On 16 March 2010 05:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that you
would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain thought comes
into your consciousness, I could have been really hurt if
Even if you
On 3/16/2010 4:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 05:51, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that you
would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain thought comes
into your
On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation
implies consciousness is not unitary but continually splits just as the
states of other quantum systems. So while these counterfactual states
(realized
On 3/15/2010 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation
implies consciousness is not unitary but continually splits just as the
states of other quantum
On 14 March 2010 08:43, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
(BTW the formatting for your last few posts looks odd when I read them
with Gmail. Would it be possible to revert to plain text?)
[Stathis]
Does that matter here? I thought the argument was that if system A is
capable of
On 3/14/2010 5:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 March 2010 08:43, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
(BTW the formatting for your last few posts looks odd when I read them
with Gmail. Would it be possible to revert to plain text?)
[Stathis]
Does that matter here? I thought
On 12 March 2010 11:59, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
The pathways are all intact and can spring into action if the person
wakes up. There is a continuum from everything being there and ready
to use immediately, to all there but parts of the system dormant, to
not there at all
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive
On 3/12/2010 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a
On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal
worlds, and
he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too.
In some worlds his car is a Toyota.
But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds.
Tp
On 11 Mar 2010, at 02:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Here's an interesting theory of consciousness in which
counterfactuals would make a difference.
The fat that the counterfactuals makes a difference is the essence of
comp and of the comp supervenience thesis. But that is the reason why
On 11 March 2010 13:57, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons
could be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is
unknown. The
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a
computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a
an actual computation currently not using that device.
I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems
On 3/11/2010 4:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 11 March 2010 13:57, Jack Mallahjackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes,
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive device in the actual
supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that
device.
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or
a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience
of a an actual
On 12 March 2010 04:17, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
[Stathis]
We can do a thought experiment. A brain is rigged to explode unless it
goes down one particular pathway. Does it change the computation being
implemented if it is given the right input so that it does go down
that
On 3/11/2010 2:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 March 2010 04:17, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
[Stathis]
We can do a thought experiment. A brain is rigged to explode unless it
goes down one particular pathway. Does it change the computation being
implemented if it is
On 12 March 2010 10:46, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
[Stathis]
When a brain is not being consciously used at all, because the person
is in dreamless sleep, the counterfactuals are all still there;
[Brent]
Hmmm. Are they? Suppose instead of being asleep the person is
On 3/11/2010 4:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 March 2010 10:46, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
[Stathis]
When a brain is not being consciously used at all, because the person
is in dreamless sleep, the counterfactuals are all still there;
[Brent]
Hmmm. Are they?
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
conclusion is that if the artificial neurons lack consciousness, then
On 3/10/2010 6:57 PM, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
conclusion is that if the
HI,
2010/3/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons
could be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is
unknown. The conclusion is that if
On 08 Mar 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that
consciousness supervenes only on realisations capable of
instantiating this complete range of underlying physical
On 9 March 2010 09:06, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
If consciousness supervenes on the physical realization of a computation,
including the inactive part, it means you attach consciousness on an unknown
physical phenomenon. It is a magical move which blurs the difficulty.
There
On 8 March 2010 16:46, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
--- On Fri, 3/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
If the inputs to the remaining brain tissue are the same as they would have
been normally then effectively you have replaced the missing parts with a
magical
On 08 Mar 2010, at 10:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's perhaps just a matter of definition but I would have thought the
requirement for a hypercomputer was not compatible with
computationalism, but potentially could still come under
functionalism.
Putnam(*) is responsible for introducing
On 06 Mar 2010, at 23:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and
one difficulty remains in the step
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that consciousness
supervenes only on realisations capable of instantiating this complete range
of underlying physical activity (i.e. factual + counterfactual) in virtue of
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference
between a computation and a description of computation. Due to
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and
one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between
a computation
On 04 Mar 2010, at 22:59, Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, I hope you feel better.
Thanks.
My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
Why would I think so?
Now I am warned.
--- Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you
On Mar 5, 8:43 am, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
and in any case is a thought experiment.
The term seems particularly appropriate in this case!
Charles
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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To post to this group, send
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my paper is that
the inputs to the remaining brain are identical to what they would have been
if the whole brain were present. Thus, the neural activity in the
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and
one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between
a computation and a description of computation. Due to the static
character of Platonia, some believes it
On 3/5/2010 1:29 PM, Charles wrote:
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my paper is that the
inputs to the remaining brain are identical to what they would have been if the
whole brain were present.
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has
counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
http://cogprints.org/6321/
I've finally come around
Bruno, I hope you feel better. My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
--- Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to assume
that counterfactuals count. No one but you considers that 'prescience' or
any
On 5 March 2010 06:43, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
similarly in your paper where you consider a gradual removal of brain
tissue. It would have to be very specific surgery to produce the sort of
delusional state you describe.
I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key
On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:33, Jack Mallah wrote:
I finally figured out what was happening to my emails: the spam
filter got overly agressive and it was sending some of the list
posts to the spam folder, but letting others into the inbox. The
post I'm replying to now was one that was hidden
On 12 February 2010 03:14, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
That's not true. For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain
has counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
http://cogprints.org/6321/
I've finally come around to reading this paper. You
I finally figured out what was happening to my emails: the spam filter got
overly agressive and it was sending some of the list posts to the spam folder,
but letting others into the inbox. The post I'm replying to now was one that
was hidden that way.
--- On Sun, 2/14/10, Bruno Marchal
2010/3/2 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
I guess by 'physical supervenience' you mean supervenience on physical
activity only. That is not what computationalism assumes. Computationalism
assumes supervenience on both physical activity and physical laws (aka
counterfactuals). There is
From: stath...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 20:23:55 +1100
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 23 February 2010 04:45, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
It seems that these thought experiments inevitably lead to considering
a
digital
Last post didn't show up in email. Seems random.
--- On Tue, 2/23/10, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
-even if there was a one-to-one relationship between distinct computations
and distinct observer-moments with distinct qualia, very similar computations
could produce very similar
On 23 February 2010 04:45, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
It seems that these thought experiments inevitably lead to considering a
digital simulation of the brain in a virtual environment. This is
usually brushed over as an inessential aspect, but I'm coming to the
opinion that it
My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so maybe
not today.
--- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
OK, so you're suggesting there may not be a one-to-one
. I'll try resending from my gmail account and hopefully it'll work
better!
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: RE: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my
. I'll try resending from my gmail account and hopefully it'll work
better!
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: RE: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 10:40 AM, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so
maybe not today.
--- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:42:17 -0800
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
To: everything
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have others such as Bruno replied. I
use yahoo email. I may need to use a different method to prevent my posts from
getting lost. They do seem to show up on Google groups though.
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:42:17 -0800
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
Subject: RE: problem of size '10
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have others such as Bruno replied. I
--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On reading the first page of your paper a thought occurred to me. What
actually happens in the case of progressive Alzheimer’s disease is a bit
different from the idea that I get from the discussion.
Hi Stephen. Certainly,
, could this be
happening here? Seriously!
Onward!
Stephen
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Friday, February 12, 2010 11:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: problem of size '10
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute consciousness
to a movie of a computation
That's not
On 13 Feb 2010, at 19:48, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute
consciousness to a
On 11 Feb 2010, at 17:14, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low
measure; it's a brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously
no - it
On 11 Feb 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread
(which is actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a
brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a
zombie. Stop abusing the language.
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread (which is
actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and the other
half were twice their
On 28 January 2010 12:46, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
than the others have. My reply to the main measure again '10 thread will
follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal
On 28 Jan 2010, at 02:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a
different issue than the others have. My reply to the main measure
again '10 thread will follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
than the others have. My reply to the main measure again '10 thread will
follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would also not say yes to a computationalist
On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 7:46 PM, Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different
issue than the others have. My reply to the main measure again '10 thread
will follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal
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