[Fis] On Mantras and Realism

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

I wish to add a simple observation concerning the discussion of  
realism and Arne's complete rejection of it. I advocate the solipsism  
of logical positivism and place semeiotics first among sciences but I  
consider Arne's rejection of realism to be incorrect, it fails to  
allow the inference of reality from direct experience.


For example, I take it as a fundamental premise that any  
communication requires the medium of reality - and thereby confirms  
its being.


Nor do we have to adopt objective realism and reject solipsism. There  
are clearly, from the point of view of my models at least, things  
that have epistemological status (can be known) and no ontological  
status (do not exist) - e.g., irrational numbers (and other  
relations) and televisions - conversely there are clearly things that  
have both epistemological status and ontological status - e.g.,  
quantity (and other rational measures) and apples.  Further, I can  
establish criteria that allows me to distinguish between the two:  
that which can be known and does exist, and that which can be known  
that does not. If we do not allow reality then there is no means to  
make this important distinction.


I prefer to accept the position that there is nothing that has  
ontological status that cannot also be known - though I cannot be  
certain of it in science since this would deny falsification - but  
this allows the recognition that much of ontology is unlikely to be  
available in my experience except by inference through reason.


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info



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[Fis] Joseph Tainter's Social and Cultural Complexity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

I agree with Stan Salthe that Tainter's "kinds of complexity" are not  
kinds at all but simply different circumstances in which complexity  
appears.


From a anthropological point of view, it should be clear that no  
scholar wisely references Wikipedia unless it is to study the  
anthropological and sociological implications of its unreliable  
nature and its risk to the public. It is hardly surprising that one  
would find conceptual diversity there.


How does an anthropologist quantify complexity? What are the measures  
that illustrate Tainter's claim that complexity has increased in  
societies? It is not clear to me that these claims are true. The  
numbers of individuals in societies has increased - and we certainly  
appear to prefer to believe that our society is more complex than  
earlier societies - but there seems to be little basis for this  
intuition. These claims need to be founded upon some means of  
quantification (per algorithmic complexity is, for example).


Does an individual in a hunter gatherer society, in fact, live in a  
more complex society than an individual in today's society? In my own  
proximity, for example, I doubt that my social relationships are  
fewer than that of a hunter gatherer in a relatively sized community  
of the hunter gatherer period - my family relationships are likely to  
be simpler since I am disconnected from extended family - it is true  
that all my relationships have a greater geographic diversity and the  
medium by which I communicate has a different nature often, but this  
does not seem to be enough to increase the complexity of my  
individual experience.


The number of relationships that any individual can possibly maintain  
is surely self limiting and this would constrain the complexity that  
any individual - any single node in the complexity - can manifest. If  
the nodes are bound in this way then complexity is also also bound  
despite scale.


It seems likely that the complexity in societies has a natural  
threshold. While the overall number of unique arrangements may  
increase, the actual complexity never breaches a self-limiting  
threshold. If I were to apply algorithmic measures of complexity, I  
would say there is a limit to the number of steps that any given  
individual can manage.


Simply enumerating elements tells us nothing about complexity.  
Diversity does not equal complexity, it may be the product of  
complexity but because diversity is increasing does not mean that  
complexity is increasing.


For example, in algorithmic terms - if, in the example given, the  
organization in which the artifacts were shipped to Africa actually  
required more steps to assemble a weapon than other more orderly  
organizations, then the system was indeed more complex, not merely  
"complicated."


If the behavior of a society for an individual becomes simpler  
because of arising diversity then the complexity is, in fact,  
reduced, not increased, for that individual. Overall complexity may  
remain the same.


I feel a clear definition of complexity is missing from Tainter's  
discussion and I see distinct concepts being confused. I find myself,  
for example, wanting a clear specification of complexity versus scale  
and diversity.


I could argue that "civilization" is simply the inevitable product of  
scale. Simply, just the result of the number of individuals.  
Creativity has nothing to do with it *except to the degree that  
solutions are kept within the bounds of the complexity threshold* and  
despite scale the complexity of the system is unchanged beyond an  
identifiable threshold.


In my view scale and complexity are not necessarily correlated and  
problem solving efforts, in fact, do not increase in complexity -  
they change and get smarter. "Smarter" or "intelligence" is a word  
that seems to be missing from Tainter's discussion - intelligence  
necessarily increases so that solutions live within the bounds of the  
available complexity threshold.


When the complexity necessary for individuals in the system to  
operate effectively has requirements that go beyond these limits then  
the system remains constrained to function at the capacity of the  
threshold - it simply cannot breach this threshold. Instituted  
systems that require more complexity simply fail until the system is  
constrained by natural selection and solutions within the complexity  
threshold are re-established.


Now, in this limited response I have applied a simple algorithmic  
definition of complexity - the number of steps required to do  
anything - and I have avoided other characteristics of complexity -  
such as decidability and termination - Tainter may be applying some  
other measure and have some other way of characterizing complexity.  
If he does, it isn't mentioned in his posting.


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Stev

[Fis] Explaining Experience in Nature

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Colleagues,

We have started a new information site at http://senses.info and I  
have just posted a sample chapter from my book there as a stimulus  
and discussion point for a workshop we are holding at Stanford  
University's Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI)  
in March.


The sample chapter can be found here:

http://senses.info/explaining-experience-in-nature/introductory- 
remarks/


The workshop, under the same theme, deals with "The Foundations of  
Logic and Apprehension," and details can be found here:


http://iase.info/symposiums/stanford/2007/Explaining-Experience- 
in-Nature.html


The workshop is small and invitation only, if you are interested in  
participating please contact myself or one of the programme committee  
to express an interest. The goal of the workshop is to explore the  
formalization of theories that explain experience in nature, and to  
tackle exactly what such a theory and formalization might look like.


The proceedings of the workshop will be published in a new academic  
journal entitled "Explaining Experience" that we will launch mid  
year. If you are interested in participating on the Editorial Board  
of this journal then please contact me and I will send you the  
journal proposal.


Sincerely,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info


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Re: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Joseph,

I think it is a mistake to consider the brain in isolation as a  
structural complexity. Especially, if your goal is to lead to  
questions of social and cultural complexity.


It seems to me that aspects of form independent of the structural  
complexity of the human brain are likely to introduce dominant  
complexities that are transparent to such an analysis. For example,  
height and weight, gender, ethnicity and social status are eliminated  
in such an analysis and each of these are contributors to social and  
cultural complexity that is unrelated to the superficial complexity  
in the form of the brain.


I also think it is an error to consider the brain in isolation to the  
rest of the physiological form in general, but that seems to be quite  
a different objection.


With respect,
Steven



--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info



On Jan 26, 2007, at 1:31 PM, Joseph Tainter wrote:

... The immediate example is not social/cultural complexity  
(although the example certainly generates social and cultural  
complexity), but something more fundamental: the complexity of the  
human brain. As I hope to show, some questions about brain  
complexity lead into general questions about social and cultural  
complexity, and indeed about complexity in general.

...
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Re: [Fis] Re: Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Feb 2, 2007, at 5:07 AM, Igor Matutinovic (by way of Pedro  
Marijuan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>) wrote:



...
Considering that we necessarily operate under certain genetic  
constraints, are there (absolute) upper limits to our ability to  
manage social complexity?

...


By "genetic constraints" I assume you simply mean that we have  
certain capacities and are not omnipotent. Is not conflict and war an  
indicator of our individual failure to manage social complexity? Or  
would you argue that war is social complexity management?


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info



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Re: [Fis] Re: Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Interesting comments. I basically agree with Loet - the biological  
metaphor is the wrong starting point.


However, when Loet says


..is constrained by the room of individuals to experience and
phantasize. This is no biological, but a psychological constrain.


This does not appear to be a psychological constraint but an  
environmental constraint.


I am also unclear about Loet's distinction between information and  
meaning. So let me interpret in my terms.


As Loet describes meaning it appears to have a zero impact upon the  
world.


Recall that my definition of knowledge is it that which determines  
subsequent action (I discovered recently that this is consistent with  
Varela) and information is that which identifies cause and adds to  
knowledge. Meaning is then either an unnecessary term or it is a  
function of knowledge (which is my preference).


I don't really know what Loet means by "meaning is provided from the  
perspective of insight." I think we agree however: for meaning to  
have an impact upon the world as a function of knowledge it must also  
be a source of information in my model.


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info



On Feb 2, 2007, at 10:53 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Like the individual mind is somewhat constrained by the biology of  
the body,

society is constrained by the room of individuals to experience and
phantasize. This is no biological, but a psychological constrain.  
Thus, it
is not the volume of our brains, but the complexity with which we  
are able
to process meaning. The dynamics of meaning processing may be very  
different
from the dynamics of information processing. For example,  
information is

processed with the arrow of time, while meaning is provided from the
perspective of hindsight. Different meanings can be based on different
codifications (e.g., economic or scientific codifications), while  
meaning

itself can be considered as a codifying the information.

My main point is that the biological metaphor may be the wrong  
starting

point for a discussion of social and cultural complexity.

With best wishes,


Loet



Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/




-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Pedro Marijuan
Sent: Friday, February 02, 2007 2:39 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: Continuing Discussion of Social and
Cultural Complexity

Dear Igor and colleagues,

Your question is fascinating, perhaps at the time being
rather puzzling or
even un-answerable...

What are the complexity limits of societies? Our individual
limits are
obvious ---the size of "natural bands" depended both on
ecosystems and on
the number of people with which an individual was able to communicate
"meaningfully", keeping a mutual strong bond.  Of course, at the same
time  the band was always dynamically subdividing in dozens
and dozens of
possible multidimensional partitions and small groups (eg.
the type of
evanescent grouping we may observe in any cocktail party).
Pretty complex
in itself, apparently.

Comparatively, the real growth of complexity in societies is
due (in a
rough simplification) to "weak bonds". In this way one can
accumulate far
more identities and superficial relationships that imply the
allegiance to
sectorial codes, with inner combinatory, and easy ways to
rearrange rapidly
under general guidelines. Thus, the cumulative complexity is almost
unaccountable in relation with the natural band --Joe
provided some curious
figures in his opening. And in the future, those figures may
perfectly grow
further, see for instance the number of scientific specialties and
subspecialties (more than 5-6.000 today, less than 2-3.000 a
generation ago).

Research on social networks has highlighted the paradoxical
vulnerability
of societies to the loss of ... weak bonds. The loss of
strong bonds is
comparatively assumed with more tolerance regarding the
maintenance of the
complex structure (human feelings apart).  Let us also note that
considering the acception of information as "distinction on
the adjacent" I
argued weeks ago, networks appear as instances of new
adjacencies... by
individual nodes provided with artificial means of
communication ("channels").

In sum, an economic view on social complexity may be interesting but
secondary. What we centrally need, what we lack,  is  a serious info
perspective on complexity (more discussions like the current
one!). By the
way, considering the ecological perspectives on complexity
would be quite
interesting too.

best regards

Pedro

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Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of  
nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not  
exist - as a general category that includes culture - but culture  
does not stand alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers  
and televisions.


The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by  
convention and manifest in the behavior of individuals - culture is  
merely one such convention.


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info



On Feb 5, 2007, at 11:37 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:


Dear colleagues,

I agree with most of what is said, but it does not apply to social  
systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also psychological  
ones -- operate differently from the hierarchical formations that  
are generated "naturally". That is why we oppose "nature" to  
"culture" in the semantics: cultural (and social) systems enable us  
to model the systems under study and this changes the hierarchical  
order. I understand that Maturana et al. argue that the next-order  
systems always model the lower-order ones, but then the word  
"model" is used metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological)  
model enables us to reconstruct the system(s) under study to such  
an extent that we are able to intervene in these systems, e.g. by  
using a technology. This inverts the hierarchy.


Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological {psychological  
{social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan? -- then  
our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example, by  
building dykes like in Holland and thus we get: social {biological}  
since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.


While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next- 
lower ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language  
enables us not only to exchange these models, but also to study  
them and to further codify them. The further codification sharpens  
the knife with which we can cut into the lower-level ones. We are  
not constrained to the next-order lower level, but we can freely  
move through the hierarchy and develop different specialties  
accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.). Scientists are able to  
adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural achievement which  
was generated naturally, but once in place also had the possibility  
to distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level systems  
can raise and begin to answer this question. And doubling reality  
into a semantic domain that can operate relatively independently of  
the underlying (represented) layer increases the complexity which  
can be absorbed with an order of magnitude.


The issue is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a  
specific form of social organization. While tribes ("small groups")  
can still be considered using the "natural" metaphor, and high  
cultures were still organized hierarchically (with the emperor or  
the pope at the top), modern social systems set science "free" to  
pursue this reconstruction in a techno-economic evolution. "All  
that is solid, will melt into air" (Marx). Because of our  
biological body, we are part of nature, but our minds are entrained  
in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level ("culture")  
which feeds back and at some places is able increasingly to invert  
the hierarchy.


With best wishes,


Loet
Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/

Now available: The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured,  
Simulated. 385 pp.; US$ 18.95
The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society; The Challenge  
of Scientometrics



From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:fis- 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of John Collier

Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 5:18 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

Hi folks,

I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic  
emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here.


Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one  
constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are  
the same thing. That is a clue.


Loet and I dealt with this issue previously on this list about a  
year ago when he claimed that social communications channels open  
up new possibilities (analogous to Jerry's position here), and I  
asked him why this was so, since any further structure must reduce  
the possibilities, not increase them. We each promoted out view for  
a while, and then stopped, as it wasn't going anywhere. The reason  
is that there is nowhere to go with this issue. Both

[Fis] Explaining Experience in Nature (event)

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

The Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering

Prof. Michael Friedman, The Positivist Agenda (The Foundations of  
Logic and Apprehension)


Tuesday, May 15, 2007 4:15 pm - 5:45 pm at
Cordura Hall - Center for the Study of Language and Information
Stanford University, Palo Alto

Registration:
http://iase-fla1.eventbrite.com/


Is the manifest existence of experience in the world to be mastered  
only by poets and priests, or is its mystery one that science can  
disclose?


Before 1950 the answer was clear, experience lay at the foundation  
of  scientific consideration. But the challenge of it seemed  
unsurmountable.


In 1928, the philosopher of science, Rudolf Carnap, wrote:

"The question is this: provided that to all or some types of  
psychological processes there correspond simultaneous processes in  
the central nervous system, what connects the processes in question  
with one another? Very little has been done toward a solution to the  
correlation problem of the psychophysical relation, but, even if this  
problem were solved (i.e., if we could infer the characteristics of a  
brain process from the characteristics of a psychological process,  
and vice versa), nothing would have been achieved to further the  
solution of the essence problem (i.e., the psychophysical problem).  
For this problem is not concerned with the correlation, but with the  
essential relation; that is, with that which "essentially" or  
"fundamentally" leads from one process to the other or which brings  
forth both from a common root.


...there still remain, in the main, three hypotheses: mutual  
influence, parallelism, and identity in the sense of the two aspect  
theory...


Three contradicting and unsatisfactory answers and no possibility of  
finding or even imagining an empirical fact that could here make the  
difference: a more hopeless situation can hardly be imagined..."


Rudolf Carnap, P. 37-38. The Logical Structure of the World. 1928.

Since 1928 a lot of work has been done in neuroscience on what Carnap  
calls the “correlation problem.” We have identified behavior in the  
nervous system that corresponds to certain psychological processes.  
But, as Carnap anticipated, no progress has been made on the  
essential problem.


In workshops and seminars the Institute for Advanced Science &  
Engineering aims to bring together leading theorists, logicians and  
computer scientists, with empirical research in biology and physics  
to ask some of the harder questions regarding the foundations of  
logic and apprehension, with the ultimate goal of addressing what is,  
perhaps, the last remaining really hard problem in science and moving  
toward a demonstrable explanation of experience in nature.


This series of lecture/discussions is a prelude to our workshop in  
December. Speakers from multiple disciplines are invited to present  
in the context the Institute's theme, "Explaining Experience in  
Nature." The format of this series of lectures/debates consists of a  
40 minute lecture followed by a led discussion and debate.


Professor Michael Friedman, a leading scholar of the history of  
logical positivism, gives our inaugural talk on the positivist  
agenda. He is Frederick P. Rehmus Family Professor of Humanities at  
Stanford University and is the author of Reconsidering Logical  
Positivism published in 1999 by Cambridge University Press. For more  
information about Professor Friedman see his Stanford University  
profile.


Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Chairman.

Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info


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Re: [Fis] Re: info & meaning

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I have to confess that I have not yet had the time to review the  
paper that opened this session.


Metaphors aside, what you have described here is consistent with  
information theory, is it not? Except that you have not defined  
"meaning." In particular, you do not suggest how "a meaning" might be  
measured so that it can be compared.


From my point of view the appropriate definition of meaning is that  
a meaning is a behavior. This is a useful definition that is  
malleable to comparison. It applies in all semantic cases from  
computer science to biophysics. Meaning then is the behavioral  
product of a communication "in a system," it is the ultimate product  
of apprehension through semeiosis in a biophysical system.


"Exactness" then, as you suggest, is the degree to which behaviors  
are similar - but I am certain that this would distress Shannon  
because the comparison is external to the system; it requires a  
privileged point of view. Indeed, it distresses me.


A more interesting approach is to assume that the behavior between  
like systems is deterministic; assume that the effective transmission  
of a "meaning" is determined if only both the signal is complete and  
clear, and the sender and receiver are similar systems.


Thus if sign S produces behavior B in the sender, then the complete  
and clear transmission of S to R, the receiver, will produce behavior  
identical to B in the systems R to the degree that R is similar to S.


So, it is not that meaning itself cannot me communicated, but rather  
that the systems involved vary. In the case of members of our  
species, our constant system modification by the variety of our  
sensory inputs changes the behavior potentially produced by a given  
sign at any given point in time.


With respect,
Steven



--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Oct 2, 2007, at 9:17 AM, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:


Greetings All,

In my view ‘meaning’ exists (or not) exclusively within systems.   
It exists to the extent that inputs (incoming information) resonate  
within the structure of the system.  The resonance can either  
reinforce the existing architecture (confirmation), destabilize it  
(e.g., cognitive disequilibrium), or construct new features of the  
architecture (e.g., learning).  Social communication often involves  
the goal of re-constructing architectural elements present in the  
mind of one agent by another agent.  I am using highly metaphorical  
language here, but a very straightforward example of this at the  
molecular level is the transfer of structural information between  
prions and similar proteins folded in ‘ordinary’ ways.  In this  
sense, meaning itself cannot be transferred between agents;  
although a new instance of meaning can be constructed.  This is  
essentially the idea behind the Dawkins model of populations of  
memes (concept analogs of genes).


>From this point of view, the ‘exactness’ of a meaning doesn’t seem  
to make sense.  A meaning defines itself without error.  It would  
make sense, however, to talk about the degree of similarity between  
meanings when the social goal was to replicate a particular  
instance of meaning.  Perhaps this is what Jerry meant and I have  
over-analyzed the idea here, but if this is a novel or erroneous  
perspective I would like to see some discussion of it.  I guess my  
main point here is to separate the notion of meaningfulness from  
the social context that demands the sharing of meanings and  
constrains the construction of meanings to resonate at the level of  
the social network.






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Re: SV: [Fis] info & meaning

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I read Pedro's post differently. What definition of meaning are you  
using exactly?


I was going to express agreement with Pedro too, but I do not agree  
with either Soren of Christophe's interpretation of Pedro's posting.  
Can Pedro clarify? And can we be more precise in what we mean when we  
use the term "meaning?"


With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info


On Oct 4, 2007, at 3:38 PM, Christophe Menant wrote:


Dear Soren,
I agree with your reading of Pedro’s  proposal as to start with  
cellular meaning, and then go thru the higher levels of evolution.  
It has the advantage of beginning with the simplest case and then  
look at more complex ones. See (1) for a corresponding approach.
But I’m afraid I disagree with your point regarding first person  
consciousness as not representing anything real, as just being a  
bio-cultural artefact as you say. I take human consciousness as  
being a reality resulting from an evolution of representations. But  
this is not our today subject.
Coming back to it, Walter Riofrio, (New FIS member) has an  
interesting approach to the notion of meaning where he groups  
together the emergence of autonomy, function and meaning (2). I  
understand his work as associating inside a system a meaningful  
information with a function that needs it in order to use it, in a  
background of autonomy. Such evolutionary link between meaningful  
information and function looks as an interesting tool.


All the best
Christophe
(1) - Short paper: http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/index.HTM
  - Full paper: http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf
(2) http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00114521/en/



> Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 22:13:27 +0200
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: SV: [Fis] info & meaning
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; fis@listas.unizar.es
>
> Dear Pedro
>
> Do I understand you right when I see your models as:
>
> 1. There is no meaning in inanimate nature.
> 2. Meaning is constructed on a first level by life in the form of  
single

> cell life forms.
> 3. Second level is (chemical) communication between cells.
> 4. Third level is multicellular organisms as species with a gene  
pool.

> 5. Fifth level is their communication.
> 6. Sixth level human construction of meaning in 'life worlds'.
>
> But there is no object of meaning in itself. Energy and mathematical
> information are the basic reality. First person meaningful  
consciousness is
> a bio-cultural artifact useful for the construction of life and  
culture, but

> it is not an image of anything real.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Søren
>
>
> -Oprindelig meddelelse-
> Fra: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:fis- 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] På

> vegne af Pedro Marijuan
> Sendt: 4. oktober 2007 14:23
> Til: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Emne: Re: [Fis] info & meaning
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
> What if meaning is equivalent to "zero"?
>
> I mean, if we backtrack to the origins of zero, we find those  
obscure
> philosophers related to Buddhism in India, many centuries ago  
(Brahmagupta,
> 600 ad). It was something difficult to grasp, rather bizarre, the  
fruit of
> quite a long and winding thought, and frankly not of much  
practicity. Then
> after not many developments during a few centuries, another  
scholar in
> central Asia (al-Kwarismi) took the idea and was able to  
algorithmize the
> basic arithmetic operations. Mathematics could fly... and  
nowadays any

> school children learns and uses arithmetics & algebra so easily.
>
> The idea is that if we strictly identify (we "zero" on) meaning as a
> biological construct, work it rigorously for the living cell as a  
tough

> problem of systems biology (and not as a flamboyant autopoiectic or
> autogenic or selftranscence doctrines of Brahmaguptian style),  
then we work
> for a parallel enactive action/perception approach in  
neuroscience, and

> besides pen a rigorous view in social-economic setting under similar
> guidelines --and also find the commonalities with quantum  
computing and

> information physics... finally information science will fly.
>
> Otherwise, if we remain working towards the other direction, the
> undergrounds of zero downwards, we will get confined into bizarre,
> voluminous, useless discussions & doctrines on information.  
Cellular meaning

> is our zero concept: we should go for it.
>
> best
>
> Pedro
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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> Checked by AVG Free Edition.
> Version: 7.5.488 / Virus D

Re: TR: SV: [Fis] info & meaning

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Christophe,

I am not satisfied by this definition of "meaning." It is vague and  
uncertain. Your paper also introduces a notion of "abstract meaning"  
where I believe you are referring to "marks" or the latent potential  
of "meaning" (by my definition) in the world. So I think the problem  
is that there is not a sufficiently rigorous framework here.


My interpretation of Pedro's call to arms was that he was indeed  
calling for a rigorous semeiotic science, which is what the  
"information science" he described necessarily becomes. I took his  
call to be one that appealed for foundational work, not merely a  
tidying up of convention.


The definition of meaning that I am looking for, like Pedro, is one  
that can be applied with the rigor extends Shannon and applies to  
biophysics. This rigorous evolution is already underway in the  
community with the consideration of "algorithmic information  
theory" (Chaitin, Wolfram et al.). I don't share their optimism for  
emergence theory as the ultimate solution to all things but the  
development of the notion of algorithmic information itself is a  
useful and rigorous step forward.


My apparently simplistic proposal, that "meaning" refer to the  
behavior that is the product of a communication, should be seen in  
this context. It, in fact, applies at all scales. It may not be  
immediately apparent to you that it applies in the case of complex  
organisms like ourselves, but it does. The behavioral complex of our  
physiology produces a variety of small and potentially large  
behavioral changes on the receipt of information, for example in the  
complex assessment of what is benign and what is a threat, and in how  
to deal with information overload and how to deal with limited  
information.


For me then, marks contain potential information. One might say they  
possess "latent meaning." They produce information in their  
apprehension that adds to knowledge and produces behavior (recall, my  
definition of "knowledge" is generalized to "that which determines  
subsequent action").


So then we can now speak specifically about what a "meaning" is. This  
definition works perfectly well if you are referring to the meaning  
of any syntactic entity, be it a computer program interpreted by a  
machine or an informal communication between us. It works perfectly  
well if you apply it to logical syntax exchanged between us. It works  
perfectly well if we apply it to a computer language, mathematical  
logic or works of art.


If you were identical to me in all important respects then you would  
understand exactly what I have said here and it would produce in you  
behavior exactly like that in me. But we are not identical and  
therein lies the variance.


So the questions to resolve are

	1. Is the sender sending a message that is complete? That is, does  
the message contain all the information to reproduce the sender  
behavior in an identical receiver? This is the "meaning" in the  
sender. More precisely, the "meaning" in the sender is exactly the  
behavior produced by the mark that is the "message" in the sender and  
no other.

2. Signal to noise ratio; successful transmission of the mark.
	3. The behavior the message produces in the receiver; the "meaning"  
in the receiver. As noted before, if sender and receiver are  
identical and the message is complete and clear it will produce a  
determined behavior - the same behavior as found in the sender.


There are, of course, differences between you and I (including  
culture and educational background) so I cannot expect that this note  
produces in you what it produces in me (and the old adage of  
information theory and computer science applies: garbage in, garbage  
out).


The fact that the term "meaning" is overloaded in conventional  
language and not rigorously used should not deter us from the  
clarification of the concept here. When someone says "What do you  
mean?" they are really asking "How does this information change how  
you behave?" Where behavior covers all levels of process within the  
organism.


I think Soren and I may well be in agreement up to this point. Where  
we disagree is on the mechanics involved, and especially concerning  
the mechanics of sentience. At this level of definition however this  
is unimportant. I suggest that the nature of "consciousness" is only  
relevant if some aspect of it plays a role in these mechanics (as it  
does in my model and not in Soren's).


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Oct 5, 2007, at 3:56 AM, Christophe MENANT wrote:


Steven,

In a few words, what I understand by “meaning”.

1) We all agree that t

Re: [Fis] info & meaning

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Christophe,

There is an overloading or contradiction and inconsistency in your  
argument from my point of view. First you argue for this notion  
"abstract meaning"; meaning that exists "around us" and then you  
argue that meaning is generated.


From the point of view of my model there is no meaning at all in  
newspapers. Newspapers are marks and meaning occurs in relation to  
them when they are apprehended. That act of apprehension is the final  
act in a communication in the Shannon sense, the apprehension of the  
physical newspaper, the medium containing the signal. The information  
in that act of apprehension causes behavioral modifications in the  
organism (meaning).


This act of apprehension applies to both author and reader. In the  
author it is present in the incremental act and refinement of  
creation. The author can be said to have acted meaningfully and we  
call this meaning behavior "intention," but there is no "meaning" in  
the marks and at this level there is no difference between the sender  
and the receiver in terms of the mechanisms involved.


There do exist two types of mark, those that are the product of  
intention and those that are not ("natural marks") - but these are  
both treated in precisely the same way by the organism. Discerning  
the difference between them is something that relies upon learning  
(being able to refer to past analysis of the world - or, more simply,  
"the recognition of similarity" as Carnap would put it).


Similarly, from the point of view of my model, there is no meaning at  
all in thunderstorms. But they are marks and these marks are  
apprehended. They provide information in that apprehension. You refer  
to this as "meaning generation."


In both cases the significant processes of semeiosis differentiate  
these marks and maps them to different behaviors. If the newspaper  
contains some especially outrageous news I may exclaim and cancel my  
planned family vacation to Iraq. If the thunderstorm is especially  
fierce and proximate I may take shelter. If the fly is stationary I  
may not be able to apprehend it. It is the same semeiotic process at  
work in all cases.


The important things of note here are that "meaning" is simply the  
behavior produced by interactions between the organism and the  
world.  Marks are the subjects of those interactions (the message, in  
the Shannon sense). We treat marks equally. Signs are individuated  
experiences.


The point it that you cannot give special meaning status to the  
stationary fly and the moving fly, the blank sheet of paper and the  
newspaper, in any sense as "meaning existing around us" or not. There  
is only the potential of meaning in the fly if the fly is apprehended  
under any circumstance. There is only the potential of meaning in the  
apprehension of the paper, in any circumstance, and only if  
apprehend. By which I mean that the fly and the paper, under all  
circumstances, if apprehended, are treated in the same way - the  
behavior produced (in the "what it means for me now" of the frog say)  
may vary.


I challenge your phrase "information present around us can be  
meaningful" as lacking rigor. Information is not "present around us,"  
information is the result of a communication, out interaction with  
the world, those communications are "happening" constantly. The  
source these communications ("marks") are present around us.


I think our disagreement may merely be about the rigorous use of  
language, and not really substantive. Newspapers simply cannot be  
said to "contain meaning" but they can be said to be the subjects of  
meaning; unless, that is, you propose some supernatural property to  
"meaning."


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Oct 7, 2007, at 4:15 AM, Christophe MENANT wrote:


Dear Steven,
Thanks for having corrected your statement about “Abstract meaning”.
Let’s put our discussion back of the fis@listas.unizar.es  list.

Coming to an understanding of "Information and meaning exist around  
us", let me illustrate this reality by a couple of examples.


A newspaper contains meaningful information (contains meanings).  
The meanings exist prior our reading. They are the ones that the  
writer has put in his text. When reading the text we may on our  
side generate a meaning similar to the one put by the writer, or a  
different one if we interpret the words and sentences differently  
from what the writer wanted to mean. An article that we do not read  
also contains some meaning (the one put by the writer). But if we  
do not read the article, we will not access this meaningful  
information which is existing in the article. We will not interpret  
the information

Re: [Fis] Re: info & meaning

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I'm with Guy. What is information if it is not the measure of  
physical states? It is my view also that a scientific theory is only  
valid if it attempts to map to something in the world. Otherwise it  
is mere fantasy.


With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Oct 15, 2007, at 10:42 AM, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:


Dear Giuseppe et al.,

I find the issues of meaning and interpretation very interesting,  
but I
think this FIS discussion needs to find some common ground if we  
are to get

anywhere.  For example, Giuseppe wrote:

" There is no "purely physical" status of information, since a  
physical

structure yields no information, per se."

I couldn't disagree more, although I'm not sure that we disagree at  
all in
substance.  I take structure, organization, contrast, and gradients  
to be
the physical essence of all information by definition.  This is why  
I see a
fundamental connection between information and entropy.  The  
problem is that
I find myself unwilling to suspend my personal lexicon in order to  
better
appreciate the substance of posts like the one below,  and others  
seem to be
equally inflexible with semantics in this context.   I wonder if we  
can
agree upon a set of terms for our discussion (and beyond?) that  
will help to

clarify the scope and limitations of the ideas we are discussing.

Here is my attempt to apply Stan's specification hierarchy to the  
levels

targeted for the term 'information' in our discussion:

(physical structure (observer perception and interpretation)  
signals and

communication)))

As I see it, there is nothing for an observer to perceive in the  
absence of
physical structure, and signals cannot transmit meaning' if  
observers are
unable to perceive and interpret them.  My personal preference is  
to ally
'information' with structure at the base of it all, but we should  
find a set
of terms to keep these levels distinct in our conversation that is  
agreeable
to all of us.  We may be working too hard in arguing about which of  
these

three levels is the basis of 'information'.

Regards,

Guy


on 10/15/07 10:04 AM, Giuseppe Longo at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


On Sunday 14 October 2007, mjs wrote:

If information is not physical, and therefore governed by physical
principles, then what is its ontological status?


why any scientific notion should have a "physical ontological"  
status?
the issue is never ontological, but "just" theoretical: which  
theory, with its
own theoretical principles, can handle this or that notion? that  
is the

question.
And, within theories of inert, within which physical (theoretical)  
principles?

classical, relativistic, quantum?

Information is in signs and languages, it needs an interpreter, or  
a compiler

as in operational semantics (in computers).
In some contexts, information may be formalised by the same  
equations as
(neg-)entropy. But the coincidence of equations does imply the  
formation of
the same invariants, the underlying "objects": the wave equation  
applies to
water waves as well as to Quantum Mechanics (Schroedinger, modulo  
the passage
to the complex field and Hilbert spaces). In no way a quantum  
state yields
the same invariants or intended physical object as a water wave:  
formalisms

may have very different (structural, physical) meanings.
The connection between information and (physical) entropy is not  
ontological;
indeed, not even theoretical, just formal: a theory requires both  
a formalism
and the formation of invariants (like with Noether's theorems in  
Physics:
invariance as symmetries defines the physical objects, by their  
properties;

no common invariants between Shannon and Boltzmann)

There is no "purely physical" status of information, since a physical
structure yields no information, per se. Signs must be implemented in
physical ink or digits, of course, but this needs a writer and,  
then, an

interpreter. This shows up clearly in the issue of finiteness.
In a finite space-time volume, typically, we can only put a finite  
amount of

signs, thus of information.
But is there, per se, a finite amount of information in a finite  
space-time
volume?  What then about Riemann sphere, as a model of Relativity,  
which is
finite, but illimited? how much information does it contain?  
Infinite? The
question simply does not make sense, in absence of a specification  
of a

writer and an interpreter (or compiler).
And in a finite space-time volume in Quantum Physics? one needs a  
wave
equation in a, possibly infinite, dimensional Hibert space, to  
talk of one

quanton within it; is this finite or infinite information?
A finite number of quanta may, of course, be represented by  
finitely many
independent state vectors, n say, but quantum superposition 

[Fis] A New Kind of Positivism

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Colleagues,

As a courtesy, allow me to bring to your attention a talk that I will  
be giving at Stanford on the 13th (this coming Thursday).

http://iase.info/presentations/coglunch-march-2008-introductory-talk.html

Sincerely,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info


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Re: [Fis] list discussions

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear list,

I like this question "Is nature orderly?" and agree that it is worthy  
of discussion. However, let me ask exactly how you would define an  
orderly nature, how you would detect an orderly nature and what do you  
think the implications are of it not being orderly?

Joe, I'm not sure what you mean when you say "any order we may  
discern" and "logical in an expanded sense of logic"; surely any order  
we discern is a priori logical in any expanded sense.

With respect,
Steven


On May 23, 2008, at 7:06 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> With due respect to Pedro, my first reaction to Stan's proposed  
> question is  a positive "very useful". I believe that there are deep  
> issues of randomness or spontaneity, determinism and computability  
> that will emerge from its discussion. Another aspect is whether any  
> order we may discern can be, as I suggest, logical in an expanded  
> sense of logic. I would look forward to a discussion of this topic.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joe Brenner
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2008 5:56 PM
> Subject: [Fis] list discussions
>
> Dear FIS colleagues,
>
> It is a long time that we do not have discussions in the list. I  
> have not been able to arrange any other "planned session" after Bob  
> Logan's one, due to work reasons (changing to a new job months ago).  
> It is not sure at all that in a few weeks there will be a new  
> session arranged. However, several weeks ago, Stan suggested  
> starting an open, informal discussion around a simple question:
>
> Is Nature Orderly?
>
> As a side comment (or response of sorts), I quote from P.M. Binder:  
> "The field of complex systems currently appears as an unfinished  
> mosaic. Many capable researchers are polishing and gluing the tiles  
> that may turn it into the queen of all sciences, the science of  
> synthesis and surprise. As we realize how much everything is  
> connected, both cooperation [or emergence] and dynamical frustration  
> can become important tools for our understanding of how the world  
> works."  (2008, Nature, 320, pp. 320-21)..


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Re: [Fis] list discussions

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Guy,

Let us get the first question out of the way. What, exactly, do you  
mean by orderly? As you use it here you appear to mean there is  
manifest order and that changes to become another manifest order. This  
is not what I take the question "Is nature orderly?" to address.

Is there order at all? What, exactly, is the ontological status of an  
ordered state? Is order merely the product of apprehension (perception)?

For me, it is the case that perceived order is the product of  
apprehension alone; by which I mean things like ordinal and cardinal  
numbers have no ontological status beyond their apprehension (0 and 1  
being the only numbers with an ontological status beyond apprehension).

However, the above does not answer the question "Is nature orderly?"  
This question asks that we look beyond apprehension. Is the perceived  
order the product of an intrinsic order? Here I look for an ontology  
from primitive nature. In my case I will argue that natural laws are  
universal and that these address the question at hand. Nature is  
orderly if and only if natural laws are universal and derive as a  
consequence of primitive nature.

The implication of there being no orderliness, by this definition, is  
that natural laws are not universal and there is no primitive nature  
from which to derive them.

With respect,
Steven

On May 23, 2008, at 9:50 AM, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:

> Greetings all,
>
> I, too, like the seed of this new discussion; although I recommend  
> slight modifications of the question.  Frankly, I think it is  
> undeniable that there is a degree of orderliness, and a degree of  
> disorder, in Nature.  I also think we would all agree that Nature  
> constantly constructs new order, even as it actively deconstructs  
> other instances of orderliness.  The timely questions in my mind  
> include:
>
> To what degree is Nature orderly and how does this degree change  
> over time?
>
> How can we best describe the dynamical turnover of order/disorder  
> within Nature at large?
>
> Regards,
>
> Guy Hoelzer
>

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Re: [Fis] list discussions

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Guy,

What is the "limited lens of perception" if it is not in fact the  
window of empiricism?

That we perceive order at all simply testifies to the uniformity of  
natural law, and by that measure I will argue that Nature is orderly.

But it should be clear that though I perceive patterns in this order,  
the patterns are merely the product of apprehension and are only  
indicative of the uniformity in Nature law. The patterns themselves  
have no ontological status beyond their apprehension. They are merely  
co-incident.

Our ability to extend the reach of our apprehension by technology  
alters none of this.

Stan appears to have forgotten FIS protocol. This is my third and last  
post this week.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On May 23, 2008, at 1:14 PM, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:

> Hi Steven,
>
> I appreciate the distinction you draw between structural order and  
> process
> order.  At least I think this is another way of describing your  
> distinction.
> I had structural order in mind, as you correctly inferred.  With this
> restriction, I would embrace the paragraph Stan subsequently posted
> answering the question "what is order?".
>
> If I understand you correctly, we may disagree about the ontology of
> structural order.  I think structural order (e.g., patterns,  
> gradients) is
> objectively detectable (measurable), and that this is the foundation  
> of
> empirical science.  The limited lens of perception (i.e., limited by
> modalities of sensation) tends to be biased and distorting to some  
> degree.
> Technology has greatly extended our (human) perceptive range,  
> accuracy and
> precision.  Science has improved our ability to interpret the  
> perceived
> data.  All of this leaves us far from perfection, but I think we are  
> also
> far better at characterizing natural order than you seem to  
> believe.  You
> seem to be arguing that anything we think we have learned beyond the  
> raw
> data (0's and 1's) is just fantasy.  Is that a fair approximation?
>
> I do think that structural order is ultimately a consequence of  
> universal
> natural laws, so maybe our views are not as opposed as they seem.
>
> Regards,
>
> Guy
>
>
> on 5/23/08 10:32 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith at [EMAIL PROTECTED]  
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Dear Guy,
>>
>> Let us get the first question out of the way. What, exactly, do you
>> mean by orderly? As you use it here you appear to mean there is
>> manifest order and that changes to become another manifest order.  
>> This
>> is not what I take the question "Is nature orderly?" to address.
>>
>> Is there order at all? What, exactly, is the ontological status of an
>> ordered state? Is order merely the product of apprehension  
>> (perception)?
>>
>> For me, it is the case that perceived order is the product of
>> apprehension alone; by which I mean things like ordinal and cardinal
>> numbers have no ontological status beyond their apprehension (0 and 1
>> being the only numbers with an ontological status beyond  
>> apprehension).
>>
>> However, the above does not answer the question "Is nature orderly?"
>> This question asks that we look beyond apprehension. Is the perceived
>> order the product of an intrinsic order? Here I look for an ontology
>> from primitive nature. In my case I will argue that natural laws are
>> universal and that these address the question at hand. Nature is
>> orderly if and only if natural laws are universal and derive as a
>> consequence of primitive nature.
>>
>> The implication of there being no orderliness, by this definition, is
>> that natural laws are not universal and there is no primitive nature
>> from which to derive them.
>>
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>>
>> On May 23, 2008, at 9:50 AM, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:
>>
>>> Greetings all,
>>>
>>> I, too, like the seed of this new discussion; although I recommend
>>> slight modifications of the question.  Frankly, I think it is
>>> undeniable that there is a degree of orderliness, and a degree of
>>> disorder, in Nature.  I also think we would all agree that Nature
>>> constantly constructs new order, even as it actively deconstructs
>>> other instances of orderliness.  The timely questions in my mind
>>> include:
>>>
>>> To what degree is Nature orderly and how does this degree change
>>> over time?
>>>
>>> How can we best describe the dynamical turnover of order/disorder
>>> within Nature at large?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Guy Hoelzer
>>>
>>
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>
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Re: [Fis] list discussions: Steven to Joe on Logic

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List, Joseph and John,

I'm not sure John's comments actually went out to the list, but they  
were obviously intended to do so. I'm responding here to both as my  
first post of the new week.

I do not disagree with Joseph's observations about predicate logic  
with reference to describing the orderliness of nature, but predicate  
logic was never intended to deal with the natural order, it was  
designed rather (as I see it) as a means to capture the methods of  
systematic and rigorous thought; which is not at all the same thing.

The limit of logic's ability to describe the orderliness of nature  
lies in the foundations of logic. Refinement and innovation is needed.  
This demands that logic be introspective and reconsider its core, it  
does not require that we abandon the program of logic.

BTW: I have no idea what this "logic in reality" is that Joseph refers  
to. There are plenty of process algebras about, which is what he  
appears to describe.

I simply disagree with the suggestion that logic is incompatible with  
consideration of dynamic systems. I think this question is one that  
reaches into the foundations of mathematics and of physical calculus  
and it is one that requires a deep reassessment of the nature of the  
world from within the three intimately related disciplines; logic,  
mathematics and physics.

This is not to say that the new disciplines of information and  
computation science have nothing to offer but I rather think that the  
contribution is secondary to the new data from genetics and molecular  
biophysics in general, which is forcing us to reassess these new  
disciplines as a whole.

I'm in accord to some large degree with John's bet on "semiotics via a  
sound informal pragmatics." I do think that is how we get there. But  
it is my expectation that it will ultimately be more formal than he  
suggests. It has to be if we want to engineer it. If there is a  
science and engineering here then that rises above all others it is  
the science and engineering of semeiotics in my view.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On May 25, 2008, at 10:02 AM, John Collier wrote:

> At 05:26 PM 25/05/2008, Joseph Brenner wrote:
>> Dear List Colleagues, Dear Steven,
>>
>> Much discussion has branched from Steven's first paragraph. This is  
>> my
>> answer to his second.
>>
>> If the "order we may discern in nature" refers to aspects of real
>> interactive and emergent processes, then in my view no truth- 
>> functional
>> propositional or predicate logic, even modal or paraconsistent forms
>> thereof, can describe that order. One needs an extension to  
>> something like
>> my logic in reality, where the terms refer to the actual  
>> alternating states
>> of the processes, about which inferences can be made.
>>
>> Standard bivalent logic is adequate to handling changes and  
>> "oppositions"
>> like changes in physical phase and the phases of the moon, not the  
>> dynamics
>> involved in a shift from unacceptable government to an acceptable  
>> one. Yet I
>> would like to see a certain order in this form of alternation also.
>>
>> The difference in complexity is crucial. Such non-repetition as  
>> exists
>> between "day and night and day" is trivial. In processes of real  
>> interest,
>> the concept of circularity, as sometimes
>> used is discussions of autopoesis, is misleading
>>
>> Comments?
>
> I agree with you, Joe, that the principles of logic alone are not  
> enough
> to describe sort of self-organizing and self-producing systems that
> autopoiesis was intended to explain (I think it is a defective for  
> this
> purpose, but I won't go there now -- it is a good start). My own  
> view is
> that we need dynamical systems theory as well, but not in its
> purely mathematical form, which is purely descriptive, and, ironically
> has no real dynamical component (forces and flows). The logic of
> distributed systems (flow of information in networks) is probably
> also useful, but in its current form (as in Barwise and Seligman,
> 1997), it can't work as it relies on regularities, which can be
> accidental. I have argued that it should be fixed with dynamical
> (in the strong sense) connections, so we are in for the whole
> strong sense of dynamics. Now dynamics is an empirical, not
> a logical study, so we need more than logic.
>
> I also think that things like control theory (cybernetics and
> second order cybernetics) is useful, since we need not
> only to describe the connections within the sort of sys

Re: [Fis] fis-spam-problem

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

FIS test


On Jun 10, 2008, at 10:36 AM, Michael Leyton wrote:

>> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
>> wrote:
>>
>>> finally the Computing Center here has established a solution for  
>>> the false
>>> spam cases of our list. In principle, the four addresses of the  
>>> heading (the
>>> last "spam" cases) have been granted unconditional access to the  
>>> fis list.
>>> Could you make a try please? So we will see whether the solution  
>>> effectively
>>> works.
>
>
> Testing from Michael Leyton
>
>
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

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Re: [Fis] fis-spam-problem

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

FIS test

I am getting an acknowledgement from the FIS system, but the message  
itself is not being sent to me on the list. I'm not sure if this is my  
problem or the list.

Steven



On Jun 10, 2008, at 10:36 AM, Michael Leyton wrote:

>> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
>> wrote:
>>
>>> finally the Computing Center here has established a solution for  
>>> the false
>>> spam cases of our list. In principle, the four addresses of the  
>>> heading (the
>>> last "spam" cases) have been granted unconditional access to the  
>>> fis list.
>>> Could you make a try please? So we will see whether the solution  
>>> effectively
>>> works.
>
>
> Testing from Michael Leyton
>
>
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

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Re: [Fis] Plasticity and the History of Art

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear John,

I confess that I get a little alarmed when people prepend "neuro" to  
everything. So perhaps you can justify exactly why you regard neural  
plasticity as a "tool" of explanation. What is it about plasticity  
that would allow explanation in the history of Art? And why would this  
provide any better explanation than any other variable physical  
characteristic, for example, the cellular life-cycle, body weight or  
organism topology?

With respect,
Steven

--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info


On Sep 21, 2008, at 10:08 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> Hi,everyone,
> I  have been listening in and behaving myself till now, taking great
> interest in the discussion of big issues. Now I want to step in  
> because
> with Ramachandran's 'laws' the big issues are coming down to  
> specifics  in
> my area.  For the last fifteen years I have been trying to use
> neuroscience to help understand the history of art and have been  
> delighted
> to discover that neuroscientists are similarly engaged, following a  
> two
> and a half thousand year tradition. Indeed, last year I published a  
> book
> with Yale reviewing that history 'Neuroarthistory. From Aristotle and
> Pliny to Baxandall and Zeki'.  It is fascinating that big thinkers  
> have
> been trying to formulate laws-or at least principles-in this area.   
> But of
> course nobobody until today had enough knowledge of the brain to  
> explore
> the neurological foundations of those principles.  Now I believe we  
> do,
> and my next two books will endeavour to do that.   One puzzle for me  
> is
> that people in neuroaesthetics tend to disregard neural plasticity  
> which
> to me is an essential tool as I  try to explain why different  
> individuals
> have made art in different ways at different times and in different
> places.   That is why I differentiate my activity, which has much in
> common with neuroaesthetics, as neuroarthistory.  What I am trying  
> to do
> is to formulate principles which explain those differences, using the
> record of all art worldwide from prehistory to the present as  
> experimental
> material.  If you want to find out a bit about this project you can  
> read
> the introductory material to my Atlas of World Art 2004(just  
> reissued in a
> cheaper edition as the Atlas of Art 2008).   I like to think that the
> wealth of data provided by that rich record allows us both to  
> formulate
> and test such principles.  The testing is the essential part.
> Whether
> the principles I -and others working in this area-come up with are
> eventually recognised as laws remains to be seen, John
>
>
> ___
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Re: [Fis] Fw: Neuroscience of Art:Insights & Leads: Reply to Jerry and Stan

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Oct 1, 2008, at 9:00 AM, Joseph Brenner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  
wrote:



Dear Friends,

  ...
Jerry wrote:

>Your post was studied for some time. I would suggest that, from my  
perspective, that you are developing a internal language that orders  
your feelings in a manner that >is satisfying to personal your  
needs.  But, I find it difficult to translate your expressions into  
the usual usages that allow me to understand your expressions.  What  
is it, >really, that you are seeking to signify?


I have no interest in translating my expressions into the usual  
usages since it is exactly those I claim fail to give an adequate  
picture of the real processes involved in creativity. My personal  
needs have nothing to do with it. My system is grounded in science,  
and I seek scientific validation.




Well. This would all be very well if there were some definitions to  
support the terms you use and some evidence of a scientific approach.


With respect.
Steven




>In particular, your style suggests that the notion of sign, signals  
and semiosis at the base of >natural and human communication is  
purposefully excluded from your discourse.  The >information content  
of messages comes to us in these forms. And, we give our sensual  
>experiences to others in these forms.  Is this merely my  
imagination or do you intentionally >exclude the profound separation  
that guides an artist from the sensory impressions to the >sensual  
expressions?


I do not wish to exclude semiosis from my system. I merely point out  
that your style excludes the dynamics ;-). Both are needed for an  
adequate description of the complex of creative processing of  
information. I will indeed exclude the "profound separation" to  
which you refer. I see nothing but complex systems of non-separations.


>The phrase:

"be directed inversely to the logic of ethics, inversely to any  
rational or irrational process, that is, inversely to processes that  
lead toward the absolute identity or diversity of non- 
contradiction."reads to me as an abuse of the everyday usage of the  
>notion of both inverse and and identity.  Can you give meaningful  
definitions of how you are >using the terms "identity" and "inverse"  
in this context?(Neither of these terms cohere to logic >as it is  
typically expressed although both are common in mathematics.)


It should be clear by now that my system cannot be judged in terms  
of what it critiques. I am dealing with neither everyday usage nor  
what and what does not cohere to logic "as it is typically  
expressed". An identity to me is a macrophysical object or inert  
concept that to all intents and purposes does not enter into  
interactions with its environment (since its production). It is a  
non-contradiction without an antagonistic "partner". Moving in the  
inverse direction means the moving of two contradictory elements  
toward maximum dialectic interaction, where there is the ground for  
creative emergence under the right conditions.


>Perhaps the critical phrase in your thinking is:"dynamic  
electrostatic equilibrium".Is it your >intention to communicate that  
mental dialectics in the parliament of the mind must engineer >the  
absolute stoppage of time?


Exactly the opposite. I wished to point out that the "resting"  
potential of a nerve cell is anything but rest or stoppage.


> In my simple notion of a Greek-ish world, the pleasures of art  
should parallel the pleasures of >good friends, good food, good wine  
and a good lover!


I would not dream of changing your notion, which I totally share.  
What have I said that might have led you to think otherwise?


Stan wrote:

>As an artist (all media) my reaction to the below is quizzical.   
Neuroscience, information >science, esthetics, etc. are logical  
products in  the realm of 'knowing that', which I call Nature, >or  
Reality, while the unfolding of an artistic work takes place in the  
realm of 'knowing how', >which I call The World, or Actuality.  The  
one is a view from the outside, the other a view >from the inside,  
reflecting the 'externalist / internalist' duality.


My logic in reality states that this duality is an illusion.  
External and internal, reality and actuality interact dialectically,  
that is, share part of one another's properties such that when one  
predominates, the other is repressed (or potentialized) and vice  
versa, alternately and reciprocally.


>I think it could be urged that the current 'social intent' of  
external logical understanding is to >serve technology (as in  
computation).  In this it makes things replicable.


This is because "external logical understanding" is as  
(unnecessarily) limited in its scope as you imply. My logic is a  
logic of "non-computability", that is, it applies to real processes  
that are non-Markovian, hence non-computable.


>An artist makes things unique, as is any actual occasion, even  
though it may be working within >a strong tradition (

Re: [Fis] informational economics?, msg from Igor M.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Igor, Pedro, list.

If there is any sense in which these networks are "anticipatory" I  
agree that it is not in the sense that they are predictive.

If the term can be applied to these networks at all it is in the sense  
that the individuals involved "anticipate" reward. The behavior  
associated with that disposition is simply modified (mitigated)  
according to the conventions the individuals embody.

This is inevitable behavior and is entirely seperate from any  
information model embodied or prediction individuals may make as a  
result of that model.

With respect,
Steven



--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Nov 3, 2008, at 1:26 AM, "Pedro C. Marijuan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 > wrote:

> message from
> Igor Matutinovic
> Managing Director
> GfK-Center for Market Research
> 
>
> Pedro raised an interesting question that deserves discussion - if
> anything because the last crisis cost tax-payers few trillions of
> dollars in the US and Europe.
>
> First, we should define what do we mean by calling financial flows
> "anticipatory" information flows? Are all financial flows  
> "anticipatory"
> and what they, if any, "anticipate".
>
> Let equate "anticipatory" with foresight, forethought, forecast - a  
> kind
> of "objective", "rational", forecast of future events.
>
> Traditional activity of banking is lending to business and  
> households by
> using a security collateral (assets, income ..). It would be difficult
> to demonstrate that this activity is anticipating or enabling any  
> major
> change in economic structure or consumer behavior. Innovation in
> business (new technologies and marketing ideas) is usually financed by
> venture capital, which is outside the banking system. Lending in its
> traditional aspect just helps the extant structure getting bigger.  
> It is
> "following" in the established footsteps, not "predicting", and the  
> risk
> involved is minimal for the bank as well as the interest rate  
> charged to
> clients.
>
> Investment banking, on the other hand, involves sale of securities,
> facilitating mergers and other corporate reorganizations, acting as
> brokers etc.. This activity is better called speculative than
> anticipatory - speculative in terms of bets on future events like a
> direction of a stock index, or commodity. The essence of these bets is
> closer to casino gambling than to anything else. It would be  
> meaningless
> to consider that taking a position on the "red" is "anticipatory" in  
> any
> sense.
>
> The origins of the current financial crisis are multiple, as is the  
> norm
> in any complex system. In the real sector - the housing market - the
> construction of new houses must have exceeded sound demand - those
> clients that can repay mortgage (with low probability of default,  
> which
> the bank can insure against with the insurance companies). So we start
> with an overproduction of houses which have difficulty finding quality
> buyers. To move the houses "off the shelf" the mortgage brokers turned
> to "Ninja" clients (no income, no job, no assets) and irresponsibly  
> (!)
> concluded housing sales (cashing in their commission at NO risk) and  
> let
> the banks finance the client. Banks in cooperation with investment  
> banks
> afterwards securitized these (bad) mortgage loans into three  
> tranches of
> different degree of risk (AAA; BBB; CCC) and sold them thereafter to
> other banks and investors around the world. The rating of the  
> securities
> by independent institutions was at least irresponsible if not
> fraudulent. The whole process of selling new homes to Ninja buyers was
> based on the expectation that the housing prices will continue to  
> rise,
> forever ... Every financial institution involved with creation and  
> sales
> of securities (e.g. Collateral Default Obligation, or Credit Default
> Swap) based on mortgage loans ) had real or fictitious earnings or
> booked an - to be found later, fictitious - increase in the value of
> assets in the Balance Sheet. Brokers and managers wer paid their  
> bonuses
> on the base of it.
> To cut it short, the whole structure crumbled when Ninja's started to
> default on their loans, and there were too many of them to fit into
> insurance default statistics...
>
> The learning's: financial flows were not "anticipatory" - 99% of the
> financial industry, FED, etc.. were caught by surprise. Lack of
> regulation, greed,

Re: [Fis] Fw: Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530, Issue 1)

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Necessary and sufficient distinctions:

Knowledge is that which determines subsequent action.

Information in that which identifies cause and adds to knowledge.

With respect,
Steven

--
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://IASE.info
http://senses.info


On Oct 6, 2009, at 6:32 AM, José María Díaz Nafría   
wrote:

> -- Mensaje reenviado --
> De: Rafael Capurro 
> Fecha: 6 de octubre de 2009 02:28
> Asunto: Re: [Fis] Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530,  
> Issue 1)
> Para: José María Díaz Nafría 
>
>
> dear jose maria and fis colleagues,
>
> greetings from japan
>
> I very much agree with pedro's suggestions about naturalizing the
> concept of knowledge i.e. of not reducing it to the propositional
> traditional (platonic and partly arisotelian) concept (as suggested
> also by floridi building a hierarchy where the top is propositional
> scientific knowledge). the concept of implicit knowldge or
> fore-knowledge in hermeneutic terms is a key issue that links in some
> way the 'typical' human propositional knowledge with knowledged in
> non-human agents. we should diversify our concepts and avoid
> hierarchical and dogmatic human-centered views also through a classic
> connection of data becoming information becoming knowledge, where
> 'becoming' is some kind of black box that explains nothing.
>
> kind regards
>
> rafael
>
>
>
>
> Zitat von José María Díaz Nafría :
>
>> Dear FIS colleagues:
>>
>> I apologize for being so quiet, considering the interesting topics
>> arisen with the occasion of our proposal to the COST open call of  
>> past
>> March, which we thank once again. This proposal as revisited by FIS
>> came to coincide in time with a call for themes proposal by the
>> European Science Foundation (Eurocores Theme Proposal), which we also
>> presented with a short timing. We may not succeed in the first
>> attempt, but anyhow it aims at opening a new scientific topic in the
>> ESF. If the proposed theme were selected, new projects in the
>> delimited field (well fitted to FIS interests) from any European  
>> state
>> could be presented to joint the research network. I say that, to
>> justify our silence in the FIS arena, while we were actually working
>> on it, although in the background. Afterwards, it was too late to
>> answer, when already other issues were under discussion… To keep on
>> the argument thread of our COST essays: we were not among the few
>> selected proposals, but were given reasons to hope and reworked the
>> proposal and applied again one week ago. About the theme proposal for
>> Eurocores, we do not have any evaluation yet.
>>
>> Even if I am not answering straight forward Pedro’s words, I feel  
>> that
>> we should let FISers know our efforts in finding new cooperative
>> research scenarios within the realm of FIS interests. Now taking back
>> Pedro’s proposal of discussion about knowledge: on the one hand, I
>> cordially thank Pedro’s initiative of bringing to this outstanding
>> stage a part of our elucidation; on the other hand, before saying
>> something about the topic, I feel the need to set the context were  
>> the
>> strive for this definition take place, which also implies giving a
>> general idea about BITrum project (see
>> ),
>> where we pursue an interdisciplinary approach to the information
>> concept from a maximally open perspective, aiming at the mutual
>> understanding of all the concerned points of view. As you may see in
>> the given link, one of the main means to get such a mutual
>> understanding is a glossary of concepts, metaphors, theories and
>> problems concerning information. At the first stage, it should help  
>> in
>> the definition of working teams, while in following stages it may
>> become an arena of discussion about particular issues, a reference of
>> specific themes and crystallization of both research (within working
>> teams) and consensus.
>> Hence, the elucidation itself will be somehow reflected in this
>> glossary, which edition has already started and its first public
>> version -although very incomplete- will see the light at the end of
>> this year.
>>
>> Although BITrum members are committed to feed the glossary, any
>> interested author is wellcomed to contribute. The managing schema of
>> the glossary includes: 1) a coordination board for glossary edition;
>> 2) an editor per article, who takes over the integration of every
>> contribution to such voice in a non redundant and rather systematic
>> article; 3) any other may contribute, as author or coauthor, with
>> entries, which will be afterwards integrated by the editor in an
>> article.
>> As an example, Pedro is editor of the voices: “Action-perception
>> cycle”; “Cognit”; “Foundations of Information Science”;  
>> “Knowledge
>> recombination”. Other FISers, like Rafael Capurro, Wolfgang
>> Hofkirchner or Peter Fleissner also contribute as editors of other
>> voice

Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Stan. Loet, List ...

It is simply incorrect to assume that language distinguishes our  
species. Many species make use of language and, within the limits of  
physiology, construct marks to communicate persistently with other  
members of their species. It is the opposable thumb and other aspects  
of our physical structure that enable us to write books, print,  
construct libraries, etc...

The notion of "person-independent" knowledge makes little sense to me.  
If there is a consistency between the knowledge that I embody and the  
knowledge that Loet embodies it is due entirely to a regularity in our  
personal behaviors derived from a commonality of relevant physical  
structure and common habit. Common habit is still person dependent.

I have never understood the idea of "biosemiotics." This, or any other  
qualified semeiotic, seems to introduce a fundamental misunderstanding  
about the nature of semeiotic theory.

With respect,
Steven

--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info




On Oct 7, 2009, at 1:44 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

>> S: The difference between us and animals is basically language.
>
>>  S: Why not 'check out' 'Biosemiotics'?
>>
>> STAN
>
> Dear Stan,
>
> I don't understand the "bio" in this. If we distinguish between two  
> systems
> of reference for knowledge -- discursive knowledge to be attributed to
> interhuman communication, and personal knowledge to be attributed to  
> human
> psychologies -- the latter one is biologically embedded by the body,  
> but the
> former is only embedded by human minds (which are of course embodied).
> Knowledge can then also be globalized and become person-independent.  
> In
> other words: discursive knowledge is generated bottom-up, but  
> control can be
> top-down.
>
> Shouldn't it therefore be "psycho-semiotics"? "Bio-semiotics" is  
> only valid
> for personalized knowledge. (For the good order, let me hasten to  
> add that
> the two systems of knowledge -- the interpersonal and the personal  
> ones --
> are reflexive to each other.)
>
> Best wishes,
>
>
> Loet
> 
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/

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Re: [Fis] The Information Cluster

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Pedro,

I what sense, exactly, is this proposal "bio-inspired?" Is there some  
common uniquely biophysical feature to which you appeal? Item 3, that  
might appeal to this claim, is too general to succeed.

With respect,
Steven

--
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://IASE.info
http://senses.info


On Oct 27, 2009, at 8:20 AM, "Pedro C. Marijuan"  wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> My impression after the recent --and intense-- exchange on "knowledge
> definition" is that the discussion should also be centered in the  
> quest
> for a new conceptual information cluster, globally, rather than trying
> to achieve consensus upon a single term, or proceeding term by term.
> Well, here is my particular bio-inspired proposal:
>
> 1. INFORMATION
> Which has to be treated as "distinction on the adjacent". Temporarily
> leaving aside the adjacency part, a discussion on the "grammar of
> distinctions" is needed. Thus, a possible concrete case could be   
> color
> vision.  How do we build the panorama of color nuances out from the
> different types of cones activated in the retina? If the idea of
> multidimensional partitions can be applied, this will be an excellent
> test on how far we can go along that road. Colors arisen from
> combinations of colors should respond to, and be captured by, the
> partitional treatment (including the curious "disappearance" of  
> colors...).
>
> 2. INFORMATION PROCEEDING
> The central idea is that, actually, information  is never "processed",
> except in the realm of artificial systems. As natural information
> becomes internalized by the living subject, it is mingled with the
> internal life processes, and proceeds up to the point of
> irretrievability. Thus, information always changes the subject (no  
> such
> thing as a "separate" observer in the information realm). Those  
> changes
> in the subject, echoing late Tom Stonier in this very list (in the  
> 90's)
> posting on "semantic metabolism", would include further aspects about
> meaning generation, response, relevance to the life cycle, closure,  
> and
> fitness.
>
> 3. KNOWLEDGE ACCRETION & RECOMBINATION
> Two  exemplary cases might be envisioned for both accretion and
> recombination: protein domains in the prokaryotic world, and the
> disciplinary knowledge of our societies. Perhaps, at the time being,  
> the
> social discussion looks more "timely". The point is that past
> conceptions of knowledge do not help in the dramatic knowledge
> recombination efforts needed to confront global problems of today. Per
> se, the idealizations of the scientific method eliminate the social
> process of accretion of specialized knowldege and the later
> social-institutional recombination of the isolated disciplines, which
> are often seen as mere pragmatic, "dirty", pork-barrel matters... a  
> new
> science, information science, with a completely different abstraction
> procedure is needed (no rhetoric!)
>
> best greetings
>
> Pedro
>
> PS. Finally I am working on a web site (awfully in construction yet),
> see below. Comments will be appreciated.
>
> -- 
>
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza. España / Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Asymmetry and Information: A modest proposal

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

I share Loet's point of view. We must place our focus upon a general  
theory of information that is formal. Any such theory must be based on  
empirical measures.


With respect,
Steven

--
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://IASE.info
http://senses.info


On Nov 27, 2009, at 10:00 AM, Loet Leydesdorff   
wrote:



Dear John and colleagues,

What I find beautiful about Shannon's information concept is that it  
is formal. Specification of a system of reference is left free.  
Thus, information can be provided with meaning in a physical  
discourse or a biological or any other one in which distributions  
can be studied. When a system of reference is specified (e.g.,  
physics, biology) the information is made meaningful to that system,  
and of course everyone then claims priority for his/her specific  
notion of information. When one comes from bio-semiosis, biology is  
the ultimate frame of reference and when one comes from physics,  
information is physical.


Perhaps, I should not use the word information because this has two  
meanings: uncertainty and meaningful information ("a difference  
which makes a difference"). The latter is system-specific while the  
former is not necessarily. I am particularly interested in this  
because models generate alternative possibilities and therefore  
redundancies. Are redundancies also physical or biological? I don't  
think so.


With best wishes,


Loet

Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es[mailto:fis- 
boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of John Collier

Sent: Friday, November 27, 2009 5:09 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymmetry and Information: A modest proposal

I am about to go out, so this will be short. In addition to the
applications Pedro mentions below, it has become commonplace
in physics to speak of information in a physical entity or process.
For example, there is a problem concerning black holes that they
seem to destroy information, but the physical notion of information
does not allow it to be destroyed, only transformed. It is analogous
to energy in many respects, but has to do with form or structure
rather than effort. There was an article on the black hole problem
in Scientific American a couple of months ago..

I try to keep this usage in mind when I work on information theory,
making distinctions as required for the specific application. I think
that there is a nested hierarchy of information types with increasing
independence from (or perhaps more correctly specification of from
the top down) the physical basis. In Stan's terminology this would
be {it from bit {negentropy {hierarchical {functional  
{intentional}.


There is a discussion of this in my paper Information in biological  
systems

(Handbook of Philosophy of Science, vol 8, Philosophy of Information,
2008, Chapter 5f). You can find a preprint at
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Information%20in%20Biological%20Systems.pdf
In that paper I focus on biological (functional) information, with
a special emphasis on the role of information channels in determining
information dynamics. The channels themselves, in this case, are
also information bearing, and are typically dynamical, which is
different from the average physical case.


At 03:40 PM 2009/11/27, you wrote:

Dear Jerry and John H,

As far as I see the problem, rather than a "gold standard" for the  
term

information, an enlargement of context is required. We should speak
about "informational entities" ---living cells, organisms, nervous
systems, companies and institutions, countries, global  
civilization) and

their peculiar way of handling very different categories of
information-related constructs (e.g., knowledge, meaning). A new
perspective is needed, just a way of thinking that provides a  
economic

view of this realm.

In computer science they study the "Knapsack Problem" of  
combinatorial
optimization. An optimal composition has to be chosen for the  
multiple
contents of the rucksack needed in a trip, given a certain limit  
weight
and keeping the total value as large as possible. We cannot  
accumulate

endless discussions on quantum information, thermodynamics, open
systems, origins of life, etc. and finally devote a few lines to say
what info is or not is. We should make a light recollection of  
starting

points so that the rucksack can carry a new assortment of analytical
items to apply in the social-problems of today --multidisciplinary
recombination, sustainability and social use of knowledge...

Thus, as a matter of play, we might pen the "10 basic principles of
information science":

1. Information goes beyond communication, involving info generation,
signaling, reception, meaning elaboration and response by the
"informational entiti

Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I am a little troubled by this account of the term "meaning." As  
described the distinction is not necessary and the concept of  
"constraint" seems arbitrary. How are we to identify these  
constraints? What is the measure of meaning?


As I understand it Christophe proposes that the measure of meaning is  
"the suitability of information for some purpose" as defined by a  
natural constraint. So that we may say that a system input is  
meaningful if and only if it produces a behavior that statisfies some  
constraint, otherwise it is not meaningful.


However, Christophe provides no means to systematically identify  
constraints. I'm sure those he mentions seem obvious to him but they  
seemed far from obvious to me. It isn't clear, for example, how to  
derive "to stay alive" or "to pursue happiness" as a natural constraint.


I much prefer a more general definition derived from the Peircian  
pragmaticist definition (and internally consistent in my model).  
Meaning is a term concerning signs, it is the difference that a sign  
makes in the world.


A meaning is a reference to the information that a sign provides. It  
is a meta concept allowing us to reason about information.


With respect,
Steven

--
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://IASE.info
http://senses.info


On Nov 30, 2009, at 3:48 AM, Christophe Menant > wrote:



Yes Joseph, you are right.
As the satisfaction of the constraint is mandatory for the system to  
maintain its nature, system and constraint are indeed tightly linked.
The “stay alive” constraint came up on earth with the first  
organisms that had to maintain a local far from equilibrium status.  
The existence of the constraint goes with the being of the living en 
tity.
As we are all more or less Cartesian networked, we are naturally  
brought to identify components. (“divide each of the problems I was  
examining in as many parts as I could”).

More on this in a wider perspective at
http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/MenantChristophe.pdf
All the best
Christophe


From: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 10:01:35 +0100

Dear Christophe,

I like your approach. Here is something even simpler: the system is  
the meaning of the information. System and meaning are not totally  
separable. One's perspective focuses on one or the other, as the  
case may be.


Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Christophe Menant
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2009 9:30 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal

Dear all,
As the notion of information is again (and interestingly) put on the  
forefront, let’s not forget the evolutionary approach that naturally 
 introduces the notion of meaning and allows to bring in a system or 
iented perspective.
Assuming we put aside the reason of being of the universe, there is  
no entity to care about information before the coming up of life on  
earth.
Information is a notion that we humans have invented as a set of  
tools to help the understanding and managing of our world. And  
animals also manage information.
A basic tool is the measurement of the quantity of information with  
the Shannon transmission capacity of a channel, whatever the meaning  
of the information being transmitted thru the channel.
The meaning of an information can be called many names: content,  
purpose, aboutness, goal, target, sense, aim, …
As already presented in the FIS discussions, I feel that the meaning  
of information (whatever it’s naming) exists because there is a syst 
em that needs this meaning, a system that creates this meaning or us 
es it in order to satisfy a constraint. The system being an animal,  
a human or an artificial system. The constraints guiding the meaning 
 generation can be very many. Constraints are then organic (stay ali 
ve, maintain the species, …), human (valorise ego, look for happines 
s, …), artificial (obey a process, …). And following such an  
approach allows to model meaning generation by a simple system usabl 
e for animals and humans and robots (1), (2).
This does not pretend answering all the questions related to the  
complex subject of meaningful information, but it introduces that  
needed notion in simple terms.

All the best
Christophe
(1) http://cogprints.org/6279/2/MGS.pdf
(2) 
http://www.eucognition.org/uploads/docs/First_Meeting_Hamburg/Workshop_A__menant-web.pdf


> Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 08:53:48 +0200
> To: l...@leydesdorff.net; fis@listas.unizar.es
> From: colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal
>
> At 11:13 PM 2009/11/27, you wrote:
> >Dear Joseph,
> >
> >Be my guest and have some Irish children for breakfast!
> >
> >I did not mean my intervention as directed against substantive  
theorizing.
> >In addition to a mathematical theory of communication, w

Re: [Fis] Explaining Experience In Nature

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Joe,

I confess that it takes me half a day to review my Introductory  
Remarks. Your comments are received within an hour of my notification  
to the list. So I suspect that if you spend a little more time  
actually reading the content of my work you will find most of your  
questions answered.

I will take the time to review your comments below, especially those  
that relate to the information science aspects of my work, and I will  
offer a considered response to them later.

My initial suggestion is that you read my notes on Quantum Mechanics  
found in "the manuscript."

With respect,
Steven



On Mar 2, 2010, at 4:06 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

> Dear Steven,
>
> I have made a first reading of your text and am sympathetic to its  
> objectives. Three quick comments:
>
> a) In 1947, Stephane Lupasco wrote: "Logic is experience; experience  
> is logic". He then and I now in my rework of his theory Logic in  
> Reality (2008) Dordrecht: Springer reject standard logic in favor of  
> a logic of real physical interactions. Thus when you write about  
> opposition "against the primitive", the dynamics of opposition look  
> very similar.
> b) My logical system, however, does not have to establish a new  
> primitive, since I believe all the necessary interactions can be  
> derived from the fundamental physical dualities at the quantum  
> level, percolating into the thermodynamic and eventually the  
> cognitive world.
> c) Under these circumstances, I would like to understand the  
> necessity of the concept of Peircean signs. In what way is it  
> necessary to say that physical, informational processes, in which  
> information is both a means to model the world, and a part of the  
> world modeled, are something else than what they are? Can you please  
> expand on this point?
>
> Perhaps the complete book does this, but I am concerned that the  
> manuscript as is fails to discuss the implications of your approach  
> to information as in the work that has become familiar to me of the  
> people in the FIS group, also Floridi and others.
>
> Perhaps you can outline a specific advance you have made which will  
> make it easier to comment.
>
> Thank you and best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Message d'origine
> De: ste...@semeiosis.org
> Date: 02.03.2010 20:49
> À: "Foundations of Information Science Information 
> Science" >
> Objet: [Fis] Explaining Experience In Nature
>
> Dear List,
>
> After two years of intense and difficult work I am finally prepared  
> to represent my "Introductory Remarks," the first 75 pages of my  
> book "Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations of Logic and  
> Apprehension."
>
> I am still shy of showing off the mathematics, that'll please some  
> and disappoint others, but I do encourage my friends to read this  
> update.
>
> This update is, I feel, a significant advance over earlier work and  
> a plausible attack on the Church-Turing Thesis.
>
> The update can be found at:
>
>   http://senses.info
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> http://iase.info
> http://senses.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info







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Re: [Fis] Explaining Experience In Nature

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

This is a response to a general question posed by Joe Brenner related to my 
work at 

http://senses.info

I interpret the query two fold:

1) Summarize the relevant impact of the theory in the context of 
Information Science.
2) Enumerate specific and relevant advances over earlier theories. 

However, the first question to really answer is what possible use is 
"Information Science?" What does it do for us and what can we do with it?

Shannon's "Information Theory" remains valuable. It addresses specific 
questions in the "communication" of data between two points. Specifically, the 
questions are: 

1. "Is the message sent the message received?" and 
2. "Does any difference between the two matter?"

This is not the context of my particular concern and, in fact, I have ceased to 
use the term "communication" in anything other that Shannon's specific context. 
My context is, rather, biophysical "apprehension" and I have little use of the 
term "communication" unless it refers exactly to point to point events of the 
kind Shannon considered.

Recall that in my work I propose the following definitions:

1. Knowledge = that which determines subsequent action.
2. Information = that which identifies cause and adds to knowledge.
3. Meaning = the difference in behavior produced by information.

The application of these definitions is generalized, and deliberately so, since 
we wish to construct a theory that applies broadly to classical physics and 
biophysics.

You will find a brief discussion in my published remarks referred to above that 
deals with language and translation machines. In this discussion I talk about 
the entities involved. In particular, I discuss self modification and the 
meaning of a computer program to the developer and the machine.

So my concern in the information sciences rests squarely with reasoning about 
the meaning of inputs to the system (apprehension) by the definitions given 
above.

This investigation is in a different context than Shannon's since it relates to 
the mechanics of logical differentiation in apprehension and the impact of this 
mechanics on our understanding of behavior and the foundations of logic.

A relevant advance then, aside from the model itself, is the rigorous and 
systematic structure that this model provides as a part of my overall effort to 
mathematize a physics that includes sense and motility.

What does such mathematics do for us? If it holds it will enable us to predict 
the explicit effects of inputs to biophysical systems, it will explain the 
operation of biophysical systems and the behavior of such systems in groups. 

In considering any alternative to the one I propose it must be measured by the 
degree to which it answers these questions. The issues in making any such 
comparison are given in my remarks. 

There are many other specific advances but these may be considered peripheral 
to the particular focus of information science. 

I personally have a "unified science" view, holding semeiotic theory, theories 
that are concerned with the foundations of logic and apprehension, first among 
the sciences. And while I do hold Charles Peirce in high regard I do not call 
myself "a Peircean." 

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info


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Re: [Fis] Welcome ---and Explaining Experience In Nature

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Pedro,

1. In fact I am in constant contact with with the neuroscience community 
throughout the USA since my work proposes a new way to look at the behavior of 
neurons and a new physical basis for memory. 

2. My proposal is a general covariance of sense and motility not a "cycle."

3. My proposal deals directly with cognition and recognition, providing a new 
model for the role of neurons, other cells and membranes in "decision making."

4. The mathematization of my model, outlined in my remarks and the subject of 
my current efforts, will provide a new mechanics for biophyics.

Did you have a particular criticism you wish to see addressed?

With respect,
Steven


--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info







On Mar 12, 2010, at 6:01 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

> Dear FIS colleagues,
> 
> Let me first welcome Dr. Zong-Rong Li and some other Chinese colleagues 
> who have very recently joined the FIS list. The coming conference in 
> Beijing is an exciting occasion  in many regards, one of them to enlarge 
> the fis community with scholars belonging to a very different culture 
> and way of thinking. Our long term project of advancing an Information 
> Science / a Science of Information could be substantially enriched and 
> globalized --anecdotally let us remind Leibniz, the pioneer "philosopher 
> of information", how he developed binary logic out from historical 
> Chinese conceptual backgrounds ("book of changes", etc.).
> 
> Well, trying to connect with the recent exchanges in the list, it is 
> intriguing that terms such as knowledge, action, information, meaning 
> logic, etc. have been just entered --but without sufficient rigorous 
> background in the corresponding neuroscience and cognitive fields. I 
> mean, as an instance, should the cycle action / perception be considered 
> in those relationships? Should we approach "concepts" in their idealized 
> face value, or think about Fuster's and Berthoz's proposal of "cognits"? 
> How logic could handle this more realistic world of "cognits"? It is not 
> an in-depth criticism of course, but pointing to the general necessity 
> of wider trans-multi-disciplinary foundations that include the essential 
> workings of our intellective "engine"...
> 
> In the FIS 2010 Call, there was some references to "intelligence 
> science". Could they be taken as a promise of imminent advancements in 
> that very direction?
> 
> best wishes,
> and welcome!
> 
> Pedro
> 
> -- 
> 
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza. España / Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ___
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[Fis] On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Dear List,

I bring Erik Verlinde's recent paper to your attention because it highlights 
some foundational issues in Information Science and the general use of the 
notion of "Information" in physics.

Here is the paper:

On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton
http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785

The paper has attracted a lot of attention and Lee Smolin's response, also on 
arvix, is really what made me begin to look at this question seriously. Though 
various people have been bringing the paper to my attention since it was first 
published in January.

Verlinde appeals to a notion of an "entropic force" associated with a 
conception of information and frankly I'm puzzled by it. What, exactly, does he 
refer to I wonder and how does it relate to Shannon, if at all? 

My initial view is to suspect that the paper is a work of pure metaphysics and 
not physics at all. But then I ask myself to what degree it is less 
metaphysical than anything else we see in physics today. So I reserve judgement 
until I have given the matter more consideration.

Anyone else concerned by this?

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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Re: [Fis] Revisiting the Fluctuon Model

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

I am not aware of anything in computing or computer science that says that 
recursions must have a bottom.

This whole "it-bit" question appears to me to be a basic category mistake. 
Perhaps someone can clarify for me in more definite terms exactly what an "it" 
is. 

Before you do so, however, let me add the following: The definition "an 'it' an 
implementation of a 'bit'" will not satisfy me. Conversely, telling me that it 
has something to do with units of mass/energy from which bits may arise is not 
helpful either (though I may applaud the constructive nature of the statement). 
No equivalence statement appears to be useful. 

In the end some kind of epistemological statement is necessary, perhaps one 
that says something to the effect that "bits" are ways of speaking about "its." 
But this statement is not an especially useful either, except perhaps to 
observe that bits have their subject of discourse. 

There is little justification to view any current information theory as being 
more than a way of speaking about the unfolding of the world. More 
specifically, despite current fashion, Quantum Theory and the Photo Electric 
Effect, there is no scientific justification for placing bits "into" the 
foundations of the world. 

Hence, I can make no sense of a "Fluctuon." 

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info







On Sep 25, 2010, at 2:41 AM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote:

> Dear all,
>  
> Regarding the very interesting discussion of ”it” from ”bit” and vice versa.
>  
> Usually each level of information processing (semantic, algorithmic, 
> implementational) presupposes some “it” in which “bit” is implemented. In 
> computing, recursions must have a bottom.
>  
> Could it be the case that on the very fundamental level, “it” and “bit” 
> cannot be distinguished at all?
> They simply are an “it-bit” like in Informational Structural Realism of 
> Floridi who (using different reasoning) argues that reality is an 
> informational structure.
>  
> Fluctuons being quantum-mechanical phenomena have already dual wave-particle 
> nature. 
> Why cannot they be “it-bit” as well?
>  
> Best,
> Gordana
>  
>  
> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
> Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
> Sent: den 25 september 2010 10:48
> To: 'Joseph Brenner'; 'Stanley N Salthe'; fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Revisiting the Fluctuon Model
>  
> Dear Joe,
>  
> Please let me start by repeating my idea that fluctuons are "its", that is, 
> energy in some form. If (mathematical) idealism is anti-realist, this is 
> certainly not what I would consider Conrad's theory to be. Stan comes to the 
> same conclusion, that fluctuons are its, but this suggests to him a 
> non-materialist conception of information. This is a first place where 
> something like another logic is needed that can incorporate the 
> material-energetic and non-material aspects of information.
>  
> Can this issue not simply be solved by returning to Shannon’s concept of 
> information. Bits of information are dimensionless. In S = k(B) H, the 
> Boltzmann constant provides the dimensionality.
>  
> One should not confuse this mathematical concept of information with the 
> biologically inspired concept of information as “a difference which makes a 
> difference” (Bateson). This is observed information by a system which can 
> provide meaning to the information.
>  
> I would not call this “anti-realist”, but “anti-positivist”. The 
> specification in the mathematical discourse remains res cogitans (as 
> different from res extensa). All of physics also has this epistemological 
> status. All other science, too, but sometimes positivism is ideologically 
> prevailing.
>  
> Best wishes,
> Loet
>  
> Loet Leydesdorff 
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>  
>  
> ___
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Re: [Fis] WG: Re: [Fwd: Foundational Views of Shannon Information Theory]--From Gavin Ritz

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Amen.

Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info



On Feb 16, 2011, at 12:51 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

> Dear Pedro and Friends,
> 
> It is rather fascinating to observe - scientifically, without vested interest 
> - that an initiative such as this one, devoted to information, is continually 
> accompanied by its loss. Previously discussed subjects, such as the existence 
> of alternative logics that speak directly to issues of process structure, 
> identities and diversities, are often not given even a passing reference. In 
> the absence of any mechanism that might "automatically" call attention to 
> this fact, one is forced either to silence, which is also a loss of 
> information, or to repetition, which requires energy that might be better 
> expended otherwise in debate.
> 
> I know that Pedro has been and still is struggling with the archives and 
> their indexation. All I can suggest is that all of us make a particular 
> effort, as we make our comments, to search the archives to give some minimum 
> recognition of and to prior effort. The objective is not its acceptance, but 
> to insure a dialogue in which no theory or position is given, actually or by 
> implication, any unjustified exclusivity or universality.
> 
> Thank you,
> 
> Joseph 









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Re: [Fis] Reply to Jerry

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Stan,

You wrote:

On Mar 6, 2011, at 12:42 PM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

> 
> ... There can be no 'objective' knowledge of properties outside the material 
> abilities of the knower.  Bridgman was the most honest physicist! And von 
> Uexküll was the best psychologist.  There is no knowledge outside the knower. 
>  All is 'local knowledge' only.  Yes, this is postmodernism.  However, even 
> with this viewpoint as a standpoint, one can proceed to do standard 
> theoretical and philosophical work because, for example, the universe IS one 
> of our equations!  In postmodernism, scientific theory and philosophy become 
> artistic achievements for their own sake, expressing humanity's, and more 
> particularly Western Culture's imagination.  The difference, then, is that in 
> the postmodern view, there might be other perspectives, while in the standard 
> scientific view there is only one true perspective, which frequently gets 
> locked into repressive ‘bandwagons’ (as in Darwinian evolutionary biology, or 
> general relativity cosmology).  


Excepting for some complaint concerning the labels you choose (I don't see the 
point of calling this fact "post modernism" or referring to scientific theory 
as "artistic achievements"), and if I understand you correctly, I agree with 
that there is "no knowledge outside the knower." 

However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly uniform 
and it is that uniformity upon which we rely.

At core, accepting potential refinement of the scientific method, I can't 
imagine what "other perspectives" are allowed ... but, perhaps, that is my own 
(positivist) intellectual investment. Your sociological comments do not 
persuade me that there are alternatives.

With respect,
Steven


--
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Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
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[Fis] Science abandons absolute truth

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear James,

Let us first be clear about the nature of "truth" from a scientific point of 
view. "Truth" is simply a way of speaking about existence, it is a way of 
speaking about the correspondence that you seek between the apprehension of 
statements and the way things are. 

"Justified true beliefs" are today, essentially, verifiable and fallible, not 
absolute. This is now how we characterize Plato's appeal to "justification." 

Therefore, even incorrect science can be said to be "true." Newton's laws are 
true to this extent, they do correspond to the way things are, they are 
verifiable and fallible. That we know the extent of their fallibility is beside 
the point. General Relativity is simply a closer approximation, also verifiable 
and fallible. 

Can we say that Newton's laws are "not true" on the basis of this? If we are 
rigorous about it, I don't think that we can. Clearly GR can be said to be 
closer to the way things are because the statement of it is a broader 
"explanation." But if we do so then we must accept that "truth" is simply a 
matter of degree, a measure of "certainty" in our statements.

In short, "truth" has become redundant, a metaphysical notion inherited from a 
time when the conception of "absolute truth" seemed viable and could be 
imparted by an ultimate authority. In fact, there is no such authority and 
"truth" is a meaningless notion in science unless by it we refer to 
"certainty," a question of degree - and at that point it is obsolete.

"Truth" is then a "psuedo-problem" in philosophy. Science necessarily abandons 
all hope of absolute truth and our use of the term and hand-wringing over the 
notion can be comfortably abandoned.

I still do not understand the appeal to postmodernism. There does not seem to 
me to be anything postmodern about "no knowledge outside the knower." Indeed, 
it is a modern idea developed by logicians of the modern era. 

[I'm thinking of the subjectivism of Frege and the positivism/pragmaticism of 
Carnap and Peirce. I exclude the empiricism of Reichenbach only because it now 
seems to me that it tends to leave the question untouched; but I'm open to 
arguments to the contrary.]

Incidentally, I ignored your appeal to "objective reality" because I really do 
not know what you refer to without some clarification from you. However, I do 
accept that the universe is existent, that I am a part of it, and that it is 
that which we test our theories against.

With respect,
Steven




On Mar 7, 2011, at 12:54 PM, James Hannam wrote:

> Dear Steven,
> 
> I agree that science has forced us to accept that the universe is an
> objective reality.  It stands as an unforgiving test of our theories which
> must be judged accordingly.  Although we cannot say that the “scientific
> method” is certainly the best way to investigate nature, we can be fairly
> sure that it is the best way discovered so far.  
> 
> Knowledge of the universe, of course, is not the same thing as the universe
> itself and does require a knower.  However, it must have some correspondence
> to the universe in order to qualify as something which we know – what Plato
> called justified true beliefs.  Thus, as a historian of science, I
> completely accept that my subject is a story of how we discovered knowledge
> that corresponds to the universe and rejected those theories that do not.
> But neither do I want to err in the opposite direction.  False theories can
> nevertheless be useful; true theories can be generated in irrational ways;
> intuition can be a powerful theory builder; not all dead ends are blind
> alleys.  So I think we can take a mildly positivist slant on the history of
> science while still taking on board the lessons of what Jerry calls
> postmodernism.
> 
> Best wishes
> 
> James
> 
> The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the
> Scientific Revolution by James Hannam is available for pre-order now.
> 
> "Well-researched and hugely enjoyable."  New Scientist 
> 
> “A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development… captures the
> wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity and its engaging
> strangeness.” Sunday Times
> 
> “This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable
> no-nonsense clarity… James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down an
> old caricature.” Sunday Telegraph
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
> Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Sent: 06 March 2011 23:46
> To: Foundations of Information Science of Information Science Information
> Information Science
>

Re: [Fis] replies to Steven and James

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Mar 12, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

> ...
> 
>> On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 6:46 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> ... I agree with that there is "no knowledge outside the knower."
>> 
>> However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly 
>> uniform and it is that uniformity upon which we rely.
> 
> Well, if by 'uniformity' you mean that the results of our activities have 
> some predictability, I would say that what this actually refers to is that 
> our conceptual tools (laws, expectations, etc.) are usually successful in 
> aiding our projects. That is a great intellectual achievement.  But as to a 
> supposed actual uniformity (?statistical) of the universe, that is a product 
> of, and exists in, our discourses.
> 

No, this is not what I am trying to convey. 

My assertion is an existential one not an epistemological one. The universe, 
independent of any conception, is profoundly uniform and it is this uniformity 
that is the basis of perceived universals. Our conceptions can have no 
intrinsic uniformity unless they are founded upon this profound feature of the 
world. 

Nor am I referring to statistical uniformity. Again, I make an existential 
statement, not an epistemological one. I refer only to uniformity that 
underlies the laws and principles of our observations; it is the scientific 
assertion that the determinant features of the world, apprehended as laws and 
principles, are everywhere the same.


> Then, to Steven again:
> 
> 
>> I still do not understand the appeal to postmodernism. There does not seem 
>> to me to be anything postmodern about "no knowledge outside the knower." 
>> Indeed, it is a modern idea developed by logicians of the modern era.
> I think this view, given the obtuse attitudes of most academic scientists, 
> requires a label, preferably one that shocks.  Yes, this view was prefigured 
> by logicians, and as well, most forcefully in my view, by Jacob von Uexküll's 
> 'Theoretical Biology'.  In any case, most generally, the postmodern view is 
> anti-modern in that it eschews any supposedly universal understanding, which 
> modern science implicitly pretends to.  Within science, the famous 
> incongruity between general relativity and quantum mechanics might have 
> engendered a kind of postmodernism.  Instead, it has sent many brilliant 
> minds upon the evidently thankless task of trying to ‘square the circle’!
> 

I doubt your view warrants the term "postmodernism" for the reasons I have 
already stated. 

Your claim that "modern science implicitly pretends to" a "supposedly universal 
understanding" misses the point made in the above comments. If there is an 
unspoken dependence then this is it. 

A view that "eschews any supposed universal understanding," simply cannot be 
scientific. It is the view of disenchanted sociologists, philosophers or 
diplomats, perhaps.

The profound existential uniformity that I refer to is the necessary basis of 
scientific knowledge, without it all bets are off. It is certainly a 
conjecture, both verifiable and fallible, but without it there can be no 
science.

As to the famous incongruity between GR and QM, each focus upon distinct 
aspects of nature. Our failure, so far, to have a unified view of these evident 
aspects of the world is simply an indicator that there is work to do. If it has 
engendered anything it is a literal mindedness that has closed minds to the 
revisions necessary and thus we have stalled. "To the man with a hammer, 
everything is a nail." I take it to be a warning that we must be more rigorous, 
not less.

Incidentally, I elaborate on my earlier "Science Abandons Absolute Truth" 
posting on my blog:

http://stevenzenith.info/science-abandons-absolute-truth


With respect,
Steven



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[Fis] On uniformity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Mar 15, 2011, at 7:47 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

> 
> v.547.8  Steven writes:
> 
> "However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly
> uniform and it is that uniformity upon which we rely."
> 
> I disagree.
> for reasoning see comment to v547.12
> 
> 
> v547.12 Steven writes: 
> The universe, independent of any conception, is profoundly uniform and it is 
> this uniformity that is the basis of perceived universals. Our conceptions 
> can have no intrinsic uniformity unless they are founded upon this profound 
> feature of the world. 
> 
> I find Steven's statement of principle to be exact. 
> Of, course, this line of reasoning explains virtually nothing.
> With the conceptualization of "mass", nature is striped of her identities.
> In my view, the only intrinsic uniformity is of space and time. 
> The twisting of the remainder of reality to fit into the uniformity prison, 
> distorts  the truth of matter and the truth of matters.
> This line of reasoning perfectly excluded the mental, bilogical and chemical 
> sciences because of the necessity for irregular extension. The essence of the 
> distortion of universality begins with the effort to strip  the atomic 
> numbers of their individuality. The other consequences follow from this 
> antecedent. 

Dear Jerry,

I elaborated on my earlier post on my blog at:

http://stevenzenith.info/the-profound-uniformity-of-the-world

I am not convinced by your contention that there is a "necessity for irregular 
extension" that invalidates the conjecture of uniformity and ask you to 
substantiate that claim.

This is not to say that there are not such extensions and that they are not 
necessary for the refinement of ideas. Surely they are. But from a strictly 
epistemological point of view they are indicators, pragmatic and temporary 
aberrations that are ultimately resolvable by applying the necessary uniformity 
conjecture.

As I note often: if a logical reduction fails it is never an indicator of the 
supernatural or a justification for metaphysics. It is an indicator that we 
must, of necessity, review the logical construction that failed and ultimately 
revise it.

The central point of my argument is that no scientific epistemology is possible 
without this conjecture of profound uniformity. If we reject it or worse, if we 
find evidence that the universe is not uniform in this way, by finding a galaxy 
that does not conform to the laws observed in the others for example, then all 
bets are off and no scientific epistemology is possible.

Since I take space and time to be merely a way of speaking about mass/energy, 
as did Einstein, its uniformity or not is a matter of conception alone. If you 
disagree then you essentially affirm the case I make since space and time would 
characterize all structure in such a system and the uniform laws and principles 
would be laws and principles of space and time.

Incidentally, for me "explanation" is the identification of causes. The notion 
of profound uniformity identifies the casual basis, the functional dependence, 
of all scientific knowledge; as such it is an explanation of why such a system 
works.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Mar 20, 2011, at 4:18 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

> ... I am convinced that for further progress in information, let alone other 
> matters, some recognition of the limitations of Peirce may have to be 
> recognized. John's statement that "pragmatics means action" can be applicable 
> to real processes only if the pragmatics in question includes ontological 
> (scientific) principles and not only epistemological classifications. 

Dear Joe,

I do not believe that any Peirce scholar takes Peirce to be definitive. 
Peirce's inquiry is broad and penetrating, but it is also diverse and 
exploratory.

However, I do not think that Peirce would understand your second sentence here 
because it is poorly stated, full of misconceptions about his ideas and 
incomplete. Peirce gave these existential matters deep consideration.

> 
> As Queiroz, Emmeche and El Hani write: "In a Peircean model, Sign, Object and 
> Interpretant are triadically coupled in a dynamically irreducible process. In 
> other words, 'information' requires a triadic pattern of determinative 
> relationships involving the Sign, Object and Interpretant." Information, in 
> this view, has a "processual nature".
> 
> In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean 
> categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which 
> 'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of the 
> universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are 
> indeed interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they 
> cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated agent. Here, we have gone 
> outside Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and his/her interactions 
> requires a physical dialectics and logic that is absent in Peirce.

This is simply a false statement. Peirce gave extensive consideration to what 
you call "agents and their interactions" and physical, existential, aspects as 
they relate to the elements of logic. 

> To try to restate my interpretation, to say that for effective information, 
> or effective semiosis to take place by having a Sign effectively communicate, 
> by mediating the relation between Object and Interpretant, a form from the 
> object to Interpretant by changing the state of the interpreter (emphasis 
> mine) says no more than that information is something that changes the state 
> of an agent. In the statement that an effective Sign, by being actualized 
> (sic), has an actual effect on an interpreter (NOT interpretant), Sign is 
> simply a placeholder for an undefined real process, since a "Sign defined as 
> a medium for the communication of a form" is, again, simply an analytic 
> mirror for some reality that operates according to as yet undefined rules.
> 
> The Peircean processual approach to information seeks to acquire additional 
> dynamics by distinguishing it from some structure considered as a totally 
> static phenomenon. What has been missed are the actual and potential dynamic 
> aspects of structure and form themselves - a sequence of nucleotides, for 
> example, not in abstracto, but in a real cell.

Again, this is simply not the case. I urge you to find a copy of his Collected 
Papers, or the chronological publications of The Peirce Project, where there 
are examples too numerous for me to cite in brief.

One note of my own observation: This notion of "communicate" that you use and 
is often found in discussions of information is a way of speaking about the 
distinct expression and apprehension of marks. Signs do not "communicate" (and 
nor do "marks"). A sign in any semeiotic theory is a feature of, embodied by, 
the apprehender.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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[Fis] On Category Errors

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

Since I ran out of responses last week, I recently "responded" to Joe Benner's 
"Logic In Reality" posts on my blog:

http://stevenzenith.info/on-logic-reality-category-errors-and-how-to-m

There I quote Peirce on the subject of "Reality." 

If my criticism is unjust or I have interpreted Joe incorrectly then I will 
appreciate the clarification.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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[Fis] Email Formats by FIS Contributors

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

There is an increasing tendency by FIS contributors to use a variety of quoting 
formats that make reading the contributions extremely difficult. This includes 
the use of font-size and font-color that will be removed when the message is 
presented in plain text form as, for example, when the message is stored in the 
FIS archive.

Can I suggest that contributors take care not to use rich text or HTML formats, 
despite the obvious temptation and send mail to the list only in plain text and 
are careful to demark the contributions appropriately, removing material that 
is not relevant to the response.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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Re: [Fis] On Uniformity

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Jerry,

A world of change and diversity does not at all imply that the underlying laws 
are not uniform. A move from antecedent to consequence is the first response, 
it is not the ultimate response of constructive science which seeks to 
overwhelm the superficial by the identification of basis.

The fact that science is a process of refinement, and consequently incomplete, 
only serves to indicate that there is more work to do.

You contexts illustrate only the continuing need to unify science, to provide a 
single context for the description of nature. Chemical elements are merely 
differences, they still adhere to the same underlying laws and principles.

Your conjecture that the uniformity of nature is the ploy of mathematical 
physicists to justify the ability of their conceptions to describe the world is 
cute. But, unfortunately, this is no more than saying that God is the ploy of 
theologians. Of course, both are the case but one is demonstrably more 
effective than the other.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info




On Apr 3, 2011, at 7:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

> Vol. 547.20   Steven "On uniformity"
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you for your reference to your blog.
> 
> Here are some assertions from your blog:
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> The concept of uniformity in nature underpins the whole of scientific 
>> knowledge.
>> 
>> This profound uniformity is necessary to enable any scientific statement, 
>> without it there can be no science.
>> 
>> To say the world is profoundly uniform is an existential statement, not an 
>> epistemological one; yet it has direct consequences for scientific 
>> epistemology and provides its foundation.
>> 
>> The universe, independent of any conception, is then necessarily and 
>> profoundly uniform if we are to have any scientific knowledge.
>> 
>> This uniformity is that which underlies the laws and principles of our 
>> observations; it is the scientific assertion that the determinant features 
>> of the world, apprehended as laws and principles, are everywhere the same.
>> 
>> The profound uniformity of the existent universe is the necessary basis of 
>> scientific knowledge; without it all bets are off.
>> 
>> 
> 
> If you want to invalidate science you need only demonstrate one case in which 
> the uniformity is denied. 
> 
> 
> 
> Ordinarily in scientific philosophy, the arguments run from antecedents to 
> consequences.
> 
> Your blog simply iterates, in somewhat varied rhetorics, your singular belief 
> in uniformity. It appears to be an initiating belief of your personal 
> philosophy.
> 
> 
> 
> My response to your assertions is simply that the principle of uniformity is 
> contrary to my experience. 
> 
> I experience a world that is richly textured with diversity and uniqueness, 
> one that changes second by second, minute by minute, day by day, month by 
> month, year by year, decade by decade, and, if I believe history, generation 
> by generation and even from branch to branch on the tree of life.
> 
> 
> 
> I have many forms of logic to interpret by experience, one of then, emergent 
> from the logic of Lavoisier / Dalton, operating on invisible particles, is 
> that matter has an identity that is preserved under transformation of 
> properties. This uniqueness of identity is not a uniformity, rather the 
> properties of an identity is a basis for separating this from that.
> 
> 
> 
> The formal logic of this system is a number system, the atomic number system. 
> The atomic number system is based on the principle that each chemical element 
> is non-uniform with respect to other chemical elements. The notion of the 
> alchemists that a hidden uniformity existed in matter was rejected after 
> several centuries of failure. The formal logic of the atomic number system is 
> irregular, valences are irregular, they are not uniform. Further, valencies 
> are context sensitive, the non-uniformity of contexts changes the behavior of 
> valences.  This context-sensitivity is amply demonstrates by the change of 
> inorganic matter into living matter by life itself. 
> 
> 
> 
> Thus, I assert that my examples do NOT invalidate science in general but do 
> demonstrate, in any extremely rough way, non-uniormity of the chemical and 
> life sciences.  It is not the efficient causality of Aristotle, the 
> manifestation of space and time, of which I write, rather, it is material 
> causality of Aristotle that generates biological reproduction. 
> 
> 
> 
> The philosophy of physical uniformity is known to me

Re: [Fis] On Uniformity: principle of statistical stabilization

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Andrei,

As long as we understand that the world itself is not probabilistic. :-)

Probability being merely a way of speaking about that which is inaccessible. 
Probabilistic laws only work because the world is, in fact, profoundly uniform.

With respect,
Steven 



On May 8, 2011, at 1:47 AM, Andrei Khrennikov wrote:

>Dear all,
> I think that the discussion on uniformity of the world's laws is closely 
> related to a role which the basic principle of modern probability theory
> (and hence modern science, since laws of nature are probabilistic, in their 
> modern formulation), 
> the principle of statistical stabilization of relative frequencies. By this 
> principle probability is the limit of relative frequency 
> of occurence of an event A in a long series of observations. Von MIses used 
> this principle as the cornerstone of his frequency probability theory,
> in the conventional measure-theoretic probability theory (Kolmogorov, 1933), 
> it is exhibited through the law of large numbers
> (at least roughly speaking). Thus a  phenomenon is recognized as physical (or 
> real) if it satisfies the principle of statistical stabilization
> of relative frequencies. If not, then it does not belong to the domain of 
> science, by definition! This is an important episthemological
> principle. I speculate that Nature might be essentially more complicated; 
> there can occure events which do not 
> satisfy the principle of statistical stabilization, but, although they do not 
> belong to science, they are not less real than those which are described by 
> homogeneous laws, describing repeatable phenomena, see
> for details A.   Khrennikov, Interpretations of Probability. De Gruyter, 
> Berlin, 2009,  second edition (completed).
> 
> Yours,
> Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
> International Center for Mathematical Modeling
> in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
> Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden
> ____
> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf 
> Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith [ste...@semeiosis.org]
> Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 1:04 AM
> To: Jerry LR Chandler
> Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] On Uniformity
> 
> Dear Jerry,
> 
> A world of change and diversity does not at all imply that the underlying 
> laws are not uniform. A move from antecedent to consequence is the first 
> response, it is not the ultimate response of constructive science which seeks 
> to overwhelm the superficial by the identification of basis.
> 
> The fact that science is a process of refinement, and consequently 
> incomplete, only serves to indicate that there is more work to do.
> 
> You contexts illustrate only the continuing need to unify science, to provide 
> a single context for the description of nature. Chemical elements are merely 
> differences, they still adhere to the same underlying laws and principles.
> 
> Your conjecture that the uniformity of nature is the ploy of mathematical 
> physicists to justify the ability of their conceptions to describe the world 
> is cute. But, unfortunately, this is no more than saying that God is the ploy 
> of theologians. Of course, both are the case but one is demonstrably more 
> effective than the other.
> 
> With respect,
> Steven
> 
> 
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>http://senses.info
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Apr 3, 2011, at 7:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> 
>> Vol. 547.20   Steven "On uniformity"
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Thank you for your reference to your blog.
>> 
>> Here are some assertions from your blog:
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The concept of uniformity in nature underpins the whole of scientific 
>>> knowledge.
>>> 
>>> This profound uniformity is necessary to enable any scientific statement, 
>>> without it there can be no science.
>>> 
>>> To say the world is profoundly uniform is an existential statement, not an 
>>> epistemological one; yet it has direct consequences for scientific 
>>> epistemology and provides its foundation.
>>> 
>>> The universe, independent of any conception, is then necessarily and 
>>> profoundly uniform if we are to have any scientific knowledge.
>>> 
>>> This uniformity is that which underlies the laws and principles of our 
>>> observations; it is the scientific assertion that the determinant features 
>>> of the world, apprehended as laws and principles, are everywhere the same.
&g

Re: [Fis] end of session

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I prefer that you do not speak for others, to any degree. I certainly exclude 
myself.

With respect,
Steven
 

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://senses.info


On May 30, 2011, at 1:37 PM, karl javorszky wrote:

> Dear All,
> 
> please let me contribute to the summary of this session. Of the multi-faceted 
> work we have done, I'd like to touch but two points: a. applicability and 
> code, b. time.
> 
> To have a businessman in our group is a blessing. We are reminded that 
> science is not only a pastime but should bring some profit, too. The 
> hypothesis we have accepted (I do not dare to write: "the result we have 
> agreed on") is that there was a deep logical flaw in our "rational" thinking 
> these last centuries. We have culturally accepted a rounding error in our 
> calculations by concentrating on one - rather debatable - definition, namely 
> that a1+b1=c=a2+b2 with a1#a2. This has turned out to be the result of a 
> wishful thinking. Our ancestors have not been able to look deeper into the 
> consequences of this rounding error. Our generation has had access to 
> computing devices which have allowed shifting through wast amounts of data 
> until some numerical facts could be found that allow a much exacter modeling 
> of Nature than the classical way of reckoning has so far made possible.
> 
> The basic tool one uses - in its easiest and lightest, primitive version -, 
> is a Table with 136 rows and 72x71 columns and 9 planes. The actual 
> complexity is in fact a bit more demanding. Yet, this Table appears to give a 
> good model for quite many applications relating to order, information, 
> movement, places, mass, velocity, alternatives, potentials (energy) and many 
> more concepts one is happy to have found a rational explanation (definition) 
> for.
> 
> The Table will at first be studied in C++  or Matlab varieties. After its 
> usefulness will have been recognised, it will be doubtlessly integrated in 
> chips (prominently, on both ends of a communication channel), therefore 
> written in machine code, if not hardwired.
> The practical uses of the Table cannot now be enumerated. Focused hearing, 
> pattern recognition and cryptography will be the most evident beneficiaries. 
> 
> As the concept behind the Table deals only with a+b=c, the concept will be 
> useful in every field where formal logic contributes. The relationship 
> between place and mass is of a high importance both in Physics and in 
> Chemistry. The quality property of assemblies of mass in (relatively) fixed 
> places is what Chemistry in the sense of Biochemy and - later - Genetics 
> deals with. So, the businessman in our midst may look forward to fruitful 
> results of the translation of basic science into applications.
> 
> Natural numbers and operations with them cannot be patented. Their 
> applications can. This group may have made progress beyond the most 
> optimistic estimations - if the group can and will act responsibly. Now, it 
> is the turn of the businessmen to be active. The proposition is out in the 
> open.
> 
> To the discussion on what we call colloquially "time". There can be at least 
> three different readings found if one understands the concepts behind a+b=c. 
> First, there is the length of a "convoy". This is a local, closed loop of 
> time. Second, there is time as the differentiating semantic marker between 
> cause and effect. This  can be read off the Table by means of the ties. If 
> the ties are ordered, there must have been a before. Third, there is the 
> global reading of time. This is visible on differentiations of a+b=c as a 
> temporal-spatial process. One unified reading being logically impossible 
> (there cannot be concurrently contradicting readings of priorities of 
> orders), there evolve subsegments in space in which each a different version 
> of the local times exist. As not all possible reorders can take place 
> concurrently, there will be sub-alternatives, in each of which those reorders 
> can take place which would be elsewhere contradictory.
> 
> Thank you for the collaboration and the high level of discussions in this 
> session.
> Karl 
> 
> 2011/5/27 Pedro C. Marijuan 
> Dear FIS colleagues,
> 
> The ongoing session on  information theory  ("information: mystery
> solving") will be closed soon. At his convenience, Mark Burging will
> send the usual Colophon with his impressions and some synthesis.
> 
> These are pretty complicate weeks for teaching and research, so some
> pause in the discussions will be appreciated by many. In any case, the
> list is always open to tangential discussions and spontaneous n

Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Mark,

My concern about all recent discussions on FIS is the apparent tendency to 
endow the notion of "information" with an existential status that is 
unwarranted. Information does not exist beyond our conception and so the 
language you use here worries me since there is nothing that is actually 
"carried." Therefore, any discussion of a "carrier" of information is either 
meaningless or a convenience. 

For me, at least, the term "information" is simply a way of speaking about the 
necessary distinctions of causality. It is that which identifies cause and adds 
to knowledge, where "knowledge" is our way of speaking about that which 
determines subsequent action.

So for me it is difficult to imagine "types" of information unless we are 
referring to causal types. Any other categorization is cannot be general.

There are, of course, special ways of speaking about information in the 
particular and in this we may find categorization convenient, not absolute.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://senses.info


On Jun 7, 2011, at 6:34 PM, Mark Burgin wrote:

> Discussion colophon
> 
>   Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive),
> 
>   I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a 
> discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in 
> which many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate efforts 
> of all active participants of the discussion, who shared their interesting 
> ideas related to information theory and practice, and especially to Joseph 
> Brenner, who expertly distilled communication of different participants 
> separating more or less direct answer to the suggested questions. As these 
> questions have quintessential importance for information theory and 
> methodology, I would like to suggest tentative answers to these questions, 
> giving arguments in support of this approach.
> Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction 
> between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative 
> or qualitative characteristics of information?
>  All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for 
> example height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to reduce 
> a person to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and other 
> physical, chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to 
> information, even qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a 
> strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information 
> measures, although there are infinitely many information measures. We can 
> often hear and read such expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher 
> information”.
> 
> Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed 
> by the general theory of information (GTI)?
>   A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we 
> say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information 
> definitions. If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer is 
> YES as it is demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010). 
>   At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by 
> different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions 
> define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or 
> knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define 
> nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are any) 
> are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing knowledge 
> on information and information processes in one unified system, allowing one 
> to discern information from other phenomena.
> Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between 
> information and an information carrier?
>  In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between 
> information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make 
> distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself, calling 
> both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel itself, 
> calling both things “a novel”.
>  At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a 
> distinction between information and an information carrier, especially, 
> because any thing contains information and thus, is an information carrier, 
> but it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is 
> unreasonable and contradicts principles of science.
> 
>  I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail. 
> 
>  Sincerely,
> Mark
> 

Re: [Fis] meaningful information

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

There is a lot of concept overloading in the community involving the term 
"meaning." So it would help me if you and Antony could just give a one sentence 
definition of the term. For example, for me:

meaning = the behavior that is the product of apprehending a sign.

Which is an extreme pragmatic definition in the spirit of Peirce. Note that 
this definition excludes, or rather characterizes differently, descriptive 
sentences of the form "The dog runs toward the house." The meaning of which is 
not that the dog runs toward the house, but the behavior of the apprehender.

With respect,
Steven


On Jul 20, 2011, at 10:41 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
> 
> Some of you may be interested in this context in my forthcoming article “
> "Meaning" as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and 
> simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning, Social Science 
> Information 50(3-4) (2011) 1-23. In preprint available at 
> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1011/1011.3244.pdf .
> 
> I argue that the dynamics of meaning are very different from those of 
> information.
> 
> Best wishes,
> Loet
> 
> 
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> 
> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
> Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
> Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 1:38 PM
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion
> 
> Thanks, Anthony, for the info on your book. As you will see during future 
> discussion sessions (currently we are in the vacation pause) some parties in 
> this list maintain positions not far away from your own views. In our archive 
> you can check accumulated mails about the matter you propose --e.g. 
> discussions during the last spring. But I think you are right that the whole 
> biological scope of information has been rarely discussed.  best wishes 
> ---Pedro
> 
> FIS website and discussions archives: see http://infoscience-fis.unizar.es/
> 
> 
> aread...@verizon.net escribió:
> I emailed an earlier version of the following contribution to the listserve a 
> few days ago and am interested in finding out if it is suitable  for 
> dissemination and, if os, when it might be included. My main interest is in 
> promoting discussion about the approach it takes to dealing with the 
> observer-dependent aspects of information.
> 
> My book " Meaningful Information: The BridgeBetween Biology, Brain and 
> Behavior' has just been published by Springer. Itintroduces a radically new 
> way of thinking about information and the importantrole it plays in living 
> systems. Thiså opens up new avenues for exploring howcells and organisms 
> change and adapt, since the ability to detect and respondto meaningful 
> information is the key that enables them to receive their geneticheritage, 
> regulate their internal milieu, and respond to changes in their 
> environment.The types of meaningful information that different species and 
> different celltypes are able to detect are finely matched to the ecosystems 
> in which theylive, for natural selection has shaped what they need to know to 
> functioneffectively within them. Biological detection and response systems 
> range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the 
> relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary 
> nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of 
> mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be detected 
> andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our 
> specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of 
> which areexplored within this new framework.
> 
> The book's home page can be found at: 
> http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/book/978-1-4614-0157-5
> 
> I am eager tofind out what members think about it.
> 
> Anthony Reading
> 
> 
> 
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
> ___
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> fis@listas.unizar.es
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Re: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

The document seems extremely confused to me. This is not least because the 
author does not appear to present a clear definition of the terms in the title 
or the expression of subject in the work. In particular, I can find no 
definition of "meaning" other than the one presented in a quote from Shannon 
and the subsequent use of the term is confused to say the least. Similarly, the 
term "semantic" is not clearly defined and abused. The same goes for other 
terms such as "knowledge."

So I take an even harsher view than Joseph since it is not even a good 
representative of the view that "computer algorithms can provide all you know, 
and all you need to know." The definitive representative of that view is 
Stephen Wolfram's book "A New Kind Of Science," and while I have my problems 
with the theory in the book, it is - at least - well defined.

With respect,
Steven


On Oct 3, 2011, at 9:17 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear Krassimir,
> 
> Thank you for bringing this document to our attention, for completeness. I 
> would have wished, however, that you had made some comment on it, putting it 
> into relation with your own work and, for example, that of Mark Burgin, 
> which are dismissed out of hand.
> 
> From my point of view, Sunik's work is another one of those major steps 
> backwards to an earlier, easier time when it was claimed that computer 
> algorithms could provide "all you know, and all you need to know" about 
> information. One example of a phrase the author presents as involving 
> meaning is "Peter's shirt size". . .
> 
> From a methodological standpoint, I think it underlines, /a contrario/, the 
> danger of focus on a single approach to information. My current idea, which 
> I propose for discussion, is that a document purporting to offer a theory of 
> information should provide a reasoned, comparative discussion of 4 to 5 
> theories. This number is large enough for judgments to be possible on a 
> preferred approach and small enough for the average reader, like myself, to 
> keep the similarities and differences in mind.
> 
> Thank you and best wishes,
> 
> Joseph
> 
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Krassimir Markov" 
> To: "FIS" 
> Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 12:00 PM
> Subject: [Fis] Fw: General Information Theory
> 
> 
> -Original Message- 
> From: boris.sunik
> Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 11:10 AM
> To: ithea-...@ithea.org
> Subject: General Information Theory
> 
> Dear Colleague,
> 
> For your information:
> http://www.GeneralInformationTheory.com
> 
> Regards,
> Boris Sunik
> 
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis 
> 
> ___
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Re: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

> 2. Brain: Are Neurons and bits really that different? 

Yes, the difference is stunning. I suggest you read a few papers on the subject.

>  Neither C++ no other practically used programming
> languages ever got any formal proofs of their functionality.

This is simply not the case. Again, I suggest you search for a few papers on 
the subject and read them. There are many.

With respect,
Steven



On Oct 10, 2011, at 3:09 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

> 
> 
> -Original Message- 
> From: boris.sunik
> Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 10:26 PM
> To: 'Krassimir Markov'
> Subject: RE: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Krassimir,
> Below are my points regarding discussed issues.
> 
> Regards,
> Boris Sunik
> 
> 1. I never claimed that computer algorithms could provide "all you know, and
> all you need to know" about information. To the contrary, I consider this
> statement as wrong.
> 
> My idea is that the relevant way of information representation and
> information explanation consists of viewing the real world in the same
> conceptual coordinates, which are used for representation of computer
> algorithms.
> 
> IMHO, this approach exactly matches the computing experience of the modern
> world. Computer languages are not able to express any information except the
> rules of manipulation with the bits and bytes of the computer storage. BUT,
> these very limited abilities are nevertheless sufficient not only for the
> controlling very different machines but also for the manipulating human
> beings.
> 
> Why a computer is that efficient? It is while computer languages adequately
> model the real world. Among other this means that data designated in
> computer languages coincide with the outside real  objects as the names
> coincide with the designated objects.
> Hence follows the idea of creating the programming-language-like-notation,
> which allows words directly designating external objects.
> 
> 2. Brain: Are Neurons and bits really that different?) that are the proof of
> the entire premise are unable to be proved, have no tests or evidence and
> are taken as self-evident.
> 
> In my opinion, no proofs for that are necessary. The solution is to build
> the knowledge system based on this premise and see whether it will
> practically work. Neither C++ no other practically used programming
> languages ever got any formal proofs of their functionality. The usability
> of a language depends not on any formal checks but on whether they could be
> effectively used in practice. I mean TMI could practically be used and hope
> it will.
> 
> 3. definition of "meaning
> 
> In TMI "semantics" and "meaning" are synonyms. The  characteristic for TMI
> understanding of semantics is firstly considered at the end of "Problem
> Statement". Another place is 2.6 where I deliberately chose the simplest
> systems, because they are the best in showing the approach's basics. The
> approach itself could be applied on arbitrary complex systems.
> 
> In a few words: ―  meaning of the linguistic item is the branch(s) of
> algorithm(s) associated with this item.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Krassimir Markov [mailto:mar...@foibg.com]
> Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 22:32 PM
> To: boris.sunik
> Subject: Fw: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Gavin Ritz
> Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 11:22 PM
> To: 'Steven Ericsson-Zenith' ; 'Joseph Brenner'
> Cc: 'Foundations of Information Science'
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik
> 
> I agree with you both.
> 
> The declarative statements (4 statements in 2.4.1 Digital Computer versus
> Brain: Are Neurons and bits really that different?) that are the proof of
> the entire premise are unable to be proved, have no tests or evidence and
> are taken as self evident.
> 
> This path is a dead end.
> 
> Regards
> Gavin
> 
> 
> 
> The document seems extremely confused to me. This is not least because the
> author does not appear to present a clear definition of the terms in the
> title or the expression of subject in the work. In particular, I can find no
> definition of "meaning" other than the one presented in a quote from Shannon
> and the subsequent use of the term is confused to say the least. Similarly,
> the term "semantic" is not clearly defined and abused. The same goes for
> other terms such as "knowledge."
> 
> So I take an even harsher view than Joseph since it is not even a good
> representative of the

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I find this view a little disturbing. 

If you do not have a definition, of some kind, of the term "information." Your 
claim is simply equivalent to saying that you have no idea what you are talking 
about. How can you proceed without a clarification of terms? 

I can at least point toward living things, organisms, and ask: "What is this 
and what distinguishes it?"  And thereby justify the question "What is life?" 

What justification do you have for asking the question: "What is information?"

If it appears that we do not know what we are talking about, that would appear 
to be an adequate explanation of why "Information Science" has little traction.

Recall my own definition of "information" as "that which identifies cause and 
adds to knowledge," i.e., speaking of that which is in-formation, it rests 
between cause and that which determines subsequent action, it modifies that 
which determines subsequent action. 

Is information then a "necessary distinction," forced upon us by the world, or 
is it a "way of speaking," a notion that we force upon the world? And what does 
it mean to have a science of it?

I think it is clear, "Information" is a way of speaking about the ongoing 
transformation of the unfolding world, it is a way of speaking about "change." 
Just as "cause" and "effect" are ways of speaking about change. Information has 
no existential status beyond our conception of it as such.

A science of information then would be the study and language of change, of 
differences, of the process of causes and effects and ways of speaking about 
them. Information exists in this sense then only if the cause it identifies 
makes a difference to the effect under consideration.

With respect to "Library Science," that I will take to be simply the organizing 
of text to facilitate effective access to reading materials, "information 
science" relates only to the measure of the difference such organization makes 
to the behavior (effective or otherwise) of those accessing these materials.

This suggests that "Information Science" is a useful study for those that wish 
to reason about behaviors of any kind, and if I were to teach or study the 
subject then this would be the motivation for placing it into my curriculum. 

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info







On Dec 3, 2011, at 4:23 AM, m...@aiu.ac.jp wrote:

> Dear Colleagues: 
> There are some questions which periodically return to FIS 
> discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: "What is 
> information?" However, the lack of consensus regarding central 
> concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information 
> Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question 
> "What is life?" But, this does not threaten the identity of 
> Biology. 
> 
> Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a 
> commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with 
> Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in 
> Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with 
> Library 
> Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, 
> as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
> http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science 
> interleave 
> on many levels. 
> 
> Information Science will never receive recognition without an 
> organized effort of research community to introduce its 
> philosophy, 
> goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience. 
> 
> Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as 
> a subject of independent study do not have big enough 
> circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of 
> the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce 
> Information Science as a subject of education at the college 
> level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize 
> in this direction. 
> 
> Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not 
> easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a 
> perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the 
> context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not 
> information, can be applied in all possible contexts of 
> education? 
> 
> Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a 
> syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who 
> are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but 
> participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome 
> differences between our views on the definition of 
> information, on the relationship of 

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Dec 4, 2011, at 2:57 AM, m...@aiu.ac.jp wrote:

> 3. Do we know what we are talking about? (Answer to Steven)
> 
> Sometimes I doubt it, when I read FIS discussions. Of course, 
> I am joking.

I read the same discussions, and I'm not so sure :-).

> ... I do not see any problem in discussing ten different concepts 
> of information, as long as there is a common conceptual 
> framework prepared by philosophy of information and a common 
> methodology for the inquiry.

I'm not sure what a "philosophy of information" is exactly, to be honest. It 
is, perhaps, the merely the title for the variety of uses and abuses of the 
term "information."

In terms of Shannon, I see no philosophy. As I noted before, I see 
"Information" simply as a way of speaking about the process of change and, in 
particular, processes that make a difference - and this is consistent with 
Shannon. Hence, it has merit as a means of speaking about existence but it is a 
category error to attribute existential status to "information."

In affirmation, ways of speaking that us the term are useful only if they 
enable methods of reasoning about processes that make a difference to outcomes. 
 

It would be hard for me to identify ten different concepts of information, 
although I suspect it would be easy to identify ten or more vague or overloaded 
usages of the term.

> For instance, I have my own definition of information about 
> which I published several papers. Of course, I believe that it 
> is superior over other definitions. But, it does not mean that 
> I would not want to discuss yours. For instance, I think that 
> the concept of information should apply to phenomena in the 
> domain of quantum mechanics. Over there the use of the concept 
> of causality is questionable. I would be very interested in 
> your view of this matter. 

I see no problem using the notion of "information" when speaking about 
probabilities, probability is simply a way of speaking about a lot of stuff. It 
is a compression of the facts that relies upon the great uniformity of the 
world. Indeed, speaking about probabilities is a necessary epistemic 
requirement when dealing with the inaccessible (practically or in fact). I do 
not take challenges to causality seriously except to consider such challenges 
as pointers toward opportunities for new discovery.

> In my opinion the main task for Information Science is not to 
> study one particular  pre-defined concept, but to search for 
> what is common for many phenomena which form contexts for the 
> use of the term information or which have similar 
> manifestations to the phenomena which in the past were 
> associated with information.

The problem here is that we must not let language analysis dominate good sense, 
else we find ourselves misled. Science does not study concepts or history, it 
studies the facts of the matter independent of our language constructions. If 
we allow ourselves to be constrained by our preconceptions and convention then 
we will find ourselves pursuing white rabbits.

> Then we can try to check whether 
> either of existing concepts of information (as defined by you, 
> me, others) can be used to formulate unifying theory of these 
> phenomena. If not, a new concept of information will have to 
> be formulated. But don't worry, I am sure my concept will be 
> just fine ;-) 

I am glad you are so confident. But you have not defined your terms.

With respect,
Steven





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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I'm with Bob on this to a point. 

Too often I see people giving information an existential status that it is not 
due. As you will recall, in my terms, information is simply a way of speaking 
about that which identifies cause and adds to knowledge, "knowledge" is simply 
a way a way of speaking about that which determines subsequent action. 

However, this does allow me to identify a rock as the source of information and 
to speak about its behavior in terms of its "knowledge," that about its 
structure and dynamics that determine its subsequent action.

I do not use "semeiosis" in the universal way that I use "knowledge." I could 
see it being so used only if it excludes sensory operation, since I argue for a 
role that sense plays in the behavior of living systems, and I include that 
role as distinguishing semeiosis, the term for me refers only to the sign 
processing of living systems.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 18, 2012, at 9:30 AM, Bob Logan wrote:

> Dear Stanley - how can there be information in the abiotic world? Information 
> is the noun associated with the verb to inform or informing. A rock can not 
> be informed. An abiotic entity can not be informed. Information begins with 
> life. A bacterium can be informed but not an abiotic entity. When we look at 
> stars or the moon or a fossil, they are not information. Our interpretation 
> of the things in nature we observe, biotic or abiotic is the information. 
> Perhaps I am missing something but that is how I see things from my naive 
> point of view. The star, the moon or the fossil are not signs unless you 
> believe that God exists and he or she made these signs for us to interpret. 
> What do you mean that semiosis is a universal phenomenon? 
> 
> best Bob
> On 2012-03-18, at 11:48 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
> 
>> As my first posting for this week:
>> 
>> Bob, Loet -- I respond by clarifying that my meaning in this little equation 
>> is that (following Sebeok) semiosis is a universal phenomenon.  The system 
>> of interpretance in my effort here is the LOCALE.  It is such locales that 
>> have evolved into organisms and social systems.  In organisms and other 
>> distinct systems of interpretance, the sign is the context for 
>> interpretation.  So, in the little equation, I am GENERALIZING semiosis into 
>> abiotic Nature.
>> 
>> STAN
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 2:57 AM, Loet Leydesdorff  
>> wrote:
>> Dear Bob,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Yes, I agree: the difference that makes a difference is operationally 
>> generated by a receiving system; information itself is nothing but a series 
>> of differences (contained in a probability distribution). The selection 
>> mechanisms in the receiving systems that position the incoming uncertainty 
>> have to be specified (as hypotheses). Meaningful information emerges from 
>> selecting the signal from the noise.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The meaningful information (the differences that make a difference) can 
>> again be communicated as information (for example, in and among biological 
>> systems). Thus, the operation is recursive and the communication / 
>> autopoiesis continues. Meaning can only be communicated by systems which are 
>> able to entertain a symbolic order reflexively such as human beings and in 
>> interhuman discourses.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I’ll read the book by Reading.
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Loet
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>> 
>> Professor, University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
>> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
>> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
>> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ; 
>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
>> Behalf Of Bob Logan
>> Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 10:55 PM
>> To: Stanley N Salthe
>> Cc: fis
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Stan - great formula but as I learned from Anthony Reading who wrote a 
>> lovely book on information Meaningful Information - it is the recipient that 
>> brings the meaning to the information. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> PS My book What is Information was been translated into Portuguese and 
>> published in Brazil where I am doing a 4 city, 5 university spea

Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Christophe,

I don't buy this overloading of the term "information" by the "uoward/downward" 
argument. 

I also lament the lack of rigor concerning the definition of the term 
"information," but I lament more the lack of rigor concerning the definition of 
the term "meaning." What is the definition of the term in the chapter you 
reference? 

The best that I could guess in terms of my own work is that it refers to some 
action potential that is altered by information, although this does not exactly 
fit your description. This, as opposed to my own use of the term "meaning" as 
the term speaking about the behavior produced by the apprehension of a sign 
(Peirce's pragmaticism). In my terms the action potential to which you seem to 
refer is called "knowledge." By this definition "representations" do not have a 
fixed associated meaning, they do not always produce the same behavior. In 
apprehension by individuals they can be said to have an action potential that 
is additive to the current potential in the organism. This would be consistent 
with a claim that representations "mean" different things to different 
individuals in different contexts.

We also appear to disagree concerning the term "semantics," that I take in the 
spirit of logic (with Carnap) to refer only to the rules of language 
transformation.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 16, 2012, at 11:18 AM, Christophe Menant wrote:

> Dear FISers, 
> Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical & meaningless) and 
> upwards (biological & meaningful). The difference being about interpretation 
> or not. 
> It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing and 
> meaning generation.
> There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book 
> (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477).
>  
> “Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations.An Evolutionary 
> Approach”
> Content of the chapter:
> 1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation
> 1.1. Information.Meaning of information and quantity of information
> 1.2. Meaningful information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic approach
> 2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach 
> 2.1. Stay alive constraint and meaning generation for organisms
> 2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary approach
> 2.3. Meaning transmission
> 2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks of 
> meanings
> 2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations
> 3. Meaningful Information and Representations in Humans
> 4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems
> 4.1. Meaningful information and representations from traditional AI to 
> Nouvelle AI. Embodied-situated AI
> 4.2. Meaningful representations versus the guidance theory of representation
> 4.3. Meaningful information and representations versus the enactive approach
> 5. Conclusion and Continuation
> 5.1. Conclusion
> 5.2. Continuation
> A version close to the final text can be reached at 
> http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009.pdf
> 
> As Plamen says, we may be at the beginning of a new scientific revolution. 
> But I’m afraid that an understanding of the meaning of information needs 
> clear enough an understanding of the constraint at the source of the meaning 
> generation process. And even for basic organic meanings coming from a “stay 
> alive” constraint, we have to face the still mysterious nature of life. And 
> for human meanings, the even more mysterious nature of human mind.
> This is not to discourage our efforts in investigating these questions. Just 
> to put a stick in the ground showing where we stand. 
> Best,
> Christophe 
> Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:47:28 +0100
> From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
> 
>  Mensaje original 
> Asunto:   Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
> Fecha:Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:24:38 +0100
> De:   Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov 
> Para: Pedro C. Marijuan 
> Referencias:  <20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com> 
> <4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es>
> 
> 
> +++
> 
> Dear All,
> 
> I could not agree more with Pedro's opinion. The referred article is 
> interesting indeed. but, information is only physical in the narrow sense 
> taken by conventional physicalistic-mechanistic-computational approaches. 
> Such a statement defends the red

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear John,

Since Locke "established usage" and appeals to authority has rarely been a 
criteria of "right" definition or sufficient to deny refinement. To state one's 
own usage clearly, in order to disclose its flaws and intention, seems hardly a 
cause for criticism, unless that criticism be simply to state your own usage 
with the same or greater clarity. I do not believe we can speak for the usage 
of others, nor can we appeal to "dictionaries" of any kind. It is our 
individual responsibility to "take charge" of our definitions (a position, for 
example, that I call "definitionism").

I am with you in believing that to assert "real" meaning, independent of our 
own usage, of any term is silly, indeed to do so is unscientific.

For me, terms like "information" and "knowledge" are simply ways of speaking 
about the world, they are notions that we force upon the world, they are not 
necessary distinctions, forced upon us by the world. Without an epistemology of 
this kind in the development of ideas it's hard to project whether the usage of 
any given term will be productive. 

Of course, we must allow for the vagaries of fortune and perception, the road 
to clarity is paved with many corrections.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Apr 18, 2012, at 4:54 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Steven,
>  
> You are free to use "information" as you wish; however, physicists, 
> especially cosmologists, have been using it in ways that involve meaning in 
> no direct way at all. They do computations on it, and explain cosmological 
> and astronomical phenomena in terms in which it (or an equivalent) is 
> essential. See, for example, Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, earlier 
> work by Wheeler and Gell Mann, more recent work by Seth Lloyd. It is an 
> established usage.
>  
> The idea of talking in terms of the real meaning of "x", where x is some term 
> is really a bit silly. The important thing is whether some idea for which x 
> is a sign can be used productively and scientifically.
>  
> John
> 
>  
> Professor John Collier  
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
> Durban 4041 South Africa
> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292
> F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> email: colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>> On 2012/03/18 at 07:24 PM, in message 
> <4ad9379c-fb4a-40f8-826e-52f5978ff...@iase.us>, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
>  wrote:
> 
> I'm with Bob on this to a point. 
> 
> Too often I see people giving information an existential status that it is 
> not due. As you will recall, in my terms, information is simply a way of 
> speaking about that which identifies cause and adds to knowledge, "knowledge" 
> is simply a way a way of speaking about that which determines subsequent 
> action. 
> 
> However, this does allow me to identify a rock as the source of information 
> and to speak about its behavior in terms of its "knowledge," that about its 
> structure and dynamics that determine its subsequent action.
> 
> I do not use "semeiosis" in the universal way that I use "knowledge." I could 
> see it being so used only if it excludes sensory operation, since I argue for 
> a role that sense plays in the behavior of living systems, and I include that 
> role as distinguishing semeiosis, the term for me refers only to the sign 
> processing of living systems.
> 
> With respect,
> Steven
> 
> 
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> http://iase.info
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Mar 18, 2012, at 9:30 AM, Bob Logan wrote:
> 
> > Dear Stanley - how can there be information in the abiotic world? 
> > Information is the noun associated with the verb to inform or informing. A 
> > rock can not be informed. An abiotic entity can not be informed. 
> > Information begins with life. A bacterium can be informed but not an 
> > abiotic entity. When we look at stars or the moon or a fossil, they are not 
> > information. Our interpretation of the things in nature we observe, biotic 
> > or abiotic is the information. Perhaps I am missing something but that is 
> > how I see things from my naive point of view. The star, the moon or the 
> > fossil are not signs unless you believe that God exists and he or she made 
> > these signs for us to interpret. What do you mean that semiosis is a 
> > universal phenomenon? 
> > 
> > best Bob
> > On 2012-03-18, at 11:48 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
> > 
> >> As my first posting for this week:
> >> 

Re: [Fis] POSTS ON TERRY' S BOOK

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Hector,

What, exactly, is your objection to it? It's anti-reductionism (that I would 
object to also) or it's claim that Turing computation is insufficient (to which 
I have no objection)?  

With respect,
Steven

--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Apr 27, 2012, at 1:39 PM, Hector Zenil wrote:

> Could someone summarize why Terrence Deacon's book is such a presumed
> breakthrough judging by the buzz it has generated among FIS
> enthusiasts?
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan
>  wrote:
>> Dear colleagues,
>> 
>> Krassimir Markov's suggestion is excellent. Next year we could have a
>> FIS conference in his place, centered in the exploration of the new info
>> avenue drafted by Terrence Deacon's book, and started by Stuart Kauffman
>> and others. Previously my suggestion is that we have a regular
>> discussion session (like the many ones had in this list). A couple of
>> voluntary chairs, and an opening text would be needed. Sure Bob Logan
>> could handle this (perhaps off list) and we would have a fresh
>> discussion session for the coming months.
>> 
>> Technical Note: the current messages are not entering in the list; the
>> filter is rejecting them as there are too many addresses together.
>> Please, send the fis address single, and all the others separated or as
>> as Cc. Otherwise I will have to enter them one by one.
>> 
>> best
>> 
>> ---Pedro
>> (fis list coordination)
>> 
>> -
>> Pedro C. Marijuán
>> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
>> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
>> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
>> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
>> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
>> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
>> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
>> -
>> 
>> 
>> ___
>> fis mailing list
>> fis@listas.unizar.es
>> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
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Re: [Fis] CFP: Special theme issue of Elsevier's Journal “Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology” (JPBMB)

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Only if Elsevier address the following concerns:

http://thecostofknowledge.com/

Steven

--
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Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On May 30, 2012, at 11:26 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov wrote:

> 
> 
> 
> Dear Colleagues,
> 
>  
> I am pleased to invite you to submit a contribution for
> 
>  
> a special theme issue of Elsevier's Journal “Progress in Biophysics & 
> Molecular Biology” (JPBMB)
> 
>  
> http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/
> 
>  
> 
> entitled
> 
>  
> Can Biology Create A Profoundly New Mathematics and Computation?
> 
>  
> Submission deadline: 31.08.2012
> 
>  
> CFP & Submission page:  
> http://www.inbiosa.eu/en/Workshops-And-Conferences-View.html?article=can-biology-create-a-profoundly-new-mathematics-and-computation
> 
>   
> This theme issue continues the effort of the FP7 project INBIOSA 
> (www.inbiosa.eu), the results of which are recently published in a Springer 
> volume
> 
> 
> 
> http://www.inbiosa.eu/en/Press-View.html?article=integral-biomathics-tracing-the-road-to-reality
> 
> 
> 
> I would appreciate if you distribute this announcement to your colleagues and 
> other mailing lists.
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you!
> 
> 
> 
>  
> Best wishes,
> 
> 
> 
> ___ ___ ___
> 
> Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov
> landline:   +49.30.38.10.11.25
> fax/ums:   +49.30.48.49.88.26.4
> mobile: +44.12.23.96.85.69
> email: pla...@simeio.org
> URL:  www.simeio.org
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis


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Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 564, Issue 3

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

For a "Whole-Cell Computational Model" this paper, an interesting pulling 
together of the pieces as it is, says precious little about the membrane 
behavior and dynamic structure of the cell - something that I expect from a 
paper that claims to be a "whole-cell" model. The title of the paper appears to 
be missing the word "Toward …"

Steven

--
  Dr Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
  http://iase.info



On Oct 16, 2012, at 1:19 PM, Kevin Clark  wrote:

> "A Whole-Cell 
> Computational Model Predicts Phenotype from Genotype"


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Re: [Fis] Paper on Ulanowicz's A Third Window: Ulanowicz’s Process Ecology, McLuhan’s Media Ecology and Kauffman-Logan’s Notion of Biotic Information

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Bob,

I can make no sense of this usage of the term "constraint." And while I 
understand where you are going, mainly because I'm familiar with yours and 
Kauffman's work, this paper strikes me as flawed.

First, the paper claims to seek a "non-reductionist" answer but fails to 
provide an alternative scientific epistemology - "non-reductionism" is not an 
epistemology. In brief, the problem is in the methodology of the paper which is 
still atomistic - and this is why you have a problem with atomistic reduction. 
Reduction as a method is not necessarily atomistic - reduction to a point is 
obviously empty.

Leaving aside any question concerning the existential nature of the suggestions 
made in the paper, that might be clarified if a theory of knowledge had been 
stated, the term abused most in this paper is "semiotic."  That semeiotic 
theory is relevant I have no doubt, but as used here it is meaningless faddism.

In its atomism the paper commits the crime it seeks to avoid in rejecting 
reduction, for rather than an integration assembling the atomic parts as 
suggested under environmental limits, you need to identify mechanisms that 
differentiate from the whole - like Darwin's natural selection - which is 
surely the true nature of organization propagation by constraint. 

And I know this is where you are trying to go here but I believe it is 
necessary to go beyond the naive constraints of known physics. As to 
information theory, the paper seems misguided.

Best regards,
Steven


On Feb 1, 2013, at 6:11 AM, Bob Logan  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues - I received the following response below to my paper from 
> Christophe Menant on the FIS listserv so some of you might not have received 
> it. The easiest way for me to respond to the question that Christophe raises 
> is to share with you the original paper I wrote with Stuart Kauffman and 
> others in which we argue that in biotic systems that the constraints are the 
> information.
> 
> <1POEFeb1.pdf>
> 
> Christophe Menant  wrote on Jan 31, 2013 
> 8:34:51 AM EST.
> 
> Dear Bob,
> Your paper is interesting. And there is a point on which I would appreciate 
> knowing a bit more. It is about the way you use the word "constraint". 
> Here are the understandings I got from your paper (your last paragraph):
> 1) Constraint  as information: 
> - "biotic information is nothing more than the constraints that allows a 
> living organism to harness energy from its environment to propagate its 
> organization".
> - "I do not know where the energy comes from to build the constraints but the 
> constraints are the information".
> - "That  constraint, that vital piece of information was the spark that 
> ignited the biosphere".
> 2) Constraint as part of a system transforming energy into work:
> - "a living organism must be able through constraints to do work with the 
> energy it imports from its environment" 
> - "where does the energy come from to build the constraints to turn 
> environment energy into the work needed by an organisms to achieve its 
> metabolism" 
> 3) Constraint as constructing information: 
> - "foundation which views information as the construction of constraints".
> 4) Constraint as allowing a finalized work: 
> - "an aleatoric event took place in which a constraint emerged that allowed a 
> collection of organic molecules to do the work necessary to propagate their 
> organization". 
> These usages of the word look as gravitating around information and 
> energy/work. But perhaps you mean something else as the word can be used in 
> many different ways. (as you may remember, I use it as characterizing the 
> nature of a system: http://cogprints.org/6279/2/MGS.pdf) 
> It would interesting you tell us a bit more about the way you position the 
> word in your approach.
> Thanks in advance
> Christophe 
> 
> Here are Christophe's usage of constraint: A meaning is a meaningful 
> information that is created by a system submitted to a constraint when it 
> receives an external information that has a connection with the constraint. 
> The meaning is formed of the connection existing between the received 
> information and the constraint of the system.
> The function of the meaning is to participate to the determination of an 
> action that will be implemented in order to satisfy the constraint of the 
> system.
> 
> On 2013-01-30, at 11:02 PM, Bob Logan wrote:
> 
>> Dear Colleagues - I was very moved by Robert Ulanowicz's book A Third Window 
>> - I saw parallels with the work of McLuhan and a project I co-authored with 
>> Stuart Kauffman and others. That resulted in the attached paper. Some of you 
>> on FIS  will receive this email post twice as I do not know who all is on 
>> FIS - I am sending this post to all folks that were copied on emails to or 
>> from Robert Ulanowicz.
>> I hope you will find time to read my paper and sent me your comments. If you 
>> like this paper I have another that I submitted to Zygon that deals with 
>> matte

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: SV: Science, Philosophy and Information. An Alternative Relation] S.Brier

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

John,

When you say "philosophers" do you mean "theorists?" And, if not, what 
distinguishes the two? 

What would "a philosophical component" of information theory look like? Does 
such a component simply speak about the existential status of information? Is 
there some epistemology involved? Are there ethical imperatives that I could 
draw from such a philosophy?

Steven



On Feb 11, 2013, at 9:38 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> I guess I am at a loss to see them as separate 
> discourses.  Especially in the domain of Information.
> 
> Contrary to what Stan said, I think that many of 
> the major advances in science from Statistical 
> Mechanics, to Relativity Theory to Quantum 
> Mechanics did and continue to have a major 
> philosophical component, and professional 
> philosophers work with scientists directly in 
> each of these fields, It used to be true in 
> Computer Science, but is less so now. In 
> Cognitive Science there is currently virtually 
> now separation. In Biology there are many 
> philosophers who work with biologists, and vice 
> versa, but far too many who do not.
> 
> I think that technology is much more linked to 
> industry than it is to the sciences above.
> 
> John
> 
> At 06:03 PM 2013/02/11, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>> How does one measure the synergy among three discourses?
>> That is an interesting question within information theory (as part of both
>> science and philosophy).
>> 
>> Best,
>> Loet
>> 
>> 
>> -Original Message-
>> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
>> Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
>> Sent: Monday, February 11, 2013 4:29 PM
>> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>> Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: SV: Science, Philosophy and Information. An Alternative
>> Relation] S.Brier
>> 
>>  Original Message 
>> Subject:SV: [Fis] Science, Philosophy and Information. An
>> Alternative
>> Relation
>> Date:   Thu, 07 Feb 2013 20:32:04 +0100
>> From:   Søren Brier 
>> To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch , Pedro Clemente
>> Marijuan Fernandez , fis@listas.unizar.es
>> , John Collier 
>> References: <6043399.89641360255002322.javamail.webm...@bluewin.ch>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Dear Joseph
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I go for each of the three nominally independent disciplines are not
>> independent, but that each provides a dynamic ontological and
>> epistemological link to the other two, more or less strong or "actual"
>> depending on the extent to which one wishes to emphasize certain aspects
>> of knowledge. Science without philosophy is stupid but philosophy
>> without science is blind. I am for a synergetic interaction.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Best wishes
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  Søren Brier
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Professor in the semiotics of information, cognition and commmunication
>> science,
>> 
>> department of International Business Communication, Copenhagen Business
>> School,
>> 
>> Dalgas Have 15, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> *Fra:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
>> [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *På vegne af *joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
>> *Sendt:* 7. februar 2013 17:37
>> *Til:* Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez; fis@listas.unizar.es; John Collier
>> *Emne:* [Fis] Science, Philosophy and Information. An Alternative Relation
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>> 
>> The formation of the the Society for the Philosophy of Information at
>> the University of Hertfordshire is announced in the link in John's note.
>> It includes the announcement and Call for Papers of the International
>> Conference on the Philosophy of Information to be held in Xi'An, China
>> in October, 2013, sponsored by both the above Society, led by Professor
>> Luciano Floridi and the Institute for the Philosophy of Information in
>> Xi'An under the direction of Professor Wu Kun.
>> 
>> This increased activity in the area of the philosophy of information
>> (another major Workshop is planned this Spring) raises the issue of the
>> relation between the science and philosophy of information as well as of
>> the philosophy of science. I am aware of and agree with the position
>> expressed by Pedro that information science in the FIS framework should
>> emphasize scientific research in the sense of knowledge that is
>> quantifiable and/or provable. However, I do not believe that either he
>> or others of you intend to exclude rigorous qualitative knowledge,
>> especially as it concerns the dual nature of information.
>> 
>> The ubiquitous presence of information in all disciplines, as emphasized
>> by Wu, suggests an alternative relation linking philosophy, science and
>> information that is NOT one of simple hierarchical inclusion or
>> possession ("of"). One possibility is to say that it is information that
>> links philosophy and science, but this formulation perhaps fails to
>> recognize the general properties of the latter two.
>> 
>> Another possibility is to say that each of the three nominally
>> 

Re: [Fis] Informatics vs. Mathematics

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

This view is fundamentally flawed. The introduction of subjectivity confusing 
the matter. The distinction is not about "objects" but "operations."

In mathematics, taken as the science that draws necessary conclusions, 
operations suffer no causal loss. Whereas, information is the means to reason 
about the causal integrity of interaction.

Turing machines conduct mathematical operations, not informational operations. 
Communication of one machine to another, OTOH, is an informational operation.

Regards,
Steven


On Apr 15, 2013, at 4:10 PM, "Krassimir Markov"  wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
> It is really pleasure to read your posts in this exciting mail list.
> During the time I am subscribed in (Thanks to Pedro for inviting me!) I have 
> read interesting and very useful ideas.
> Now I think is the right time to put one very important question: 
> What is the main difference between Informatics and Mathematics?
> In other words: What is the main difference between “Information object” and 
> “Mathematical one” ?
> Well, I nave answer (of course, from my point of view):
> The main difference is the Subject!
> Mathematical theories totally avoid the subject and subjective interpretation 
> of mathematical structures and operations.
> It doesn’t mater who will interpret the mathematical constructions ( like 
> y=f(x) ) – now and after 1000 years the interpretation MUST be the same.
> In Informatics it is just the opposite – it is of crucial importance who will 
> interpret the information structures and operations.
> Let remember the Turing Machine, the basic Subject of Informatics with which 
> all interpretations of algorithms have to be compared.
> The philosophical conclusion is simple – the information phenomena (as 
> reflections) exist in the reality but may be interpreted ONLY by the Subjects.
> In other words, the information is kind of reflection for which the CONCRETE 
> Subject have appropriate interpretation (an evidence what is reflected).
> Subject may be a human, an animal, an electronic device, etc. i.e. natural or 
> artificial entity.
> In all cases, the “reflection” (or “pattern”, if you prefer) has to be 
> recognized by the Subject to became “information”. 
> 
> Friendly regards
> Krassimir___
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[Fis] Stanford seminar "On The Origin Of Experience"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Please forgive my cross-posting.

The video of my Nov. 13th lecture is now available on YouTube,

http://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M

it includes the first chapter of my forthcoming book. The full
transcript is now also available as a book preview here.

https://www.createspace.com/Preview/1137409

In a follow up lecture on January 15th I will speak about the life and
work of Charles Sanders Peirce. In this lecture I will place Charles
in the broader context of intellectual developments in and around the
formation of Harvard University.

Best regards,
Steven
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Re: [Fis] [PEIRCE-L] Stanford seminar "On The Origin Of Experience"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Thank you Anny. That is an interesting interpretation of my position.

As will be made clear in the book, for me a religion is simply a set
of ideas such that we cannot look upon the world without consideration
of them. In this sense, science is my religion.

I should make it clear that I am personally indifferent to the notion
of "God." But I understand its context, the motivation and origin for
its use. In my next lecture, however, I will speak about the view and
motivations of Benjamin Peirce, his son Charles, and the attempt by
them and other radical Unitarians to re-conceive the notion of God in
scientific terms.

But it should be clear that this attempt, led by Benjamin Peirce, from
influences and peer encouragements that can be traced back to Descarte
through Malebranche and the Unitarian logical challenge to divided
conceptions (i.e. Trinity), and articulated in his book "Ideality in
the physical sciences" is rightly paralleled with the positivist and
existentialist movement in Europe during the nineteenth century.

In my view it is a direct parallel to the existentialist challenge to
historical conceptions of divinity. I describe Benjamin as a "cautious
positivist" in that he argued for true positivism (that science may be
universally applied) but did not want science to lose touch with the
deeper cosmological issues and issues of "quality." (In this he, and
the others of his ilk in and around Harvard, were thwarted by
conservative social forces and subsequently Unitarianism lost its
way).

These same motivations led in Europe to a concern over the social
implications of the failure of past conceptions (in the rise of
science and rejection of scripture) and in the absence of an
alternative. A concern expressed in terms that "God is dead."

The social pragmatism of this Harvard centered group was to place our
concerns over the nature of our existence clearly into the domain of
science and to re-conceive of the notion of God in scientific terms. A
view articulated by Charles in his "Neglected Argument."  I've been
saying that it is a sort of atheism without the "a," but this is not
quite fair I think since atheism is most generally a form of
materialism. This move acknowledges the common ground in the inquiry
of science and theology on the deeper issues, i.e, the intimate human
inquiry into the nature of the world and our place in it.

Anyhow, this narrative has unfolded before me during the development
of my work and provides the historical context and precedence for it.
It is discussed in one chapter of the forthcoming book and I will
speak of it (working from this chapter) on January 15th when I lecture
at Stanford on the life and work of Charles Sanders Peirce. This
lecture will place Charles in this broader context. As you know, 2014
is the centenary of Charles' death.

For others, if you have not yet caught my lecture last month, you can
see it here: http://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M  The transcript of the
lecture is available as a book review here:
https://www.createspace.com/Preview/1137409

Again, my thanks for your kind comments.

Best regards,
Steven


On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 AM, Anny Ballardini
 wrote:
> Steven Ericsson-Zenith,
>
> I finally had some time to follow this interesting presentation of your
> book. And if I understand properly, which is also connected with some of
> your previous contributions on this list, the fact that you want to show
> that light is static is an hermetic statement that God exists in an
> ever-present presence. And as far as I can remember, you will be able to
> show mathematically your supposition. This draws back to your previous
> commitment as a religious member of our community. You also say that "new
> ideas are not familiar," but as you know, new ideas are the bread of
> artists, and this goes well along with what research is supposed to be. The
> only difference in-between artistic and scientific research is that the
> latter requires an armamentarium of historical information (precise
> quotations, previous theories) that artistic performance does not have. That
> all belongs to the digestion of art criticism.
> I am wondering in this moment about Leonardo. He simply skipped all previous
> history and created on his own in a gut-lived process that put himself in a
> competition with his own self. Those who play an instrument or paint,
> perfectly know what I am talking about.
> After this book, which I can see as a major contribution to the scientific
> community, maybe you will finally be able to get to pure research, your own.
>
> What might be difficult here for people like me who do not have extended
> studies in mathematics or physics, are the extended drawbacks to these
> specialized sciences.
>
> Anyhow, congratulations, and let us know when the next lecture comes up.
&g

Re: [Fis] [PEIRCE-L] Stanford seminar "On The Origin Of Experience"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I make one thing I say here clear. When I say "rejection of
scripture," I really must say "rejection of the literal interpretation
of scripture." Many of these radical Unitarian's - if not all of them
at the time - still considered themselves "Christian."

Steven


On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 2:10 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  wrote:
> Thank you Anny. That is an interesting interpretation of my position.
>
> As will be made clear in the book, for me a religion is simply a set
> of ideas such that we cannot look upon the world without consideration
> of them. In this sense, science is my religion.
>
> I should make it clear that I am personally indifferent to the notion
> of "God." But I understand its context, the motivation and origin for
> its use. In my next lecture, however, I will speak about the view and
> motivations of Benjamin Peirce, his son Charles, and the attempt by
> them and other radical Unitarians to re-conceive the notion of God in
> scientific terms.
>
> But it should be clear that this attempt, led by Benjamin Peirce, from
> influences and peer encouragements that can be traced back to Descarte
> through Malebranche and the Unitarian logical challenge to divided
> conceptions (i.e. Trinity), and articulated in his book "Ideality in
> the physical sciences" is rightly paralleled with the positivist and
> existentialist movement in Europe during the nineteenth century.
>
> In my view it is a direct parallel to the existentialist challenge to
> historical conceptions of divinity. I describe Benjamin as a "cautious
> positivist" in that he argued for true positivism (that science may be
> universally applied) but did not want science to lose touch with the
> deeper cosmological issues and issues of "quality." (In this he, and
> the others of his ilk in and around Harvard, were thwarted by
> conservative social forces and subsequently Unitarianism lost its
> way).
>
> These same motivations led in Europe to a concern over the social
> implications of the failure of past conceptions (in the rise of
> science and rejection of scripture) and in the absence of an
> alternative. A concern expressed in terms that "God is dead."
>
> The social pragmatism of this Harvard centered group was to place our
> concerns over the nature of our existence clearly into the domain of
> science and to re-conceive of the notion of God in scientific terms. A
> view articulated by Charles in his "Neglected Argument."  I've been
> saying that it is a sort of atheism without the "a," but this is not
> quite fair I think since atheism is most generally a form of
> materialism. This move acknowledges the common ground in the inquiry
> of science and theology on the deeper issues, i.e, the intimate human
> inquiry into the nature of the world and our place in it.
>
> Anyhow, this narrative has unfolded before me during the development
> of my work and provides the historical context and precedence for it.
> It is discussed in one chapter of the forthcoming book and I will
> speak of it (working from this chapter) on January 15th when I lecture
> at Stanford on the life and work of Charles Sanders Peirce. This
> lecture will place Charles in this broader context. As you know, 2014
> is the centenary of Charles' death.
>
> For others, if you have not yet caught my lecture last month, you can
> see it here: http://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M  The transcript of the
> lecture is available as a book review here:
> https://www.createspace.com/Preview/1137409
>
> Again, my thanks for your kind comments.
>
> Best regards,
> Steven
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 AM, Anny Ballardini
>  wrote:
>> Steven Ericsson-Zenith,
>>
>> I finally had some time to follow this interesting presentation of your
>> book. And if I understand properly, which is also connected with some of
>> your previous contributions on this list, the fact that you want to show
>> that light is static is an hermetic statement that God exists in an
>> ever-present presence. And as far as I can remember, you will be able to
>> show mathematically your supposition. This draws back to your previous
>> commitment as a religious member of our community. You also say that "new
>> ideas are not familiar," but as you know, new ideas are the bread of
>> artists, and this goes well along with what research is supposed to be. The
>> only difference in-between artistic and scientific research is that the
>> latter requires an armamentarium of historical information (precise
>> quotations, previous theories) that artistic performance does not have. That
>> all belongs to the digesti

[Fis] Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

My lecture on the 15th involves an uncommon subject (for me), God. What
role does God play in the construction of computing machinery and why is
the subject of my talk at all relevant today?

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
His life, contributions to logic, and the "American Enlightenment."
http://www.stanford.edu/class/ee380/

The lecture will be recorded, I'll let you know when it is available.

Regards,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] [PEIRCE-L] Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

There appears to be a paperwork delay of it on YouTube. Although you
can find it at

http://ee380.stanford.edu

in its unedited form - and play it on non-windows platforms only if
you have VLC or some other windows based player.

Regards,
Steven


On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 1:56 PM, Jerry LR Chandler
 wrote:
> Steven:
>
> Has your lecture been posted?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
> On Jan 7, 2014, at 6:43 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
>
> Dear List,
>
> My lecture on the 15th involves an uncommon subject (for me), God. What role
> does God play in the construction of computing machinery and why is the
> subject of my talk at all relevant today?
>
> Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
> His life, contributions to logic, and the "American Enlightenment."
> http://www.stanford.edu/class/ee380/
>
> The lecture will be recorded, I'll let you know when it is available.
>
> Regards,
> Steven
>
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirc...@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but
> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of
> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

> Is there such a thing as Collective Intelligence?

I am concerned that the methods of the Harvard paper demonstrate nothing at
all and, however well intended, they appear to be insufficiently rigorous
and one might say "unscientific."

If the question were: are there things that a group of individuals may
achieve that an individual may not, build the Pyramids or go to the Moon,
for example, then manifestly this is the case.

However, can we measure the objective efficiency of a group by considering
the problems solved by individuals working together in groups such that we
may identify whether there is an environment independent quantifiable
addition or loss of efficiency in all cases? Perhaps, but one suspects not.

Bottomline: I think you must stop worrying about collective intelligence
and speak to quantifiable efficiencies in all cases.

> How does IT effect the existence or non-existence of Collective
Intelligence?

The internet does not seem to have especially improved general intelligence
- it has made apparent the ignorance what what there all along. On the
other hand, it appears to have misinformed more individuals than it has
benefitted.

Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info

+1-650-308-8611





On Thursday, March 6, 2014, Pedro C. Marijuan
>
wrote:

> Dear John P. and FIS Colleagues,
>
> Thanks for the kickoff text. It a discussion on new themes that only
> occasionally and very superficially has surfaced in this list.
> Intelligence, the information flow in organizations, distributed
> knowledge, direct crowd enlistment in scientific activities... It sounds
> rather esoteric, but in the historical perspective the phenomenon is far
> from new. Along the biggest social transformations, the "new information
> orders" have been generated precisely by new ways to circulate
> knowledge/information across social agents--often kept away from the
> previous informational order established. In past years, when the
> initial Internet impact was felt, there appeared several studies on
> those wide historical transformations caused by the arrival of new
> social information flows --O'Donnell, Hobart & Schiffman, Lanham, Poe...
>
> But there is a difference, in my opinion, in the topic addressed by John
> P., it is the intriguing, more direct involvement of software beyond the
> rather passive, underground role it generally plays.  "Organizational
> processes frozen into the artifact--though not fossilized". Information
> Technologies are producing an amazing mix of new practices and new
> networkings that generate growing impacts in economic activities, and in
> the capability to create new solutions and innovations. So, the three
> final questions are quite pertinent. In my view, there exist the
> collective intelligence phenomenon, innovation may indeed benefit from
> this new info-crowd turn,  and other societal changes  are occurring
> (from new forms of social uprising  and revolt, to the detriment of the
> "natural info flows" --conversation--, an increase of individual
> isolation, diminished happiness indicators, etc.)
>
> Brave New World? Not yet, but who knows...
>
> best ---Pedro
>
>
>  Prpic wrote:
> > ON COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: The Future of IT-Mediated Crowds
> > John Prpić
> > Beedie School of Business
> > Simon Fraser University
> > pr...@sfu.ca
> >
> >
> > Software (including web pages and mobile applications etc) is the key
> building block of the IT field in terms of human interaction, and can be
> construed as an artifact that codifies organizational process “…in the form
> of software embedded “routines” (Straub and Del Guidice 2012). These
> organizational processes are frozen into the artifact, though not
> fossilized, since the explicit codification that executes an artifact can
> be readily updated when desired (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001, Yoo et al.
> 2012).
> >
> > A software artifact always includes “a setting of interaction” or a user
> interface, for example a GUI or a DOS prompt (Rogers 2004), where human
> beings employ the embedded routines codified within the artifact (including
> data) for various purposes, providing input, and receiving programmed
> output in return. The setting of interaction provides both the limits and
> possibilities of the interaction between a human being and the artifact,
> and in turn this “dual-enablement” facilitates the functionality available
> to the employ of a human being or an organization (Del Giudice 2008). This
> structural view of artifacts (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001) informs us that
> “IT artifacts are, by definition, not natural, neutral, universal, or
> given” (Orlikowski 

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process."
What, exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general
(Shannon). Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism
and modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how
information theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the
synaptic level because the actions and the decisions made are made across
the structure and not at a single location.

Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a
particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and
is immediately covariant with the "appropriate" response (another shape)
which may be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include
neurons and astrocytes in the brain).

Regards,
Steven



On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

> Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,
>
> First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
> thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
> that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.
>
> My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not
> address Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His
> reference to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I
> had missed when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a
> reference to information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory
> is required to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes
> Peircean semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note
> that Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of
> his matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.
>
> In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
> (eds.). New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four
> papers: "The Architecture of Theories", "The Doctrine of Necessity
> Examined", "The Law of Mind"  and "Man's Glassy Essence". Unfortunately, in
> none of these is the word 'process' used, let alone described as a concept.
> 'Process' is not an entry in the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce,
> edited by Bergman and Paavola, so the most one can say is that process was
> not a common concept in Peirce. If Information-as-Process is to be
> developed as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's semiotics will help.
>
> In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable
> properties than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun
> dialectic and the concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of
> information being dynamic (a process) or static depending on what it
> reflects does not give as complete a notion as I would like that
> information is /in-itself/ a process, even it reflects (refers to) static
> or abstract objects. Nevertheless, Krassimir clearly sees the dualism of
> information as composed of dynamic and static entities, whose interaction,
> as in the case of the first two approaches, can be discussed in the
> framework of Logic in Reality. The problem is his use of the term
> 'reflection' whose nature is not clear as I have remarked to him before.
>
> I look forward to further discussion.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message - From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
> To: "Carolina Isiegas" 
> Cc: 
> Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?
>
>
> Dear Dr. Isiegas:
>
> I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
> network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
> discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
> network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
> .
>
> Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
> sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
> the "structural information" inhering in the neuronal network. John
> Collier (also a FISer) calls such information "enformation" to draw
> attention to its different nature.
>
> With best wishes for success,
>
> Bob Ulanowicz
>
>  Dear list,
>>
>> I have been reading during the last year all these interesting
>> exchanges. Some of them terrific discussions! Given my scientific
>> backgound
>> (Molecular Neuroscience), I would like to hear your point of view on the
>> topic of neuroinformation, how information "exists" within the Central
>> Nervous Systems. My task was experimental; I was interested in
>> investigating the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory,
>> specifically, the role of the cAMP-PKA-CREB signaling pathway in such
>> brain
>> functions (In Ted Abel´s Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
>> spent 7 years). I ge

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my
model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point
and response covariance is impossible to consider.

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as "information as
process."

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it
> allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition
> analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic
> information measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> in which  can be considered as the a posteriori and  the a priori
> distribution. This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and
> aggregated. One can also develop measures for systemic developments and
> critical transitions. In other words, information as a process can also be
> measured in bits of information. Of course, one can extend the
> dimensionality (*i*) for the multivariate case (*ijk*…), and thus use
> information theory for network analysis (including time).
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
> References:
>
> ·Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of
> Network Data Using Information Theory. *Social Networks, 13*(4), 301-345.
>
> ·Theil, H. (1972). *Statistical Decomposition Analysis*.
> Amsterdam/ London: North-Holland.
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> *Emeritus* University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
> London;
>
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Steven
> Ericsson-Zenith
> *Sent:* Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
> *To:* Joseph Brenner
> *Cc:* fis
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process
>
>
>
> I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process."
> What, exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general
> (Shannon). Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?
>
>
>
> In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism
> and modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how
> information theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the
> synaptic level because the actions and the decisions made are made across
> the structure and not at a single location.
>
>
>
> Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a
> particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and
> is immediately covariant with the "appropriate" response (another shape)
> which may be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include
> neurons and astrocytes in the brain).
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Steven
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner 
> wrote:
>
> Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,
>
> First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
> thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
> that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.
>
> My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not
> address Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His
> reference to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I
> had missed when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a
> reference to information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory
> is required to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes
> Peircean semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note
> that Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of
> his matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.
>
> In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
> 

Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Terry, list.

I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I
did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many
more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a
question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have
purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried.

To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of
Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now
recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite
brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership
at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another
argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not
I.

I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon.
My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), "Informatique." I do
this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to
inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its
unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original
intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true
ontology.

That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there
is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This
suggests that no "complete theory of information" is, in fact, conceivable.

I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But
then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example,
simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and
advocated by myself as "the basis of experience" or as Benjamin Peirce's
"universal will" or Charles' (weaker) "matter as effete mind," all being
the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately
in the same equations as a "force" that have an effect upon the world, in
this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A theory
based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically
"extra" today, is clearly not at all dualist.

I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial of dualism, but I
wonder if Terry merely advocates an identity theory. As I have noted often
such a theory is, in fact, a dualism.

Regards,
Steven

--
   Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
   Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
   http://iase.info










On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for
> reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than
> any single-minded approach.
>
> With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the
> priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best
> middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big
> challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than
> I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my
> reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort
> of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there
> too.
>
> In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify
> my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes
> them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow
> not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but
> I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I
> am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get
> your comment about "dualisms that do exist in nature" and how you
> connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to
> do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising
> from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of
> incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In
> which case we may need to agree to disagree.
>
> I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications
> regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am
> hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between
> physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about
> how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa
> dualism, with reference and significance on the former side of this
> divide and Shannon information (and related uses in physics) on the
> latter. You can read my view as arguing that this dualism cannot
> merely be left as an unanalyzed assumption if we are seeking a
> complete theory of information.
>
> I

Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Terry,

This "emergence theory," at least on the face of it, is then surely an
advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically indistinguishable
from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the two.

"Information theory" is a way of speaking about what happens in the world.
As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a
step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet
the explanatory goal.

My best definition of "information" does not standalone: Information is
that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where "knowledge" is
generalized to include all that determines subsequent action (importantly,
it is the immediate that includes all physical actions).

It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical
property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of flexible
closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor functions),
characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon
the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides a
sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is
always associated with a response.

Regards,
Steven




On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> Hi Steven,
>
> My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious
> about your claim that a complete theory of information may be
> impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except
> irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an
> identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory
> in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic
> physical property.
>
> Thanks, Terry
>
> On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  wrote:
> > Dear Terry, list.
> >
> > I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this
> discussion. I
> > did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with
> many
> > more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a
> > question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have
> > purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried.
> >
> > To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of
> > Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now
> > recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both
> quite
> > brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his
> readership
> > at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another
> > argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign?
> Not
> > I.
> >
> > I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon.
> > My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), "Informatique." I do
> > this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also
> to
> > inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its
> > unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its
> original
> > intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true
> > ontology.
> >
> > That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because
> there
> > is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension.
> This
> > suggests that no "complete theory of information" is, in fact,
> conceivable.
> >
> > I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But
> > then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for
> example,
> > simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and
> > advocated by myself as "the basis of experience" or as Benjamin Peirce's
> > "universal will" or Charles' (weaker) "matter as effete mind," all being
> > the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found
> ultimately
> > in the same equations as a "force" that have an effect upon the world, in
> > this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A
> theory
> > based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically
> > "extra" today, is clearly not at all dualist.
> >
> > I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial of dualism, but I
> > wonder if Terry merely advocates an identity theory. As I have noted
> often
> > such a theory is, in fact, a dualism.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Steven
> >
> > --
> >Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith

Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Terry,

First, allow me to respond to your questions on my own account and then
further challenge your own.

No, information is not for me a "stereochemical" property, in that I am
less concerned about the particulars of the chemistry involved. However, my
principal concern is a generalized (flexible and closed) structure that may
be formed by different elements in different environments. So it is
structure that is primary and not chemistry, that may simply be seen as a
means to an end.

Your question concerning my definition of knowledge is insightful. Indeed,
knowledge embodied by an organism may be false, but this has no impact at
all upon the responses that the organism produces in its utilization. The
false knowledge may, in fact, benefit the organism. All knowledge, indeed
any knowledge, is that which determines subsequent physical actions, be it
true or false. Fallibilism is simply part of a method of knowledge
refinement. Of course, this model opens up some interesting philosophical
questions in that sustained error can now potentially play an important
role in evolution.

You claim that "to understand information requires a theory of dynamical
constraints" and further these constraints do not have "reducible
components." You are perhaps inspired by Darwin's constraint of natural
selection? These are, for me, posterior determinants. But natural selection
is not itself dynamic and nor does it have an existential status that would
allow me to say that it has "level specific properties." This, again,
suggests dualism (sorry).

Regards,
Steven

 PS. Let's just say that I posted this to FIS on Monday, and I'll limit
myself next week. :-)



On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 9:23 PM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> Dear Steven,
>
> Sadly Taking the time (and wordiness) required to explain my critique
> and redefinition of emergence is beyond the scope this venue and your
> patience, so I can only point to my too lengthy book for that account.
> Needless to say I do not accept either dualism or identity theory. My
> claim is that to understand information requires a theory of dynamical
> constraints, and since constraints don't have reducible components
> they are level specific relational properties, not identified with
> intrinsic properties of specific material objects or energetic
> systems, but not epiphenomenal.
>
> Do I understand you to be reducing information to a stereochemical
> property? And do you reduce "knowledge" to anything that determines
> "physical actions"? Obviously, I must be missing something. I would
> not be alone in arguing that for something to be information "about"
> something, it must be capable of being in error. How can simple
> physical properties or causal interactions have this property of
> falliblism?
>
> — Terry
>
> On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  wrote:
> > Dear Terry,
> >
> > This "emergence theory," at least on the face of it, is then surely an
> > advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically
> indistinguishable
> > from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the
> two.
> >
> > "Information theory" is a way of speaking about what happens in the
> world.
> > As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a
> > step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet
> > the explanatory goal.
> >
> > My best definition of "information" does not standalone: Information is
> > that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where "knowledge" is
> > generalized to include all that determines subsequent action
> (importantly,
> > it is the immediate that includes all physical actions).
> >
> > It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic
> physical
> > property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of
> flexible
> > closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor
> functions),
> > characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon
> > the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides
> a
> > sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is
> > always associated with a response.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Steven
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON  >
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Hi Steven,
> >>
> >> My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious
> >> about your claim that a complete theory of information may be
> >> impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean 

Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

efers to
this refinement and the in situ selection of one or the other? This would
be more in line with my thinking.

However, I hope you see the confusion concerning your use of terms.

Just in case you are unfamiliar with YUK and YUM, these are Stuart
Kauffman's terms to refer to the constraints that direct bacteria to follow
a sugar gradient.



On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> RE: Steven Ericsson-Zenith (I am not sure that your comment was posted to
> FIS)
>
> The phrase "dynamical constraint" should not be that unfamiliar or
> difficult to parse.
> Constraint on the degrees of freedom of a dynamical system is the most
> obvious (and the meaning that I have in mind), though I suppose that
> there could also be other meanings that are possible (such as might
> characterize the increase in convectional correlation in the formation
> of Bénard convection cells). I don't see that the notion of constraint
> need be restricted to some extrinsically imposed static boundary
> condition.
>
> As far as I can tell, this concept is quite unrelated to my friend Stu
> Kauffman's use of "Yuk or Yum" (a normative—not
> physico-chemical—distinction), which of course can only apply to
> something like a living system that is organized to perpetuate its
> organization by utilizing external resources and avoiding dangerous
> extrinsic conditions. Indeed, I believe that my simple model of an
> autogentic system provides an unambiguous description of the minimal
> dynamical system organization necessary to determine a
> self/environment relation that embodies an intrinsic good-for/bad-for
> valuation.
>
> In any case, I don't see any reason to think that my use of the
> concept of dynamical constraint, or constraint in general, to explore
> the nature of information and agency should imply that this is a case
> of "posterior determination" rather than an acquired disposition that
> organizes an autonomous agent's adaptive responses to extrinsic
> conditions. I hope that this clears up any confusion that my use of
> this term evoked.
>
> RE: Joseph Brenner
>
> I think that we are largely in agreement.  And I think that you
> accurately locate our differences in how we understand the
> contribution of quantum-atomic-molecular properties to these dynamical
> properties, and to the relationship we call informational. I am
> generally of the opinion that non-classical quantum effects percolate
> up to the molecular scale and higher only if very special conditions
> prevail (such as in photosynthesis), and that otherwise the
> statistical nature of these influences results in canceling effects.
> To me it is a bit analogous to the classical vs relativistic
> distinction in which at mesoscopic spatio-temporal scales (and well
> below c) relativistic effects can be neglected without any significant
> error effects. But I agree that this means that (in principle) both
> extreme scale effects "can sometimes" be relevant, and are ultimately
> part of the complete picture. I just don't see how these effects
> change the dynamical system requirements that determine how a relation
> of reference or significance is intrinsically established for that
> system (i.e. IN and BY that system independent of this being assessed
> by an external "observer" - whether explicitly or implicitly).
>
> As to the various interpretations of the quantum measurement problem,
> I also agree that my view is not the mainstream view, but it is not
> purely idiosyncratic either. There is more work needed here. For me,
> to make the claim that quantum indeterminacy is the "... foundation of
> the dualisms at higher levels of reality" abandons the most
> interesting game in town by just positing its irresolvability. To me
> this just ends inquiry into this interesting mystery by invoking
> another mystery that is claimed to be irresolvable. I take the view of
> Richard Feynman who said about quantum physics "... I don't understand
> it. Nobody does" — by which he means that nobody has a clear idea of
> why it must be the way it is. I am skeptical of those who claim they
> know, or know that it has no deeper resolution. In this respect, I am
> comfortable in my minority opinion.
>
> But disagreement at this most basic theoretical level doesn't
> undermine our ability to come to a convergent understanding of many of
> the higher-order phenomena we have discussed, including the
> organization of dynamical systems able to intrinsically determine the
> reference and significance of information. In this and other arenas I
> look forward to interesting critical debates to shed more light on
> the

Re: [Fis] THE FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE--Zhao Chuan

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I agree with Jerry and Joe - and I agree that, in part, this may be a
language or cultural issue/challenge.

I would like to see a few basic statements about the scientific
epistemology involved in the approach. I want to see a separation of
concerns. Right now I see a not entirely exhaustive bunch of topics (how
would I or they know?) simply thrown into a bag labeled "Intelligence
Science."  While these topics may have a common basis (although this is not
stated) together their relationships are uncertain.

I am also concerned with the use of adjectives. For example, what, exactly,
is the distinction between AI and "Advanced" AI? I do not understand this
distinction.

I encourage our Chinese friends to precisely differentiate their various
topics and illustrate how they are related, stating the type of inquiry
they propose and the nature of it (formal or experimental, for example). If
there is a difference between Intelligence and Wisdom, exactly what is it
and how are the two related? If emotion plays a role, is it critical, where
does it fit, what difference does it make and how, exactly, does it occur?

In short I feel that we need to agree on practices, exchange scientific
glossaries and agree on terms.

Regards,
Steven



On Fri, Mar 6, 2015 at 6:53 PM, 钟义信  wrote:

> Dear Pedro,
>
>
> Thank you very much for recommending Ms. ZHAO's good topic, intelligence
> science, for discussion at FIS platform. I think it very much valuable that
> Ms. ZHAO put forward to us the great challenge of methodology shift. The
> attached file expressed some of my understanding on this iuuse that I would
> like to share with FIS friends.
>
>
> Best regards,
>
>
> Yixin ZHONG
>
>
>
> - 回复邮件 -
> *发信人:*Pedro C. Marijuan 
> *收信人:*fis 
> *时间:*2015年03月04日 19时58分15秒
> *主题:*Re: [Fis] THE FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE--Zhao Chuan
>
>
> Dear Chuan and FIS colleagues,
>
> The scientific study of intelligence is quite paradoxical. One is
> reminded about the problems of psychology and ethology to create
> adequate categories and frameworks about animal and human intelligence.
> The approaches started in Artificial Intelligence were quite glamorous
> three or four decades ago, but the limitations were crystal clear at the
> end of the 80's. It marked the beginning of Artificial Life and quite
> many other views at the different frontiers of the theme (complexity
> theory, biocybernetics, biocomputing, etc.) Also an enlarged
> Information Science was vindicated as the best option to clear the air
> (Stonier, Scarrott... and FIS itself too). In that line, Advanced
> Artificial Intelligence, as proposed by Yixin Zhong and others, has
> represented in my view a bridge to connect with our own works in
> information science. That connection between information "processing"
> and intelligence is essential. But in our occasional discussions on the
> theme we have always been centered in, say, the scientific
> quasi-mechanistic perspectives. It was time to enter the humanistic
> dimensions and the connection with the arts. Then, this discussion
> revolves around the central pillar to fill in the gap between sciences
> and humanities, the "two cultures" of CP Snow.
> The global human intelligence, when projected to the world, creates
> different "disciplinary" realms that are more an historical result that
> a true, genuine necessity. We are caught, necessarily given our
> limitations, in a perspectivistic game, but we have the capacity to play
> and mix the perspectives... multidisciplinarity is today the buzzword,
> though perhaps not well addressed and explained yet. So, your
> reflections Chao are quite welcome.
>
> best--Pedro
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
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>
>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] Chuan's reply6-Chuan's reply3 - THE FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE--Zhao Chuan

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I asked for a concise statement of "complex scientific method" and you sent
me this. I have stared at it for awhile and can make no sense of it. I am
certainly aware of EPR and the surrounding issues. Can anyone help me here?

Are the Chinese team by proposing "Intelligence Science" simply proposing
Solipsism? Do they propose that all intelligence is simply an illusion?

I mean no disrespect and I do suspect that there is a language/cultural
problem here.

Steven



On Tue, Mar 10, 2015 at 6:34 PM, 赵川  wrote:

> in the attackment, thanks!
>
>
>
> ___
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>
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Re: [Fis] Chuan's reply11 - THE FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE - unless reaches

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

You are not the first person to point this out :-)

I have argued for years that the power profile and dynamics required
excludes Turing's models of computation from biophysics. See:
https://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M

Steven


On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:32 PM, Joshua Augustus Bacigalupi <
bacigalupiwo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I understand that he equates (or at least compares) it to the paradox of
>> simultaneity between distinctive events and their interrelationhips in
>> mechanics.
>
>
> If I understand Joseph, he is right to point out that the notion of
> 'simultaneity' from a non-observer stance is not necessary, because the
> distributed nature of physics is an ontological given in my Monist world
> view.  The confusion now is that humans often over extend the machine
> analogy to explain currently unexplained phenomena, e.g. intelligence.  It
> is exactly the fact that most assume a priori that if the brain and
> universe aren't actually digital, or at least mechanical, they can be
> simulated to the point to duplication via such noiseless state machines.
>
> Not only do I argue that we have over-extended our industrial analogies
> past the point of utility in the context of intelligence, mind,
> significance, cognition, etc., I also suggest that such heuristics actively
> obfuscate a viable path to discover such understanding.  Why?
>
> Let's take vision.  It is often assumed that our own retina digitizes EM
> phenomena transducing them into independent states like bits in a square
> wave.  Or, at the very least, such evolved systems can be simulated to the
> point of duplication via state machines.  The problem is that a large
> amount of energy is expended to create such independent discrete states,
> states that are specifically designed not to be related in any way with
> adjacent states.  However, there is a vast amount of relationships, both
> temporal and spatial, among potential observables embedded in the agent's
> surroundings that can co-stimulate two adjacent rods thereby assimilating
> not only two distinct events, but their spatio-temporal relations,
> simultaneously.  This potentially useful information to the agent is
> embedded in the agent's environment for free, so to speak.  Digitizing, on
> the other hand, spends energy to filter out these inter-relations only to
> re-create these relations later with still more energy and increased memory
> consumption.
>
> In this way, Joseph is right to question the need to insert the notion of
> simultaneity, because, the biology never took it out.  It is our centuries
> of trying to perfect our control over noiseless states that creates the
> paradox; and, therefore, a need to overtly put it back in.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 10:16 PM, Joshua Augustus Bacigalupi <
> bacigalupiwo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Pedro and Joseph, thank you for your thoughtful replies.  I was away this
>> weekend, and look forward to responding shortly to your comments.
>>
>> But, briefly:
>> Pedro - I'm not sure I have access to Koichiro Matsuno's discussion re:
>> paradoxes.  Would you mind quoting some of the relevant portions of this
>> discussion?
>>
>> Joseph - Your comments on simultaneity are very insightful.  They bring
>> much to mind; but, I will let these initial thoughts settle over the next
>> day or so before I respond.
>>
>> Until then, best to all;
>> Josh
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 6:33 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
>> joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Josh, Pedro, Chuan and All,
>>>
>>> In Josh's original note and the subsequent comments on it, I see a
>>> poetic sensibility with which I fully empathize. I return, however, to four
>>> of Josh's expressions for I think require further discussion would be
>>> useful to explicate the complex relations involved. In reverse order, they
>>> are as follows, with my comments interpolated:
>>>
>>>  · the self-efficacious relationship between agents and
>>> surroundings
>>>
>>> JEB: a good expression of the need for looking at content and context
>>> together;
>>>
>>> · the simultaneous dynamic between so-called parts and wholes
>>>
>>> JEB: ‘so-called parts’ suggests a non-separability or overlap between
>>> parts and wholes, leading toward a necessary new mereology, but see point
>>> 4;
>>>
>>> · a both/and outcome
>>>
>>> JEB: a necessary processual antidote to an either/or ontology;
>>>
>>> · a paradox of simultaneity
>>>
>>> JEB: here, the concept of simultaneity has been ‘imported’ from
>>> classical logic and physics and I think there is a better alternative. If
>>> classical simultaneity does not exist, as in General Relativity and other
>>> absolutes also do not exist, there is no paradox to be explained. In the
>>> case of time, the non-separability of time and space has as a consequence
>>> that neither simultaneity nor succession is ‘pure’ but each is partly the
>>> other, like parts and wholes. Thus the word ‘simultaneous’ in point 2 is
>>> not req

Re: [Fis] It from Bit redux . . .

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Trust me. You are in good company.

Steven




> On Jun 14, 2015, at 5:22 PM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> From Loet's post:
> >During the recent conference in Vienna, I was amazed how many of our 
> >colleagues wish to ground information in physics.<
> I would say that I was disappointed . . . 
> 
> For me this exchange on It from Bit is problematic as its seems to simply 
> revisit the same problem introduced with Shannon's use of the term 
> “information“ in his Mathematical Theory of Communication – but dressed with 
> a slightly different face. I had this same problem with “lack of precise 
> thinking“ (or terminology?) in the It from Bit video from last month. This 
> endless(?) debate around an old issue of “meaningful information“ versus 
> “meaningless information“ (aka DATA awaiting MEANINGFUL interpretation) I 
> find unhelpful in addressing FOUNDATIONAL issues. If we cannot keep our terms 
> straight I am not sure how progress is made.
> 
> Yes, of course physics has a place in the conversation, but the needless 
> blurring of basic terms does not, I think, advance the project. If a basic 
> nomenclature and/or taxonomy cannot be agreed and then abided in these 
> conversations, it leaves me wondering how I might contribute. I am new to 
> this group, but this seems like it should have been dealt with from the start 
> in agreeing the FIS group goals.
>  
> 
> Marcus Abundis
> about.me/marcus.abundis
> 
>   
> 
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Re: [Fis] Krassimir's Notes . . .

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Fantasies about Quantum Mechanics aside, Probability and Information are 
distinct. Both are ways of speaking about the world. You may speak of 
alternatives probabilistically, but you cannot say that “information is 
probabilistic." 

Any truth based system is necessarily flawed (Godel) and dualist. The great 
disadvantage of mathematics grounded upon first-order logic is also exactly 
what you say because it can lead to over-confidence. This is not to say that 
logical proof systems are not useful for checking syntactic and semantic 
reasoning, they are. But they cannot provide the certainty desired. 

Mathematical proofs are not logical proofs.

Reasoning about motion and degrees of freedom in dynamic structure, be it 
falling bodies or social graces, is not greatly helped by first-order logic.  
FOL is only concerned with certain types of thinking. 

Arbitrary axioms are no basis for rigor.   In my view, at least, only the 
general covariance of premises can provide a basis of scientific argument.  
Constructive methods are flawed if they do not consider the action of premises 
together.  Arbitrary axioms only represent the abductions that may lead us to 
this. 

Existence is before essence, remember the prime principle of existentialism.

Regards,
Steven



> On Jun 17, 2015, at 6:04 PM, Koichiro Matsuno  wrote:
> 
> At 9:36 PM 06/17/2015, Pedro wrote:
> 
> ... What if information belongs to action,
> 
> [KM] This is a good remark suggesting that information may go beyond the 
> standard stipulation of first-order logic. A great advantage of mathematics 
> grounded upon first-order logic is to enjoy the provability or computability 
> of an inductive judgement with use of the few axiomatic primitives. This 
> scheme, however, does not work for information at large, though notably 
> except for Shannon's information bits. If one faces a statement like 
> "information is probabilistic", it would go beyond first-order logic when the 
> predicate "to be probabilistic" admits its quantification as revealed in the 
> context-dependent probabilities in QM. Once we enter the higher stage of 
> second-order logic, it could be possible to form an opinion of course while 
> its provability may be out of reach in most cases. Nonetheless, if one wants 
> to save something good with saying "information is probabilistic", a likely 
> makeshift might be to relate information to action, for instance, as 
> appealing to conditiona!
> l probabilities which are quite at home with the action of setting and 
> detecting such conditions. 
> 
>   Koichiro
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

“use” is particularly ambiguous. So I do not think, as presented, that 
“meaning” is “solved?” By which I assume you intended to say “what the term 
‘meaning’ is a reference to.”

Indeed, all of these terms “social”, “habit”, “use” are ambiguous.

I believe that the best we can do is to say that a “meaning” is exactly the 
action (“behaviors,” “motions") that is the product of apprehension, where 
apprehension is that which the organism takes from the world. This is not as 
simple as saying “sign” in the Peircean sense, in that the “third” in 
“apprehension” is an accumulative filter.

Quiet simply there is no meaning except that which an organism displays in 
response to the world. I may say that P typically responded like Y to X (in a 
“Rosetta stone” sense), but I can never assert generally that X means Y.   

This view is closer to Charles Peirce than it is to L. Wittgenstein. Both were 
confused by the binary system of Boole - a dualism - truth values must be 
discarded if you are to speak rigorously. This is not to deny the utility of 
truth value systems.

In short, the universe does not care whether or not a thing is true or false, 
this or that. Consistency is a human affair.

Regards,
Steven



> On Jun 20, 2015, at 11:55 PM, Günther Witzany  > wrote:
> 
> Meaning is a social function (G.H.Mead). The meaning can be simply 
> identifying by looking what habits it produces (C.S.Peirce), the meaning of a 
> word is its use (late Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations). There 
> remains no question about "meaning" so far. This problem is finally solved.
> 
> Best
> Guenther
> Am 20.06.2015 um 22:33 schrieb Jerry LR Chandler:
> 
>> List:
>> 
>> My opinions categorically reject the shallow proposition below which ignores 
>> the foundational logic.
>> 
>> The biological sciences focus on life itself.
>> The scientific foundation of biological information is included under the 
>> notion of Foundation of Information Science.
>> 
>> The adjectives "cognitive" and "computational" and "linguistic" do not 
>> influence the meaning the foundation of the science, they are merely 
>> descriptors of sub-aspects of the science or incomplete perspectives of 
>> biology.
>> 
>> The post introduces the proposition that these three adjectives are not even 
>> modifiers of the meaning of biology, mere metaphors, each of which can carry 
>> a vast array of meanings.  
>> 
>> Personally, I am rather fond of elephants and find this slight of elephants, 
>> one of mother nature's greatest achievements, unwarranted. 
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
>> 
>> 
>> On Jun 19, 2015, at 7:52 PM, howlbl...@aol.com  
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> re: cognitive biology vs computational biology.
>>>  
>>> may i suggest that you add yet one more approach to the list: linguistic 
>>> biology.  per the work of Guenther Witzany.  also reflected in my book The 
>>> God Problem: How a Godless Cosmos Creates.
>>>  
>>> each approach uses a helpful metaphor.  no one approach sees the elephant 
>>> in its entirety. so please let us use all three.
>>>  
>>> with oomph--howard
>>>  
>>> --
>>> Howard Bloom
>>> Howardbloom.net 
>>> Author of: The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces 
>>> of History ("mesmerizing"-The Washington Post), 
>>> Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st 
>>> Century ("reassuring and sobering"-The New Yorker), 
>>> The Genius of the Beast: A Radical Re-Vision of Capitalism ("A tremendously 
>>> enjoyable book." James Fallows, National Correspondent, The Atlantic), 
>>> The God Problem: How A Godless Cosmos Creates("Bloom's argument will rock 
>>> your world." Barbara Ehrenreich), 
>>> How I Accidentally Started the Sixties (“Wow! Whew! Wild! Wonderful!” 
>>> Timothy Leary), and 
>>> The Mohammed Code (“A terrifying book…the best book I’ve read on Islam.” 
>>> David Swindle, PJ Media).
>>> Former Core Faculty Member, The Graduate Institute; Former Visiting 
>>> Scholar-Graduate Psychology Department, New York University
>>> Founder: International Paleopsychology Project. Founder: The Group 
>>> Selection Squad; Founder, Space Development Steering Committee. Board 
>>> Member and Member Of Board Of Governors, National Space Society. Founding 
>>> Board Member: Epic of Evolution Society. Founding Board Member, The Darwin 
>>> Project. Founder: The Big Bang Tango Media Lab. Member: New York Academy of 
>>> Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, American 
>>> Psychological Society, Academy of Political Science, Human Behavior and 
>>> Evolution Society, International Society for Human Ethology. Scientific 
>>> Advisory Board Member, Lifeboat Foundation. Advisory Board Member, The 
>>> Buffalo Film Festival. Editorial board member, The Journal of Space 
>>> Philosophy. 
>>>  
>>> In a message dated 6/19/2015 9:22:14 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
>>> emanl@gmail.com

Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

To aid clarity: In the model I describe, a response to apprehension (“meaning”) 
is unconditional and independent of any observer. It is a function of the 
organism. These behaviors include the development of action potentials, many 
impossible for an external observer to see.

Regards,
Steven



> On Jun 21, 2015, at 2:53 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  wrote:
> 
> “use” is particularly ambiguous. So I do not think, as presented, that 
> “meaning” is “solved?” By which I assume you intended to say “what the term 
> ‘meaning’ is a reference to.”
> 
> Indeed, all of these terms “social”, “habit”, “use” are ambiguous.
> 
> I believe that the best we can do is to say that a “meaning” is exactly the 
> action (“behaviors,” “motions") that is the product of apprehension, where 
> apprehension is that which the organism takes from the world. This is not as 
> simple as saying “sign” in the Peircean sense, in that the “third” in 
> “apprehension” is an accumulative filter.
> 
> Quiet simply there is no meaning except that which an organism displays in 
> response to the world. I may say that P typically responded like Y to X (in a 
> “Rosetta stone” sense), but I can never assert generally that X means Y.   
> 
> This view is closer to Charles Peirce than it is to L. Wittgenstein. Both 
> were confused by the binary system of Boole - a dualism - truth values must 
> be discarded if you are to speak rigorously. This is not to deny the utility 
> of truth value systems.
> 
> In short, the universe does not care whether or not a thing is true or false, 
> this or that. Consistency is a human affair.
> 
> Regards,
> Steven
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jun 20, 2015, at 11:55 PM, Günther Witzany > <mailto:witz...@sbg.at>> wrote:
>> 
>> Meaning is a social function (G.H.Mead). The meaning can be simply 
>> identifying by looking what habits it produces (C.S.Peirce), the meaning of 
>> a word is its use (late Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations). There 
>> remains no question about "meaning" so far. This problem is finally solved.
>> 
>> Best
>> Guenther
>> Am 20.06.2015 um 22:33 schrieb Jerry LR Chandler:
>> 
>>> List:
>>> 
>>> My opinions categorically reject the shallow proposition below which 
>>> ignores the foundational logic.
>>> 
>>> The biological sciences focus on life itself.
>>> The scientific foundation of biological information is included under the 
>>> notion of Foundation of Information Science.
>>> 
>>> The adjectives "cognitive" and "computational" and "linguistic" do not 
>>> influence the meaning the foundation of the science, they are merely 
>>> descriptors of sub-aspects of the science or incomplete perspectives of 
>>> biology.
>>> 
>>> The post introduces the proposition that these three adjectives are not 
>>> even modifiers of the meaning of biology, mere metaphors, each of which can 
>>> carry a vast array of meanings.  
>>> 
>>> Personally, I am rather fond of elephants and find this slight of 
>>> elephants, one of mother nature's greatest achievements, unwarranted. 
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>> 
>>> Jerry
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Jun 19, 2015, at 7:52 PM, howlbl...@aol.com <mailto:howlbl...@aol.com> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> re: cognitive biology vs computational biology.
>>>>  
>>>> may i suggest that you add yet one more approach to the list: linguistic 
>>>> biology.  per the work of Guenther Witzany.  also reflected in my book The 
>>>> God Problem: How a Godless Cosmos Creates.
>>>>  
>>>> each approach uses a helpful metaphor.  no one approach sees the elephant 
>>>> in its entirety. so please let us use all three.
>>>>  
>>>> with oomph--howard
>>>>  
>>>> --
>>>> Howard Bloom
>>>> Howardbloom.net <http://howardbloom.net/>
>>>> Author of: The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces 
>>>> of History ("mesmerizing"-The Washington Post), 
>>>> Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st 
>>>> Century ("reassuring and sobering"-The New Yorker), 
>>>> The Genius of the Beast: A Radical Re-Vision of Capitalism ("A 
>>>> tremendously enjoyable book." James Fallows, National Correspondent, The 
>>>> Atlantic), 
>>>> The God Problem: How A Godless Cosmos Creates("Bloom

Re: [Fis] QM and information

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

> On Jun 26, 2015, at 10:02 PM, Andrei Khrennikov  
> wrote:
> Life is hard... I am afraid that it is impossible to put this qualifier in 
> front "information" used in recent information approaches to quantum 
> mechanics. 
> For Zeilinger and Brukner (this is my private impression from private 
> discussions), information so to say "exists" in nature so to say by itself, 
> it seems it is "meaningless", however, to apply quantum theory an OBSERVER 
> has to appear at the scene, information here is PRIVATE INFORMATION of 
> observer.

I do not know what to call your model here other than Solipsism. It certainly 
has nothing to do with Information Theory or Information Science. Indeed, it is 
unrecognizable I suggest to anyone associated with epistemology or the study of 
Logic in its broadest sense, except to give it that label. Indeed, it further 
affirms an increasing conviction that the discipline of physics has abandoned 
all good reason.


> The same happens in QBism of Fuchs and Mermin (this is again my private 
> impression from private discussions), they start with interpreting the wave 
> function as representing 
> subjective probability about possible results of measurements, but privately 
> they speak about Nature producing chance and hence information.
> 
> see also arxiv.org/pdf/1503.02515v1.pdf section 3.2, in particular, one 
> important citation of Fuchs.
> 
> All this can be disappointing, but it works; quantum people want to say: we 
> do not know what is information 
> but when we get it we immediately understand that this is it. 

Not just disappointing but entirely fanciful. I cannot imagine that “it works” 
in any material sense or in any purely mathematical sense. 

Regards,
Steven


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[Fis] Information and Locality Introduction

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

This is the start of the next FIS discussion. And this is the first of several 
emails kicking the discussion off and divided into logical parts so as not to 
confront the reader with too many ideas and too much text at once.

The subject is one that has concerned me ever since I completed my PhD in 1992. 
I came away from defending my thesis, essentially on large scale parallel 
computation, with the strong intuition that I had disclosed much more 
concerning the little that we know, than I had offered either a theoretical or 
engineering solution. 

For the curious, a digital copy of this thesis can be found among the reports 
of CRI, MINES ParisTech, formerly ENSMP, 
http://www.cri.ensmp.fr/classement/doc/A-232.pdf, it is also available as a 
paper copy on Amazon.

Like many that have been involved in microprocessor and instruction 
set/language design, using mathematical methods, we share the physical concerns 
of a generation earlier, people like John Von Neumann, Alan Turing, and Claude 
Shannon. In other words, a close intersection between physical science and 
machine engineering.

So I wish to proceed as follows, especially since this is a cross disciplinary 
group: 

First identify a statement of the domain, what is it that I, in particular, 
speak of when we use the term “Information.” I will clarify as necessary. I 
will then discuss the issue of locality, what I think that issue is and why it 
is a problem. Here we will get into several topics of classical discussion. I 
will briefly present my own mathematics for the problem in an informal yet 
rigorous style, reaching into the foundations of logic. 

I will then discuss some historical issues in particular referencing Benjamin 
Peirce, Albert Einstein and Alan Turing. And finally discuss the contemporary 
issues, as I see them, in biophysics, biology, and associated disciplines, 
reaching into human and other social constructions, perhaps touching on 
cosmology and the extended role of information theory in mathematical physics.

This will seem very broad but in all cases I will focus upon the issues of 
locality they each present.

Before my preparations for these discussions I surveyed existing pedagogical 
work to see how our science is currently presented and I came across the Khan 
Academy video series on Information Theory, authored by Brit Cruise. 

As flawed as I find this work, it is none-the-less an adequate place for us to 
start and to build upon. It does a good job in briefly presenting the work of 
Claude Shannon and others, in its second part on Modern Information Theory. 

I especially encourage advanced readers to take the few minutes it will take to 
review the Origin of Markov Chains, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 
Information Entropy, Compression Codes and Error Correction to set the field 
and ensure that we are on the same page. You may also find the final video on 
SETI work interesting, it will be relevant as we proceed. 

You can review these short videos on YouTube and here:

https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computer-science/informationtheory

or here:

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLbg3ZX2pWlgKDVFNwn9B63UhYJVIerzHL

I invite you to review these videos as the context for my next posting that 
will be a discussion of what is good about this model, locality, and what is, I 
now argue, fundamentally missing or wrong headed.

Pedro, at the end of this I will aggregate these parts for the FIS wiki.

Regards,
Steven

--
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http://iase.info



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Re: [Fis] Information and Locality, on the Introduction

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Pedro,

(First, I suspect that there remains an issue with the FIS server.)

I agree with your rejection of the coda “and hence ultimately quantum” and my 
particular reason for this is that it effectively denies structuralism. It will 
become clear, I hope, in this discussion that for me structuralism is 
fundamental. IOW, the central role of structure cannot be ignored as is 
essentially the case for all our digital forms.

This necessarily leads me to a particular view of the unit value that differs 
from convention. For me, the unit value, 1, has what is normally considered a 
dimensionality that is added by the Cartesian system. So 1 is what is normally 
thought of as the radius of a sphere. Dimension then reduces at the 
intersection with further values, for example a circle exists at the 
intersection of two values and, finally, points are terminal, the intersection 
of such a circle with a third value. 

So this view provides the foundation for a very different mathematics that I 
claim is the necessary consequence of this type of thinking - whereas 
mathematical convention derives from human commerce.  The advantage is a 
natural constraint that avoids infinite dimensionality, introduced by the 
Cartesian system, greater than we perceive.

And, indeed, I do put together the Allostery and broad stimulated protein 
conformance of biophysical structure with metabolites of all kinds, both from 
the environment and internally, to the organism structure in the taking away of 
a signal. 

Indeed, this allosteric conformance, I argue as a part of my main line of 
research, requires us to consider a new physical feature of nature that denies 
the strong locality of the Bit, provides a role for sense (or “feeling”) in 
biophysical behavior, and solves the across structure coordination that has 
thwarted us in large-scale computational terms. 

I should hasten to add that this lack of locality too has nothing at all to do 
with quantum mechanics.

Regards,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
http://iase.info






> On Sep 18, 2015, at 4:11 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  
> wrote:
> 
> Thanks Steven. I find it curious that you have referred  to 
> biophysical/physical grounds to establish meaning and apprehension.  In the 
> latter, it is rather unclear for me whether you put together in the same 
> footing the taking away of a metabolite from the environment and the taking 
> away of a signal (which is not really taken 'away'). For the living cell this 
> difference is crystal clear, although very few people have worked on it 
> --notoriously Gerhardt great paper on eukaryotic signaling paths (1999) and 
> also some of my bioinfo works. In my view, this distinction is essential to 
> draw a natural history of communication, and particularly to understand 
> meaning. Locality, in the way you have started to introduce it, looks quite 
> close to "embodiment": in what extent can one talk about  locality without 
> endorsing some form of embodiment and of situatedness? As Landauer (1987) 
> put, "information is always physical", which I agree, but not with the coda 
> that often accompanies it : "and hence ultimately quantum".
> best--Pedro
>> From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
>> Subject: Information and Locality, on the Introduction
>> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 09:54:52 -0700
>> To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Dear List,
>> 
>> First a few clarifications on the definition of terms for my usage.
>> 
>> "Semantics" are the rules of transformation for syntax, per Carnap.
>> 
>> "Meaning" is the physical behavior that is the consequence of apprehension, 
>> where apprehension is a biophysical taking away from the world in an 
>> organism.
>> 
>> Strictly, "apprehension" begins with a sense that leads to a response. 
>> Depending on the type of organism, apprehension may involve a physical 
>> processing by the organism. This may result in a failure to manifest a 
>> response external to the organism.
>> 
>> I understand that this use of the term "meaning" differs from its ambiguous 
>> informal use. The reason for this rigor is to enable the discussion to be 
>> unified in the physical sciences.
>> 
>> Because many in this forum are familiar with the work of Charles Peirce, let 
>> me note that this is a stricter Pragmaticism. I intend to leave Charles 
>> Peirce's semiotic theory aside (except to acknowledge it here).
>> 
>> One of the reasons for the form of my introduction is to highlight the 
>> distinction between Communication and Information. We can ignore dance and 
>> other arts as communi

[Fis] Information and Locality.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

This is not merely a matter of software, it is one of structure.

At the end of the day only holomorphic functors can describe biophysical sense 
and actions, allosteric conformances, and it is only the binding of these as 
hyperfunctors that they can describe my sense and response at all scales.

Shapes and Shaping

At its simplest, information in biophysics involves shapes and shaping. These 
shapes are cell receptors and motor functions, changed and bound by genetic 
mechanics in flexible closed structures (cells and membranes). We can describe 
these shapes at all levels of the organism with dynamic holomorphic functors. 
These describe the shapes upon the surface of cells, be they receptor clusters 
or motor functions.  

These are sensitized by a necessary new basis. A universal that is across all 
flexible closed structure and is responsible for the associated range of 
sensation, allosteric shaping and coordination across these structures.



I have one more piece to add, expanding information science into its proper 
domain.


My apologies for the delay between posts. I am still in recovery and in 
addition to the problems with the FIS server last week my Thyroid crashed (the 
consequence of radiation treatment last year) leaving me feeling pretty ill. 

Regards,
Steven


--
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http://iase.info



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Re: [Fis] Information and Locality.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

e solar system. 

Indeed, to do anything at all requires that we provide the missing locality.

Regards,
Steven


--
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http://iase.info <http://iase.info/>



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Re: [Fis] Information and Locality.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

 the product of intent.
> 
> The bottom-line is that if you live only in language then you live in an 
> impoverished world.
> 
> Of course all theories are the free creation of the mind, it is what comes 
> next that matters.
> 
> This inevitably leads me to the work of Benjamin Peirce, who may have been 
> the first to observe that all the laws of nature are necessarily the 
> algebraic sum of their action together. The idea was developed by Einstein, 
> though Einstein was motivated by Maxwell’s work on covariance, as General 
> Covariance and emphasizing that the natural laws are necessarily independent 
> of any particular coordinate system.
> 
> The challenge that Benjamin Peirce saw was how to unify this purely 
> mathematical view with the physical sciences. I believe he set both of his 
> sons James and Charles upon this task.
> 
> This goal of unifying pure mathematics and the physical sciences has yet to 
> be achieved, although I am hopeful. In particular the movement against truth 
> value systems may be gaining momentum.
> 
> And this leads me to mention locality because Einstein was concerned by 
> concerns that I share. It is certainly the case that in GR we can speak only 
> of the local event but if you want to solve real problems you yourself 
> provide the unification of calculations, for example, to take man out of the 
> solar system. 
> 
> Indeed, to do anything at all requires that we provide the missing locality.
> 
> Regards,
> Steven
> 
> 
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
> http://iase.info <http://iase.info/>
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Re: [Fis] Information is a linguistic description of structures

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Emanuel,

Unfortunately, you have stated no axioms and introduced subjectivity.

Recall that I began with a definition of “semantic” per Carnap. Semantics are 
simply the rules of syntax transformation. Semantics have little to do with 
natural human language. Indeed, Carnap was very conscious of these questions 
and wrote extensively on them. In particular, he was especially conscious of 
the levels of linguistic expression and the cyclic grounding problem that you 
have exhibited here. I recommend that you review his The Logical Syntax Of 
Language (Carnap, 1937). It is one of my favorites.

The question of axiomatics in information theory is covered by Shannon and 
better expressed in the Kahn video series by Brit Cruise that I pointed to at 
the start. I suggest you at least take the short amount of time that it will 
take to review those videos.

Regards,
Steven




> On Sep 23, 2015, at 10:47 PM, Emanuel Diamant  wrote:
> 
> Dear FIS colleagues,
>  
> As a newcomer to FIS, I feel myself very uncomfortable when I have to 
> interrupt the ongoing discourse with something that looks for me quite 
> natural but is lacking in our current public dialog. What I have in mind is 
> that in every discussion or argument exchange, first of all, the grounding 
> axioms and mutually agreed assumptions should be established and declared as 
> the basis for further debating and reasoning. Maybe in our case, these things 
> are implied by default, but I am not a part of the dominant coalition. For 
> this reason, I would dare to formulate some grounding axioms that may be 
> useful for those who are not FIS insiders:
>  
> 1. Information is a linguistic description of structures observable in a 
> given data set
> 2. Two types of data structures could be distinguished in a data set: primary 
> and secondary data structures.
> 3. Primary data structures are data clusters or clumps arranged or occurring 
> due to the similarity in physical properties of adjacent data elements. For 
> this reason, the primary data structures could be called physical data 
> structures.
> 4. Secondary data structures are specific arrangements of primary data 
> structures. The grouping of primary data structures into secondary data 
> structures is a prerogative of an external observer and it is guided by his 
> subjective reasons, rules and habits. The secondary data structures exist 
> only in the observer’s head, in his mind. Therefore, they could be called 
> meaningful or semantic data structures. 
> 5. As it was said earlier, Description of structures observable in a data set 
> should be called “Information”. In this regard, two types of information must 
> be distinguished – Physical Information and Semantic Information. 
> 6. Both are language-based descriptions; however, physical information can be 
> described with a variety of languages (recall that mathematics is also a 
> language), while semantic information can be described only by means of 
> natural human language.
>  
> This is a concise set of axioms that should preface all our further 
> discussions. You can accept them. You can discard them and replace them with 
> better ones. But you can not proceed without basing your discussion on a 
> suitable and appropriate set of axioms.
>  
> That is what I have to say at this moment.
> My best regards to all of you,
> Emanuel.
>  
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Re: [Fis] Locality?

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Marcus,

I think this is a wise question. We must always speak up and seek clarification 
when we are concerned about our interpretation of the environment (in which can 
be found my posts to FIS) if we are to achieve effective communication (the 
exchange of knowledge between apprehending entities).  

Thinking about the systems that Shannon worked upon, the ideas as conveyed by 
Brit Cruise, and the computing machines and systems that I have helped design, 
it is easy to see how one may become unclear.

I spent many years studying the movement of data from one processor to another 
by various means, memory subsystems and the hardware problems of “addressing” 
and “alignment,” hidden cache hierarchies and such like to improve performance 
pragmatics, and I designed mathematically founded programming languages to 
enable engineers to speak of semantics and performance semantics that are a 
part of this bit "motion.” 

And within these programming languages I studied the locality of expression, 
scope, aliasing, and so on.

I spent further years informally studying the practices of engineers in 
different parts of the world using these languages. And I informally observed 
the common effects that these languages have upon how these engineers behave 
and define themselves. Going so far, it seemed to me, as to dressing the same 
way, liking the same kinds of music, dating the same types of people, and 
buying the same models of car. There are observable differences, for example, 
between C programmers and those that program in LISP.

Later I dealt with the Turing test and via a conversational interface that 
provided access to content in a world full of people with a wide range of 
educational and economic backgrounds.

All of these experiences present a different sense of “Locality” to the mind.

In the digital world, dominant in current Information Science, the ultimate 
Locality is, necessarily, the Bit - combined with other bits via machine 
operations. Everything else is not local, it is organized Bits. 

And this is the point at the foundation of my discussion. 

Bits may be organized but this organization is arbitrary - and has meaning only 
in the effect that it has upon the behavior of the machine. Whether they are 
aligned in 8bit or 64bit words as, in fact, as some hardware electronic grid 
with high level hardware controller enforcing a strict organization, or they 
are holes in the ground managed by our grandchildren, it is the same and our 
perception of the Locality is an illusion.

I make the point that this organization is taken for granted and not properly 
unaccounted for.

Since processor operations are 64bit wide (and have, experimentally, been 
wider), we can say that this is the extent of locality in the common machine 
(data structures are organization, not localities). But allosteric Locality  
(if I may extend the common notion of this term) in biophysics is very 
different, much more flexible, across the entire structure and sense is 
directly bound to response.

Regards,
Steven


--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
http://iase.info








> On Sep 28, 2015, at 8:57 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> I am embarrassed to admit I feel I don't quite grasp the notion of 
> Locality you reference. This seems to be a key initial concept in your model, 
> and thus I feel I cannot comment specifically on following matters. By 
> locality do you mean the “fact“ of specific items being specifically situated 
> in specific environments? Please point me to the passage/post where you feel 
> you explain this most succinctly (sorry?).
> 
> Otherwise, I *think* I agree with the general Gestalt of your model . . . 
> but again I am getting stuck early on and cannot comment specifically. Help 
> is appreciated . . . 
> 







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[Fis] Information and Locality. Finale.

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

 only missing direct consideration of 
Locality, it necessarily implies an extended Locality.  At almost every level, 
a primitive type or simple or complex aggregates of types, the typing system 
deceives us. We consider 8bit or 64bit words to be one. In fact they have no 
locality at all and their Locality is, in fact, in implementation, arbitrary.  

Information is always about something. We speak of the world as in-formation.  
And as a result it is impossible for information to be basic.

We gather these illusions, we organize them and describe them as software, and 
place them into artificially organized machines based upon the mechanisms of 
the industrial revolution (the Jacquard Loom).  These machines are a Chinese 
room except there is no-person inside the machine. There is no Turk. There can 
never be any feeling.


This model consists of a discovery of a physical role for sense or feeling in 
biophysical assimilation and the activity of information in the world.


In our disciplines, with all respect to people here, we speak about ideas and 
hope to maybe change behavior by their acceptance. Yet if none of us change 
behavior by bringing these ideas into the world then our work is quite 
literally without meaning. And this may bring out the existential crisis in 
each of us.


In theoretical physics motion is "in-formation."  Yet we should not become 
confused about its role as a generalization existentially. It can only inform 
motions and identify cause. Information can never speak about basis.  It can 
never be equated with substance or force, it may only speak about these things.


Finally, I feel exactly as you feel. When I look upon the world, I see the same 
things that you see.

We are structurally very similar and the basis of our experience is universal. 

The entire difference between you and I is our environment, the things and the 
people we keep in it.


I should not have to point out that this way of thinking makes the ideas of 
General AI a futile fantasy. We may perhaps enhance or reproduce our 
experiences through technology derived from these ideas but we can never 
transfer senses or mind. These ideas are simply the dualism of the modern age.


The facts are simple motions passing through biology and mediated by structure. 
 There is surely a better or worse way to socially organize. But not via the 
whimsy of opinion, although opinion certainly impacts motions, but by the facts 
of nature. We may expect that as we are better able to discern these facts that 
we will be more effective in living together.


It is worth noting that, as far as we know, we are the only instance of intent 
or WILL, the manifestation of this new universal, in the entire universe. The 
knowledge that we are now acquiring as a result of rapid advances in biophysics 
will provide us the ability to place life where it would not otherwise occur. 

This gives a role to WILL in the grander scheme of things and a “grand 
challenge” for humanity.


Thinking about the nature of Locality opens a range of complex ideas that may 
seem unrelated. But the bottom-line is a simple confrontation. Are we a 
technological whimper, polluting our environment to demise?  Or will we accept 
a role to extend a place for intension and WILL beyond the Darwinian accident?  

It is not that Nature does not need people (as the International Conservation 
groups would have it), people are Nature.

Regards,
Steven

PS. With acknowledgement and respect to the mathematician and astronomer 
Benjamin Peirce of Harvard University (1809-1880).

--
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http://iase.info



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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Information And Locality, Addendum's]--Steven

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

with a new
> viral (sub-viral) branch, plus the well-known archeal and eubacterial ones.
>
> Unfortunately, the neglect of the life cycle is almost universal. Neither
> neuroscientists nor psychologists nor social scientists are sufficiently
> aware of this invisible "water" that permeates all living stuff. Echoing
> some old evolutionary statement, everything should made sense in relation
> with the advancement of the corresponding life cycle. Just the superficial
> observation of human exchanges in our societies, or in whatever historical
> epoch, the conversational small-talk topics, the way people greet each
> other, the gossip media... the condensates of the individuals' info cycles
> are everywhere. A new conceptualization of information as accompanying the
> development of human action for the sake of life cycles and subtending the
> cooperation structures of economic life could have wide multidisciplinary
> interest--I think. (Unfortunately, these adventures are discouraged: Mark
> is terribly right about the sorrow state of our collective brain
> reservoirs--poor universities! kingdoms of conventionalism and tunnel
> vision).
>
> To conclude, the emphasis on the generative also allows some connection
> with Howard's and Bob's  criticisms on the "dead"  approach to
> cosmological matters.  I do not venture to expose my own naive views,
> rather will repeat a wonderful sentence from Michael Conrad (1996): "When
> we look at a biological system we are looking at the face of the underlying
> physics of the universe."
>
> best--Pedro
>
>
>
> Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:
>
>> (From Steven)
>>
>>  Original Message 
>> Subject: Information And Locality, Addendum's
>> Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2015 16:46:41 -0700
>> From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
>> To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science <
>> fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> CC: Pedro Marijuan 
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear List,
>>
>> Looking over my promises in this discussion I have two particular notes
>> to provide. These got put aside as I became distracted by both the server
>> issues and my health.
>>
>> I promised to provide a historical statement (referencing Benjamin
>> Peirce, Einstein and Turing) and a brief mathematical statement.  I will
>> make these statements separately over the coming days.
>>
>> Pedro, I note that server issues continue. Regards,
>> Steven
>>
>>
>> --
>>  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
>>  http://iase.info
>> ---
>>
>> ___
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>>
>>
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Five Momenta

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Pedro and List,

A note to add that the momenta in Pedro's question of disciplinary scope is 
very much on my mind as I undertake the final structuring of the content of my 
book on this now very broad subject. This final restructuring has taken much of 
my attention over the past week or two, along with my continuing fight with a 
variety of medication effects, and so I must add an apology for the 
high-latency in my contributions.

Obviously there will be details missing and this question of locality and its 
absence across dynamic physical structure, leading to my proposal of a new 
universal aspect of nature such that it may drive a new (bio)mechanics, is 
central.

In addition, the resolution of our instruments are not yet adequate to show the 
mechanics I speak of either in the organisms of interest to the current body of 
research or at the atomic level. I have only a limited ability to direct this 
research. I trust that I will be forgiven if I simply suggest the way ahead as 
these technologies evolve. 

When we do reach a capable resolution (hopefully in the not too distant future) 
I suggest, for example, that we will discover neither a discrete nor a smooth 
continuum but rather a dynamic knotted “disturbances and distortions of the 
continuum" in the world’s fundamental structure. And further, this inclusive 
model allows me to predict that we will place on this continuum, as the origin 
of both gravitation and sense/response, the single label “Light."

Because of this broad field of inquiry it can be considered a very active area 
of research and there are always new results to consider from a variety of 
sources - and this is where I have spent most of my time in the past ten years. 
For example, HHMI is a rich and diverse source and "Clique topology reveals 
intrinsic geometric structure in neural correlations" 
(http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.06172) has my attention today. I tend to steer away 
from detailed analysis of human neural structures, essentially because the 
degree of complexity is too high to manage without a more fundamental 
biophysical understanding first. For this reason I prefer the neural analysis 
of, say, biophysicist Dennis Bray over the attempts at explanation of 
mathematician Vladimir Itskov, although his highlight of the limits of 
conventional models of “neural” [sic] computation is very relevant. 

But the source of research study could have easily been the dynamics of blood 
flow in the human brain, the behavioral study and neural development of blinded 
kittens, a marine study of protists, jellyfish, plants or algae, the study of 
pain anomalies in genetically related families in Europe and Pakistan, the 
neural dysfunction of children in Canada, electroception by Zoologists in 
Australia, the bioengineering of digital counters in DNA strands or 
manipulation of other genetics in the labs at Stanford.  And I find the 
behavior of buffalo around a pond, or the empathetic or hunting social 
behaviors of sea mammals, as fascinating as human behavior manifest on Facebook.

It does seem relevant for me, however, to highlight just how my work on the 
allostery of biophysics and mathematical flexible closed structure, my 
particular view of the universal, informing, mathematics, sense and response, 
may be incorporated generally (appealing to the power of Wigner’s 
simplification) into the physical sciences and thus the general potential scope 
of endeavor that this may allow.  

Certainly, it seems to me, that this “as above, so below,” Eugene Wigner 
inspired, approach and the "general covariance” or “algebraic sum of physical 
laws” of Einstein and Benjamin Peirce, has allowed me to discover, as it did 
Maxwell for electrodynamics, simple mathematics of value able to get traction 
on the structure of the problem without being bogged down by the manifest 
complexities of biochemistry and metabolic thermodynamics.

Recalling always that despite my excursions into biology, social behavior, 
cosmology, and the depths of theoretical physics, that from the start I have 
labeled my work “The Foundations of Logic and Apprehension, informed by 
research in biophysics." And that my original motivating interest, apart from a 
confessed human curiosity, rests squarely in the large scale engineering 
problems and mathematics of process interaction in recognition and complex 
decision making in parallel computation. 

I understand how this endeavor may indeed seem a “crazy story” by conventional 
measures - it has certainly taken me "down the path least traveled" - but I 
trust that it will be taken in the truest spirit of scientific and mathematical 
investigation and inquiry.
 
It seems likely that I will be able to share this restructured (draft) Table Of 
Contents of my book, in which it will be seen that much of this momenta across 
discipline scope is covered, in the coming days, along with the additional 
notes I have promised. 

Steven


> On Oct 20, 2015, at 8:31 AM, Pe

Re: [Fis] Response to Salthe

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Darwin's observations were challenged by the American geologist Clarence
King in his "Catastrophe and Evolution" (King 1877), an argument much
admired and supported by Charles Peirce. He argues that it is not natural
selection by incremental mutation, while indubitable in some minor cases,
but the catastrophic evolutionary pressure that produces the significant
diversity of species.

Steven

​
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Re: [Fis] Response to Salthe

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

For reference you can find a copy of Clarence King's "Catastrophe And
Evolution" in the folder "King" here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-c2CVg9ZQsAY2NZcU1mNGVrbFU/view?usp=sharing

On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
wrote:

> Darwin's observations were challenged by the American geologist Clarence
> King in his "Catastrophe and Evolution" (King 1877), an argument much
> admired and supported by Charles Peirce. He argues that it is not natural
> selection by incremental mutation, while indubitable in some minor cases,
> but the catastrophic evolutionary pressure that produces the significant
> diversity of species.
>
> Steven
>
> ​
>
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Re: [Fis] Response to Salthe

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Here is a more direct link. Google drive tricked me :-)

https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B-c2CVg9ZQsAel9tVktvQmxucUk&usp=sharing

On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
wrote:

> For reference you can find a copy of Clarence King's "Catastrophe And
> Evolution" in the folder "King" here:
>
>
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-c2CVg9ZQsAY2NZcU1mNGVrbFU/view?usp=sharing
>
> On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
> wrote:
>
>> Darwin's observations were challenged by the American geologist Clarence
>> King in his "Catastrophe and Evolution" (King 1877), an argument much
>> admired and supported by Charles Peirce. He argues that it is not natural
>> selection by incremental mutation, while indubitable in some minor cases,
>> but the catastrophic evolutionary pressure that produces the significant
>> diversity of species.
>>
>> Steven
>>
>> ​
>>
>
>
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[Fis] "no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

A few days ago Joseph Brenner wrote the following :

> … I conclude that no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced 
> to address the essential aspects of life, mind, and information. That 
> information has dual aspects has been more or less explicit in everything I 
> have tried to write in the last eight years.

This has bothered me from a number of perspectives, it sounds reasonable but is 
in fact deeply flawed. I worry that others may take it seriously and so I step 
from the shadows. The argument seems to be an advocacy of dualism and 
information mysterianism, but I doubt that Joe sees it this way.

For example, consider the biophysical motions necessarily involved in 
sensation, thought, and consideration when going to the store and the selective 
motions when reaching the store. Joe suggests that the dual aspects of 
information in a conventional physics is sufficient to explain these actions or 
motions, I simply cannot accept this. It is rather like saying that gravitation 
and electromagnetism are dual aspects of matter - and even though we have two 
clear and mathematical theories of each no physicist believes that this is the 
case.

I am especially concerned with the introduction here of the dismissive idea of 
“doubtful physical concepts” that seem to me to open the door of judgementalism.

As a reminder, Relativity was once considered a “doubtful physical concept.”

Can anyone defend Joe’s position?

Regards,
Steven

--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
http://iase.info <http://iase.info/>




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Re: [Fis] "no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

This is a response to both Stan and John, but especially Stan since John 
wanders to the non-physical.

Shannon’s perspective is not one of “choice,”  this suggests some proactive and 
there is no physical proactive in Shannon. Mathematical randomness is not 
logical choice. There is no force tending toward one thing or another.Indeed, I 
believe that to suggest information has physical action is contradictory in 
Joseph’s model.

However, I would accept such a proactive if you can define it well enough (as I 
believe I have in Flexible Closed Structure and as Benjamin Peirce hinted at 
when he referred to “will” or covariant “spirit”). But let me be clear that 
such a physical proactive would necessarily be covariant with other physical 
forces, and necessarily lead to life and sensation, and hence not, in fact, be 
a “dual aspect."

Regards,
Steven



> On Jul 18, 2016, at 7:41 AM, Stanley N Salthe  wrote:
> 
> Steven, Joseph --
> 
> This depends upon what are the “dual aspects” of information.  Very 
> generally, on the basic Shannonian perspective,  information is a selection 
> from among possibilities.  Matter does this physically, and at small scale is 
> never at rest, always choosing. Then there are the consequences of these 
> choices -- interpretation.  Interpretation has a basic physical meaning as 
> the consequences of the choices.
> 
> STAN
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  <mailto:ste...@iase.us>> wrote:
> Dear List,
> 
> A few days ago Joseph Brenner wrote the following :
> 
>> … I conclude that no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be 
>> introduced to address the essential aspects of life, mind, and information. 
>> That information has dual aspects has been more or less explicit in 
>> everything I have tried to write in the last eight years.
> 
> This has bothered me from a number of perspectives, it sounds reasonable but 
> is in fact deeply flawed. I worry that others may take it seriously and so I 
> step from the shadows. The argument seems to be an advocacy of dualism and 
> information mysterianism, but I doubt that Joe sees it this way.
> 
> For example, consider the biophysical motions necessarily involved in 
> sensation, thought, and consideration when going to the store and the 
> selective motions when reaching the store. Joe suggests that the dual aspects 
> of information in a conventional physics is sufficient to explain these 
> actions or motions, I simply cannot accept this. It is rather like saying 
> that gravitation and electromagnetism are dual aspects of matter - and even 
> though we have two clear and mathematical theories of each no physicist 
> believes that this is the case.
> 
> I am especially concerned with the introduction here of the dismissive idea 
> of “doubtful physical concepts” that seem to me to open the door of 
> judgementalism.
> 
> As a reminder, Relativity was once considered a “doubtful physical concept.”
> 
> Can anyone defend Joe’s position?
> 
> Regards,
> Steven
> 
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611 
> 
> http://iase.info <http://iase.info/>
> 
> 
> 
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[Fis] Experimental verification of an indefinite causal order

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Experimental verification of an indefinite causal order

"Investigating the role of causal order in quantum mechanics has recently
revealed that the causal relations of events may not be a priori well
defined in quantum theory. Although this has triggered a growing interest
on the theoretical side, creating processes without a causal order is an
experimental task. We report the first decisive demonstration of a process
with an indefinite causal order. To do this, we quantify how incompatible
our setup is with a definite causal order by measuring a “causal witness.”
This mathematical object incorporates a series of measurements that are
designed to yield a certain outcome only if the process under examination
is not consistent with any well-defined causal order. In our experiment, we
perform a measurement in a superposition of causal orders—without
destroying the coherence—to acquire information both inside and outside of
a “causally nonordered process.” Using this information, we experimentally
determine a causal witness, demonstrating by almost 7 SDs that the
experimentally implemented process does not have a definite causal order."

http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/3/e1602589

A valuable contribution, if repeated elsewhere.

Steven


--
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Research Scholar - +1 650 308 8611
Los Gatos, California. ste...@iase.us
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Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Dear List,

The recent discussions on ethics are bewildering and irrationally vague.

What, for example, does "integrity" mean?  Did I miss a formal
definition of it?  And what, exactly, is "a much deeper knowledge" -
this distinct between integral and intellectual simply makes no sense to me.

In my view there are two senses in which the term ethics may be justly
used.  And by "ethics" I mean exactly the cause of intentional
behaviors, no more.

There are "natural ethics" the sources of inevitable behavior, in which
survival and welfare are the primary motivators.  Piracy, for example,
is an natural ethic - it is the inevitable product of social conditions
in which property dynamics are not in balance (where some are denied
access to available resources and others hoard).  The second form is of
the kind more generally discussed, the conventions that mitigate natural
ethics.

Even though this second kind of ethics, conventions, are prescriptive in
nature, my constructive view of ethics itself is not prescriptive.  One
can readily imagine a meta-ethics, a science of ethics, that formalizes
the characterization of natural ethics and mitigating conventions that
is predictive; i.e., can predict intentional behavior in groups.

Only when such a science exists can we begin to consider optimization.

With respect,
Steven





Luis Serra (by way of Pedro Marijuan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>) wrote:

...
What is the type of information required to be integral, to reach 
individual's completeness? In my opinion, Integrity, in the sense 
referred by Michael, requires a much deeper knowledge than just 
intellectual knowledge: it requires to realize it, to deeply assume 
it. In my opinion it is not either a question of, say, "blind belief" 
in some behavior or something doctrinal. Integrity, in the sense I 
understood to Michael, comes naturally as a result of personal 
maturity and experience. Therefore, in the context of this great 
discussion on Ethics and Information I wonder:
- what kind or what type of information is required to reach 
individual's completeness?, and also,

- where this information can be obtained?

A second comment very much connected with the previous one.
Somebody said (Socrates, I think) that human beings' evil does not 
exist, it is just a question of ignorance. Again, a similar question 
arises to me: What kind of information could be the "antidote" of 
human evil? Does this question make a very special sense in our 
globalized societies?

...


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Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Dear Pedro,

I think we set our sights too low and we give up too soon if the best we 
can do is treat ethics as "the art of moral problem solving."  The 
conflict and horrors in the social orders of our species follows 
directly from such ambiguity.  Earlier attempts may be incomplete or 
failed but the pursuit still has merit.


I think it necessary, in terms of the "highest good," to pursue a 
scientific foundation of ethics. One that may eventually provide the 
sound underpinning of a new global society able to navigate its 
diversity by reference to natural foundations. 

The arts too will benefit from and be expanded by such a foundation in 
my view.


As to economics, I clearly prefer that ethics is not driven by 
economics.  I believe that, in any case, the reverse is true.


With respect,
Steven


Pedro Marijuan wrote:

Dear colleagues,

If ethics relates mostly to the quest for the "good" or for the "good 
reasons" of our social behavior, apparently it can be treated as 
another discipline --really? An initial complication is about the 
subject --good... "to whom"? It maybe one's personal interests, or 
his/her family, business, profession, country, species, Gaia... but 
those goodnesses are usually in conflict, even in dramatic 
contraposition. It is a frequent motif of dramas, movies, poetry, etc. 
(aren't we reminded "arts as technologies of ethics"?).


And then the complications about the circumstances, say the "boundary 
conditions". Any simple economic story or commercial transaction 
(e.g., remember that ugly provincial story about "the nail found in 
Zaragoza") may involve quite a number of situational changes and 
ethical variants ---if we put scale into a whole social dimension of 
multivariated networkings... it is just mind boggling. So I really 
would not put much weigh on those hierarchical categorizations that 
only take a minimalist snapshot upon a minimalist, almost nihilist 
scenario. However, some points by Loet months ago on how complexity 
may hide-in & show up along privileged axis might deserve discussion 
at this context.


Could we accept ethics just as an Art of moral problem solving? Quite 
many conceptual tools would enter therein, but the "scientificity" of 
the whole would not be needed. Even more, such scientificty would look 
suspicious to me. A few decades ago, a "scientific" guiding of the 
whole social evolution was taking place in a number of countries... 
apparently paving the way to a new, conflict less Era!


best regards

Pedro



At 22:56 06/05/2006, you wrote:

Replying to Pedro's query below, we can have:

{physical / chemical affordances {biological behaviors {cultural norms
{social guidance {personal past learnings {{{...{continuing process of
individuation...}.  Some of us would place ethics somewhere 
between

social guidance and personal past learnings.  An interesting question in
this scheme is 'where is transcendence?'  The problem is that there is
added, with each integrative level, further constraints.  At present 
I am
considering that, if we allocate the same energies at each level, 
then the
remaining degrees of freedom in the higher levels will benefit from 
having
stronger embodiment than would have been possible in the lower 
levels. That

is to say that, e.g., behaviors which could only be weakly supported in,
say, the biological level, become more possible to be manifested in, 
say,

the social level.

STAN



>Dear FIS colleagues,
>
>The question recently raised by Luis, but also in a different way by 
Karl,

>Stan and others, is a tough one. How do our formal "disciplinary"
>approaches fare when confronting the "global" reality of social 
life? My

>point is that most of knowledge impinging on social life matters is of
>informal, implicit, practical, experiential nature. How can one gain 
access

>to cognitive "stocks" of such volatile nature? Only by living, by
>socializing, by a direct hands-on participation...  Each new 
generation has
>to find its own way, to co-create its own socialization path. No 
moral or
>ethical progress then!!! (contrarily to the advancement of other 
areas of

>knowledge). Obviously, learning machines or techno environments cannot
>substitute for a socialization process --a side note for "prophets" 
of the

>computational.
>
>By the way, in those nice categorizations by Stan --it isn't logically
>awkward that the subject tries to be both subject and observer at 
the same

>time? If it is so, the categorization process goes amok with social
>openness of relations and language open-endedness, I would put.  Karl's
>logic is very strict, provided one remains strictly within the same 
set of

>reference. Anyhow, it is a very intriguing discussion.
>
>best
>
>Pedro
>
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Re: [Fis] The Identity of Ethics

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

In response to Michael Nagenborg.

We surely have nothing to fear from knowing how ethics work in the world 
and applying that knowledge can only help us all.  Any effort to 
establish a science of ethics can only be done without prejudice and by 
following wherever it leads.  We cannot expect it to concur with our 
existing conventions or support existing prejudices.  As to "morality" 
this seems to me to be a term applied to notions that have no foundation 
except precedence.  There can be no room for such precedence in an 
honest effort of this kind.


As observed earlier, for me natural ethics are the cause of inevitable 
behaviors.  These behaviors are mitigated by conventions.  One can 
readily see these behaviors are tractable to good logic and are thus 
likely to be predictable.  Conventions are only useful in so far as they 
mitigate for the optimization of the goals by individuals.  Arbitrary 
conventions, by which good sense is vastly outnumbered today, is the 
cause of chaos and enslaves us.


Michael does not mind considering ethics and medical science an art form 
- I object on both counts :-) since this seems to me a most 
unsatisfactory state of affairs.  In this context "art form" simply 
means hand-waving and appeals to mystery - it does not mean "Art."


Further, it seems futile to me to attempt to wrest sense from "moral 
facts" - this is as futile as any other deconstruction. A science of 
ethics demands we rebuild the world on natural foundations.


With respect,
Steven




M. Nagenborg wrote:

Dear Pedro,
dear all,

when it comes to "ethics as science" we should be distinguish between 
the scientific research on morality (or the "good") and the attempt to 
use the scientific nature of ethics to establish a certain form of 
morality or a set of rules called "ethics" within a society.


Scientist working in the field of ethics may be considered experts in 
moral questions, but they should not be considered as a form of 
preacher who tells people exactly what to do. (You may not even become 
more ethical by doing research on ethics.)


From my own understanding, I consider ethics as a way to describe and 
reflect on morality. The results of this may even be used by some 
people to reflect on their own morality, but I do not believe (or 
hope) that Plato's idea that a philosopher should become king is still 
alive. What ethics may be good for is to work as a tool to remind us 
of alternatives in what we are doing.


So, as good as it seems to consider "ethics as an Art of problem 
solving" this is a little bit unsatisfying, because if we really 
believe that "morality" can not become the object of scientific 
research, we should at least be able to make clear, why we think so. 
For example we should explain what makes the difference between moral 
and non-moral facts - and, voilà, we are doing ethics again! And I 
think we should at least try to clear this kinds of question in a 
scientific manner, which should help us to make the discussion 
rational in the sense, that we can communicate and justify our views 
on morality.


I do not mind considering ethics as a form of art, by the way, just 
like I would consider medicine as an art. But - like in the example of 
medicine - there is plenty of space left for scientific reasoning 
within the field of an art. Thus, I would not make a strong 
distinction between art and science, in the sense that something that 
is considered "art" can not include elements of scientific reasoning.


With best regards,
Michael Nagenborg

Pedro Marijuan schrieb:

Dear colleagues,

If ethics relates mostly to the quest for the "good" or for the "good 
reasons" of our social behavior, apparently it can be treated as 
another discipline --really? An initial complication is about the 
subject --good... "to whom"? It maybe one's personal interests, or 
his/her family, business, profession, country, species, Gaia... but 
those goodnesses are usually in conflict, even in dramatic 
contraposition. It is a frequent motif of dramas, movies, poetry, 
etc. (aren't we reminded "arts as technologies of ethics"?).


And then the complications about the circumstances, say the "boundary 
conditions". Any simple economic story or commercial transaction 
(e.g., remember that ugly provincial story about "the nail found in 
Zaragoza") may involve quite a number of situational changes and 
ethical variants ---if we put scale into a whole social dimension of 
multivariated networkings... it is just mind boggling. So I really 
would not put much weigh on those hierarchical categorizations that 
only take a minimalist snapshot upon a minimalist, almost nihilist 
scenario. However, some points by Loet months ago on how complexity 
may hide-in & show up along privileged axis might deserve discussion 
at this context.


Could we accept ethics just as an Art of moral problem solving? Quite 
many conceptual tools would enter therein, but the "scientificity" of 
the whole would not be nee

Re: [Fis] QUANTUM INFORMATION

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Dear Andrei and List,

I have been reading the session opening post for a few days now and
trying to make sense of it in terms of the Foundations of Information
Science.

These questions continue to be raised and I am glad the session here
causes me to return to them.  They continue to be the center
of an ongoing crisis in physics.  I am not sure of the state of play -
and it would be useful to me to have a physicist summarize the latest
work.  


The last paper I reviewed on the subject was James Malley's paper
(http://arxiv.org/ftp/quant-ph/papers/0402/0402126.pdf)  which, at the
time, I thought convincingly showed that EPR results do not commute.  A
paper from Daniele Tommasini
(http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/0651/00/locaqft.pdf)
appears to show that EPR is unmeasurable.  I'd like to hear the
standing of these papers today, if anyone knows.

I was fortunate to be in a conversation with Roger Penrose a few years
ago about these questions and he put it rather well by saying that he
was troubled that cricket balls did not appear to behave according to
the rules of quantum physics.  

I have a number of standing questions about entanglement theory
especially as it related of molecular biology. For example:  Is an
entire organism considered to be an entangled entity?  What is the
theoretical and experimental justification for stem cells as origin of
entangled cell structures?  How does that work according
to entanglement physics?  It is simple to consider entanglement
in the case of single photons, it is rather more difficult to
generalize it.  Although, aggregate manifestations of entanglement may,
in fact, be easier to deal with both experimentally and theoretically.

What Penrose is getting at by the above remark is that if such states
as entanglement/non-locality and superposition do exist at the quantum
level they must surely manifest at the classical level.  Andrei's
appeal to scale in his recent post seems unreasonable (he essentially asks at what increase of mass
entanglement stops). 


Hence, entangled states/non-locality, superposition, must
necessarily be in the mechanics of information theory.  In other words,
we need a theory of information that unifies classical and quantum
theories - or we need some reasonable explanation of why there should
be two theories.

I think there may, in fact, be ready manifestation of
entanglement/non-locality at the classical level
underlying the integration of experience in senses. If this is not a
classical level manifestation of entanglement and non-locality then it
requires that we
do something like Jonathan Edwards'
(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~regfjxe/aw.htm) proposal and reduce integrated
experience to single cells.  This does not seem likely in my view
because the argument reduces to a point and if it does not the locality
issues
remain within the cell.  However, I do think Jonathan's work is very
interesting and worthy.  In my view, even if the manifestation is
isolated to a single cell or just a few
cells in the brain, the locality issue is a problem for sentience
engineering and cognitive
science. (Obvious example: smash fingers from both hands in a door. How
is it you can integrate the pain of each together in a single
cognition?)  

Indeed, I do currently assume in my work that there is this
manifestation of entanglement/non-locality at the classical level of
sentience
engineering and that it does explain the integration of experience. 
However, whether this non-locality and associated sensory / cognitive
integration relates directly to EPR I leave as an
open question.  There are many miles to go before we sleep.  It
certainly would be convenient, however, if I could say with some
certainty that all organisms are entangled entities - in a single whole
or in parts.

As to the Toshiba device, as they say here in the USA, "I'm from
Missouri" (the "show me" state) - I will wait until they actually have
something to show before passing judgment.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
SEMEIOSIS RESEARCH
INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE & ENGINEERING

http://www.semeiosis.org
http://iase.info


Andrei Khrennikov (by way of Pedro Marijuan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>)
wrote:

  11th FIS Discussion Session:
  
  QUANTUM INFORMATION 
  Andrei Khrennikov & Jonathan D.H. Smith
  
  
  



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[Fis] Quantum Information - Probability Functions and Information

[Steven Ericsson Zenith]

Dear List,

I apologize to Andrei for not responding directly to his earlier posting 
- I may yet respond to it.  But the discussion here subsequently may 
make an itemized response moot, and this discussion distracted me from 
my particular response - partly because I wanted to see how the 
discussion panned out.


I have found the discussion rather bewildering - we have returned 
rapidly to the old horse in physics.  So let me make a couple of simple 
observations - some of which may simply repeat what others have said here.


1. Quantum probability functions are either directly equivalent to 
probability functions in Shannon's information theory or they are not.   
Which is it?


2. If there are new physical mechanisms discovered in quantum mechanics 
then I am with Penrose - recall my earlier report of his observation 
concerning cricket balls.  The mechanisms must exist independent of 
scale. And that implies to me that a clear mechanistic integration with 
information theory is possible and required.


3. It seems to me that the problem here is the parallel postulate and 
its equivalent by extension to computation.  This is the reason 
probabilities come into it at all.  Perhaps we need to be reminded that 
probabilities are the result of observations of the statistical behavior 
of individuals.  Individuals have an ontological status while 
probability functions only have epistemological status. 

4. Recurring laws of probability do appear to be stable laws, but they 
are founded upon the aggregation of individual behavior.  Their 
ontological status is derived from the behavior of individuals, not by 
their own account.


With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson Zenith

INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
Palo Alto, California
http://iase.info


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