subject:"Re\: Re\: \?"

Re: Re[2]: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-06 Thread Terren Suydam

This is how I see it as well. All possible worlds already exist in a
platonic sense, and one's experience represents a single path traversed
through the infinite multitude of possibilities. This connects nicely to
the universal dovetailer idea.

On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 8:19 AM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> I think there is no split, but continuous differentiation. So there is
> always an infinity of worlds. Or there is no world at all and only
> consciousness differentiation.
>
> Quentin
>
> Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 14:17, scerir via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>> Worlds, worlds. What are these worlds? When a pig observes a Young
>> interferometer does this pig create worlds? Does this pig split worlds? Or
>> not, because there is not full consciousness? And in Alpha Centauri,  where
>> there are no pigs, no humans, no consciousness, no Young interferometers?
>> No Franson interferometers either ...
>>
>> --
>> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>> Mercoledì, 06 Gennaio 2021, 01:28PM +01:00 da Quentin Anciaux
>> allco...@gmail.com:
>>
>> Here a schema:
>> [image: image.png]
>>
>> After 3 experiments, you have *8* worlds... each with the memory of the
>> initial experiment, 4 of the 2nd version A and for of the 2nd version B...
>> etc
>>
>> Every *worlds* has a past which is linked directly with the previous
>> experiment and to the initial experiment... in each world there is an
>> ensemble of 3 results.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>> Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 13:01, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>> I should have been more explicit; since the trials are independent, the
>> other worlds implied by the MWI for any particular trial, are unrelated to
>> the other worlds created for any OTHER particular trial. Thus, each other
>> world has an ensemble with one element, insufficient for the existence of
>> probabilities. AG
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 4:41:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 3:33:52 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 10:05 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>> >> One world contains an Alan Grayson that sees the electron go left,
>> another world is absolutely identical in every way except that it contains
>> a  Alan Grayson that sees the electron go right. So you tell me, which of
>> those 2 worlds is "THIS WORLD"?
>>
>>
>> *> It's the world where a living being can observe the trials being
>> measured. The other world is in your imagination (if you believe in the
>> MWI). AG *
>>
>>
>> From that response I take it you have abandoned your attempt to poke logical
>> holes in the Many Worlds Interpretation and instead have resorted to a
>> pure emotional appeal; namely that there must be a fundamental law of
>> physics that says anything Alan Grayson finds to be odd cannot exist,
>> and Alan Grayson finds many Worlds to be odd. Personally I find Many
>> Worlds to be odd too, although it's the least odd of all the quantum
>> interpretations, however I don't think nature cares very much if you or I
>> approve of it or not. From experimentation it's clear to me that if Many
>> Worlds is not true then something even stranger is.
>>
>>
>> I have no idea whatsoever, how you reached your conclusions above. There
>> are things called laboratories, where physicists conduct experiments, some
>> of which are quantum experiments with probabilistic outcomes. The world in
>> which such things exist, I call THIS world. Worlds postulated to exist
>> based on the claim that any possible measurement, must be a realized
>> measurement in another world, I call OTHER worlds. Those OTHER worlds are
>> imagined to exist based on the MWI. These are simple facts. I am not making
>> any emotional appeals to anything. The possible oddness of the Cosmos is
>> not affirmed or denied here. I agree the Cosmos might be odd, possibly very
>> odd, but this has nothing to do with our discussion. The core of my
>> argument is that since the trial outcomes in quantum experiments are
>> independent of one another, there's no reason to claim that each of the
>> OTHER worlds accumulates ensembles, as an ensemble is created in THIS
>> world. Without ensembles in those OTHER worlds, the MWI fails to affirm the
>> existence of probability in any of those OTHER worlds. AG
>>
>>
>>  See my new list at  Extropolis 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>> --
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>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/55a83617-d49c-403c-a679-02025441ef6fn%40googlegroups.com
>> 
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments

Re: Re[2]: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux

I think there is no split, but continuous differentiation. So there is
always an infinity of worlds. Or there is no world at all and only
consciousness differentiation.

Quentin

Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 14:17, scerir via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> Worlds, worlds. What are these worlds? When a pig observes a Young
> interferometer does this pig create worlds? Does this pig split worlds? Or
> not, because there is not full consciousness? And in Alpha Centauri,  where
> there are no pigs, no humans, no consciousness, no Young interferometers?
> No Franson interferometers either ...
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> Mercoledì, 06 Gennaio 2021, 01:28PM +01:00 da Quentin Anciaux
> allco...@gmail.com:
>
> Here a schema:
> [image: image.png]
>
> After 3 experiments, you have *8* worlds... each with the memory of the
> initial experiment, 4 of the 2nd version A and for of the 2nd version B...
> etc
>
> Every *worlds* has a past which is linked directly with the previous
> experiment and to the initial experiment... in each world there is an
> ensemble of 3 results.
>
> Quentin
>
> Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 13:01, Alan Grayson  a
> écrit :
>
> I should have been more explicit; since the trials are independent, the
> other worlds implied by the MWI for any particular trial, are unrelated to
> the other worlds created for any OTHER particular trial. Thus, each other
> world has an ensemble with one element, insufficient for the existence of
> probabilities. AG
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 4:41:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 3:33:52 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 10:05 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
> >> One world contains an Alan Grayson that sees the electron go left,
> another world is absolutely identical in every way except that it contains
> a  Alan Grayson that sees the electron go right. So you tell me, which of
> those 2 worlds is "THIS WORLD"?
>
>
> *> It's the world where a living being can observe the trials being
> measured. The other world is in your imagination (if you believe in the
> MWI). AG *
>
>
> From that response I take it you have abandoned your attempt to poke logical
> holes in the Many Worlds Interpretation and instead have resorted to a
> pure emotional appeal; namely that there must be a fundamental law of
> physics that says anything Alan Grayson finds to be odd cannot exist, and Alan
> Grayson finds many Worlds to be odd. Personally I find Many Worlds to be
> odd too, although it's the least odd of all the quantum interpretations,
> however I don't think nature cares very much if you or I approve of it or
> not. From experimentation it's clear to me that if Many Worlds is not true
> then something even stranger is.
>
>
> I have no idea whatsoever, how you reached your conclusions above. There
> are things called laboratories, where physicists conduct experiments, some
> of which are quantum experiments with probabilistic outcomes. The world in
> which such things exist, I call THIS world. Worlds postulated to exist
> based on the claim that any possible measurement, must be a realized
> measurement in another world, I call OTHER worlds. Those OTHER worlds are
> imagined to exist based on the MWI. These are simple facts. I am not making
> any emotional appeals to anything. The possible oddness of the Cosmos is
> not affirmed or denied here. I agree the Cosmos might be odd, possibly very
> odd, but this has nothing to do with our discussion. The core of my
> argument is that since the trial outcomes in quantum experiments are
> independent of one another, there's no reason to claim that each of the
> OTHER worlds accumulates ensembles, as an ensemble is created in THIS
> world. Without ensembles in those OTHER worlds, the MWI fails to affirm the
> existence of probability in any of those OTHER worlds. AG
>
>
>  See my new list at  Extropolis 
>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
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> 
> .
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>
> --
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Re: Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

2018-05-07 Thread John Clark

If the Real numbers exist then the Continuum Hypothesis is either true or
it is not.  But are the Real numbers really real? No less a mathematician
than Gregory Chaitin (of Chaitin's Omega fame) is on record as saying the
real numbers do not exist. If he's right and they don't exist then the
Continuum Hypothesis is neither true nor false, its gibberish. Perhaps a
better example would be "is the Goldbach Conjecture either true or not
true?" because we know integers exist and unlike the Continuum Hypothesis
we can at least conceive of experimental evidence proving that it is wrong;
tomorrow a computer grinding through ever larger integers could find some
huge even number that is not the sum of two prime numbers.

 John K Clark

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Re: Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

2018-05-01 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 3:37:15 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> An interesting proof by Hamkins and a lot of discussion of its 
> significance on John Baez's blog.  It agrees with my intuition that the 
> mathematical idea of "finite" is not so obvious. 
>
> Brent 
>
>
This gets into the rarefied atmosphere of degrees of unprovability. I have 
a book by Lerman on the subject, which I can read maybe 25 pages into 
before I am largely confused and lost. I would really need to be far better 
grounded in this. The idea is that one may ask if things are diagonal up 
to ω ordinarlity, which is standard Gödel/Turing machine stuff. Then we 
might however have Halting or provability out to ω + n, or 2ω to nω and 
then how about ω^n and then n^ω and now make is bigger with ω^ω and so 
forth. Then this in principle may continue onwards beyond the alephs into 
least accessible cardinals and so forth. One has this vast and maybe 
endless tower of greater transfinite models. 

Finite systems that are well defined are cyclic groups and related 
structures. A mathematical system that has some artificial bound on it is 
not going to satisfy any universal requirements. The most one can have is 
finite but unbounded. So long as one does not have some series or 
progression that grows endlessly this can work.

LC
 

>
>  Forwarded Message  
>
> On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 1:13 PM, James  wrote: 
> > On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 7:19 AM, Cris  wrote: 
> >> 
> >> ... For any set of axioms, there is a Turing machine which 1) never 
> halts and 2) that set of axioms cannot prove that it never halts. ... 
> > 
> >> But don’t you agree that the Halting Problem has a definite truth 
> value? In other words, that a given Turing machine (with a given input) 
> either runs forever or doesn’t, regardless of our ability to prove it? ... 
> > 
> > To answer the question posed, shouldn't we ask if, given any 
> > *particular* TM, there exists *some* consistent system/set of axioms 
> > that can prove whether it halts or not?  I was under the impression 
> > that the answer here was "yes", regardless of any individual 
> > consistent system being unable to tackle the general problem. 
>
> The problem is when you have nonstandard natural numbers.  It's 
> perfectly valid, for instance, to have a Turing machine halt after ω + 
> 3 steps.  You can say, "oh, but we use the unique standard model 
> defined by the second-order theory", but then the second order theory 
> has to live in some universe, and there are universes in which what's 
> uncomputable in your universe can be computable in mine: 
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/every-function-can-be-computable/ 
> https://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2016/04/02/computing-the-uncomputable/ 
>
> So as soon as you move away from "only physically implementable math 
> is real", then you have do deal with all these other models. 
> -- 
> Mike 
> ___ 
> math-fun mailing list 
> math...@mailman.xmission.com  
> https://mailman.xmission.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/math-fun 
>
>

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Re: Re:: Entanglement

2018-04-21 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List


> 
> > > In case of a collapse theory, the non-local effect is far 
> more problematic. Alice then finds a result at her place and because there is 
> no other copy of her who found the other result, new information has 
> appeared. And that means that Bob's result is now also well defined but the 
> information about his measurement exists at a space-like separation. In the 
> MWI Bob may know that Alice has already made her measurement, but he would 
> also know that Alice exists as a superposition of two copies who will have 
> found two different results, so there exists no information about what he is 
> about to find later when he will measure his spin at the distant location 
> where Alice is as that entire place is in a superposition.
> > 
> > Saibal
> > 
> > > That is where the wave-function comes in: the wave function acts 
> > non-locally to ensure that when Bob does make his measurement, he will only 
> > obtain results that agree with angular momentum conservation -- his results 
> > cannot be arbitrary because that would violate the basic conservation law 
> > enshrined in the singlet wave-function. Bob's measurement is independent of 
> > Alice, but the state that he is measuring is necessarily correlated with 
> > Alice's -- changed by Alice's measurement. Many worlds does not alter this 
> > basic fact.
> 
> Bruce
> 
It seems (to me) interesting to point out that Vaidman, speaking about 
teleportation, writes:
'The resolution which I found for myself is as follows: In the framework of the 
MWI, the teleportation procedure does not move the quantum state: the state 
was, in some sense, in the remote location from the beginning. The correlated 
pair, which is the necessary item for teleportation, incorporates all possible 
quantum states of the remote particle, and, in particular, the state which has 
to be teleported. The local measurement of the teleportation procedure splits 
the  world in  such a manner that in each of the worlds the state of the remote 
particle differs form the state by some known transformation. The number of 
such worlds is relatively small. This explains why the information which hasto 
be transmitted for teleportation of a quantum state—the information which world 
we need to split into, i.e., what transformation has to be applied—is much 
smaller than the information which is needed for the creation of such a state.'
See https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9810089 page 11

Now "the correlated pair incorporates all possible quantum states" seems to be 
exactly "the psi-Function as a Catalogue of Expectations" as Schroedinger named 
it in 1935.
See https://homepages.dias.ie/dorlas/Papers/QMSTATUS.pdf

-serafino

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Re: Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 5:38 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 8/12/2017 3:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is indeed
> based on the 1p/3p confusion).
>
>
> I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If the
> duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol, he will
> never be aware of being duplicated. In fact, he can never get first person
> knowledge of that duplication, even if he is, in fact, duplicated.
>
>
> Let's examine that a bit.  Suppose I've created an AI.  Could this AI
> experience "being in Moscow *and* being in Washington".  I think so.  I
> simply provide duplicate sets of sensors, visual, audio, temperature, etc
> in both M and W.  Now suppose the AI consists of two computers
> synchronously executing the same AI routine using the same sensory inputs,
> and this AI is connected to sensors in Helsinki.  Now I switch the sensors
> to those in M *and* W.  The AI experience M *and* W.  But suppose that
> instead I switch one of the computers to the M sensors and the other to the
> W sensors.  You ask the AI, when still connected to Helsinki, to bet on
> whether it will experience M *xor* W.  Is there a right answer?
>
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic

2017-07-11 Thread Telmo Menezes

Ok, looking forward to reading it.

Thanks!
Telmo.

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 5:29 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> "The Comprehensible Cosmos" is one that is just about the structure of
> physics and one I like best. "The Fallacy of Fine Tuning" primarily debunks
> theists who try to invoke physics to prove the existence of God. It also has
> some interesting physics and philosophical ideas in it.
>
> Brent
>
> On 7/11/2017 1:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> Hi Brent,
>>
>> Which book by Vic would you recommend one to read first?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Telmo.
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 5:22 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Interesting essay.  When I was helping edit Vic's books I made a similar
>>> argument too him - that the reason his Point-of-View-Invariance seemed so
>>> powerful in rederiving physics is that physicist were only interested in
>>> things that obeyed POVI.
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> Let us say we were interested in describing all phenomena in our
>>> universe.
>>> What type of mathematics would we need? How many axioms would be needed
>>> for
>>> mathematical structure to describe all the phenomena? Of course, it is
>>> hard
>>> to predict, but it is even harder not to speculate. One possible
>>> conclusion
>>> would be that if we look at the universe in totality and not bracket any
>>> subset of phenomena, the mathematics we would need would have no axioms
>>> at
>>> all. That is, the universe in totality is devoid of structure and needs
>>> no
>>> axioms to describe it. Total lawlessness! The mathematics are just plain
>>> sets without structure. This would finally eliminate all metaphysics when
>>> dealing with the laws of nature and mathematical structure. It is only
>>> the
>>> way we look at the universe that gives us the illusion of structure.
>>>
>>> I"m sure you're aware of Max Tegmark's "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis"
>>> in
>>> which all possible mathematical structures obtain in some universe; and
>>> his
>>> later restriction of this idea to the "Computable Universe Hypothesis" in
>>> which only Turing computable universes exist.   But you are probably not
>>> aware of the ideas of Bruno Marchal, a mathematical logician in Brussels.
>>> He has a much more worked out idea of reality based on the Universal
>>> Dovetailing computer which he combines with the assumption that
>>> consciousness is certain kind of information processing to conclude that
>>> the
>>> UD computation produces all experience and implies physics.  It seems
>>> like a
>>> crankish idea at first, but Bruno is a very nice and serious guy, not at
>>> all
>>> a crank (though I don't agree with all of his theories).   Here's his
>>> basic
>>> paper:
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>> I know him from his posting on the Everything list;
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/10/2017 3:56 PM, Noson Yanofsky wrote:
>>>
>>> Thank you!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Vic Stenger’s books are always very interesting!!!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Attached is a paper on finding lawlessness.
>>>
>>> And here is a link to another paper that was just published:
>>>
>>> http://nautil.us/issue/49/the-absurd/chaos-makes-the-multiverse-unnecessary
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please pass them on to whoever would be interested in them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> All the best,
>>>
>>> Noson
>>>
>>> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:meeke...@verizon.net]
>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 4:48 PM
>>> To: spinozalens via Free Thinkers Physics Discussion Group
>>> ; no...@sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu; Atvoid-2
>>> 
>>> Subject: Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's gratifying to see Vic's contribution to the philosophy of science
>>> recognized.  I think it's important to recognize though that mathematics
>>> is
>>> not "effective" in weeding out false physics theories.  Intelligence has
>>> evolutionary advantage insofar as it is good at prediction; which is
>>> implicitly projection of regularities into the future.  So humans have a
>>> built-in tendency to see patterns - even where they are specious.  They
>>> can
>>> build mathematical theories which don't have any reference reality, just
>>> as
>>> they can invent superstitions about physical events.
>>>
>>> Anyway, thanks to Prof Yanofsky.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> On 7/10/2017 8:14 AM, spinozalens via Free Thinkers Physics Discussion
>>> Group
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> In Marcus Chown's delightful book " The Never Ending Days of Being Dead"
>>> a
>>> whole chapter ( Patterns in the Void)  is devoted to Vic's ideas " Where
>>> The
>>> Laws Of Physics Comes From" Chown used good judgement including this
>>> chapter
>>> in his book.  I  think that had Lawrence Krauss been more familiar with
>>> Vic's work , he possibly wouldn't have walked in the minefield he did
>>> with
>>> his book. "A Universe From Nothing"  In my opinion Vic had a very good
>>> answer to this question. This answer has not received enough attention in
>>> the physics

R: Re: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

2016-09-04 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List






Messaggio originale

Da: agrayson2...@gmail.com

Data: 05/09/2016 0.52

A: "Everything List"

Cc: 

Ogg: Re: Re: Aaronson/Penrose





On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 3:11:49 PM UTC-6, scerir wrote:




Messaggio originale

Da: "Alan Grayson" 

Data: 30/08/2016 18.23

A: "Everything List"

Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem 
puts this issue to rest. AGhttp://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf
FWIW, I just meant that no possible signalling (due to the random nature of the 
measurements) does not, IMO, mean we don't have FTL transmission of 
information. I read Bruce's comment to imply otherwise, perhaps mistakenly. AG
### I do not remember Bruce's comment. I think FTL information between two 
observers and FTL information (or "influences") between entangled pairs are 
different things. But there is another problem: is space-time independent of 
entanglement? 
### Hi Alan, read also
https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7308
https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795






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Re: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

2016-09-04 Thread agrayson2000



On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 3:11:49 PM UTC-6, scerir wrote:
>
>
>
> Messaggio originale
> Da: "Alan Grayson" >
> Data: 30/08/2016 18.23
> A: "Everything List">
> Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose
>
> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling 
> theorem puts this issue to rest. AG
> http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf
>
>
FWIW, I just meant that no possible signalling (due to the random nature of 
the measurements) does not, IMO, mean we don't have FTL transmission of 
information. I read Bruce's comment to imply otherwise, perhaps mistakenly. 
AG

>
> ### Hi Alan, read also
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7308
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795
>
>

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Re: Re: MWI question for the physicists...

2015-08-11 Thread David Nyman

On 11 August 2015 at 07:09, 'scerir' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> BTW there is an amusing paper by (the manyworlder) Lev Vaidman.
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609006

Nice paper (from a while back). AFAICT his resolution of the indeterminacy
issue in MWI is logically identical to Bruno's FPI in the context of
computationalism. In other words, in both cases it is an 'illusion of
ignorance' attributable to the limitation on information available to each
'copy' of a deterministically proliferated observer. Each copy will
inevitably (and subjectively justifiably) identify itself as a continuation
of a common 'ancestor'. Each observer will therefore feel justified in
making probabilistic predictions based on its *subjective restriction* to
an apparently (but, sub specie aeternitatis, illusorilly) singular personal
history. According to Vaidman this is essentially what the paper is about.

I'm frankly staggered that this (i.e. the equivalence between the two forms
of FPI) can be in the least controversial at this stage.

David

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Re: Re: MWI question for the physicists...

2015-08-11 Thread Pierz

Thanks - that looks interesting! I'll be reading that on the train 
tonight...

On Tuesday, August 11, 2015 at 4:10:00 PM UTC+10, scerir wrote:
>
> BTW there is an amusing paper by (the manyworlder) Lev Vaidman. 
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609006 
>
>
>   
>

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Re: Re: A curious puzzle - teaching a computer to understand infinity

2015-07-14 Thread meekerdb

On 07/14/15, John Clark wrote:

On Tuesday, July 14, 2015 , Brent wrote:

> Just ask yourself how you grasp the notion of infinity.

I don't have a visceral grasp of the true immensity of infinity. Do you?  

No, I don't, which was more or less my point.  What we think of as our "grasp 
of infinity" is an ability to consistently manipulate and use some symbol that 
just means "bigger than anything else we're concerned with".   In mathematics 
it mostly comes up in proofs by induction.  There's an interesting book 
available  online, 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/publications/moore-wirth-2014a.pdf
which describes one somewhat successful effort to have a computer do automatic 
proof by induction; which is what I would regard as one kind of 'grasping 
infinity'.

Brent
On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Pierz  wrote:

> Sure. It's a concept even very young children can understand

Have you actually tried this experiment? I think if you ask a very young child 
for the largest number there is he will say something like a million zillion, 
if you counter with a million zillion +1 he will look puzzled for a second and 
then with a note of triumph in his voice will say a million zillion +2 and it 
will take some time to convince him that still isn't quite right.  

> Computers just iterate until told or forced to stop, they cannot reason 
about their own iterative processes.

Actually they can.  
The computer program Mathematica
 uses iteration to calculate the numerical value of PI, if you tell it to 
calculate the first 500 digits to the right of the decimal point it can do it 
in about half a second, if you tell it to calculate the first 
10,000 digits to the right of the decimal point it can do it in about 
3 second
s, but if you ask it to calculate an infinite number of digits to the right of 
the decimal point it won't even start the iteration procedure, instead it will 
tell you that is an impossible task and you're being a idiot for asking it to 
do such a thing. Well OK,... the program is more polite than that and its 
language more diplomatic but I have a hunch that's what it's thinking. 

> infinity and zero are about equally easy mathematical concepts to grasp - 
historically both appeared in Indian mathematics around the same time.

And yet the idea that there was more than one sort of infinity and some 
infinite things were bigger than others wasn't 
discovered until about 1880, not because the proof was so technically 
difficult it isn't (the ancient Greeks could have discovered it), but because 
before Georg Cantor nobody had even tried; before Cantor everybody thought it 
was obvious that nothing could be larger than infinity and that was that. 
Everybody thought they understood infinity but they did not.

 John K Clark 

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Re: Re: Do they or don't they exist? Is anyone familiar with this paper?

2014-09-25 Thread 'cdemorse...@yahoo.com' via Everything List

And what of the singularity theorized as the initial state of the Big Bang? -- Original message-- From: LizRDate: Wed, 9/24/2014 5:21 PMTo: everything-list@googlegroups.com;Subject:Re: Do they or don't they exist? Is anyone familiar with this paper? This appears to be saying that all the Hawking radiation that would be emitted by a BH over its lifetime actually comes out in one huge burst before the BH can finish collapsing. That would surely affect the characteristics of supernovae in which BHs are thought to form? ... The entire mass of the BH coming out as radiation???Also, what's at the centre of our galaxy. and others?On 25 September 2014 11:44, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:Read more at: Researcher shows that black holes do not exist Researcher shows that black holes do not existBlack holes have long captured the public imagination and been the subject of popular culture, from Star Trek to Hollywood. They are the ultimate unknown – the blac... View on phys.orgPreview by Yahoo

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