Dan, Terry, and list,
Dan
http://www.dataversity.net/cognonto-takes-knowledge-based-artificial-intelligence/
Interesting claim for application of Peircean ideas in the tech industry.
Thanks for the pointer. I'm happy to see more interest and applications
of Peirce's logic and ontology.
Terry
Jerry,
If Peirce had intended any further meaning, he would have
mentioned it explicitly.
Really?
Yes, really. Peirce wrote about logic and EGs in multiple articles,
lectures, and MSS. He didn't say everything in every article. But
if you can't find something in at least one source, it's
On 11/22/2017 10:50 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
This is common in the formal logic of the chemical sciences.
Peirce studied logic long before he studied chemistry.
He picked up his brother's copy of Whatley's logic when he was 12.
Boole's two books (1847, 1854) were published when he was 8 an
On 11/21/2017 4:08 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
CSP’s strange insistence on the logical perplexity of repeating
words in sentences (or on sheets of assertion) has long puzzled me.
Are you referring to the following passage?
From 2.13:
it seems reasonable that any decidedly marked point of the
On 11/21/2017 11:48 AM, Mary Libertin wrote:
In para 4 states that the first use should be in bold to
designate it as the first. This is similar in some ways
to the type/token distinction...
Peirce said that selectives serve the same role as pronouns or a
kind of artificial proper name, such as
On 11/17/2017 5:05 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I think, the three kinds of implication or hierarchy are: Composition,
power, and classification:
Composition: "a contains b" or "b is a part of a", "if we have a, then
we have b too".
Power: "a can have an effect on b", "if a changes, then b is not
On 11/14/2017 11:49 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
what I wrote about the Latin "condicio" and "conditio" was wrong.
As far as I have got it from looking it up, both means both (state
and prerequisite), and some other things too such as seasoning
I checked a large Latin-English dictionary (over 200
On 11/3/2017 10:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
For you, formal logic is a branch of mathematics; for us, though...
It's always a bad idea to make claims about anyone else's thoughts,
contemporary or historical. It's best to quote their exact words.
As for me, I completely agree with Peirce:
Gary F,
There are two separate issues here: (1) the isomorphism between Peirce's
1911 system and his earlier presentations; and (2) the relationship
between Peirce's endoporeutic and GTS.
About #1, the issues are clear for first-order logic (Alpha + Beta):
every graph drawn according to the 1903
Gary F, Jeff BD, Kirsti, Jon A,
I didn't respond to your previous notes because I was tied up with
other work. Among other things, I presented some slides for a telecon
sponsored by Ontolog Forum. Slide 23 (cspsci.gif attached) includes
my diagram of Peirce's classification of the sciences and
Gary F,
The issues are far deeper than notation or computer processing.
1903 was a critical year in which Peirce began his correspondence
with Lady Welby. That led him to address fundamental semiotic issues.
I’ll have to confess at this point that I have no interest in learning
EGs for the sak
Gary R and Jon A,
Gary
as Peirce argues in the Neglected Argument and elsewhere is,
first, hypothesis formation (abduction), deduction of the
implications of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising
a test of it, and, once a test has been devised, finally the
inductive experimental testing is
I received an offline message that asked where learning occurs
in the cycle of observation, induction, abduction, revision,
deduction, and action.
Answer: at every turn of every cycle.
John
Forwarded Message
But your cycle implies that one person just keeps going around it,
On 10/21/2017 12:49 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
So my chapter leans more to the biological/biosemiotic side;
but I think the essential ideas are the same.
I agree. I subscribed to an email list on Rosen's ideas for a
while, but I stopped because it was generating too much email.
I am very s
On 10/20/2017 5:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
But John S found Peirce's tripartite diagram of the "main stages"
of an inquiry inadequate and offered his own well-known cyclical
diagram as a corrective.
Peirce's three methods of reasoning are fundamental. I was not
correcting them. I was just
On 10/20/2017 3:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that
many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural
forms - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes
of reasoning, even about addition and
Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that
methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are
kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument).
And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of
inquiry. Therefore, all of
Kirsti and Gary R,
Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.
My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
in just one line. If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:
1901 | Individual | CP 3.61
Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben,
Jon
By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully
employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to
talk about actual things that "react with the other like things
in the environment" (CP 6.495).
Yes. That's why I
Kirsti and Gary R,
If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.
Kirsti,
Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual.
In tha
On 10/17/2017 8:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I would rather see as Mark Type Token, using Type as mediation...
I agree that the type is the mediator, but changing the order would
conflict with the names Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It's
better to draw them in a triangle with Type at
This thread is getting hung up on words. I recommend Peirce's
advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
from any options that anyone is debating.
Let's consider the two words 'real' and 'existence'.
Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
dictum: "To be
Gary and Dan,
Dan
This is certainly a wonderful service to all.
I agree.
And if you have all of Lowell 2 available, please post it also.
When I get started reading something, I don't want to stop.
But the discussions can focus on the posted parts.
John
-
PEIRCE
Jerry,
I was making a narrow, noncontroversial point.
LEM plays a central role in triad, the logic of logic, the logic
of mathematics and the logic of science.
LEM is an assumption in many versions of logic. If you prefer
a 3-valued logic, feel free to adopt it. It's your choice.
[JFS] Y
On 10/14/2017 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce’s study of logic seems to be a /quest for the elemental./
It grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the...
It's unclear what "It" refers to. His study of logic certainly
does not grow out of phenomenology. Therefore, "It"
Jerry and Kirstima,
Jerry
the issue of the "Law of the Excluded Middle” is a red herring to me.
Kirstima
LEM presents one of the three basic misassumptions in modern logic.
LEM is a convention used in a technical (mathematical) sense.
It's important to keep the conventions distinct from ord
Charles, Gary F, and Edwina,
Charles
On what the sheet of assertions represents in EGs, I thought
Peirce said it represents TRUTH...
Yes, but that is because a blank sheet in EGs is a graph that says
nothing false. When I teach EG logic, I say "Silence is golden".
Charles
if we frame a theo
On 10/11/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
[Peirce] also says that “the logician assumes that the meaning
of language is well known between himself and the person to whom
he is imparting his doctrine” — an assumption that is quite
unrealistic in ordinary dialogue, and in fact is a common so
Jerry LRC, Jon AS, List,
Jerry
[JFS] Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction
implies everything.
Everything? While this assertion is widely repeated in
the literature, I think it is highly problematic.
It's widely repeated because it is a fundamental assumption
of most versio
Gary F and Jon,
Your comments about Peirce's views of negation in 1903 and 1906
are significant for later changes in this thinking about 3-valued
logic and about existential graphs.
Gary
this definition of "not" as problematic... plays the key role in
the evolution from the "scroll" (read as a
On 10/9/2017 2:28 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I never would have guessed that “what we mean by “/not/” is
“every proposition would be true if it were.”
That comment can only be true if there is no middle option --
i.e., a stone is either hard or not hard AND there is no
possibility of being n
Susan Haack recently published an article with the title
"The real question: Can philosophy be saved?":
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319990958_The_Real_Question_Can_Philosophy_be_Saved_2017
From the first page:
Yes, something is rotten in the state of philosophy. I'd go
so far as to
Dan, Edwina, Gene,
Dan
the Pirahãs... are initially welcoming. But you must make yourself
useful to the community. They do not have the luxury of accommodating
people who cannot carry their own weight.
I enjoyed your writings about the Pirahãs, and I certainly defer
to your expertise on anthro
On 10/1/2017 6:59 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
The number of values to which all should subscribe is very few
-- I make them to be tolerance, helpfulness, and democracy in
the widest sense.
I agree that those values are both important and universal.
But they are complex goals. According to Peirc
On 9/30/2017 10:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Firstness and Secondness [Feeling and Reaction] exist within
the individual and, if the process of forming conclusions is
confined to these two modes - it is indeed a relativist opinion.
It is only within the action of Thirdness that the 'controlle
On 9/28/2017 7:18 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
Multiverse theory is a symptom of intellectual desperation…
a descent into debating the number of angels on the head of a pin.
Both of those lines are contrary to anything Peirce would have
said or approved.
Peirce's First Rule of Reason: "Do not b
Jon AS and Jeff BD,
[JFS] I would say that every diagram is an image ...
[JAS] Peirce explicitly said otherwise in CP 2.277,
dividing hypoicons into images, diagrams, and metaphors.
But 'hypoicon' is a very technical term.
JBD
Peirce seems to use the term "image" in at least two senses...
On 9/27/2017 5:07 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
A diagram, in Peirce's terminology, is not an image; it is an icon,
with indexical and symbolic elements, that embodies the significant
relations among the parts of its object. An algebraic equation is
a diagram just as much as a geometric figure.
On 9/25/2017 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I consider that the initial quotation was simply Peirce's
general Introduction to his anticipated analysis, explaining
that he was going to explore fallacious logic, using a key example.
I agree.
Muhammad Ali did a lot of bragging. But he followe
On 9/2/2017 8:31 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
[Metaphysics is] "First in dignity, last in the order of learning":
What is meant by "learning"? Is it the learning of the researcher,
or the learning of the pupil, who is being taught by the researcher
the results of the research?
The word Aquinas use
On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote:
I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy
could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics
is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead.
I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion
On 8/31/2017 6:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
FZ: About Sowa’s classification of the sciences, compared to Peirce’s,
I don’t see something new.
I strongly agree. I was *not* attempting anything new. And I was
most definitely *not* attempting to produce a classification of the
sciences. I did no
Jerry LRC, Tommi, Gary F, and Kirsti,
Jerry
Thanks for collecting and posting the references to Simons works.
His views have changed hues since his book!
Yes. I'd say that the theoretical analysis in his 1987 book is
still valid, but Simons got hit with a large dose of reality in
his dozen ye
Reality
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:51:22 -0400
From: John F Sowa
To: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com
Dear Matthew,
Your note led me to search for publications by Peter Simons that
can be freely downloaded. And I came across a rich vein of texts
that are critical for the proposed ISO standard.
&g
Stephen CR, Gary F, and Kirsti,
I also received some offline comments, which I'll start with.
And I'm including a slightly revised copy of CSPsciences.jpg.
Anon
Might it be useful to label/annotate the relationships and have
a legend which describes the motivations behind the divisions
via the
I drew the attached CSPsciences.jpg to illustrate Peirce's
"Outline Classification of the Sciences", CP 1.180-202
or EP 2.258-262 (1903).
The dotted lines show dependencies: the category at the lower end of
each line depends on the one at the higher end. Only two sciences
have no dependencies on
Stefan B, Stephen CR, Bev, and Kirsti,
I drew a new diagram based on Peirce's classification of the
sciences. I'll send it to the list in a separate thread.
Stephan
I believe you are seeing this from a very different viewpoint.
I am interested in the sociology and history of knowledge.
So am
On 8/16/2017 6:29 PM, sb wrote:
in my opinion the diagram should contain two cycles. A "habit" cycle and
a "something unexpected happens" cycle. The diagram should also address
the fact, that the stock of knowledge changes with every turn on the
"something unexpected happens" cycle.
All those
Jerry,
JFS
In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.
JLRC> Do you have specific citations?
I wish that Peirce had used the word 'cycle' and had drawn a diagram
similar to t
On 8/12/2017 4:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the
pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in
order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear.
That 1878 article about the gates of
On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
a practical actionable something (expression, act) that contains
the initial sign and the index.
Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said th
On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does
not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of
relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the
system, can be arbitrary choice, but usu
On 8/10/2017 3:23 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Is Tarski’s approach to the formal logics of metalanguages essential
to give coherence to communication with the broad array of modern
synthetic symbol systems?
By itself, Tarski's version of model theory and metalanguage is not
sufficient. But s
Gene, Gary F, and Clark,
Gene
let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning
of Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider
audience over many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on
Ogden that brought Peirce into the discussion, using quot
On 8/9/2017 9:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce certainly devoted a lot of study to the meanings of English
words, especially in the period /before/ he developed his detailed
classification of signs, but of course his work was not /limited/
to those studies.
Yes. I would never "block t
Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark,
Kirsti
Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?
Yes. Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful
concept must show its passport at the gates of perception
and action. That is a major part of its context.
Kirsti
Letters to lady Welby need to be
On 8/7/2017 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s
late 19th / early 20 th Century rhetoric?
Very directly. Peirce had provided the logical foundation for
describing all of them. He didn't have the modern experience with the
latest compute
On 8/4/2017 5:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot
tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.
That is, because additional information is needed
Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that
three-way
On 7/28/2017 5:07 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
when [Peirce] uses “intentional” in an ordinary context, it means
pretty much the same as it typically does in ordinary usage today.
For instance, CP 1.334 (c. 1905)...
Yes. And note the definition of 'intentional' that he wrote
for the _Century
On 7/28/2017 12:39 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little
resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it
is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger
breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned to
I have been following new developments in physics for many years,
and I am also interested in Peirce's views on the subject. But I
agree with the summary below by Kashyap V Vasavada.
I would prefer not to have these emails stuff my folder for
Peirce-L. Unless other Peirce-L subscribers want to
On 7/12/2017 5:19 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I assume that each JPG you would want to download is an image
of a single page of the CD.
Yes. I'm primarily interested in Peirce's definitions,
and I've given up hope for that "forthcoming" volume.
I've found that going to the word list to find
I have downloaded some of Peirce's definitions, and I wondered
whether there is any site that contains more or all of them.
Following are the few that I downloaded as .jpg files:
http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/defs
For the short ones, I've extracted part of the .jpg page.
But the longer ones (more
On 6/29/2017 2:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon--The Peirce list is a forum, not a kind of personal 'storage' site.
Gary R
I second that motion.
My email handler (Thunderbird) has a place to store "drafts".
Other email handlers I've used or seen also have such storage
sites. I suggest them as
Jon A, Charles Pyle, and John C.,
The main point I was trying to make is that the term 'proposition'
is basic, and that information is knowledge (propositional content)
that is being communicated or derived in some way.
Jon
there is simply no reason why we should not take seriously the
lectures
Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,
JA
Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?
I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
but we can discuss other issues later.
JD
I take the following passage to indicate tha
On 6/28/2017 1:44 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
The short shrift for now is that neither Peirce nor I is talking about
propositions in the sense of dicisigns or dicent symbols at this juncture
but rather the simpler sorts of propositions that fall under the heading
of the Propositional Calculus in curren
Jon,
That's an important topic to explore:
JA
we can take up the issue of propositions in more detail
as it arises in the relevant context.
For a good analysis of the issues, I recommend the following book:
Stjernfelt, Frederik (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality
of Peirce’s Doctrine o
On 6/27/2017 6:08 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Thanks for making what might otherwise appear confusing and complex,
clear and simple.
I hope I didn't make it too clear and simple -- because I agree with
Peirce (and with modern lexicographers) that word senses are definitely
not clear and simple. I wa
Jon,
The subject line raises some complex issues:
Information = Comprehension × Extension
A more fundamental term is 'proposition', which is informally
defined as the "meaning" of a sentence. That meaning is usually
analyzed as comprehension (AKA intension) and extension.
Given that definit
On 6/25/2017 5:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
interesting outline - and I'd need to spend a lot more time on it.
I realize that 112 slides are a bit much to digest. So I deleted
93 slides to create a short version (title page + 18 slides):
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf
In the short v
On 6/25/2017 6:24 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
I am also concerned with maintaining avenues of communication
and cross-fertilization among various communities of inquiry.
We have to observe the specialized ways that terms are used
in particular communities but we cannot capitulate to uses
so specialized
Jon A,
I was trying to emphasize the distinction between syntax and semantics.
Literally, 'formal' means "according to form"; 'syntactic' means
"according to the arrangement (taxis)". For diagrams (in one or more
dimensions) the form is the arrangement. Therefore, the word 'formal',
when applie
Dear Kirsti,
End of this dicussion in my part.
Nothing bothers me. But I do have one very general comment:
In any discussion of any subject of any kind, avoid using
the word 'you'. It always diverts attention away from the
subject and toward the person being addressed.
John
On 6/20/2017 11:58 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual
persons' ???
No, that's not what I said or implied. You said that you agreed
with Gene, and I was also agreeing with Gene:
On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote:
What "
On 6/19/2017 12:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I’ve just read your article on “Peirce's contributions to the 21st
century” (http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf)... I couldn’t explain
what’s wrong with it as clearly as you have. (especially in your section
on “logical negativism.”
I got th
On 6/18/2017 3:50 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or logic,
or philosophy, to be “empirical sciences” according to current usage,
although they are all “positive sciences” for Peirce, so we can’t
really substitute the one for the other i
On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the
special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal)
in that they study real things and not idealizations.
In the 19t
On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I think we are general agreement.
I think we mostly agree. But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'. I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predict
Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,
Jon
The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.
No. Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative. Note l'Académie française. Modern linguists emphasize
the desc
Kirsti and Jon A.
Kirsti
Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly,
by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.
Jon
ditto amen qed si.
Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic. Th
On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote:
What "would motivate [AI systems] to kill us?"
Rationally-mechanically infantilized us.
Yes. That's similar to what I said: "The most likely reason why
any AI system would have the goal to kill anything is that some
human(s) programmed [or somehow in
On 6/15/2017 9:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system
semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some
degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems.
That definition is compatible with Peirce's comment tha
Gary F, Jerry LRC, and Jerry R,
GF
Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic
pragmatically as “the science of the laws of the stable
establishment of beliefs” (CP 3.429).
When you use the term "pragmatically", the issues of how that stable
establishment can be achieved in a fi
L] Rheme and Reason
Date: 6/12/2017 3:00 PM
From: John F Sowa
...
[Although Peirce was careful to distinguish syntax and semantics,
he used the single word 'illation' (inference) without explicitly
stating which aspects were syntactic and which were semantic (or
truth preserving).] Toda
Jon and Jerry,
To specify a system of formal logic, there are many equivalent
options for choosing the notation, the operators, the definitions,
the axioms, and the rules of inference.
JA
One could hardly dispute the importance of implication relations
like A ⇒ B. The set-theoretic analogues a
On 6/12/2017 11:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Is computation power relevant to semiotics? If so, what are the
forms of the propositions that transform illations to relations?
As Peirce said, everything is relevant to semiotic. For starters,
read his 1887 article on "Logical machines":
http:
On 6/11/2017 10:32 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce says in CP 3.429 that “Logic may be defined as the science of the
laws of the stable establishment of beliefs.”I’ll quote a bit more of
the article below, but I’d recommend reading the whole of it in CP 3, if
you have access to it.
I str
On 6/12/2017 7:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
It may well be that it is LOGICALLY impossible to prove.
That may be true. That may be like the existence of God.
There are no proofs that God exists. There are no proofs that
God does not exist.
In fact, there are no two people -- believer
On 6/11/2017 5:08 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
An icon is an icon when it's interpreted as an icon.
An index is an index when it's interpreted as an index.
The same goes for term, sentence, argument by any name.
The first two sentences are true. But the third is false.
In natural languages and artif
IRCE-L] Rheme and Reason
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2017 10:06:00 -0400
From: John F Sowa
Jon and Gary F,
These issues are fundamental logical principles. They are semantic
issues that are independent of any syntactic notations.
JA
The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking
o
Kirstina,
I'm sympathetic to the possibility of paranormal phenomena. In fact,
I know of some unexplained examples. But the only thing we can say
is "They're weird, and we don't know how or why they happened."
Sheldrake has not been searching evidence for 'parapsychology' as such,
as a somewh
Jon and Gary F,
These issues are fundamental logical principles. They are semantic
issues that are independent of any syntactic notations.
JA
The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking
out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases... runs into cul-de-sacs
when taken too
On 6/8/2017 11:09 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
But Peirce wrote his later (1909) version in a letter, not a
well-edited, peer-reviewed publication. It's not a "full scale
revision", but it's one of the best available examples of how
his views evolved after 1906.
*/[GF: ] It’s at least an ex
Jerry, Kirsti, Gary R, Helmut, list,
I didn't respond to some earlier points in this thread because I was
tied up with other things. But I looked into Sheldrake's writings and
the earlier writings on morphogenesis by Conrad Waddington, a pioneer
in genetics, epigenetics, and morphogenesis. For
On 6/1/2017 11:23 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
If you have watched Sheldrake’s talk, how would you describe
his 10 categories?
I would call his categories hypotheses. But in any case, I found his
"dialogue with David Bohm" much more informative:
http://www.sheldrake.org/files/pdfs/A_New_Scienc
On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science.
As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science.
John
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On 5/29/2017 4:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Roberts (p.92) describes the “Prolegomena” as “Peirce’s last full
scale revision of EG,” and notes that the “tinctures” did not really
solve the problems with representing modal logic that Peirce thought
he had solved in the spring of 1906.
I agre
On 5/26/2017 8:49 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
my own site, http://www.gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm, which
I think improves on Zeman’s version in some respects, even
correcting a few errors.
Yes, that looks good.
your contribution to the “Five Questions” collection,
http://www.jfsowa.com/p
On 5/25/2017 6:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In recent weeks I have found references that give insights into
the state of the logics of chemistry in the CSP era.
Could you please copy the excerpts in an email note?
A citation of 739-page book from 1860 and a 554-page book from 1952
would req
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