RE: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

Gary R and Martin, i'm just now reading your posts in reply to the one i put up last week. Gary, you focus on Merleau-Ponty's reference to the “mystery” inherent in “ipseity.” What this brings to my mind is not Heidegger, but rather Peirce's own reference to Secondness as “the being that

[PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

List, After so much striving for precision, perhaps a shift to the subject of indeterminacy would be in order. The following is excerpted from Content and Context (TS ·15) (gnusystems.ca) , where it includes a dozen or so links to its larger context

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

“From manuscripts R 703–4 it is clear that Peirce worked extensively on the third Illustrations article, “The Doctrine of Chances,” that same month.” That month was August 1910, according to Cornelis de Waal’s edition of Illustrations of the Logic of Science, from which the above quote is

[PEIRCE-L] phaneroscopic observation

List, I recently updated a section of one chapter of my online book Turning Signs, a section that introduces Peirce’s phaneroscopy in such a way that those interested in the subject might want to have a look at it. It is only one small part of a much

RE: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics

Thanks for your comments, Dan. What I was trying to show, in a nutshell, is that Peirce anticipated what is now called an “enactive” approach to cognition, as defined by Varela here in Turning Signs. I think it is obvious that this approach is closely

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than a less determinate state of things, or that the universe

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

Jon and other folks in this thread, [Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.] Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our sentiments toward things in general should be,”

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

Jon and other folks in this thread, Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that “sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are products of evolution rather than

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and public venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those are aimed at venues and audiences other than the community of students and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

Gary R, Jon et al., It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, and his account of the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also explain why I see KS (written in 1901) as marking a turn

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

Jon, i have a question about your slides 20 and 23. On #20, under the heading of Objective Idealism, your proposal is that “Continuous/triadic semiosis is real and primordial (3ns).” On #23, under “Defining Continuity,” you cite the “Categorial Vector: 3ns→1ns→2ns,” (the vector of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

Jon, thanks for the correction. So it’s three volumes in 5 books. I didn’t see any mention of the forthcoming third volume on the DeGruyter site. Love, gary Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

For those who may not know, The Logic of the Future is a 3-volume set published by DeGruyter, in which Ahti Pietarinen set himself the task of publishing everything Peirce wrote related to Existential Graphs and their applications. I may be attacked (as Jon was) for “advertising” Logic of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

Helmut, In Peirce's terms, existence is one of three modes of being. Many philosophers, he says, “recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

Helmut, a feeling, in the Peircean sense we’re using here, can’t be sent or received, or even perceived in the way that an external object can be perceived. As Jon explained, it can only be prescinded from an actual experience, which means dropping out of consideration the usual distinctions

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol. gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, list, I see it was a mistake for me to suggest searching Turning Signs for the word “meaning,” since it gives well over 700 hits and most of them are distractions (from the project of constructing a theory of meaning) when taken out of context. I should have paid more attention to the

[PEIRCE-L] corrected post on meaning

(My previous attempt to post this was hit by the dreaded whiteout syndrome, so here’s a corrected version.) Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also undertaken in my netbook Turning

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

Helmut and John, It may take me awhile to respond to either or both of your posts in this thread, because I have less time for reading and writing than I used to, and I’m deliberately slowing down at both. For instance, when I first noticed an affinity between the Merleau-Ponty quote near the

[PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

List, The ongoing updating of points in my online book Turning Signs has generated another mini-essay, this time connecting texts from Buddhist philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, biology and even physics with Peircean semiotic/logic and phaneroscopy. It may

[PEIRCE-L] diagrams and mental images in reasoning

According to C.S. Peirce, deductive reasoning is of a diagrammatic nature. But it’s not always perfectly clear what the nature of a diagram is in this context (which is both semiotic and psychological). I’ve just put together a mini-essay that aims to clarify this. Due to all the links and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] thoughts, signs and things

Hello Sally, good to hear from you! Thich Nhat Hanh has performed great service in making Buddhist ideas and practices accessible to the “Western” world. Peirce’s writings refer vaguely to Buddhism here and there, but he didn’t have access to the translations and studies of Zen texts that we

[PEIRCE-L] thoughts, signs and things

Since the list has been fairly quiet lately, some Peirceans might be interested in a newly revised part of Turning Signs which explores some of the connections (and apparent contradictions) among Peircean semiotics, phaneroscopy, Buddhist sutras and meditation practices. This part/point is here

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final paragraph is too much of a stretch for me. JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are degenerate triadic relations, reducible to their constituent dyadic relations … Accordingly, a series of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

GF: I would say that the [John Cage] score, the set of instructions for the performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or sequence of sounds) was a sign. JAS: Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking? GF: It’s lacking an object. It

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

Jon, list, GF: A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign … GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a representation, and a representation is a sign. Its dynamic object is a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al., Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway token furnishes one example. My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Jon, Gary R, List, Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my internal editor. JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Jon, list, JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon, GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of the sign. JAS: That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon AS, JAS: Again, I tend to think of an immediate interpretant as an interpretant of a type, each dynamical interpretant as an interpretant of a token, and the final interpretant as the interpretant of the sign. Any given proposition (sign) has a certain final interpretant, formulations of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon, JAS: In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon AS, Evidently the two 1906 texts we’ve been discussing got fused or “welded” in my quasi-mind. And meanwhile the sign you had uttered failed to fulfill its function because the minds of utterer and interpreter were not fused into a commens “at the outset” (EP2:478). I was thinking that my

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jack, I'm not sure what you mean by "consubstantiality" - maybe the language and the language-using bodymind being of the same substance, or the same kind of agency? Peirce does seem to assert that, and I've applied the idea in my book, but I don't know that it's scientifically testable. When I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon AS, List, GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the uttered sign itself. JAS: To what other sign could he be referring in that passage? GF: I’ll quote the entire passage below, but first we have to resolve the ambiguity introduced with the term “uttered

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Gary R, thanks for introducing this quote into the thread: CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon AS, List, JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including both motivation and intention, cannot be any interpretant of the sign that is currently being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that such determinations must pertain somehow to the object of that sign,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

We should mention that John Sowa quoted part of R 602 back on August 16 (Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25 (mail-archive.com) ), claiming that it contradicted “ADT’s slide 25”. There was some follow-up

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jerry R, Jon AS, list, I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which will surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, though, that my own internal context for thinking about these matters is weighted toward the psychological perspective on them.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted Peirce’s Logic Notebook: CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the intended interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

Jack, the pragmatic use of the final interpretant is that it serves as an ideal for each author and each reader to aim at: the Truth of the matter. It is not merely the last dynamic interpretant in the series; it is more like a mathematical limit, or like the final cause of a process, to use the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

Margaretha, Jon AS, List, I don’t see as much similarity between Popper’s “Three Worlds” and Peirce’s three “categories” as Jon does. The main difference is that there’s no Firstness in Popper’s schema. The list of “logical distinctions” Margaretha gives in explanation of it is a list of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

List, this time my post does address the matter of the subject line. I hope no one will object to using the Peircean (and post-Peircean) semiotic framework to explain how attention to context, or lack of it, can affect communication among people like ourselves: Turning Signs 15: Context and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

Jon, List, I am post-Peircean myself, and so is my book. I find it hard to understand why anyone takes that adjective as an insult, whether to themselves or to their theories, unless they are looking for something to take as an insult and an excuse to vent their animosity. My original point

[PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

Jack, I appreciate your point that “we cannot have an epistemology without some form of "anthropology".” If I may extend the idea a little, we cannot hope to understand human nature, or why humans think and act the way we do, unless we can draw on insights emerging from biology, anthropology,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list?

John, I was puzzled by Edwina's response to my note in support of your (and her) proposal of starting a new list. The context of your proposal was a series of complaints about the subject matter of postings on the list; the gist of it seems to be that there's too much posting about Peirce's actual

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining about the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one that would be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to peirce-l) wouldn’t have to read all those complaints any more. Gary f. } Truth is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

Margaretha, when you speak of “argumentative dynamics,” are you referring to an “argument” as a verbal conflict between people, or as an attempt to persuade someone of the truth of some assertion, or as the type of sign that represents a process of reasoning from premisses to conclusion?

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, but one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, science as a “conversation with nature”: Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca) . Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))

“Perfect readiness to assimilate new associations implies perfect readiness to drop old ones.… To be a philosopher, or a scientific man, you must be as a little child, with all the sincerity and simple-mindedness of the child's vision, with all the plasticity of the child's mental habits.” —

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Broadening Phaneroscopy (was Critical analysis ofBelluci's paper)

John, your post advocating a narrow view of phaneroscopy is based on the claim that identification = assessment = evaluation. That strikes me as an extraordinary claim. Can you offer any basis for it in formal logic? Gary f. } Love truth, but pardon error. [Voltaire] {

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

Jon AS, list, Your final paragraph (referring to the particular/material categories) reinforces a remark I made Wednesday concerning ADT’s slide 48: “Peirce indicates in a couple of texts that the “material categories” could be picked out phaneroscopically as well as the “universal

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

Gary R, I see what you mean, but as far as I know Peirce’s “phaneroscopy” (just like his “phenomenology”) included analysis and generalization as well as observation. In R 318 (1907) he wrote, “Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity

Edwina, in your haste to respond, you forgot to mention that your interpretation of my post is your opinion, as all interpretations are. But we will assume that you meant that, and evaluate your reply accordingly. } Act in such a way that your heart may be free from hatred. Let not your

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity

John, you've said repeatedly that only a direct quotation from Peirce can represent what he thought or meant. Now you tell us that not even a direct quotation can do that: "Nobody on planet earth is qualified to say that he or she knows exactly what Peirce meant." For all we know, Peirce could

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

John, thanks for your continued interest in ADT’s talk! It was originally given as a Zoom webinar, and the recording of it can be played from the University of Milan website: André De Tienne: The Role and Relevance of Phaneroscopy for inquiry | Dipartimento di Filosofia - DIPAFILO (unimi.it)

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

ET: … and frankly, from these slides, he [ADT] doesn't seem to have any understanding of the categories. Those Who Know All about the categories have thereby spoken! Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky Sent: 16-Sep-21 17:16 To:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

Jerry R, The slow read is not quite concluded: there are still two more slides to go. Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you ask here; the last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical portrait of a science-egg (with its various parts labelled). As for

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Conclusion: Phaneroscopy as a “science-egg” Gary f. Text: Phaneroscopy

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theism (was Inquiry Into Inquiry)

ense I agree with it. Gary f. } There's nothing more ruthless than life itself, and there's no other source of compassion. [gnox] { https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net Sent: 16-Sep-21 00:31 To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schm

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Slide 46 is a continuation of 45. Gary f. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ►

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

Jon AS, I forgot to thank you for providing the quote from Baldwin’s Dictionary: CSP: Formal logic classifies arguments by producing forms in which, the letters of the alphabet being replaced by any terms whatever, the result will be a valid, probable, or sophistic argument, as the case may be;

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logica utens vs docens (was Slow Read slide 44

John, Jon A.S., Phyllis et al., JFS: Nobody today makes a distinction between a logica utens (using) vs a logica docens (teaching). GF: It may well be that nobody outside of Peircean studies uses those terms, which Peirce took from the Scholastic philosophers. And it may be that the distinction

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

John, Phyllis, I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic is a logica utens or a logica docens. Since you teach the subject yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

Gary R, list, GR: However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly unlikely that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a logica docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in consideration of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

Gary, thank you for reminding us of “The Simplest Mathematics”, i.e. of “of these very simple branches of mathematics which lie at the root of formal logic.” When we juxtapose it with some of Peirce’s other writings on mathematics, logic and phaneroscopy, and the relations of “dependence”

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 43

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. Text: How does one become a phaneroscopist? How to train

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 42

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. 8. Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry Gary f. Text: •

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another perspective

For another perspective on the roles of mathematics and logic in phaneroscopic analysis, see Francesco Bellucci's 2015 paper at https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis . (It's a .doc file instead of the usual .pdf.) Gary f. From:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

I wonder whether Peirce was being ironic when he wrote in R 645 of Phaneroscopy being “still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

Thanks for your comments, Jon! What I posted yesterday was only the first few pages of R 645. Reading the rest of it yesterday, I realized that it reveals quite a lot about the theory and practice of Peirce’s phaneroscopy, that it has not been published in the standard primary sources, and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make an amendment to Ketner’s transcription. One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions of what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning.” But it seems to me that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic, some readers may be interested in the context of the quotation from R 645 (1909) which occupies most of slide 38. Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 36

Jack, what you are asking for here is what I call (in my book ) “premature precision.” Nevertheless I can offer a few pointers. The Commens Dictionary (Commens | Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce ) is the best resource for his

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 36

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. Text: General definition I use the word phaneron to mean or

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

Jeff, List, I did notice, Jeff, that your usage of "phenomenology" is very close to John's - that is, it agrees with the "general" definition of the word that I quoted from the OED, as opposed to the "Philosophy" definition given there, which is much more detailed - but i won't try to persuade

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 35

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Since the word “manifest” is a key word in Peirce’s “etymological definition” (slide

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

John, I am aware that some scientists use the word "phenomenology" in reference to "The division of any science which is concerned with the description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or theoretical explanation." The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell and Hamilton

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

List, Rather than take a side in this recurring “debate”, I’d like to take a long view of how the list has changed over the two decades that I’ve been subscribed to it. I will try to keep it relevant, but those who are inclined to dismiss it as the mere reminiscences of an old man, or as a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

John, Jeff, List, We seem to have consensus that Peirce's phenomenology makes observations based on direct experience and draws upon mathematical principles to analyze whatever appears into its elements, to arrive at a very general theory which he calls the "Doctrine of Categories." Without

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Jeff, Helmut, John, List, Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Jon A, allow me to point out that slide 34 (except for its title) consists *entirely* of a quotation from Peirce. There are two more slides coming which give definitions of the phaneron, and all three present some challenges to interpretation, but to begin by assigning them (or ADT's

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34. Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49 To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re:

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 34

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Here we reach the point where Peirce invents a new English word to replace

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

John, I am puzzled as to why you bother to repeat all this, since it's all been said before and nobody has questioned any of it. The only question I have is why you insert "phaneroscopy" in your new subject line, as there is nothing in the entire post about "phenomenology/phaneroscopy in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

ET: I think that this is becoming absurd – GF: On that point we agree! I will henceforth cease to comment on your interpretations of Peirce, no matter how far they may wander from what Peirce actually wrote. You have your own style of interpretation and you are welcome to it. Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

Jon A.S., John S., list, Perhaps we are making some progress in this reading of ADT’s talk, if John is ready to admit that Peirce’s phenomenology is a separate science from mathematics, that it occupies a place in the hierarchy below mathematics but above all other sciences, and that its focus

RE: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

John, Helmut, "Qualitative possibility" is the term Peirce used in the Lowell Lectures of 1903 : CSP: My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

Edwina, I think we should note that De Tienne follows chronological order in his presentation of Peirce quotes in this part of his talk, but the chapter of CP 7 that you are quoting from strings together a number of texts from widely separated periods in Peirce’s life, and in complete disregard

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 29

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. This slide continues his narrative of the gradual development of Peirce’s thinking

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

John, in the clear light of morning, it appears to me that your revision of ADT's slide 25 is all about theoretical models. (I prefer "model" over "diagram", generally speaking, because we tend to think of a "diagram" as two-dimensional, while the dimensionality of a "model" is not thus limited.)

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

John, we agree that De Tienne’s reference to a “transition out of mathematics” in slide 25 can be confusing, and you say that we can avoid the confusion “by adopting the word 'diagram' for ADT's slide 25.” It’s not clear to me how this “adopting” would work. Do you mean substituting the word

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

Thanks Jon, this does clarify the matter, especially the definitions of Firstness where Peirce uses phrases such as “positive suchness” and “positive possibility.” It’s yet another reminder of the importance of context in determining the meaning of a word. I think it was Comte who first used

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post … In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he says this: CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization)

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