Hi Andrew,
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:13, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version
of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).
Certainly it is clear that your yes doctor hypothesis subsumes CTM.
Not after step seven. The UD, or UD*, makes the reasoning independent
of the level. The "yes doctor" *image* is an help for the first six
steps (indeterminacy, non locality, delays invariance). I let open the
question of identity between the biological brain and the generalized
brain.
But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why "all
consequences of comp are inherit by CTM".
Because if you can deduce a proposition independently of the choice of
a level, all what is proved will get on for all theories narrowing the
level.
One could adopt CTM and yet still debate comp -
I doubt so, frankly.
though I have no interest in doing so. Above all, why should CTM
inherit the second of your three comp sub-hypotheses: Church Thesis
and Arithmetical Realism?
Ah! OK. If you want Church thesis out, I am OK. If this is the
difference with CTM?
Church thesis is really the key and the pointer on theoretical
computer science (and diagonalizations) for the fundamental thing.
And you can drop out Arithmetical Realism, and replace it by the
assumption of believing in enough arithmetical relations to provide a
sense to Church thesis. By which I mean the original classical logical
thesis by Church, and proposed with different form but provably
equivalent meaning, by Post, Markov, Kleene (actually the one who
creates the "Church thesis". For Church it was a definition).
But then that is why I define what I mean by comp: it is Church thesis
and the "yes doctor", but where "yes doctor" is a memo for "It exist a
level such that my consciousness is invariant for digital functional
substitutions. At step seven, the level don't depend on the high
level, CTM like, chosen for the ease of the first six steps.
Expression like "mind is a digital computer" are category error,
and is also ambiguous.
I am happy to settle with something much more abstract, such as
"mind is an algorithm of some kind" if that helps.
But you mind still be guilty of a forbidden identity ! A guilty of
fuzziness which might prevent you to understand the nuance in the
movie graph reasoning, or in Olympia.
Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an
algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea,
but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then,
related to the fact that physical machines appears as relatively
stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too, and that this
is already not just described in arithmetic, but emulated in
arithmetical truth.
It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a
theory toward its logical consequences.
It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind,
which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM).
I wonder what you consider to be the "identity thesis in the
philosophy of mind"
It is long to describe, especially that its foprmulatiosn might depend
on the choice of basic ontology. But simply said, the identity mind id
the mind-brain identity. It goes from the trivial (and in my opinion
incorrect) literal identification, that the mind is the brain, or is
the brain activity, to some epiphenomenal one-one association. With
DM, I argue that if you can reasonably ascribe a mind to a machine,
the machine's mind itself cannot ascribe its mind to its body and is
indeed something else. The first person views depend on non formal
truth, which change the logic of the "& p" arithmetical nuances.
I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of
topic.
No. Chalmers state categorically this concept is compatible with
physics.
I read that defense of dualism in the context of Everett, which I see
as a progress in monism. Also "X state categoricallly" is never
convincing.
Now the mind-body problem is not solved, neither in DM, nor in QM. Nor
is the problem of what is matter, in both DM, and QM, especially QM +
gravitation. So I doubt any X can be categorical on this, and serious
at the same time.
Chalmers stopped at step 3, if you have the slides. He did not accept
the first step indeterminacy and leaves the place.
But you seem more ... courageous? Taking comp seriously is like taking
the quantum seriously, it leads to shocking possibilities.
With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer,
but you cannot attach a computer to a mind.
I am not sure of the point you are making here. What do you mean by
'attach'?
Imagine a robot working in some fields, and imagine it equipped with a
complex computer, so that it makes a lot of decision including many
constrained by an amount of self-referential correctness, like the
ability to say "it rains" and act to protect its mechanics. But then
the robot discovered, after some accident, that it has no computer in
the skull, but just radio emitter on the surface, so that its brain
was something else and somewhere else.
Imagine that you are duplicate at W and M, but in exactly the same
room without window. You know you have been reconstituted, but you
don't know yet if you are in the W room or the M room. Your mind is
attach to two histories, despite they have differentiate. With the
UD*, this appears in the extreme, below your level of substitution,
the numbers of universal rendering increases at infinitum.
You might attach an infinity of computer executions to a mind. The
relation is not one-one.
Assuming 'attach' means instantiated, yes, the mind is multiply
instantiated. No problem there. This is the basis of my concept
multisolipsism - described shortly.
OK. The point is that such a multi-instanciation is the "true"
happening in arithmetic. I often describe this as an ocean of numbers
dreams which can be glued in first person plural perspective.
That is among other things a consequence of UDA.
Now I'm really not sure what you mean by 'attach'. Associate with?
Consider instantiated in? Consider supervenient on? Causally
dependent on?
Statistically dependent on. Let us say. To a body you can associate a
mind. To a mind you can associate an infinity of bodies. But there is
no real bodies, a body is a sort of projection, and a mind has an
infinity of such projection. It is hard to make a picture. It is
necessarily counter-intuitive.
To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is
ambiguous. That might be enough in some context, but the more
precise comp is needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM)
necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic
(or computer science).
And rather than saying that "thought literally is a kind of
computation", comp says that ...?
That there is level of 3-description of my 3-self such that my
consciousness (1-self), content included, remains invariant, for
digital substitution made at that level.
Indicating the "necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics
to arithmetic (or computer science)" because ...?
I am separating my responses to various parts of your email so I can
stay focused on one issue at a time as we exchange our views.
My compartmentalised response is continued in email subject: CTM and
ALG
i will read and comment soon or asap.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
