Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:17 AM, Craig Weinberg

> wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 9:22:10 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 12:18 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> Where do you get the idea that subjective events cannot repeat? It
>> >> seems another thing that you've just made up, with no rational
>> >> justification.
>> >
>> >
>> > Subjective events cannot  literally repeat for the same reason that
>> > historical events cannot literally repeat and you cannot step into the
>> same
>> > river twice. All conditions are constantly changing so that it is
>> impossible
>> > for every condition to be reproduced in a given frame of experience
>> because
>> > what frames private experience is the relation with every other
>> experience
>> > in the history of the universe, and to an eternity ahead.
>>
>> My current experience is due to the current configuration of my brain,
>>
>
> But the current configuration of your brain "is due" to the current events
> in your life.
>

Yes, and the milk is in the refrigerator because I put it there, but if
someone else put it there, or if it miraculously materialised there, the
milk would still be in the refrigerator.


> and the current configuration of my brain is due to the preceding
>> configurations.
>
>
> Then you rule out any possibility of perception or interaction with
> anything outside of your brain. Your brain is basically a slime mold in the
> dark.
>

Brain configuration at T2 is determined by the configuration C1 at T1 +
external influences at T1 + transition rules.

 The current configuration is due to the preceding
>> configurations because of the deterministic causal chain which you
>> discount. But even without this causal chain, if the current
>> configuration repeats due to chance at some future point, the
>> experience would repeat.
>
>
> That's your assumption. My understanding is that no experience can ever
> repeat. How could it? Every particle is always decaying at different rates
> in different combinations which cannot be controlled. Even if one
> phenomenon were to precisely repeat, the context in which is has repeated
> is different, so that the overall event is not repeated. Configurations of
> matter don't repeat, but they can echo.
>

It is known from quantum mechanics that a given volume of space has a
finite number of possible configurations. This number can be calculated:
the Bekenstein bound. So there is only a finite number of brain states that
you can have if your brain remains finite in size, and this number is far,
far greater than the number of mental states you can have since most
possible brain states do not correlate with mental states (eg., if your
brain is mashed in a blender). If you can only have a finite number of
brain states what would prevent the brain states from repeating?

The causal chain is significant only insofar
>> as it reliably brings about the correct configuration for experiences.
>> A car mechanic is only significant insofar as he reliably fixes a
>> problem with the car, but if the same operation were performed
>> accidentally by a chimpanzee playing with the engine, the car would
>> run just as well.
>>
>
> That is not the case for free will. If my arm moves without my moving it,
> that would be a spasm. If I imitate that motion for a doctor, it is not
> really a spasm, even though I am reliably bringing about the correct
> configuration to effect the arm motion. Two very different ways to arrive
> at the same function. That means that if you build a system based purely on
> function, there is no way of knowing which ways of accessing those
> functions are present and which are not. To deny this, or remain ignorant
> of it, is like a huge flashing neon sign that the full reality of the
> phenomenon of consciousness has not been considered at all.
>
>>
How have you addressed the point I made? If the correct configuration of
the brain were arranged, your arm would move as freely and consciously as
you like. The brain configuration for a spasm would be different. That's
why one is a spasm and the other is voluntary movement. To build something
you don't necessarily need to understand it, you just need to arrange
matter in the correct configuration. Cells do this, and they don't
understand anything.

We know that the person is the same regardless of the origin of the
>> matter in their body.
>
>
> Huh? What person are you claiming is the same as another person?
>

A person has atoms from a hamburger in their brain one day and atoms from a
pizza another day, but they remain the same person. The origin of the
matter is not important.

We know that the entire person is rebuilt from
>> alternative matter over the course of normal metabolism and they
>> remain the same person.
>
>
> Not all at once though. Any organization can trade a certain number of old
> employees for new employees at a given time - the new employees learn by
> example of existing employees and can be trained b

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:24:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Apr 2013, at 17:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain  
function, and aware of them in a way which is a million times  
more detailed than any fMRI could ever be.



No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any  
direct way. Some antic believed consciousness comes from the  
liver. That consciousness is related to a brain is a theory, there  
are only evidence, we cannot experience any theory.


By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to  
be the seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that  
whatever we experience personally is most available impersonally  
as brain activity. We can manipulate brain activity magnetically  
and experience a change in our consciousness, when the same is not  
true of any other organ. This does not mean that our experience is  
caused by the brain or that brain characteristics can be  
translated into conscious qualities, but the correlation shows us  
that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events between  
space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most  
of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable  
to any of the forms or functions on the 'other side.'


I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we  
built  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are  
build during early childhood, and others are brought by long  
histories. We are not experiencing a brain. In fact we can't  
according to the usual theory that there are no sensory neurons in  
the brain.


If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we  
don't 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able  
to tell the difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a  
plane and the seats on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off  
though, then we would be able to infer air travel. The same goes  
for the brain. We are only aware of it when some unexpected  
experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes,  
proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give us  
direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory.  
It's multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that  
sounds like it is coming from outside of our body, but on another  
level we can test and understand that it can't be.


As much as it is quite plausible, the brain existence is theoretical.

Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes,  
phantom smells, etc. All of these give us *direct* experiences of  
tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, and  
phantom smells, and provide only *indirect* evidence that, perhaps,  
there is a brain, in some possible reality.


Each one of those however are experiences which expose the medium  
itself.


How could something like be possible?




Like a lens flare in photography, or pixelation in a video, the  
phenomena not only reveals a non-purposive sensory artifact, but the  
particular intrusive quality of the artifact actually reflects the  
art itself. This is what the neurological symptoms tell us - not  
that we have a brain and that it is real,


OK, then.



but that there is more to our nature than to simply be a clear  
conduit to an objectively real universe. In this way, our senses  
provide us not only with simple truth, but also simple doubt which  
leads us to sophisticated truth, which then leads to sophisticated  
doubt, and finally a reconciled truth (multisense realism).


OK. Note that the hypostases might play the role of the "multisense"  
in the comp theory.








Both inside and outside of the body, and the body themselves are  
theoretical constructs, which might have, or not, some reality,  
primitive or not.


I'm not so big on the power of the theoretical. To me theory is only  
as good as the access it provides to understanding.


Exactly.

Bruno






Craig


Bruno






Craig


Bruno





Craig



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 12, 2013 4:58:31 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Craig:
> "...If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we 
> don't 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell 
> the difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the 
> seats on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be 
> able to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of 
> it when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual 
> phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give 
> us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's 
> multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it 
> is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and 
> understand that it can't be.-Craig..."
>
> JM: Consequently we have no proper indication of what our "theory" is 
> based on (cf:Bruno) - we just 'think'. And 'believe'. 
> And apply NAMES for it. Like 'consciousness'. 
> It is interesting how superstition creeps into science.
> (cf: religions). 
>

I think that behind the thinking and believing is only sensing and 
participating. That's the only thing that I can't conceive of as having a 
more primitive description. Everything else seems to easily boil down to 
sensory experiences (not limited to humans of course). I can imagine a 
space station made of oatmeal and grass in less time than it takes to type 
this sentence, so the idea of forms and experiences without public material 
is easy. By contrast of course, all of the experiences or forms I can 
imagine could never have any need themselves to generate any sensory 
experience.

Craig
 

>
> John M
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, 
 and aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any 
 fMRI could ever be. 



 No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct 
 way. Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That 
 consciousness is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, 
 we cannot experience any theory.

>>>
>>> By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be 
>>> the seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we 
>>> experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We 
>>> can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our 
>>> consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not 
>>> mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain 
>>> characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the 
>>> correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events 
>>> between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most 
>>> of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of 
>>> the forms or functions on the 'other side.'
>>>
>>>
>>> I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built 
>>>  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build during 
>>> early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We are not 
>>> experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual theory that 
>>> there are no sensory neurons in the brain.
>>>
>>
>> If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't 
>> 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the 
>> difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats 
>> on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able 
>> to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it 
>> when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual 
>> phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give 
>> us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's 
>> multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it 
>> is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and 
>> understand that it can't be.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
>>>
 Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/




>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an email to everything-li...@**g

Re: Free-Will discussion

[John Mikes]

Craig:
"...If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't
'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the
difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats
on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able
to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it
when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual
phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give
us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's
multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it
is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and
understand that it can't be.-Craig..."

JM: Consequently we have no proper indication of what our "theory" is based
on (cf:Bruno) - we just 'think'. And 'believe'.
And apply NAMES for it. Like 'consciousness'.
It is interesting how superstition creeps into science.
(cf: religions).

John M



On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function,
>>> and aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any
>>> fMRI could ever be.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct way.
>>> Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That consciousness
>>> is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, we cannot
>>> experience any theory.
>>>
>>
>> By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be the
>> seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we
>> experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We
>> can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our
>> consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not
>> mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain
>> characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the
>> correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events
>> between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most
>> of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of
>> the forms or functions on the 'other side.'
>>
>>
>> I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built
>>  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build during
>> early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We are not
>> experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual theory that
>> there are no sensory neurons in the brain.
>>
>
> If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't
> 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the
> difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats
> on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able
> to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it
> when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual
> phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give
> us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's
> multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it
> is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and
> understand that it can't be.
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
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>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com.
>>
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**
>> group/everything-list?hl=en
>> .
>> For more options, visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:24:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2013, at 17:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, 
>>> and aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any 
>>> fMRI could ever be. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct way. 
>>> Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That consciousness 
>>> is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, we cannot 
>>> experience any theory.
>>>
>>
>> By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be the 
>> seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we 
>> experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We 
>> can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our 
>> consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not 
>> mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain 
>> characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the 
>> correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events 
>> between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most 
>> of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of 
>> the forms or functions on the 'other side.'
>>
>>
>> I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built 
>>  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build during 
>> early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We are not 
>> experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual theory that 
>> there are no sensory neurons in the brain.
>>
>
> If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't 
> 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the 
> difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats 
> on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able 
> to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it 
> when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual 
> phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give 
> us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's 
> multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it 
> is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and 
> understand that it can't be.
>
>
> As much as it is quite plausible, the brain existence is theoretical. 
>
> Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom 
> smells, etc. All of these give us *direct* experiences of tinnitus, 
> vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, and phantom smells, and 
> provide only *indirect* evidence that, perhaps, there is a brain, in some 
> possible reality.
>

Each one of those however are experiences which expose the medium itself. 
Like a lens flare in photography, or pixelation in a video, the phenomena 
not only reveals a non-purposive sensory artifact, but the particular 
intrusive quality of the artifact actually reflects the art itself. This is 
what the neurological symptoms tell us - not that we have a brain and that 
it is real, but that there is more to our nature than to simply be a clear 
conduit to an objectively real universe. In this way, our senses provide us 
not only with simple truth, but also simple doubt which leads us to 
sophisticated truth, which then leads to sophisticated doubt, and finally a 
reconciled truth (multisense realism).


> Both inside and outside of the body, and the body themselves are 
> theoretical constructs, which might have, or not, some reality, primitive 
> or not.
>

I'm not so big on the power of the theoretical. To me theory is only as 
good as the access it provides to understanding.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> -- 
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>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>  
>>  
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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>

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Apr 2013, at 17:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain  
function, and aware of them in a way which is a million times more  
detailed than any fMRI could ever be.



No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct  
way. Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That  
consciousness is related to a brain is a theory, there are only  
evidence, we cannot experience any theory.


By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to  
be the seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that  
whatever we experience personally is most available impersonally as  
brain activity. We can manipulate brain activity magnetically and  
experience a change in our consciousness, when the same is not true  
of any other organ. This does not mean that our experience is  
caused by the brain or that brain characteristics can be translated  
into conscious qualities, but the correlation shows us that what an  
fMRI reveals is the correlation of events between space-time body  
and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most of the private  
experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of the  
forms or functions on the 'other side.'


I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we  
built  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are  
build during early childhood, and others are brought by long  
histories. We are not experiencing a brain. In fact we can't  
according to the usual theory that there are no sensory neurons in  
the brain.


If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we  
don't 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to  
tell the difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a  
plane and the seats on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off  
though, then we would be able to infer air travel. The same goes for  
the brain. We are only aware of it when some unexpected experience  
is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive  
changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give us direct  
experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's multi- 
layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it  
is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test  
and understand that it can't be.


As much as it is quite plausible, the brain existence is theoretical.

Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom  
smells, etc. All of these give us *direct* experiences of tinnitus,  
vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, and phantom  
smells, and provide only *indirect* evidence that, perhaps, there is a  
brain, in some possible reality.


Both inside and outside of the body, and the body themselves are  
theoretical constructs, which might have, or not, some reality,  
primitive or not.


Bruno






Craig


Bruno





Craig



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, and 
>> aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any fMRI 
>> could ever be. 
>>
>>
>>
>> No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct way. 
>> Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That consciousness 
>> is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, we cannot 
>> experience any theory.
>>
>
> By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be the 
> seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we 
> experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We 
> can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our 
> consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not 
> mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain 
> characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the 
> correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events 
> between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most 
> of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of 
> the forms or functions on the 'other side.'
>
>
> I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built 
>  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build during 
> early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We are not 
> experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual theory that 
> there are no sensory neurons in the brain.
>

If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't 
'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the 
difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats 
on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able 
to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it 
when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual 
phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give 
us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's 
multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it 
is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and 
understand that it can't be.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>  
>  
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain  
function, and aware of them in a way which is a million times more  
detailed than any fMRI could ever be.



No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct  
way. Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That  
consciousness is related to a brain is a theory, there are only  
evidence, we cannot experience any theory.


By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to  
be the seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that  
whatever we experience personally is most available impersonally as  
brain activity. We can manipulate brain activity magnetically and  
experience a change in our consciousness, when the same is not true  
of any other organ. This does not mean that our experience is caused  
by the brain or that brain characteristics can be translated into  
conscious qualities, but the correlation shows us that what an fMRI  
reveals is the correlation of events between space-time body and  
sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most of the private  
experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of the  
forms or functions on the 'other side.'


I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built   
theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build  
during early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We  
are not experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual  
theory that there are no sensory neurons in the brain.


Bruno





Craig



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, and 
> aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any fMRI 
> could ever be. 
>
>
>
> No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct way. 
> Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That consciousness 
> is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, we cannot 
> experience any theory.
>

By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be the 
seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we 
experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We 
can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our 
consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not 
mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain 
characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the 
correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events 
between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most 
of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of 
the forms or functions on the 'other side.'

Craig



> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 12:18 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Where do you get the idea that subjective events cannot repeat? It
>> seems another thing that you've just made up, with no rational
>> justification.
>
>
> Subjective events cannot  literally repeat for the same reason that
> historical events cannot literally repeat and you cannot step into the same
> river twice. All conditions are constantly changing so that it is impossible
> for every condition to be reproduced in a given frame of experience because
> what frames private experience is the relation with every other experience
> in the history of the universe, and to an eternity ahead.

My current experience is due to the current configuration of my brain,
and the current configuration of my brain is due to the preceding
configurations. The current configuration is due to the preceding
configurations because of the deterministic causal chain which you
discount. But even without this causal chain, if the current
configuration repeats due to chance at some future point, the
experience would repeat. The causal chain is significant only insofar
as it reliably brings about the correct configuration for experiences.
A car mechanic is only significant insofar as he reliably fixes a
problem with the car, but if the same operation were performed
accidentally by a chimpanzee playing with the engine, the car would
run just as well.

>> Before we move to styrofoam balls, it's problematic that you don't
>> even accept  the modest assumption that the same matter in the same
>> configuration will yield the same behaviour and same subjective
>> states, such as they may be.
>
>
> There is no "same". There is "seems the same" by some standard of sensory
> interpretation. Configurations of matter don't yield any subjective states,
> any more than configurations of TV sets yield TV programs. The TV sets are
> built so that the programs can be watched. They have no meaning or use
> otherwise.

But the same configuration of electronics fed the same signal would
produce the same TV program. If the configuration is different and/or
the signal is different the program would be different.

>> Disrupting
>> the form of this matter disrupts the experiences, while swapping the
>> matter for different matter in the same form does not.
>
>
> If you swap the matter in a TV set for cheese, it won't work, even if the
> cheese is in the same configuration. Maybe the TV set is constructed only of
> certain materials for good reasons, or maybe you can make a TV set out of
> cheese, but it receives different (more cheesy?) programs.

If you swap the matter in a TV set for different matter of the same
type the TV will work the same. You can do this blindly, knowing
nothing about TV's and it will just work. If you know something about
TV's you can swap out components for components of different type but
equivalent function and it will work the same.

>> But it does seem, at the very least, that building a person out of
>> matter builds the experiences.
>
>
> Says who? Has someone assembled a living person from scratch yet? Have we
> even cloned an adult into another adult without growing it first from a
> zygote?

We know that the person is the same regardless of the origin of the
matter in their body. We know that the entire person is rebuilt from
alternative matter over the course of normal metabolism and they
remain the same person. We know that replacing components in a person
with artificial analogues, proteins and other small molecules, leaves
the person unchanged, and we know that molecules that arise naturally
are exactly the same in every respect we have been able to determine
as their artificial analogues. We have created bacteria with
artificial DNA which function normally. We have not yet created an
entire organism from scratch but if we did and it didn't work that
would be a staggering scientific puzzle implying that something
magical is going on, and you would expect that there would be some
evidence of this in the other experiements we have done.

>> Use the same matter but disrupt the
>> form - no experiences; use different matter and keep the form -
>> experiences.
>
>
> What different matter are you talking about? Can you use DNA made out of
> laundry soap?

If laundry soap contains all the elements needed to make DNA you
should be able to make DNA from it. Artificial DNA is made from
various chemicals ultimately derived, I guess, from petroleum and
minerals mined from the ground and ammonia synthesised from
atmospheric nitrogen.

>> The organisms now alive purport to create organisms in the future, but
>> they might all be wiped out. The universe doesn't care and has no
>> purpose or function.
>
>
> Then by that definition, we cannot be part of the universe since we are
> nothing but cares, purposes, and functions.

We are part of the universe but we are not identical to the universe.
The whole does not necessarily have all the properties of the parts
and the part

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain  
function, and aware of them in a way which is a million times more  
detailed than any fMRI could ever be.



No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct  
way. Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That  
consciousness is related to a brain is a theory, there are only  
evidence, we cannot experience any theory.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 8, 2013 8:53:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 11:35 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> It does mean you could replicate World War II if you replicate the 
> >> complex arrangement of matter. It does not mean you would necessarily 
> >> understand it if you replicated it, any more than a photocopier 
> >> understands the image it is copying. But if the photocopier were 
> >> technically very good, the copy could be arbitrarily close to the 
> >> original in the opinion of anyone who *did* understand it. Similarly, 
> >> if you replicated World War II to a close enough tolerance the 
> >> observers inside the replication would understand it and an external 
> >> observer would understand it. 
> > 
> > 
> > Your view assumes that time is a generic plenum of duration, while I 
> > understand that it is precisely the opposite. Time is proprietary and 
> > unrepeatable subjective content. Experiences can be inspected and 
> controlled 
> > publicly to a limited extent but no single event or collection of events 
> can 
> > be repeated in the absolute sense since all events are eventually 
> > intertwined causally with all others. You want to make this about 
> > arrangements of matter but it is about experiences of time. 
>
> Where do you get the idea that subjective events cannot repeat? It 
> seems another thing that you've just made up, with no rational 
> justification. 
>

Subjective events cannot  literally repeat for the same reason that 
historical events cannot literally repeat and you cannot step into the same 
river twice. All conditions are constantly changing so that it is 
impossible for every condition to be reproduced in a given frame of 
experience because what frames private experience is the relation with 
every other experience in the history of the universe, and to an eternity 
ahead.


> >> Matter is, indeed, not absolutely important for mind. What is 
> >> important is the functional arrangement of matter. If this is 
> >> replicated, the mind is replicated. 
> > 
> > 
> > By that assumption, if I arrange styrofoam balls in the shape of the 
> > molecules of a cheeseburger, then a gigantic person would be able to eat 
> it 
> > and it would taste like a cheeseburger. If that were true, then we 
> should 
> > see the same arrangements over and over again - giant ants the size of a 
> > planet, etc. Arrangement is only important because of the properties of 
> what 
> > you are arranging. If you arrange inert blobs, then all that you can 
> ever 
> > get is larger, more complex arrangements of inert blobs. No mind is 
> present 
> > in arrangement. 
>
> Before we move to styrofoam balls, it's problematic that you don't 
> even accept  the modest assumption that the same matter in the same 
> configuration will yield the same behaviour and same subjective 
> states, such as they may be. 
>

There is no "same". There is "seems the same" by some standard of sensory 
interpretation. Configurations of matter don't yield any subjective states, 
any more than configurations of TV sets yield TV programs. The TV sets are 
built so that the programs can be watched. They have no meaning or use 
otherwise.


> >> This happens in the course of 
> >> normal physiology, whereby all the matter in your body is replaced 
> >> with different matter from the food you eat, but you still feel that 
> >> you are you. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's because your lifetime is made of subjective experience, and 
> > experience is publicly accessible in a limited way as forms and 
> functions. 
> > Your view confuses the vehicle of life with a producer of life. 
>
> If your lifetime is made of subjective experiences, the matter in your 
> body seems essential for these experiences to be realised. 


Certainly. If you are going to watch the show, you need a TV set in working 
order.
 

> Disrupting 
> the form of this matter disrupts the experiences, while swapping the 
> matter for different matter in the same form does not. 
>

If you swap the matter in a TV set for cheese, it won't work, even if the 
cheese is in the same configuration. Maybe the TV set is constructed only 
of certain materials for good reasons, or maybe you can make a TV set out 
of cheese, but it receives different (more cheesy?) programs.
 

>
> >> But why would a complex experience require a complex arrangement of 
> >> matter? 
> > 
> > 
> > It doesn't require it, that is just the inevitable embodiment of it. If 
> you 
> > want to play baseball, you play on a baseball diamond. The baseball 
> diamond 
> > doesn't conjure baseball players to the field out of the aether (only in 
> the 
> > dreams of Kevin Costner and functionalists does 'Build it and they will 
> > come." work out.). 
>
> But it does seem, at the very least, that building a person out of 
> matter builds the experiences. 


Says who? Has someone assembled a living person from scratch yet? Have we 
even cloned an adult into another adult wit

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 11:35 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> It does mean you could replicate World War II if you replicate the
>> complex arrangement of matter. It does not mean you would necessarily
>> understand it if you replicated it, any more than a photocopier
>> understands the image it is copying. But if the photocopier were
>> technically very good, the copy could be arbitrarily close to the
>> original in the opinion of anyone who *did* understand it. Similarly,
>> if you replicated World War II to a close enough tolerance the
>> observers inside the replication would understand it and an external
>> observer would understand it.
>
>
> Your view assumes that time is a generic plenum of duration, while I
> understand that it is precisely the opposite. Time is proprietary and
> unrepeatable subjective content. Experiences can be inspected and controlled
> publicly to a limited extent but no single event or collection of events can
> be repeated in the absolute sense since all events are eventually
> intertwined causally with all others. You want to make this about
> arrangements of matter but it is about experiences of time.

Where do you get the idea that subjective events cannot repeat? It
seems another thing that you've just made up, with no rational
justification.

>> Matter is, indeed, not absolutely important for mind. What is
>> important is the functional arrangement of matter. If this is
>> replicated, the mind is replicated.
>
>
> By that assumption, if I arrange styrofoam balls in the shape of the
> molecules of a cheeseburger, then a gigantic person would be able to eat it
> and it would taste like a cheeseburger. If that were true, then we should
> see the same arrangements over and over again - giant ants the size of a
> planet, etc. Arrangement is only important because of the properties of what
> you are arranging. If you arrange inert blobs, then all that you can ever
> get is larger, more complex arrangements of inert blobs. No mind is present
> in arrangement.

Before we move to styrofoam balls, it's problematic that you don't
even accept  the modest assumption that the same matter in the same
configuration will yield the same behaviour and same subjective
states, such as they may be.

>> This happens in the course of
>> normal physiology, whereby all the matter in your body is replaced
>> with different matter from the food you eat, but you still feel that
>> you are you.
>
>
> That's because your lifetime is made of subjective experience, and
> experience is publicly accessible in a limited way as forms and functions.
> Your view confuses the vehicle of life with a producer of life.

If your lifetime is made of subjective experiences, the matter in your
body seems essential for these experiences to be realised. Disrupting
the form of this matter disrupts the experiences, while swapping the
matter for different matter in the same form does not.

>> But why would a complex experience require a complex arrangement of
>> matter?
>
>
> It doesn't require it, that is just the inevitable embodiment of it. If you
> want to play baseball, you play on a baseball diamond. The baseball diamond
> doesn't conjure baseball players to the field out of the aether (only in the
> dreams of Kevin Costner and functionalists does 'Build it and they will
> come." work out.).

But it does seem, at the very least, that building a person out of
matter builds the experiences. Use the same matter but disrupt the
form - no experiences; use different matter and keep the form -
experiences.

> The experience is primary, and why is to allow complex interactions and
> experiences as a kind of trellis to extend aesthetic qualities. If the
> experience supervenes on arrangement then you have to explain why there is
> any experience there to begin with, what it is, and how it comes to attach
> itself to 'arrangements'. You can't do that, but nobody can because it's
> incorrect.

Can you explain what use there is for bodies, why experience is
attached to them and disrupting the body disrupts the experience?

>> The influences going back billions of years are just the means to
>> create organisms now alive.
>
>
> Why do you think that there is a "now"? What causes it and where does it
> come from? Aren't the organisms now alive just the means to create organisms
> which will live in the future?

The organisms now alive purport to create organisms in the future, but
they might all be wiped out. The universe doesn't care and has no
purpose or function.

>> It took billions of years of evolution to
>> create cars, but if a car randomly fell together from scrap iron and
>> so on in the exact form of a Toyota Corolla, it would function exactly
>> the same as a Toyota Corolla despite never seeing the inside of a
>> Toyota factory.
>
>
> That's because the Toyota doesn't feel like anything. If it did, then it
> would not feel like a Toyota since it had never been inside of a Toyota
> factory. It would, in the absence of o

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 7, 2013 3:46:04 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> Because it is an observed fact that consciousness is associated with 
> >> certain complex arrangements of matter. 
> > 
> > 
> > So what? World War II was associated with certain complex arrangements 
> of 
> > matter also, but that doesn't mean you could understand, define, or 
> > replicate World War II that way. 
>
> It does mean you could replicate World War II if you replicate the 
> complex arrangement of matter. It does not mean you would necessarily 
> understand it if you replicated it, any more than a photocopier 
> understands the image it is copying. But if the photocopier were 
> technically very good, the copy could be arbitrarily close to the 
> original in the opinion of anyone who *did* understand it. Similarly, 
> if you replicated World War II to a close enough tolerance the 
> observers inside the replication would understand it and an external 
> observer would understand it. 
>

Your view assumes that time is a generic plenum of duration, while I 
understand that it is precisely the opposite. Time is proprietary and 
unrepeatable subjective content. Experiences can be inspected and 
controlled publicly to a limited extent but no single event or collection 
of events can be repeated in the absolute sense since all events are 
eventually intertwined causally with all others. You want to make this 
about arrangements of matter but it is about experiences of time.


> > Matter is nothing at all but a way of 
> > organizing experiences of public perspectives on different scales by 
> > frequency and size. It is a way for eternity to be present explicitly as 
> > forms and functions as well as implicitly as perceptions and 
> participations. 
> > The forms and arrangements of them are irrelevant from an absolute 
> > perspective. In this final phase of the Western approach, we are like 
> > RainMan having an OCD attack as we recite Who's On First about 
> wavefunctions 
> > and ion channels. It is only important to us locally, for medicine and 
> > engineering, but cosmologically it is a dead end. This conversation is 
> > associated with certain IP addresses, certain routers and switches, 
> certain 
> > video screens and GUIs - but that has nothing to do with what is 
> generating 
> > the conversation at all. Not even a little bit. Trying to make a new 
> > conversation by using statistical models between these screens and 
> routers 
> > without any human users involved is idiiotic. It is like a sculpture of 
> an 
> > uninhabited city. 
>
> Matter is, indeed, not absolutely important for mind. What is 
> important is the functional arrangement of matter. If this is 
> replicated, the mind is replicated. 


By that assumption, if I arrange styrofoam balls in the shape of the 
molecules of a cheeseburger, then a gigantic person would be able to eat it 
and it would taste like a cheeseburger. If that were true, then we should 
see the same arrangements over and over again - giant ants the size of a 
planet, etc. Arrangement is only important because of the properties of 
what you are arranging. If you arrange inert blobs, then all that you can 
ever get is larger, more complex arrangements of inert blobs. No mind is 
present in arrangement.
 

> This happens in the course of 
> normal physiology, whereby all the matter in your body is replaced 
> with different matter from the food you eat, but you still feel that 
> you are you. 
>

That's because your lifetime is made of subjective experience, and 
experience is publicly accessible in a limited way as forms and functions. 
Your view confuses the vehicle of life with a producer of life. 


> >> If consciousness were fundamental then why would it need this complex 
> >> arrangement? 
> > 
> > 
> > It's only complex where there is a complex experience, like an animal. 
> It 
> > doesn't need to have complexity, but it wants increasing richness and 
> > significance, and complexity is the public expression of that. 
>
> But why would a complex experience require a complex arrangement of 
> matter?


It doesn't require it, that is just the inevitable embodiment of it. If you 
want to play baseball, you play on a baseball diamond. The baseball diamond 
doesn't conjure baseball players to the field out of the aether (only in 
the dreams of Kevin Costner and functionalists does 'Build it and they will 
come." work out.).
 

> If the experience is primary it does not explain why, whereas 
> if the experience supervenes on the complex arrangement it does. 
>

The experience is primary, and why is to allow complex interactions and 
experiences as a kind of trellis to extend aesthetic qualities. If the 
experience supervenes on arrangement then you have to explain why there is 
any experience there to begin with, what it is, and how it comes to attach 
itself to 'arrangements'. You can't do that, but nobody can bec

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Because it is an observed fact that consciousness is associated with
>> certain complex arrangements of matter.
>
>
> So what? World War II was associated with certain complex arrangements of
> matter also, but that doesn't mean you could understand, define, or
> replicate World War II that way.

It does mean you could replicate World War II if you replicate the
complex arrangement of matter. It does not mean you would necessarily
understand it if you replicated it, any more than a photocopier
understands the image it is copying. But if the photocopier were
technically very good, the copy could be arbitrarily close to the
original in the opinion of anyone who *did* understand it. Similarly,
if you replicated World War II to a close enough tolerance the
observers inside the replication would understand it and an external
observer would understand it.

> Matter is nothing at all but a way of
> organizing experiences of public perspectives on different scales by
> frequency and size. It is a way for eternity to be present explicitly as
> forms and functions as well as implicitly as perceptions and participations.
> The forms and arrangements of them are irrelevant from an absolute
> perspective. In this final phase of the Western approach, we are like
> RainMan having an OCD attack as we recite Who's On First about wavefunctions
> and ion channels. It is only important to us locally, for medicine and
> engineering, but cosmologically it is a dead end. This conversation is
> associated with certain IP addresses, certain routers and switches, certain
> video screens and GUIs - but that has nothing to do with what is generating
> the conversation at all. Not even a little bit. Trying to make a new
> conversation by using statistical models between these screens and routers
> without any human users involved is idiiotic. It is like a sculpture of an
> uninhabited city.

Matter is, indeed, not absolutely important for mind. What is
important is the functional arrangement of matter. If this is
replicated, the mind is replicated. This happens in the course of
normal physiology, whereby all the matter in your body is replaced
with different matter from the food you eat, but you still feel that
you are you.

>> If consciousness were fundamental then why would it need this complex
>> arrangement?
>
>
> It's only complex where there is a complex experience, like an animal. It
> doesn't need to have complexity, but it wants increasing richness and
> significance, and complexity is the public expression of that.

But why would a complex experience require a complex arrangement of
matter? If the experience is primary it does not explain why, whereas
if the experience supervenes on the complex arrangement it does.

>> Why would it persist in much the same way despite a complete replacement
>> of the matter? Why would it be disrupted with relatively small structural
>> changes in the matter?
>
>
> Because as a vertebrate, we are really out on a limb as far as pushing the
> envelope of sensory elaboration. To get to this depth of privacy, it is sort
> of like how forging a samurai sword must be folded over and over to
> incorporate the oxygen and carbon into the steel. We are dply embedded
> in forms within forms and functions within functions. It as if all kinds of
> agreements are in place on different levels - zoologically, biologically,
> psychologically, that for a time they will all suffer together to have this
> human lifetime show - all of these noble influences going back billions of
> years are sort of kneeling so that for a time a human person can become
> relevant...as long as you get burned, buried, or eaten at the end :)

The influences going back billions of years are just the means to
create organisms now alive. It took billions of years of evolution to
create cars, but if a car randomly fell together from scrap iron and
so on in the exact form of a Toyota Corolla, it would function exactly
the same as a Toyota Corolla despite never seeing the inside of a
Toyota factory.

 Fact 1 accepted by everyone: we are conscious.
 Fact 2 accepted by everyone except you: everything that happens in the
 universe is either determined or random.
>>>
>>>
>>> "Everyone" meaning like three people on this list?
>>
>>
>> No, everyone who understands the conventional meaning of the terms
>> "determined" and "random". Perhaps you are excluded because you have your
>> own private definition for these words.
>>
>>>
>>> A lot of people think that the universe does not include their own life.
>>> They conceive of the universe from the view from nowhere, like some perfect
>>> diorama which exists in an observation bubble. When presented with real
>>> opportunities to participate in the world, nobody thinks that what they eat
>>> for lunch is determined by physics or random, they personally contribute to
>>> their own lunch experience and the universe fully suppor

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 6, 2013 5:01:49 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:51 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 5, 2013 6:47:00 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? 
>> If that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
>>
>   
> Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move 
> your muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes. 
>

 How can you be any more aware of those processes than by being them?

>>>
>>> Because I have no idea that these processes are going on, or even that I 
>>> have a brain. Why do you think people used to believe that they think with 
>>> their hearts, or with their immaterial soul? 
>>>
>>
>> People thought that because they tried to explain private physics in the 
>> terms of public physics instead of understanding it in its own terms. You 
>> already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, and aware 
>> of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any fMRI could 
>> ever be. The problem is that you are making the same mistake that the 
>> immaterialists make only in reverse. You begin with absolute certainty in 
>> what instruments have shown us of the outside of matter to the extent that 
>> you doubt what your own native senses tell you about the inside of matter.
>>
>
> You use the word "subconscious" differently to the way most people do. 
> Most processes in your body occur subconsciously in the conventional sense 
> of the word. It makes it difficult to participate in a discussion when you 
> redefine words. At least make it explicit when you do so.
>

Point taken - in general I do tend to blurt based on my own worked-through 
understanding of things, but I do that intentionally because its a way for 
me to see if they fit with all of the rest of what is being discussed. It's 
a way of beta-testing the the deeper implications of the concept. In this 
case, however, I'm not sure that I'm using subconscious in a different way, 
its that I'm challenging how you are using "your" in "all of your actions 
are obviously due to subconscious influences". To me, using that 'your' to 
mean the behavior of your body is an ideologically loaded presumption.  The 
body becomes your body through private conscious association (you will let 
people do surgery on your body since by being unconscious, it is not really 
your body at the time as far as your personal awareness is concerned). It 
is a generic public artifact which is not just subconscious, but actually 
devoid of all private content. It is an impersonal presentation of a 
particular slice of biological history made temporarily interactive...or 
that's how it appears from the outside anyhow.

 
>
>>  You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if 
>>> the processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or 
>>> subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is 
>>> possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.
>>>
>>
>> This would be a case where the intentional would have to come from its 
>> complete opposite -  from the unintentional (determined and random), which 
>> could happen theoretically, but not in a universe which had no use for 
>> intention. A universe where intentionality is fundamental can pretend to be 
>> unintentional, but unintentional can't pretend to be anything. 
>> Unintentional is anesthetic and has no plausible use for intention.
>>
>
> It sounds again like something you have just made up. What's worse, you 
> present it as certain or self-evident. 
>

It is an understanding of what seems certain and self-evident. It's no more 
or less made up than any such understanding that any scientist or 
philosopher has ever had.
 

>  
>
>> Why does the universe need to hae a "use" for something? Who made this 
>>> rule?
>>>
>>
>> It's not a rule it's reason. If there were no fish in the water, there 
>> would be no such thing as gills. If there were gills on a cow, then that 
>> would be weird, especially if someone was saying that gills are an illusion.
>>
>
> The universe is not conscious and doesn't care. 
>

Here you use the same ideology. The universe then either cannot include 
you, or you are not conscious and don't care. Which is it?

We could be wiped out tomorrow by an asteroid hit and everything else would 
> continue as before. Perhaps life and intelligence will evolve again, 
> perhaps they won't.
>

Yes, the universe is a dynamic, multi-level syzygy of private intentional 
sequences and public unintentional consequences. Not everything knows or 
cares about human beings or planet Earth but that doesn't mean that 
consciousness and caring isn't as real as helium or the Andromeda galaxy.
 

>  
>
>>  And what d

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:51 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, April 5, 2013 6:47:00 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences?
> If that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
>

 Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move
 your muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes.

>>>
>>> How can you be any more aware of those processes than by being them?
>>>
>>
>> Because I have no idea that these processes are going on, or even that I
>> have a brain. Why do you think people used to believe that they think with
>> their hearts, or with their immaterial soul?
>>
>
> People thought that because they tried to explain private physics in the
> terms of public physics instead of understanding it in its own terms. You
> already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, and aware
> of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any fMRI could
> ever be. The problem is that you are making the same mistake that the
> immaterialists make only in reverse. You begin with absolute certainty in
> what instruments have shown us of the outside of matter to the extent that
> you doubt what your own native senses tell you about the inside of matter.
>

You use the word "subconscious" differently to the way most people do. Most
processes in your body occur subconsciously in the conventional sense of
the word. It makes it difficult to participate in a discussion when you
redefine words. At least make it explicit when you do so.


>  You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if
>> the processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or
>> subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is
>> possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.
>>
>
> This would be a case where the intentional would have to come from its
> complete opposite -  from the unintentional (determined and random), which
> could happen theoretically, but not in a universe which had no use for
> intention. A universe where intentionality is fundamental can pretend to be
> unintentional, but unintentional can't pretend to be anything.
> Unintentional is anesthetic and has no plausible use for intention.
>

It sounds again like something you have just made up. What's worse, you
present it as certain or self-evident.


> Why does the universe need to hae a "use" for something? Who made this
>> rule?
>>
>
> It's not a rule it's reason. If there were no fish in the water, there
> would be no such thing as gills. If there were gills on a cow, then that
> would be weird, especially if someone was saying that gills are an illusion.
>

The universe is not conscious and doesn't care. We could be wiped out
tomorrow by an asteroid hit and everything else would continue as before.
Perhaps life and intelligence will evolve again, perhaps they won't.


>  And what difference does it make if you say intentionality is fundamental
>> or emergent? It could be a fundamental fact that consciousness will emerge
>> when matter is organised in particular ways.
>>
>
> The difference is that the argument that intention must be reduced to
> determinism or randomness doesn't make any sense but it makes perfect sense
> that intention would be fundamental and determinism and randomness would
> naturally arise as perceptual fictions. The idea that consciousness will
> emerge from an organization of inanimate, unconscious matter (which makes
> no sense to begin with since there is no real way to conceive of a universe
> devoid of all detection and presentation) is just a religious faith with no
> explanatory power at all. Why not just say that when there are a trillion
> customers at the galactic WalMart that consciousness appears on a random
> planet.
>

Because it is an observed fact that consciousness is associated with
certain complex arrangements of matter. If consciousness were fundamental
then why would it need this complex arrangement? Why would it persist in
much the same way despite a complete replacement of the matter? Why would
it be disrupted with relatively small structural changes in the matter?


>  In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand
 what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do"
 then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither
 determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.

>>>
>>> What do you claim is the difference between choosing to do what you want
>>> to do and acting as a physical phenomenon which is intentional rather than
>>> unintentional (determined or random)?
>>>
>>
>> I don't accept your claim that "intentional" (either in the common sense
>> or the philosophical sense) is incompatible with the phenomenon being
>> determined or random. It seem

Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 5, 2013 6:47:00 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? If 
 that were the case why would personal awareness exist?

>>>   
>>> Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move your 
>>> muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes. 
>>>
>>
>> How can you be any more aware of those processes than by being them?
>>
>
> Because I have no idea that these processes are going on, or even that I 
> have a brain. Why do you think people used to believe that they think with 
> their hearts, or with their immaterial soul? 
>

People thought that because they tried to explain private physics in the 
terms of public physics instead of understanding it in its own terms. You 
already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, and aware 
of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any fMRI could 
ever be. The problem is that you are making the same mistake that the 
immaterialists make only in reverse. You begin with absolute certainty in 
what instruments have shown us of the outside of matter to the extent that 
you doubt what your own native senses tell you about the inside of matter.
 

>  
>
>> You can't tell me that you feel neurons firing in your cerebellum, for 
>>> example.
>>>
>>
>> No, neurons firing are my feeling already, there is no more way that they 
>> can be felt from the human perspective.
>>
>  
> But you are directly aware that your fingers are hitting the keys and 
> control them to write your email. You do not make such a decision to 
> activate cortical centres; it happens when you do something, but it is 
> subconscious.
>

It's subconscious but its still me. Of course I make the decision to 
activate cortical centres, I AM the cortical centers and when I turn my 
attention toward particular capacities, that attention is represented 
publicly as simulataneous and serial changes in tissues, cells, and 
molecules. I am not in my body, my body is just how I look at any given 
moment to participants other than me. 

>  
>
>>  It is an inference from empirical data that the brain is the organ of 
>>> thought at all. 
>>>
>>> You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if 
>>> the processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or 
>>> subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is 
>>> possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.
>>>
>>
>> This would be a case where the intentional would have to come from its 
>> complete opposite -  from the unintentional (determined and random), which 
>> could happen theoretically, but not in a universe which had no use for 
>> intention. A universe where intentionality is fundamental can pretend to be 
>> unintentional, but unintentional can't pretend to be anything. 
>> Unintentional is anesthetic and has no plausible use for intention.
>>
>
> Why does the universe need to hae a "use" for something? Who made this 
> rule?
>

It's not a rule it's reason. If there were no fish in the water, there 
would be no such thing as gills. If there were gills on a cow, then that 
would be weird, especially if someone was saying that gills are an illusion.
 

> And what difference does it make if you say intentionality is fundamental 
> or emergent? It could be a fundamental fact that consciousness will emerge 
> when matter is organised in particular ways.
>

The difference is that the argument that intention must be reduced to 
determinism or randomness doesn't make any sense but it makes perfect sense 
that intention would be fundamental and determinism and randomness would 
naturally arise as perceptual fictions. The idea that consciousness will 
emerge from an organization of inanimate, unconscious matter (which makes 
no sense to begin with since there is no real way to conceive of a universe 
devoid of all detection and presentation) is just a religious faith with no 
explanatory power at all. Why not just say that when there are a trillion 
customers at the galactic WalMart that consciousness appears on a random 
planet.
 

>  
>
>>  * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of 
>> free will,
>> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
>> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
>> *
>> *
>> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed 
>> incomplete
>> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the 
>> level of their
>> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, 
>> unless it has been 
>> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
>> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what 
>> kind of'. 
>>
>  
> In order to decide if free

Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg

> wrote:

Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? If
>>> that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
>>>
>>
>> Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move your
>> muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes.
>>
>
> How can you be any more aware of those processes than by being them?
>

Because I have no idea that these processes are going on, or even that I
have a brain. Why do you think people used to believe that they think with
their hearts, or with their immaterial soul?


> You can't tell me that you feel neurons firing in your cerebellum, for
>> example.
>>
>
> No, neurons firing are my feeling already, there is no more way that they
> can be felt from the human perspective.
>

But you are directly aware that your fingers are hitting the keys and
control them to write your email. You do not make such a decision to
activate cortical centres; it happens when you do something, but it is
subconscious.


>  It is an inference from empirical data that the brain is the organ of
>> thought at all.
>>
>> You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if
>> the processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or
>> subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is
>> possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.
>>
>
> This would be a case where the intentional would have to come from its
> complete opposite -  from the unintentional (determined and random), which
> could happen theoretically, but not in a universe which had no use for
> intention. A universe where intentionality is fundamental can pretend to be
> unintentional, but unintentional can't pretend to be anything.
> Unintentional is anesthetic and has no plausible use for intention.
>

Why does the universe need to hae a "use" for something? Who made this
rule? And what difference does it make if you say intentionality is
fundamental or emergent? It could be a fundamental fact that consciousness
will emerge when matter is organised in particular ways.


> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free
> will,
> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
> *
> *
> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed
> incomplete
> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the
> level of their
> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless
> it has been
> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what
> kind of'.
>

 In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand
 what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do"
 then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither
 determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.

>>>
>>> What do you claim is the difference between choosing to do what you want
>>> to do and acting as a physical phenomenon which is intentional rather than
>>> unintentional (determined or random)?
>>>
>>
>> I don't accept your claim that "intentional" (either in the common sense
>> or the philosophical sense) is incompatible with the phenomenon being
>> determined or random. It seems to be something you just made up and present
>> as self-evident, which it certainly is not.
>>
>
> You don't accept it but you have no reason to offer for your opinion. I
> present my view as self-evident because to me it certainly is. It's funny
> for you to talk about 'making things up' since that is certainly a thing
> which makes no sense in an unintentional universe.
>

I have a good reason for my opinion:

Fact 1 accepted by everyone: we are conscious.
Fact 2 accepted by everyone except you: everything that happens in the
universe is either determined or random.
Conclusion: hence, consciousness is compatible with a deterministic or
random universe.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 4, 2013 8:14:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 12:53 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 4, 2013 7:10:45 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 8:26 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
>>>
 Stathis wrote:
 *"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
 exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
 *
 *
 And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
 conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 
 'influence' 
 (nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may 
 decide to 
 'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason. 
 You even 
 may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly. 
 All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free 
 decision. 
 Continuing your sentence:

>>>
>>> I'm not coerced when I don't think I am coerced. Obviously, all my 
>>> actions are due to subconscious influences, namely, the biochemistry of my 
>>> brain, of which I am unaware.
>>>
>>
>> Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? 
>> If that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
>>
>   
> Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move your 
> muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes. 
>

How can you be any more aware of those processes than by being them?
 

> You can't tell me that you feel neurons firing in your cerebellum, for 
> example.
>

No, neurons firing are my feeling already, there is no more way that they 
can be felt from the human perspective.
 

> It is an inference from empirical data that the brain is the organ of 
> thought at all. 
>
> You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if 
> the processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or 
> subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is 
> possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.
>

This would be a case where the intentional would have to come from its 
complete opposite -  from the unintentional (determined and random), which 
could happen theoretically, but not in a universe which had no use for 
intention. A universe where intentionality is fundamental can pretend to be 
unintentional, but unintentional can't pretend to be anything. 
Unintentional is anesthetic and has no plausible use for intention.

 
>
>> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free 
 will,
 but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
 incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
 *
 *
 The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed 
 incomplete
 circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the 
 level of their
 compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless 
 it has been 
 proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
 Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what 
 kind of'. 

>>>  
>>> In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand 
>>> what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do" 
>>> then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither 
>>> determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.
>>>
>>
>> What do you claim is the difference between choosing to do what you want 
>> to do and acting as a physical phenomenon which is intentional rather than 
>> unintentional (determined or random)?
>>
>
> I don't accept your claim that "intentional" (either in the common sense 
> or the philosophical sense) is incompatible with the phenomenon being 
> determined or random. It seems to be something you just made up and present 
> as self-evident, which it certainly is not.
>

You don't accept it but you have no reason to offer for your opinion. I 
present my view as self-evident because to me it certainly is. It's funny 
for you to talk about 'making things up' since that is certainly a thing 
which makes no sense in an unintentional universe.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

-- 
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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 12:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, April 4, 2013 7:10:45 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 8:26 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
>>
>>> Stathis wrote:
>>> *"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
>>> exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
>>> *
>>> *
>>> And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
>>> conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 'influence'
>>> (nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may decide
>>> to
>>> 'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason.
>>> You even
>>> may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly.
>>> All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free decision.
>>> Continuing your sentence:
>>>
>>
>> I'm not coerced when I don't think I am coerced. Obviously, all my
>> actions are due to subconscious influences, namely, the biochemistry of my
>> brain, of which I am unaware.
>>
>
> Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? If
> that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
>

Your actions are due to physical processes in your brain which move your
muscles, but you are not actually aware of these physical processes. You
can't tell me that you feel neurons firing in your cerebellum, for example.
It is an inference from empirical data that the brain is the organ of
thought at all.

You seem stuck on the belief that it is not possible to be conscious if the
processes leading to consciousness are deterministic, random or
subconscious. As a matter of logical deduction, this is false. It is
possible for a thing to have qualities different from its parts.


> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free
>>> will,
>>> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
>>> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
>>> *
>>> *
>>> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed
>>> incomplete
>>> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the
>>> level of their
>>> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless
>>> it has been
>>> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
>>> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what
>>> kind of'.
>>>
>>
>> In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand
>> what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do"
>> then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither
>> determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.
>>
>
> What do you claim is the difference between choosing to do what you want
> to do and acting as a physical phenomenon which is intentional rather than
> unintentional (determined or random)?
>

I don't accept your claim that "intentional" (either in the common sense or
the philosophical sense) is incompatible with the phenomenon being
determined or random. It seems to be something you just made up and present
as self-evident, which it certainly is not.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 4, 2013 7:10:45 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 8:26 AM, John Mikes 
> > wrote:
>
>> Stathis wrote:
>> *"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
>> exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
>> *
>> *
>> And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
>> conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 'influence' 
>> (nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may decide 
>> to 
>> 'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason. 
>> You even 
>> may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly. 
>> All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free decision. 
>> Continuing your sentence:
>>
>
> I'm not coerced when I don't think I am coerced. Obviously, all my actions 
> are due to subconscious influences, namely, the biochemistry of my brain, 
> of which I am unaware.
>

Why are all of your actions "obviously" due to subconscious influences? If 
that were the case why would personal awareness exist?
 

>  
>
>> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free 
>> will,
>> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
>> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
>> *
>> *
>> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed 
>> incomplete
>> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the level 
>> of their
>> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless it 
>> has been 
>> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
>> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what kind 
>> of'. 
>>
>  
> In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand 
> what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do" 
> then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither 
> determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.
>

What do you claim is the difference between choosing to do what you want to 
do and acting as a physical phenomenon which is intentional rather than 
unintentional (determined or random)?

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 8:26 AM, John Mikes  wrote:

> Stathis wrote:
> *"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
> exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
> *
> *
> And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
> conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 'influence'
> (nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may decide
> to
> 'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason. You
> even
> may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly.
> All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free decision.
> Continuing your sentence:
>

I'm not coerced when I don't think I am coerced. Obviously, all my actions
are due to subconscious influences, namely, the biochemistry of my brain,
of which I am unaware.


> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free
> will,
> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
> *
> *
> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed incomplete
> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the level
> of their
> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless it
> has been
> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what kind
> of'.
>

In order to decide if free will exists the first thing is to understand
what is meant by the term. If it means "I choose to do what I want I do"
then free will exists. If it means something else such as "neither
determined nor random" then it doesn't exist.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Free-Will discussion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:26:23 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Stathis wrote:
> *"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
> exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
> *
> *
> And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
> conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 'influence' 
> (nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may decide 
> to 
> 'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason. You 
> even 
> may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly. 
> All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free decision. 
> Continuing your sentence:
>

It's true that there are influences outside of your personal range of 
consciousness which contribute to our personal intentions, but who is to 
say that these sub-conscious or super-conscious influences are not also 
*ourselves*? As our personal awareness blurs out into countless 
semi-conscious interactions where we increasingly blend into the public 
infinity and private eternity, who is to say that our personal will doesn't 
influence those outlying resources as much as they influence us?

*
> *
> * "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free 
> will,
> but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
> incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
> *
> *
> The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed incomplete
> circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the level 
> of their
> compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless it 
> has been 
> proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).
>

Right on. I would further suggest however that free will doesn't exist in 
public physics, it insists through private physics.

Craig
 

>
> Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what kind 
> of'. 
>
> John M
>

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Free-Will discussion

[John Mikes]

Stathis wrote:
*"I also have a very simple and straightforward idea of free will: I
exercise my free will when I make a choice without being coerced"*
*
*
And how do you know that you are *not* coerced? your mind works on both
conscious and (sub-? un-? beyond-?) conscious arguments that 'influence'
(nicer, than 'coerced') your decisive process. Then again you may decide to
'will' against your best (or not-so-best?) interest - for some reason. You
even
may misunderstand circumstances and use them wrongly.
All such (and another 1000) may influence (coerce??) your free decision.
Continuing your sentence:
*
*
* "...I never said that the laws of physics deny the possibility of free
will,
but free will is impossible if you define it in such a way as to be
incompatible with the laws of physics or even with logic."*
*
*
The "Laws" of physics are our deduction from the so far observed incomplete
circumstances - they don't "allow" or "deny" - maybe explain at the level
of their
compatibility. The "impossibility" of free will is not a no-no, unless it
has been
proven to be an existing(?) FACT (what I do not believe in).

Logic is the ultimate human pretension, especially if not said 'what kind
of'.

John M

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