On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we see around us
is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a
correct
argumentation
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we see around us
is material, then the
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting
a statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about
reality and thus being forced to accept
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
consciousness
of
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
So to save
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
ontological RITISAR existence.
So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
running on
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
No,
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
subset of the class of computational
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form.
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:58, Flammarion wrote:
I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that
if you write down hypothetical truths about what
an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude
that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine.
I don't proceed in that way at
Bruno:
the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
your website?
Ronald
On Aug 18, 10:46 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Ronald,
On 18 Aug 2009, at 14:14, ronaldheld wrote:
I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
I do not
Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
not about
explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
contingency as the price
paid for
Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of
Darwin idea that things evolve.
We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you
Hi,
Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
exercises:
1) count the number of bijections from a set A to itself. (= card{x
such that x is bijection from A to A})
2) describe some canonical
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8
On 19 Aug 2009, at 18:41, ronaldheld wrote:
Bruno:
the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
your website?
Yes.
It is also the pdf on my home page, at the right of
A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of
Plotinus’ Theory of Matter
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
rigorous spelling out
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat
Seems like this post didn't go through, so I'll resend it:
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming
On 19 Aug 2009, at 23:03, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Hi,
Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
exercises:
...
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e.
CTM
and
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable* of
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter.
The notion of computation and computability have been
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is
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