Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Friday, July 25, 2014 9:15:10 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the sense you give to understand. Then it's a bet that comp is false also. I can understand why it's meaning is incomplete and its truth can only be trivial rather than profound. It's a bet that knowledge can exist also. All knowledge can be a bet. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will preserves the soul ([]p p), that is, that the substitution will preserve the relation with truth. I can understand the opposite though. Consciousness can appear mechanical from a distance if consciousness is primary. There can't be any substitution, but the relation is preserved automatically. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p p. Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible knowledge (which belongs to another topic). Is the comp mind-body problem one which doesn't include the hard problem? with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate, which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients (who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get reconciliate: Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non natural notion of knower. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. That is the identity thesis which makes no sense, neither with comp, nor with Everett QM. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. Leading him to eliminate somehow consciousness. That is not quite serious. It is to him though. If comp were true, wouldn't he have to be an example of a machine who understands his 1p consciousness as 3p? This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,, refering to people who are wrong (with respect to comp) is not an argument against comp, or the Theaetetus. Sure it's an argument, if comp is going
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 25 Jul 2014, at 17:07, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is its description.? Richard Hi Richard, I only said that the 3p self is its description. It is the body, as seen as a code written in nature's language, or anything from which you can build that body (like the Gödel number sent by a teletransporter device). It is the []p, and can be seen as an object in arithmetic (or even in physics, temporarily). The soul, on the contrary is defined with the Theaetetus method, []p p, and appears to be not describable in any 3p way. I will come back on explaining why this is so. I have already alluded to the explanation. From scratch it is long and pretty technical. Bruno Thank you Bruno for explaining the distinction between self and soul. But it seems to me that if the soul can only be 1p, is there a soul for every different 1p person in the 3p self. I would prefer one soul, and even one person. I am not sure what makes you think that this would not be the case. We have one abstract body, even if implemented through infinitely many computations, which can diverge. And we have one soul, which feels unique, and *is* unique from the 1p perspective, even if, from a 3-1p perspective, they multiplied, like with amoeba division and animals reproduction. Roughly the 3p body/self is the []p, and the soul is defined (or meta-defined) by []p p. Anyway, what we prefer might not always be the case. I don't like so much that self-multiplication too, but it is unavoidable once we assume the computationalist theory of mind. Bruno Richard Bruno Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is its description.? Richard Hi Richard, I only said that the 3p self is its description. It is the body, as seen as a code written in nature's language, or anything from which you can build that body (like the Gödel number sent by a teletransporter device). It is the []p, and can be seen as an object in arithmetic (or even in physics, temporarily). The soul, on the contrary is defined with the Theaetetus method, []p p, and appears to be not describable in any 3p way. I will come back on explaining why this is so. I have already alluded to the explanation. From scratch it is long and pretty technical. Bruno Bruno Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the sense you give to understand. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will preserves the soul ([]p p), that is, that the substitution will preserve the relation with truth. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p p. Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible knowledge (which belongs to another topic). with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate, which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients (who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get reconciliate: Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non natural notion of knower. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. That is the identity thesis which makes no sense, neither with comp, nor with Everett QM. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. Leading him to eliminate somehow consciousness. That is not quite serious. This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,, refering to people who are wrong (with respect to comp) is not an argument against comp, or the Theaetetus. or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self- deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, It cannot, so I certainly do not believe it. []p p cannot be expressed in the language of the machine. 2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning. You miss that []p p is not a description. We can come back on this when we are enough familiar with some results in mathematical logic. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is its description.? Richard Hi Richard, I only said that the 3p self is its description. It is the body, as seen as a code written in nature's language, or anything from which you can build that body (like the Gödel number sent by a teletransporter device). It is the []p, and can be seen as an object in arithmetic (or even in physics, temporarily). The soul, on the contrary is defined with the Theaetetus method, []p p, and appears to be not describable in any 3p way. I will come back on explaining why this is so. I have already alluded to the explanation. From scratch it is long and pretty technical. Bruno Thank you Bruno for explaining the distinction between self and soul. But it seems to me that if the soul can only be 1p, is there a soul for every different 1p person in the 3p self. I would prefer one soul, and even one person. Richard Bruno Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind- body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. Bruno Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is its description.? Richard Bruno Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p p. with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,, or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self-deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, 2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced by the machine, then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it makes mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. There is no cause for a machine to represent its interior as anything fundamentally different than its exterior, all that the math indicates as far as I can tell is that some of the qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are hidden. Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not a true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, and more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot which is irreducible and direct, while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, skeletal ingredient. The machine is part of the soul...the part in which souls reflect each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional entropy/normalization. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. What is comp but a 3p description? I think this is another sleight of hand. If we talk about 1p in these quasi-mystical terms of being a machine's soul, we forget that we are still viewing 1p
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 18 Jul 2014, at 14:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, July 18, 2014 4:10:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: With the TOE elementary arithmetic (predicate logic + RA axioms), the input are numbers, and they obey the laws of addition and multiplication. They make more sense according to which universal numbers they are given to. But what is an input? What laws indicate that a such thing as an 'input' can exist? What prevents all numbers from being 'put' from the beginning? Assume the axioms of RA. use Gödel's technic to define the phi_i in RA (there are tuns of books which does that in all details). You can define the enumeration of all the UD computational steps, by the arithmetical version of the enumeration of the phi_i(j)^n. By definition the number j are the input, to the program i. the phi_i(j)^n represent the nth step of the computation of i on j. nothing prevents all the numbers to be put on the beginning, and that is why we have a big, yet mathematically soluble, self-indeterminacy problem in arithmetic. Then we can test the solution, and it fits already at the propositional level. Of course if you use the combinators instead of elementary arithmetic, the inputs are combinators, and the laws are: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) + some identity axioms. Right, but I'm not asking about what kinds of things are inputs, I am asking what is the ontology of input itself and what gives computationalism the right to assume it? There is no ontology proper. You can choose any first order specification (definition) a anything capable to imitate any Turing machine, or computer. Once, and for all, I have chosen the following theory, which is accepted by all scientists and most philosophers: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x + a bit of syntactical sugar (and + predicate logic). I mention another often, to remind people that it is a key point of the drivation of physics, that the ontic part has no influence on physics. Physics is machine independent, like a large part of computer science is machine-independent, like a large part of geometry and physics are coordinate independent. You can't program a device to be programmable if it isn't already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? At least in the same sense that 23 is prime outside 1p views. Then programmability becomes another axiom that computationalism needs not to require an explanation. ? A function is programmable if and only if the function is partial computable (this includes the total functions). I'm not talking about the function of programmability, I'm talking about the metaphysics of the possibility of programmability. Sorry, I don't do metaphysics. The fact that there are tapes for Turing machines, that reading and writing is even possible. All that follows from x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x Literally. We know that since Gödel 1931. Turing knew that too. Everybody knowing the subjects knows that. Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? You can see it that way. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine's operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a Stepped Reckoner, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with 'reg', as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 17 Jul 2014, at 01:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! ? The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being 'input' into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? What theory details the ontology of inputs? Arithmetic. The subset of true sigma_1 sentences emulate the UD, that is the activity of all programs on all inputs. You can't program a device to be programmable if it isn't already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? At least in the same sense that 23 is prime outside 1p views. Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? You can see it that way. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine's operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of- motion. Leibniz called his early computer a Stepped Reckoner, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with 'reg', as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world's most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn't always mean that the person's feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an experience of a sense of certainty (especially a 'common sense') that is an informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof exists or not. The
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Thursday, July 17, 2014 4:25:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jul 2014, at 01:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! ? The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? What theory details the ontology of inputs? Arithmetic. The subset of true sigma_1 sentences emulate the UD, that is the activity of all programs on all inputs. That only says that activity and inputs exist, but not what they are or what laws define them. You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? At least in the same sense that 23 is prime outside 1p views. Then programmability becomes another axiom that computationalism needs not to require an explanation. Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? You can see it that way. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being 'input' into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? You can't program a device to be programmable if it isn't already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine's operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of- motion. Leibniz called his early computer a Stepped Reckoner, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with 'reg', as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world's most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn't always mean that the person's feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an experience of a sense of certainty (especially a 'common sense') that is an informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof exists or not. The calculation procedure is run and the output is generated. It can be compared against the results of other calculators or to employ more calculations itself to assess a probability, but it has no sense of whether the results are certain or not. Our common sense is a feeling which can be proved wrong, but can also be proved right informally by other people. We can come to a consensus beyond rationality with trust and intuition, which is grounded the possibility of the real rather than the realization of the hypothetical.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! ? The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? What theory details the ontology of inputs? You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an experience of a sense of certainty (especially a ‘common sense’) that is an informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof exists or not. The calculation procedure is run and the output is generated. It can be compared against the results of other calculators or to employ more calculations itself to assess a probability, but it has no sense of whether the results are certain or not. Our common sense is a
