Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 16-févr.-06, à 21:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I should have said that Bp p seems wrong, not that it's too simple. I was trying to say that it seems wrong to say that Bp p gets us further than Bp, i.e. provability + truth is more than provability. In order for Bp p Bp, it seems to me that we would have to have access to truth (p) directly, we would have to *know* that we've proved something to be true, not just that we've been consistent. In order to be *sound* we have to be given true truth for our reasoning to start with (and then of course be then be consistent with it). This is similar to why I don't think that knowledge is simply true belief. Bruno: first believe that the soul = the intellect. Exercise: what is wrong? Answer tomorrow :-) (+ answers to Danny and Ben). Bruno I don't know what you're trying to get at with soul = intellect. To me the intellect is simply at the same par with provability and reason. The intellect has to be given true truth in order for it to come up with true truth (if it reasons consistently). More than that, the intellect has to be given true truth and know that it was given true truth, in order to reason its way to more true truth and know that it has done so. To sum up with logician's tools: G* can prove that Bp and Bp p are equivalent (p representing any proposition written in some language understandable by the machine, for example numbers and addition + multiplication symbols in case the machine is a Peano Arithmetic prover. Godel showed how to define the provability B with numbers and addition and multplication symbols and Penao axioms indeed). With the Plotinian vocabulary: The divine intellect know that the soul and the intellect are the same machine having the same discourse, but neither the soul nor the intellect can know of believe that, so that they differ from their point of view. You can guess (unlike Plotinus) some inescapable tension between the soul and the intellect. The intellect is the humble and modest one. It is a scientist. The intellect is aware that either he can say crackpots-thing or it is consistent that he will say crackpots things (cf ~Bf - ~B(~Bf) is equivalent with Bf v DBf). On the contrary, the soul looks a bit like an arrogant entity which never doubt, which pretend to be always right and, the more unnerving, is always right. Now with the sound machine, the divine intellect know that the soul and the intellect (terrestrial) have the same discourse, but neither the soul nor the terrestrial intellect can ever believe or know that assimilation. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp) such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations, including negative one which we can not prove except that we can derive them from the initial comp act of faith (yes doctor). cf: Bruno: ... and note that the coherence of taking simultaneously both a and b above is provided by the incompleteness results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by ... no machine can grasp all aspect of machine. Tom: So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running away from ill-defined words like machine, reason, soul, faith, etc., for who knows what personal reasons. That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability = Bp = Beweisbar(p) cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this. My fault. I will come back on this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp) such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations, including negative one which we can not prove except that we can derive them from the initial comp act of faith (yes doctor). cf: Bruno: ... and note that the coherence of taking simultaneously both a and b above is provided by the incompleteness results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by ... no machine can grasp all aspect of machine. Tom: So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running away from ill-defined words like machine, reason, soul, faith, etc., for who knows what personal reasons. That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability = Bp = Beweisbar(p) cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this. My fault. I will come back on this. Bruno Bruno: since when do we think 'beweisbar' (provable) anything within the domain of our knowledge-base which may have connotations beyond it (into the unlimited)? Since when do we want to speak about Truth in a general sense? Our 'truth'? Our percept of reality? I think simple definitions are limiting the validity of the 'definition' into a narrower model. John M
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Hi John, Le 16-févr.-06, à 16:21, John M wrote: since when do we think 'beweisbar' (provable) anything within the domain of our knowledge-base which may have connotations beyond it (into the unlimited)? Since when do we want to speak about Truth in a general sense? Our 'truth'? Our percept of reality? I think simple definitions are limiting the validity of the 'definition' into a narrower model. My reasoning will work already with arithmetical truth. This is non trivial. Leibnitz, Hilbert, and many mathematicians before Godel would have believed that arithmetical truth gives a narrower model, but after Godel we know that we cannot formalized that notion in any effective way. The fashion today consists even in considering it to be a too large concept. But I will make clear (well I will try, or refer to some literature) that what I say can be extended on much more large notion of truth. I assure you John that the approach is everything but reductionnist. Even just about numbers there is no effective TOE (by Godel). Now, there are angel like Anomega (Analysis + Omega rule) which can grasp the whole arithmetical truth, thanks to their infinite power, but then they cannot grasp the whole analytical truth, and will suffer similar limitation as the more terrestrial machines. Here truth has nothing to do with any form of perception. We are in Platonia, by hypothesis. We keep our eyes closed, if you want. Note also that without simple definition we would not progress, and would not been able to find our errors, or our limitations. Bruno PS a) I answer Tom, and Ben tomorrow. b) For those who read Plotinus, what I call Angels, is what Plotinus call Gods. It corresponds just to loebian entities which cannot been simulated by a computer. There is a chapter in Boolos 1993 describing Anomega, and showing it obeys to G and G*. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Responses interspersed below. Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. Bruno: Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp) such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations, including negative one which we can not prove except that we can derive them from the initial comp act of faith (yes doctor). Actually I was referring to what you said in the belief... thread http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg08680.html where you respond to my statement This runs counter to the whole PHILOSOPHY (mind you) of modern science, that we are simply machines, and that there is no WHY. with: This is due to the materialist who like to use the idea that we are simply machine just to put under the rug all the interesting open problem of (platonician) theology. Since Godel's discovery this position is untenable. Now we know that we don't know really what machines are. With the comp-or-weaker hyp, we already know that if we are machine then the physical laws emerges from in a totally precise and testable way. Tom: So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running away from ill-defined words like machine, reason, soul, faith, etc., for who knows what personal reasons. Bruno: That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability = Bp = Beweisbar(p) cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this. My fault. I will come back on this. Bruno Actually, when I was talking about a lack of precise definition, I wasn't referring to you, Bruno. I was talking about what happens in the general conversation when we don't define our terms, or when we are assuming different definitions based on different philosophies consciously or unconsciously held. On the contrary, I would echo John Mikes' sentiment that some of your definitions seem too simple for my taste. I think I would agree with your definition of reasoning though, but I take issue with your definition of Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p. I think elsewhere you also define Knowledge as Belief Truth, and I have the same problem with that. These definitions seem too simple. These seem equivalent to accidental true belief and accidental true proof. They lack the justification factor. (I feel a reference to G*/G coming. ;) ) Anyway, perhaps we can start a new thread if we want to talk about this part some more, or this is probably what you've been trying to explain to us all along in previous threads. Tom
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Bruno: That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability = Bp = Beweisbar(p) cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this. Tom: ... On the contrary, I would echo John Mikes' sentiment that some of your definitions seem too simple for my taste. I think I would agree with your definition of reasoning though, but I take issue with your definition of Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp p. I think elsewhere you also define Knowledge as Belief Truth, and I have the same problem with that. These definitions seem too simple. These seem equivalent to accidental true belief and accidental true proof. They lack the justification factor. (I feel a reference to G*/G coming. ;) ) Anyway, perhaps we can start a new thread if we want to talk about this part some more, or this is probably what you've been trying to explain to us all along in previous threads. Bruno: Bp p seems too simple. Actually, given that I limit myself in the interview of sound machines, we know that they obey to Bp - p, by definition (a sound machine proves only true statements: so Bp - p). So we know Bp and Bp p are equivalent, so you could at I should have said that Bp p seems wrong, not that it's too simple. I was trying to say that it seems wrong to say that Bp p gets us further than Bp, i.e. provability + truth is more than provability. In order for Bp p Bp, it seems to me that we would have to have access to truth (p) directly, we would have to *know* that we've proved something to be true, not just that we've been consistent. In order to be *sound* we have to be given true truth for our reasoning to start with (and then of course be then be consistent with it). This is similar to why I don't think that knowledge is simply true belief. Bruno: first believe that the soul = the intellect. Exercise: what is wrong? Answer tomorrow :-) (+ answers to Danny and Ben). Bruno I don't know what you're trying to get at with soul = intellect. To me the intellect is simply at the same par with provability and reason. The intellect has to be given true truth in order for it to come up with true truth (if it reasons consistently). More than that, the intellect has to be given true truth and know that it was given true truth, in order to reason its way to more true truth and know that it has done so. Tom
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Bruno wrote: ... and note that the coherence of taking simultaneously both a and b above is provided by the incompleteness results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by ... no machine can grasp all aspect of machine. Bruno Thanks, Bruno, for the above and also your more lengthy response, and also to Jef for your response below. After I posted the question below about Bruno's a) and b) I realised that I had set up a false dichotomy, and I was bracing for the appeal to Godel which Bruno and in a way also Jef responsed with. I've been trying to figure out how best to pose what I was actually trying to get at and I've been busy, but I wanted say thanks for the response. For now, I think that there's a problem with defining what a machine is. As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running away from ill-defined words like machine, reason, soul, faith, etc., for who knows what personal reasons. I recognize that part of the problem is a difference in philosophy, the prime example being the Platonic vs. Aristotelian. I guess this underscores the importance of Jeanne's original question about the place for philosophy in subjects like Artificial Intelligence. Perhaps this is obvious to most of us here, but it is an interesting question. In fact, the very question Why philosophize? is actually philosophizing. We humans just can't get away from it. It's what we do naturally. And perhaps this is part of what I'm trying to get at. A machine has to be interviewed by a human in order to philosophize. We humans are somehow the source of something from nothing in a way that a machine is not (Jef's something special about the human experience). This is part of the definition of a machine, as I see it. Back to thinking. Tom -Original Message- From: Jef Allbright [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 20:18:35 -0800 Subject: Re: Artificial Philosophizing On 2/7/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man A and b above both make sense to me. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. I'll agree that was implied by my statement. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. Note that I would in fact agree with both a and b above. (And also perhaps Bruno doesn't agree with himself (Bruno's a) vs. b) above)). If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. But wouldn't this be grasping all aspects of ourselves? If not, then what part of ourselves is outside of the realm of being able to grasp, and if so, how can we say we are machines in a totally closed rationalistic/naturalistic world? Brent and Jef's paragraphs sound mystical to me, as mystical as any other first truth assumption. I intentionally adopted a mystical tone in response to Tom's assertion about modern philosophy being the death of humanness since I was trying to relate to someone who appeared to be saying that there's something essentially special about the human experience. So I agreed, trying to show that from the subjective point of view, the human experience certainly is extraordinary, but that it's all a part of an objectively knowable, but never fully known, world. My viewpoint is mystical to the extent that Albert Einstein and Buckminster Fuller were mystical, acknowledging the mystery of our experience while remaining fully grounded in an empirical but never fully knowable reality. To go to the heart of Tom's assertion about complete self knowledge, in order for a system to fully know something, it must contain a complete model of that something within itself, therefore the system that knows must always be more complex than that which it knows. It seems to me that much endless discussion and debate about the nature of the Self, Free Will and Morality hinges on a lack of understanding of the relationship between the subjective and objective viewpoint, and that each tends to expand in ever-increasing spheres of context. Expanding the sphere of subjective understanding across an increasing scope of subjective agents and their interactions provides ever-increasing but never complete understanding of shared values that work. Expanding the sphere of objective understanding provides increasing scope of instrumental knowledge of practices that work. Combining the two by applying increasingly objective instrumental knowledge toward the promotion of increasingly shared subjective values is the very essence of moral decision-making. Paradox is always a case of insufficient context. - Jef http
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 10-févr.-06, à 00:18, Russell Standish a écrit : This is one point where I depart from your metaphysics. Traditional aristotelianism asserts existence of matter, and that psyche emerges from that. OK. (except that many aristotelian, like Stephen, are dualist, but most of their naturalist grandchildren are materialist monist, so ok). You assert the existence of numbers, and of psyche, and show how matter arises from that. I assume only the existence of numbers. Then psyche arises (logically, not temporaly), and then matter arises (logically too, and this has been partially tested, but only partially). I agree that in the UDA I assume psyche/consciousness, for example, when thinking about saying yes or no to the doctor, but this is logically eliminated when I go to the universal machine interview, where psyche will be described by Boole (the laws of mind) and Godel-Lob-Solovay (laws of loebian self-reference). I think both are needed. The psyche supervenes on matter, and the properties of matter depend on the psyche. Dualism? All of which exists because numbers exist. Arithmetical Monism? I am not sure I understand you. If you agree everything comes from numbers then we do agree. Oops ... must go. Bon week-end, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of humanness that is more than a machine (i.e. simply following a set of instructions). Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. Brent says that realizing we are machines is the beginning of (or another step in) the death of human hubris (arrogance). I thought that Bruno maintains that humility is on the side of realizing that we cannot totally understand ourselves. Pascal, Reason can begin again when we recognize what we cannot know. Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Tom Given that we believe in sense? Who/what gives that? Do we believe in that? Georges. Georges, you are using sense by asking those questions. Well, all my education (and probably even my genes) tried hard to convice me that I do. Still, I have a (very strong) doubt. Obviously, things tend to appear just as if I would. But maybe just as obviously as the sun tend to appear to be moving around the earth. Obviously also, the sense view is very well suited for us to best live and reproduce. This means it is almost always appropriate and efficient for everyday life discussion and decision making. But being appropriate and efficient in such cases does not mean at all that it is correct. It does not follow that it is appropriate everywhere, especially when we are in the kind of discussions we have here, about what would be a machine or what it might mean that reality actually exists. I was just wondering whether people here were willing to have a look on what they are sitting on. List, OK, we don't have to use any of those scary words like sense and reason and faith. We're just trying to get at reality. Or are people starting to get nihilistic? Have a little faith (oops) and let's talk. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. (And also perhaps Bruno doesn't agree with himself (Bruno's a) vs. b) above)). If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. I feel a flaw in the then just there whatever definition of machine you want to consider. Georges. -- Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] CLIPS-IMAG, 385, rue de la Bibliothèque, B.P. 53, 38041 Grenoble Cedex 9 Tel: (33-4) 76 63 58 55, Fax: (33-4) 76 44 66 75
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 08-févr.-06, à 22:55, Russell Standish a écrit : On Wed, Feb 08, 2006 at 08:17:05PM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, we (as observer) perceive at any given time a finite amount of information... so what you could know (still as an observer of a system) is finite, hence digitalisable at the level of information that you could know about the object, so I don't see why a radioactive source and the click pattern on a geiger counter cannot be simulated... You could object randomness, but generating (and executing) all program by the UD will generate all random string as well. Regards, Quentin A UD can generate the set of all random strings, but it still needs to select a single string to be equivalent to a Geiger counter. AFAIK, this is impossible for a Turing machine ... Not if the UD (which is a turing machine) copies you each time it generates one bit of the random strings. This is the idea of getting the quantum indeterminacy as a particular case of the comp first person indeterminacy. I think it is the idea of Everett and everything-like theories. but rather trivial from a real, physical machine. Accepting not only weak-materialism (existence of primitive matter) and the quantum theory that is accepting the existence of primitive matter and that it obeys to the quantum. But this is the kind of things we are trying to explain (from simpler things, like numbers and/or comp etc.). I can do it on my computer, for example, showing it to be capable of more than a Turing machine. Only if your computer is interfaced with a quantum generator (assuming the quantum theory). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 03:05:48PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A UD can generate the set of all random strings, but it still needs to
select a single string to be equivalent to a Geiger counter.
AFAIK,
this is impossible for a Turing machine ...
Not if the UD (which is a turing machine) copies you each time it
generates one bit of the random strings.
I had a smart response here, and I just realised I had misinterpreted
the word copy here, so I just deleted it. Copy in English also
means to send something (envoyer) (I copied him in on the
conversation), as well as to reproduce something.
Yes you are quite right (under COMP, and under the more regular meaning
of copy). However, I don't think this is how a Geiger counter works...
This is the idea of getting the quantum indeterminacy as a particular
case of the comp first person indeterminacy. I think it is the idea of
Everett and everything-like theories.
but rather trivial from a
real, physical machine.
Accepting not only weak-materialism (existence of primitive matter) and
the quantum theory that is accepting the existence of primitive matter
and that it obeys to the quantum. But this is the kind of things we are
trying to explain (from simpler things, like numbers and/or comp etc.).
This is one point where I depart from your metaphysics. Traditional
aristotelianism asserts existence of matter, and that psyche emerges
from that. You assert the existence of numbers, and of psyche, and
show how matter arises from that.
I think both are needed. The psyche supervenes on matter, and the
properties of matter depend on the psyche. All of which exists because
numbers exist. There is a name for such a concept - strange loop. I
thought this name was due to Stewart and Cohen, but it appears
Hofstadter got there first in GEB.
The reason I have come to this position is that try as I might, I
cannot remove the Anthropic Principle as an axiom. I would dearly love
someone to show that it is a consequence of other assumptions, or can
be derived from such by means of a simple, obvious assumption. But
most people I talk to don't even see the problem (perhaps because
they're still grounded in Aristotelian ways...)
I can do it on my computer, for example,
showing it to be capable of more than a Turing machine.
Only if your computer is interfaced with a quantum generator (assuming
the quantum theory).
But it is. Its called a keyboard. (The faster you type, the more
genuine randomness is generated). Do a Google search on /dev/random,
or on Havege*. There is also a fantastically complicated quantum
random generator that consists of an arrangement of spinning disks
interacting with a volume of air@ (OK perhaps not proven quantum, but
our best theories that describe the operation of the device, ie Chaos
theory, indicates quantum influence).
*
@Article{Seznec-Sendrier03,
author = {Andr\'e Seznec and Nicolas Sendrier},
title ={{HAVEGE}: A user-level software heuristic for generating
empirically strong random numbers},
journal = {{ACM} Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation},
year = 2003,
volume = 13,
pages ={334--346}
}
@
@InProceedings{Jakobsson-etal98,
author = {Jakobsson, M. and Shriver, E. and Hillyer, E. and Juels, A.},
title ={A Practical Secure Physical Random Bit Generator},
booktitle ={Proceedings of the 5th {ACM} Conference on Computer and
Communications Security},
pages ={103--111},
year = 1998,
address = {San Francisco},
month ={November}
}
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
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International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgp4kC0HXwTet.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Hi Russel,
Interleaving some comments...
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2006 6:18 PM
Subject: Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 03:05:48PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A UD can generate the set of all random strings, but it still needs to
select a single string to be equivalent to a Geiger counter.
AFAIK,
this is impossible for a Turing machine ...
Not if the UD (which is a turing machine) copies you each time it
generates one bit of the random strings.
I had a smart response here, and I just realised I had misinterpreted
the word copy here, so I just deleted it. Copy in English also
means to send something (envoyer) (I copied him in on the
conversation), as well as to reproduce something.
**
[SPK]
Does it not seem incoherent to use terms that imply some form of
*process* when considering notions that are implicitly changeless and
static? This has perpetually bothered me in the discussions of the
neoplatonians...
BTW, copying is the identity morphism for computations (and
informorphisms in general) in Pratt's discussion of Chu spaces...
**
Yes you are quite right (under COMP, and under the more regular meaning
of copy). However, I don't think this is how a Geiger counter works...
***
[SPK]
It does seem that Bruno is considering the ticks, etc. of the Geiger
Counter as included in the over all 1st person aspect of the bit string,
this would include all aspects of the experience of the Geiger Counter...
***
This is the idea of getting the quantum indeterminacy as a particular
case of the comp first person indeterminacy. I think it is the idea of
Everett and everything-like theories.
but rather trivial from a
real, physical machine.
Accepting not only weak-materialism (existence of primitive matter) and
the quantum theory that is accepting the existence of primitive matter
and that it obeys to the quantum. But this is the kind of things we are
trying to explain (from simpler things, like numbers and/or comp etc.).
This is one point where I depart from your metaphysics. Traditional
aristotelianism asserts existence of matter, and that psyche emerges
from that. You assert the existence of numbers, and of psyche, and
show how matter arises from that.
I think both are needed. The psyche supervenes on matter, and the
properties of matter depend on the psyche. All of which exists because
numbers exist. There is a name for such a concept - strange loop. I
thought this name was due to Stewart and Cohen, but it appears
Hofstadter got there first in GEB.
**
[SPK]
Are you considering a Categorical difference of classes here, in the
sense that the classof matter structures/processes is different (in kind not
degree) from the class of psychies? Have you considered Vaughan Pratt's idea
for a relationship between them?
**
The reason I have come to this position is that try as I might, I
cannot remove the Anthropic Principle as an axiom. I would dearly love
someone to show that it is a consequence of other assumptions, or can
be derived from such by means of a simple, obvious assumption. But
most people I talk to don't even see the problem (perhaps because
they're still grounded in Aristotelian ways...)
**
[SPK]
I concurr with this observation; it is as if most people do not see the
deep conundrum that exist within the Aristotelian hylemorphism
(http://radicalacademy.com/jdcosmology2.htm) in its assumption of a primal
substance which, if I understand correctly, is seperated into its plethora
of forms by many processes. It is the origin of the latter that I argue
should be considered as fundamental, as a primitive class Becoming (ala
Bergson), and substance is then shown to be the class of all forms that can
emerge (think morphisms) from Becoming.
Pratt's idea seems to add a dual to this morphism that would include
such notions as computations; we then have a nice duality that avoid's
Descartes' fallasy of trying to build dualism from substantivalism, ala res
extensa and res cognitas.
**
I can do it on my computer, for example,
showing it to be capable of more than a Turing machine.
Only if your computer is interfaced with a quantum generator (assuming
the quantum theory).
But it is. Its called a keyboard. (The faster you type, the more
genuine randomness is generated). Do a Google search on /dev/random,
or on Havege*. There is also a fantastically complicated quantum
random generator that consists of an arrangement of spinning disks
interacting with a volume of air@ (OK perhaps not proven quantum, but
our best theories that describe the operation of the device, ie Chaos
theory, indicates quantum influence).
***
[SPK]
Would the subclass of all of these randomness generators include
automorphisms?
***
*
@Article{Seznec-Sendrier03,
author = {Andr\'e Seznec and Nicolas
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 08:49:24PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
*
@Article{Seznec-Sendrier03,
author = {Andr\'e Seznec and Nicolas Sendrier},
title = {{HAVEGE}: A user-level software heuristic for generating
empirically strong random numbers},
journal = {{ACM} Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation},
year = 2003,
volume = 13,
pages = {334--346}
}
@
@InProceedings{Jakobsson-etal98,
author = {Jakobsson, M. and Shriver, E. and Hillyer, E. and Juels, A.},
title = {A Practical Secure Physical Random Bit Generator},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th {ACM} Conference on Computer and
Communications Security},
pages = {103--111},
year = 1998,
address = {San Francisco},
month = {November}
}
**
[SPK]
Any of these available online free, to non-academics like me?
**
snip
Onward!
Stephen
Yes, I believe so, as I think I read them. Do a Google search on the
paper titles...
If they really are copy protected, I can probably get a copy for you through
my (fading) UNSW connection.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpsmXYPtS1ip.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Best of all - try a washing machine. Get all your wife's stockings and throw them loosely into the washing machine and switch it on for one cycle. When you see the state of entanglement of everything at the end you will understand genuine randomness. Kim Jones On 10/02/2006, at 10:18 AM, Russell Standish wrote: Only if your computer is interfaced with a quantum generator (assuming the quantum theory). But it is. Its called a keyboard. (The faster you type, the more genuine randomness is generated). Do a Google search on /dev/random, or on Havege*. There is also a fantastically complicated quantum random generator that consists of an arrangement of spinning disks interacting with a volume of air@ (OK perhaps not proven quantum, but our best theories that describe the operation of the device, ie Chaos theory, indicates quantum influence).
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Jef Allbright wrote: On 2/7/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man A and b above both make sense to me. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. I'll agree that was implied by my statement. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. Note that I would in fact agree with both a and b above. So do I. Brent Meeker
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Tue, Feb 07, 2006 at 08:34:22PM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: To the list, I don't understand how some of you accept the term we are machine and not we are digitalisable at some level and hence emulable at that level, could someone enlight me on this apparent contradiction ? Quentin Machine means more than Turing machine. For example, I would count a Geiger counter connected to a radioactive source as a machine, yet no Turing machine can reproduce its pattern of clicks. We are machine simply means to me that there is no immaterial soul breathing life into our bodies - we are ultimately 100% material. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpofm4lpo9XN.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 08-févr.-06, à 10:36, Brent Meeker a écrit : Jef Allbright wrote: On 2/7/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man A and b above both make sense to me. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. I'll agree that was implied by my statement. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. Note that I would in fact agree with both a and b above. So do I. ... and note that the coherence of taking simultaneously both a and b above is provided by the incompleteness results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by ... no machine can grasp all aspect of machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le 06-févr.-06, à 22:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man To be sure, and clear, note that I have never said I am a machine, nor man is a machine. All what I say is that: IF I am a machine THEN physics emerges from machine's psychology or theology. Both ontologically and epistemologically. Now, I have made some progress, and strictly speaking, I can replace the comp hyp by the much more general lobian hyp. This entails that machines and a very large class of non-machine shares the same physical laws. Of course my argument remains simpler to present with the comp hyp, and I still can refer to it for that reason. b) become no machine, no angels, nor Gods can grasp all aspect of itself. Even the Plato's and Plotin's big ONE can't, but it is not because it lacks something, in that case, it is more because it does not lack anything so that somehow it is far above the very idea of grasping. See Boolos 1993 (precise ref in my Lille thesis) for an explicit description of an angel (by which I mean any loebian entity which is not turing emulable, but still follows the G/G* logic). Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of humanness that is more than a machine (i.e. simply following a set of instructions). The idea of following a set of instructions is level dependent. I agree it is basically inhuman. Now machine can observe themselves (in more than one sense) and this in general leads to unpredictable behavior. With or without the quantum hyp. it can be said that man or nature follows simple set of instruction like following the (linear and computable) solutions of the Schroedinger Eq. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. Well, if we are machines, we must admit we are philosophizing a liitle bit :) Brent says that realizing we are machines is the beginning of (or another step in) the death of human hubris (arrogance). I agree, but loebianity is almost the most general characterization of humilty and modesty. For the modalist: humility = Dt - DBf, Modesty = B(Bp-p)-Bp. I will come back on this, when I will come back on the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' hypostases. I thought that Bruno maintains that humility is on the side of realizing that we cannot totally understand ourselves. No loebian entity can fully understand it-selves, and that gives to them many (really many) alternative exploration paths, which can recombine or not. Pascal, Reason can begin again when we recognize what we cannot know. Yes and no. Some have used that formula with the meaning that you can reason, but only starting from such or such sacred book on revelations. In particular I am not sure in which sense pascal did use it. Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? I hope this help a little bit. I hope I can make it clearer, perhaps by finding a way to explain Godel's theorem and incompleteness phenomena, and how they are related to G and G*, and the discoveries of mystical machines (which are just machines which look deep inside themselves, in the Godel-Lob sense of self-reference). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Le Mercredi 8 Février 2006 10:41, Russell Standish a écrit : On Tue, Feb 07, 2006 at 08:34:22PM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: To the list, I don't understand how some of you accept the term we are machine and not we are digitalisable at some level and hence emulable at that level, could someone enlight me on this apparent contradiction ? Quentin Machine means more than Turing machine. For example, I would count a Geiger counter connected to a radioactive source as a machine, yet no Turing machine can reproduce its pattern of clicks. We are machine simply means to me that there is no immaterial soul breathing life into our bodies - we are ultimately 100% material. Cheers Hi, we (as observer) perceive at any given time a finite amount of information... so what you could know (still as an observer of a system) is finite, hence digitalisable at the level of information that you could know about the object, so I don't see why a radioactive source and the click pattern on a geiger counter cannot be simulated... You could object randomness, but generating (and executing) all program by the UD will generate all random string as well. Regards, Quentin
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Wed, Feb 08, 2006 at 08:17:05PM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, we (as observer) perceive at any given time a finite amount of information... so what you could know (still as an observer of a system) is finite, hence digitalisable at the level of information that you could know about the object, so I don't see why a radioactive source and the click pattern on a geiger counter cannot be simulated... You could object randomness, but generating (and executing) all program by the UD will generate all random string as well. Regards, Quentin A UD can generate the set of all random strings, but it still needs to select a single string to be equivalent to a Geiger counter. AFAIK, this is impossible for a Turing machine, but rather trivial from a real, physical machine. I can do it on my computer, for example, showing it to be capable of more than a Turing machine. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpwEb2b656wF.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Georges wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of humanness that is more than a machine (i.e. simply following a set of instructions). Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. Brent says that realizing we are machines is the beginning of (or another step in) the death of human hubris (arrogance). I thought that Bruno maintains that humility is on the side of realizing that we cannot totally understand ourselves. Pascal, Reason can begin again when we recognize what we cannot know. Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Tom Given that we believe in sense? Who/what gives that? Do we believe in that? Georges. Georges, you are using sense by asking those questions. List, OK, we don't have to use any of those scary words like sense and reason and faith. We're just trying to get at reality. Or are people starting to get nihilistic? Have a little faith (oops) and let's talk. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. (And also perhaps Bruno doesn't agree with himself (Bruno's a) vs. b) above)). If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. But wouldn't this be grasping all aspects of ourselves? If not, then what part of ourselves is outside of the realm of being able to grasp, and if so, how can we say we are machines in a totally closed rationalistic/naturalistic world? Brent and Jef's paragraphs sound mystical to me, as mystical as any other first truth assumption. Tom
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
Hi Tom, Le Mardi 7 Février 2006 18:03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. But wouldn't this be grasping all aspects of ourselves? If not, then what part of ourselves is outside of the realm of being able to grasp, and if so, how can we say we are machines in a totally closed rationalistic/naturalistic world? Brent and Jef's paragraphs sound mystical to me, as mystical as any other first truth assumption. Tom Knowing a (complex) program, without knowing the input data does not give us much information... To the list, I don't understand how some of you accept the term we are machine and not we are digitalisable at some level and hence emulable at that level, could someone enlight me on this apparent contradiction ? Quentin
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On 2/7/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man A and b above both make sense to me. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. I'll agree that was implied by my statement. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. Note that I would in fact agree with both a and b above. (And also perhaps Bruno doesn't agree with himself (Bruno's a) vs. b) above)). If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. But wouldn't this be grasping all aspects of ourselves? If not, then what part of ourselves is outside of the realm of being able to grasp, and if so, how can we say we are machines in a totally closed rationalistic/naturalistic world? Brent and Jef's paragraphs sound mystical to me, as mystical as any other first truth assumption. I intentionally adopted a mystical tone in response to Tom's assertion about modern philosophy being the death of humanness since I was trying to relate to someone who appeared to be saying that there's something essentially special about the human experience. So I agreed, trying to show that from the subjective point of view, the human experience certainly is extraordinary, but that it's all a part of an objectively knowable, but never fully known, world. My viewpoint is mystical to the extent that Albert Einstein and Buckminster Fuller were mystical, acknowledging the mystery of our experience while remaining fully grounded in an empirical but never fully knowable reality. To go to the heart of Tom's assertion about complete self knowledge, in order for a system to fully know something, it must contain a complete model of that something within itself, therefore the system that knows must always be more complex than that which it knows. It seems to me that much endless discussion and debate about the nature of the Self, Free Will and Morality hinges on a lack of understanding of the relationship between the subjective and objective viewpoint, and that each tends to expand in ever-increasing spheres of context. Expanding the sphere of subjective understanding across an increasing scope of subjective agents and their interactions provides ever-increasing but never complete understanding of shared values that work. Expanding the sphere of objective understanding provides increasing scope of instrumental knowledge of practices that work. Combining the two by applying increasingly objective instrumental knowledge toward the promotion of increasingly shared subjective values is the very essence of moral decision-making. Paradox is always a case of insufficient context. - Jef http://www.jefallbright.net Increasing awareness for increasing morality
Artificial Philosophizing
Bruno wrote: Jeanne Houston wrote: I am a layperson who reads these discussions out of avid interest, and I hope that someone will answer a question that I would like to ask in order to enhance my own understanding. There is an emphasis on AI running through these discussions, yet you seem to delve into very philosophical questions. Are the philosophical discussions applicable to the development of AI I would say so, but probably not in a predictible way ... Today the reverse is still more true. (i.e., trying to grasp all aspects of the mind of man if you are trying to develop a true copy), ... or in some indirect way perhaps, by giving evidences that no man can grasp all aspect of man, so that if we make a copy, some bets or hopes, or faith, or things like that are in order. or are they only interesting diversions that pop-up from time to time. My thanks to anyone who wishes to respond. Jeanne Houston I do use explicitly the computationailist hypothesis (the thesis that I am a machine) which is stronger than the strong AI thesis (machine can think). Actually I am no more in need of comp (I realised that my theory works for a large variety of non-machines), but, still, with the comp hyp, the reasoning is simpler. Bruno On 2/6/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We can't JUST DO things (like AI). Whenever we DO things, we are THINKING ABOUT them. I'd venture to say that HOW WE THINK ABOUT THINGS (e.g. philosophy, epistemology, etc.) is even MORE important that DOING THINGS (engineering, sales, etc.). That is one way of looking at the advantage that we humans have over machines. We have the capability to not just do things, but to know why we are doing them. This runs counter to the whole PHILOSOPHY (mind you) of modern science, that we are simply machines, and that there is no WHY. This modern philosophy, if taken to its extreme, is the death of the humanness. Tom Caylor Jef Allbright wrote: To realize that we are just machines in a physical world, and that this validates and enhances--rather than diminishes--the romance, the meaning, and the mystery of human existence, is a very empowering conceptualization. To travel into the void, leaving behind myths and tradition, and then to emerge from the void, to see that all is as it was, but standing on physical law, both known and not yet known, is to gain the freedom to grow. - Jef http://www.jefallbright.net Increasing awareness for increasing morality Brent Meeker wrote: I think you've got it the wrong way 'round. The view of modern science is that we are machines and machines can do philosophy and know they are doing it and can have reasons why. It is the death of human hubris - which may eventually succumb to the wounds it has received since Copernicus. Brent Meeker So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of humanness that is more than a machine (i.e. simply following a set of instructions). Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. Brent says that realizing we are machines is the beginning of (or another step in) the death of human hubris (arrogance). I thought that Bruno maintains that humility is on the side of realizing that we cannot totally understand ourselves. Pascal, Reason can begin again when we recognize what we cannot know. Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Tom
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [...] Could we try to make sense of this, given that we believe in sense? Given that we believe in sense? Who/what gives that? Do we believe in that? Georges.
