John,
Interesting, but from the point of view of the interview, this would be
cheating. If such sophisticated form of comp is justified, then by the
UDA reasoning, it has to be justified by the lobian machine. If it is
the case that such move is proposed by the lobian machine, I will let
you
Peter Jones writes:
And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated...
Right! So if you claimed we were living in a computer simulation because you
liked the sound of it, that would be a metaphysical position.
It would still be a metaphsyical claim if I had a very good
. Science is really just
common
sense writ large.
Stathis Papaioannou
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 8:54 PM
Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology
You can use meta in that way if you like, but metaphysics is about as
deeply
ingrained in the language as any philosophical term can be. I think it was Hume
rather than Kant who started the anti-metaphysics movement:
If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for
Peter jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
matter-as-Bare-Substance to
Le 24-août-06, à 22:46, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
.. theology
A much better pejorative!
I can understand, but I *strongly* disagree on this. theology has
been studied by the so called rational mystics, which are also the
greek philosopher/scientist (but also by Chinese and Indian
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
on that, too.
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2006 9:06 AM
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 24-août-06, à 22:46, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
.. theology
A much
.
Without necessarily resorting to mystics or (religious) theology.
John
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 8:00 PM
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Brent wrote:
If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from
beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because
there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white.
Our views (I did not press: definition) of a
Brent, you ask the tuppence (or million $) questions.
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] asked:
1: But is this different than trying to think of new
models?
Somebody suggested (on another list) that MY model
is the unlimited universe. I could not argue, yet it
is a limited model, since our
Peter Jones:
Theology is a subset of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not deal with
purely logical and/or empirical facts. T
Metaphysics can. It depends on who is doing it.
his means you could come up with
any metaphysical theory consistent with the logical and empirical facts,
no
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) :
There are many interpretations of the box and diamond.
Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based
on provability (or provability within a system). But there are,
and always were, ideas of
: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they
are
talking metaphysics
Le 24-août-06, à 08:51, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I agree with the importance of recursion theory. By the way I got the
book by Cutland.
Nice. It is a very good book. I recommend it heartily to all those who
want to dig a bit the math behind the comp. hyp.
Bruno
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and
say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they
are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Stathis Papaioannou
The
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the
physicst's account
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis:
would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at
the * I plant into your text?
The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our
interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the
'world'.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) :
There are many interpretations of the box and diamond.
Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based
on provability (or provability within a system). But there are,
and
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and
say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they
are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At
the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms
Le 21-août-06, à 17:42, 1Z a écrit :
The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define
exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes
him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly
defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute
Facts which
Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit :
I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
neceesarily
the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
that
that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
But aren't they claiming that numbers
Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit :
If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are
necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects
exist, and are
all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim,
ie Mathematical Monism, is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit :
If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are
necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects
exist, and are
all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim,
ie
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit :
I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
neceesarily
the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
that
that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
But
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a
Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit :
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of
the Riemann zeta function
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the computationalsim
and supervenience thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough
statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD
without CT,
Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive.
Also I prefer to define physics by
Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit :
But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD
sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential'
claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person
way'. The key issue here is surely
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive.
A
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit :
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say numbers
exist, Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were
numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist,
I just mean that the proposition numbers exists is true
, are in the same circle.
Regards
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM
Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter
Peter Jones writes:
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the
physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour.
That would
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 11:51:07 -0400
Stathis,
you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into - because I don't believe it).
Matter
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi David,
Le 18-août-06, à 02:16, David Nyman wrote (answering John):
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative -
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of
the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is dependent on
Le 21-août-06, à 04:14, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno
(BTW please delete any previous version of this posted in error.)
I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as
if' mode.
All right. I thought so. Let us try to see if and where we differ.
But at the
1Z wrote:
That's the strangest thign I've read ina long
time.
!!! That's odd, because this's the stringest thagn I've road ina ling
tome.
David
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
numbers, as has been discussed regarding your
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of
the Riemann zeta function follows a collapse that is
Tom Caylor wrote:
But then I think this search
for invariance eventually brings us full circle to a self-referential
paradox. Math is whatever we observe (to be true / to exist)
independent of the observer.
The fact that an observer can observe something doesn't make it
dependent
on the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because comp makes it possible to postulate a simple theory where
everything is communicable in a third person way. By making the first
person primitive, you loose the ability to explain it (or to get some
best possible third person explanation).
I'm still not sure I've
David Nyman wrote:
This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely
relationally as behaviour.
By whom ?
I just can't
see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero'
in this 'maximally serious' sense.
Some of us think matter does...
1Z wrote:
This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely
relationally as behaviour.
By whom ?
Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the
'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my
sense of reflexive ontic 'realism' or
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely
relationally as behaviour.
By whom ?
Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the
'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my
sense of
1Z wrote:
Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some
possible things
exist, other don't.
Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations
without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's
conceptually helpful to have a 'figure/ ground' sort
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some
possible things
exist, other don't.
Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations
without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's
conceptually helpful to
Bruno
I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in
'as if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning
that we could make explicit the choices that motivate our different
ontic starting assumptions. Are there perhaps irreconcilable issues of
style or
Bruno
(BTW please delete any previous version of this posted in error.)
I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as
if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning that we
could make explicit the choices that motivate our different ontic
starting
Hi David,
Le 18-août-06, à 02:16, David Nyman wrote (answering John):
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just
David,
your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the
belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know
what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god?
My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position):
Let me IN into
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's
clear, both for you and the list, that:
Comp is false.
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 8:16 PM
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Dave,
thanks fir the friendly and decent words. It was not questionable
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