Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[James N Rose]

Well, my friend, I am no Georg Cantor, but
I am of a like-mind to him.

What I have discerned, is an important insight
that indeed resolves the chasm, and does, as you
point out, make things mightily more complicated.

There is level of complication that has been with
us all the time, but which we have smoothly or 
inadvertantly 'chosen' to ignore; because it is too 
intimate within standard functions and operations to 
be immediately noticed.

EVERY integration, or differentiation; or multiplication
or division of a non-scalar factor  ... changes the 
dimensionality of a relational equation.  This, by
default, changes the rank of the corresponding Cantorian 
matrices.

No statistical evaluation stands alone as if borne full
grown.  It exits -within- a mathematical landscape of 
adjacent and extended functionFORMS that are the rest of
the pre-integrations, pre-differentiations, pre-multiplicands,
pre-dividands ... that "surround" it in 'mathematical space'.

And it, in and of itself, represents a part of the 'mathematical
environment' for any and all of those .. 'others'. 

The beautiful simplicity is that -every- change of dimensional
specification, CONVERTS mathematical statements, IN COMPARISON
TO THOSE MATH-ENVIRONMENT COMPANIONS.

If, for example, a base function was qualia deterministic, 
the conversion reveals the function product to be qualia 
statistical.

And even more 'confusing', as it were, is the concept that
we can take a base datum group, assign it an 'identity',
change the dimensionality as described above, and end up,
not with an 'alternative function/identity', but with the
Base Datum Identity -- SEEN as if looking at it through
alternate lenses and windows.  IT 'stays' the same; we
'appreciate' -- different relational aspects that are
there all the time but unrecognized because the
mathematic-statements are out lenses of focus.

Choose a different mathematical lens (like choosing
a different wavelength of energy) and you 'see'
something different.

Intrinsic to all observables -and- mathematic-forms,
are BOTH deterministic -and- statistical relations.

They CONVERT.  They CONSERVE.  Even through the change 
of qualia.  They REVEAL ... different relations when 
seem through options math-viewers.

Quite fascinating.

:-)

Jamie
April 3, 2007 


> Jamie,
> wise words, but no cigar here. For a "RE-Evaluation" I have 
> insufficient knowledge even in the "E" - to compare it into a "RE-".
> Statistical is different: I question the topical meaning, as being 
> just a 'model'-related idea (in MY sense: as a limited topical 
> fraction of the totality within boundaries of our capabilities to 
> observe) because so far nobody (incl our computers) had the mental 
> power to exercise statistics upon the infinite totality - which 
> would be trivial anyway.   Stathis is wise to concentrate on THIS 
> (our?) universe in his Stathistical considerations, as he mentioned. 
> If we include the multiverse (any definition) into statistics it would
> produce inadvertently infinites compared to infinites and it would 
> require a Georg Cantor to find out how to compare all those infinites. 
> The sophisticated 'statistical' and 'probabilistic' math is fine, it 
> is a good mental game, but all is originated in limited patterns for 
> the comparison. 
> 
> 
> Change the boundaries of your model (selection) and both the 
> statistical figures and the (arbitrary? so called:) probabilities 
> will change.(Useful though they are in building our technology). 
> You need a vacation from the mathematical brainwashing to agree.
> I feel, you have it. 
> 
> John

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John Mikes]

Jamie,
wise words, but no cigar here. For a "RE-Evaluation" I have insufficient
knowledge even in the "E" - to compare it into a "RE-".
Statistical is different: I question the topical meaning, as being just a
'model'-related idea (in MY sense: as a limited topical fraction of the
totality within boundaries of our capabilities to observe) because so far
nobody (incl our computers) had the mental power to exercise statistics upon
the infinite totality - which would be trivial anyway.
Stathis is wise to concentrate on THIS (our?) universe in his Stathistical
considerations, as he mentioned. If we include the multiverse (any
definition) into statistics it would produce inadvertently infinites
compared to infinites and it would require a Georg Cantor to find out how to
compare all those infinites.
The sophisticated 'statistical' and 'probabilistic' math is fine, it is a
good mental game, but all is originated in limited patterns for the
comparison. Change the boundaries of your model (selection) and both the
statistical figures and the (arbitrary? so called:) probabilities will
change. (Useful though they are in building our technology).
You need a vacation from the mathematical brainwashing to agree.
I feel, you have it.

John


On 4/2/07, James N Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> John M, et al,
>
>
> It is a fact of existential experiencing that
> minds are typically so innured to their millieu
> and environmental encounters that 'alternative
> interpretations' are overlooked and missed to
> appreciation and understanding.
>
> ---  When it became apparent to me that
> QM -and- Relativity are undeniable behemoths
> of existential relation, a la mode "Holmes",
> the unavoidable conclusion arose that the
> mis-analysis which keeps them 'separate' rests
> not in their respective qualia and aspects, but
> in our comprehension of mathematics.
>
> If the respective mathematics of statistics and determinism
> are distinct and 'irreconsilable', then we need to do
> a re-evaluation of the 'mathematics in general' for amenability,
> rather than making an effort to force-fit equations that
> resist algorythmic transformation into one another.
>
> Jamie R
>
>
>

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[James N Rose]

John M, et al,


It is a fact of existential experiencing that 
minds are typically so innured to their millieu
and environmental encounters that 'alternative 
interpretations' are overlooked and missed to
appreciation and understanding.

---  When it became apparent to me that
QM -and- Relativity are undeniable behemoths
of existential relation, a la mode "Holmes",
the unavoidable conclusion arose that the
mis-analysis which keeps them 'separate' rests
not in their respective qualia and aspects, but 
in our comprehension of mathematics.

If the respective mathematics of statistics and determinism
are distinct and 'irreconsilable', then we need to do 
a re-evaluation of the 'mathematics in general' for amenability, 
rather than making an effort to force-fit equations that
resist algorythmic transformation into one another.

Jamie R

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John Mikes]

It's getting such and sucher - the multiple, back-and-forth gets dizzying.
So I will copy certain sentences of the "Stathistical" discussion for
reflection.-Below is the orig.Maze.
John
---

> JM earlier: What else can we 'imagine'? Ideational -- of whom? Mine?
> Yours? I would not recite "of the universe" because HOW do we have access to
> a conscious process of the totality with our limited mind?
>

SP:"I don't quite understand this question. "

First: I corrected typos, but that will not solve the understandability. I
try to paraphrase the question, although that usually makes it even more
convoluted:
I suppose, you imagine THAT computer to be 'above' our limited knowledge of
the human mind, (what we do not know in its entirety) to simulate it in 'all
conscious' aspect.
Maybe a 'consciousness of the totality of the entire universe?'  We can
'simulate' in a computer only the part we know of and that is insufficient
for representing "it all".  Of course we should not reduce our
'comp'-substrate to an Apple, IBM, or similar.

"My "in principle" is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given
the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc."

" Physically" - as in our imaginational (I almost wrote: figment)
reductionist science e.g. "Physics 101"? I mean: "material"? I don't know
about the 'laws' of the universes,
(I don't know how to restrict such from the other universes - if such exist)
- I know only
about those in-model-findings (see below) that produced the most match in
our limited ways of past observations/explanations and our 'science'
declared (and calculated) them "laws of physics". With new findings such
"laws" may change. Not the universe(s)

"If we could model a hurricane on a computer"

Here come the 'models'. Not the gorgeous chicks in skimpy clothes and NOT
the functional simulations of constructs for easier study/understanding,
(like to simulate a biological process by an electrical/mathematical
construct, etc.). I mentioned earlier and I paraphrase:
as I use the word (non-exclusively my way) it is a topical/functional
limitation of a part of the totality (a limited extract) for the
understanding and handling of our limited minds. A mental cut to our
capabilities. Of course it does not collapse buildings. In "my" model we
consider about a hurricane only what we know of, speed, geometry, pressure
etc., I wish we knew about more from beyond-our-model circumstances and
could so interfere with its occurrence, or even stop them.
Like our 'model' of the brain is tissue within the skull and no link to
ideational qualities,
personal topical thoughts, experiences - memories, which are all handled in
the churning of these tissues - (and maybe else, still to be found). They
are believed to be linked, some say: they are included in those (physical??)
measurements we use in the present practice. I consider such reductionist
science a pars pro toto.
A 'complete' version of (my type) model is the thing itself (Robert Rosen).
Had we such 'complete mode' available your 'zombie' would be a real person.
-
" You don't even need "science":
 and:
"for each part of the brain, a precise description of what happens when, for
example, a certain neurotransmitter is released into a certain synapse, will
allow you eventually to predict how the whole brain will behave, amazingly
difficult though that task would be. "

I accept the findings of our reductionist science with awe it is the only
and efficient way how we learn about the world. And the results are
astonishingly proliferous. I would add: in spite of our little understanding
what we are talking about. The edifice of 'science' is remarkable, with all
those "it must be", "it may be", "it is assumed" and "as postulated"  qualia
of very smart people. I seek a peek 'beyond', like some do it with
'numbers', some with UD, Multiverse, Q-science or religious faith.
That 'certain neurotransmitter into certain synapse' may explain many
processes, not exclusively though: given changes from other parts (in or
outside the skull) may alter the way how "the whole brain behaves" . We
think in a narrow window of the 'givens'
Reproducibility is usual within fixed model-framework, easily misunderstood
for the general processes. Matching experiments are designed and
quantitatively evaluated.
Engineered. Technology is an incredible model-achievement. Almost perfect. .

--
" I can't explain exactly how my computer works, but I that doesn't mean it
must contain magical processes.

This after the complexity of biological processes is IMO exaggerated.
(After the French aristocratic 'Academy's verdicts' that Stevenson's
locomotive will not move, just turn its wheels on the spot and Fulton's
impeller will just drill a hole in the water,  magical is what we cannot
explain as of today). Then came epistemic enric

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/31/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that
> > computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience
> > theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to
> > take place in order to "happen". But that question aside, computationalism
> > depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all
> > the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree
> > of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a
> > functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind -
> > i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John
> > Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I
> > tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure.
> >
> Here we go:
> i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in
> order to "happen".
> What else can we 'imagine'? Ideationa -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I wouild
> not recite "of the unioverse" because HOW do we have access to a conscious
> process of the totality with our limited mind?
>

I don't quite understand this question.

...(a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes
> in our brain using a computer,...
> In principle EVERYTHING is possible. Look at the discussions on this list.
>
>

My "in principle" is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given
the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc.

...(b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical
> brain,...
> If a 'model' is identical in all respects ("functionally") it is not a
> model, it is the THING itself. So we are in this case playing withg words.
> NOTHING can be completely identical in this world, because everything is the
> product of ALL the actual circumstances co- functioning in the construction
> of the 'thing' (process). And ALL the circumstances do not ever repeat
> themselves identically: it would be a merrygoround world loop what we so far
> did not experience. We can find similarity in ALL aspects we observe, but
> that does not include the complete totality. We like to call such similarity
> an 'identity'..
> .So I do not argue against your finding a) and b) possible, but does it
> make sense?
>

If we could model a hurricane on a computer the simulation would not destroy
houses, but if the model were good enough it would tell us which houses a
real hurricane would destroy. Similarly, if we could model a brain, we would
be in a position to know how a person would behave in a given situation. We
could use the computer model to control the person's muscles and no-one
would realise he wasn't a "real" person, i.e. we would have at least a
zombie.

2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other
> > > tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how
> > > bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, "appropriately
> > > configured" and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1.
> > >
> > > Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The
> > macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which
> > describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded in
> > these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these
> > conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane
> > potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical
> > difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it should
> > be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain,
> > receiving afferent impulses from sense organs and sending afferent impulses
> > to muscles, which would result in a being whose behaviour is
> > indistinguishable from that of an intact human. The only way around this
> > conclusion is if the behaviour of the brain depends on physical processes
> > which are not computable, like Penrose's postulated quantum gravity effects.
> > This is possible, but there isn't really any good evidence supporting it, as
> > far as I'm aware.
> >
>
> 3-29 insert s:
> ...The macromolecules follow the laws of physics:...
> NONONONONO!  Certain experiences with macromolecules are described in our
> incompletge views as being described by certain (statistical?
> probabilistic?) findings in the physical domain. Macro- or
> nonmacromolecules, atoms, their parts, show behavior in our 'slanted',
> 'partial'. observation which have been matched to calculations drawn upon
> similarly era-restricted observational explanatory calculations (physics). I
> did not work with atoms or molecules, when I made my macromo;leculs and
> their applications. I worked with masses that behaved. Then I put them into
> a reductionist analysis abd tried to 'match' the numerical data to those 

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John Mikes]

Dear Stathis, sorry for the delay, I had to 'save' most of this response and
finish it later. Of course that will show in the inadequacy of the last
part, a second guess never matches.-
*
I tried to direct that overgrown discussion back to Earth, you went up the
clouds again.
Let me, please, interject in ItALICS into the copy os OUR post below.
John

On 3/29/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/29/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
> >
> >  Stathis:
> > let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s):
> >
> > - Original Message -
> >  *From:* Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> > *Sent:* Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM
> > *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
> > >
> > > SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote:
> > >
> > > *-SP:
> > >
> > Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be
> > replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not
> > only act the same, you would also feel the same. - *
> >
> > 
> > I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to
> > the topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion.
> >
> > 1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary
> > digital mechanism? Do we really believe that our "human complexity" is that
> > simplistic and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally
> > restricted) we know only a bit of what our "thinking mind" is capable
> > of/doing. Some of these features are reproduced into binary digital
> > churnings and that is the standard. A robot of limited capabilities (maybe
> > if in certain aspects even exceeding the limits of our human activity
> > details).
> > I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is
> > not like such 'standard': it may be "analogous", or, if digital: of
> > unlimited variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in
> > our today's epistemy.
> >
> > The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that
> computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience
> theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take
> place in order to "happen". But that question aside, computationalism
> depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all
> the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree
> of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a
> functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind -
> i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John
> Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I
> tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure.
>
Here we go:
i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in
order to "happen".
What else can we 'imagine'? Ideationa -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I wouild not
recite "of the unioverse" because HOW do we have access to a conscious
process of the totality with our limited mind?
*
...(a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes
in our brain using a computer,...
In principle EVERYTHING is possible. Look at the discussions on this list.
...(b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical
brain,...
If a 'model' is identical in all respects ("functionally") it is not a
model, it is the THING itself. So we are in this case playing withg words.
NOTHING can be completely identical in this world, because everything is the
product of ALL the actual circumstances co- functioning in the construction
of the 'thing' (process). And ALL the circumstances do not ever repeat
themselves identically: it would be a merrygoround world loop what we so far
did not experience. We can find similarity in ALL aspects we observe, but
that does not include the complete totality. We like to call such similarity
an 'identity'..
.So I do not argue against your finding a) and b) possible, but does it make
sense?
***

> 2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other
> > tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how
> > bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, "appropriately
> > configured" and electric flow in it. F

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/29/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Stathis:
> let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s):
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Sent:* Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
>
>
>
>
> On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
> >
> > SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote:
> >
> > *-SP:
> >
> Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be
> replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not
> only act the same, you would also feel the same. - *
>
> 
> I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to the
> topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion.
>
> 1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary digital
> mechanism? Do we really believe that our "human complexity" is that
> simplistic and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally
> restricted) we know only a bit of what our "thinking mind" is capable
> of/doing. Some of these features are reproduced into binary digital
> churnings and that is the standard. A robot of limited capabilities (maybe
> if in certain aspects even exceeding the limits of our human activity
> details).
> I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is
> not like such 'standard': it may be "analogous", or, if digital: of
> unlimited variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in
> our today's epistemy.
>
> The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that
computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience
theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take
place in order to "happen". But that question aside, computationalism
depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all
the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree
of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a
functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind -
i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John
Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I
tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure.


>   2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and
> other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter
> how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, "appropriately
> configured" and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1.
>
> Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The
macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which
describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded in
these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these
conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane
potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical
difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it should
be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain,
receiving afferent impulses from sense organs and sending afferent impulses
to muscles, which would result in a being whose behaviour is
indistinguishable from that of an intact human. The only way around this
conclusion is if the behaviour of the brain depends on physical processes
which are not computable, like Penrose's postulated quantum gravity effects.
This is possible, but there isn't really any good evidence supporting it, as
far as I'm aware.

> 3. "you" - and who should that be? can we separate our living
> brain (I mean with all its functionality) from 'YOU', the self, the
> person, or call it the simulacron of yourself? What's left? Is there "me"
> and "my brain"? As I like to call it: the brain is the 'tool' of my
> mind, mind is pretty unidentified,  but - is close to my-self, some call it
> life, some consciousness, - those items we like to argue about because none
> of us knows what we are talking about (some DO THINK they know, but only
> something and for themselves).
>
>
I find it hard to define consciousness, but I know what it is, and so does
everyone who has it.

4. "feel"  who/what? the transistors?
> (Let me repeat: I am not talking about Transistor Stathis).
>
>
You could equally well ask, do the proteins/ phospholipids/ nucleic acids
etc. feel? Apparently, they do. If your brain st

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Stathis: 
let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s):
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?





  On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 
SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote:

*-SP:
  Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be 
replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not 
only act the same, you would also feel the same. - *

  
  I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to the 
topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion.

  1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary digital 
mechanism? Do we really believe that our "human complexity" is that simplistic 
and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally restricted) we 
know only a bit of what our "thinking mind" is capable of/doing. Some of these 
features are reproduced into binary digital churnings and that is the standard. 
A robot of limited capabilities (maybe if in certain aspects even exceeding the 
limits of our human activity details). 
  I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is not 
like such 'standard': it may be "analogous", or, if digital: of unlimited 
variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in our today's 
epistemy.  

  2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other 
tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how bigger 
or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, "appropriately configured" and 
electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1.

  3. "you" - and who should that be? can we separate our living
  brain (I mean with all its functionality) from 'YOU', the self, the person, 
or call it the simulacron of yourself? What's left? Is there "me" and "my 
brain"? As I like to call it: the brain is the 'tool' of my mind, mind is 
pretty unidentified,  but - is close to my-self, some call it life, some 
consciousness, - those items we like to argue about because none of us knows 
what we are talking about (some DO THINK they know, but only something and for 
themselves).

  4. "feel"  who/what? the transistors? 
  (Let me repeat: I am not talking about Transistor Stathis). 

  *-SP:
  Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality 
by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the 
predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. And in 
any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if 
computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one 
universe. 
  Stathis Papaioannou-*

  
  Yes, "we today" KNOW about only 1 universe. But we believe in a physical 
reality what we 'feel', 'live it' and hold as our 'truth' as well. Even those 
'more advanced' minds saying they don't believe in it, cry out (OMIGOD!) when 
"Dr. Johnson's stone" hurts their toe in the shoe. 

  I like to draw comparisons between "what we know today" and what we knew 
1000, 3000, or 5000 years ago and ask: what will we 'know' just 500 years ahead 
in the future by a continuing epistemic enrichment? (If humanity survives that 
long). 
  Please, readers, just list the answers alphabetically.

  Cheerz

  


   

  



--


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11:07 AM

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John Mikes]

On 3/28/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> Le 26-mars-07, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be
> > replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you
> > would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes
> > on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by
> > means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the
> > predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA.
>
>
> Yes. And I intervene only when I find a contradiction between what is
> said, with the consequence of the UDA.
> I am also open to criticism of the UDA itself.
>
>
>
>
> > And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still
> > relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter)
> > there is only one universe.
>
>
> Certainly.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> Then comes my ceterum censeo (applicable to the entire discussion) after
Bruno's Certainly :  -- AS FAR AS WE KNOW  --(today).
John

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 26-mars-07, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be 
> replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you 
> would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes 
> on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by 
> means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the 
> predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA.


Yes. And I intervene only when I find a contradiction between what is 
said, with the consequence of the UDA.
I am also open to criticism of the UDA itself.




> And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still 
> relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) 
> there is only one universe.


Certainly.


Bruno


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 25-mars-07, à 15:13, Mark Peaty a écrit :

>
> I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last
> couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this
> thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this
> everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only
> possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened
> in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility
> exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get
> the feeling that comp could lead to madness.


You begin to see the point perhaps ...




> But then, of
> course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe
> somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-)


You wish :-)


>
> The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around
> this critical point of duration and continuity for some time
> now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being
> aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically
> paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for
> more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this
> discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be
> that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes,
> or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can
> get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow
> transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far
> asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that
> we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more
> or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our
> brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is
> nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing
> this have been scores of millions of years in the making.


OK. This is not so new. A rough summary of Aristotle versus Plato 
consists in saying:
Aristotle: reality is what you see and measure (let the experts speak, 
and sleep well)
Plato: what you see and measure *could* be the shadow of the shadow of 
the shadow of what *could* perhaps be (let us keep vigilance in all 
situations).




>
> Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated!

It is the least we can say. My original motivation was in showing that 
with comp the mind body problem is two times more complex than 
materialists usually think. Indeed (cf uda) with comp you have to 
explain the physical from the "number-theoretical/information 
theoretical etc..) studies.



> AFAICS under
> Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic
> view which does not even have a consolation

Careful with the idea of consolation. A priori science is not supposed 
to comfort us, but to believe (and hopefully know). Cf some recurring 
remark from Stathis to Tom. Now, if you have "faith", really, then 
there are no reason to be anxious about any finding by science.



> that we are
> participating in a genuine continuity.

And here you are quite quick. But, with respect to this notion of 
continuity,  I have a problem with a list, given tat for being less 
quick on such question you have to invest more in a bit more technical 
computer science. I am not sure computer science and logic makes it 
possible to recover any third person global notion of continuity, but 
evidences add that there are genuine first person plural genuine 
continuity. Actually, the very notion of computation, both classical 
and quantum, could have his roots in topology. In some mathematical 
structure, akin to first person structure, the notion of computable is 
equivalent with the notion of being continuous.




> Pre-comp, one could
> assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I'
> am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't
> make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very
> good that the world is going on independently of me and I have
> the chance of really contributing.


I would not abandon that idea.




>  In a pre-comp universe a wise
> person will recognise that, well, things are always what we
> believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no
> guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are
> necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so
> long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and
> purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being
> as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something
> and at least we tried.

Nice.



> But with comp, assuming there are no
> intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience
> wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a
> coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current
> experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_
> cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it
> must always be possible that everything we take to be an
> indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of
> this slice o

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> No.  I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I
> recognize is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an
> analogue in brains.  When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs
> the time evolution of the ODEs define the states.  But in the
> simulation, what actually evolves them is passing them to another
> program that takes them and the current state as data and
> integrates; thus producing a sequence of states.  When you talk
> about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the
> states.  They are what we write into memory; they form the
> "narrative" of the simulation.  The integrator is like a simulation
> at a lower level, perhaps at the level of neurons.  We're not aware
> of it and in fact many different integration algorithms could be
> used with little difference in the outcome (as in the comp idea of
> replacing neurons with chips).  But the integrator, even conceived
> as an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is performing a function,
> connecting
> one state to the next.  I'm not denying that you can simulate all
> this and that you can take a block universe view of the
> simulation.  I'm just saying that the block can't be made of just
> the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs to include the unconscious
> parts that connect the conscious parts. 
> 
> 
> The integrator is just a device to generate the next state. Perhaps 
> without it there would be no continuity because there would be no 
> simulation, but if you had the DE's all solved beforehand you could 
> simply plot the states and have continuous motion, or whatever it is you 
> are simulating. In any case, what could it possibly mean for the 
> unconscious part binding my OMs together to be disrupted? Suppose that 
> this happened every minute on the minute: would I feel any different? If 
> I did feel different, that would mean my consciousness was affected, so 
> it would be the OMs that differed, not just the unconscious part; while 
> if I didn't feel any different by definition my continuity of 
> consciousness has been maintained and the unconscious disruption is 
> irrelevant.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

No, my thought was that if you slice the physical or computational basis of 
consciousness to finely then no single slice is conscious, i.e. and OM must 
have some duration. And since it has duration it provides an inherent sense of 
time.  Note that I'm not denying that the physical process or computation can 
be more finely divided; maybe even arbitrarily finely divided, as for a 
continuum.  I'm just saying that below some granularity, there is no longer a 
"thought" or an "observation" that can be associated with that grain; that it 
takes some sequence of grains to constitute a thought.  

Further, I note that in replacing neural processes by a digital simulation this 
simulation must use much finer space and time divisions than those that 
correspond to "thoughts" or OMs.  So even assuming comp, consciousness is an 
emergent phenomena not a fundamental one.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last
> couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this
> thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this
> everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only
> possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened
> in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility
> exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get
> the feeling that comp could lead to madness. But then, of
> course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe
> somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-)
>
> The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around
> this critical point of duration and continuity for some time
> now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being
> aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically
> paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for
> more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this
> discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be
> that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes,
> or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can
> get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow
> transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far
> asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that
> we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more
> or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our
> brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is
> nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing
> this have been scores of millions of years in the making.
>
> Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated! AFAICS under
> Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic
> view which does not even have a consolation that we are
> participating in a genuine continuity. Pre-comp, one could
> assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I'
> am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't
> make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very
> good that the world is going on independently of me and I have
> the chance of really contributing. In a pre-comp universe a wise
> person will recognise that, well, things are always what we
> believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no
> guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are
> necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so
> long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and
> purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being
> as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something
> and at least we tried. But with comp, assuming there are no
> intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience
> wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a
> coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current
> experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_
> cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it
> must always be possible that everything we take to be an
> indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of
> this slice of multiverse.
>
> That is a pretty rugged conception to present to people as
> _necessarily_ possible. I therefore take comfort in the
> difficulties that people have in integrating Comp into a
> coherent explanation of the universe we perceive. I realise that
> much can be done with higher mathematics but just because people
> can create a formal language system in which algorithmic
> processes can be referred to with simple symbols, and sets of
> such symbols can be syntaxed together with indicators that mean,
> effectively, 'and so on so forth for ever and ever', this does
> not mean that the universe outside of peoples' heads can ever
> reflect this. I think it behoves contributors here to consider
> whether the universal dovetailer can ever be more real than Jack
> and his Beanstalk. Jack and his magic vegetable have been around
> for a couple of centuries now. The universal dovetailer may do
> likewise. We just need to keep in touch with the idea though
> that 'It Ain't Necessarily So!'.


Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be
replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not
only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes on to show that
this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but
we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in
cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. And in any case, the ideas
Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is
wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you a

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Mark Peaty]

I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last 
couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this 
thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this 
everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only 
possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened 
in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility 
exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get 
the feeling that comp could lead to madness. But then, of 
course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe 
somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-)

The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around 
this critical point of duration and continuity for some time 
now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being 
aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically 
paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for 
more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this 
discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be 
that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes, 
or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can 
get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow 
transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far 
asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that 
we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more 
or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our 
brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is 
nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing 
this have been scores of millions of years in the making.

Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated! AFAICS under 
Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic 
view which does not even have a consolation that we are 
participating in a genuine continuity. Pre-comp, one could 
assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I' 
am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't 
make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very 
good that the world is going on independently of me and I have 
the chance of really contributing. In a pre-comp universe a wise 
person will recognise that, well, things are always what we 
believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no 
guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are 
necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so 
long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and 
purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being 
as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something 
and at least we tried. But with comp, assuming there are no 
intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience 
wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a 
coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current 
experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_ 
cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it 
must always be possible that everything we take to be an 
indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of 
this slice of multiverse.

That is a pretty rugged conception to present to people as 
_necessarily_ possible. I therefore take comfort in the 
difficulties that people have in integrating Comp into a 
coherent explanation of the universe we perceive. I realise that 
much can be done with higher mathematics but just because people 
can create a formal language system in which algorithmic 
processes can be referred to with simple symbols, and sets of 
such symbols can be syntaxed together with indicators that mean, 
effectively, 'and so on so forth for ever and ever', this does 
not mean that the universe outside of peoples' heads can ever 
reflect this. I think it behoves contributors here to consider 
whether the universal dovetailer can ever be more real than Jack 
and his Beanstalk. Jack and his magic vegetable have been around 
for a couple of centuries now. The universal dovetailer may do 
likewise. We just need to keep in touch with the idea though 
that 'It Ain't Necessarily So!'.



Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> No.  I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I
> recognize is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an
> analogue in brains.  When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs
> the time evolution of the ODEs define the states.  But in the
> simulation, what actually evolves them is passing them to another
> program that takes them and the current state as data and
> integrates; thus producing a sequence of states.  When you talk
> about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the
> states.  They are what we write into memory;

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

No.  I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize
> is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in
> brains.  When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of
> the ODEs define the states.  But in the simulation, what actually evolves
> them is passing them to another program that takes them and the current
> state as data and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states.  When you
> talk about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the
> states.  They are what we write into memory; they form the "narrative" of
> the simulation.  The integrator is like a simulation at a lower level,
> perhaps at the level of neurons.  We're not aware of it and in fact many
> different integration algorithms could be used with little difference in the
> outcome (as in the comp idea of replacing neurons with chips).  But the
> integrator, even conceived as an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is
> performing a function, connecting
> one state to the next.  I'm not denying that you can simulate all this and
> that you can take a block universe view of the simulation.  I'm just saying
> that the block can't be made of just the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs
> to include the unconscious parts that connect the conscious parts.


The integrator is just a device to generate the next state. Perhaps without
it there would be no continuity because there would be no simulation, but if
you had the DE's all solved beforehand you could simply plot the states and
have continuous motion, or whatever it is you are simulating. In any case,
what could it possibly mean for the unconscious part binding my OMs together
to be disrupted? Suppose that this happened every minute on the minute:
would I feel any different? If I did feel different, that would mean my
consciousness was affected, so it would be the OMs that differed, not just
the unconscious part; while if I didn't feel any different by definition my
continuity of consciousness has been maintained and the unconscious
disruption is irrelevant.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  >  >> wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > John M wrote:
>  >  > Stathis and Brent:
>  >  >
>  >  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
>  >  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
>  >  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
>  >  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
>  >  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  >  >
>  >  > John M
>  >
>  > That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
>  > static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
>  > this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
>  > rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think
> however this
>  > misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that
> when it is
>  > run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
>  >
>  >
>  > As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from
>  > within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been
> able
>  > to come up with a method for distinguishing between block
> universe time
>  > and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise
> to the
>  > effect (or illusion) of linear time.
> 
> I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE,
> PDE, and stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is
> doing in running a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of
> variable values and functions that computer the rate-of-change of
> those variables - not just the values.  When it runs, the
> integration routine uses the functions to generate new values.  I'm
> not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to
> an abstract computation in Platonia.  It take the states to
> correspond to OMs.  But the states are not standing in isolation
> with no relation.  They are related by the integrator.  The
> integrator may be thought of as simulator of time.  If it is part of
> an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther,
> point to the next OM.  If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone
> are not sufficient to construct consciousness.  At least that's what
> I think part of the time ;-) 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real 
> computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but 
> goes through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a "1" turns 
> into a "0"? These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant 
> hardware detail when considering abstract machines.

No.  I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize is 
arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in brains.  
When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of the ODEs 
define the states.  But in the simulation, what actually evolves them is 
passing them to another program that takes them and the current state as data 
and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states.  When you talk about 
isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the states.  They 
are what we write into memory; they form the "narrative" of the simulation.  
The integrator is like a simulation at a lower level, perhaps at the level of 
neurons.  We're not aware of it and in fact many different integration 
algorithms could be used with little difference in the outcome (as in the comp 
idea of replacing neurons with chips).  But the integrator, even conceived as 
an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is performing a function, connecting 
one state to the next.  I'm not denying that you can simulate all this and that 
you can take a block universe view of the simulation.  I'm just saying that the 
block can't be made of just the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs to include 
the unconscious parts that connect the conscious parts.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > John M wrote:
> >  > Stathis and Brent:
> >  >
> >  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> >  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> >  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> >  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> >  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >  >
> >  > John M
> >
> > That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
> > static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
> > this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
> > rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think however this
> > misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is
> > run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
> >
> >
> > As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from
> > within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able
> > to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time
> > and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the
> > effect (or illusion) of linear time.
>
> I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and
> stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running
> a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions
> that computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the
> values.  When it runs, the integration routine uses the functions to
> generate new values.  I'm not insisting on the computer hardware here - it
> applies equally to an abstract computation in Platonia.  It take the states
> to correspond to OMs.  But the states are not standing in isolation with no
> relation.  They are related by the integrator.  The integrator may be
> thought of as simulator of time.  If it is part of an OM then and OM
> includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, point to the next OM.  If
> it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not sufficient to construct
> consciousness.  At least that's what I think part of the time ;-)


I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real
computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but goes
through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a "1" turns into a "0"?
These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant hardware detail when
considering abstract machines.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> John M wrote:
>  > Stathis and Brent:
>  >
>  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
>  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
>  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
>  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
>  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  >
>  > John M
> 
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
> static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
> this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
> rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think however this
> misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is
> run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
> 
>  
> As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from 
> within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able 
> to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time 
> and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the 
> effect (or illusion) of linear time.

I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and 
stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running a 
simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions that 
computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the values.  When it 
runs, the integration routine uses the functions to generate new values.  I'm 
not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to an abstract 
computation in Platonia.  It take the states to correspond to OMs.  But the 
states are not standing in isolation with no relation.  They are related by the 
integrator.  The integrator may be thought of as simulator of time.  If it is 
part of an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, 
point to the next OM.  If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not 
sufficient to construct consciousness.  At least that's what I think part of 
the time ;-)

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> John M wrote:
> > Stathis and Brent:
> >
> > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >
> > John M
>
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may
> leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with the
> idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as
> state values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation must
> be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate", i.e.
> the clock.


As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within
the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up
with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear
time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or
illusion) of linear time.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Wednesday 21 March 2007 17:46:32 Brent Meeker wrote:
> John M wrote:
> > Stathis and Brent:
> >
> > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >
> > John M
>
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may
> leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with
> the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically
> as state values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation
> must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate",
> i.e. the clock.
>
> Brent Meeker
>

But the internal states of a computation are not tied to an "external" clock. 
The "external" clock rate is irrelevant (from the inside).

Quentin Anciaux

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

John M wrote:
> Stathis and Brent:
>  
> ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> Would it not make sense to write instead of
> "we are" (thing-wise) -
> the term less static, rather process-wise:
> "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  
> John M

That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may 
leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with the 
idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state 
values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* 
and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Stathis and Brent:

ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. 
Would it not make sense to write instead of 
"we are" (thing-wise) - 
the term less static, rather process-wise:
"We do"  (in whatever action)?

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2007 3:23 PM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?



  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  > 
  > 
  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
  > 
  > 
  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  >  >
  >  >
  >  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  >  > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> wrote:
  >  >
  >  >
  >  >  >If there are OMs which don't
  >  >  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
  >  > stream of
  >  >  > consciousness.
  >  >
  >  > There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
  >  > remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
  >  > *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a
  > problem with
  >  > what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.
  >  >
  >  >
  >  > Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life?
  > 
  > Certainly not consciously.
  > 
  >  >If you
  >  > are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense
  > that you
  >  > have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a
  >  > moment ago.
  > 
  > I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to
  > the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the
  > content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception
  > and the other as memory of a perception.
  > 
  >  >You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or
  >  > suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of
  > these
  >  > things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking
  >  > about them or their absence.
  > 
  > 
  >  >So a bland sameness from moment to moment
  >  > constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity,
  > 
  > What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of
  > one.  I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the
  > same person I was a few minutes ago?  Don't feel and
  > different.  Must be." 
  > 
  > 
  > It seems you are using "consciousness" in a more specific sense than I 
  > am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not 
  > being unconscious.
  > 
  >  >since an OM
  >  > that deviated substantially from this would either not be
  > considered as
  >  > a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had
  >  > happened.
  > 
  > But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not
  > related except by their conscious content.  So an OM never has
  > knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation.  One
  > might experience an OM whose content was, "I'm a different person
  > than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in
  > my memory." but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of
  > being me. 
  > 
  > 
  > No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to 
  > continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity 
  > separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have 
  > zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although 
  > they might need to be brought into play again in an instant.
  > 
  > My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the
  > inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in
  > content, to create a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it
  > because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything.  What
  > creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed
  > and so not part of an OM. 
  > 
  > 
  > Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must 
  > do it through affecting conscious factors. 

  That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/21/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> > Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must
> > do it through affecting conscious factors.
>
> That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity
> of identity, but I don't think we are.  I may think of it from time-to-time,
> but generally I don't have any "sense of identity" to be affected.  That's
> the problem I see with OMs.  They are usually conceived as what people not
> on this list call "thoughts", the sort of thing expressible in simple
> sentence.  They don't come with a subordinate clause, "and this thought is
> by Brent Meeker."


It's true that we are not always conscious of a sense of identity, but that
just means we don't have to worry about this when considering most OMs. An
analogy would be representing visual information in a simulation. There is
no need to simulate what is going on behind a person's back as long as any
shadows or reflections affecting his visual field are taken care of. Of
course, the simulation must instantly create the new visual information when
the person turns his head, and similarly it must provide information
pertaining to memory and personal identity if he should decide to focus on
this.


> >Suppose some unconscious
> > factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of
> > consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my
> > conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X
> > plays a role while maintaining that I would not have noticed anything
> > different without X.
>
> Depends on what you mean by "notice".  The brain implements a physical
> processes, of which you are not conscious.  It causes your next thought to
> pop into consciousness.  If the brain's process had been a little different,
> say it was perturbed by a cosmic ray particle, your next conscious thought
> would have been different.  You would have a different thought - but you
> wouldn't *notice* it was different.
>
> Could something, a shower of cosmic ray particles, cause you to suddenly
> have the thought, "I am Brent Meeker." and if it did, would your "sense of
> continuity of identity" have been affected?  If the "I" referred to Sthathis
> Papaioannou that would be a discontinuity of identity.  But if "I" referred
> to me, it would just be an instance of your brain having one of my thoughts
> and would not affect your identity.


If I started experiencing your thoughts, then I would be you. It would be
like a duplication experiment in which you can expect an equal probability
of finding yourself in your original position or in my position. While this
was happening, I (Stathis) would be unconscious. After it was over, if I
were left with no memory of the event, I might notice a discontinuity in the
external world, things apparently having moved substantial distances
instantaneously etc., but it wouldn't affect my sense of identity.


> >You could use that as a definition of unconscious:
> > if it were removed, you would not notice any change.
> >
> > Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more
> > like network of paths with marked stepping stones.  Once in awhile
> > there's a stone that's marked, "Remember you're Brent Meeker." and
> > every path that includes one of these is "me", even if the path also
> > includes some marked "Remember you're Stathis Papaioannou."
> >
> >
> > How could you tell the difference, from the inside, between such a path
> > and a chain?
>
> You couldn't, but neither is there any reason for them to form a sequence
> of any kind. In the metaphor the stones are arranged on the ground and have
> adjacency relations.  But in the OM picture each one exists in isolation and
> there are no adjacency relations.


Computationalism implies that a stream of consciousness survives
fragmentation of the process generating the stream. If it did not, then
there would be some change in experience as a result of fragmentation. For
example, if an experience supervenes on past computational states as well as
on the present instantaneous state, then arbitrarily slicing up the
computation will change and perhaps completely disrupt the stream of
consciousness. Consider a time interval t1t2t3 in which a simulated subject
perceives a light stimulus (t1, t2, t3 are according to the clock within the
simulation). The light is shone into his eyes at t1, and he presses a button
at t3 to indicate that he has seen it. Now, suppose that the computation is
cut at t2, so that the interval t1t2 is run several real time days before
t2t3, or several days after, or not at all. Then since the experience during
t2t3 is dependent not only on the computational activity going on in that
interval, but also on what has gone on before, perhaps by excising t1t2 from
its normal position in relation to t2t3 the subject will not perceive the
stimulus, or not perceive it in time to press the button at t3. But

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  >  >> wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  >  >If there are OMs which don't
>  >  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
>  > stream of
>  >  > consciousness.
>  >
>  > There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
>  > remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
>  > *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a
> problem with
>  > what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.
>  >
>  >
>  > Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life?
> 
> Certainly not consciously.
> 
>  >If you
>  > are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense
> that you
>  > have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a
>  > moment ago.
> 
> I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to
> the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the
> content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception
> and the other as memory of a perception.
> 
>  >You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or
>  > suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of
> these
>  > things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking
>  > about them or their absence.
> 
> 
>  >So a bland sameness from moment to moment
>  > constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity,
> 
> What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of
> one.  I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the
> same person I was a few minutes ago?  Don't feel and
> different.  Must be." 
> 
> 
> It seems you are using "consciousness" in a more specific sense than I 
> am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not 
> being unconscious.
> 
>  >since an OM
>  > that deviated substantially from this would either not be
> considered as
>  > a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had
>  > happened.
> 
> But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not
> related except by their conscious content.  So an OM never has
> knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation.  One
> might experience an OM whose content was, "I'm a different person
> than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in
> my memory." but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of
> being me. 
> 
> 
> No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to 
> continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity 
> separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have 
> zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although 
> they might need to be brought into play again in an instant.
> 
> My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the
> inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in
> content, to create a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it
> because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything.  What
> creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed
> and so not part of an OM. 
> 
> 
> Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must 
> do it through affecting conscious factors. 

That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity of 
identity, but I don't think we are.  I may think of it from time-to-time, but 
generally I don't have any "sense of identity" to be affected.  That's the 
problem I see with OMs.  They are usually conceived as what people not on this 
list call "thoughts", the sort of thing expressible in simple sentence.  They 
don't come with a subordinate clause, "and this thought is by Brent Meeker."

>Suppose some unconscious 
> factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of 
> consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my 
> conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X 
> plays a role while maintaining that I would not have noticed anything 
> different without X. 

Depends on what you mean by "notice".  The brain implements a physical 
processes, of which you are not conscious.  It causes your next thought to pop 
into consciousness.  If the brain's process had been a little different, say it 
was perturbed by a cosmic ray particle, your next conscious thought would have 
been different.  You would have a different thought - but you wouldn't *notice* 

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

John M wrote:
> Glad to have misread your "consiousness" as being "not unconscious". I 
> agree with you even in the 'life' part, except that I consider that darn 
> elusive 'consciousness' still "on", when you sleep or are anesthesized.  
> "You" (whatever it is) are still "responding to the information you get: 
> you wake up to the alarm clock, or from unconsciousness. There are 
> different 'levels' to be included into that noumenon.
> John M


Yes it's a problem that there a different levels of consciousness; although I'd 
say that an anesthetized person is not conscious at all.  A sleeping person is 
still processing sensory stimuli; he can usually be awakened by whispering his 
name.  Part of the time when asleep he is dreaming, which is more conscious 
than dreamless sleep as evidenced by the fact that he may remember the dream.  

And then there is self-consciousness, when one actually introspects.  I'm not 
sure that's any different than just being conscious of perceptions, but it may 
be.

This thread started from a discussion of "observer moments", which are 
purportedly building blocks which constitute consciousness even without being 
assembled, i.e. just the existence of the blocks, each isolated from all the 
others is enough to constitute a stream of consciousness.  The blocks are like 
Julian Barbour's time capsules; except Barbour supposes that each time capsule 
contains a complete state of the universe.  In that case, it is much more 
plausible that there is an implicit order connecting the capsules.  I find the 
OM hypothesis dubious because a time-slice of consciousness, i.e. a thought, 
seems to me to have very little content.  Not nearly enough to supply an 
implicit chain.  If I think, "There's a yellow butterfly." it may equally 
connect to "I should buy butter." and "I shouldn't use insecticide here."  

Now to some this may be a feature, not a bug ;-)  These are both "consistent 
continuations" and therefore they are both "me" and there as are many me's as 
there there are paths of consistent continuations through all the possible OMs. 
 But that just leads back to my general complaint about "everything" theories.  
They have no predictive power.  Notice that in comparison a material theory 
would say there are neural connections in your brain such that if we mapped 
them we would know that "There's a yellow butterfly." would be followed by "I 
should buy butter." and not "I shouldn't use insecticide here."  

Brent Meeker


> 
>     - Original Message -----
> *From:* Stathis Papaioannou <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, March 19, 2007 7:13 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/20/07, *John M* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> 
> Stathis:
> it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness:
> as I see you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'.
> The physiological (mediacal?) way.
> In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness
> for over 15 years - most researchers consider it more than that:
> the noun (Ccness) is only partially related to the adjective
> (conscious - maybe "of")..
> This is why I included into my identification of it not only
> "acknowledgement" referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and
> response to' which implies activity in some process.
> Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to
> identify an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its
> content) as a snapshot-static image of a state.
> Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another
> questionmark).
> Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the
> wider sense as well.
> John M
> 
>  
> I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you
> are not actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from
> your past, and so on. And I'm not sure that life can be equated with
> consciousness because you are still alive, and even your neurons are
> still for the most part going about their business, when you are
> asleep or anaesthetised.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Glad to have misread your "consiousness" as being "not unconscious". I agree 
with you even in the 'life' part, except that I consider that darn elusive 
'consciousness' still "on", when you sleep or are anesthesized.  "You" 
(whatever it is) are still "responding to the information you get: you wake up 
to the alarm clock, or from unconsciousness. There are different 'levels' to be 
included into that noumenon.
John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 7:13 PM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?





  On 3/20/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 
Stathis:
it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see 
you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological 
(mediacal?) way. 
In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 
years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only 
partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe "of").. 
This is why I included into my identification of it not only 
"acknowledgement" referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' 
which implies activity in some process. 
Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an 
importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static 
image of a state. 
Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another 
questionmark). 
Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider 
sense as well.
John M

  I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you are not 
actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from your past, and so on. 
And I'm not sure that life can be equated with consciousness because you are 
still alive, and even your neurons are still for the most part going about 
their business, when you are asleep or anaesthetised. 

  Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/20/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Stathis:
> it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see
> you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological
> (mediacal?) way.
> In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15
> years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is
> only partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe "of")..
> This is why I included into my identification of it not only
> "acknowledgement" referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response
> to' which implies activity in some process.
> Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify
> an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a
> snapshot-static image of a state.
> Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another
> questionmark).
> Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider
> sense as well.
> John M
>

I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you are not
actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from your past, and so
on. And I'm not sure that life can be equated with consciousness because you
are still alive, and even your neurons are still for the most part going
about their business, when you are asleep or anaesthetised.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Stathis:
it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see you 
consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological 
(mediacal?) way. 
In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 years 
- most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only 
partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe "of").. 
This is why I included into my identification of it not only "acknowledgement" 
referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' which implies 
activity in some process. 
Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an 
importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static 
image of a state. 
Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another questionmark). 
Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider sense as 
well.
John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 5:54 AM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?





  On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> wrote:
>
>
>  >If there are OMs which don't
>  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
> stream of
>  > consciousness.
>
> There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
> remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
> *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with 
> what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.
>
>
> Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life?

Certainly not consciously.

>If you
> are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you 
> have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a
> moment ago.

I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM 
in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. 
my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a 
perception.

>You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or
> suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these 
> things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking
> about them or their absence.


>So a bland sameness from moment to moment
> constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, 

What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of one.  
I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the same person I 
was a few minutes ago?  Don't feel and different.  Must be." 

  It seems you are using "consciousness" in a more specific sense than I am. I 
am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not being 
unconscious.



>since an OM
> that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as
> a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had
> happened.

But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not related 
except by their conscious content.  So an OM never has knowledge of another OM 
against which to measure its deviation.  One might experience an OM whose 
content was, "I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now 
notice a discontinuity in my memory." but I'm not sure even that would break my 
feeling of being me. 

  No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to continuity 
of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity separate from these 
other cues. But if at any moment these factors have zero conscious activity, 
they could in theory be eliminated, although they might need to be brought into 
play again in an instant. 



My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner 
narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create 
a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously 
remembering anything.  What creates the chain is something unconscious - 
something not observed and so not part of an OM. 

  Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it 
through affecting conscious factors. Suppose some unconscious factor X were 
partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence. 
That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have 
been diff

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Jason,

do you really consider YOUR (= ours, as of humans of today) capability of any 
'ordering' - according to what WE find orderable - the ONLY possible 'ordering' 
that be? 
To include the word 'disorder' makes no difference.
Noise? anything not fitting into what we can compute to fit into our order. 
Random? ditto. Chaos? what we cannot (today) assign to already discovered - YES 
- order. 
 I give some credence to our ignorance (epistemically still undiscovered 
parts). 
We choose our 'models' to be studied/observed according to our knowledge of 
order. 

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jason 
  To: Everything List 
  Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2007 3:50 PM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?




  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  >
  > I'm not sure what you mean by "the order of your current observer moment".
  >
  >
  > Stathis Papaioannou

  I see how my wording was confusing.  What I meant by "order" was order
  vs. disorder, e.g. we are experiencing a well structured observer
  moment as opposed to white noise, even though the vast majority of
  conceivable observer moments would consist of white noise.  A SSA
  would say we are not experiencing white noise/white rabbits because
  those OM's have a lower statistical measure.  While not assuming an
  SSA, one could only explain our current experience on this planet as
  an infinitesmally small and rare occurance among the unlimited set of
  possible observer moments.

  Jason


  


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12:33 PM


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> >  >If there are OMs which don't
> >  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
> > stream of
> >  > consciousness.
> >
> > There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
> > remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
> > *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with
> > what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.
> >
> >
> > Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life?
>
> Certainly not consciously.
>
> >If you
> > are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you
> > have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a
> > moment ago.
>
> I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM
> in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares,
> i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory
> of a perception.
>
> >You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or
> > suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these
> > things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking
> > about them or their absence.
>
>
> >So a bland sameness from moment to moment
> > constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity,
>
> What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of
> one.  I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the same
> person I was a few minutes ago?  Don't feel and different.  Must be."


It seems you are using "consciousness" in a more specific sense than I am. I
am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not being
unconscious.

>since an OM
> > that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as
> > a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had
> > happened.
>
> But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not related
> except by their conscious content.  So an OM never has knowledge of another
> OM against which to measure its deviation.  One might experience an OM whose
> content was, "I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I
> now notice a discontinuity in my memory." but I'm not sure even that would
> break my feeling of being me.


No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to continuity
of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity separate from
these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have zero conscious
activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although they might need to be
brought into play again in an instant.

My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner
> narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to
> create a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it because one is rarely,
> consciously remembering anything.  What creates the chain is something
> unconscious - something not observed and so not part of an OM.


Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it
through affecting conscious factors. Suppose some unconscious factor X were
partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence.
That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have
been different. I can't claim that X plays a role while maintaining that I
would not have noticed anything different without X. You could use that as a
definition of unconscious: if it were removed, you would not notice any
change.

Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more like
> network of paths with marked stepping stones.  Once in awhile there's a
> stone that's marked, "Remember you're Brent Meeker." and every path that
> includes one of these is "me", even if the path also includes some marked
> "Remember you're Stathis Papaioannou."


How could you tell the difference, from the inside, between such a path and
a chain?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
> 
>  >If there are OMs which don't
>  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
> stream of
>  > consciousness.
> 
> There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
> remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
> *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with
> what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. 
> 
>  
> Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? 

Certainly not consciously.

>If you 
> are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you 
> have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a 
> moment ago. 

I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM in 
which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. my 
staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a 
perception.

>You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or 
> suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these 
> things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking 
> about them or their absence. 


>So a bland sameness from moment to moment 
> constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, 

What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of one.  I'd 
say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the same person I was a 
few minutes ago?  Don't feel and different.  Must be."

>since an OM 
> that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as 
> a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had 
> happened.

But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not related except 
by their conscious content.  So an OM never has knowledge of another OM against 
which to measure its deviation.  One might experience an OM whose content was, 
"I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a 
discontinuity in my memory." but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling 
of being me.

My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner 
narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create 
a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously 
remembering anything.  What creates the chain is something unconscious - 
something not observed and so not part of an OM.

Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more like 
network of paths with marked stepping stones.  Once in awhile there's a stone 
that's marked, "Remember you're Brent Meeker." and every path that includes one 
of these is "me", even if the path also includes some marked "Remember you're 
Stathis Papaioannou."

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> >If there are OMs which don't
> > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of
> > consciousness.
>
> There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
> remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
> *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it
> means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.


Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? If you are
absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have
been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago.
You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed
sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they
happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their
absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of
memory and continuity of identity, since an OM that deviated substantially
from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately
alert you that something strange had happened.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  >  >> wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  >  > Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in
> telepathic
>  >  > communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or
> not. The
>  >  > effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is
> adequately
>  >  > explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
>  >  > experiences need not have happened at all, let alone
> happened in the
>  >  > remembered order and in the remembered body.
>  >
>  > It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an
> isolated,
>  > experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes
> memories of
>  > past experiences.   That makes it a compound.  If an OM can
> be such
>  > a compound then it can include memory of which OM was
> immediately
>  > before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand
>  > Russell) and define mental "time".  Under comp this chain may
> branch
>  > (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't
>  > include memory of a predecessor.
>  >
>  >
>  > The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they
> arose
>  > in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in
>  > theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from
>  > within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments
>  > occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the
> real world.
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I understand that.  But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences,
> then there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in
> Bruno's comp.  OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM
> are disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with
> any other OM.  They aren't able to create even the illusion of
> continuity. 
> 
>  
> Sure: continuity is created by memory. 

But I don't see how.

>If there are OMs which don't 
> remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of 
> consciousness. 

There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering 
being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory 
component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an 
unconscious part of consciousness.

Brent Meeker

>they might be part of someone else's stream of 
> consciousness, or just stand in isolation, with no future or past. I 
> imagine this is what it would be like in the end stages of dementia.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
>  
> 
> > 


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> >  > Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in
> telepathic
> >  > communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not.
> The
> >  > effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately
> >  > explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
> >  > experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in
> the
> >  > remembered order and in the remembered body.
> >
> > It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated,
> > experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of
> > past experiences.   That makes it a compound.  If an OM can be such
> > a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately
> > before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand
> > Russell) and define mental "time".  Under comp this chain may branch
> > (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't
> > include memory of a predecessor.
> >
> >
> > The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose
> > in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in
> > theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from
> > within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments
> > occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real
> world.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I understand that.  But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences, then
> there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in Bruno's
> comp.  OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM are
> disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with any other
> OM.  They aren't able to create even the illusion of continuity.


Sure: continuity is created by memory. If there are OMs which don't remember
being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of
consciousness. they might be part of someone else's stream of consciousness,
or just stand in isolation, with no future or past. I imagine this is what
it would be like in the end stages of dementia.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
> 
>  > Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic
>  > communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The
>  > effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately
>  > explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
>  > experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the
>  > remembered order and in the remembered body.
> 
> It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated,
> experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of
> past experiences.   That makes it a compound.  If an OM can be such
> a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately
> before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand
> Russell) and define mental "time".  Under comp this chain may branch
> (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't
> include memory of a predecessor. 
> 
>  
> The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose 
> in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in 
> theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from 
> within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments 
> occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou

I understand that.  But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences, then there is 
no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in Bruno's comp.  OMs that don't 
happen to be remembering some other OM are disconnected and are equally 
consistent and inconsistent with any other OM.  They aren't able to create even 
the illusion of continuity.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> > Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic
> > communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The
> > effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately
> > explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past
> > experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the
> > remembered order and in the remembered body.
>
> It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated,
> experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past
> experiences.   That makes it a compound.  If an OM can be such a compound
> then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs
> will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental
> "time".  Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not
> include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor.


The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose in
the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in theory
they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from within a
particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments occurred in the
remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Jason]

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "the order of your current observer moment".
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

I see how my wording was confusing.  What I meant by "order" was order
vs. disorder, e.g. we are experiencing a well structured observer
moment as opposed to white noise, even though the vast majority of
conceivable observer moments would consist of white noise.  A SSA
would say we are not experiencing white noise/white rabbits because
those OM's have a lower statistical measure.  While not assuming an
SSA, one could only explain our current experience on this planet as
an infinitesmally small and rare occurance among the unlimited set of
possible observer moments.

Jason


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/18/07, *Jason* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > 
> wrote:
> 
> Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some
> statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives.
> Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than
> others.  However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made
> from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do.
> 
> An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is:  First, whatever measure an
> experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being
> experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in
> the UD.  Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why
> does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million?  How can an
> experience be given more "weight" by being more common within the UD?
> Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple
> times? 
> 
> 
> Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic 
> communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The 
> effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately 
> explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past 
> experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the 
> remembered order and in the remembered body. 

It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience 
of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences.   
That makes it a compound.  If an OM can be such a compound then it can include 
memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as 
suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental "time".  Under comp this chain 
may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't 
include memory of a predecessor.

Brent Meeker

>Thus it is meaningless to 
> speak of having the same experience multiple times: you only experience 
> one thing at a time, and you can't remember experiencing multiple 
> identical experiences, since if you could there would be something to 
> distinguish them and they wouldn't be identical. However, the weighting 
> of OMs *relative* to other OMs with the same time stamp and sense of 
> identity is important in considering future expectations. If you undergo 
> destructive teleportation with two copies appearing in London and one 
> copy in Paris, you will subjectively have a 2/3  and 1/3 chance of 
> finding yourself in London and Paris, respectively, after entering the 
> sending station.
> 
> A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set
> containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more
> would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit)
> experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical
> experiences.  Consider just visual experiences, there are many more
> ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this
> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be
> experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor
> infront of you) to be experienced.
> 
> As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing
> a rational universe and perspective.  Is your experience now a rare
> abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there
> something to be said for SSA's?  SSA's would suggest most experiences
> are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life
> to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences
> highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial
> conditions of a program in the UD).
> 
> Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
> the order of your current observer moment?  Are self sampling
> assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences?
> 
> 
> The most common white rabbit universes in the UD will involve everything 
> breaking up into noise, like your image cited above but not just for 
> vision, and these will be eliminated not due to having a low measure 
> (they will have a relatively much higher measure than orderly 
> universes), but because they do not support observers. However, if there 
> are multiple candidate successor OMs including ones with bizarre events 
> happening, you should expect to experience the ones with higher measure. 
> To deny this would be to deny the validity of probability theory.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean by "the order of your current observer moment".
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Jason,
I salute this post, not because of the technicalities (which I don't want to 
get mixed into - understandably), but for its stance on the 'statistical'. 
I visualize the totality as incomprehensible for the present human mind with 
its limited mental capacity and so whatever 'we' want to comprehend and handle, 
we chop it off into limited models (parts of the totality, on any grounds). Now 
what difference does it make in the (elusive) 'reality' whether in our 
selection we find (by our ways(!) of looking) more or less matching occasions? 
Take another choice of boundaries and such frequency will change. I do not use 
'infinity', but in the "unlimited" variations of 'everything possible' (not in 
our judgement). 
A 'supernatural(?) Loeb machine may include larger models, but to encompass the 
totality it should have been the totality itself. (Leading to the several times 
mentioned "everything = Nothing" maxim.)

Remarks to 2 parts of your last par:
1.
"Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
the order of your current observer moment?"
As I take it, science must not become a matter of a democratic(?) vote. Few may 
find the right things and many may be misled. A good statistical question about 
statistical answers. 
Then again I wonder how to read your "order (of your current) OM"? I identify 
an observer as anything (-body incl.) that 'receives' information (not the 
Shannon 'bit': in my vocab.: info = difference accepted - any). [for those who 
like split hair: identity may also be information, if it is considered as a 
variant in the assumption of variations].
And for 'order' I like David Bohm's vocab: things known. 
(as in 'Explicate Order'). So I figure the OM as some 'snapshot' what science 
likes to take and call it a 'state'. In the ceaseless change we live in -  it 
is transitional. 
2,
"Are self sampling assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit 
experiences?"
The SSA may refer to "anything possible", WhtRabU included. So we may have 
experiences about them as well. Our assumptions don't seem to me as a 
protection to stay within our (assumed?) "reason". I have yet to find a way 
to get into such. Colin's limited solipsism is one obstacle. We know what we 
know about, compose our 'world' accordingly. 
Experiencing is also tricky: it may refer to a 'first', an AHA, but it may be 
the series of acknowledging again and again something already known. 
Experiencing the regularity of...(and I refuse the convert the experienced 
thing into 'regularity' as a 1st.).

Regards

John M 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jason 
  To: Everything List 
  Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:25 PM
  Subject: Statistical Measure, does it matter?



  Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some
  statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives.
  Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than
  others.  However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made
  from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do.

  An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is:  First, whatever measure an
  experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being
  experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in
  the UD.  Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why
  does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million?  How can an
  experience be given more "weight" by being more common within the UD?
  Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple
  times?

  A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set
  containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more
  would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit)
  experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical
  experiences.  Consider just visual experiences, there are many more
  ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this
  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be
  experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor
  infront of you) to be experienced.

  As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing
  a rational universe and perspective.  Is your experience now a rare
  abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there
  something to be said for SSA's?  SSA's would suggest most experiences
  are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life
  to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences
  highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial
  conditions of a program in the UD).

  Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
  the order of your current observer moment?  Are self sampling
  assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences?

  Jason



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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/18/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some
> statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives.
> Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than
> others.  However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made
> from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do.
>
> An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is:  First, whatever measure an
> experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being
> experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in
> the UD.  Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why
> does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million?  How can an
> experience be given more "weight" by being more common within the UD?
> Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple
> times?


Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic
communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect
(or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each
OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have
happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the
remembered body. Thus it is meaningless to speak of having the same
experience multiple times: you only experience one thing at a time, and you
can't remember experiencing multiple identical experiences, since if you
could there would be something to distinguish them and they wouldn't be
identical. However, the weighting of OMs *relative* to other OMs with the
same time stamp and sense of identity is important in considering future
expectations. If you undergo destructive teleportation with two copies
appearing in London and one copy in Paris, you will subjectively have a 2/3
and 1/3 chance of finding yourself in London and Paris, respectively, after
entering the sending station.

A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set
> containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more
> would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit)
> experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical
> experiences.  Consider just visual experiences, there are many more
> ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this
> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be
> experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor
> infront of you) to be experienced.
>
> As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing
> a rational universe and perspective.  Is your experience now a rare
> abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there
> something to be said for SSA's?  SSA's would suggest most experiences
> are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life
> to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences
> highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial
> conditions of a program in the UD).
>
> Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for
> the order of your current observer moment?  Are self sampling
> assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences?


The most common white rabbit universes in the UD will involve everything
breaking up into noise, like your image cited above but not just for vision,
and these will be eliminated not due to having a low measure (they will have
a relatively much higher measure than orderly universes), but because they
do not support observers. However, if there are multiple candidate successor
OMs including ones with bizarre events happening, you should expect to
experience the ones with higher measure. To deny this would be to deny the
validity of probability theory.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the order of your current observer moment".

Stathis Papaioannou

Stathis Papaioannou

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