On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> In a post you agreed with principle 1:
> Principle 1: if the guy in Helsinki is assured that the event X will be
> statified/realized at both W and M, then P(X) = 1.
>
Probability is a measure of confidence, so
On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> I am still waiting for an explanation about your two recent
posts which contradicted themselves.
What are you talking about?
In a post you agreed with
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> I am still waiting for an explanation about your two recent posts which
> contradicted themselves.
What are you talking about?
>
> The first person remains singular for both copies.
Yes, and BOTH
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 9:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
On 9 August 2016 at 03:27, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
>> >>
>> And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem.
>> Before *you* perform the 2 slit experiment it would
On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If
computationalism is true then the machine will be able to make
2 copies that are identical to each other in every way and
On 9 August 2016 at 03:27, John Clark wrote:
And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same problem.
Before *you* perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be gibberish to ask*
you* "After the experiment what do *you* expect to see?", because both
before
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote:
> >
>> >
>> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If computationalism is true
>>
>> then the machine will be able to make 2 copies that are identical to
>> each other in every way and will remain identical until the
On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 8:49 PM, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 9:50 AM, Telmo Menezes
> wrote:
>
>
>> >
>> I am asking if you think that, for computationalism to be true, the
>> diaries of the duplicates must be equal even after the
On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 9:50 AM, Telmo Menezes
wrote:
>
> I am asking if you think that, for computationalism to be true, the
>
> diaries of the duplicates must be equal even after the duplication
>
> event.
Only if the environments the 2 are in are also
On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 7/31/2016 1:48 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> I would agree but Bruno wouldn't, according to him there is something about
>> me that a physical machine can't duplicate, Bruno is clear as mud about
>> what
>> that
On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 9:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:48 AM, Telmo Menezes
> wrote:
>
>
>> We make a copy of you. [...]
>>
>>
>>> >
>>> >
>>> OK stop right there! Bruno says
>>> "Nothing can duplicate a first person view
On 7/31/2016 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
> f
or comuptationalism to be true, then the
future diary must also be identical?
I don't know what that means, identical to what? I'm saying that
computationalism
is true if and only if a physical machine can duplicate
On 7/31/2016 1:48 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I would agree but Bruno wouldn't, according to him there is something about
>me that a physical machine can't duplicate, Bruno is clear as mud about what
>that something is but apparently it's important.
The future cannot be duplicated. Don't you
On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> But there is nothing in the laws of physics to prevent somebody else
>> from having those exact same memories.
>
>
> >
> At the level of macroscopic bodies there is. The somebody else can't
> occupy the same
On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:48 AM, Telmo Menezes
wrote:
>
>> We make a copy of you. [...]
>>
>>
> >
>> >
>> OK stop right there! Bruno says
>>
>> "
>> *Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point
>> of view, with or without
On 7/30/2016 7:25 PM, John Clark wrote:
O
n Sat, Jul 30, 2016 Telmo Menezes >wrote:
>
You have a set of memories
about your past that we can refer to as your "diary".
But there is nothing in the laws of
On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
> O
> n Sat, Jul 30, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> >
>> You have a set of memories
>>
>> about your past that we can refer to as your "diary".
>
>
> But there is nothing in the laws of physics to
On 31 July 2016 at 12:25, John Clark wrote:
> OK stop right there! Bruno says
> "*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point
> of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense.
> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1
O
n Sat, Jul 30, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> You have a set of memories
>
> about your past that we can refer to as your "diary".
But there is nothing in the laws of physics to prevent somebody else from
having those exact same memories. You say that diary
On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 6:42 PM, John Clark wrote:
> For some reason Bruno takes great stock in a written diary
"Diary" refers to a set of memories of the past that one recognizes as
genuine, independently of how they are recorded. Bruno's argument does
not rely on giving
to their own.Thanks.
-Original Message-
From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jul 30, 2016 3:48 pm
Subject: Re: That stupid diary
On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 3:36 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List
<everything-list@g
On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 3:36 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Do you have a reason why or how, hypothetically, speaking, that some
> magical computer cannot duplicate everything about you?
No, and magic is not required.
> >
> Are you a
Do you have a reason why or how, hypothetically, speaking, that some magical
computer cannot duplicate everything about you? Are you a non-materialist? What
reason given sufficient computing magic and the computers ability to do
ginormous, research about john clark, forbids it from restoring
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