# The propositions of comp?

```On 07/02/11 19:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
```
Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea, but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then, related to the fact that physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too, and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, but emulated in arithmetical truth.

```
This is the starting point I am trying to agree between the two of us.

PROPOSITION 1
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The mind is related to the execution of an algorithm -- for instance, on some physical machine.
```
```
Then, we propose, we go beyond the concept of the physical machine, and simply suppose that:
```
PROPOSITION 2
```
The mind is the execution of an algorithm, an algorithm which simply exists, without the requirement for any physical instantiation, or any physical universe / multiverse in actuality. In other words, the algorithm simply exists, and simply runs, and the subjective experience of this algorithm:
```Looks exactly like
Feels exactly like
Sounds exactly like
Smells and tastes exactly like
a real physical, relativistic, quantum mechanical reality.

```
The first proposition, that the mind is / is related to the execution of an algorithm, I have no problem with whatsoever. This is what I see emphasised in your steps 1-7, with examples of displacement of the observer in space, and then time, and then replacement, and then duplication in space and time.
```This all makes perfect sense.
I think of this as tautological.

```
Equally, there is no problem, of course, that in the context of the execution of the algorithm, "physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too".
```But
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The *obvious* implication is that the physical machines *are* relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm, specifically, the algorithm instantiated in the physical quantum mechanical universe.
```And that
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"physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too", in the virtual reality each observer generates between the ears, as Deutsch describes.
```
Now
Going on from that starting point
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We are philosophically interested in showing that this execution of the algorithm may be taking place in such a way as to give the appearance of the physical quantum mechanical universe, without there having to be an actual physical quantum mechanical universe.
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I am delighted to entertain this possibility. However, I have not to date understood the basis on which you are claiming you have found support for it. I'm sure I'll get there!
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It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a theory toward its logical consequences.
```

```
I know exactly what you mean about this. For years, after I had I deduced the extraordinary implications of Everett's formulation, I acknowledged that very peculiar properties of the transtemporal experiential reality were implied, but I could not really take them as real and actual, let alone make them part of my personal epistemology. (Eventually, however, quite recently, these implications began to become real for me. This, I can report, is a wildly exciting, terrifying, and totally all consuming transition!)
```
I have titled the reply to your email as The propositions of comp?
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In this thread I would like to be crystal clear simply about what the propositions are, then I know exactly what we are discussing in subsequent / parallel threads.
```
Andrew

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