the prior steps?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 3:43 PM
Subject: RE: Belief Statements
I meant to define the symbol
At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)
I wanted to have a sequence that does not accumulate net
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)
I wanted to have a sequence
Hi Stephen:
At 10:49 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing
required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency?
It is not a logical inconsistency. What I am trying to convey is that each
step in the sequence pays no
At 09:41 27/01/05 +, Brent Meeker wrote:
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
With comp the
mind-body relation is one-one
in the body - mind direction
At 09:29 28/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a
particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I
think, therefore I am,
At 08:38 26/01/05 -0500, Tianran Chen wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City. They claimed
to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces
backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th,
and so on. And of
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think,
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in
the course of, say, a
On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think,
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by
Brent Meeker wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a
particular
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think,
therefore
I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in the course
of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think,
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in
the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney)
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 12:16:24 -0800 (PST)
It is true that there are some physical systems for which we can
predict the future state without calculating all intermediate states.
Periodic systems
On 28 Jan 2005 Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm not sure I understand the computational hyposthesis - and I certainly
don't
*believe* it.
So you don't believe that even in principle a digital computer can be
conscious? I think the challenge to this is going to come not from
theoretical considerations,
Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally
implemented as part of another program, would be conscious.
First, it's a little confusing what we mean by a bit string. Is this
the program of the computer? A snapshot of its state? Can a program
or a snapshot be
in the bud. I
am surprised that Greg Egan didn't notice this...
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 8:38 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Hal Finney wrote:
I had
Dear Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Hal and Tianran,
Assuming there is some aspect of consciousness that requires QM ( I
side with Penrose on this) these out of order computations are
impossible. This boils down to the fact that for systems that have
time-like relationship with each
Mind or John Gribbin's Schroedinger's Kittens.
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 9:48 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Dear Stephen
Stephen Paul King
Hi Hal,
At 22:30 17/01/05 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
I reject Schmidhuber Comp because a sequence of world states [world
kernels] which may indeed be Turing machine [or some extension there of]
emulable is nevertheless managed by the system's dynamic which is external
to the machine.
Any sub
What I am really talking about is availability of choice.
My All/Nothing model appears to preclude choice. In this it seems a member
of a class that assume all information already exists.
Awhile ago I posted on another model in which there is a Nothing. This
Nothing suffers the same
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.
However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with
nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not? It is
intelligence and consciousness which defines things and makes relative
comparisons.
Danny Mayes
Hal
At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.
However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with
nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not? It is intelligence
and consciousness which defines things and makes relative
It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics
question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known
physics were established.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.
However, this
At 04:41 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics
question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known
physics were established.
You really miss the point. It is a question of logic and finding an
unavoidable meaningful
At 01:32 16/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15/1/05 Bruno Marchal wrote:
Obviously! But it is so only because you dismiss the failure induction
problem. Also: third person identity is arguably an illusion. But I
hardy doubt first person identity can ever be an illusion or that it
Hello Hal,
In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a
universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with
Hi Bruno:
At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote:
Hello Hal,
snip mine
Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.
?
So I find I must also reject ... Comp: I (you) am (are)
computable/Turing emulable.
Hi Bruno:
In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a
universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with
]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
On 15/1/05 Danny Mayes wrote:
To have any sense perception there has to be the passage of an
inordinately large amount of time as compared to the smallest units of
time available. If each
On 15/1/05 Brent Meeker wrote:
(quoting my post)
It's easy to get confused over the meaning of terms like different person
here. The basic idea I am trying to get across is that if a person or other
conscious entity is destroyed and after a certain time period is (to an
arbitrary level of
[EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:
Could you explain this last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am
absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of
illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately
replaced by an exact copy, with all my
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer
to
simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the
world
will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here
I
am a few moments
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.
With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this
assumption would entail the falsity of comp,
which is that I can be simulated by a computer program.
(I, or any of
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer
to simply bypass the problem.
Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the plurality
of worlds, but in
counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
Could you explain this last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I
prefer to simply bypass the problem.
Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the
plurality of worlds,
At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:
Could you explain this last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer
to simply bypass the problem.
Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as
]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:
Could you explain this last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.
With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this
assumption would entail the falsity of comp,
which is that I can be simulated by a computer
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am
absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of
illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately
replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories,
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Alastair Malcolm [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 11 January 2005 14:47
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so
there are many notion
At 09:45 12/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me,
basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true
that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false');
This is a little ambiguous. But I will take it as
At 18:12 11/01/05 -0500, John M quotes Russell Standish writing:
(if I am correct in the quotes).
4) For those who believe in Computationalism, the Turing model of
computation implicitly requires this Time postulate.
Here I disagree a lot. Actually most models of computation does no
require
-
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 8:19 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 06:12:28PM -0500, John M wrote:
SNIP, Quotes for reply see above in the text.
On 9 January 2005 Alastair Malcolm wrote:
This is a fascinating discussion list, full of stimulating ideas and
theories, but I would be interested to know what people *actually* believe
on the subject of many/all worlds - what one would bet one's house or life
on, given that one were forced to
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.
I'm not sure that this is the best definition of a possible world.
I'm concerned that we are hiding a lot of assumptions in this word.
It relates to my earlier comment about ambiguity in which constitutes
At 10:32 09/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
logically possible(*) worlds (alpw).
I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many
IL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, January 10, 2005 6:50
PM
Subject: Re: Belief
Statements
Dear Russell,
since you e-mail without words
(only an attachment) I copy your text here to give my reply to it - interspaced,
if you don't mind :
--
On M
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 09 January 2005 16:21
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Alastair Malcolm writes:
For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of
many
worlds in some guise or other
- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 09 January 2005 19:28
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
I can't conceive of space-time being anything other than infinite. The
existence of all logically possible worlds seems necessary
Comments below, please.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 8:16 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Hi Russell:
My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property
but also
Hi Russell:
At 06:50 PM 1/10/2005, you wrote:
It is an assumption (or perhaps postulate: the Time postulate). It is
amenable to debate, just as Euclid's axioms are. I offer the following
points in its favour:
1) Observation is the process of creating information, by
distinguishing differences
Alastair Malcolm writes:
For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world
(ours) so conveniently life-suited - sufficiently
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Alastair Malcolm writes:
For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world
(ours) so conveniently
My views on the subject of a multiverse are:
1) The base level embedding system should have no net information.
2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic.
The above seem to have consequences:
i) There can be no down select [limitation] on the number of worlds.
ii) There can be no
@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 4:01 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
My views on the subject of a multiverse are:
1) The base level embedding system should have no net information.
2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic.
The above seem to have consequences:
i
Hi Russell:
My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property
but also produces all kinds of worlds that have no time in the sense of
there being any ordered sequence. There are also worlds that are just a
single kernel that is given physical reality in a manner
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