On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both
of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind
literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a
kind of computation."
I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point.
I have no difficulty with this point.
that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought
literally is a kind of computation."
This point being what I understand your steps one to seven to be making.
However, I am very happy to settle for "Mind is an algorithm and / or a
structure of information of some kind. An arithmetical process.".
So instead of CTM, I will use ALG
I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point, ALG, the
mind is an algorithm and / or a stucture of information. An arithmetical
Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it much
easier to see what you are saying.
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the
indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context /
instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an automatic
concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic structure of
information) i.e. ALG.
By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer can
be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent simultaneously
at two different locations in space at the same time, the observer is
similarly existent simultaneously at two different locations in time 'at
the same time'. I would also include this as an automatic concomitant
Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is
non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information /
algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments where it is
instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic concomitant
Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in my view.
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a
deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I
published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in
the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument
have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four).
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been
more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web
page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but
is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short
version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual
implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a
comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian
antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non
locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the
All good so far.
Continued in Multisolipsism
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