I tried Salvia for the first time yesterday. Very similar to
dreaming, but more intense, with a lot more sounds.
At first I thought, Nothing's happening. Then I thought, I seem to
be about to slide sidewise...I need to stop.
Then, I was sitting somewhere...in a tilled field I think, and I
am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Kelly, and others,
Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It usually
last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you, I know
only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy you found
your experience
What is the advantage of assigning consciousness to computational
processes (e.g. UDA), as opposed to just assigning it to the
information that is produced by computational processes?
For example, to take Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness paper,
if you just say that the consciousness is
On Apr 20, 2:04 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
The main difficulty I see is that it fails to explain the sequential
aspect of consciousness. If consciousness is identified with
information then it is atemporal.
Time is just the dimension of experience. But experience is
On Apr 20, 8:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The drawback is that any physical system (which could be mapped onto
any information or any computation) would be conscious. This is only a
drawback if you believe, I guess as a matter of faith, that it is
false.
Right, the
On Apr 20, 3:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
If I sent you an arbitrary binary string, it would have no meaning
unless you either knew in advance how to interpret it or how it was
produced. Either interpretation or understanding of how it was
produced can be described with
On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
view. But if A is a
On Apr 21, 2:33 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These states can belong to more than one sequence of
conscious experience. But the question is whether the order of the
states in the computation is always the same as their order in any
sequence of conscious experience in which
. These people who
advocate extreme platonism are crazy, because it doesn't match what I
observe.
But, there will also be a version of you who never has a normal
experience again. For eternity you will go from strange experience to
strange experience. And this version will say, ah, ya, Kelly was
right about
On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism.
Excellent!
It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
this.
So it makes sense to start
On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
conscious of SOMETHING.
To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness
to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of
probability on those comp
On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These are edges in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
that has duration
On Apr 26, 2:01 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored. Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise filled OMs should vastly
outnumber the ordered and sensible OMs.
The
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
In fact I used that same argument with Russell
Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
then we should expect to be experiencing life as ants and not humans.
Did you win or lose that
On Apr 26, 12:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
No, I think you're missing my point. Consider your analogy of fitting
together images to make a complete picture. You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential flow of consciousness. Now
suppose your spatial
On Apr 26, 11:40 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The question is; what are their relative probability measure? What can
I expect.
Any expectations you have are unfounded. The problem of induction
applies.
Any probabilities arrived at empirically are suspect, they will
continue
On Apr 27, 2:27 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
An untestable theory. But that's OK since if it's true it's also useless.
Ha! True, true. But it being true AND useless would have a certain
aesthetic/poetic appeal. Which makes me even more inclined to think
that this is the
On Apr 27, 12:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So you have indeed the necessity to abandon comp to maintain your form
of immaterialist platonism, but then you lose the tool for questioning
nature. It almost look like choosing a theory because it does not even
address the
On Apr 27, 3:08 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Your position as you have described it sounds a lot like ASSA only
without taking measure into consideration. I am curious if you
believe there is any merit to counting OMs or not. Meaning, if I have
two computers and set them up
On Apr 27, 1:42 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Are you thinking of something like a linked list in which each state, in
it's inherent information, has a pointer to a previous (or future)
state. And the existence of this link constitutes the feeling of flow?
H. As a
On Apr 29, 2:26 am, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
What extra information do you have in mind? I'd gladly update my
priors with anything I can lay my hands on.
So changes to neural structure and the concentrations of various
chemicals within neurons and around neural synapses
On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Either of these ideas is definite
enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
philosophical ideas about consciousness).
Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
consciousness
Another good one:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8012496.stm
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On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 6:18 PM, Colin Hales
c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes me a
powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great authority and
clarity.
Aren't people who are good at math already pretty much in
I think your discussing the functional aspects of consciousness. AKA,
the easy problems of consciousness. The question of how human
behavior is produced.
My question was what is the source of phenomenal consciousness.
What is the absolute minimum requirement which must be met in order
for
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 2:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Do you suppose that something could behave just as humans do yet not be
conscious, i.e. could there be a philosophical zombie?
I think that somewhere there would have to be a conscious experience
associated with the
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 8:07 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
A fitting computer simulation would include ALL aspects involved - call it
mind AND body, 'physically' observable 'activity' and 'consciousness as
cause' -- but alas, no such thing so far. Our embryonic machine with its
On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is just a
sort of zombie, since after all the way you'd create a lookup table for a
given algorithmic mind would be to run a huge series of actual
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 9:13 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Generally I don't think that what we experience is necessarily caused
by physical systems. I think that sometimes physical systems assume
configurations that shadow, or represent, our conscious experience.
But they
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 4:22 PM, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote:
Kelly Harmon wrote:
What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
simulation of a brain?
Hi Kelly
Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up tables
are not closed
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:30 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On the contrary, I think it does. First, I think Chalmers idea that
vitalists recognized that all that needed explaining was structure and
function is revisionist history. They were looking for the animating
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I agree with your critic of consciousness = information. This is not
even wrong,
Ouch! Et tu, Bruno???
and Kelly should define what he means by information so
that we could see what he really means.
Okay, okay! I
Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
I mean by information when I say that consciousness is
information. The first is from David Chalmers' Facing up to the
Problem of Consciousness. The second is from the SEP article on
Semantic Conceptions of Information, and
come from?
Assuming platonism, I can explain why I don't see talking heads:
because every possible Kelly is realized, and that includes a Kelly
who doesn't observe disembodied talking heads and who doesn't know
anyone who has ever seen such a head.
So given that my observations aren't in conflict
exists platonically
even if the Turing machine program is never run. And therefore the
consciousness that goes with those states also exists platonically,
even if the Turing machine program is never run.
OK. So, now, Kelly, just to understand what you mean by your theory, I
have to ask you
On Mon, May 25, 2009 at 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Actually I still have no clue of what you mean by information.
Well, I don't think I can say it much better than I did before:
In my view, there are ungrounded abstract symbols that acquire
meaning via constraints
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
Indeed you agree with the hypothesis, and your philosophy appears to
be a consequence
-minimizing bet in this
branch, I know that in a closely related branch I will make the risky
gain-maximizing bet and say to hell with the Kellys in the losing
worlds.
So I know that even if I make the safe bet, there's another Kelly two
worlds over making the risky bet, which will result in a Kelly
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