Re: FPI possible continuations
On 22 Jul 2015, at 20:59, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. So this is one way in which FPI differs from Many Worlds QM scenarios, because in those scenarios, the splitting is the result of divergence from a common physical reality, whereas FPI indeterminacy is the result of divergence from a common phenomenological reality. Well said. This does not change the fact that the Everett-QM indeterminacy is a particular case of the first person indeterminacy, as I think you agree, with Quentin and me and others. Eventually, if comp is true, the first one (the result of divergence from a common physical reality) must be explain through the second one (the result of phenomenological divergence, common for the guy before the split). All right? (this of course use step 7, and is not relevant at step 3) Bruno Terren In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi John, I don't mean to signify any particular ontological commitments when I refer to UFOs or any other feature of our experience. I'm comfortable with the uncertainty entailed by the skeptic's position. At the end of the day if we want to communicate, we need to use a shared language that hopefully activates in the listener the concepts we are trying to communicate. For the question I asked, it's not important whether those features of reality are really there, only that they present to our experience in identical ways; so this would allow dreams, hallucinations, and so on, as well as the features we take for granted as being real in the sense of being independently verifiable (in principle if not in practice). Terren On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:01 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Terren, so you think there ARE UFOs? just as you think there are those other features you mentioned (or even Telmo's Mongol invasions?) I could question TIME as well (Quentin) in my agnosticism. Our knowable(??) world/science is flexible and creative. I would not mix it up with 'reality' what we cannot know for sure. (Please, consider the English ambiguity in this last sentence: A. We cannot know for sure WHAT reality is, - or - B. I cannot mix up time and the other items with reality. ) John Mikes On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. So this is one way in which FPI differs from Many Worlds QM scenarios, because in those scenarios, the splitting is the result of divergence from a common physical reality, whereas FPI indeterminacy is the result of divergence from a common phenomenological reality. Terren In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Le 20 juil. 2015 23:14, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com a écrit : Hi Terren, I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? I think it is, as measure is a relative thing, it echoes also the memory erasure experiment that Saibal Mitra I think once told. So yes any moment has multiple past as well as multiple futures. Whatever the relative measure of each, each moment is as real as any other. Quentin Cheers, Telmo. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi Terren, I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? Cheers, Telmo. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi Terren, so you think there ARE UFOs? just as you think there are those other features you mentioned (or even Telmo's Mongol invasions?) I could question TIME as well (Quentin) in my agnosticism. Our knowable(??) world/science is flexible and creative. I would not mix it up with 'reality' what we cannot know for sure. (Please, consider the English ambiguity in this last sentence: A. We cannot know for sure WHAT reality is, - or - B. I cannot mix up time and the other items with reality. ) John Mikes On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI
On 01 Mar 2015, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2015 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only personal experience is considered. Who's personal experience? All the possible one appearing in the thought experience. In the functionalist theory of mind that allows for duplication or substitution of brains, answers to questions of Who? are constructed from experiences. Persons cannot be identified with bodies, they are identified with sequences of experiences, and especially experiences of remembering. In our ordinary experience these sequences don't branch (although multiple personality disorder may be an exception), but in hypothetical duplications they do and then there are two or more sequences in the future sharing a single past sequence. What names and/or pronouns assigned to these sequences is just semantics. We could refer to the Helsinki- Washington sequence and the Helsinki-Moscow sequence. OK. No problem. It is because the first person get plural that we have to take into account all such sequences. After two iterations, for example there are four sequences, that four persons with a different first person experiences, but by computationalism we have already accepted that they are all equal in right, and notably they are all equal to the person who was in Helsinki, despite being all different from each other: HMM HMW HWM HWW There is no paradox, nor any conceptual problem. We use the usual way to use personal pronouns in the comp frame, and yes the transitivity of personal product is false, but that is often the case in modal or intensional contexts. The FPI is only in the understanding that if we iterate such self- duplication, the distribution of histories match the Bernouilli distribution. Indeed, even exactly. The probability that the number of feeling to be reconstituted in W is between x and y, will get closer to the Gaussian integral from x to y, with the usual renormalization. The rest is bad philosophy: that is philosophy which is used to prevent progress, as it happens sometimes when religion are used to prevent a science to develop. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 3 March 2015 at 05:23, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it? Well...it doesn't exactly help in developing a logically healthy mind. Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things? Yes and no. Heehee! A sense of humour, on the other hand, is a great help. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 9:50 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 4:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Who's personal experience? Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a diary as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment. (This is obviously a proxy for memory in most situations, but it simplifies matters so we don't get confused about what he is talking about.) If the machine is sophisticated enough to duplicate the human brain and all the memories it contains then duplicating the diary would be child's play. he MWI turns the universe into a matter duplicating machine. But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun you never causes ambiguity. This is a specious argument. If the possibility of future interaction is so irksome to you, then proceed with the assumption that they're duplicated outside each other's light cones. Or use the example of a forked computer simulation containing a brain emulation of an observer. You have nothing to lose in proceeding to step 4, and possibly something to gain: a record for having spent the most time on step 3. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it? Well...it doesn't exactly help in developing a logically healthy mind. Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things? Yes and no. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 1 March 2015 at 14:29, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Who's personal experience? Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a diary as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment. (This is obviously a proxy for memory in most situations, but it simplifies matters so we don't get confused about what he is talking about.) The way to identify the who in the above question is thus whoever is reading his own diary at a given moment. This is the same idea as the notes in Fred Hoyle's pigeonholes in the marvellous October the First is too late. Hence identity is constructed from notes or diary entries or memories at any given moment. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 1 March 2015 at 16:52, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun you? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world with only one version of you. What about the MWI With Everett and with everyday life there is no ambiguity in what the personal pronoun You refers to, but matter duplicating machines are not in everyday life and there is lots of ambiguity. The MWI turns the universe into a matter duplicating machine. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun you never causes ambiguity. John K Clark So thinking must be tethered to language, then? Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it? Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things? If you are so infatuated with things the way they are in this boondocks of the Multiverse then you will never get your head around the full implications of MWI. Language is not designed to deal with the ambiguity that is woven into the fabric of reality (you bloody boofhead.) That's why you have to have the maths for it, man. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI
On 3/1/2015 10:26 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun you never causes ambiguity. John K Clark So thinking must be tethered to language, then? Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it? Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things? If you are so infatuated with things the way they are in this boondocks of the Multiverse then you will never get your head around the full implications of MWI. Language is not designed to deal with the ambiguity that is woven into the fabric of reality (you bloody boofhead.) That's why you have to have the maths for it, man. Math is just language made (relatively) precise in it's declarative mode. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI
On 2 Mar 2015, at 5:30 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/1/2015 10:26 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun you never causes ambiguity. John K Clark So thinking must be tethered to language, then? Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it? Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things? If you are so infatuated with things the way they are in this boondocks of the Multiverse then you will never get your head around the full implications of MWI. Language is not designed to deal with the ambiguity that is woven into the fabric of reality (you bloody boofhead.) That's why you have to have the maths for it, man. Math is just language made (relatively) precise in it's declarative mode. Brent Thank The Empty Set for that! K -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 2 March 2015 at 04:27, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Instead of saying I hope I win the lottery they may say, if they are pedantic, I hope I end up the version of me that wins the lottery. If the lottery is tomorrow and they are pedantic they would say I hope the day after tomorrow the thing that remembers being me today remembers winning the lottery yesterday, and their hope would be fulfilled. And if they are pedantic they would also say I fear that the day after tomorrow the thing that remembers being me today remembers losing the lottery yesterday and their fear would be realized. But I don't think anybody is quite that pedantic. No, most people would just say I hope I win the lottery, because being duplicated 100 times and having one copy win the lottery is subjectively the same as having a 1/100 chance of winning the lottery. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 4:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Who's personal experience? Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a diary as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment. (This is obviously a proxy for memory in most situations, but it simplifies matters so we don't get confused about what he is talking about.) If the machine is sophisticated enough to duplicate the human brain and all the memories it contains then duplicating the diary would be child's play. he MWI turns the universe into a matter duplicating machine. But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun you never causes ambiguity. John K Clark The way to identify the who in the above question is thus whoever is reading his own diary at a given moment. This is the same idea as the notes in Fred Hoyle's pigeonholes in the marvellous October the First is too late. Hence identity is constructed from notes or diary entries or memories at any given moment. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 01 Mar 2015, at 02:29, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. OMG, that means I've forgotten what the P in Bruno's juvenile homemade acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the peepee stuff Bruno is always talking about? We have discuss this before. You are deliberately confusing. The P is for Person, and the I for indeterminacy. As we have already explained to you the FPI avoid the need to define personal identity, above the fact that we accept we survive with an artificial brain. In that case we can say clearly and without ambiguity that assuming computationalisme and the correct susbstitution level choice: 1) the guy in Helsinki does survive at W and at M, seen from a third observer (the 3p view). 2) the guy in Helsinki will survive from its 1p view at W or at M (and that his confirmed by all the diary) With the usual protocol. Only personal experience is considered. Who's personal experience? All the possible one appearing in the thought experience. With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify your self with multiple past entities. I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain you don't either, I only remember one. Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the other direction of time? Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when things don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like you've lost your personal identity? You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment would experience the fork as subjective randomness. Obviously Keep going from there. I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find and it's difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle like that. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of personal identity. If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when Bruno uses the personal pronoun you as he does with reckless abandon in his proof what is John Clark supposed to make of it? To take into account the fundamental key distinction between the 1p and 3p view, well defined at the beginning of the post and papers. When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal identity to come into it. It does when in Bruno's proof he goes on and on about how you will expect to see this and that but you will not expect to see that and this. Yes, but for a reason that Jason and Quentin proved to you to be equivalent with the use of it in the MWI where you accept the use of probability. Your argument that in one case the doppelgangers can met and not in the other case has been shown unconclusive, more than one time. Imagine that the guy in Helsinki is told that soon after the reconstitution in W and in M, he will be killed, in both place, in such a way that none have the time to meet their double. In that case probabilities would suddenly make sense, according to your criteria. But then they continue to make sense even if we change our mind and don't kill the guy in both place. I am aware of your hand-waving. I answer in case someone is not aware
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 12:42 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If we discovered some way of communicating with the other worlds, that would be interesting Interesting is a understatement, communicating with other worlds would change everything, then the situation really would be equivalent to living in a world with matter duplicating machines. But we can't communicate with other worlds and most think we never will. but I don't think it would make any difference to how people think about themselves and probability I disagree, if the communication was easy and in common usage I think it would change our gut feelings about a lot of things. For one thing the entire English language, especially personal pronouns, would need to be radically overhauled. Instead of saying I hope I win the lottery they may say, if they are pedantic, I hope I end up the version of me that wins the lottery. If the lottery is tomorrow and they are pedantic they would say I hope the day after tomorrow the thing that remembers being me today remembers winning the lottery yesterday, and their hope would be fulfilled. And if they are pedantic they would also say I fear that the day after tomorrow the thing that remembers being me today remembers losing the lottery yesterday and their fear would be realized. But I don't think anybody is quite that pedantic. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI
On 3/1/2015 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only personal experience is considered. Who's personal experience? All the possible one appearing in the thought experience. In the functionalist theory of mind that allows for duplication or substitution of brains, answers to questions of Who? are constructed from experiences. Persons cannot be identified with bodies, they are identified with sequences of experiences, and especially experiences of remembering. In our ordinary experience these sequences don't branch (although multiple personality disorder may be an exception), but in hypothetical duplications they do and then there are two or more sequences in the future sharing a single past sequence. What names and/or pronouns assigned to these sequences is just semantics. We could refer to the Helsinki-Washington sequence and the Helsinki-Moscow sequence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, ^^^ John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which person who is? it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. I disagree for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make such good predictions about future physical events. Everett said nothing about consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 28 Feb 2015, at 16:38, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, ^^^ John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which person who is? it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. I disagree for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make such good predictions about future physical events. Everett said nothing about consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. On the contrary. Everett has to make a choice for a theory of mind, and its suits him very well to define the first person by its memory sequences, but then it needs to remated them through computations. The problem is that those machines cannot distinguish the quantum computational histories from all computations a priori, so Everett's move must be push one step more, and the SWE has to be explained from a computationalist theory of the first person person. Guess what, incompleteness redeems the Theaetetus' definition. So we can try. Which I did. 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. That is indeed quite nuts. Good prediction are the key of the theory of matter. Only. I have explained a tun of time how the 3p notion of 1p and 3p makes possible to avoid us to pronounce ourselves on personal identity. You might confusing threads, as in some threads I like to discuss on personal identity, but I void it in UDA and AUDA, except in separate philosophical questioning non relevant to understand step 0 to Step 8, and its translation in arithmetic. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. ? 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. This is simply false, once you keep in mind the difference between the 1p and the 3p. Different people showed you that clearly. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity Where did I ever say that? I want only explain what can be matter, in case we assume our bodies are Turing emulable at some level. I expose a problem. Personal identity, for machine, is what I start from in AUDA. because the 3p-self is defined by the second recursion theorem of Kleene in very few steps, and the 1p-self, I explain machines recover it by the Theaetetus' definition. You have admit stopping the reading of sane04 at step 3, but you talsk like if you have read ... I don't know what imaginary texts. Quentin is right. This is lying. but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. This is babbling, hand-waving. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. So you have no idea if the delay introduced in step four change or not the expectations in helsinki? I think that at step 3, you stop thinking about the consequences of your beliefs. You never completed the thought experiment. You say that you is ambiguous, but I ask for a W or a M, and if you repeat enough the duplication (iterated duplication), as Kim saw, children understand the question, and the difference between the 1-you and the 3-you By definition, the first person experience is the content of the diaries, and most are random, by simple combinatorics. I have no clue why you behave like that. Bruno
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 9:38 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, ^^^ John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which person who is? it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. I disagree for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make such good predictions about future physical events. Everett said nothing about consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. There is an implicit unstated assumption in Everett that consciousness is duplicated with the split. This requires a physicalist/materialist/mechanism account of mind, rather than idealism or dualism, where each person has a singular uncopyable soul. Note that Everett's theory pre-dates functionalism and computationalism as popularized by Putnam. 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. Only personal experience is considered. With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify your self with multiple past entities. Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the other direction of time? You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment would experience the fork as subjective randomness. Keep going from there. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of personal identity. When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal identity to come into it. What is your mental block that turns you irrational on this matter? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 27 Feb 2015, at 19:50, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 6:29 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random. He means it appears random from any given person's perspective. Yes, people very often, usually in fact, don't know with certainty what the future will bring. Bruno apparently believes he's the first to notice that, I never said that. never. But you made me believe it is a findamental discovery not yet understood by many, or, when understood, not being taken into account (due in general to people unaware that elementary arithmetical truth implement all computations. Sometimes I make the distinction between the local FPI and the global FPI. The local FPI is the indeterminacy in a WM-duplication (say), where all you need to understand is that if you are a machine (at some description level), then you are duplicable, and you can't predict with certainty the outcome of your future open-the-door experience. The global FPI involves either arithmetical realism, or the existence of a concrete universal dovetailer execution. It is the indeterminacy described at step seven. I think you are the only person I know who does not understand the local FPI described in step 3. Yet, only that one explains how a form of subjective randomness appears, and is described in a verifiable way in their notebooks. Indeed, by simply duplicating population of machines, we can make that indeterminacy first person plural, like it seems with QM, except that here we don't start from QM. I am doing an easy thing here, which just show how hard the mind-body problem is with computationalism as the physical reality has to be extracted by some limit Global indteerminacy of the universal machine in (sigma_1) arithmetic. It is easy, as it is a formulation of a problem. It is shocking only for those who take the physical universe's primary character for granted. The religious physicalist, if you want. But those betrayes their lack of scientific atitude. They forbid the doubt. well he is the first to give that concept a pompous sounding acronym. As I said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to describe well known but pedestrian ideas. It is philosophy. OK. But it is also computer science, cognitive science, theoretical physics and ... theology (in the sense of Plato, Parmenides, Plotinus, Proclus). It is science. If you found a mistake, publish it. John, you must be serious, you have not yet convinced anyone of any reason why not trying answering the question in step 4 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. You play with the word when mocking the simple indexical definition of 1p and 3p I gave, which makes their job in the UDA. It is pure 3p, anyone can undesrtand, and sometimes you do understand (and then say this does not deserve the Nobel Prize in Physics, which might be true, or false, but is not relevant), as when you do understand it, what about step 4? And, then very patiently, for those who would not implicate themselves in a self-duplicating experience, I translated this in pure 3p arithmetic, thanks to Gödel's and Solovay's results. Self-duplication and self-reference are defined with Kleene second recursion theorem. You should study the math part if you stop at step 3. And ask any question if something seems unclear, instead of dismissing, injuring, insinuating, etc. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 28 Feb 2015, at 00:06, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 01:50:21PM -0500, John Clark wrote: Yes, people very often, usually in fact, don't know with certainty what the future will bring. Bruno apparently believes he's the first to notice that, well he is the first to give that concept a pompous sounding acronym. As I said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to describe well known but pedestrian ideas. To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, Yes, that is directly the global indeterminacy, like in step seven. But it is more which virtual body you have/will-have in the universal dovetailing (or in the sigma_1 complete arithmetic). The first person knows always who she is, even if she cannot gave a name or a description. and generates genuine randomness within a completely deterministic system. This is still a shocking result to many people. But that is in the case of the iterated self-duplication. But in front of the UD, obviously it can only be on computations which married well with gaussian choice below the substitution level. If not we have the white noise which blurs the physical stability. White rabbits, perhaps Occam catastrophes. Whether he is first or not is more debatable. Certainly, it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. Bruno's contribution is to show the mechanism works within the setting of classical computationalism via the universal dovetailer. You can say that Everett uses it first, but miss that it works for explaining matter, only if the SWE is extracted from the self- referential variant restricted to the sigma_ 1 reality. Everett was not working on the mind-body problem, and is not aware of the universal turing machine and its löbian limitations. He missed also that even in QM, the identity thesis is broken in one direction. We can attach a mind to a computation, but a mind can attach itself only to infinities of computations, in QM too! (Just that the situation is worst in arithmetic, or a fortiori in any richer everything ontology. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sunday, March 1, 2015, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com'); wrote: Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun you? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world with only one version of you. What about the MWI With Everett and with everyday life there is no ambiguity in what the personal pronoun You refers to, but matter duplicating machines are not in everyday life and there is lots of ambiguity. or other multiverse? There is no ambiguity, the meaning of you is clear because no observer can see more than one John Clark and nobody even knows for sure that more than one exists. But in a world with matter duplicating machines it's obvious there is more than one John Clark because you're looking at them. If we discovered some way of communicating with the other worlds, that would be interesting, but I don't think it would make any difference to how people think about themselves and probability. Instead of saying I hope I win the lottery they may say, if they are pedantic, I hope I end up the version of me that wins the lottery. The only real difference a multiverse would make to people is that it seems to imply that they can't die because some version of them always survives. What about a branching computer simulation? Well you tell me. If when the program reaches point X half the time it goes down path Y and half the time down path Z and I start talking about what the program will do when it goes down the path as if there were only one do you see any ambiguity? John K Clark -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. OMG, that means I've forgotten what the P in Bruno's juvenile homemade acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the peepee stuff Bruno is always talking about? Only personal experience is considered. Who's personal experience? With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify your self with multiple past entities. I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain you don't either, I only remember one. Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the other direction of time? Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when things don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like you've lost your personal identity? You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment would experience the fork as subjective randomness. Obviously Keep going from there. I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find and it's difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle like that. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of personal identity. If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when Bruno uses the personal pronoun you as he does with reckless abandon in his proof what is John Clark supposed to make of it? When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal identity to come into it. It does when in Bruno's proof he goes on and on about how you will expect to see this and that but you will not expect to see that and this. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sunday, March 1, 2015, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jasonre...@gmail.com'); wrote: 2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push on a string. Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI. OMG, that means I've forgotten what the P in Bruno's juvenile homemade acronym stand for, or you have. And what about all the peepee stuff Bruno is always talking about? Only personal experience is considered. Who's personal experience? With experiments like the quantum erasure, you are forced to identify your self with multiple past entities. I don't identify with multiple past entities and I'm quite certain you don't either, I only remember one. Why do you seem to have so much trouble with the same when its in the other direction of time? Because I can remember the past but not the future. Tell me, when things don't turn out as you expected them to do you feel like you've lost your personal identity? You admitted earlier that an AI within a forked computer simulation where one thing differed in each instance of the simulated environment would experience the fork as subjective randomness. Obviously Keep going from there. I need better transportation than that! The vehicle provided is life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you'll find and it's difficult to go very far with a old broken down vehicle like that. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun you is always obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word you is ambiguous and conveys zero information. Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go. In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. When one starts trying to define you, you get into questions of personal identity. If it has nothing to do with personal identity (!) then when when Bruno uses the personal pronoun you as he does with reckless abandon in his proof what is John Clark supposed to make of it? When one talks about a subjective first-person experiences of two third-personal identifiable duplicates, there's no need for personal identity to come into it. It does when in Bruno's proof he goes on and on about how you will expect to see this and that but you will not expect to see that and this. Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun you? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world with only one version of you. What about the MWI or other multiverse? What about a branching computer simulation? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun you? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world with only one version of you. What about the MWI With Everett and with everyday life there is no ambiguity in what the personal pronoun You refers to, but matter duplicating machines are not in everyday life and there is lots of ambiguity. or other multiverse? There is no ambiguity, the meaning of you is clear because no observer can see more than one John Clark and nobody even knows for sure that more than one exists. But in a world with matter duplicating machines it's obvious there is more than one John Clark because you're looking at them. What about a branching computer simulation? Well you tell me. If when the program reaches point X half the time it goes down path Y and half the time down path Z and I start talking about what the program will do when it goes down the path as if there were only one do you see any ambiguity? John K Clark -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 6:29 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random. He means it appears random from any given person's perspective. Yes, people very often, usually in fact, don't know with certainty what the future will bring. Bruno apparently believes he's the first to notice that, well he is the first to give that concept a pompous sounding acronym. As I said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to describe well known but pedestrian ideas. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 01:50:21PM -0500, John Clark wrote: Yes, people very often, usually in fact, don't know with certainty what the future will bring. Bruno apparently believes he's the first to notice that, well he is the first to give that concept a pompous sounding acronym. As I said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to describe well known but pedestrian ideas. To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, and generates genuine randomness within a completely deterministic system. This is still a shocking result to many people. Whether he is first or not is more debatable. Certainly, it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. Bruno's contribution is to show the mechanism works within the setting of classical computationalism via the universal dovetailer. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: It is very simple. If we are machine, we are duplicable, and in that case, using the precise (3p) definition of 3p and 1p pov I have given (more than one times), it is an exercise for high school students, as Kim explained once, using combinatorics, to show that the 1p experiences are random. I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random. Yes, the FPI is so simple, and the UDA is so simple, that PA and other Lôbian machine [...] OMG, I've never seen a sentence with so much juvenile slang and insular homemade terms before. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI (was: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?
On 27 February 2015 at 09:38, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: It is very simple. If we are machine, we are duplicable, and in that case, using the precise (3p) definition of 3p and 1p pov I have given (more than one times), it is an exercise for high school students, as Kim explained once, using combinatorics, to show that the 1p experiences are random. I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random. He means it appears random from any given person's perspective. Like radioactive decay, cats in boxes being alive or dead, and so on, as experienced by a person in a single branch of the MWI. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
