On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:Hi BrunoI will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to bothof us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mindliterally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is akind of computation."from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point.Which point?

This point.

`that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought`

`literally is a kind of computation."`

This point being what I understand your steps one to seven to be making.

`However, I am very happy to settle for "Mind is an algorithm and / or a`

`structure of information of some kind. An arithmetical process.".`

So instead of CTM, I will use ALG

`I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point, ALG, the`

`mind is an algorithm and / or a stucture of information. An arithmetical`

`process.`

`Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it much`

`easier to see what you are saying.`

`By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the`

`indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context /`

`instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an automatic`

`concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic structure of`

`information) i.e. ALG.`

`By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer can`

`be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent simultaneously`

`at two different locations in space at the same time, the observer is`

`similarly existent simultaneously at two different locations in time 'at`

`the same time'. I would also include this as an automatic concomitant`

`with ALG.`

`Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is`

`non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information /`

`algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments where it is`

`instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic concomitant`

`with ALG.`

Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in my view.

The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in adeterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that Ipublished in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this inthe seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argumenthave been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first personindeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four).3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has beenmore developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my webpage). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), butis developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 shortversion, recently published).4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtualimplementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is acomp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indianantic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and nonlocality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of thecomputation.

All good so far. Continued in Multisolipsism -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.