Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[meekerdb]

On 5/1/2011 3:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

*From:* meekerdb <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>
*Sent:* Sunday, May 01, 2011 2:20 PM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com 
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>

*Subject:* Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On 5/1/2011 7:08 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
> I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical
> picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion that
> you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is completely
> false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but classicality
> from quantum dynamics is only achived because of decoherence, so the
> brain gets entangled with the environment. The same is true, of
> course, if you run any classical machine, like your PC.
>
> Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an
> entangled state with the environment, can be written in the suggestive
> form:
>
> sum over input of |input, corresponding output>
>
> In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the
> state, as it exist at any moment.

I don't see how that can be.  Simply from an informational perspective,
the computational history can have a lot more bits than the digitized
brain can store as a state - at least as a classical system.  I think
you must be including all the information that exists in the environment
due to interaction with the brain.  This of course has been spreading
out from the brain at the speed of light; so it's not clear to me where
this history starts.  With birth?  At the big bang?  At the last Everett
split?  At the last Everett split that corresponds to a different
quasi-classical "thought??

Brent
**
Hi Brent,
You are trying to force it all into a single 3p mold. Everett 
tells us that the physical universe is reborn complete


Everett's viewpoint is that the "splits" are just in our experiences 
relative to other events.


with its own big bang, inflation etc. in each split for each observer 
on that branch. Remember, for instance, how time does not exist in the 3p?


Don't "remember" that.

Brent

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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

From: meekerdb 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 2:20 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On 5/1/2011 7:08 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
> I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical 
> picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion that 
> you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is completely 
> false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but classicality 
> from quantum dynamics is only achived because of decoherence, so the 
> brain gets entangled with the environment. The same is true, of 
> course, if you run any classical machine, like your PC.
>
> Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an 
> entangled state with the environment, can be written in the suggestive 
> form:
>
> sum over input of |input, corresponding output>
>
> In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the 
> state, as it exist at any moment.

I don't see how that can be.  Simply from an informational perspective, 
the computational history can have a lot more bits than the digitized 
brain can store as a state - at least as a classical system.  I think 
you must be including all the information that exists in the environment 
due to interaction with the brain.  This of course has been spreading 
out from the brain at the speed of light; so it's not clear to me where 
this history starts.  With birth?  At the big bang?  At the last Everett 
split?  At the last Everett split that corresponds to a different 
quasi-classical "thought??

Brent
**
Hi Brent,
You are trying to force it all into a single 3p mold. Everett tells us that 
the physical universe is reborn complete with its own big bang, inflation etc. 
in each split for each observer on that branch. Remember, for instance, how 
time does not exist in the 3p?
Onward!
Stephen

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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Bruno and Saibal, 

I agree with both of you. I would only caution against conflating the 
observer with the observed. We still need to show how we can get diffeomorphism 
invariance from OMs. I think I how how but do not know the math well enough.

Onward!

Stephen


From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 12:55 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

On 01 May 2011, at 16:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

> I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical  
> picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion  
> that you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is  
> completely false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but  
> classicality from quantum dynamics is only achived because of  
> decoherence, so the brain gets entangled with the environment. The  
> same is true, of course, if you run any classical machine, like your  
> PC.
>
> Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an  
> entangled state with the environment, can be written in the  
> suggestive form:
>
> sum over input of |input, corresponding output>
>
> In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the  
> state, as it exist at any moment.

That makes sense. The same can be argued directly with comp. It  
follows from the usual reasoning.



>
>
> This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from the  
> technical details, involves deriving physics from the theory of  
> computation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much more  
> straightforwardly.

OK, but with the mind-body problem as motivation, we have to derive  
physics from computation in a specific way, so as to be able to have  
both the quanta and the qualia (and thus by using the self-reference  
logics).



> Also, since decoherence happens in the position bases, one should   
> be able to derive space-time from first principles as well.

As we should!



> Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, you  
> should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.

Not free of electrical charge, I hope!

Bruno


>
> Saibal
>
> Citeren Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>> On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an   
>>>>>> “observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible   
>>>>>> conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of  
>>>>>> substitution  level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a  
>>>>>> coarse graining on  an ensemble that is used to define the  
>>>>>> entropy of a system in  that all of the members of the ensemble  
>>>>>> that are  indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.
>>>>
>>>> You can easily relate them.
>>>>
>>>> Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are   
>>>> experiences of an individual when his brain is in some   
>>>> computational state S.
>>>
>>> I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer   
>>> moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can   
>>> digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of   
>>> states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds  
>>> to  different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious  
>>> "thoughts".
>>
>> I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with   
>> consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole   
>> structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.   
>> Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open  
>> interval,  but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to  
>> something much more  sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It  
>> is the counter-intuitive  part of computationalism: the failure of  
>> the identity thesis.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be   
>>> realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of  
>>> which  they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and  
>>> spatially.  So  digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness  
>>> occurs in  discrete time slices.
>>
>> You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little  
>> bit  on purpose, so as no

Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[meekerdb]

On 5/1/2011 7:08 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical 
picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion that 
you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is completely 
false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but classicality 
from quantum dynamics is only achived because of decoherence, so the 
brain gets entangled with the environment. The same is true, of 
course, if you run any classical machine, like your PC.


Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an 
entangled state with the environment, can be written in the suggestive 
form:


sum over input of |input, corresponding output>

In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the 
state, as it exist at any moment.


I don't see how that can be.  Simply from an informational perspective, 
the computational history can have a lot more bits than the digitized 
brain can store as a state - at least as a classical system.  I think 
you must be including all the information that exists in the environment 
due to interaction with the brain.  This of course has been spreading 
out from the brain at the speed of light; so it's not clear to me where 
this history starts.  With birth?  At the big bang?  At the last Everett 
split?  At the last Everett split that corresponds to a different 
quasi-classical "thought??


Brent




This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from the 
technical details, involves deriving physics from the theory of 
computation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much more 
straightforwardly. Also, since decoherence happens in the position 
bases, one should  be able to derive space-time from first principles 
as well. Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, 
you should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.


Saibal

Citeren Bruno Marchal :



On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an  
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible  
conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution  
level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on  
an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system in  
that all of the members of the ensemble that are  
indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are  
experiences of an individual when his brain is in some  
computational state S.


I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer  
moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can  
digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of  
states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds to  
different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious "thoughts".


I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with  
consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole  
structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.  
Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open interval, 
 but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to something much more  
sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It is the 
counter-intuitive  part of computationalism: the failure of the 
identity thesis.





Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be  
realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of which  
they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and spatially.  So  
digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness occurs in  
discrete time slices.


You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little bit 
 on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we can  
associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my sleeping  
friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only through an  
infinity of number relations.


Bruno






Brent

We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such 
 state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational  
states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For  
example the state of your brain emulated by a program computing the 
 Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or  
the state of your brain obtained by another program simulating the  
quantum fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain  
obtained by a fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a  
prolog program emulating ... emulating the search of the solution  
of some universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs  
are emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces 
 of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist  
in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece  
of compu

Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 May 2011, at 16:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical  
picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion  
that you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is  
completely false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but  
classicality from quantum dynamics is only achived because of  
decoherence, so the brain gets entangled with the environment. The  
same is true, of course, if you run any classical machine, like your  
PC.


Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an  
entangled state with the environment, can be written in the  
suggestive form:


sum over input of |input, corresponding output>

In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the  
state, as it exist at any moment.


That makes sense. The same can be argued directly with comp. It  
follows from the usual reasoning.







This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from the  
technical details, involves deriving physics from the theory of  
computation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much more  
straightforwardly.


OK, but with the mind-body problem as motivation, we have to derive  
physics from computation in a specific way, so as to be able to have  
both the quanta and the qualia (and thus by using the self-reference  
logics).




Also, since decoherence happens in the position bases, one should   
be able to derive space-time from first principles as well.


As we should!



Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, you  
should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.


Not free of electrical charge, I hope!

Bruno




Saibal

Citeren Bruno Marchal :



On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an   
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible   
conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of  
substitution  level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a  
coarse graining on  an ensemble that is used to define the  
entropy of a system in  that all of the members of the ensemble  
that are  indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are   
experiences of an individual when his brain is in some   
computational state S.


I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer   
moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can   
digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of   
states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds  
to  different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious  
"thoughts".


I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with   
consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole   
structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.   
Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open  
interval,  but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to  
something much more  sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It  
is the counter-intuitive  part of computationalism: the failure of  
the identity thesis.





Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be   
realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of  
which  they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and  
spatially.  So  digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness  
occurs in  discrete time slices.


You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little  
bit  on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we  
can  associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my  
sleeping  friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only  
through an  infinity of number relations.


Bruno






Brent

We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some  
such  state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent  
computational  states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal  
dovetailing. For  example the state of your brain emulated by a  
program computing the  Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at  
the level of strings, or  the state of your brain obtained by  
another program simulating the  quantum fluctuation of the void,  
or the state of your brain  obtained by a fortran program  
emulating a lisp program emulating a  prolog program  
emulating ... emulating the search of the solution  of some  
universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs  are  
emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces   
of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to  
exist  in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such  
finite piece  of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD.  
The first person  glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite  
computations.
For each of them, you 

Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[smitra]

I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical 
picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion that 
you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is completely false. 
Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but classicality from 
quantum dynamics is only achived because of decoherence, so the brain 
gets entangled with the environment. The same is true, of course, if 
you run any classical machine, like your PC.


Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an 
entangled state with the environment, can be written in the suggestive 
form:


sum over input of |input, corresponding output>

In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the state, 
as it exist at any moment.



This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from the 
technical details, involves deriving physics from the theory of 
computation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much more 
straightforwardly. Also, since decoherence happens in the position 
bases, one should  be able to derive space-time from first principles 
as well. Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, you 
should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.


Saibal

Citeren Bruno Marchal :



On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an  
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible  
conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of 
substitution  level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse 
graining on  an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a 
system in  that all of the members of the ensemble that are  
indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are  
experiences of an individual when his brain is in some  
computational state S.


I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer  
moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can  
digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of  
states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds to  
different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious "thoughts".


I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with  
consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole  
structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.  
Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open interval, 
 but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to something much more  
sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It is the 
counter-intuitive  part of computationalism: the failure of the 
identity thesis.





Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be  
realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of which  
they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and spatially.  So  
digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness occurs in  
discrete time slices.


You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little bit 
 on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we can  
associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my sleeping  
friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only through an  
infinity of number relations.


Bruno






Brent

We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such 
 state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational  
states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For  
example the state of your brain emulated by a program computing the 
 Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or  
the state of your brain obtained by another program simulating the  
quantum fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain  
obtained by a fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a  
prolog program emulating ... emulating the search of the solution  
of some universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs  
are emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces 
 of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist  
in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece  
of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD. The first person 
 glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite computations.
For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computation  
which is more fine grained. But you, by the first person  
indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually  
you can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws  
are determined by the measure on your continuations of such  
computations. From this you can see that the highest level of  
substitution defines the measure on the possible lowest one, which  
you cannot distinguish, by definition. That is why, if we look at  
ourselves belo

Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an  
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible  
conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution  
level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on  
an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system in  
that all of the members of the ensemble that are  
indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are  
experiences of an individual when his brain is in some  
computational state S.


I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer  
moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can  
digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of  
states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds to  
different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious "thoughts".


I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with  
consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole  
structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.  
Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open interval,  
but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to something much more  
sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It is the counter-intuitive  
part of computationalism: the failure of the identity thesis.





Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be  
realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of which  
they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and spatially.  So  
digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness occurs in  
discrete time slices.


You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little bit  
on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we can  
associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my sleeping  
friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only through an  
infinity of number relations.


Bruno






Brent

We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such  
state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational  
states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For  
example the state of your brain emulated by a program computing the  
Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or  
the state of your brain obtained by another program simulating the  
quantum fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain  
obtained by a fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a  
prolog program emulating ... emulating the search of the solution  
of some universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs  
are emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces  
of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist  
in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece  
of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD. The first person  
glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite computations.
For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computation  
which is more fine grained. But you, by the first person  
indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually  
you can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws  
are determined by the measure on your continuations of such  
computations. From this you can see that the highest level of  
substitution defines the measure on the possible lowest one, which  
you cannot distinguish, by definition. That is why, if we look at  
ourselves below that level, we have to be confronted with a strong  
form of indeterminacy. Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this  
stage, though, without having a measure on the relative  
computations, and this prevents a direct use of the notion of  
entropy. We need more physics for that, but, as I have already  
explained we have to derive that physics from the numbers and self- 
reference if we don't want to miss the relationship between the  
quanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provable  
self-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and their  
intensional variants).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[meekerdb]

On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an 
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious 
experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM 
that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on an ensemble that 
is used to define the entropy of a system in that all of the members 
of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a macroscopic point 
of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are experiences 
of an individual when his brain is in some computational state S.


I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer 
moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can digitally 
simulated and hence be realized by a succession of states.  But I find 
it very doubtful that each state corresponds to different "thought" or 
"observation" much less conscious "thoughts".  Such thoughts are slow 
things that unfold over time and must be realized by many successive 
digital-brain states in terms of which they overlap with other thoughts 
both temporally and spatially.  So digitizing brains doesn't imply that 
consciousness occurs in discrete time slices.


Brent

We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such 
state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational states 
S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For example the 
state of your brain emulated by a program computing the Heisenberg 
evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or the state of 
your brain obtained by another program simulating the quantum 
fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain obtained by a 
fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a prolog program 
emulating ... emulating the search of the solution of some universal 
diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs are emulated by the 
universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces of computations 
obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist in a tiny part of 
arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece of computations, and 
they are all "run" by the UD. The first person glue them into a priori 
2^aleph_0 infinite computations.
For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computation 
which is more fine grained. But you, by the first person 
indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually you 
can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws are 
determined by the measure on your continuations of such computations. 
From this you can see that the highest level of substitution defines 
the measure on the possible lowest one, which you cannot distinguish, 
by definition. That is why, if we look at ourselves below that level, 
we have to be confronted with a strong form of indeterminacy. 
Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this stage, though, without having a 
measure on the relative computations, and this prevents a direct use 
of the notion of entropy. We need more physics for that, but, as I 
have already explained we have to derive that physics from the numbers 
and self-reference if we don't want to miss the relationship between 
the quanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provable 
self-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and their intensional 
variants).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an  
“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious  
experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM  
that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on an ensemble  
that is used to define the entropy of a system in that all of the  
members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a  
macroscopic point of view.


You can easily relate them.

Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are experiences  
of an individual when his brain is in some computational state S. We  
assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such  
state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational states  
S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For example the  
state of your brain emulated by a program computing the Heisenberg  
evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or the state of  
your brain obtained by another program simulating the quantum  
fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain obtained by a  
fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a prolog program  
emulating ... emulating the search of the solution of some universal  
diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs are emulated by the  
universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces of computations  
obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist in a tiny part of  
arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece of computations, and  
they are all "run" by the UD. The first person glue them into a priori  
2^aleph_0 infinite computations.
For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computation  
which is more fine grained. But you, by the first person  
indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually you  
can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws are  
determined by the measure on your continuations of such computations.  
From this you can see that the highest level of substitution defines  
the measure on the possible lowest one, which you cannot distinguish,  
by definition. That is why, if we look at ourselves below that level,  
we have to be confronted with a strong form of indeterminacy.  
Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this stage, though, without having a  
measure on the relative computations, and this prevents a direct use  
of the notion of entropy. We need more physics for that, but, as I  
have already explained we have to derive that physics from the numbers  
and self-reference if we don't want to miss the relationship between  
the quanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provable  
self-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and their intensional  
variants).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

From: Russell Standish 
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 6:14 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 05:20:24PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
> 
> But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of
> information that would have to be specified in analogue recordings
> would be at least some power greater than the information necessary to
> specify the finite bit digital version! 

I don't think the information content of an analogue recording is even
well defined, without specifying a coarse graining. But I don't see
how that is related to the Maudlin / Movie Graph argument. I'm open to
be convinced otherwise, though.

[SPK]
I am trying to better understand the relationship between the information 
content of a simulation and the computational resources required to “run” the 
simulation to see if there is a way to define a relative measure of how much 
one computational system can be said to be equivalent to another. The idea is 
that if two observers have the exact same simulations ‘running in their heads’ 
by comparing answers to questions put to them by some interviewer (Bruno’s 
idea!) then we can say that they are 1p bisimilar 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation), but since we do not have access to 
1p knowledge directly of someone other than oneself, could there be a 3p way to 
at least determine a bound within which the simulations can be said to not go. 
Basically I am looking to see if there is a ‘coherent’ physicalist version of  
David Deutsch’s Cantgotu idea. Reference: 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/message/7942 “The Simulation 
Argument and Implications for Reality” thread and the work of Carlton M. Caves 
http://info.phys.unm.edu/~caves/research.html
My process dualism idea seems to require that such exists and so if there 
is proof that it cannot exist then my crazy idea is falsified or not even 
wrong. If there is a finite constraint on the Stone space that is the dual to a 
Boolean algebra and if this constraint hold in the cases of more general 
logical algebras and their Stone duals, then the constraint would have a 
particular “signature” or feature on the logical algebraic structure. So far 
the relationships hold in infinite logics (such as in the Gel’fand duality) but 
I have not seen any one considering the finitesimal case (except for the 
constructivists). If only I could get more information on non-principle ultra 
filters... /poke William

>I would like to be wrong on this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture of the 
>universe demands infinite computational resources to implement the Laplace 
>Demon. I am trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound and an idea in resent 
>discussion by > David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that I wish 
>all persons would watch and comprehend.
> I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points this out 
> to me. 

:)

> Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer 
> moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related 
> to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of 
> a coarse graining on > an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a 
> system in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable 
> from a macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
> http://dare.uva.nl/document/134446 and 
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.3972 . In our search to define a generic 
> non-anthropocentric notion of an observer, I think that this notion of a 
> lower bound on observable differences may help us see a better outline of the 
> idea that we are looking for.
> 

It could be. Maybe Bruno has an opinion. ISTM that transformations of
implementations that leave observer moments invariant must be below
the substitution level, so you're probably on the right track here.

[SPK]
I am very interested in Bruno’s comment on this! I apologize to all members 
that are confused by my posts,  it is very frustrating that there is no 
informal way to discuss this concept that I am studying. I simply do not “think 
in symbolic”. My thoughts are more like visual/proprioceptive sensations, the 
blessing and curse of dyslexia. 
Onward!
Stephen
 

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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

From: meekerdb 
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 6:43 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On 4/28/2011 2:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: 
  Hi Russell,

  But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of information 
that would have to be specified in analogue recordings would be at least some 
power greater than the information necessary to specify the finite bit digital 
version! I would like to be wrong on this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture 
of the universe demands infinite computational resources to implement the 
Laplace Demon. I am trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound and an idea in 
resent discussion by David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that I 
wish all persons would watch and comprehend.
  I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points this out 
to me. Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer 
moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related 
to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a 
coarse graining on an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system 
in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a 
macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/134446 

What book is this?

Brent


 
  Hi Bent,

I honestly do not know. I found it from a Google search some time ago. The 
parent site is http://dare.uva.nl/ ,a “Digital Academic Repository” associated 
with the University of Amsterdam.

Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[meekerdb]

On 4/28/2011 2:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Russell,
But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of 
information that would have to be specified in analogue recordings 
would be at least some power greater than the information necessary to 
specify the finite bit digital version! I would like to be wrong on 
this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture of the universe demands 
infinite computational resources to implement the Laplace Demon. I am 
trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound 
 and an idea in resent 
discussion by David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that 
I wish all persons would watch and comprehend.
I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points 
this out to me. Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion 
of an “observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible 
conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution 
level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on an 
ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system in that all of 
the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a 
macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/134446


What book is this?

Brent

and http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.3972 . In our search to define a generic 
non-anthropocentric notion of an observer, I think that this notion of 
a lower bound on observable differences may help us see a better 
outline of the idea that we are looking for.

Onward!
Stephen


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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 05:20:24PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
> 
> But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of
> information that would have to be specified in analogue recordings
> would be at least some power greater than the information necessary to
> specify the finite bit digital version! 

I don't think the information content of an analogue recording is even
well defined, without specifying a coarse graining. But I don't see
how that is related to the Maudlin / Movie Graph argument. I'm open to
be convinced otherwise, though.

I would like to be wrong on this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture of the 
universe demands infinite computational resources to implement the Laplace 
Demon. I am trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound and an idea in resent 
discussion by David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that I wish 
all persons would watch and comprehend.
> I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points
this out to me. 

:)

Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer moment” 
corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related to 
Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a 
coarse graining on an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system 
in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a 
macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/134446 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.3972 . In our 
search to define a generic non-anthropocentric notion of an observer, I think 
that this notion of a lower bound on observable differences may help us see a 
better outline of the idea that we are looking for.
> 

It could be. Maybe Bruno has an opinion. ISTM that transformations of
implementations that leave observer moments invariant must be below
the substitution level, so you're probably on the right track here.

> Onward!
> 
> Stephen
> 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Russell,

But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of information that 
would have to be specified in analogue recordings would be at least some power 
greater than the information necessary to specify the finite bit digital 
version! I would like to be wrong on this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture 
of the universe demands infinite computational resources to implement the 
Laplace Demon. I am trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound and an idea in 
resent discussion by David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that I 
wish all persons would watch and comprehend.
I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points this out 
to me. Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer 
moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related 
to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a 
coarse graining on an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system 
in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a 
macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/134446 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.3972 . In our 
search to define a generic non-anthropocentric notion of an observer, I think 
that this notion of a lower bound on observable differences may help us see a 
better outline of the idea that we are looking for.

Onward!

Stephen



From: Russell Standish 
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 5:40 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
I can't help but think you are overanalysing things, but who
knows. ISTM that your concerns are about an unjustified digitisation
of reality.

In saying recording, I'm not assuming that the recording is digital,
nor that the "single predetermined worldline" is digital either. The
argument also works for continuous universes, and analog recordings of
those processes within that universe.

I should also comment that Bruno's "movie graph" is an analogue recording
too. 

On Wed, Apr 27, 2011 at 09:54:21PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell and Bruno,
> 
> I’ve been slowly reading “The Theory of Nothing” by Russell K. Standish 
> and stumbled over the following sentence (that has Bruno’s discussion of the 
> Movie Graph Argument and Maudlin’s Olympia and Klara in the context): “All 
> physical processes occupying single predetermined world lines must be 
> equivalent to a recording of the process.” pg. 144.
> 
> 1) Does this statement not seem only consistent with a purely
> Newtonian definition of a process such that the “single predetermined
> world line”? How is the fact that our physical world is demonstrably
> only approximately Newtonian not require us to rethink this statement?
> I contend that there is a lot of rubbish ideas being taken seriously
> by serious thinkers in fundamental  studies. One is that the Planck
> constant implies that Nature’s behaviors only exists in integer
> multiples of this constant. Such an assumption leads to nonsense such
> as the idea that space-time is granular at small size/high energy
> scales. This idea has observable consequences that have been observed
> to not be the case. Resent observations of ultra high energy gamma ray
> photons have shown that space-time is smooth even at those scales in
> direct violation of the nonsense’s predictions. Are we not using
> empirical evidence to guide our considerations?
> 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Russell Standish]

I can't help but think you are overanalysing things, but who
knows. ISTM that your concerns are about an unjustified digitisation
of reality.

In saying recording, I'm not assuming that the recording is digital,
nor that the "single predetermined worldline" is digital either. The
argument also works for continuous universes, and analog recordings of
those processes within that universe.

I should also comment that Bruno's "movie graph" is an analogue recording
too. 

On Wed, Apr 27, 2011 at 09:54:21PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell and Bruno,
> 
> I’ve been slowly reading “The Theory of Nothing” by Russell K. Standish 
> and stumbled over the following sentence (that has Bruno’s discussion of the 
> Movie Graph Argument and Maudlin’s Olympia and Klara in the context): “All 
> physical processes occupying single predetermined world lines must be 
> equivalent to a recording of the process.” pg. 144.
> 
> 1) Does this statement not seem only consistent with a purely
> Newtonian definition of a process such that the “single predetermined
> world line”? How is the fact that our physical world is demonstrably
> only approximately Newtonian not require us to rethink this statement?
> I contend that there is a lot of rubbish ideas being taken seriously
> by serious thinkers in fundamental  studies. One is that the Planck
> constant implies that Nature’s behaviors only exists in integer
> multiples of this constant. Such an assumption leads to nonsense such
> as the idea that space-time is granular at small size/high energy
> scales. This idea has observable consequences that have been observed
> to not be the case. Resent observations of ultra high energy gamma ray
> photons have shown that space-time is smooth even at those scales in
> direct violation of the nonsense’s predictions. Are we not using
> empirical evidence to guide our considerations?
> 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Reading The Theory of Nothing

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Russell and Bruno,

I’ve been slowly reading “The Theory of Nothing” by Russell K. Standish and 
stumbled over the following sentence (that has Bruno’s discussion of the Movie 
Graph Argument and Maudlin’s Olympia and Klara in the context): “All physical 
processes occupying single predetermined world lines must be equivalent to a 
recording of the process.” pg. 144.

1) Does this statement not seem only consistent with a purely Newtonian 
definition of a process such that the “single predetermined world line”? How is 
the fact that our physical world is demonstrably only approximately Newtonian 
not require us to rethink this statement? I contend that there is a lot of 
rubbish ideas being taken seriously by serious thinkers in fundamental  
studies. One is that the Planck constant implies that Nature’s behaviors only 
exists in integer multiples of this constant. Such an assumption leads to 
nonsense such as the idea that space-time is granular at small size/high energy 
scales. This idea has observable consequences that have been observed to not be 
the case. Resent observations of ultra high energy gamma ray photons have shown 
that space-time is smooth even at those scales in direct violation of the 
nonsense’s predictions. Are we not using empirical evidence to guide our 
considerations?

2) How is there a difference between the information content in the recording 
and the information content implicit in the causal structure that is implicit 
in the phrase “single predetermined world line”? I worry that we are running 
roughshod over subtle arguments about why our physical world requires at least 
the Real numbers to be described faithfully. The conservation laws require, per 
Noether’s theorems, smooth analycity of the transformation of both spatial and 
temporal variables. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noether%27s_theorem How do we 
obtain this within integer combinatorics except as only approximations? Are we 
not making a category error in implicit claim that integer approximations of a 
Real or Complex number is equal to that real or complex number?

3) What requirements exist on the “recording of the process”? It seems to be 
that the computational complexity that might be required to generate the 
recording is neglected in this notion of “a recording of the process”. For 
example, the bit string that is encoded on a DVD of the movie Avatar is 
non-informative of the complete process that lead causally to the particular 
sequence of reflecting and non-reflecting pips on the metal foil of the DVD 
plastic disc. One could prove that there could exists a very large number of 
physical processes that are capable of generating that particular sequence! 
Additionally, given a complete set of strings that have the same bit length 
generated by a purely random process, there is at least one that is identical 
to that of the movie!

4) How is a “recoding” (as considered here) different from the output of a 
computation? (There a computation is one that follows the typical Turing 
Machine definition.) It seems to me that both are imaged to be identical N –> N 
maps.

I keep going back to Wolfram’s discussion of how, paraphrasing, the best 
possible model of a physical system’s evolution is the actual evolution of that 
system. Wolfram’s claim seems to imply an equality between a notion of a 
“faithful” simulation A of a process A* and an actual physical process A such 
that if it can be shown that computational system X cannot generate A* then it 
cannot be considered to be able to implement A. I think that we might be 
overlooking something important in this! While it seems true that an N->N 
mapping process can be should to eventually span all integers that are 
arbitrarily close to all Real numbers, this process requires an infinity and we 
should be very cautious when invoking infinities within our attempted 
explanations of what we experience. I worry that we are playing fast and loose 
with our requirement of mathematical soundness for theories of physics. We are 
fallible and can make a serious mistake by projecting our crude and finitesimal 
approximations as objective 3p facts. Beware of White Rabbits!

Onward!

Stephen

PS, The Theory of Nothing is the first book that actually takes Roy Frieden’s 
and Shun-ichi Amari’s work seriously! I have studied the research of both a 
while back and was very impressed by their ideas.

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