On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for
an explanation of mind, then we should expect any "physics" extracted
from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics.
Hi David
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both
of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind
literally is a digital computer ... and that
On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical
Realism).
Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth).
Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete
Sigma_1 truth.
As I have
Stathis,
my imagination does not run that high. If I imagine myself as an alien
scientist, I would be self centered (pretentious?) enough to imagine that I
know more about those stupid humans and don't have to experiment on computer
- THEN on the real stuff, to LEARN how they are. I would know.
I
Hi Bruno
So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of
CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).
Certainly it is clear that your /yes doctor/ hypothesis subsumes CTM.
But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why "all
consequences of co
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both
of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind
liter
Hi Bruno
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a
deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I
published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in
the seventies). Many
Peter,
Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only
the formal definition of "arithmetical realism", which is that a
machine is arithmetical realist if she believes in the axiom of
elementary arithmetic *with* (the realist part) the principle of the
third excluded
An aside, concerning what actually requires simulation / arithmetic
explanation.
The algorithm of the collapse dynamics itself operates in a domain meta
to the physical, and in this regard there is a reversal of causality
with respect to the physical and the arithmetic. But I don't think this
Hi Andrew,
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:13, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version
of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).
Certainly it is clear that your yes doctor hypothesis subsumes CTM.
Not after step sev
How do you define the relative point of view?
Do you know Gödel's provability predicate? The points of view are
defined by intensional variants of the current provability predicate
of the machine with or without some oracle. There are 8 basic points
of view p (truth), Bp (provability/belie
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:19, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to
both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational
On 07/02/11 19:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an
algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea,
but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then,
related to the fact that physical machines appears
Thank you all for fine conversations, readings and ideas over the years.
I must take my leave; please remove my eaddrs from list delivery.
Thank you.
James Rose
2/7/2011
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Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it
much easier to see what you are saying.
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the
indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context
/ instantiation of this observer. I would inc
Hi Andrew,
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in
a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that
I published in 1988 (althou
On Feb 7, 4:06 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> >>> On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical
> Realism).
>
> >>> Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth).
>
> >> Actually, comp needs onl
On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Peter,
>
> Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only
> the formal definition of "arithmetical realism",
You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
neutral because it has ontological conclusions.
.which is that
On Tue, Feb 8, 2011 at 3:40 AM, John Mikes wrote:
> Stathis,
>
> my imagination does not run that high. If I imagine myself as an alien
> scientist, I would be self centered (pretentious?) enough to imagine that I
> know more about those stupid humans and don't have to experiment on computer
> - T
On 07/02/11 21:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in
a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original r
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