Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>
>> PGC,
>>
>> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is 
>> saying.
>> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct.
>>
>
> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask 
> him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to 
> vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and 
> saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense.
>
>
> Your sum up is misleading.
>
> I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue 
> for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is 
> vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a 
> test. 
>
> No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct.
>

What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of 
Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct.
 

> But we can assume it, and deduce from there.
>

People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that 
they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that 
consciousness is a mathematical model within a program.
 

> Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. 
>
> Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition 
> of Theaetetus of knowledge,
>

Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept 
is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p & p.

 

> with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea 
> case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence 
> that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and 
> the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from 
> reasoning in the comp assumption.
>

But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. They think 
that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. 
In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel 
Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 
3p.

This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the 
assertion that "1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine 
itself,", or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or 
self-deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno 
understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, 2) Machines 
cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since 
your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is 
clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no 
meaning.
 

>
>
>
> The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a 
> great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then 
> it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a 
> universe of arithmetic truths. 
>
>
> Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, 
> but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition 
> with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a 
> machine.
>

This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced by the 
machine, then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it 
makes mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, 
destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. There is 
no cause for a machine to represent its interior as anything fundamentally 
different than its exterior, all that the math indicates as far as I can 
tell is that some of the qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are 
hidden. Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not 
a true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, and 
more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot which is 
irreducible and direct, while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, 
skeletal ingredient. The machine is part of the soul...the part in which 
souls reflect each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their 
appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional 
entropy/normalization.



>
>
> Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the 
> world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer 
> program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a 
> moment of peace, etc.
>
>
> The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and it 
> has no 3p description.
>

What is comp but a 3p description? I think this is another sleight of hand. 
If we talk about 1p in these quasi-myst

Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 5:53 PM, LizR  wrote:

> On 24 July 2014 04:42, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
>> > I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI
>> multiverse
>>
>> It seems that John Clark is.
>>
>> There should be an Everett style multiverse embedded in the string
> landscape universe.
>

That's possible. String theory works like QFT (quantum field theory). I
presume but do not really know that QFT works whether every quantum state
is realized or only one in every physical interaction.


> That is, one in 10^500 of the string landscape universes happens to have
> the same laws of physics as ours, and 1 in a very, very large number of
> THOSE is identical to this one, or maybe differs by a single particle's
> spin.
>

That's way short of the number of worlds in a MWI reality, which is/are
nearly infinite.
The 10^500 is the number of possible distinct Calabi-Yau (compactified)
Manifolds CYMs.
Given the size from Yau's book at 1000 Planck lengths, and a max
close-packed density of 10^90/cc, we can fill a goodly number of universes
plus the enclosing Metaverse (formerly known as a multiverse and  also a
Megaverse) with an array of CYMs each distinct from all others, amenable to
a natural number system.
Richard




> This gives us, at humungous distances, an identical multiverse to the one
> the MWI does (assuming being in identical quantum states means actually
> being identical, as I believe it does). Plus if our "bubble" in the string
> landscape is infinite (which I think it can be?) then it *itself*
> contains a MWI style multiverse, at rather smaller distances - maybe a mere
> 10^10^70 light years, or whatever!
>
> So we get a "redundant infinity" of identical universes ("infinity
> squared" ? Or cubed, even, given the three different ways these can
> arise...? (Not that that's any larger than plain old countable infinity, of
> course!)).
>
> Excuse me, I have to go and lie down now.
>
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Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

[LizR]

On 24 July 2014 04:42, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> > I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI
> multiverse
>
> It seems that John Clark is.
>
> There should be an Everett style multiverse embedded in the string
landscape universe. That is, one in 10^500 of the string landscape
universes happens to have the same laws of physics as ours, and 1 in a
very, very large number of THOSE is identical to this one, or maybe differs
by a single particle's spin. This gives us, at humungous distances, an
identical multiverse to the one the MWI does (assuming being in identical
quantum states means actually being identical, as I believe it does). Plus
if our "bubble" in the string landscape is infinite (which I think it can
be?) then it *itself* contains a MWI style multiverse, at rather smaller
distances - maybe a mere 10^10^70 light years, or whatever!

So we get a "redundant infinity" of identical universes ("infinity squared"
? Or cubed, even, given the three different ways these can arise...? (Not
that that's any larger than plain old countable infinity, of course!)).

Excuse me, I have to go and lie down now.

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[David Nyman]

On 23 July 2014 18:25, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold of
> relative complexity, the lower level is not relevant for the description of
> the higher level. It would be like asking "why Obama has been elected?",
> and getting back the answer: everything followed the SWE.


Hmm...Well, I originally suggested that the knower *couldn't* simply be
reduced to computation or numbers, unlike the case of physical
reducibility. In my view, the presence of a 1p knower is what
"retrospectively" justifies realism about higher-level 3p structures with
which the knower is to be associated. To see what I mean, let's assume that
there is some putative ontology that can't in principle be used to justify
the presence of such a knower. Any higher-level scenario conceived in terms
of such an ontology is then vulnerable to a particularly pernicious species
of "zombie reductionism". It isn't merely that the radical absence of first
person-hood leaves in its wake nothing but zombies with 3p functional
bodies but no "consciousness". It's much more radical than that. The zombie
body is now radically lacking in "existence-for-itself". Consequently, the
distinction between any such putative "body" and its ontological reduction
is a differentiation without a difference. To put it another way, there is
nobody present for whom it could represent a difference.

I realise this may be difficult to accept, for example in the case of Deep
Blue that you posed to me. However, imagine re-posing this case with
respect to an ontology with which (let us assume) a knower could not *in
principle* be associated. In that case there could be no effective
distinction between "Deep Blue" and its physical reduction, since we have
ruled out, by assumption, the possibility of persons to whom this could
represent a difference. What might prevent us from seeing this is that we
can't help imagining the proposed scenario from a God's-eye perspective.
God then takes the role of the knower and "sees" that Deep Blue is still
there. Thus we have unwittingly justified our ascription of "Deep Blue" to
some aspect of the generalised ontology by "divine retrospection".

David

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Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>
>> PGC,
>>
>> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is
>> saying.
>> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct.
>>
>
> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask
> him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to
> vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and
> saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense.
>
>
> Your sum up is misleading.
>
> I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue
> for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is
> vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a
> test.
>
> No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume
> it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp.
>
> Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition
> of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability
> (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we
> get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p
> terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from
> inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption.
>
>
>
> The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a
> great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then
> it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a
> universe of arithmetic truths.
>
>
> Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects,
> but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition
> with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a
> machine.
>
>
>
> Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the
> world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer
> program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a
> moment of peace, etc.
>
>
> The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and it
> has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why
> we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start.
>

Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is
its description.? Richard

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
>> multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist 
>>> wrote:
>>>



 On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:

> Craig,
>
> You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I
> don't do that, ever.
> But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting
> for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly 
> assert
> that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first 
> person
> point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I
 find your paragraph rather confusing.
  Richard

>>>
>>> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is
>>> wrong/bad to believe for machine".
>>>
>>> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails
>>> set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such
>>> machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much
>>> more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false." -
>>> Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even
>>> much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some
>>> 3p verifiable way.
>>>
>>> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC
>>>
>>>
>>> --
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>>>
>>
>>
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Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
PGC,

I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he  
is saying.
My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p  
correct.


Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When  
I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be  
correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can  
learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe  
comp is correct in some sense.


Your sum up is misleading.

I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to  
argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding  
that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable,  
and I give a test.


No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can  
assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute  
comp.


Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the  
definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by  
provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind- 
body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot  
be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can  
know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the  
comp assumption.





The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's  
a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and  
sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences  
have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths.


Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p  
objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share  
some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any  
machine, is not a machine.




Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect  
created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live  
in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger,  
tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc.


The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and  
it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp.  
That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start.


Bruno





Craig



On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy  
 wrote:




On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist   
wrote:




On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Craig,

You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I  
don't do that, ever.
But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am  
waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument,  
which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for  
the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a  
valid refutation of comp.


Bruno



Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I  
find your paragraph rather confusing.

Richard

Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp  
is wrong/bad to believe for machine".


For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp  
entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be  
consistent for such machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere  
machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that.  
Therefore comp must be false." - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps  
asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting  
that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way.


Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[meekerdb]

On 7/23/2014 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Jul 2014, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/22/2014 12:08 AM, Kim Jones wrote:



On 22 Jul 2014, at 2:55 am, John Clark > wrote:



> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that allows 
you to
say "I know"?


I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest anatomical 
difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do know one thing for certain, 
whatever part it is if it evolved then it effects behavior; and if it effects 
behavior then the Turing Test works for consciousness and not just intelligence.


 John K Clark



Are you saying that there is no consciousness without intelligence? I believe (up to 
here at least) consciousness can exist minus intelligence.


Also, many things going on in the brain affect behaviour without necessarily having 
any impact on consciousness at all.


I don't think the ability to say "I know (or believe) I am awake" has anything to do 
with intelligence. But it does require consciousness (even if asleep and dreaming that 
you said that.)


What I am driving at is that it is vaguely impossible to understand anything 1p in a 
3p manner.


I think that is based on an unexamined idea of "understand".  Suppose I could monitor 
your brain with a super-fMRI and after long experimentation and mapping I could 'see' 
every thought, including distinguishing which were conscious and which weren't.  And 
suppose using this information I could create a functional model of your brain so that 
given the various inputs and environmental effects, I could predict exactly what you 
would think, at least a few minutes in advance.  And further, using this knowledge, I 
could use electrostimulation to cause you to have specific thoughts.  And having 
attained this level of knowledge of many human brains, I can now make brains to order 
having various characteristics: musical ability, empathy, humor,...


Now you will say I have not understood anything 1p (in fact my model predicts you 
will), but I would reply, "OK, what else is there to understand?"



The difference between being the one knowing that he is in Washington and believing that 
he has a copy in Moscow with being the one knowing that he is in Moscow and believing 
that he has a copy in Washington.


That difference is easily modelled in the physics and the fact that one will see Moscow 
and one will see Washington and each will remember Helsinki.  I don't understand what 
difference you think is not understood.




Once you take it into account you can, by some work, understand that such a "soul", 
subject, person, is not that easily related to a physical process. With comp, it is 
automatically related with infinitely computations, and that leads to interesting 
problems in math suggestion new ways to conceive the things rationally.


You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold of relative 
complexity, the lower level is not relevant for the description of the higher level. It 
would be like asking "why Obama has been elected?", and getting back the answer: 
everything followed the SWE.


That's David's "explanation=elimination", not mine.



Then you miss the *key* thing (well for those interested in the mind-body problem) that 
many people miss it; but not David. Nor the Ancients. It the mode of the subject, the 
hero behind the mask. Who is he?


The "modern" seems to want to eliminate it.


I want to show that it has no answer in the terms it is asked.



Thanks to incompleteness, machines already get refractory to that elimination, and known 
the 1p-3p difference.


Here, it is that once you take the higher level description into account, with their 
relative independence, you have also to take into account their mode of relation with 
themselves and truth and possibilities. As neither p, nor <>p follows from []p, by 
incompleteness, important nuances follows in the way the machine can explore the 
arithmetical reality.


It is non trivial and interesting because it reduces a part of the mind-body problem 
into a "belief in body" problem, which can be translated into arithmetic, and tested 
empirically. If that does not match, classical comp is false.


We can also compare the introspective discourse of the ideally correct universal machine 
about it and It self, and Self, with the very diverse humans theologies. The universal 
machine seems to agree with Lao-tseu that the wise stay mute. (making that task not so 
easy, how to interview a mute machine?). Comp provides G, *and* G* to solve that problem.


That pushes it off into the unprovable and therefore unknowable - which is exactly my 
point that is nothing left to understand which is understandable.


Brent

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jul 2014, at 07:18, Kim Jones wrote:




On 23 Jul 2014, at 4:38 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


Is the following true:

Self-awareness = self-consciousness (?)


OK. Both involves the 1p. But the []p gives a notion of 3p self- 
awareness, plausibly not conscious, like a machine which can assert  
simple (correct) belief about itself in the 3p sense, like an  
altimeter in a plane.






The latter sounds more like Freud's Superego to me, another ego  
that confronts the ego within the same psyche. I'm sure this  
demonstrates that consciousness is not unitary.


Not sure what you mean. What do you mean by consciousness is not  
unitary? I might agree or not according to different possible  
meanings here.


Bruno



Bad word choice. I should perhaps say consciousness may sometimes  
behave inconsistently, which a machine should not do, yes?


More or less. of course strictly speaking consciousness does not  
behave a priori, but is a reality attributed by a person about itself,  
making a person knowing things, and believing things, hoping,  
observing, etc.


Of course, correct machine will not behave inconsistently. But non  
correct machine can behave in less and less insane way, like []f, [] 
[]f, [][][]f, 







I mean, why would a machine not want to behave consistently?


They might want that indeed, but that's not simple, especially that  
they want make small theories for many things, including big things  
like everything, which leads quickly to inconsistency and madness.






Yet, psychologists can talk to 'parts of the personality' ie consult  
a certain locus of self in the person while shutting out others  
(hypnotherapy etc.) The superego is supposed to be something 'in' or  
'about' consciousness that often applies a brake to what the  
generalised conscious self would like to happen. You might offer to  
pay for our dinner together but I step in and do it (the superego in  
this case being what the wife said to me before I left home).


:)





This seems to show that the locus of the self can be scattered as it  
were amongst other selves - as if we do occasionally become 'someone  
else' or "change our mind" (se changer d'esprit)


Yes. The first person has no 3p description, somehow it self-diffract  
by self-description, you give a name to it (like when saying yes to  
the doctor), you get the infinitely many names in arithmetic, it is a  
complex fractal clouds of relative possibilities, and at some point,  
it is your decision.






There are 'organs of the mind', as it were.


OK. Consciousness is just not related to them directly, but only  
indirectly through a competition of many universal machine/number in  
arithmetic, and you are not the organ of mind, you are the owner of  
your body and organ, even of your mind. Mind is still 3p.  
Consciousness and knowledge are 1p.


Bruno





Kim

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[meekerdb]

On 7/23/2014 9:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Intelligence is more simple. It is, I think the natural state of the virgin universal 
machine.


What's a UTM with no program?

Brent

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:57, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno and Kim:

what "SELF" would you consider in e.g. ants? if we realize the  
highly merged (individualized?) group-self - the answer is different  
from taking the present individual (simplified DOWN to functional  
minimum composition units) 'ant' and trying to assign a 'self' to  
such partial(?) entity. We may see the beginnings of such  
communalization in human societies as well. We "feel" as part of a  
larger unit in certain aspects.
(a weird idea: did Lenin think of his further evolved 'communist  
man' - the one capable of unselfishly participate in achieving the  
common good - as an ant? Definitely as a partial intermediate to it  
without so identifying).


I distinguish the 3p self, and the 1p self. The 3p self of anything is  
basically "itself", or a sufficiently good description of itself at  
some level.


The 3p self of the ants is determined, in nature, in the DNA code of  
the ants, that the Queen can produce.


The 1p self of the ants is more hard to imagine, but who knows. A wasp  
developed a perfume to make ants fighting against themselves. Then  
resuming their work when the perfume dissipate, so that having the  
time to stick in a caterpillar, which convinced those ants to protect  
it from the wasp, but the wasp found the trick and the answer, quasi  
like in an opera, except it took millions of years. No 1p? I think  
they do, even similar to us for thirst, hungriness, attraction and  
repulsion, with a bigger emphasis on smell's role.


Every 3p object has a 3p describable self, but only some machines can  
exploits this fact, by well known technic.


Of course when having a self, the machine can complain better, instead  
of just crashing. I need more memory. I will no more run that  
application if you don't buy another processor, Do you really want  
that cookie?, etc.


Of course, ants consciousness might be closer to amoeba's  
consciousness, when a cuttlefish or octopus would be closer to us, yet  
it might still be the same universal person behind.


Bruno






On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

I will send a longer comment. here are just some precision.

On 22 Jul 2014, at 11:28, Kim Jones wrote:



On 20 Jul 2014, at 10:54 pm, Kim Jones, then Bruno Marchal > wrote:


I don't think, along with Russell Standish, that ants are conscious,  
for example - but individuals may share in a group 'self'. Selfhood  
is independent  of minds or of contents of minds or the precision or  
mental acuity (perception) of minds. It appears to be the kind of  
knowledge of something that cannot be demonstrated in any 3p way.


I think that ants are conscious, but probably not self-conscious.  
That comes with the spider, cuttlefishes, ... perhaps.


Bruno


So like me you observe there are  two "flavours" of consciousness?

1. The non self-aware

2. The self-aware

yes.  I usually call them

1. The conscious

2. The self-conscious

In most context aware and conscious are equivalent to me.  Both 1  
and 2 implies a self, but the self-conscious has more cognities  
abilities. It is also the difference between RA and PA. Self- 
conscious corrrespond to the Löbian machine.






It appears that not noticing that you have a self does not mean you  
don't have one.


Agreed. Amoeba have 3-self, and 1-self, but absolutely no conception  
of it, as far as I know.





This is good news for all living things. You have a self. You may  
not have noticed it but you have one.


Hmm My coffee machine has a self also, but a priori no  
conception at all of it too.




This
Is the following true:

Self-awareness = self-consciousness (?)

OK. Both involves the 1p. But the []p gives a notion of 3p self- 
awareness, plausibly not conscious, like a machine which can assert  
simple (correct) belief about itself in the 3p sense, like an  
altimeter in a plane.





The latter sounds more like Freud's Superego to me, another ego that  
confronts the ego within the same psyche. I'm sure this demonstrates  
that consciousness is not unitary.


Not sure what you mean. What do you mean by consciousness is not  
unitary? I might agree or not according to different possible  
meanings here.


Bruno





K


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Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

['Chris de Morsella' via Everything List]

I like how Max Tegmark calssified the multiverses into level I, II, II, and IV 
level multiverses. Level I multiverse is other bubble universes existing in our 
same spacetime  --  that shall we say "froze", out from an underlying state of 
eternal inflation -- and which has a high degree of measured flatness and could 
fit a huge number of bubble universes in it that are outside of our cosmic 
horizon i.e. whose light has yet to reach our own observable bubble universe 
(and may not reach it for trillions of years)
Level II multiverse is the multiverse of the infinite (or hugely vast number) 
of other possible physical realities that would manifest by changing the value 
of one or more of the fundamental constants. He calls this "effective laws" of 
physics to distinguish them from a more fundamental (and highly abstract) 
physics that does not depend on specific values of these constants.
Level II is the Everett MWI multiverse indicated by quantum mechanics.
Level IV -- is a proposed multiverse where other fundamental mathematical 
structures (that underlie physical manifested reality which we experience and 
measure) give rise to different fundamental equations of physics.

So far -- as far as I know (which may quite possibly be not be much ) -- 
this seems to be the best attempt at providing a classification of the various 
kinds of multiverses I have seen. 

One speculation Max Tegmark made in his book the Mathematical Universe is that 
it could be possible that the perhaps infinite numbers of level I and level III 
universes might map onto each other... in other words that they might be two 
avenues for explaining why these other universes exist -- there is a infinite 
or very nearly infinite volume of spacetime in which they can exist and yet be 
completely hidden from us and for the MWI of quantum physics suggesting that 
there is a branching process going on at each quantum "choice". The infinite 
(or hugely numerous) number of potential Level I universes might be one and the 
same with the also hugely numerous level III (MWI) universes.

This all gets supremely abstract and  is excluded fro the realm of the 
observable being only indirectly inferred based on an understanding of 
inflation and quantum mechanics.
Chris



 From: Richard Ruquist 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 9:42 AM
Subject: Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"
 


> I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI 
> multiverse 


It seems that John Clark is.





On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Mon, Jul 21, 2014  LizR  wrote:
>
> 
>> For the purposes of this thread I'm specifically interested in whether the 
>> MV "opposes" supersymmetry in some sense. 
>
>
>Not really. If String Theory is true there are at least 10^500 other universes 
>with different laws of physics and maybe a infinite number, but Supersymmetry 
>is a narrower idea than String Theory.  Supersymmetry is consistent with 
>String Theory but does not require it. So Supersymmetry could be true but  
>String Theory false.  And Supersymmetry is not dead yet but it's not looking 
>very healthy right now; most thought that when the LHC came online we'd find 
>Supersymmetry almost immediately, but instead there is still not even a hint 
>of it. 
>
>
>> I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI 
>> multiverse 
>>
>
>
>It's conceivable they are the same thing, that's why I thought the discovery 
>of the polarization variation of the Big Bang microwaves was such a big deal. 
>Inflation theory predicted that the enormous acceleration of the very early 
>universe would create gravity waves that would distort  the Big Bang 
>microwaves in a certain way and that is what seems to have been discovered in 
>March. 
>
>Alan Guth postulated a  inflation field that decayed away in a process 
>somewhat 
analogous to radioactive half life, and after the decay the universe 
expanded at a much much more leisurely pace. But then Andre Linde proved that 
for Guth's idea to work the inflation field had to expand faster than it 
decayed, Linde called it "Eternal Inflation". Linde showed that for every 
volume in which the inflation field decays away 2 other volumes don't decay. So 
one universe becomes 3, the field decays in one universe but not in the other 
2, then both of those two universes splits in 3 again and the inflation field 
decays away in one and doesn't decay in 2 others, and it goes on forever. So 
what we call "The Big Bang" isn't the beginning of everything it's just the end 
of inflation in our particular part of the universe. So according to Linde this 
field created one Big Bang, then 2, then 4, then 8, then 16 etc in a unending 
process. Maybe in one of those universes Schrodinger's cat is dead and in 
another the cat is alive. 
>
>
>So if that variation of the Big Bang microwaves turns out to be real (and we 
>should know by

Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jul 2014, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/22/2014 12:08 AM, Kim Jones wrote:



On 22 Jul 2014, at 2:55 am, John Clark  wrote:

> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that  
allows you to say "I know"?


I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest  
anatomical difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do  
know one thing for certain, whatever part it is if it evolved then  
it effects behavior; and if it effects behavior then the Turing  
Test works for consciousness and not just intelligence.


 John K Clark



Are you saying that there is no consciousness without intelligence?  
I believe (up to here at least) consciousness canexist  
minus intelligence.


Also, many things going on in the brain affect behaviour without  
necessarily having any impact on consciousness at all.


I don't think the ability to say "I know (or believe) I am awake"  
has anything to do with intelligence. But it does require 
consciousness (even if asleep and dreaming that you said that.)


What I am driving at is that it is vaguely impossible to understand  
anything 1p in a 3p manner.


I think that is based on an unexamined idea of "understand".   
Suppose I could monitor your brain with a super-fMRI and after long  
experimentation and mapping I could 'see' every thought, including  
distinguishing which were conscious and which weren't.  And suppose  
using this information I could create a functional model of your  
brain so that given the various inputs and environmental effects, I  
could predict exactly what you would think, at least a few minutes  
in advance.  And further, using this knowledge, I could use  
electrostimulation to cause you to have specific thoughts.  And  
having attained this level of knowledge of many human brains, I can  
now make brains to order having various characteristics: musical  
ability, empathy, humor,...


Now you will say I have not understood anything 1p (in fact my model  
predicts you will), but I would reply, "OK, what else is there to  
understand?"



The difference between being the one knowing that he is in Washington  
and believing that he has a copy in Moscow with being the one knowing  
that he is in Moscow and believing that he has a copy in Washington.


Once you take it into account you can, by some work, understand that  
such a "soul", subject, person, is not that easily related to a  
physical process. With comp, it is automatically related with  
infinitely computations, and that leads to interesting problems in  
math suggestion new ways to conceive the things rationally.


You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold  
of relative complexity, the lower level is not relevant for the  
description of the higher level. It would be like asking "why Obama  
has been elected?", and getting back the answer: everything followed  
the SWE.


Then you miss the *key* thing (well for those interested in the mind- 
body problem) that many people miss it; but not David. Nor the  
Ancients. It the mode of the subject, the hero behind the mask. Who is  
he?


The "modern" seems to want to eliminate it.

Thanks to incompleteness, machines already get refractory to that  
elimination, and known the 1p-3p difference.


Here, it is that once you take the higher level description into  
account, with their relative independence, you have also to take into  
account their mode of relation with themselves and truth and  
possibilities. As neither p, nor <>p follows from []p, by  
incompleteness, important nuances follows in the way the machine can  
explore the arithmetical reality.


It is non trivial and interesting because it reduces a part of the  
mind-body problem into a "belief in body" problem, which can be  
translated into arithmetic, and tested empirically. If that does not  
match, classical comp is false.


We can also compare the introspective discourse of the ideally correct  
universal machine about it and It self, and Self, with the very  
diverse humans theologies. The universal machine seems to agree with  
Lao-tseu that the wise stay mute. (making that task not so easy, how  
to interview a mute machine?). Comp provides G, *and* G* to solve that  
problem.


Bruno









Brent


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Re: CTM and the UDA (again!)

[Jesse Mazer]

Had some trouble following your post (in part because I don't know all the
acronyms), but are you talking about the basic problem of deciding which
computations a particular physical process can be said to "implement" or
"instantiate"? If so, see my post at
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list%40googlegroups.com/msg43484.html
and Bruno's response at
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list%40googlegroups.com/msg43489.html
. I think from Bruno's response that he agrees that there is a well-defined
way of deciding whether one abstract computation implements/instantiates
some other abstract computation "within itself" (like if I have computation
A which is a detailed molecular-level simulation of a physical computer,
and the simulated computer is running another simpler computation B, then
the abstract computation A can be said to implement computation B within
itself).

So, why not adopt a Tegmark-like view where a "physical universe" is
*nothing more* than a particular abstract computation, and that can give us
a well-defined notion of which sub-computations are performed within it by
various "physical" processes? This approach could also perhaps allow us to
define the "number of separate instances" of a given sub-computation within
the larger computation that we call "the universe", giving some type of
measure on different subcomputations within that computational universe
(useful for things like Bostrom's self-sampling assumption, which in this
case would say we should reason as if we were randomly chosen from all
self-aware subcomputations). So for example, if many copies of a given AI
program are run in parallel in a computational universe, that AI could have
a larger measure within that computational universe than an AI program that
is only ever run once within it...of course, this does not rule out the
possibility that there are other "parallel" computational universes where
the second program is run more often, as would be implied by Tegmark's
thesis and also by Bruno's UDA. But there is still at least the theoretical
possibility that the multiverse is false and that only one unique
computational universe exists, so the idea that all possible
universes/computations are equally real cannot be said to follow logically
from COMP.

Jesse


On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:38 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

> Recent discussions, mainly with Brent and Bruno, have really got me
> thinking again about the issues raised by CTM and the UDA. I'll try to
> summarise some of my thoughts in this post. The first thing to say, I
> think, is that the assumption of CTM is equivalent to accepting the
> existence of an effectively self-contained "computationally-observable
> regime" (COR). By its very definition, the COR sets the limits of possible
> physical observation or empirical discovery. In principle, any physical
> phenomenon, whatever its scale, could be brought under observation if only
> we had a big enough collider. But by the same token, no matter how big the
> collider, no such observable could escape its confinement within the limits
> of the COR.
>
> If we accept that the existence of a COR is entailed by assuming CTM, we
> come naturally to the question of what might be "doing the computation". In
> terms of the UDA, by the time we get to Step 7, it should be obvious that,
> in principle, we could build a computer from "primitive" physical
> components that would effectively implement the infinite trace of the UD
> (UD*). Furthermore, if such a computer were indeed to be implemented, the
> COR would necessarily exist in its entirety somewhere within the infinite
> redundancy of that trace. This realisation alone might well persuade us, on
> grounds of explanatory parsimony and the avoidance of somewhat strained or
> ad hoc reservations, to accept FAPP that UD*->COR. Should we be so
> persuaded, any putative underlying "physical computer" would have already
> become effectively redundant to further explanation.
>
> Notwithstanding this, we may still feel the need to retain reservations of
> practicability. Perhaps the physical universe isn't actually sufficiently
> "robust" to permit the building of such a computer? Or, even if that were
> granted, could it not just be the case that no such computer actually
> exists? Reservations of this sort can indeed be articulated, although
> worryingly, they may still seem to leave us rather vulnerable to being
> "captured" by Bostrom-type simulation scenarios. The bottom line however
> seems to be this: Under CTM, can we justify the "singularisation", or
> confinement, of a computation, and hence whatever is deemed to be
> observable in terms of that computation, to some particular physical
> computer (e.g. a brain)? More generally, can we limit all possibility of
> observation to a particular class of computations wholly delimited by the
> activity of a corresponding sub-class of physical objects (uniquely
> characterisable as "physical computers") within the limits 

Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

[Richard Ruquist]

> I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI
multiverse

It seems that John Clark is.


On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:24 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014  LizR  wrote:
>
>
>> > For the purposes of this thread I'm specifically interested in whether
>> the MV "opposes" supersymmetry in some sense.
>>
>
> Not really. If String Theory is true there are at least 10^500 other
> universes with different laws of physics and maybe a infinite number, but
> Supersymmetry is a narrower idea than String Theory.  Supersymmetry is
> consistent with String Theory but does not require it. So Supersymmetry
> could be true but String Theory false.  And Supersymmetry is not dead yet
> but it's not looking very healthy right now; most thought that when the LHC
> came online we'd find Supersymmetry almost immediately, but instead there
> is still not even a hint of it.
>
> > I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI
>> multiverse
>>
>
> It's conceivable they are the same thing, that's why I thought the
> discovery of the polarization variation of the Big Bang microwaves was such
> a big deal. Inflation theory predicted that the enormous acceleration of
> the very early universe would create gravity waves that would distort  the
> Big Bang microwaves in a certain way and that is what seems to have been
> discovered in March.
>
> Alan Guth postulated a inflation field that decayed away in a process
> somewhat analogous to radioactive half life, and after the decay the
> universe expanded at a much much more leisurely pace. But then Andre Linde
> proved that for Guth's idea to work the inflation field had to expand
> faster than it decayed, Linde called it "Eternal Inflation". Linde showed
> that for every volume in which the inflation field decays away 2 other
> volumes don't decay. So one universe becomes 3, the field decays in one
> universe but not in the other 2, then both of those two universes splits in
> 3 again and the inflation field decays away in one and doesn't decay in 2
> others, and it goes on forever. So what we call "The Big Bang" isn't the
> beginning of everything it's just the end of inflation in our particular
> part of the universe. So according to Linde this field created one Big
> Bang, then 2, then 4, then 8, then 16 etc in a unending process. Maybe in
> one of those universes Schrodinger's cat is dead and in another the cat is
> alive.
>
> So if that variation of the Big Bang microwaves turns out to be real (and
> we should know by Christmas) it would be a big shot in the arm for Everett.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jul 2014, at 09:08, Kim Jones wrote:




On 22 Jul 2014, at 2:55 am, John Clark  wrote:

> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that  
allows you to say "I know"?


I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest  
anatomical difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do know  
one thing for certain, whatever part it is if it evolved then it  
effects behavior; and if it effects behavior then the Turing Test  
works for consciousness and not just intelligence.


 John K Clark



Are you saying that there is no consciousness without intelligence?  
I believe (up to here at least) consciousness can exist minus  
intelligence.



Keeping the distinction intelligence/competence. I agree with you, as  
I agree consciousness can exist without any relative well adapted  
competence, yet keeping its full turing universal competence.





Also, many things going on in the brain affect behaviour without  
necessarily having any impact on consciousness at all.


I don't think the ability to say "I know (or believe) I am awake"  
has anything to do with intelligence.


It might have a relation with stupidity, or more generally [] f.



But it does require consciousness (even if asleep and dreaming that  
you said that.)


What I am driving at is that it is vaguely impossible to understand  
anything 1p in a 3p manner.



Yes. The crazy thing is that very fact can be understood in a 3p  
manner, even without assuming comp, here, but assuming the classical  
theory of belief and knowledge, and then using Gödel Löb (3p theorem)  
and then results by Boolos, Goldblatt, Kusnetsov & Muravitski which  
gives the math of []p & p. It describes as I said a knower, related to  
the machine, and unnameable by the machines, and she can know that.


The two Boolos' book, 1979 and 1993) contains a chapter on the []p & p  
intensional variant, and its intensional logic S4Grz.


Bruno





Kim

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Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jul 21, 2014  LizR  wrote:


> > For the purposes of this thread I'm specifically interested in whether
> the MV "opposes" supersymmetry in some sense.
>

Not really. If String Theory is true there are at least 10^500 other
universes with different laws of physics and maybe a infinite number, but
Supersymmetry is a narrower idea than String Theory.  Supersymmetry is
consistent with String Theory but does not require it. So Supersymmetry
could be true but String Theory false.  And Supersymmetry is not dead yet
but it's not looking very healthy right now; most thought that when the LHC
came online we'd find Supersymmetry almost immediately, but instead there
is still not even a hint of it.

> I hope you are not confusing the MV multiverse with the Everett MWI
> multiverse
>

It's conceivable they are the same thing, that's why I thought the
discovery of the polarization variation of the Big Bang microwaves was such
a big deal. Inflation theory predicted that the enormous acceleration of
the very early universe would create gravity waves that would distort  the
Big Bang microwaves in a certain way and that is what seems to have been
discovered in March.

Alan Guth postulated a inflation field that decayed away in a process
somewhat analogous to radioactive half life, and after the decay the
universe expanded at a much much more leisurely pace. But then Andre Linde
proved that for Guth's idea to work the inflation field had to expand
faster than it decayed, Linde called it "Eternal Inflation". Linde showed
that for every volume in which the inflation field decays away 2 other
volumes don't decay. So one universe becomes 3, the field decays in one
universe but not in the other 2, then both of those two universes splits in
3 again and the inflation field decays away in one and doesn't decay in 2
others, and it goes on forever. So what we call "The Big Bang" isn't the
beginning of everything it's just the end of inflation in our particular
part of the universe. So according to Linde this field created one Big
Bang, then 2, then 4, then 8, then 16 etc in a unending process. Maybe in
one of those universes Schrodinger's cat is dead and in another the cat is
alive.

So if that variation of the Big Bang microwaves turns out to be real (and
we should know by Christmas) it would be a big shot in the arm for Everett.

  John K Clark

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jul 2014, at 18:55, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Jul 20, 2014  Kim Jones  wrote:

> OK. So what separates us then, from dolphins and elephants

Intelligence


I would have said here that what separate us from dolphins and  
elephants is typically more competence, notably in the degrees of  
freedom of our body through the fingers, like the apes, and then  
unlike the apes, the oral cavity and the vocal chords. Such ability  
makes possible, and useful, to get tools, and competence, in diverse  
way, can grow.


I use the term intelligence in a sense closer to the one discussed by  
David Böhm and Krishnamurti. Intelligence is the more a sort of  
primitive of competence. Intelligence causes competence, but  
competence has a negative feedback on Intelligence.


Competence is very complex, and needs hard works and chance. The  
correct theory of competence in the limit exists, and are consequences  
of the second recursion theorem.


Intelligence is more simple. It is, I think the natural state of the  
virgin universal machine. It is a state of facing/living infinite  
degrees of freedom.


Since more recently I am open to the idea that this is already a  
conscious state. That one is then related to basically all universal  
numbers.


So intelligence is just turing universality, or in term of set of  
numbers or formula/belief:  Sigma_1 completeness.


Now a universal machine needs another universal machine to be  
executed, and with comp, in the 3p it ends in what we did assume at  
the start: elementary arithmetic.





> You aren't allowed to respond "Intelligence"

Sorry. Please don't call the cops.

> because intelligence is what makes introspection possible in the  
first place.


That's right Kim.  (I assume comp all along).

Introspection by itself is not Turing universal though, as shown by  
Royer, a student of Case.


3p introspection is defined by the D'x' = 'xx' technic (Kleene's  
second recursion theorem, and variant). That leads to a mathematics of  
the ideally correct believer, and that G. Then G* adds the annulus of  
true but non believable (in that communicable and justifiable way).  
The 1p introspection is then offers freely by arithmetic when using  
the Theaetetus' definition.


By "==" I mean "corresponds" or "represents"

[]p == believe p. That one can be defined in the language of the  
machine. It is the 3p self. It is basically what the doctor will put  
on a disk, when proceeding the digital brain transplant.


[]p & p === I know p. That one cannot be defined in the language of  
the machine. It is the knower, or soul, or subject of the experience.


Imagine someone NOT believing comp, and in particular believing that  
he is NOT duplicable. Then let us duplicate him.
Then it follows that both copies will pretend to be the real one, as  
they feel it (with the usual assumptions), and in the first person  
sense, they are each right. But both might try to tell you "look I  
know that I am the original, I know my doppel will say the same, but  
please don't believe him, it's an impostor!" At the metalevel, that is  
what []p & p describes, and indeed the machine cannot describes this  
in any 3p way, making the statement of those "original" obviously vain  
in the 3p justifiable sense, yet absolutely true from the machines'  
perspective.


The reason why []p & p cannot be defined in arithmetic is that it  
would allow to trap the correct machine into an inconsistency. There  
would be a predicate K(x), obeying the S4 axioms, but by Gödel  
diagonalisation lemma you would be able to construct a formula k such  
that the machine believes k <-> ~K(k). Knowledge cannot be defined in  
the language of the machine (and thus neither soul, first person,  
etc.), for the same reason you will never find a knight, on the Knight- 
Knaves Island of Smullyan, telling you that you will never known that  
he is a knight.


Bruno




If that's true then Watson is conscious because Watson engaged in  
behavior that if it was performed by a human would certainly be  
regarded as intelligent.





> You can can question many things about the content of your  
consciousness.


That's true I can,  but I have no way of knowing if Kim Jones can do  
the same thing.


> A cat can't.

And how do you know that?

> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that  
allows you to say "I know"?


I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest  
anatomical difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do know  
one thing for certain, whatever part it is if it evolved then it  
effects behavior; and if it effects behavior then the Turing Test  
works for consciousness and not just intelligence.


 John K Clark


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RE: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

[John Ross]

Yes, in that sense tronnies form protons, just as they form everything else  in 
our Universe.  Protons need a lot of tronnies to do what they do.  Combinations 
of hydrogen (one proton) produce helium and the fusion energy of stars.  This 
energy is provided by the approximately 15 gamma ray entrons (30 tronnies) in 
each proton.  The neutrino entron (two tronnies) in the proton provides 
galactic gravity when it is released as a neutrino photon (aka graviton) with 
the destruction of protons in  Black Holes.  

 

As to your island issue, I think you may have a point if it were true that our 
Universe began with a singularity.  But that is not correct.  I explain the Big 
Bang and inflation in Chapter XXV, “Life and Death of Universes”.  Our Universe 
was preceded by our predecessor universe.  Universes are created in Big Bang 
explosions of Monster Black Holes which form near the center of each universe 
about half way through the life of the universe.  The Monster Black Holes grows 
by consuming galaxies until it has consumed a large majority of the universe.  
Toward the end of the life of the universe the gravity of the Monster Black 
Hole extends to the edge of the universe.  When the Monster Black Hole explodes 
in its Big Bang, galaxies from the outer edge of the universe would have been 
accelerating toward the Monster Black Hole for many billions of years, picking 
up speed each second.  Some of these galaxies will be approaching the  site of 
the Monster Black Hole from all directions when it explodes.  They will be 
traveling at speeds of many thousand times the speed of light (such as 20,000 
c) and may be located several light years from the Monster when it explodes.  
These galaxies will pass through the site of the Big Bang explosion and will 
continue at about the same speed expanding in all directions to create the 
inflation period of the  new universe.

 

This has been going on for many universes.  (I take a guess that our Universe 
is about 47 in the series of universes.)  The new universe will be made of 
matter or anti-matter depending on the matter or anti-matter of the predecessor 
universes.  This is why we do not in our Universe see any anti-matter galaxies.

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 5:37 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Higgs and "SUSY vs the Multiverse"

 

On 23 July 2014 12:07, John Ross  wrote:

Tronnies do not form protons.  Tronnies form only entrons (two tronnies), 
electrons (three tronnies) and positrons (three tronnies).

 

Protons are comprised of a very high energy electron (comprised of an electron 
and a neutrino entron) and two positrons plus about 15 gamma ray entrons.

 

So tronnies do form protons - quite a number of tronnies per proton, to be 
sure. But anyway.

 

Antiprotons are comprised of a very high energy positron (comprised of a 
positron and a neutrino entron) and two electrons plus about 15 gamma ray 
entrons.

 

In the beginning there were probably an equal number of protons and 
antiprotons.  These particles tended to annihilate each other.  But if the 
proton collected an electron to form a hydrogen atom it was then no longer 
attracted to the antiproton.  The same applied to the antiproton if it 
collected a positron to form an anti-hydrogen atom.  Soon however, purely by 
chance, protons and hydrogen began to outnumber antiprotons and anti-hydrogen.  
The more protons and hydrogen that formed as compared to anti-protons and 
anti-hydrogen, the more the population of free positrons was reduced as 
compared to free electrons.  So there were many more free electrons as compared 
to free positrons.  This meant that neutrino entrons were more likely to 
combine with an electron than to combine with a positron.  This lead to a 
further increase in the number of protons as compared to antiprotons.  But 
protons continued to annihilate antiprotons so the population of antiprotons 
were basically wiped out.  All this probably took a long time.  Any 
anti-hydrogen that formed could exist unless it and some nearby hydrogen became 
ionized in which case the protons would annihilate the anti-protons.

 

There was a 50-50 chance it could have gone the other way in which case we 
would live in an anti-universe made of anti-matter.  You and I would be 
anti-matter!  

 

OK, but I suspect that your answer begs the question of why the universe isn't 
composed of "islands" of matter and antimatter, because you would tend to get 
domains forming of one or the other, almost certainly of a size far smaller 
than that of the entire visible universe. The characteristic sizes of these 
would be determined by the average speed with which the matter involved was 
moving during the big bang (this is similar to the "horizon problem" that 
inflation is supposed to solve, I think). So if you had a region that happened 
to become matter, the

CTM and the UDA (again!)

[David Nyman]

Recent discussions, mainly with Brent and Bruno, have really got me
thinking again about the issues raised by CTM and the UDA. I'll try to
summarise some of my thoughts in this post. The first thing to say, I
think, is that the assumption of CTM is equivalent to accepting the
existence of an effectively self-contained "computationally-observable
regime" (COR). By its very definition, the COR sets the limits of possible
physical observation or empirical discovery. In principle, any physical
phenomenon, whatever its scale, could be brought under observation if only
we had a big enough collider. But by the same token, no matter how big the
collider, no such observable could escape its confinement within the limits
of the COR.

If we accept that the existence of a COR is entailed by assuming CTM, we
come naturally to the question of what might be "doing the computation". In
terms of the UDA, by the time we get to Step 7, it should be obvious that,
in principle, we could build a computer from "primitive" physical
components that would effectively implement the infinite trace of the UD
(UD*). Furthermore, if such a computer were indeed to be implemented, the
COR would necessarily exist in its entirety somewhere within the infinite
redundancy of that trace. This realisation alone might well persuade us, on
grounds of explanatory parsimony and the avoidance of somewhat strained or
ad hoc reservations, to accept FAPP that UD*->COR. Should we be so
persuaded, any putative underlying "physical computer" would have already
become effectively redundant to further explanation.

Notwithstanding this, we may still feel the need to retain reservations of
practicability. Perhaps the physical universe isn't actually sufficiently
"robust" to permit the building of such a computer? Or, even if that were
granted, could it not just be the case that no such computer actually
exists? Reservations of this sort can indeed be articulated, although
worryingly, they may still seem to leave us rather vulnerable to being
"captured" by Bostrom-type simulation scenarios. The bottom line however
seems to be this: Under CTM, can we justify the "singularisation", or
confinement, of a computation, and hence whatever is deemed to be
observable in terms of that computation, to some particular physical
computer (e.g. a brain)? More generally, can we limit all possibility of
observation to a particular class of computations wholly delimited by the
activity of a corresponding sub-class of physical objects (uniquely
characterisable as "physical computers") within the limits of a
definitively "physical" universe?

This is where Step 8 comes in. Step 7 seeks to destabilise our naive
intuition about an exclusive 1-to-1 relationship between computations and
particular physical objects by pointing to the consequences of a physical
implementation of UD*. Step 8 however is a change of tactic. First, it
postulates a scenario where physical tokens have been contrived to
represent a "conscious computation" (either in terms of a brain or in terms
of a substitute "computer"). Then it sets out to shows how all putatively
"computational" relations between such tokens could in principle be
disrupted without change in the net physical action or environmental
relations of the system that embodies them. Step 8 differs from Step 7 in
that it seeks in the first instance to undermine the very notion that
physical activity can robustly embody *any* second-order relations above
and beyond those of net physical action. Accepting such a stringent
conclusion would then seem to rule out CTM prima facie. The only
possibility of salvaging it would lie in an explanatory strategy in terms
of which computational relations take logical precedence over physical
ones. Given that computational relations are effectively arithmetical, this
in turn leads to the conclusion that CTM->UD*->COR (or more generally, that
each implies the others).

Notwithstanding this it would seem that Step 8 is not wholly persuasive to
everybody, so is there yet another tack? The line of argument that I've
been pursuing with Brent has led me to consider the following analogy,
which I'm sure you'll recognise. Consider something like an LCD screen as
constituting the "universe of all possible movie-dramas". In terms of this
analogy, what are the referents of any "physical observations" on the part
of the dramatis personae featured in such presentations? IOW what are we to
suppose Joe Friday to be referring to when he asks for "Just the facts,
ma'am"? Well, the one thing we can be sure of is that NO such reference can
allude to the "underlying physics" (i.e. the pixels and their relations) of
the LCD display. If this analogy holds, at least in general outline, what
justification, under CTM, could remain for any assumption that our own
observations and references might "accidentally" allude to some
"LCD-physics" postulated, mutatis mutandis, as underlying the COR? Would it
not seem extraordinary that any such un

Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 4:16:07 AM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
> > On 23 Jul 2014, at 4:33 am, Craig Weinberg  > wrote: 
> > 
> > To be unconscious is not merely to lose the faculties which make our 
> quality of life human, but to lose all faculties. 
>
> Perhaps, but I doubt that you lose your 'self'. A self is immortal. Just 
> like you wake up from the anaesthetic after the surgery. Where your 'self' 
> was during, is an open question (downing tequila sunrises in the bar at 
> Platonia Central???) 
>

I agree, but I think that just means that the self is a deeper, 
transpersonal level of consciousness.
 

>
> Similarly, is the person who is undergoing transportation-with-delay 
> unconscious? 


I don't think that there will be teleportation with delay. Reconstructing a 
body won't even survive as an organism much less a person.


Craig
 

> It is merely said that 'they' (presumably this means their 'self' - 
> whatever that is, which is what I am asking) is 'stored'. While their self 
> is being stored somewhere it doesn't matter if we think of 'them' as 
> unconscious because they will disagree with you from their 1p report on 
> their experience where they will experience no discontinuity of self 
> whatsoever. So the self cannot be a secretion of the mind. You can knock a 
> mind right out and still get a self back when you take all the tubes out 
> after an extraordinary amount of time. 
>
> Schumacher is still Schumacher. Alive and well, in a coma, as a vegetable 
> or dead. A person. 
>
> Kim

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Kim Jones]

> On 23 Jul 2014, at 4:33 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> 
> To be unconscious is not merely to lose the faculties which make our quality 
> of life human, but to lose all faculties.

Perhaps, but I doubt that you lose your 'self'. A self is immortal. Just like 
you wake up from the anaesthetic after the surgery. Where your 'self' was 
during, is an open question (downing tequila sunrises in the bar at Platonia 
Central???) 

Similarly, is the person who is undergoing transportation-with-delay 
unconscious? It is merely said that 'they' (presumably this means their 'self' 
- whatever that is, which is what I am asking) is 'stored'. While their self is 
being stored somewhere it doesn't matter if we think of 'them' as unconscious 
because they will disagree with you from their 1p report on their experience 
where they will experience no discontinuity of self whatsoever. So the self 
cannot be a secretion of the mind. You can knock a mind right out and still get 
a self back when you take all the tubes out after an extraordinary amount of 
time.

Schumacher is still Schumacher. Alive and well, in a coma, as a vegetable or 
dead. A person.

Kim

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