Hi John,
Le 27-avr.-05, à 16:17, John M a écrit :
again a post from you with your wits. I will post my reply (if I get
the
relevant points from Russell and - if I can - ) onlist.
However your expression:
... I think we can progress
only by understanding misunderstandings ...
(what I assume as
.
Bruno
John M
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be
Russell and John.
I will elaborate later.
Bruno
John M
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: Free
PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 2:49 AM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Le 26-avr.-05, à 21:36, John M a écrit :
Russell wrote:
Ah John, if only I could understand what you're saying
exchange, to be nice to the list.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 8:09 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Russell S. writes in his convoluted from attachment-digging out ways:
Laplace's daemon is a hypothetical creature that knows the exact state
of every particle in the universe. In a deterministic universe
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 8:09 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Russell S. writes in his convoluted
PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 7:58 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 05:14:42PM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system -
Tierra
to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one
in
which the random no.
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 05:45:58PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
which the random no. generator is
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
which the random no. generator is replaced with a true random
no. generator called HAVEGE, and another
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
which the random no. generator is replaced with a true random
no. generator called HAVEGE, and
: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 7:58 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
isn't this getting out of control?
I am not talking about your ingenious octopus question (ask the octopus!)
I am talking of the simplistic anthropomodelled and today-level-related way
of thinking: something (anything) is black or white, in other words:
it is
M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:53 AM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
isn't this getting out of control?
I am
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-avr.-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
A decision I make is free when I feel that I could have decided
otherwise.
OK I can take that definition of free-will, although I would bet that
free-will will always be in company of any genuine act of will.
Bruno
15, 2005 6:27 AM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-avr.-05, 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a crit :
A decision I make is free when I feel that I could have decided
otherwise.
OK I can take that definition of free-will, although I would bet that
free
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes
Here is my definition: a decision I make is free when I feel that I
could
have decided otherwise.
Is the question of free will just a matter of definitions? Definitional
arguments are sterile and have no meaning. If I define free will to be
a 14
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
This is more or less the point I was trying to make: philosophical
discussion leads to a troubling entaglement that seems to lead to
contradictions. I return to what I called a definition but I should
probably have called a description of the basic phenomenon we
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 11:25 AM
To: Hal Finney
Subject: RE: Free Will Theorem
-Original Message-
From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 4:25 PM
To: everything-list
Hal Finney writes:
On the other hand, I might aknowledge that my feeling of freedom is not
actually consistent with the particular interpretation of the term
freedom
the philosopher is trying to foist on me. In other words, if freedom
means
not bound by determinism or randomness, then I
Hal Finney wrote:
The question of free will has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
at least the first part of this page on Compatibilism,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilism is the
doctrine that free will is compatible with
In various places including a post in the All/Nothing multiverse thread:
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5859.html
I have defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
I have been arguing that Turing's decision procedure result points towards
the multiverse being a
Please find my remarks interspaced below.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 2:11 AM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Russell wrote
, Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A
distinction:
...free will to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate
choices... is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited
views.
There may be (hidden
Stathis Papaioannou writes
Here is my definition: a decision I make is free when I feel that I could
have decided otherwise.
Is the question of free will just a matter of definitions? Definitional
arguments are sterile and have no meaning. If I define free will to be
a 14 pound bowling ball,
-Original Message-
From: John M [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 10:04 PM
To: Russell Standish; Stathis Papaioannou
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
..
[JM]:
I am sure you do a decent job. Tierra, however, does
: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 2:11 AM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Russell wrote in his attachment-style post:
[RS]:
Since we live in a quantum mechanical world, randomness is inherently
quantum mechanical. Chaos, as a classical mechanism will amplify
quantum randomness
-Original Message-
From: John M [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 9:05 PM
To: Brent Meeker; everything-list@eskimo.com
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Dear Brent,
I wish I had the insight into future development of our knowledge-base. Or
am
Le 12-avr.-05, à 05:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
And does it really make much difference, whether we are talking truly
random or intractably pseudo-random?
You may be interested to know that the class
of problems soluble by machine with
pseudo-random oracle is properly contained
in the
Norman Samish wrote:
I have somewhat arbitrarily defined free will as voluntary
actions that are both self-determined by a Self-Aware
Object, and are not predictable.
My reasoning is that if something is completely predictable,
then there is no option for change, hence no free will.
But
[Forwarded to the list on behalf of Quentin Anciaux]
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 14:53:55 +0200
Le lundi 11 avril 2005 Ã 22:41 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou a Ã
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lundi 11 avril 2005 à 22:41 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
We would then still believe that we had free will
, even though in reality we are all blindly following a predetermined
script. How could we possibly know that this is not what is in fact
happening?
@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 1:42 AM
Subject: Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients)
with
the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts.
One thing is even worse: to draw
The question of free will has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
at least the first part of this page on Compatibilism,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilism is the
doctrine that free will is compatible with determinism.
On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 09:45:49AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
The question of free will has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
at least the first part of this page on Compatibilism,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilism is
Norman Samish wrote:
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable.
To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's actions
must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
fundamental level, this must be quantum indeterminacy.
This is
Norman Samish wrote:
If free will simply means self-determination then
Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined
we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as
to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds
(our selves) determine our actions.
Le 11-avr.-05, à 08:08, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Norman Samish wrote:
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely
predictable.
To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's
actions
must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
fundamental
Norman Samish wrote:
But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou
referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is
such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely
predictable.
Do they have free will?
Another example might be a
banned from writing to the list?
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 10:46 PM
Subject: Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers
Bruno wrote:
Actually I am not sure I can put any meaning on the word free-will. My
old defense (in this and other list) was just a defense of the notion of
will. If someone can explain me how he/she distinguish free-will from
will, I would be glad.
Bruno
I currently consider Free Will to be a
I got something from you yesterday ... maybe you had an errant email
relay like I suffered yesterday.
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 11:25:29AM -0400, John M wrote:
I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being
included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list?
John Mikes wrote:
The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A
distinction:
...free will to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate
choices... is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views.
There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons'
Norman Samish wrote:
If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is
right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He
says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is
whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions.
Apologies for double-posting. My dial-up account is rather unreliable.
Jonathan Colvin
Norman Samish wrote:
If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is
right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have
free will. He
says, the only relevant question as to
Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:41:53PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It may be the case that quantum indeterminacy adds a random element
which
contributes to our experience of free will, but you are dismissing the
other theoretical possibility, which is that our brains
: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 7:28 PM
Subject: Re: Free Will Theorem
Norman Samish wrote:
If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is
right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He
says
On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 01:26:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I think this situation is essentially hypothetical. No machine is
completely deterministic - computers are designed to be as
deterministic as possible, but still suffer bit errors through
chance. Human brains, however,
John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with
the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts.
One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such.
I disagree with this, in general. In medical science, in particular, one of
the most
Hi Stathis:
My argument is that Turing's result points towards the MWI and makes it a
deterministic outcome but I so far see no reason why all worlds should run
concurrently. So the judge's decision you experience now is an
indeterminate [random] selection from all possible outcomes and gives
Hi Stathis:
I left out that Turing's result seem to point towards a conclusion that the
set of universe descriptions does not form a continuum but rather a
countable set and thus these descriptions can generally differ by too large
an amount to store all prior quantum level states - too coarse
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on
whether the case is
Russel, Stathis
I agree that free will and legal responsibility are different. Free
will is a subjective concept. It is a feeling that one has
about being "master" of one's decisions. In the terminology used in
this list, free will is also a "first person" issue.
Legal responsibility is an
Russell Standish writes:
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:30:25AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I agree that the purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from
happening again; at least, this is what the purpose of punishment ought to
be. But note that this *does* imply an assumption about the reasons
This discussion is exhibiting the usual confusion about what free will
means. The concept itself is incoherent as generally used (taken as meaning
my actions are not determined). But then in this case they must be merely
random (which is hardly an improvement), or we require recourse to a
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers of schizophrenia, which
may be seen as disorders of free will:
1. Command auditory hallucinations. The patient hears voices commanding him
to do sometimes horrific things, which he feels he *must* obey, and often
does obey, even though he does
If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and
to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only
relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious
minds (our selves) determine our actions.
But what about the sufferers
nd awe.
I don't want to even guess how much we did not
yet discover. Well, we are past the Flat Earth. Or are we?
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Pete Carlton" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
S
The answer to Statis' question seems straightforward. Given quantum
indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine
free will exists.
...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine*
free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety,
Norman Samish writes:
The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum
indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine
free will exists.
...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising
*genuine*
free will, as opposed to this
@eskimo.com
Subject: John Conway, Free Will Theorem
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2005 01:30:00 -0700
Greetings,
I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John
Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his results
with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker
Hi Stathis:
At 08:17 AM 4/8/2005, you wrote:
I am worried that some of what I have always believed to be my freely made
decisions may actually result from physical processes in my brain which
are either, on the one hand, completely random, or on the other hand,
entirely deterministic (even if
Greetings,
I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John
Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his
results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He
presents this as the Free Will Theorem, saying basically that
particles
the Kochen-Specker paradox. He
presents this as the Free Will Theorem, saying basically that
particles must have as much free will as the experimenters who are
deciding which directions to measure the |spin| of a spin-1 particle
in.
--I would replace his words free will with indeterminacy
a lab so well isolated that we can get A entangled
to P without also entangling B.
To go back to the idea that
the "Free Will Theorem", saying basically that
particles must have as much "free will" as the experimenters who are
deciding which directions to measure th
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