Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Jamie, wise words, but no cigar here. For a RE-Evaluation I have insufficient knowledge even in the E - to compare it into a RE-. Statistical is different: I question the topical meaning, as being just a 'model'-related idea (in MY sense: as a limited topical fraction of the totality within boundaries of our capabilities to observe) because so far nobody (incl our computers) had the mental power to exercise statistics upon the infinite totality - which would be trivial anyway. Stathis is wise to concentrate on THIS (our?) universe in his Stathistical considerations, as he mentioned. If we include the multiverse (any definition) into statistics it would produce inadvertently infinites compared to infinites and it would require a Georg Cantor to find out how to compare all those infinites. The sophisticated 'statistical' and 'probabilistic' math is fine, it is a good mental game, but all is originated in limited patterns for the comparison. Change the boundaries of your model (selection) and both the statistical figures and the (arbitrary? so called:) probabilities will change. (Useful though they are in building our technology). You need a vacation from the mathematical brainwashing to agree. I feel, you have it. John On 4/2/07, James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M, et al, It is a fact of existential experiencing that minds are typically so innured to their millieu and environmental encounters that 'alternative interpretations' are overlooked and missed to appreciation and understanding. --- When it became apparent to me that QM -and- Relativity are undeniable behemoths of existential relation, a la mode Holmes, the unavoidable conclusion arose that the mis-analysis which keeps them 'separate' rests not in their respective qualia and aspects, but in our comprehension of mathematics. If the respective mathematics of statistics and determinism are distinct and 'irreconsilable', then we need to do a re-evaluation of the 'mathematics in general' for amenability, rather than making an effort to force-fit equations that resist algorythmic transformation into one another. Jamie R --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Well, my friend, I am no Georg Cantor, but I am of a like-mind to him. What I have discerned, is an important insight that indeed resolves the chasm, and does, as you point out, make things mightily more complicated. There is level of complication that has been with us all the time, but which we have smoothly or inadvertantly 'chosen' to ignore; because it is too intimate within standard functions and operations to be immediately noticed. EVERY integration, or differentiation; or multiplication or division of a non-scalar factor ... changes the dimensionality of a relational equation. This, by default, changes the rank of the corresponding Cantorian matrices. No statistical evaluation stands alone as if borne full grown. It exits -within- a mathematical landscape of adjacent and extended functionFORMS that are the rest of the pre-integrations, pre-differentiations, pre-multiplicands, pre-dividands ... that surround it in 'mathematical space'. And it, in and of itself, represents a part of the 'mathematical environment' for any and all of those .. 'others'. The beautiful simplicity is that -every- change of dimensional specification, CONVERTS mathematical statements, IN COMPARISON TO THOSE MATH-ENVIRONMENT COMPANIONS. If, for example, a base function was qualia deterministic, the conversion reveals the function product to be qualia statistical. And even more 'confusing', as it were, is the concept that we can take a base datum group, assign it an 'identity', change the dimensionality as described above, and end up, not with an 'alternative function/identity', but with the Base Datum Identity -- SEEN as if looking at it through alternate lenses and windows. IT 'stays' the same; we 'appreciate' -- different relational aspects that are there all the time but unrecognized because the mathematic-statements are out lenses of focus. Choose a different mathematical lens (like choosing a different wavelength of energy) and you 'see' something different. Intrinsic to all observables -and- mathematic-forms, are BOTH deterministic -and- statistical relations. They CONVERT. They CONSERVE. Even through the change of qualia. They REVEAL ... different relations when seem through options math-viewers. Quite fascinating. :-) Jamie April 3, 2007 Jamie, wise words, but no cigar here. For a RE-Evaluation I have insufficient knowledge even in the E - to compare it into a RE-. Statistical is different: I question the topical meaning, as being just a 'model'-related idea (in MY sense: as a limited topical fraction of the totality within boundaries of our capabilities to observe) because so far nobody (incl our computers) had the mental power to exercise statistics upon the infinite totality - which would be trivial anyway. Stathis is wise to concentrate on THIS (our?) universe in his Stathistical considerations, as he mentioned. If we include the multiverse (any definition) into statistics it would produce inadvertently infinites compared to infinites and it would require a Georg Cantor to find out how to compare all those infinites. The sophisticated 'statistical' and 'probabilistic' math is fine, it is a good mental game, but all is originated in limited patterns for the comparison. Change the boundaries of your model (selection) and both the statistical figures and the (arbitrary? so called:) probabilities will change.(Useful though they are in building our technology). You need a vacation from the mathematical brainwashing to agree. I feel, you have it. John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
It's getting such and sucher - the multiple, back-and-forth gets dizzying. So I will copy certain sentences of the Stathistical discussion for reflection.-Below is the orig.Maze. John --- JM earlier: What else can we 'imagine'? Ideational -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I would not recite of the universe because HOW do we have access to a conscious process of the totality with our limited mind? SP:I don't quite understand this question. First: I corrected typos, but that will not solve the understandability. I try to paraphrase the question, although that usually makes it even more convolutedG: I suppose, you imagine THAT computer to be 'above' our limited knowledge of the human mind, (what we do not know in its entirety) to simulate it in 'all conscious' aspect. Maybe a 'consciousness of the totality of the entire universe?' We can 'simulate' in a computer only the part we know of and that is insufficient for representing it all. Of course we should not reduce our 'comp'-substrate to an Apple, IBM, or similar. My in principle is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc. Physically - as in our imaginational (I almost wrote: figment) reductionist science e.g. Physics 101? I mean: material? I don't know about the 'laws' of the universes, (I don't know how to restrict such from the other universes - if such exist) - I know only about those in-model-findings (see below) that produced the most match in our limited ways of past observations/explanations and our 'science' declared (and calculated) them laws of physics. With new findings such laws may change. Not the universe(s) If we could model a hurricane on a computer Here come the 'models'. Not the gorgeous chicks in skimpy clothes and NOT the functional simulations of constructs for easier study/understanding, (like to simulate a biological process by an electrical/mathematical construct, etc.). I mentioned earlier and I paraphrase: as I use the word (non-exclusively my way) it is a topical/functional limitation of a part of the totality (a limited extract) for the understanding and handling of our limited minds. A mental cut to our capabilities. Of course it does not collapse buildings. In my model we consider about a hurricane only what we know of, speed, geometry, pressure etc., I wish we knew about more from beyond-our-model circumstances and could so interfere with its occurrence, or even stop them. Like our 'model' of the brain is tissue within the skull and no link to ideational qualities, personal topical thoughts, experiences - memories, which are all handled in the churning of these tissues - (and maybe else, still to be found). They are believed to be linked, some say: they are included in those (physical??) measurements we use in the present practice. I consider such reductionist science a pars pro toto. A 'complete' version of (my type) model is the thing itself (Robert Rosen). Had we such 'complete mode' available your 'zombie' would be a real person. - You don't even need science: and: for each part of the brain, a precise description of what happens when, for example, a certain neurotransmitter is released into a certain synapse, will allow you eventually to predict how the whole brain will behave, amazingly difficult though that task would be. I accept the findings of our reductionist science with awe it is the only and efficient way how we learn about the world. And the results are astonishingly proliferous. I would add: in spite of our little understanding what we are talking about. The edifice of 'science' is remarkable, with all those it must be, it may be, it is assumed and as postulated qualia of very smart people. I seek a peek 'beyond', like some do it with 'numbers', some with UD, Multiverse, Q-science or religious faith. That 'certain neurotransmitter into certain synapse' may explain many processes, not exclusively though: given changes from other parts (in or outside the skull) may alter the way how the whole brain behaves . We think in a narrow window of the 'givens' Reproducibility is usual within fixed model-framework, easily misunderstood for the general processes. Matching experiments are designed and quantitatively evaluated. Engineered. Technology is an incredible model-achievement. Almost perfect. . -- I can't explain exactly how my computer works, but I that doesn't mean it must contain magical processes. This after the complexity of biological processes is IMO exaggerated. (After the French aristocratic 'Academy's verdicts' that Stevenson's locomotive will not move, just turn its wheels on the spot and Fulton's impeller will just drill a hole in the water, magical is what we cannot explain as of today). Then came epistemic enrichment. It's OK to postpone understanding,
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
John M, et al, It is a fact of existential experiencing that minds are typically so innured to their millieu and environmental encounters that 'alternative interpretations' are overlooked and missed to appreciation and understanding. --- When it became apparent to me that QM -and- Relativity are undeniable behemoths of existential relation, a la mode Holmes, the unavoidable conclusion arose that the mis-analysis which keeps them 'separate' rests not in their respective qualia and aspects, but in our comprehension of mathematics. If the respective mathematics of statistics and determinism are distinct and 'irreconsilable', then we need to do a re-evaluation of the 'mathematics in general' for amenability, rather than making an effort to force-fit equations that resist algorythmic transformation into one another. Jamie R --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/31/07, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in order to happen. But that question aside, computationalism depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind - i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure. Here we go: i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in order to happen. What else can we 'imagine'? Ideationa -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I wouild not recite of the unioverse because HOW do we have access to a conscious process of the totality with our limited mind? I don't quite understand this question. ...(a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes in our brain using a computer,... In principle EVERYTHING is possible. Look at the discussions on this list. My in principle is somewhat narrower: I meant physically possible, given the laws of our universe, without recourse to multiverses etc. ...(b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical brain,... If a 'model' is identical in all respects (functionally) it is not a model, it is the THING itself. So we are in this case playing withg words. NOTHING can be completely identical in this world, because everything is the product of ALL the actual circumstances co- functioning in the construction of the 'thing' (process). And ALL the circumstances do not ever repeat themselves identically: it would be a merrygoround world loop what we so far did not experience. We can find similarity in ALL aspects we observe, but that does not include the complete totality. We like to call such similarity an 'identity'.. .So I do not argue against your finding a) and b) possible, but does it make sense? If we could model a hurricane on a computer the simulation would not destroy houses, but if the model were good enough it would tell us which houses a real hurricane would destroy. Similarly, if we could model a brain, we would be in a position to know how a person would behave in a given situation. We could use the computer model to control the person's muscles and no-one would realise he wasn't a real person, i.e. we would have at least a zombie. 2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, appropriately configured and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1. Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded in these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it should be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain, receiving afferent impulses from sense organs and sending afferent impulses to muscles, which would result in a being whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of an intact human. The only way around this conclusion is if the behaviour of the brain depends on physical processes which are not computable, like Penrose's postulated quantum gravity effects. This is possible, but there isn't really any good evidence supporting it, as far as I'm aware. 3-29 insert s: ...The macromolecules follow the laws of physics:... NONONONONO! Certain experiences with macromolecules are described in our incompletge views as being described by certain (statistical? probabilistic?) findings in the physical domain. Macro- or nonmacromolecules, atoms, their parts, show behavior in our 'slanted', 'partial'. observation which have been matched to calculations drawn upon similarly era-restricted observational explanatory calculations (physics). I did not work with atoms or molecules, when I made my macromo;leculs and their applications. I worked with masses that behaved. Then I put them into a reductionist analysis abd tried to 'match' the numerical data to those in the books. I made 'bilayers', 'ligands'. Indeed I got responses which I described as performing as expected. And
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Dear Stathis, sorry for the delay, I had to 'save' most of this response and finish it later. Of course that will show in the inadequacy of the last part, a second guess never matches.- * I tried to direct that overgrown discussion back to Earth, you went up the clouds again. Let me, please, interject in ItALICS into the copy os OUR post below. John On 3/29/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 3/29/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s): - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote: *-SP: Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. - * JM I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to the topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion. 1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary digital mechanism? Do we really believe that our human complexity is that simplistic and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally restricted) we know only a bit of what our thinking mind is capable of/doing. Some of these features are reproduced into binary digital churnings and that is the standard. A robot of limited capabilities (maybe if in certain aspects even exceeding the limits of our human activity details). I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is not like such 'standard': it may be analogous, or, if digital: of unlimited variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in our today's epistemy. The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in order to happen. But that question aside, computationalism depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind - i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure. Here we go: i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in order to happen. What else can we 'imagine'? Ideationa -- of whom? Mine? Yours? I wouild not recite of the unioverse because HOW do we have access to a conscious process of the totality with our limited mind? * ...(a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes in our brain using a computer,... In principle EVERYTHING is possible. Look at the discussions on this list. ...(b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical brain,... If a 'model' is identical in all respects (functionally) it is not a model, it is the THING itself. So we are in this case playing withg words. NOTHING can be completely identical in this world, because everything is the product of ALL the actual circumstances co- functioning in the construction of the 'thing' (process). And ALL the circumstances do not ever repeat themselves identically: it would be a merrygoround world loop what we so far did not experience. We can find similarity in ALL aspects we observe, but that does not include the complete totality. We like to call such similarity an 'identity'.. .So I do not argue against your finding a) and b) possible, but does it make sense? *** 2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, appropriately configured and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1. Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded in these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it should be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain, receiving afferent
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/29/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s): - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote: *-SP: Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. - * JM I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to the topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion. 1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary digital mechanism? Do we really believe that our human complexity is that simplistic and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally restricted) we know only a bit of what our thinking mind is capable of/doing. Some of these features are reproduced into binary digital churnings and that is the standard. A robot of limited capabilities (maybe if in certain aspects even exceeding the limits of our human activity details). I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is not like such 'standard': it may be analogous, or, if digital: of unlimited variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in our today's epistemy. The non-standard part of Bruno's comp, as I see it, is to accept that computation can lead to thought but to reject the physical supervenience theory, i.e. that computation requires certain physical processes to take place in order to happen. But that question aside, computationalism depends on the idea that (a) it is *in principle* possible to reproduce all the physical processes in our brain using a computer, to an arbitrary degree of precision, and (b) such a reproduction, yielding by definition a functionally identical brain, also yields a functionally identical mind - i.e., as opposed to a zombie. Roger Penrose says that (a) is false; John Searle and religious people say that even if (a) is true, (b) is false. I tend to think that (a) and (b) are both true, but I am not completely sure. 2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, appropriately configured and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1. Each neuron is made up of macromolecules in a watery medium. The macromolecules follow the laws of physics: there are equations which describe how phospholipid bilayers form membranes, how proteins embedded in these membranes change conformation when ligands bind to them, how these conformation changes result in ion fluxes and changes in transmembrane potential, and so on. So if you ignore for the moment the technical difficulties involved in working all this out and implementing it, it should be possible to program a computer to behave just like a biological brain, receiving afferent impulses from sense organs and sending afferent impulses to muscles, which would result in a being whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of an intact human. The only way around this conclusion is if the behaviour of the brain depends on physical processes which are not computable, like Penrose's postulated quantum gravity effects. This is possible, but there isn't really any good evidence supporting it, as far as I'm aware. 3. you - and who should that be? can we separate our living brain (I mean with all its functionality) from 'YOU', the self, the person, or call it the simulacron of yourself? What's left? Is there me and my brain? As I like to call it: the brain is the 'tool' of my mind, mind is pretty unidentified, but - is close to my-self, some call it life, some consciousness, - those items we like to argue about because none of us knows what we are talking about (some DO THINK they know, but only something and for themselves). I find it hard to define consciousness, but I know what it is, and so does everyone who has it. 4. feel who/what? the transistors? (Let me repeat: I am not talking about Transistor Stathis). You could equally well ask, do the proteins/ phospholipids/ nucleic acids etc. feel? Apparently, they do. If your brain stops working or is seriously damaged, you stop feeling. *-SP: Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe. Stathis
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Le 26-mars-07, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. Yes. And I intervene only when I find a contradiction between what is said, with the consequence of the UDA. I am also open to criticism of the UDA itself. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe. Certainly. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/28/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 26-mars-07, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. Yes. And I intervene only when I find a contradiction between what is said, with the consequence of the UDA. I am also open to criticism of the UDA itself. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe. Certainly. Bruno Then comes my ceterum censeo (applicable to the entire discussion) after Bruno's Certainly : -- AS FAR AS WE KNOW --(today). John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis: let me keep only your reply-part and ask my question(s): - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, March 25, 2007 7:34 PM Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SKIP - Sorry, Mark, this goes to Stathis, who wrote: *-SP: Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. - * JM I am not implying that you accept it, just scribble down my remarks to the topic - in accordance maybe with your opinion. 1. Standard? meaning our embryonic-level (first model) 0-1 binary digital mechanism? Do we really believe that our human complexity is that simplistic and ends at the inner surface of our skull? Even there (locally restricted) we know only a bit of what our thinking mind is capable of/doing. Some of these features are reproduced into binary digital churnings and that is the standard. A robot of limited capabilities (maybe if in certain aspects even exceeding the limits of our human activity details). I think 'comp' as Bruno uses the word and compares it to a L-machine is not like such 'standard': it may be analogous, or, if digital: of unlimited variance (infinitary, not only binary), and not even simulable in our today's epistemy. 2. Replaced? meaning one takes out that goo of neurons, proteins and other tissue-stuff with its blood suply and replace the cavity (no matter how bigger or smaller) by a (watch it): *digital* computer, appropriately configured and electric flow in it. For the quale-details see the par #1. 3. you - and who should that be? can we separate our living brain (I mean with all its functionality) from 'YOU', the self, the person, or call it the simulacron of yourself? What's left? Is there me and my brain? As I like to call it: the brain is the 'tool' of my mind, mind is pretty unidentified, but - is close to my-self, some call it life, some consciousness, - those items we like to argue about because none of us knows what we are talking about (some DO THINK they know, but only something and for themselves). 4. feel who/what? the transistors? (Let me repeat: I am not talking about Transistor Stathis). *-SP: Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe. Stathis Papaioannou-* JM Yes, we today KNOW about only 1 universe. But we believe in a physical reality what we 'feel', 'live it' and hold as our 'truth' as well. Even those 'more advanced' minds saying they don't believe in it, cry out (OMIGOD!) when Dr. Johnson's stone hurts their toe in the shoe. I like to draw comparisons between what we know today and what we knew 1000, 3000, or 5000 years ago and ask: what will we 'know' just 500 years ahead in the future by a continuing epistemic enrichment? (If humanity survives that long). Please, readers, just list the answers alphabetically. Cheerz John Mikes -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.18/733 - Release Date: 3/25/2007 11:07 AM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Le 25-mars-07, à 15:13, Mark Peaty a écrit : I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get the feeling that comp could lead to madness. You begin to see the point perhaps ... But then, of course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-) You wish :-) The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around this critical point of duration and continuity for some time now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes, or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing this have been scores of millions of years in the making. OK. This is not so new. A rough summary of Aristotle versus Plato consists in saying: Aristotle: reality is what you see and measure (let the experts speak, and sleep well) Plato: what you see and measure *could* be the shadow of the shadow of the shadow of what *could* perhaps be (let us keep vigilance in all situations). Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated! It is the least we can say. My original motivation was in showing that with comp the mind body problem is two times more complex than materialists usually think. Indeed (cf uda) with comp you have to explain the physical from the number-theoretical/information theoretical etc..) studies. AFAICS under Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic view which does not even have a consolation Careful with the idea of consolation. A priori science is not supposed to comfort us, but to believe (and hopefully know). Cf some recurring remark from Stathis to Tom. Now, if you have faith, really, then there are no reason to be anxious about any finding by science. that we are participating in a genuine continuity. And here you are quite quick. But, with respect to this notion of continuity, I have a problem with a list, given tat for being less quick on such question you have to invest more in a bit more technical computer science. I am not sure computer science and logic makes it possible to recover any third person global notion of continuity, but evidences add that there are genuine first person plural genuine continuity. Actually, the very notion of computation, both classical and quantum, could have his roots in topology. In some mathematical structure, akin to first person structure, the notion of computable is equivalent with the notion of being continuous. Pre-comp, one could assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I' am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very good that the world is going on independently of me and I have the chance of really contributing. I would not abandon that idea. In a pre-comp universe a wise person will recognise that, well, things are always what we believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something and at least we tried. Nice. But with comp, assuming there are no intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_ cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it must always be possible that everything we take to be an indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of this slice of multiverse. This is a problem for any block view of reality
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get the feeling that comp could lead to madness. But then, of course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-) The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around this critical point of duration and continuity for some time now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes, or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing this have been scores of millions of years in the making. Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated! AFAICS under Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic view which does not even have a consolation that we are participating in a genuine continuity. Pre-comp, one could assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I' am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very good that the world is going on independently of me and I have the chance of really contributing. In a pre-comp universe a wise person will recognise that, well, things are always what we believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something and at least we tried. But with comp, assuming there are no intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_ cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it must always be possible that everything we take to be an indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of this slice of multiverse. That is a pretty rugged conception to present to people as _necessarily_ possible. I therefore take comfort in the difficulties that people have in integrating Comp into a coherent explanation of the universe we perceive. I realise that much can be done with higher mathematics but just because people can create a formal language system in which algorithmic processes can be referred to with simple symbols, and sets of such symbols can be syntaxed together with indicators that mean, effectively, 'and so on so forth for ever and ever', this does not mean that the universe outside of peoples' heads can ever reflect this. I think it behoves contributors here to consider whether the universal dovetailer can ever be more real than Jack and his Beanstalk. Jack and his magic vegetable have been around for a couple of centuries now. The universal dovetailer may do likewise. We just need to keep in touch with the idea though that 'It Ain't Necessarily So!'. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No. I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in brains. When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of the ODEs define the states. But in the simulation, what actually evolves them is passing them to another program that takes them and the current state as data and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states. When you talk about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the states. They are what we write into memory; they form the
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/25/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I hope you guys will forgive my irreverence, but in the last couple of hours for the first time I have managed to read this thread to here. Having done so, and in the spirit of this everything-list wherein it is assumed everything is not only possible but _will_ happen and indeed may already have happened in a universe near you [and of course is that possibility exists, then it definitely already always has happened], I get the feeling that comp could lead to madness. But then, of course, it already has hasn't it ... in another universe somewhere/when else ... of course ... :-) The thing is Brent and Stathis have been going around and around this critical point of duration and continuity for some time now, without wanting to admit that *our experience of being aware of being here and now [respectively] is intrinsically paradoxical*. Well I have felt compelled to that viewpoint for more than a decade or so now, and I find from reading this discussion that comp does not solve this. OK, it may well be that Loebian machines, whether modest or not in other universes, or just modest but smarter than me - the latter not hard :-) can get on with the computation of their ontology and somehow transcend the apparent paradox. The paradox I have thus far asserted to be primary is the comparatively simple thought that we are constantly mistaken in taking our experience to be more or less _all of what is happening_ when it is really only our brain's construction of its model of self in the world, which is nothing to sniff at of course but then the processes for doing this have been scores of millions of years in the making. Comp makes the whole thing much more Comp-licated! AFAICS under Comp, we are each and every one of us confined to an anthropic view which does not even have a consolation that we are participating in a genuine continuity. Pre-comp, one could assume that, no matter how deluded one might be, as long as 'I' am able to be coherent long enough to recognise that it doesn't make sense to say 'I don't exist' then the chances were very good that the world is going on independently of me and I have the chance of really contributing. In a pre-comp universe a wise person will recognise that, well, things are always what we believe them to be until we discover otherwise so we have no guarantee that our attempts to do the right thing are necessarily the best. However we have a right to believe that so long as we have tried to sort out the facts of our situation and purposed not to cause avoidable harm to others then we are being as ethical as we know how to be and this counts for something and at least we tried. But with comp, assuming there are no intrinsic barriers to the formation of worlds and experience wherein we can come to truly believe we and our world have a coherent history, we have no reason to assume that this current experience _and the whole noumenal world we believe to exist_ cannot just wink out of existence. By definition it seems, it must always be possible that everything we take to be an indication of duration 'out there' is a transient artefact of this slice of multiverse. That is a pretty rugged conception to present to people as _necessarily_ possible. I therefore take comfort in the difficulties that people have in integrating Comp into a coherent explanation of the universe we perceive. I realise that much can be done with higher mathematics but just because people can create a formal language system in which algorithmic processes can be referred to with simple symbols, and sets of such symbols can be syntaxed together with indicators that mean, effectively, 'and so on so forth for ever and ever', this does not mean that the universe outside of peoples' heads can ever reflect this. I think it behoves contributors here to consider whether the universal dovetailer can ever be more real than Jack and his Beanstalk. Jack and his magic vegetable have been around for a couple of centuries now. The universal dovetailer may do likewise. We just need to keep in touch with the idea though that 'It Ain't Necessarily So!'. Standard computationalism is just the theory that your brain could be replaced with an appropriately configured digital computer and you would not only act the same, you would also feel the same. Bruno goes on to show that this entails there is no separate physical reality by means of the UDA, but we can still talk about computationalism - the predominant theory in cognitive science - without discussing the UDA. And in any case, the ideas Brent and I have been discussing are still relevant if computationalism is wrong and (again a separate matter) there is only one universe. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No. I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in brains. When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of the ODEs define the states. But in the simulation, what actually evolves them is passing them to another program that takes them and the current state as data and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states. When you talk about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the states. They are what we write into memory; they form the narrative of the simulation. The integrator is like a simulation at a lower level, perhaps at the level of neurons. We're not aware of it and in fact many different integration algorithms could be used with little difference in the outcome (as in the comp idea of replacing neurons with chips). But the integrator, even conceived as an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is performing a function, connecting one state to the next. I'm not denying that you can simulate all this and that you can take a block universe view of the simulation. I'm just saying that the block can't be made of just the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs to include the unconscious parts that connect the conscious parts. The integrator is just a device to generate the next state. Perhaps without it there would be no continuity because there would be no simulation, but if you had the DE's all solved beforehand you could simply plot the states and have continuous motion, or whatever it is you are simulating. In any case, what could it possibly mean for the unconscious part binding my OMs together to be disrupted? Suppose that this happened every minute on the minute: would I feel any different? If I did feel different, that would mean my consciousness was affected, so it would be the OMs that differed, not just the unconscious part; while if I didn't feel any different by definition my continuity of consciousness has been maintained and the unconscious disruption is irrelevant. Stathis Papaioannou No, my thought was that if you slice the physical or computational basis of consciousness to finely then no single slice is conscious, i.e. and OM must have some duration. And since it has duration it provides an inherent sense of time. Note that I'm not denying that the physical process or computation can be more finely divided; maybe even arbitrarily finely divided, as for a continuum. I'm just saying that below some granularity, there is no longer a thought or an observation that can be associated with that grain; that it takes some sequence of grains to constitute a thought. Further, I note that in replacing neural processes by a digital simulation this simulation must use much finer space and time divisions than those that correspond to thoughts or OMs. So even assuming comp, consciousness is an emergent phenomena not a fundamental one. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2007 3:23 PM Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? Certainly not consciously. If you are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago. I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a perception. You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, What's a sense of memory? Is it conscious? I'm not conscious of one. I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, Am I the same person I was a few minutes ago? Don't feel and different. Must be. It seems you are using consciousness in a more specific sense than I am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not being unconscious. since an OM that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had happened. But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate. They are not related except by their conscious content. So an OM never has knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation. One might experience an OM whose content was, I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in my memory. but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of being me. No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although they might need to be brought into play again in an instant. My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create a chain of experience. Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything. What creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed and so not part of an OM. Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it through affecting conscious factors. That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity of identity, but I don't think we are. I may think of it from time-to-time, but generally I don't have any sense of identity to be affected. That's the problem I see with OMs. They are usually conceived as what people not on this list call thoughts, the sort of thing expressible in simple sentence. They don't come with a subordinate clause, and this thought is by Brent Meeker. Suppose some unconscious factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X plays a role while maintaining that I would
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On Wednesday 21 March 2007 17:46:32 Brent Meeker wrote: John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. Brent Meeker But the internal states of a computation are not tied to an external clock. The external clock rate is irrelevant (from the inside). Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or illusion) of linear time. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or illusion) of linear time. I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and stochastic. But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions that computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the values. When it runs, the integration routine uses the functions to generate new values. I'm not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to an abstract computation in Platonia. It take the states to correspond to OMs. But the states are not standing in isolation with no relation. They are related by the integrator. The integrator may be thought of as simulator of time. If it is part of an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, point to the next OM. If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not sufficient to construct consciousness. At least that's what I think part of the time ;-) Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or illusion) of linear time. I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and stochastic. But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions that computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the values. When it runs, the integration routine uses the functions to generate new values. I'm not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to an abstract computation in Platonia. It take the states to correspond to OMs. But the states are not standing in isolation with no relation. They are related by the integrator. The integrator may be thought of as simulator of time. If it is part of an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, point to the next OM. If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not sufficient to construct consciousness. At least that's what I think part of the time ;-) I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but goes through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a 1 turns into a 0? These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant hardware detail when considering abstract machines. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M wrote: Stathis and Brent: ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. Would it not make sense to write instead of we are (thing-wise) - the term less static, rather process-wise: We do (in whatever action)? John M That's part of what I'm struggling with. ISTM that OMs, being static, may leave out something essential to consciousness. But this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state values. I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the rate, i.e. the clock. As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or illusion) of linear time. I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and stochastic. But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions that computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the values. When it runs, the integration routine uses the functions to generate new values. I'm not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to an abstract computation in Platonia. It take the states to correspond to OMs. But the states are not standing in isolation with no relation. They are related by the integrator. The integrator may be thought of as simulator of time. If it is part of an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, point to the next OM. If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not sufficient to construct consciousness. At least that's what I think part of the time ;-) I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but goes through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a 1 turns into a 0? These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant hardware detail when considering abstract machines. No. I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize is arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in brains. When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of the ODEs define the states. But in the simulation, what actually evolves them is passing them to another program that takes them and the current state as data and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states. When you talk about isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the states. They are what we write into memory; they form the narrative of the simulation. The integrator is like a simulation at a lower level, perhaps at the level of neurons. We're not aware of it and in fact many different integration algorithms could be used with little difference in the outcome (as in the comp idea of replacing neurons with chips). But the integrator, even conceived as an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is performing a function, connecting one state to the next. I'm not denying that you can simulate all this and that you can take a block universe view of the simulation. I'm just saying that the block can't be made of just the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs to include the unconscious parts that connect the conscious parts. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Glad to have misread your consiousness as being not unconscious. I agree with you even in the 'life' part, except that I consider that darn elusive 'consciousness' still on, when you sleep or are anesthesized. You (whatever it is) are still responding to the information you get: you wake up to the alarm clock, or from unconsciousness. There are different 'levels' to be included into that noumenon. John M - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 7:13 PM Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/20/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological (mediacal?) way. In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe of).. This is why I included into my identification of it not only acknowledgement referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' which implies activity in some process. Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static image of a state. Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another questionmark). Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider sense as well. John M I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you are not actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from your past, and so on. And I'm not sure that life can be equated with consciousness because you are still alive, and even your neurons are still for the most part going about their business, when you are asleep or anaesthetised. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
John M wrote: Glad to have misread your consiousness as being not unconscious. I agree with you even in the 'life' part, except that I consider that darn elusive 'consciousness' still on, when you sleep or are anesthesized. You (whatever it is) are still responding to the information you get: you wake up to the alarm clock, or from unconsciousness. There are different 'levels' to be included into that noumenon. John M Yes it's a problem that there a different levels of consciousness; although I'd say that an anesthetized person is not conscious at all. A sleeping person is still processing sensory stimuli; he can usually be awakened by whispering his name. Part of the time when asleep he is dreaming, which is more conscious than dreamless sleep as evidenced by the fact that he may remember the dream. And then there is self-consciousness, when one actually introspects. I'm not sure that's any different than just being conscious of perceptions, but it may be. This thread started from a discussion of observer moments, which are purportedly building blocks which constitute consciousness even without being assembled, i.e. just the existence of the blocks, each isolated from all the others is enough to constitute a stream of consciousness. The blocks are like Julian Barbour's time capsules; except Barbour supposes that each time capsule contains a complete state of the universe. In that case, it is much more plausible that there is an implicit order connecting the capsules. I find the OM hypothesis dubious because a time-slice of consciousness, i.e. a thought, seems to me to have very little content. Not nearly enough to supply an implicit chain. If I think, There's a yellow butterfly. it may equally connect to I should buy butter. and I shouldn't use insecticide here. Now to some this may be a feature, not a bug ;-) These are both consistent continuations and therefore they are both me and there as are many me's as there there are paths of consistent continuations through all the possible OMs. But that just leads back to my general complaint about everything theories. They have no predictive power. Notice that in comparison a material theory would say there are neural connections in your brain such that if we mapped them we would know that There's a yellow butterfly. would be followed by I should buy butter. and not I shouldn't use insecticide here. Brent Meeker - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Monday, March 19, 2007 7:13 PM *Subject:* Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/20/07, *John M* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological (mediacal?) way. In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe of).. This is why I included into my identification of it not only acknowledgement referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' which implies activity in some process. Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static image of a state. Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another questionmark). Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider sense as well. John M I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you are not actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from your past, and so on. And I'm not sure that life can be equated with consciousness because you are still alive, and even your neurons are still for the most part going about their business, when you are asleep or anaesthetised. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? Certainly not consciously. If you are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago. I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a perception. You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, What's a sense of memory? Is it conscious? I'm not conscious of one. I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, Am I the same person I was a few minutes ago? Don't feel and different. Must be. It seems you are using consciousness in a more specific sense than I am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not being unconscious. since an OM that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had happened. But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate. They are not related except by their conscious content. So an OM never has knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation. One might experience an OM whose content was, I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in my memory. but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of being me. No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although they might need to be brought into play again in an instant. My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create a chain of experience. Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything. What creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed and so not part of an OM. Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it through affecting conscious factors. That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity of identity, but I don't think we are. I may think of it from time-to-time, but generally I don't have any sense of identity to be affected. That's the problem I see with OMs. They are usually conceived as what people not on this list call thoughts, the sort of thing expressible in simple sentence. They don't come with a subordinate clause, and this thought is by Brent Meeker. Suppose some unconscious factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X plays a role while maintaining that I would not have noticed anything different without X. Depends on what you mean by notice. The brain implements a physical processes, of which you are not conscious. It causes your next thought to pop into consciousness. If the brain's process had been a little different, say it was perturbed by a cosmic ray particle, your next conscious thought would have been different. You would have a different thought - but you wouldn't *notice* it was different. Could something, a shower of cosmic ray particles, cause you to suddenly have the thought, I am Brent Meeker. and if it did, would your
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/21/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it through affecting conscious factors. That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity of identity, but I don't think we are. I may think of it from time-to-time, but generally I don't have any sense of identity to be affected. That's the problem I see with OMs. They are usually conceived as what people not on this list call thoughts, the sort of thing expressible in simple sentence. They don't come with a subordinate clause, and this thought is by Brent Meeker. It's true that we are not always conscious of a sense of identity, but that just means we don't have to worry about this when considering most OMs. An analogy would be representing visual information in a simulation. There is no need to simulate what is going on behind a person's back as long as any shadows or reflections affecting his visual field are taken care of. Of course, the simulation must instantly create the new visual information when the person turns his head, and similarly it must provide information pertaining to memory and personal identity if he should decide to focus on this. Suppose some unconscious factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X plays a role while maintaining that I would not have noticed anything different without X. Depends on what you mean by notice. The brain implements a physical processes, of which you are not conscious. It causes your next thought to pop into consciousness. If the brain's process had been a little different, say it was perturbed by a cosmic ray particle, your next conscious thought would have been different. You would have a different thought - but you wouldn't *notice* it was different. Could something, a shower of cosmic ray particles, cause you to suddenly have the thought, I am Brent Meeker. and if it did, would your sense of continuity of identity have been affected? If the I referred to Sthathis Papaioannou that would be a discontinuity of identity. But if I referred to me, it would just be an instance of your brain having one of my thoughts and would not affect your identity. If I started experiencing your thoughts, then I would be you. It would be like a duplication experiment in which you can expect an equal probability of finding yourself in your original position or in my position. While this was happening, I (Stathis) would be unconscious. After it was over, if I were left with no memory of the event, I might notice a discontinuity in the external world, things apparently having moved substantial distances instantaneously etc., but it wouldn't affect my sense of identity. You could use that as a definition of unconscious: if it were removed, you would not notice any change. Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more like network of paths with marked stepping stones. Once in awhile there's a stone that's marked, Remember you're Brent Meeker. and every path that includes one of these is me, even if the path also includes some marked Remember you're Stathis Papaioannou. How could you tell the difference, from the inside, between such a path and a chain? You couldn't, but neither is there any reason for them to form a sequence of any kind. In the metaphor the stones are arranged on the ground and have adjacency relations. But in the OM picture each one exists in isolation and there are no adjacency relations. Computationalism implies that a stream of consciousness survives fragmentation of the process generating the stream. If it did not, then there would be some change in experience as a result of fragmentation. For example, if an experience supervenes on past computational states as well as on the present instantaneous state, then arbitrarily slicing up the computation will change and perhaps completely disrupt the stream of consciousness. Consider a time interval t1t2t3 in which a simulated subject perceives a light stimulus (t1, t2, t3 are according to the clock within the simulation). The light is shone into his eyes at t1, and he presses a button at t3 to indicate that he has seen it. Now, suppose that the computation is cut at t2, so that the interval t1t2 is run several real time days before t2t3, or several days after, or not at all. Then since the experience during t2t3 is dependent not only on the computational activity going on in that interval, but also on what has gone on before, perhaps by excising t1t2 from its normal position in relation to t2t3 the subject will not perceive the stimulus, or not perceive it in time to press the button at t3. But that would mean the same computation (and same physical activity in a computer) in t2t3
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Jason, do you really consider YOUR (= ours, as of humans of today) capability of any 'ordering' - according to what WE find orderable - the ONLY possible 'ordering' that be? To include the word 'disorder' makes no difference. Noise? anything not fitting into what we can compute to fit into our order. Random? ditto. Chaos? what we cannot (today) assign to already discovered - YES - order. I give some credence to our ignorance (epistemically still undiscovered parts). We choose our 'models' to be studied/observed according to our knowledge of order. John M - Original Message - From: Jason To: Everything List Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2007 3:50 PM Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure what you mean by the order of your current observer moment. Stathis Papaioannou I see how my wording was confusing. What I meant by order was order vs. disorder, e.g. we are experiencing a well structured observer moment as opposed to white noise, even though the vast majority of conceivable observer moments would consist of white noise. A SSA would say we are not experiencing white noise/white rabbits because those OM's have a lower statistical measure. While not assuming an SSA, one could only explain our current experience on this planet as an infinitesmally small and rare occurance among the unlimited set of possible observer moments. Jason -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.13/725 - Release Date: 3/17/2007 12:33 PM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis: it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological (mediacal?) way. In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe of).. This is why I included into my identification of it not only acknowledgement referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' which implies activity in some process. Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static image of a state. Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another questionmark). Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider sense as well. John M - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 5:54 AM Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter? On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? Certainly not consciously. If you are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago. I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a perception. You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, What's a sense of memory? Is it conscious? I'm not conscious of one. I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, Am I the same person I was a few minutes ago? Don't feel and different. Must be. It seems you are using consciousness in a more specific sense than I am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not being unconscious. since an OM that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had happened. But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate. They are not related except by their conscious content. So an OM never has knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation. One might experience an OM whose content was, I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in my memory. but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of being me. No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although they might need to be brought into play again in an instant. My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create a chain of experience. Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything. What creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed and so not part of an OM. Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must do it through affecting conscious factors. Suppose some unconscious factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of consciousness in sequence. That means that if X had been different, my conscious experience would have been different. I can't claim that X plays a role while maintaining that I would not have noticed anything different without X. You could use that as a definition of unconscious: if it were removed, you would not notice any change. Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more like network of paths
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/20/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: it seems you apply some hard 'Occami\sation' to consckiousness: as I see you consider it as 'being conscious - vs. unconscious'. The physiological (mediacal?) way. In my experience from reading and intenrnet-discussing Ccness for over 15 years - most researchers consider it more than that: the noun (Ccness) is only partially related to the adjective (conscious - maybe of).. This is why I included into my identification of it not only acknowledgement referring to the awareness-part, but also 'and response to' which implies activity in some process. Considering our world as a process it has not too much merit to identify an importqan noumenon (still not agreed upon its content) as a snapshot-static image of a state. Some equate Ccness with life itself (good idea, life is another questionmark). Your anesthesiologistic version has its audience, but so has the wider sense as well. John M I thought my sense was wider. You can be conscious even though you are not actually analysing sensory input, remembering things from your past, and so on. And I'm not sure that life can be equated with consciousness because you are still alive, and even your neurons are still for the most part going about their business, when you are asleep or anaesthetised. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/18/07, Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives. Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than others. However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do. An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is: First, whatever measure an experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in the UD. Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million? How can an experience be given more weight by being more common within the UD? Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple times? Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. Thus it is meaningless to speak of having the same experience multiple times: you only experience one thing at a time, and you can't remember experiencing multiple identical experiences, since if you could there would be something to distinguish them and they wouldn't be identical. However, the weighting of OMs *relative* to other OMs with the same time stamp and sense of identity is important in considering future expectations. If you undergo destructive teleportation with two copies appearing in London and one copy in Paris, you will subjectively have a 2/3 and 1/3 chance of finding yourself in London and Paris, respectively, after entering the sending station. A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit) experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical experiences. Consider just visual experiences, there are many more ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor infront of you) to be experienced. As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing a rational universe and perspective. Is your experience now a rare abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there something to be said for SSA's? SSA's would suggest most experiences are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial conditions of a program in the UD). Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for the order of your current observer moment? Are self sampling assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences? The most common white rabbit universes in the UD will involve everything breaking up into noise, like your image cited above but not just for vision, and these will be eliminated not due to having a low measure (they will have a relatively much higher measure than orderly universes), but because they do not support observers. However, if there are multiple candidate successor OMs including ones with bizarre events happening, you should expect to experience the ones with higher measure. To deny this would be to deny the validity of probability theory. I'm not sure what you mean by the order of your current observer moment. Stathis Papaioannou Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/18/07, *Jason* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Every conscious perspective within the UD could be said to have some statistical measure in relation to other conscious perspectives. Which is to say, some experiences occur with a greater frequency than others. However, I am wondering if any useful conclusions can be made from this as Self Sampling Assumptions do. An argument that casts doubt on SSA's is: First, whatever measure an experience has, if it exists in the UD it has probability 1 of being experienced, regardless of how frequently or infrequently it occurs in the UD. Second, if two experiences are indistinguishable what/how/why does it matter if it is experienced one time or a million? How can an experience be given more weight by being more common within the UD? Is it meaningful to say an experience can be experienced multiple times? Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences. That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental time. Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor. Brent Meeker Thus it is meaningless to speak of having the same experience multiple times: you only experience one thing at a time, and you can't remember experiencing multiple identical experiences, since if you could there would be something to distinguish them and they wouldn't be identical. However, the weighting of OMs *relative* to other OMs with the same time stamp and sense of identity is important in considering future expectations. If you undergo destructive teleportation with two copies appearing in London and one copy in Paris, you will subjectively have a 2/3 and 1/3 chance of finding yourself in London and Paris, respectively, after entering the sending station. A reason for believing SSA's is: If one considered an infinite set containing one instance of every distinguishable observer moment, more would contain disorded and illogical (talking white rabbit) experiences vs. what we would consider to be ordered and logical experiences. Consider just visual experiences, there are many more ways for a disordly almost random image (such as this http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg ) to be experienced than for a meaningful image (like your computer monitor infront of you) to be experienced. As you read and contemplate this post, you find yourself experiencing a rational universe and perspective. Is your experience now a rare abberation among the set of all possible experiences or is there something to be said for SSA's? SSA's would suggest most experiences are produced in universes that are stable and ordered enough for life to evolve, and therefore making completely illogical experiences highly unlikely (but not impossible as they could occur as the initial conditions of a program in the UD). Do most on this list believe there must be some statistical reason for the order of your current observer moment? Are self sampling assumptions necessary to rule out talking white rabbit experiences? The most common white rabbit universes in the UD will involve everything breaking up into noise, like your image cited above but not just for vision, and these will be eliminated not due to having a low measure (they will have a relatively much higher measure than orderly universes), but because they do not support observers. However, if there are multiple candidate successor OMs including ones with bizarre events happening, you should expect to experience the ones with higher measure. To deny this would be to deny the validity of probability theory. I'm not sure what you mean by the order of your current observer moment. Stathis Papaioannou Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure what you mean by the order of your current observer moment. Stathis Papaioannou I see how my wording was confusing. What I meant by order was order vs. disorder, e.g. we are experiencing a well structured observer moment as opposed to white noise, even though the vast majority of conceivable observer moments would consist of white noise. A SSA would say we are not experiencing white noise/white rabbits because those OM's have a lower statistical measure. While not assuming an SSA, one could only explain our current experience on this planet as an infinitesmally small and rare occurance among the unlimited set of possible observer moments. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences. That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental time. Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor. The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences. That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental time. Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor. The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world. Stathis Papaioannou I understand that. But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences, then there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in Bruno's comp. OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM are disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with any other OM. They aren't able to create even the illusion of continuity. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences. That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental time. Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor. The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world. Stathis Papaioannou I understand that. But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences, then there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in Bruno's comp. OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM are disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with any other OM. They aren't able to create even the illusion of continuity. Sure: continuity is created by memory. If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. they might be part of someone else's stream of consciousness, or just stand in isolation, with no future or past. I imagine this is what it would be like in the end stages of dementia. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Each observer moment lives only transiently and is not in telepathic communication with any other OMs, whether related to it or not. The effect (or illusion) of continuity of consciousness is adequately explained by each OM remembering past experiences. These past experiences need not have happened at all, let alone happened in the remembered order and in the remembered body. It seems you are simultaneously asserting that an OM is an isolated, experience of one thing and contrarily that it includes memories of past experiences. That makes it a compound. If an OM can be such a compound then it can include memory of which OM was immediately before it and OMs will form a chain (as suggested by Bertrand Russell) and define mental time. Under comp this chain may branch (and merge) but it would not include isolated OMs that didn't include memory of a predecessor. The memories of past experiences are called real memories if they arose in the usual causally linked fashion, in the same brain. However, in theory they could be false memories. There is no way to tell, from within a particular moment of experience, whether remembered moments occurred in the remembered order or even occurred at all in the real world. Stathis Papaioannou I understand that. But if OMs are isolated, unitary experiences, then there is no way to explain 'consistent continuation' as in Bruno's comp. OMs that don't happen to be remembering some other OM are disconnected and are equally consistent and inconsistent with any other OM. They aren't able to create even the illusion of continuity. Sure: continuity is created by memory. But I don't see how. If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Brent Meeker they might be part of someone else's stream of consciousness, or just stand in isolation, with no future or past. I imagine this is what it would be like in the end stages of dementia. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
On 3/19/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? If you are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago. You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, since an OM that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had happened. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there are OMs which don't remember being you then they are not going to be part of your stream of consciousness. There's the rub. Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a problem with what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness. Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life? Certainly not consciously. If you are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense that you have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a moment ago. I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception and the other as memory of a perception. You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of these things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking about them or their absence. So a bland sameness from moment to moment constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity, What's a sense of memory? Is it conscious? I'm not conscious of one. I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, Am I the same person I was a few minutes ago? Don't feel and different. Must be. since an OM that deviated substantially from this would either not be considered as a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had happened. But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate. They are not related except by their conscious content. So an OM never has knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation. One might experience an OM whose content was, I'm a different person than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in my memory. but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of being me. My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in content, to create a chain of experience. Memory cannot do it because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything. What creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed and so not part of an OM. Of course you can deny that there is any chain and think of it more like network of paths with marked stepping stones. Once in awhile there's a stone that's marked, Remember you're Brent Meeker. and every path that includes one of these is me, even if the path also includes some marked Remember you're Stathis Papaioannou. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
