JC: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is
a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only
illegal according to the rules of
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
I don't see why this should be so.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
immortality
is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
inherent in that branch.
Stathis: I don't see why this
John Mikes wrote:
I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly
common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic
pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an
earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal
consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
complete world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
immortality
is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
inherent in that branch.
Stathis: I
Hal Finney writes:
Jesse Mazer writes:
Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider
the
thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where
entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible
for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property
Le 16-avr.-05, à 01:21, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
property X
and Y. For
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
property
Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't
there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal
systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never instantiated). This seems in direct
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically
impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk
about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be
logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously
Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you
think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori
contradictory?
Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that
is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:46 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
mechanically (even allowing infinite
Johnathan Colvin:
That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori
illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious
what
is allowed and what is forbidden.
So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according
to the rules of
I agree with Brent's comment:
I essentially agree. If we say, 2+2=5 then we have failed to describe
anything because we have contradicted our own semantics. Logic is not a
constraint on the world, but only on our use of language to describe it. But
that doesn't mean that any world for
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends,
for example
Jim Coons writes:
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in
time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it
matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be
earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle.
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
dressed in a pink rabbit outfit.
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
dressed in a
Jonathan Colvin writes:
I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I
said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just
because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically
possible.
It's important to understand that
Saibal Mitra wrote:
I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of
similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the
absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given
observer.
Given the absolute measure you can define effective
Jesse Mazer writes:
Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe
that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the
thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Generally, I don't think
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
-Original Message-
From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:02 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I
-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Saturday, April 16, 2005 12:27 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory
Jonathan Colvin writes:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I
think it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
dressed
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:58 AM
To: Brent Meeker
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 14-avr.-05, à 13:53, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Before drawing drastic conclusions, like QTI, from the multiple-worlds
Saibal Mitra wrote:
If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is
death, that
branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum
mechanics
doesn't
imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never
fall
asleep!
This latter statement
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
QM or QTI do not imply
that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
*experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake
up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die
in your sleep -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000
Jesse Mazer wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be
the last conscious being
Le 14-avr.-05, à 01:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
Nick Prince writes:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal
but
also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
live on - the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
QM or QTI do not imply
that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
*experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you
wake
up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if
Le 14-avr.-05, à 09:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some
worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the
consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max
Tegmark aknowledged this in a
://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Thursday, April 14, 2005 10:20 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
QM or QTI do
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where
you were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through
some means so that there are universes where your consciousness exists
at the very beginning? I don't really believe this, but the logic seems
to
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your consciousness will survive until the
Danny Mayes writes:
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where you
were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through some
means so that there are universes where your consciousness exists at the
very beginning? I don't really believe this, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in
time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it
matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be
earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. In
fact if our
snip
Stathias:
Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the
multiverse.
There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and
smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point
in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to
find yourself alive,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 7:38 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no
means clear that just because
Nick Prince writes:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but
also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
live on - the conclusion seems inescapable
Can anyone figure
I don't beleive QTI implies this at all. It does imply that your
experienced reality will get rather weird, as strange coincidences
will start happening to keep you alive. It also implies that friends
will be temporary, as you will see them all die off eventually - but
many people change
Hi Nick,
I asked a question in a thread Quantum accident survivor some time ago
where, at least in my mind, it was concluded that we can indeed be removed
from loved ones each time we survive a situation that was clearly deadly in
most cases and that one's consciousness is nudged away from the
Nick Prince wrote:
My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have
been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following
query and I am new to the group.
I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the
last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side,
we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the
most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company!
The
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the
last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter
side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which
even the most sociable amongst us may well tire
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