On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:57, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno and Kim:

what "SELF" would you consider in e.g. ants? if we realize the highly merged (individualized?) group-self - the answer is different from taking the present individual (simplified DOWN to functional minimum composition units) 'ant' and trying to assign a 'self' to such partial(?) entity. We may see the beginnings of such communalization in human societies as well. We "feel" as part of a larger unit in certain aspects. (a weird idea: did Lenin think of his further evolved 'communist man' - the one capable of unselfishly participate in achieving the common good - as an ant? Definitely as a partial intermediate to it without so identifying).

I distinguish the 3p self, and the 1p self. The 3p self of anything is basically "itself", or a sufficiently good description of itself at some level.

The 3p self of the ants is determined, in nature, in the DNA code of the ants, that the Queen can produce.

The 1p self of the ants is more hard to imagine, but who knows. A wasp developed a perfume to make ants fighting against themselves. Then resuming their work when the perfume dissipate, so that having the time to stick in a caterpillar, which convinced those ants to protect it from the wasp, but the wasp found the trick and the answer, quasi like in an opera, except it took millions of years. No 1p? I think they do, even similar to us for thirst, hungriness, attraction and repulsion, with a bigger emphasis on smell's role.

Every 3p object has a 3p describable self, but only some machines can exploits this fact, by well known technic.

Of course when having a self, the machine can complain better, instead of just crashing. I need more memory. I will no more run that application if you don't buy another processor, Do you really want that cookie?, etc.

Of course, ants consciousness might be closer to amoeba's consciousness, when a cuttlefish or octopus would be closer to us, yet it might still be the same universal person behind.

Bruno





On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I will send a longer comment. here are just some precision.

On 22 Jul 2014, at 11:28, Kim Jones wrote:



On 20 Jul 2014, at 10:54 pm, Kim Jones, then Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > wrote:

I don't think, along with Russell Standish, that ants are conscious, for example - but individuals may share in a group 'self'. Selfhood is independent of minds or of contents of minds or the precision or mental acuity (perception) of minds. It appears to be the kind of knowledge of something that cannot be demonstrated in any 3p way.

I think that ants are conscious, but probably not self-conscious. That comes with the spider, cuttlefishes, ... perhaps.

Bruno


So like me you observe there are  two "flavours" of consciousness?

1. The non self-aware

2. The self-aware

yes.  I usually call them

1. The conscious

2. The self-conscious

In most context aware and conscious are equivalent to me. Both 1 and 2 implies a self, but the self-conscious has more cognities abilities. It is also the difference between RA and PA. Self- conscious corrrespond to the Löbian machine.





It appears that not noticing that you have a self does not mean you don't have one.

Agreed. Amoeba have 3-self, and 1-self, but absolutely no conception of it, as far as I know.




This is good news for all living things. You have a self. You may not have noticed it but you have one.

Hmm.... My coffee machine has a self also, but a priori no conception at all of it too.



This
Is the following true:

Self-awareness = self-consciousness (?)

OK. Both involves the 1p. But the []p gives a notion of 3p self- awareness, plausibly not conscious, like a machine which can assert simple (correct) belief about itself in the 3p sense, like an altimeter in a plane.




The latter sounds more like Freud's Superego to me, another ego that confronts the ego within the same psyche. I'm sure this demonstrates that consciousness is not unitary.

Not sure what you mean. What do you mean by consciousness is not unitary? I might agree or not according to different possible meanings here.

Bruno





K


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