On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:

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Hi BrunoI will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to bothof us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mindliterally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is akind of computation."from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/

`So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of`

`CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).`

`Expression like "mind is a digital computer" are category error, and`

`is also ambiguous. It relates also on the identity thesis in the`

`philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus`

`with CTM). I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is`

`out of topic.`

`With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but`

`you cannot attach a computer to a mind. You might attach an infinity`

`of computer executions to a mind. The relation is not one-one. That is`

`among other things a consequence of UDA.`

`To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is ambiguous.`

`That might be enough in some context, but the more precise comp is`

`needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM) necessary reduction of`

`body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science).`

I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point.

Which point? The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:

`1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a`

`deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I`

`published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in`

`the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument`

`have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.`

`2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person`

`indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four).`

`3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been`

`more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web`

`page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but`

`is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short`

`version, recently published).`

`4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual`

`implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a`

`comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian`

`antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non`

`locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the`

`computation.`

`Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic`

`(or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church`

`Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is`

`sufficiently big.`

`So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which`

`want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to`

`derive quanta and qualia without postulating them.`

`You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW.`

`Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is`

`not yet solved in the concrete.`

`Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that`

`comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no`

`problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for`

`reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to`

`distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you`

`miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6.`

`Step 8 extends the invariance: it shows that we cannot distinguish`

`virtual reality with arithmetical reality, so we don't need to run`

`physically (and BTW, what would that mean?) a universal dovetailer to`

`get the global first indeterminacy (the one based on a "running" UD).`

`So step 8 just shows that we don't need the assumption of a big`

`universe to get the reversal.`

`I told the list that a scientist thought having find a refutation of`

`UDA. I got it, and it was that: I would have forget that we might live`

`in a little physical universe. My answer is just a reference to step`

`8. So later he replied with the idea that the movie-graph can think.`

`That's a progress. Now, I have debunked more than once on this list`

`the idea that a movie can think. (It is an error akin to the confusion`

`between a number and a gödel number of a number, a confusion between a`

`description of a computation and a computation, it is a confusion of`

`the type finger and moon (ultrafrequent in the field).`

`Of course, even without step 8, UDA1-7 is already very nice given that`

`it shows the reversal in the case of 'big universe', and in passing`

`shows that digital mechanism (comp) entails indeterminacy, non`

`locality, and non cloning of matter. Of course the white rabbits`

`remains and have to be hunted away, if we want to keep comp (and thus`

`CTM, given that CTM implies comp).`

This is what seems straightforward to me. Thought is a computation. OK. Experiential reality is a computation. OK.

`No. When you say "experiential reality" is a computation, you are`

`saying something ambiguous, where comp is far more precise. Because if`

`I can survive with a digital brain, then the experiential reality, the`

`first person, subjective, experience is not a attachable to a`

`computation, but to an infinity of computations, and it obeys a logic`

`driven by the knowing arithmetical points of view, which makes it`

`closer to the non computable notion of "inner god" than to a 3-person`

`computation. The first person cannot even describe (or name, in the`

`logician terms) itself.`

`It might seem amazing, but when you take comp (which implies CTM) you`

`eventually see that neither experiential nor experimental reality are`

`computational. Universal numbers leaves in a ocean of non computable`

`numbers.`

`Also, when you say computation, people can still confuse a computation`

`with a physical implementation of that computation.`

New Point Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'

`You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others, including`

`Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the computationalist hypothesis is`

`already in the "King Milinda" text, which is a greec-hinduist text`

`from before JC.`

`You can see CTM as an ancestor of the more precise modern comp (TC +`

`yes doctor). The "yes doctor" is a belief in a level of description,`

`where CTM believes implicitlt that we know the level (neuron level,`

`for example). But as Colin explains we might take into account the EM`

`fields. I argue that we have to take into account the glial cells (100`

`time more numerous than the neurons). No problem with comp, the level`

`might be as low as the 10^1000 rational cut of the heisenberg matrix`

`of the milky way at the dimension of the superstrings.`

The Computational Hypothesis says that "physics as we know it is notthe fundamentallevel of reality."

`Give me the reference. Chalmers opposed me on this at the ASSC4. This`

`is a consequence of comp, not a direct consequence. Indeed it is the`

`result of my thesis that many oppose ((but rarely publicly for some`

`reason) since I published it in 1988. Just read the archive on this`

`list. Most materialist and atheists believe that physics describes the`

`fundamental level of reality, and today virtually nobody has seen that`

`it cannot be so. Only Wheeler wrote an explicit paper where he`

`suggests that physics might rely on a deeper non physical theory. See`

`Laws without laws, and david Deutsch critical reply.`

and"Just as chemical processes underlie biological processes, andmicrophysicalprocesses underlie chemical processes, something underliesmicrophysical processes.

`Give me the reference. I would appreciate if Chalmers changed his mind`

`on this. I would appreciate even more if he refers to my work, given`

`that he knows its existence.`

Underneath the level of quarks, electrons, and photons is a furtherlevel: the level of bits.

`I sort of agree, like Wheeler on this. Typically physicists, like`

`Deutsch and Landauer for example, replies that the further level is`

`quantum bit, and that if nature is made of information, it is quantum`

`information. but I do think that even quantum information comes from`

`the bits (and the perspectival nature of the observers).`

These bits are governed by a computational algorithm, which at ahigher level produces theprocesses that we think of as fundamental particles, forces, and soon."

`That is digital physics, and I can explain that comp negates digital`

`physics. If I am a computer, then physical reality is not a computer.`

`Physical reality become non totally Turing emulable.`

This is what you claim to have established around point 7 in yourpaper.

`Step seven establish that physics is a branch of arithmetic. That`

`schroedinger equation has to be redundant. Step 1-7 is the reduction`

`of the mind body problem to a purely mathematical body problem. It is`

`the contrary of the idea that particles and fileds result from a`

`classical algorithm. And the math part shows the details of this and`

`makes physics a non computable (a priori) integration (sum) on all`

`'arithmetical fictions'.`

`With step seven you know that the TOE is just logic + addition and`

`multiplication:`

x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) laws of addition x*0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x laws of multiplication.

`AUDA is based on the fact that in that theory you can define Gödel's`

`beweisbar (provability predicate) "B", and physics, including the`

`justification of the wave equation (if that is correct) arise from the`

`behavior of Bp & Dp. The interest here relies on the fact that the G/`

`G* splitting inherited by Bp & Dp leads to a general unified theory of`

`qualia and quanta.`

`I don't expect you to really understand this without studying some`

`good textbook in logic. A good one is the book by Boolos and Jeffrey`

`(and Burgess for ulterior edition).`

`UDA can already been seen as a popular (human) presentation of AUDA. I`

`have always done them together.`

I do not follow the step from CTM to a Computational Hypothesis.(no, your last explanation did not help)

`CTM is the (fuzzy) idea that the mind function like a software`

`processed by a natural computer (the brain). OK?`

`Comp can be seen as more precise, more rigorous and much more weak`

`version of CTM.`

CTM implies COMP, and COMP does not imply CTM.

`Like we have that COMP implies STRONG-AI, but STRONG-AI does not imply`

`COMP (machine can think does not logically entail that only machine`

`can think).`

`Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with`

`saying that there is a level of functional substitution where my`

`(first person) consciousness is invariant for a substitution made at`

`that level. Comp can show that we can never known our level of`

`substitution, and my reasoning works whatever I mean by my brain (it`

`could be the entire galaxy or the entire observable universe if`

`someone asks for it). CTM is vague on the level, and miss the point`

`that we cannot know it, if it exists.`

`Comp is also much more general than CTM, which relies usually on some`

`amount of neurophilosophy, or on representationalist theory of the`

`mind, and CTM is often criticized by 'externalist', like brent Meeker`

`for example. But comp is not annoyed by externalism, given that it`

`defines the (generalized) brain by the portion of universe you need,`

`like possibly the matrix above.`

`So comp is a very weak, and thus general, hypothesis. And the result`

`is easy to describe: physics is not the fundamental branch. Computer`

`science is (or arithmetic, in the large sense of the study of`

`arithmetical truth (like with Number Theory) because computer science`

`can be be embedded in number theory, unlike most of mathematical`

`logic, note. Note also that usual mathematics (math without categories`

`and mathematical logic) can probably be embedded in arithmetic: open`

`problem).`

`So comp is more precise, and more general. To sum up. What you deduce`

`from it will be too.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.