Re: Brain teaser
On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and
doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course we don't know that for sure... you are being
ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with a
proof, for your idea of we know that. I understand...
The same is true for the proposition we are not machine.
Is not p, of Bpp, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is
ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...},
with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base
level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological as
opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting means
believed by some machine, and which I denote by Bp. Of course,
and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely
arithmetical proposition (beweisbar(p)), but they are
epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition
coded in the machine language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which describes
the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical proposition
with their usual standard interpretation). Then some arithmetical
proposition are singled out as epistemological because they describe:
- the thinking of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp p, or the observation of
some machine like Bp Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp Dt p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the
corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I
don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision
has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is
limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age
7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing how
a digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew
already, in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong. I
have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd
comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely
said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language. You give always too
much precise answer but with a non relevant precision. Here you were
just wrong, but no matter how we try to make the point, you will evade
it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or on opinion assertion, making hard
to progress.
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should be astonished.
OK. Human are relative universal number by comp... Could you
add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean?
Relative to what?
Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that we
assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing the
combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or
-relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to
the base theory, or
-relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal
number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.
Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be
seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers?
Which isomorphisms?
Consider how many different languages humans use to describe the
same physical world, we would think it silly if someone made claims
that only English was the 'correct' language. So too with mathematics.
You confuse the content of mathematics and the language used. The
mathematical reality has nothing to do with language.
You attribute to me the idea that chalkboard don't exist. Did I
ever said that?
UDA Step 8.
Many others have already told you this many times. UDA step 8
concludes that chalkboard does not exist in a primary sense. Not
that chalkboard does not exist in the observable sense.
OK, my point is that just as the chalkboard emerges so too do the
possible arithmetic representations of said chalkboard.
That could make sense if you put the card on the table, and tell what
you are assuming, and how the numbers emerge
Re: Brain teaser
On 3/10/2013 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and
doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course we don't know that for sure... you are being ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with a
proof, for your idea of we know that. I understand...
The same is true for the proposition we are not machine.
Is not p, of Bpp, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Hi Bruno,
OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels?
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...},
with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base
level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological as
opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting means
believed by some machine, and which I denote by Bp. Of course, and
that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely arithmetical
proposition (beweisbar(p)), but they are epistemological because
they involve a machine, and a proposition coded in the machine
language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which describes
the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical proposition
with their usual standard interpretation). Then some arithmetical
proposition are singled out as epistemological because they describe:
- the thinking of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp p, or the observation of
some machine like Bp Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp Dt p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the
corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I
don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision
has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age 7
to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing how a
digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew already,
in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong. I
have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd
comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely
said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language.
No, they use naive language. They do not assume that they know what
they do not know.
You give always too much precise answer but with a non relevant
precision. Here you were just wrong, but no matter how we try to make
the point, you will evade it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or on
opinion assertion, making hard to progress.
You are claiming that my question is incoherent. OK, let us move along.
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should be astonished.
OK. Human are relative universal number by comp... Could you
add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean?
Relative to what?
Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that we
assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing the
combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or
-relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to
the base theory, or
-relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal
number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.
Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be
seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers?
Which isomorphisms?
Relations between universal numbers that are equivalences. For
example, the universal number that encodes the statement X in language B
is isomorphic to the statement X in language A, iff B(X) = A(X) ...
Consider how many different languages humans use to describe the same
physical world, we would think it silly if someone made claims that
only English was the 'correct' language. So too with mathematics.
You confuse the content of mathematics and the language used. The
mathematical reality has nothing to do with language.
No, that is not my sin. My sin is that I do not know exactly now to
communicate in
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 10 Mar 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells, Hey, stop! they may stop. This is the case even though the process is still deterministic or probabilistic. In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to steal a car will steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If someone yelling at the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free will over their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe. You can yell at a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will be no change in where the stone rolls. In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief will stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person yelling nor the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not. What difference would it make to them if neither the person yelling nor the thief can control whether or not they are yelling or stealing? It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random). You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't exist, why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not? I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out or not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of interest to me? Furthermore, it is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not even with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical chaotic systems. It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would be impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not. Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it would impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means, things are *determined*. Why would there be a such thing as care in a deterministic universe? I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all things are determined* then there can be no care. Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine everything. Bruno A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to say that you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain works. This is not because the judge does not believe the expert witness, it is because brain physics is not relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the brain physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. An expert witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your brain which is associated with impulse control will have a very good chance of convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant. Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*. Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may technically be *English* but it is still a language problem. If the brain is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person may not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. Judges are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or random, but they still make their judgements despite this. No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean that their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they would not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of inevitable and necessary consequences of antecedent states of affairs. Judgment is impossible under determinism. Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible. You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic. Craig Brent Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2904 / Virus Database: 2641/6156 - Release Date: 03/08/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Brain teaser
On 10 Mar 2013, at 09:31, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/10/2013 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto
Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless
and doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course we don't know that for sure... you are being
ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with
a proof, for your idea of we know that. I understand...
The same is true for the proposition we are not machine.
Is not p, of Bpp, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Hi Bruno,
OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels?
To ask a machine about herself (like in self-duplication experiences),
you need to represent the machine in the language available to the
machine. This generates the stratification.
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is
ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...},
with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base
level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological
as opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting
means believed by some machine, and which I denote by Bp. Of
course, and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely
arithmetical proposition (beweisbar(p)), but they are
epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition
coded in the machine language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which
describes the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical
proposition with their usual standard interpretation). Then some
arithmetical proposition are singled out as epistemological
because they describe:
- the thinking of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp p, or the observation
of some machine like Bp Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp Dt p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of
the corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further
question. I don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK.
Precision has its place and time but not here when our time to
respond is limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from
age 7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans
knowing how a digital machine work. Of course, the digital
machine knew already, in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong.
I have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd
comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just
precisely said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language.
No, they use naive language. They do not assume that they know
what they do not know.
And you do?
You give always too much precise answer but with a non relevant
precision. Here you were just wrong, but no matter how we try to
make the point, you will evade it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or
on opinion assertion, making hard to progress.
You are claiming that my question is incoherent. OK, let us move
along.
No, I was claiming that you were wrong. You said I don't take into
account children, but I do.
AUDA can be said to take into account all creatures, or all Löbian
consistent extensions of elementary arithmetic.
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should be astonished.
OK. Human are relative universal number by comp... Could you
add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word
mean? Relative to what?
Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that
we assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing
the combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or
-relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to
the base theory, or
-relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal
number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.
Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be
seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers?
Which isomorphisms?
Relations between universal numbers that are equivalences. For
example, the universal number that
Re: Brain teaser
On 3/10/2013 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Mar 2013, at 09:31, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/10/2013 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and
doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course we don't know that for sure... you are being
ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with
a proof, for your idea of we know that. I understand...
The same is true for the proposition we are not machine.
Is not p, of Bpp, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Hi Bruno,
OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels?
To ask a machine about herself (like in self-duplication experiences),
you need to represent the machine in the language available to the
machine. This generates the stratification.
This in not ontic as it implies an extension, as in: Machine X is
represented by machine X' which is represented by machine X'' which is
represented by ... And, some how X does not equal X
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is
ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...},
with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base
level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological
as opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting
means believed by some machine, and which I denote by Bp. Of
course, and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely
arithmetical proposition (beweisbar(p)), but they are
epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition
coded in the machine language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which
describes the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical
proposition with their usual standard interpretation). Then some
arithmetical proposition are singled out as epistemological
because they describe:
- the thinking of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp p, or the observation
of some machine like Bp Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp Dt p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the
corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I
don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision
has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is
limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age
7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing
how a digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew
already, in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong.
I have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd
comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely
said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language.
No, they use naive language. They do not assume that they know
what they do not know.
And you do?
How could I? Why do you think that if I do not know exactly the
language to answer your question then I must be some ...
You give always too much precise answer but with a non relevant
precision. Here you were just wrong, but no matter how we try to
make the point, you will evade it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or on
opinion assertion, making hard to progress.
You are claiming that my question is incoherent. OK, let us move
along.
No, I was claiming that you were wrong. You said I don't take into
account children, but I do.
AUDA can be said to take into account all creatures, or all Löbian
consistent extensions of elementary arithmetic.
So, I am not a creature included here, somehow, and yet my
existence is not a falsification of comp. Interesting, I am deluded
about being deluded about being deluded about being ... .
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should be astonished.
OK. Human are relative universal number by comp... Could you
add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean?
Relative to what?
Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that
we assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of
Re: Brain teaser
On 10 Mar 2013, at 11:26, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/10/2013 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Mar 2013, at 09:31, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/10/2013 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto
Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless
and doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course we don't know that for sure... you are being
ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an
hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory
with a proof, for your idea of we know that. I understand...
The same is true for the proposition we are not machine.
Is not p, of Bpp, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Hi Bruno,
OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels?
To ask a machine about herself (like in self-duplication
experiences), you need to represent the machine in the language
available to the machine. This generates the stratification.
This in not ontic as it implies an extension, as in: Machine X
is represented by machine X' which is represented by machine X''
which is represented by ... And, some how X does not equal X
We can do that, relatively to the base theory or to a universal
number. That's the role of the Dx = xx method. I will explain more
on the FOAR list, as I have explained this here more than once.
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is
ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0),
s(s(0)), ...}, with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that
base level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is
ontological as opposed to epistemological proposition, which in
this setting means believed by some machine, and which I
denote by Bp. Of course, and that is what comp makes possible,
Bp is also a purely arithmetical proposition (beweisbar(p)),
but they are epistemological because they involve a machine,
and a proposition coded in the machine language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which
describes the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the
arithmetical proposition with their usual standard
interpretation). Then some arithmetical proposition are singled
out as epistemological because they describe:
- the thinking of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp p, or the
observation of some machine like Bp Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp Dt p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of
the corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further
question. I don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK.
Precision has its place and time but not here when our time to
respond is limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from
age 7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans
knowing how a digital machine work. Of course, the digital
machine knew already, in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more
wrong. I have no clue why you make such ad hominem and
completely absurd comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just
precisely said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language.
No, they use naive language. They do not assume that they know
what they do not know.
And you do?
How could I? Why do you think that if I do not know exactly the
language to answer your question then I must be some ...
You give always too much precise answer but with a non relevant
precision. Here you were just wrong, but no matter how we try to
make the point, you will evade it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or
on opinion assertion, making hard to progress.
You are claiming that my question is incoherent. OK, let us
move along.
No, I was claiming that you were wrong. You said I don't take into
account children, but I do.
AUDA can be said to take into account all creatures, or all Löbian
consistent extensions of elementary arithmetic.
So, I am not a creature included here,
No, you are.
somehow, and yet my existence is not a falsification of comp.
Interesting, I am deluded about being deluded about being deluded
about being ... .
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should
Occam's Razor, Vacuum and the Scheme of the primary conditions of existence.
Occam's Razor, Vacuum and the Scheme of the primary conditions of existence. ==. Vacuum is a Negative Euclidean space (-2D) so called Pseudo- Euclidean space. It is the simplest reference frame - like the Euclidean space ( 2D). Now I will put a virtual - ideal particle in this -2D. The -2D is a very thin and flat homogeneous space, so my particle also must be thin and flat and symmetrical. Can it be a very thin and tiny limited line- string --particle? No. In my opinion even this very thin and tiny line under good microscope will be looked as a rectangle. Can it be a very thin and tiny limited loop? No. The geometrical form of a loop is too complex, needs supplementary forces to create it. Can it be a very thin and tiny limited circle? Yes. From all geometrical forms the circle is the most symmetrical. The surface of a circle takes up the minimal area it can and I will write it by formula: C/D= pi= 3.14. (!) But I can put many particles there, for example, Avogadro's number of particles: N(a). (!) # What is my next step? If I were a mathematician I would say nothing. But if I were a physicist I would say that 2D must have some physical parameters like: volume (V), temperature (T) and density (P). Yes, it seems the idea is right. Then, volume (V) is zero, temperature (T) is zero but . . but density (P) cannot be zero if 2D is a real space then its density can approximately be zero. # What can I do with these three parameters? I have only one possibility, to write the simplest formula: VP/T=R ( Clausius Clapeyron formula ! ) What is R? R is some kind of physical state of my 2D. And if I divide the whole space R by Avogadro's numbers of particles then I have a formula R/ N(a) = k, then k ( as a Boltzmann constant) is some kind of physical state of one single virtual- ideal particle. (!) # But all creators of Quantum theory said that this space, as a whole, must have some kind of background energy (E). And its value must be enormous. But the background mass of every Avogadro's particles in 2D has approximately zero mass, it is approximately massless (M). Fact. The detected material mass of the matter in the Universe is so small (the average density of all substance in the Universe is approximately p=10^-30 g/sm^3) that physicists say: ' More than 90% of the matter in the Universe is unseen.' And nobody knows what this unseen 'dark matter' is. So, if I divide enormous energy (E) by approximately dark massless (M) then the potential energy/ mass of every single virtual- ideal particle ( according to Einstein and Dirac) is E/M=c^2 (potential energy/mass E/M=c^2 ! ) ( I don't know why physicists call E/M= c^2 'rest mass' and never say potential energy/mass E/M=c^2 .) In potential state my particle doesn't move, so its impulse is h = 0. # My conclusion. I have virtual- ideal- massless particle which has geometrical and physical parameters: C/D= pi= 3.14 . . . . , R/ N(a) = k, E/M=c^2, h=0. All my virtual- ideal- massless particles are possible to call ' bosons' or 'antiparticles' . These bosons are approximately massless but have huge potential energy/mass E/M=c^2 . But I have no fermions, no electric charge, no tachyons, no time, no mass, no movement at this picture. # ===.. Now, thinking logically, I must explain all the effects of motions. And. . . and I cannot say it better than Newton: 'For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces.' # How can one single virtual- ideal particle start its movement? At first, it will be right to think about some simple kind of movement, for example: my particle will move in straight line along 2D surface from some point A to the point B. What is possible to say now? According to the Michelson-Morley experiment my particle must move with constant speed: c=1 and its speed is independent. Its speed doesn't depend on any other object or subject, it means the reason of its speed is hidden in itself, it is its inner impulse. This impulse doesn't come from any formulas or equations. And when Planck introduced this inner impulse(h) to physicists, he took it from heaven, from ceiling. Sorry. Sorry. I must write: Planck introduced this inner impulse (h) intuitively. I must write: Planck introduced his unit (h) phenomenologically. At any way, having Planck's inner impulse (unit h=1) my particle flies with speed c=1. We call it photon now. Photon's movement from some point A to the point B doesn't change the flat and homogeneous 2D surface. Of course, my photon must be careful, because in some local place some sun's gravitation can catch and change its trajectory I hope it will be lucky to escape from the sun's gravity love. # My photon can have other possibility to move. This second possibility was discover by Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck in 1925. They said the elementary particle can rotate around its diameter
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:10:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 8:13:38 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 4:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells, Hey, stop! they may stop. This is the case even though the process is still deterministic or probabilistic. In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to steal a car will steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If someone yelling at the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free will over their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe. You can yell at a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will be no change in where the stone rolls. In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief will stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person yelling nor the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not. What difference would it make to them if neither the person yelling nor the thief can control whether or not they are yelling or stealing? It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random). You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't exist, why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not? I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out or not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of interest to me? Furthermore, it is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not even with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical chaotic systems. It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would be impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not. Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it would impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means, things are *determined*. Why would there be a such thing as care in a deterministic universe? I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all things are determined* then there can be no care. Only because you are determined to think so (in both senses). No, because it doesn't make sense the other way. What could it mean to care in a deterministic world? What does it mean in a random world? Same thing - it means committing resources to make it happen or prevent it happening. That pre-supposes that there is a such thing as committing resources INTENTIONALLY to INTENTIONALLY make it happen or INTENTIONALLY prevent it happening. In a random or deterministic world, ALL *MUST* be PURELY *UN*-INTENTIONAL. There can therefore be no intentional assignment of resources, no making or preventing of anything that happens. Everything just happens the only way that it can happen. The Mars rover cares about not getting stuck, We program it to avoid getting stuck, just as we might guide a golf ball into a hole with a series of putts. That doesn't mean the golf ball whats to go toward the hole. so it spends sensor time and cpu cycles and battery power to evaluate paths and take the long way around obstacles. For the rover, it's not the long way around anything, it's just the way that it is programmed to take. It doesn't care if it's costly or not - it has no idea that time or energy are valuable in any way and will conserve or waste them with equal indifference, just as a golf ball is just as happy in the sand trap as it is on the green. You care about people agreeing that computers can't be conscious, so you spend hours asserting it on the internet. I don't care whether people agree or not. I care about the truth of what consciousness is. I have found it actually kind of sad when people finally realize that I was probably right all along. I seem to prefer the disagreement. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 4:33:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells, Hey, stop! they may stop. This is the case even though the process is still deterministic or probabilistic. In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to steal a car will steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If someone yelling at the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free will over their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe. You can yell at a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will be no change in where the stone rolls. In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief will stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person yelling nor the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not. What difference would it make to them if neither the person yelling nor the thief can control whether or not they are yelling or stealing? It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random). You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't exist, why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not? I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out or not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of interest to me? Furthermore, it is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not even with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical chaotic systems. It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would be impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not. Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it would impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means, things are *determined*. Why would there be a such thing as care in a deterministic universe? I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all things are determined* then there can be no care. Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine everything. But it does entail that we cannot determine anything. That's my point, is that care can only arise out of the possibility of determining something ourselves, just as the idea of a game can only arise out of the possibility of participation. Without that possibility of direct participation, the whole ontological basis of care is nullified as clouds would be nullified in the absence of the possibility of atmosphere. Craig Bruno A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to say that you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain works. This is not because the judge does not believe the expert witness, it is because brain physics is not relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the brain physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. An expert witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your brain which is associated with impulse control will have a very good chance of convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant. Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*. Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may technically be *English* but it is still a language problem. If the brain is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person may not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. Judges are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or random, but they still make their judgements despite this. No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean that their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they would not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of inevitable and necessary consequences of antecedent states of affairs. Judgment is impossible under determinism. Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible. You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic. Craig Brent Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:16:06 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 7:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: A person can resist their both their environment and genetic programming, And you know this how? Because identical twins can intentionally lead very different lives. We can rebel against our parents, we can seek to compensate for genetic defects. What is your basis for denying that we can resist given conditions? Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:13:55 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 6:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: An automatic pilot only controls the plane to the extent that it extends human intentions to control the plane. The automatic pilot can just as easily be set to crash the plane into a mountain as soon as possible and it won't know the difference or care. So that proves that people who commit suicide aren't conscious...? No, it says nothing about the consciousness of people who intentionally commit suicide. I don't see the connection. People commit suicide because the experience of living their lives is qualitatively intolerable, not because they have a programming error and can't tell the the difference between killing themselves and not killing themselves. An automatic pilot is incapable of committing suicide. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
Moreover, some people appear to hang tough with life, and do not commit suicide, despite the intolerable conditions of their life. Which is something of a puzzle, I suppose. Some people do and some people don't. So maybe its a biological condition that makes us hang in there? -Original Message- From: Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, Mar 10, 2013 10:21 am Subject: Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:13:55 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 6:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: An automatic pilot only controls the plane to the extent that it extends human intentions to control the plane. The automatic pilot can just as easily be set to crash the plane into a mountain as soon as possible and it won't know the difference or care. So that proves that people who commit suicide aren't conscious...? No, it says nothing about the consciousness of people who intentionally commit suicide. I don't see the connection. People commit suicide because the experience of living their lives is qualitatively intolerable, not because they have a programming error and can't tell the the difference between killing themselves and not killing themselves. An automatic pilot is incapable of committing suicide. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 11:35:31 AM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote: Moreover, some people appear to hang tough with life, and do not commit suicide, despite the intolerable conditions of their life. Which is something of a puzzle, I suppose. Some people do and some people don't. So maybe its a biological condition that makes us hang in there? Maybe biology doesn't care and it's up to us personally and directly? -Original Message- From: Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: Sent: Sun, Mar 10, 2013 10:21 am Subject: Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:13:55 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 6:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: An automatic pilot only controls the plane to the extent that it extends human intentions to control the plane. The automatic pilot can just as easily be set to crash the plane into a mountain as soon as possible and it won't know the difference or care. So that proves that people who commit suicide aren't conscious...? No, it says nothing about the consciousness of people who intentionally commit suicide. I don't see the connection. People commit suicide because the experience of living their lives is qualitatively intolerable, not because they have a programming error and can't tell the the difference between killing themselves and not killing themselves. An automatic pilot is incapable of committing suicide. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie
On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: What I am saying though is that even a perfect correlation does not mean direct causation. Everyone has a brain and a heart, but that doesn't mean the brain causes the heart. Up to now whenever we observe a fully functioning human brain we also observe a human heart connected to it, in fact historically the primary method for determining if a person is dead is checking for a heartbeat to see if that organ is still working. If I said that the electronics of your television must be linked to the plot of the TV series you are watching, would you still not understand? If you said the TV show came from Santa Clauses Workshop and then refused to say exactly what is going on at Santa's home I would not understand because there would be nothing there to understand. Would you insist that there must be some plot generating component in your TV set? If whenever I changed the circuitry of the TV set the characters on the TV not only acted differently but felt differently then yes the only logical conclusion is that there is a plot generating and more important a emotion generating component in the TV set they are opposite in every way - because they are literally the opposite side of each other. If whenever X happens Y happens and whenever X does not happen Y never happens then X causes Y, it's what the word causes means for goodness sake. And it is the word 'causes' which is completely wrong when applied to the explanatory gap. Nobody, absolutely positively nobody would try to make the case that explaining something and saying what caused it was “literally the opposite side of each other” unless logic did not support their views and renouncing logic was less painful than renouncing those views. A glass of water happens every time there is water in a glass. Yes. That doesn't mean the water causes the glass or the glass causes the water. This is getting silly. Water in a glass causes a glass of water. I think that living cells are more conscious than anything which is not a living cell. You use that word living as if it's a talisman to ward off the evil forces of physics, but biologists can't even agree on what life means and have never even found a hint that life doesn't obey the same exact laws of physics that non-life does. And there isn't even a sharp dividing line between life and non life; Is a virus alive? Well sort of. If you can get silicon dioxide to make a living cell, then you might have a point If you can get a living cell to make a microprocessor then you might have a point. If my brain changed my mind, In other words if your brain started to do things differently. Differently than what? Different from what it was before. My brain changes my mind all the time. Yes, and your brain chemistry changes all the time too. Every morning my brain wakes me up. Just like clockwork, clocks are another mechanism that operates according to the laws of physics. I am asleep and am awakened at a time deemed appropriate by my brain. Just like clockwork, clocks are another mechanism that operates according to the laws of physics. I don't have a choice when my brain wakes me up in the morning. OK, so there are things that Craig Weinberg's brain does that Craig Weinberg CANNOT control but that CAN control Craig Weinberg. How in the world does that strengthen your point? if it started to do things differently it did so for a reason, a new chemical introduced into your bloodstream that made it past the blood brain barrier for example, or the brain started doing things differently for no reason at all, in other words random. ? Which word didn't you understand? The subconscious is still consciousness Yeah yeah I've heard it all before, and as I've also said before nobody, absolutely positively nobody would try to make the case that X is equal to not X unless logic did not support their views and renouncing logic was less painful than renouncing those views. Please give me experimental evidence of one chemical reaction in the brain that is not controlled by a impersonal law of physics. Any chemical reaction which is involved in my deciding to hold in a sneeze. There would be no deciding to do if foreign particles didn't trigger release of histamines which irritate nerve cells in the nose and send a signal to the brain. That signal is excitatory pushing in the direction of a sneeze, and for every excitatory signal there is almost always a inhibitory signal saying not to do it, one signal will be stronger than the other so you will either sneeze or not. Should we inform CERN that pollen does not obey the laws of physics, or histamines? Where are these inhibitory signals coming from? Mars? No not Mars nor are they transmitted from a radio station at Santa Claus's Workshop, they come from other inhibitory neurons strictly obeying
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Everyone except free will deniers know exactly what free will is. I am NOT a free will denier anymore than I am a burp denier, and I can assure you I don't know what free will is supposed to mean and neither do you. It needs no description unless you are bending over backward to pretend it doesn't exist. I neither pretend that free will exists (except as a ASCII sequence) or does not exist because the term means precisely nothing. Are you claiming then that it both does not exist and does not not exist? Yes and there is only one thing in the universe that has both those characteristics, gibberish. So just standard bigotry. Whoever disagrees with me about anything is a crazy idiot.. Politeness aside I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that whoever continually insists that X is not determined and X is not not determined is a idiot speaking gibberish. What the hell are you talking about?? If it's teleological then its mechanistic No. Mechanistic means can be employed to teleological ends but teleology but teleology itself need not have anything to do with mechanism. What the hell are you talking about?? A action is teleological if it happens for a reason, in particular a advance toward a goal. So a computer acted in a teleological way when it moved to the next line in its program because it was a advancement toward its goal of finding the billionth digit of PI. You think people should be held responsible for random events and events which they were powerless to stop? Yes because everybody is powerless to stop the laws of physics and because the only legitimate reason for punishing anybody for anything is to prevent similar atrocities from happening in the future. Perhaps a person is a moral monster and enjoys inflicting pain on others because he had a bad environment as a child, or maybe he had bad genes, or maybe a random cosmic ray scrambled his brains; it doesn't matter because none of those possibilities would make him one smidgin less of a monster. And monsters cannot be ignored, they need to be dealt with. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:43:38 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: Everyone except free will deniers know exactly what free will is. I am NOT a free will denier anymore than I am a burp denier, and I can assure you I don't know what free will is supposed to mean and neither do you. If you say that you don't know what X is and that I don't either, then you are a denier of X. It needs no description unless you are bending over backward to pretend it doesn't exist. I neither pretend that free will exists (except as a ASCII sequence) or does not exist because the term means precisely nothing. Then you can't be mad about being called a denier of nothing. Are you claiming then that it both does not exist and does not not exist? Yes and there is only one thing in the universe that has both those characteristics, gibberish. So you are asserting that there is such a thing as gibberish which has magical powers to exist and not to exist. Most people would say that if some communication is gibberish that it does not refer to anything, not that what it refers to exists and doesn't exist. Your definition is entirely your own as far as I am aware. So just standard bigotry. Whoever disagrees with me about anything is a crazy idiot.. Politeness aside I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that whoever continually insists that X is not determined and X is not not determined is a idiot speaking gibberish. Like I said - standard bigotry. You don't understand what others are talking about, so they're crazy. What the hell are you talking about?? If it's teleological then its mechanistic No. Mechanistic means can be employed to teleological ends but teleology but teleology itself need not have anything to do with mechanism. What the hell are you talking about?? A action is teleological if it happens for a reason, in particular a advance toward a goal. So a computer acted in a teleological way when it moved to the next line in its program because it was a advancement toward its goal of finding the billionth digit of PI. No. The computer has no goal of its own. The actions of the electronic or mechanical structures are set into motion for human teleological purposes alone. There is no more goal of finding the billionth digit of Pi than a pendulum has in swinging a billion times. You think people should be held responsible for random events and events which they were powerless to stop? Yes because everybody is powerless to stop the laws of physics and because the only legitimate reason for punishing anybody for anything is to prevent similar atrocities from happening in the future. No, that would only make sense if people had control of their own actions independently of your idea of physics. Punishing stones who roll down a hill is not going to prevent similar rollings from happening in the future. You do understand this right? Tell me that you can see why punishment requires voluntary control of one's own actions independently of physics to be effective. Perhaps a person is a moral monster and enjoys inflicting pain on others because he had a bad environment as a child, or maybe he had bad genes, or maybe a random cosmic ray scrambled his brains; it doesn't matter because none of those possibilities would make him one smidgin less of a monster. And monsters cannot be ignored, they need to be dealt with. Why? Monsters are just physics. Nothing needs to be dealt with unless we have free will. Craig John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 11:57:16 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 9, 2013 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: What I am saying though is that even a perfect correlation does not mean direct causation. Everyone has a brain and a heart, but that doesn't mean the brain causes the heart. Up to now whenever we observe a fully functioning human brain we also observe a human heart connected to it, in fact historically the primary method for determining if a person is dead is checking for a heartbeat to see if that organ is still working. What does that have to do with the heart and brain being intimately connected without causing each others function? If I said that the electronics of your television must be linked to the plot of the TV series you are watching, would you still not understand? If you said the TV show came from Santa Clauses Workshop and then refused to say exactly what is going on at Santa's home I would not understand because there would be nothing there to understand. Even if you had lived every day of your life in Santa's Workshop? Would you insist that there must be some plot generating component in your TV set? If whenever I changed the circuitry of the TV set the characters on the TV not only acted differently but felt differently then yes the only logical conclusion is that there is a plot generating and more important a emotion generating component in the TV set. That's not a scientific hypothesis, it's just a sentimental prejudice. There is no evidence to support the locality of emotional experience to neurochemistry, only that access to such experience is modulated locally. Local emotion really doesn't make much sense, as molecular shapes have no need of any 'emotional' qualities to interact with other molecular shapes. they are opposite in every way - because they are literally the opposite side of each other. If whenever X happens Y happens and whenever X does not happen Y never happens then X causes Y, it's what the word causes means for goodness sake. And it is the word 'causes' which is completely wrong when applied to the explanatory gap. Nobody, absolutely positively nobody would try to make the case that explaining something and saying what caused it was “literally the opposite side of each other” unless logic did not support their views and renouncing logic was less painful than renouncing those views. Or if it they were simply relating the truth. A glass of water happens every time there is water in a glass. Yes. That doesn't mean the water causes the glass or the glass causes the water. This is getting silly. Water in a glass causes a glass of water. So water can control whether or not the glass is cracked? This is too easy. You're not even thinking anymore, you're just flailing and spitting. I think that living cells are more conscious than anything which is not a living cell. You use that word living as if it's a talisman to ward off the evil forces of physics Not at all. I use it only to recognize that a living cell is different than a dead cell. Biology applies to living cells. , but biologists can't even agree on what life means and have never even found a hint that life doesn't obey the same exact laws of physics that non-life does. And there isn't even a sharp dividing line between life and non life; Is a virus alive? Well sort of. Nevertheless, the division between life and non-life remains the single most important and obvious discernment that we will ever encounter as human beings. If you can get silicon dioxide to make a living cell, then you might have a point If you can get a living cell to make a microprocessor then you might have a point. We already have. If my brain changed my mind, In other words if your brain started to do things differently. Differently than what? Different from what it was before. Before what? My brain changes my mind all the time. Yes, and your brain chemistry changes all the time too. That's what I'm saying. My brain chemistry changes my mind all the time. Every morning my brain wakes me up. Just like clockwork, clocks are another mechanism that operates according to the laws of physics. Not as simple as a clock, no. My brain wakes me up according to all kinds of hormonal, photological, and psychological cues. Generally I wake up exactly when I need to without having to set the alarm, but I set it anyhow. I am asleep and am awakened at a time deemed appropriate by my brain. Just like clockwork, clocks are another mechanism that operates according to the laws of physics. No, not at all like a clock. The time varies from day to day. I don't have a choice when my brain wakes me up in the morning. OK, so there are things that
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 3/10/2013 1:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If there are some day machines among us which behave just like humans and they engage in criminal behaviour should they be destroyed? Will there be at least some sort of process whereby it is determined if the machine is guilty or not, or would any person have the right to demand the destruction of any machine? Would all the machines be owned and the owner responsible, even if he could show that the machine was no more predictable than a human slave? Curiously there is that sort debate going on in the U.S. right now. Should guns be destroyed because they do bad things like killing people? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Generalized Löb's Theorem
On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 4:51:56 PM UTC+2, advanced...@list.ru wrote: On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 4:48:10 PM UTC+2, advanced...@list.ru wrote: On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:33:28 PM UTC+2, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 3/5/2013 6:23 AM, advanced...@list.ru wrote: On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 1:16:15 PM UTC+2, advanced...@list.ru wrote: On Sunday, January 27, 2013 2:53:12 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 25 Jan 2013, at 18:06, Stephen P. King wrote: Have you seen this? What implications does it have? http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1301/1301.5340.pdf If the result is correct (which I think it is) it is a nice generalization of Löb's theorem. It makes it somehow more solid, and valid for a large set of consistent extension. I avoid the need of this by making the strong soundness assumption; + the comp assumption. But it confirms the feeling that Löb's works also on many divine entities. Other results by Solovay gives similar suggestions. Bu I have to study it closely to be verify what I say here in the detail. Thanks for the link. Best, Bruno *AMS Sectional Meeting AMS Special Session* http://www.ams.org/meetings/sectional/2210_program_ss17.html#title Spring Western Sectional Meeting University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO April 13-14, 2013 (Saturday - Sunday) Meeting #1089 *Special Session on Set Theory and Boolean Algebras* *An posible generalization of the Löb's theorem.*http://amsmtgs/2210_abstracts/1089-03-60.pdf http://www.ams.org/amsmtgs/2210_abstracts/1089-03-60.pdf *Jaykov Foukzon**, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel (1089-03-60) Hi advancedguidance, Same paper... -- Onward! http://ru.scribd.com/doc/129443535/Lobs-Theorem4 Stephen Yes. Stephen Paul King wrote: What implications does it have? Post reply [image: More message actions] Jan 25 Other recipients: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
Question- I also thought determinism mean't that you could predict where and when, a particle could move. But that Werner Heisenberg, said that you could determine, on, but never the other. Would you say that the universe is predictable and Heisenberg might be wrong? Thanks. Mitch Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine everything. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, Mar 10, 2013 4:33 am Subject: Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis On 10 Mar 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells, Hey, stop! they may stop. This is the case even though the process is still deterministic or probabilistic. In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to steal a car will steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If someone yelling at the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free will over their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe. You can yell at a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will be no change in where the stone rolls. In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief will stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person yelling nor the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not. What difference would it make to them if neither the person yelling nor the thief can control whether or not they are yelling or stealing? It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random). You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't exist, why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not? I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out or not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of interest to me? Furthermore, it is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not even with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical chaotic systems. It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would be impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not. Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it would impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means, things are *determined*. Why would there be a such thing as care in a deterministic universe? I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all things are determined* then there can be no care. Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine everything. Bruno A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to say that you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain works. This is not because the judge does not believe the expert witness, it is because brain physics is not relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the brain physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. An expert witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your brain which is associated with impulse control will have a very good chance of convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant. Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*. Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may technically be *English* but it is still a language problem. If the brain is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person may not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. Judges are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or random, but they still make their judgements despite this. No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean that their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they would not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of inevitable and necessary consequences of antecedent states of affairs. Judgment is impossible under determinism. Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible. You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic. Craig Brent Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails
Re: Brain teaser
On 3/10/2013 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2013, at 09:31, Stephen P. King wrote: OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels? To ask a machine about herself (like in self-duplication experiences), you need to represent the machine in the language available to the machine. This generates the stratification. Hi, ...represent the machine (to the interviewer) in the language available to the machine... OK, like the links in a spreadsheet... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 3/10/2013 1:08 PM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Question- I also thought determinism mean't that you could predict where and when, a particle could move. But that Werner Heisenberg, said that you could determine, on, but never the other. Would you say that the universe is predictable and Heisenberg might be wrong? Thanks. Mitch Determinism doesn't mean that you can predict everything. Determinism means the future is completely determined by the past. But in order to use that for prediction you have to know the past as well as the time evolution operator. This is impossible for a couple of reasons. First, you can only know about the past that is within your past light cone. There are things happening on the Sun that you can't know about for another eight minutes. If those are things that can influence what you're trying to predict then you're out of luck. Second, deterministic systems are not necessarily stable, so infinitesimal errors in your knowledge of the present state or in the evolution operator can result in large errors in prediction. So even if Heisenberg was wrong (and there's lots of evidence he wasn't and none that was) the universe still wouldn't be predictable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 5:51:35 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 3/10/2013 1:08 PM, spudb...@aol.com javascript: wrote: Question- I also thought determinism mean't that you could predict where and when, a particle could move. But that Werner Heisenberg, said that you could determine, on, but never the other. Would you say that the universe is predictable and Heisenberg might be wrong? Thanks. Mitch Determinism doesn't mean that you can predict everything. Determinism means the future is completely determined by the past. Which means that a deterministic universe always begins with a miracle that is never allowed to happen again. Craig But in order to use that for prediction you have to know the past as well as the time evolution operator. This is impossible for a couple of reasons. First, you can only know about the past that is within your past light cone. There are things happening on the Sun that you can't know about for another eight minutes. If those are things that can influence what you're trying to predict then you're out of luck. Second, deterministic systems are not necessarily stable, so infinitesimal errors in your knowledge of the present state or in the evolution operator can result in large errors in prediction. So even if Heisenberg was wrong (and there's lots of evidence he wasn't and none that was) the universe still wouldn't be predictable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 1:16 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:16:06 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 7:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: A person can resist their both their environment and genetic programming, And you know this how? Because identical twins can intentionally lead very different lives. We can rebel against our parents, we can seek to compensate for genetic defects. What is your basis for denying that we can resist given conditions? But the twins cannot resist their environment and genetic programming. The way any system behaves is completely determined by its internal state and the external influences on it. You seem to believe that intention is somehow due to something other than these two factors, but what else could it be? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 3/10/2013 4:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 5:51:35 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 3/10/2013 1:08 PM, spudb...@aol.com javascript: wrote: Question- I also thought determinism mean't that you could predict where and when, a particle could move. But that Werner Heisenberg, said that you could determine, on, but never the other. Would you say that the universe is predictable and Heisenberg might be wrong? Thanks. Mitch Determinism doesn't mean that you can predict everything. Determinism means the future is completely determined by the past. Which means that a deterministic universe always begins with a miracle that is never allowed to happen again. IF it has a beginning. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 7:59:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 1:16 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:16:06 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 7:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: A person can resist their both their environment and genetic programming, And you know this how? Because identical twins can intentionally lead very different lives. We can rebel against our parents, we can seek to compensate for genetic defects. What is your basis for denying that we can resist given conditions? But the twins cannot resist their environment and genetic programming. Why not? My nephew was short so he got hormone therapy and isn't short anymore. We have build civilization intentionally. How could a genetic sequence or an external influence cause you to invent television or chocolate chip cookies? The way any system behaves is completely determined by its internal state and the external influences on it. You seem to believe that intention is somehow due to something other than these two factors, but what else could it be? It is its own factor, actually the factor upon which internal and external influences supervene. Intention is what is actually being influenced and it is more or less what we experience it to be: the our direct and fully enfranchised participation in our own lives as a person in the world. That doesn't give us complete autonomy, nor does it give us the level of autonomy that we might think we have - because there are other levels of identity and consciousness beyond what we experience as part of what we know we experience, but that you are confusing the complexity of the reality of will with its absence. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 4:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No, that would only make sense if people had control of their own actions independently of your idea of physics. Punishing stones who roll down a hill is not going to prevent similar rollings from happening in the future. You do understand this right? Tell me that you can see why punishment requires voluntary control of one's own actions independently of physics to be effective. You have said in the past that biological processes do *not* go against the laws of physics. That would mean it is impossible to have voluntary control of one's actions independently of physics. Now you are saying the opposite. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 3/10/2013 5:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 7:59:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 1:16 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:16:06 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 7:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: A person can resist their both their environment and genetic programming, And you know this how? Because identical twins can intentionally lead very different lives. We can rebel against our parents, we can seek to compensate for genetic defects. What is your basis for denying that we can resist given conditions? But the twins cannot resist their environment and genetic programming. Why not? My nephew was short so he got hormone therapy and isn't short anymore. Why hormone therapy? Why didn't he just use his free will to grow taller? We have build civilization intentionally. How could a genetic sequence or an external influence cause you to invent television or chocolate chip cookies? By determining your intentions. The way any system behaves is completely determined by its internal state and the external influences on it. You seem to believe that intention is somehow due to something other than these two factors, but what else could it be? It is its own factor, In other words magic. actually the factor upon which internal and external influences supervene. Intention is what is actually being influenced and it is more or less what we experience it to be: the our direct and fully enfranchised participation in our own lives as a person in the world. That doesn't give us complete autonomy, nor does it give us the level of autonomy that we might think we have - because there are other levels of identity and consciousness beyond what we experience as part of what we know we experience, but that you are confusing the complexity of the reality of will with its absence. And you're confusing its complexity with magic. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 8:11:25 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 4:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: No, that would only make sense if people had control of their own actions independently of your idea of physics. Punishing stones who roll down a hill is not going to prevent similar rollings from happening in the future. You do understand this right? Tell me that you can see why punishment requires voluntary control of one's own actions independently of physics to be effective. You have said in the past that biological processes do *not* go against the laws of physics. They don't. By definition, everything that actually happens in the universe is part of the laws of physics. That would mean it is impossible to have voluntary control of one's actions independently of physics. No, it means that physics must support voluntary control of one's actions. Now you are saying the opposite. Nope. The problem is that you assume that we know a lot about physics already. I think that we have an extremely, laughably primitive understanding of physics at this point in history. We may be too stupid and arrogant to figure that out though. We like to think that the universe which we experience is the actual universe when it suits our expectations, but we decide that it must be nothing like our experience of the universe when it suits other expectations. We are clueless and clueless of how clueless we are. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 8:19:21 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 3/10/2013 5:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 7:59:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 1:16 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 12:16:06 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2013 7:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: A person can resist their both their environment and genetic programming, And you know this how? Because identical twins can intentionally lead very different lives. We can rebel against our parents, we can seek to compensate for genetic defects. What is your basis for denying that we can resist given conditions? But the twins cannot resist their environment and genetic programming. Why not? My nephew was short so he got hormone therapy and isn't short anymore. Why hormone therapy? Why didn't he just use his free will to grow taller? Because he is a person, not a muscle cell. By default we have a particular range of personal influence.. We have build civilization intentionally. How could a genetic sequence or an external influence cause you to invent television or chocolate chip cookies? By determining your intentions. Then you are just shunting intention off to another unconscious level. Even though we obviously exercise our own will directly and consciously all day long, you would rather believe that is an 'illusion' projected by other vaguely imagined influences which do have intentions, but somehow unconsicously. The way any system behaves is completely determined by its internal state and the external influences on it. You seem to believe that intention is somehow due to something other than these two factors, but what else could it be? It is its own factor, In other words magic. No more magic than 'internal states' or 'external influences'. States of what? Influences of what? actually the factor upon which internal and external influences supervene. Intention is what is actually being influenced and it is more or less what we experience it to be: the our direct and fully enfranchised participation in our own lives as a person in the world. That doesn't give us complete autonomy, nor does it give us the level of autonomy that we might think we have - because there are other levels of identity and consciousness beyond what we experience as part of what we know we experience, but that you are confusing the complexity of the reality of will with its absence. And you're confusing its complexity with magic. Magic is the official go-to straw man of the pseudoskeptic. It just means 'I have no argument so you must be stupid.' Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: That would mean it is impossible to have voluntary control of one's actions independently of physics. No, it means that physics must support voluntary control of one's actions. Now you are saying the opposite. Nope. The problem is that you assume that we know a lot about physics already. I think that we have an extremely, laughably primitive understanding of physics at this point in history. We may be too stupid and arrogant to figure that out though. We like to think that the universe which we experience is the actual universe when it suits our expectations, but we decide that it must be nothing like our experience of the universe when it suits other expectations. We are clueless and clueless of how clueless we are. As I have said many times, it would be a simple matter to prove experimentally that biological processes go against the mechanistic laws of physics as we currently understand them. Why has it never been observed in the history of science? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: And you're confusing its complexity with magic. Magic is the official go-to straw man of the pseudoskeptic. It just means 'I have no argument so you must be stupid.' I don't think you understand the word magic. You seem to think it means I don't like your theory. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 9:33:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: That would mean it is impossible to have voluntary control of one's actions independently of physics. No, it means that physics must support voluntary control of one's actions. Now you are saying the opposite. Nope. The problem is that you assume that we know a lot about physics already. I think that we have an extremely, laughably primitive understanding of physics at this point in history. We may be too stupid and arrogant to figure that out though. We like to think that the universe which we experience is the actual universe when it suits our expectations, but we decide that it must be nothing like our experience of the universe when it suits other expectations. We are clueless and clueless of how clueless we are. As I have said many times, it would be a simple matter to prove experimentally that biological processes go against the mechanistic laws of physics as we currently understand them. Why has it never been observed in the history of science? Your misconceptions about my view are addressed here: http://s33light.org/post/45037540464 Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 9:35:37 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: And you're confusing its complexity with magic. Magic is the official go-to straw man of the pseudoskeptic. It just means 'I have no argument so you must be stupid.' I don't think you understand the word magic. You seem to think it means I don't like your theory. No, you don't seem to have any idea what my theory is. I think your use of magic means I cannot be wrong. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
sorry, that was the wrong link: http://s33light.org/post/44836667412 is the right one On Sunday, March 10, 2013 9:35:37 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: And you're confusing its complexity with magic. Magic is the official go-to straw man of the pseudoskeptic. It just means 'I have no argument so you must be stupid.' I don't think you understand the word magic. You seem to think it means I don't like your theory. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: sorry, that was the wrong link: http://s33light.org/post/44836667412 is the right one What you don't address in that list is the specific criticism I have made: 1. According to physics as we know it, everything in the universe follows mechanistic rules. 2. You don't believe biological systems such as brains follow mechanistic rules. 3. So where is the experimental evidence for this? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 10:39:50 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: sorry, that was the wrong link: http://s33light.org/post/44836667412 is the right one What you don't address in that list is the specific criticism I have made: No, I did: Nothing that I propose here can be construed as contradicting any natural observation. Not only do my ideas about the relation between body and mind or matter and sense not require any additional force within public physics, but they explicitly avoid it by definition. My interpretation is a commentary on the umbilical-symmetric-nested nature of the relation of public bodies and private experience, not a squeezing of private experience into public mechanics. If you cannot grasp this concept, I suggest that you stop reading now. You will never be able to understand Multisense Realism and you will be wasting your time to go on. 1. According to physics as we know it, everything in the universe follows mechanistic rules. Physics as we know it does not include consciousness in any way, therefore it is incomplete. What it covers is complete, but the context of the big picture is not. 2. You don't believe biological systems such as brains follow mechanistic rules. I believe that whatever rules there are follow the physical reality of consciousness. What this entails is a private view which can be described as intentional and qualitative and a public view which can be described as unintentional and quantitative. (I think it's really a continuum which like a spectrum from one to the other, but to keep it simple, I say two views). 3. So where is the experimental evidence for this? Our own experience it the only evidence necessary and the only evidence possible. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 10, 2013 10:39:50 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: sorry, that was the wrong link: http://s33light.org/post/44836667412 is the right one What you don't address in that list is the specific criticism I have made: No, I did: Nothing that I propose here can be construed as contradicting any natural observation. Not only do my ideas about the relation between body and mind or matter and sense not require any additional force within public physics, but they explicitly avoid it by definition. My interpretation is a commentary on the umbilical-symmetric-nested nature of the relation of public bodies and private experience, not a squeezing of private experience into public mechanics. If you cannot grasp this concept, I suggest that you stop reading now. You will never be able to understand Multisense Realism and you will be wasting your time to go on. You said it, but it does not address the problem. 1. According to physics as we know it, everything in the universe follows mechanistic rules. Physics as we know it does not include consciousness in any way, therefore it is incomplete. What it covers is complete, but the context of the big picture is not. And it would be easy to show that physics was incomplete by demonstrating biological systems operate contrary to physics. For if they always operated in accordance with physics, then consciousness would be just epiphenomenal. 2. You don't believe biological systems such as brains follow mechanistic rules. I believe that whatever rules there are follow the physical reality of consciousness. What this entails is a private view which can be described as intentional and qualitative and a public view which can be described as unintentional and quantitative. (I think it's really a continuum which like a spectrum from one to the other, but to keep it simple, I say two views). But according to the public view biological systems follow mechanistic rules. That means that everything you do is consistent with these mechanistic rules. But you don't believe that everything you do is consistent with mechanistic rules. So where is the experimental evidence showing that these rules break down? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Occam's Razor, Vacuum and the Scheme of the primary conditions of existence.
By the way: According to Charle’s law and the consequence of the third law of thermodynamics as the thermodynamic temperature of a system approaches absolute zero the volume of particles approaches zero too. It means the particles must have flat forms. They must have geometrical form of a circle: pi= c /d =3,14 . . ( All another geometrical forms : triangle, rectangle . . . etc have angles and to create angles needs a force, without force all geometrical forms must turn into circle.) =. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
