Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

t; scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not 
> coined that word.
> 
> I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely 
> if he had a regular teaching job where he would talk to students on a daily 
> basis.  Those few years at Johns Hopkins, for example, enabled him to create 
> a revolution in logic.  I also believe that his writings in his last decade 
> would also have been far clearer and much more convincing if he had met a 
> class of students on a daily basis,
> 
> Fundamental principle:  If Peirce had more feedback from his readers, I 
> believe that he would have made major changes in his choice of terminology 
> and style of writing.  He can no longer change his texts, but we can improve 
> the way we teach, talk, and write about his theories.   And choice of 
> terminology is a good part of that process.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List, JAS
> 
> I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. 
> 
> No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, 
> in particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term 
> created by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical 
> treatment or…
> 
> Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or 
> Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular 
> individual’s works and terms. 
> 
> What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy  We aren’t 
> talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about 
> Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, 
> ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological 
> and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single 
> individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868. 
> 
> And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and “Thus, the very 
> origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
> involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits and capable of a 
> definite increase in knowledge” [5.311; emphasis in original]
> 
> And this exploration of reality involves a community of scholars, using 
> reason, doubt, discussion,ie, “There are Real Things, whose characters are 
> entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affects our 
> senses according to regular laws, and though our sensations are as different 
> as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
> perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are”  
> 5.384. And we achieve this by a ‘community of inquirers
> 5.265
> 
> That is, Peirce was cautious about the individual [Cartesian] ‘intuition’  
> and reliance on personal ‘clear and distinct ideas' and instead, focused on 
> that ‘community of inquirers over time’ - Furthermore his focus is on the 
> connection that our idea has with the real world; ie,  ’the effects, that 
> might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our 
> conception to have’. 5.402.
> 
> This isn’t about terminology; this is about the exploration of Reality - and 
> requires a community. Therefore - to examine what other scholars are saying 
> about their explorations of Reality - and with their terms The fact is - 
> other scholars are also exploring Reality; they are using different terms - 
> but- their focus and agenda is similar, and in many cases their 
> infrastructure they develop is similar to that of Peirce. Edwina
> 
>> On Apr 13, 2024, at 6:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> John, Edwina, List:
>> 
>> Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this 
>> well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave it 
>> at that.
>> 
>> JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming 
>> biological species.
>> 
>> Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the 
>> underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.
>> 
>> CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been 
>> incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small 
>> exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by 
>> appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the 
>> idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other 
>> symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole 
>> rightful creator commits a shameful off

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

eroscopy', but there is enough overlap 
> that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.
> 
> Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was 
> perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for 
> philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which 
> suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of 
> philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with a 
> distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He 
> coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any 
> way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as 
> introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the 
> corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct 
> observation than systematic study.
> 
> JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for 
> choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice.
> 
> In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing 
> terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. 
> Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and 
> applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern 
> research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different 
> terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can 
> be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as 
> Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual 
> differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it 
> seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what 
> it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so 
> far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 
> 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 12:07 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> John, List
>> 
>> I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim 
>> that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other 
>> words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see 
>> absolutely nothing wrong with this!!
>> 
>> My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have focused 
>> on the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.  When we 
>> refer to these issues and this includes within a Peircean discussion, I 
>> think we should feel free to use those different terms and thus, show how 
>> Peirce and other scholars have similar or even different analyses of these 
>> realities…even though they use different terms for the same phenomena. 
>> 
>> I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research 
>> fields; It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach us 
>> - and to do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these other 
>> fields feel comfortable with. …
>> 
>> Edwina
>>> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa >> <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
>>> 
>>> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
>>> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
>>> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
>>> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
>>> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
>>> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical 
>>> compounds.  
>>> 
>>> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
>>> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was 
>>> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough 
>>> overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the 
>>> choice of 'mark' vs 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and 
>>> his vacillation in 1908 indicates that he had some misgivings.  That 
>>&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, List

 1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be 
used?  My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar 
issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the 
development of information,  anticipation processes, the development of norms 
of behaviour; genetic developments etc and etc  - the list is enormous]…I don’t 
think that anyone can be certain of ‘who thought it first’ -and therefore we 
must use The First Person's terminology’.  Most certainly, as has been pointed 
out, when we are referring to objective sciences such as  chemistry and 
referring to empirically observable chemicals and molecules and interactions 
etc… the Community of Scholars develops the terminology, over time, together.

But- cognitive and semiosic processes are different - and as I’ve said, there 
are multiple scholars working in these fields - each unknown to the other,  and 
there is no reason why, in my view, that we cannot use their terms when we 
refer to the Peircean framework…I think we should acknowledge the analytic work 
that is being done in other fields that, unknown to the researcher, fits in 
perfectly within the Peircean framework. …And I don’t see why we should insist 
that they use Peircan terminology!

2] I think that ‘purist’ could describe Jon’s approach to Peirce, but I wasn’t 
referencing him in particular - I was referencing my view that it is a fact 
that other research is being done in the same areas that Peirce focused on - 
albeit with different terminology - and I consider it important that Peircean 
research acknowledge this work and see where these analysis, using different 
terms,  align within the Peircean framework. And of course, I always emphasize 
pragmatic applications of theory.

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I 
> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last 
> word.
> 
> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same 
> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, 
> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a 
> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter 
> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a 
> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any 
> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where 
> and when it is possible. 
> 
> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as 
> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no 
> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of 
> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it 
> behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is 
> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio 
> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and 
> design. 
> 
> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, 
> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several 
> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. 
> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and 
> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that 
> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe 
> you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I 
> will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me 
> (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since 
> I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult 
> period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then 
> that was offensive.]
> 
> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does 
> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's 
> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my 
> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant 
> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar 
> room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's 
> ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those 
> accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in 
> structural engineering on th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, List

I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim 
that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other 
words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see absolutely 
nothing wrong with this!!

My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have focused on 
the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.  When we refer 
to these issues and this includes within a Peircean discussion, I think we 
should feel free to use those different terms and thus, show how Peirce and 
other scholars have similar or even different analyses of these realities…even 
though they use different terms for the same phenomena. 

I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research fields; 
It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach us - and to 
do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these other fields feel 
comfortable with. …

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
> 
> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical 
> compounds.  
> 
> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was justified 
> in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he 
> could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the choice of 'mark' vs 
> 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and his vacillation in 1908 
> indicates that he had some misgivings.  That vacillation nullifies any 
> obligation to continue his practice.
> 
> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 'logic 
> as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the symbolic 
> logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead, he chose 
> the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe that Peirce 
> made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) deliberately chose the 
> term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'.  In my recent 
> article on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's recommendation.
> 
> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority.  It is 
> the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing 
> terminology for that field.  I recommend that practice.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> Gary R, List
> 
> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am 
> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also 
> aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the 
> same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate 
> scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms 
> that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these 
> different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should be 
> open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
> 
> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
> meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
> nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
> universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
> there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
> conceptualism. 
> 
> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
> my point, is it?
> 
> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 
> 
> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
> work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
> scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
> perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
> terms used by other scholars.
> 
> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

gt; 
> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along 
> with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is 
> applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. 
>  https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the 
>> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the 
>> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what 
>> is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ 
>>> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
>>> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
>>> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of 
>>> the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on 
>>> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>>> 
>>>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
>>> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
>>> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
>>> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
>>> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
>>> 
>>> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
>>> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
>>> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is 
>>> semiotically  taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour 
>>> of rejection???
>>> 
>>> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
>>> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
>>> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
>>> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
>>> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
>>> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms 
>>> - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move 
>>> the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And 
>>> that -  - is where I believe the focus should be. 
>>> 
>>> Edwina
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty >>> <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> List,
>>>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>>>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>>>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>>>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>>>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Robert Marty
>>>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>>>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>>>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>>>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>>>> John, List:
>>>>> 
>>>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' 
>>>>> and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>>>> 
>>>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>>>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Peirce 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct 
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the 
individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the 
meaning and function].

Edwina

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
> the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the 
> triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term 
> to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
> 
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
> 
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  
> taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???
> 
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - 
> and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the 
> real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - 
> is where I believe the focus should be. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>> 
>> List,
>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>> Regards,
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>> John, List:
>>> 
>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>> 
>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>> 
>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>> 
>>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so 
>>> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, 
>>> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>>> 
>>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>> 
>>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, wi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate 
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic 
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad 
which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ 
- and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .

 Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ 
with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are often drawn 
between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling 
which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce -  
these are ‘false distinctions’….

Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce 
used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis,  it 
better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  taking place - 
without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???

I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and 
the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce 
never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such 
modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence 
by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite 
terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean 
semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus 
should be. 

Edwina


> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few 
> years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
> same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six 
> types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  > a écrit :
>> John, List:
>> 
>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>> 
>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>> 
>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>> 
>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that 
>> it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then 
>> "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>> 
>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>> 
>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found 
>> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone 
>> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
>> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to 
>> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing 
>> explanations for his abstract ideas" 
>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>> 
>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody 
>> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the 
>> other, please let us know.
>> 
>> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his 
>> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately 
>> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on Peirce's 
>> views by carefully studying and adhering to his words.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry
This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the 
categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904.

The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be 
understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are 
‘modes of being’, or the form of the substance in which information is 
functioning,  and are basic to the Peircean framework.  And he explains them in 
the preceding and following paragrdaphs. But you can also see his outline in 
5.41 and on-150. And 1.23; And 1.300 and on [1894] 1:277 and on….

I am not sure of your agenda re: icon, index, symbol…which are Relations 
between the Represetnamen and Object in the mode of Firstness, Secondness and 
thirdness [ but I assume you know that already]…

I think my analogy of the three categorical modes of chance/freedom; current 
state interaction; and new habits of organization [aka Firstness, Secondness 
and Thirdness] ae pretty obvious within an economic process.  After all- an 
economy operates within entrepreneurship [ Firstness] where novel ideas are 
generated and developed. It operates within a steady state daily life process 
of local interactions [Secondness] - which process takes up most of the 
‘energy’ of an economic mode. And - it operates within the development of new 
economic modes and goods and services - which require the development of 
new‘habits of organization’ to produce and deliver the products. 

Even such a system as the use of symbolic units [ money[ went through these 
three categories, with the introduction of the symbol [Firstness]; and then, 
the common use in local interactions [ Secondness] and the legislated 
overseeing of the common value of these ‘bits of metal and paper’ [Thirdness]. 
And now -we are developing new symbols and new habits of the use of ‘money’..as 
a symbol of value. ..

I analyze economic modes with a triad of Investment/Production/Consumption [and 
these can even. E understood within 3ns, 2ns, 1ns!!!

Edwina



> On Apr 7, 2024, at 8:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> Dear Edwinia, List 
> 
>> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
>> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
>> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
>> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 
>> 
> 
> Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish  reach. 
> 
> I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of 
> categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic 
> closures. 
> 
> In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and 
> then asserts:
> 
> "BEING
>   Quality (Reference to a Ground)
>   Relation(Reference to a Correlate)
>   Representation  (Reference to an Interpretant)
> SUBSTANCE
> 
> The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.”
> 
> (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6)
> 
> I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and 
> symbols”.
> 
> Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? 
> Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of 
> “SUBSTANCE”  to the conclusions in economics?
> 
> Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I 
> have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months…
> 
> Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Michale

Thank you for this excellent post. You are exactly right 

Peirce's agapastic  semiosis is a dynamic and generative process- and it 
explains not merely the increasing complexity of the physicochemical and 
biological realms [which are, indeed, complex adaptive systems,]  but also, 
explains the socioeconomic world of our species. 

As you say - wealth creation, which is all about a growth economy- - is quite 
different from the no-growth zero sum wealth transfer which is found in all no 
growth steady state populations [ before the industrial age]. 

And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 

Again - thank you for an excellent post, and moving Peirce out of the seminar 
room into the real world.

Edwina 

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:57 PM, Michael J.J. Tiffany 
>  wrote:
> 
> John, List:
> 
> I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.
> 
> I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
> time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
> (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). 
> Two personal observations:
> 
> 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
> railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. 
> In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
> Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
> individual selection. 
> 
> However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
> socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
> transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
> examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted 
> with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or 
> even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the 
> extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of 
> the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they 
> shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a 
> literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, 
> especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as 
> the Santa Fe Institute once put it).
> 
> 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
> understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
> transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's 
> another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to 
> write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you 
> can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
> reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of 
> abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. 
> 
> 
> Warm regards,
> 
> Michael J.J. Tiffany
> Portsmouth, New Hampshire
> 
> 
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa  > wrote:
>> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
>> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of 
>> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C).
>> 
>> Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
>> contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
>> present.   
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
>> To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
>> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of 
>> science (U Pitt)
>> John,  
>> 
>> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
>> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
>> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead 
>> in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
>> existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass 
>> extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in 
>> his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in 
>> his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views 
>> would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the 
>> sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched 
>> nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a 
>> revolution. 
>> 
>> In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

 categorical 
> sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign).

9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the Final 
Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my post of 
today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - and note that 
it is not always part of the semiosic action. 

Edwina
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> I will try to answer in pints:
>> 
>> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of 
>> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of 
>> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes 
>> to the interpretants? 
>> 
>> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ 
>> phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. 
>> 
>> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object 
>> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic 
>> process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, 
>> of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. 
>> 
>> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen 
>> and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical 
>> modes. 
>> 
>> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference 
>> suggests your conclusion. 
>> 
>> 6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of 
>> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the 
>> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of 
>> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being 
>> of the DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t 
>> see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual 
>> example.
>> 
>> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II 
>> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a 
>> ‘purpose to the FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th 
>> DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the 
>> mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily 
>> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next 
>> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the 
>> clarity of Secondness. 
>> 
>> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.
>> 
>> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

based phenomenology to an 
> image-based phaneroscopy was necessary to get rid of Kant's struggle with a 
> Ding an sich,  Peirce's1903 terminology was based on language, which, by 
> itself, is hopelessly inadequate for mapping the phaneron to a linear 
> notation.  But his shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy coincided with an 
> emphasis on diagrams and images as more fundamental representations than 
> language or even his 1885 algebra of logic.  That shift coincided with his 
> generalization of term, proposition, argument to seme, pheme, and delome.  
> For example, the following paragraph from 1906 summarizes the issues:
> 
> "It is necessary that the Diagram should be an Icon in which the inferred 
> relation should be preserved.  And it is necessary that it should be insofar 
> General that one sees that accompaniments are no part of the Object. The 
> Diagram is an Interpretant of a Symbol in which the signification of the 
> Symbol becomes a part of the object of the icon. No other kind of sign can 
> make a Truth evident.  For the evident is that which is presented in an 
> image, leaving for the work of the understanding merely the Interpretation of 
> the Image in a Symbol."  (LNB 286r, 1906)
> 
> In his version of phenomenology, Kant was left with an unbridgeable gap 
> between a Ding an sich and the words that describe it.  Peirce removed that 
> gap by replacing phenomenology with phaneroscopy.  Too many people treat 
> those two words as synonyms.  But the crucial difference is that  the 
> phaneron is in direct contact with the Ding an sich. by means of the 
> sensations, feelings, and physical actions.  The images and feelings become 
> semes, and constructions of them become phemes.   Phaneroscopy is the science 
> of images, diagrams of images, and their mapping to symbols that may be 
> expressed in various ways, including language.
> 
> But language is secondary.  It is not the primary medium of thought.  That is 
> why the 1903 lectures are just the starting point for his last decade of 
> research and his evolution to completely new ways of thinking and a 
> revolution in his methods of analyzing and diagramming his own thoughts and 
> his system of representing it.
> 
> I started to write an article for the book Kees was editing, but I missed the 
> deadline because I kept revising it over and over again, as I kept running 
> into all these issues.  It eventually evolved into an article on phaneroscopy 
> for the book that Ahti was editing.  And after I finished that article, I saw 
> how those issues were related to (1) the topics that Tony was working on and 
> (2) the topics that Peirce was addressing with his Delta graphs.
> 
> I believe that if Peirce had not had that accident in December 1911, he would 
> have written an outstanding proof of pragmatism with the help of his Delta 
> graphs and the methods he developed in the years after 1903.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List
> 
> I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS 
> has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - 
> have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.
> 
> But just a few points:
> 
> 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is 
> assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to 
> support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in 
> the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, 
> which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new 
> ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there 
> before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely 
> new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 
> 
> 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a 
> man to escape the predestined opinion"
> . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three 
> interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process 
> of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 
> 
> 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate 
> conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not 
> the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also 
> continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161.  
> 
> I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the 
> conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’.  
> 
> And I don’t think that there is much difference in the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

 In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order 
> of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then 
> dynamical, then immediate--since the S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes 
> before the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that the If trichotomy likewise 
> comes before the Id trichotomy.

5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference 
suggests your conclusion. 
> 
> ET: And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from 
> possible to existent to necessitate [1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not 
> then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is 
> that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two 
> interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is 
> in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a 
> modes of 1ns or 2ns.


> 
> Again, we are discussing sign classification, not "cognitive movement" 
> (whatever that is). My position is that the purpose of the final interpretant 
> (to produce feeling/action/self-control) constrains the mode of being of the 
> dynamical interpretant (feeling/exertion/sign), which constrains the mode of 
> presentation of the immediate interpretant (hypothetic/categorical/relative). 
> The competing claim is that the mode of presentation of the immediate 
> interpretant constrains the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, 
> which constrains the purpose of the final interpretant. I find the former 
> much more plausible than the latter.

6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of 
understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the 
semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of the 
Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being of the 
DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t see how 
this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual example.

I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II ‘constrains’ 
the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a ‘purpose to the 
FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th DI is also in a 
mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the mode of Firstness has 
a limited amount of information [ being primarily feeling] and therefore - 
can’t provide enough information to the next experience [ the Dynamic 
Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the clarity of Secondness. 

So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.

Edwina
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 12:53 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or 
>> ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that 
>> ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to 
>> other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. 
>> 
>> And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an 
>> assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he 
>> says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But 
>> this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. 
>> 
>> And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the 
>> Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a 
>> necessitant] but, if we consider  the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY 
>> ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are 
>> in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I 
>> think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final 
>> Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a 
>> mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. 
>> 
>>  And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we 
>> see, of course, the same format 
>> 
>> Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, 
>> not within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in 
>> forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad.
>> 
>> And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible 
>> to existent to necessitat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or 
‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically 
constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- 
otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. 

And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an 
assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: 
possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is 
not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. 

And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the 
Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a necessitant] 
but, if we consider  the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten 
has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns 
and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I think this is a key 
point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 
3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot 
impose constraint. 

 And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we 
see, of course, the same format 

Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, not 
within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in forming 
the nature of the sign triad’/hexad.

And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to 
existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that 
the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the 
Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants 
will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 
2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns 
or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. 

Edwina







> On Apr 4, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing 
> that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign 
> classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign 
> classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more 
> plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the 
> possibility of misinterpretations.
> 
> Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor 
> "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible 
> can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by 
> nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant 
> divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 
> 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final 
> interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," 
> respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following 
> restrictions.
> A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a 
> sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; 
> i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only 
> feelings.
> Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, 
> can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
> necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or 
> possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally 
> produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might 
> instead produce exertions or feelings.
> A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, 
> must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of 
> presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can 
> only present those effects as abstract qualities.
> Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
> necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of 
> presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a 
> categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that 
> actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, 
> although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract 
> qualities.
> Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic 
> percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic 
> percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, 
> categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is 
> misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a 
> different universe from that of its final interpretant's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS 
has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - 
have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.

But just a few points:

1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is 
assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to 
support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the 
set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” 
“Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and 
elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He 
continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in 
the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 

2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a 
man to escape the predestined opinion"
. Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three 
interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of 
investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 

3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate 
conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not 
the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also 
continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161.  

I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the 
conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’.  

And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to 
whether the terms are logical or temporal. 

4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I 
reject  JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that 
“reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general,  but only of 
what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to 
this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ 
is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of 
the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the 
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its 
Representation” 4.536.1906.   And “the dynamical object does not mean something 
out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” 
SS197..1906. 

That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it 
becomes part of the semiotic process. 

And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate 
etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think 
refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites 
in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. .

5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic 
process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to 
linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word 
’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s 
extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is 
confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require 
merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. 

But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready 
to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I 
prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the 
Peircean framework.

Edwina

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important 
> reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant 
> and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP 
> 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. 
> In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly supports my 
> position.
> 
> TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition 
> of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is 
> present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce 
> gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: 
> ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., 
> the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic 
> Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 
> 1908).
> 
> Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being 
> "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, 
> which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy 
[TJ]. .

I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of 
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of 
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.

This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this 
generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate 
Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most 
immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic 
Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not 
always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result.

And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes.

The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an 
priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the 
Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the 
opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis.

And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant 
follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of 
the authoritarian FI. 

Edwina

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three 
> interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in 
> Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by 
> John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer 
> not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an 
> alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in 
> Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of 
> David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his 
> objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my 
> position. First this statement:
> 
> ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical 
> determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination 
> within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines 
> the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate 
> correlate (Ii)’. (JS)
> 
> Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably:
> 
> 1)  That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical 
> (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought 
> and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern 
> of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination out 
> in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The action 
> of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and the 
> interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of 
> insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying 
> signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought in 
> action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there is no 
> difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which the 
> empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the 
> six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the 
> process of semiosis.
> 2)  That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within 
> the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly 
> degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for 
> example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically within each 
> interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to most 
> complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe  hierarchy. 
> Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out that there 
> are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the 
> suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there 
> is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically organized; 
> they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would 
> suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate 
> degenerate, which is surely not the case.
> 
> What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, 
> opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources.
> 
> 
> 
> I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there 
> are others):
> 
> · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear 
> definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means 
> that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions 
> Peirce gives of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CG] Artificial empathy by a central executive

[Edwina Taborsky]

John

It seems to me that an emphasis on ’semantics rather than syntax’ sets up an 
analytic frame focusing only on entities operating within a mode of Secondness 
- and ignoring the mode of Thirdness operating in syntax.. 

Edwina

> On Mar 11, 2024, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} 
> slides for my talk on March 6.  Here is the URL:   
> https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf
>  .
> 
> I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes 
> semantics rather than syntax:  
> The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, 
> https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf
>  .  Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, 
> and/or implemented related versions. 
> 
> Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology 
> to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs.  For 
> critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster.   Nobody wants to fly 
> in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing.
> 
> LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations.  But when 
> accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant 
> syntax. 
> 
> I also want to emphasize Section 3.  That begins with slide 32, which has the 
> title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles.  The word 'cognitive' is much more general than 
> 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for 
> language.  Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and 
> the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal 
> explanation. 
> 
> In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language.  For 
> multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise 
> that a spoken language.
> 
> This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and 
> 34, and their applications in the remaining slides.  Slide 35 on the Central 
> Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, 
> hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs):  
> Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to 
> evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may 
> be erroneous or even dangerous.
> 
> Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans 
> are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?"  
>  The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken 
> seriously.
> 
> That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein:  "It's possible to write 
> a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes."  A Zen Buddhist could 
> write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes.  Depending on the 
> definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have.
> 
> John
> ___
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

I did not say that the Hopi way of taking about time is objectionable. I said 
that I consider it incorrect to consider that because the Hopi view time in a 
particular manner and have words for this view, that this does not mean that 
they would not understand the SAE way of thinking about time. That is - I 
reject the dominance of sociolinguistics or the dominance of 
words-over-the-mind. 

Edwina

> On Feb 19, 2024, at 10:58 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, List,
> 
> Peirce's writings and Jon's article about "temporal synechism" do not 
> conflict with the following sentence:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> There is a major difference between Newtonian time, time in Einstein's 
> special relativity, time in general relativity, and time in many variations 
> that physicists have proposed in the past century.   Nobody know what 
> theories may be developed in the future.   But it's doubtful that any of them 
> will make any noticeable difference in the way that different cultures talk 
> about time.
> 
> Edwina said that she considered the Hopi way of talking about time as 
> objectionable.  I admit that it's different from SAE, which is closer to my 
> way of thinking.  But I believe that there is a one-to-one mapping between 
> Hopi times and SAE times -- at least at a level that is humanly perceptible 
> without special instruments. 
> 
> And I can't see any conflict with anything Peirce wrote.  Those examples just 
> show that different people think in different ways.  I can't see any reason 
> for objecting.
> 
> John  
> 
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> John, List:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean 
> Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).
> 
> JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question 
> "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the 
> reason that explains why the first and second are related.
> 
> This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as mediation, and 
> it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted 
> previously.
> 
> CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational 
> agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as 
> third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as 
> second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law 
> according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7)
> 
> Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third 
> (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are 
> related, reflecting the intelligibility of that relation. Nevertheless, this 
> answer does not require a verb that names a triadic relation; and although it 
> provides a reason for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's 
> goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have 
> been entirely accidental, not the result of any goal/purpose/intention at all.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>  
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I think it would help if you defined ‘intentionality’.   Is it involved in all 
human actions? Did the bus driver intentionally run over the pedestrian? 

Edwina

> On Feb 13, 2024, at 3:26 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> Please see my response to Mike.
> 
> I used the word 'intentionality' because it (or something like it) is 
> involved in all human actions.  For example, I can intentionally walk to the 
> store.  But what about each step in the walk?  In effect, it is intentional, 
> but it's only conscious when there is a puddle or a broken place in the 
> sidewalk.
> 
> Other animals at every level and even plants act upon principles that would 
> be called intentional if they had been human.  But consciousness is not 
> necessary.  And even for humans, all actions appear to have the some kind of 
> intentionality, but the actors themselves will often say that they did it 
> "absent mindedly".
> 
> But absent minded actions are often done when people are "multitasking", such 
> as talking on their cell phones while crossing the street and getting run 
> over by a bus.  They didn't intend to get run over by the bus, but they did 
> intend to cross the street.  The steps of walking were not conscious, but 
> they were necessary parts of an intentional process.
> 
> In effect, Thirdness is involved in every intentional action.  And every 
> instance of Thirdness by any living being could be called intentional if a 
> human did it.   Can anybody find an example of Thirdness in any of Peirce's 
> writings that could not be considered intentional if it had been performed by 
> a human?
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List
> 
> I agree with Mike. Thirdness, in my view, does not imply or require 
> intentionality. That, after all, suggests some kind of consciousness - and I 
> think we find Thirdness in chemical and physical matter - and these forms of 
> matter do not include consciousness.
> 
> I have a problem with the quote of “Continuity presents 3ns almost to 
> perfection’ 1.337. I think that the rules of Thirdness CAN and must be, for a 
> certain period of time, ‘continuous and stable.After all- we cannot live iin 
> a world where a cat suddenly transforms into a dog.  BUT, since thirdness 
> also includes 2ns and 1ns, then, it contains within itself, the ability to 
> interact with other units of matter - as well as chance - and thus, has the 
> capacity to accept more data and thus, change these ‘continuous rules’ and 
> so, adapt and evolve.
> 
> Again - I consider that Peircean ‘continuity’ is not 3ns but is the 
> continuous morphological semiosis formation of energy-into-matter - which is 
> ongoing [ or else, as has been pointed out, entropy sneaks in]….
> 
> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I’m not a fan of the Whorf-Sapir sociolinguistics hypotheses…Objective reality 
exists, regardless of how we talk about it - and I maintain that its influence 
can be far stronger than words ie - Secondness has its own way of intruding on 
our words. And mathematics has nothing to do with sociolinguistic relativism.

As for time - I tend to follow Matsuno’s analysis [Koichiro Matsuno] with his 
three types of time: present, perfect and progressive, which can be compared 
with Peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. …and Peirce has written about the temporal and 
spatial nature of these three categories extensively [ ie, no need for 
quotations].

Yes, 3ns includes continuity -of its habits - but, I don’t see this type of 
continuity as the same as the continuous semiosic functions of the universe.  
Imagine what our universe would be, if it stopped transforming x into y via its 
mediative  process?….But, a habit in 3ns can and does change…

Edwina

> On Feb 13, 2024, at 4:40 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon,
> 
> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is 
> important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about 
> time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating 
> theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
> 
> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:  
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
> 
> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the 
> long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not 
> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of 
> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity.
> 
> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that 
> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
> 
> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability 
> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our 
> having the idea of a true continuum 
> 
> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But the 
> languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century 
> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or 
> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about 
> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way 
> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about 
> continuity.
> 
> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in SAE 
> (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by no 
> means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of 
> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
> 
> John
> _
>  
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our 
> conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he 
> calls "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we 
> envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is 
> continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, 
> meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one 
> asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight 
> of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few 
> more quotations about this.
> 
> CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive 
> the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something 
> forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] 
> time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and 
> cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me 
> it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time 
> is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)
> 
> CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the 
> fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as 
> continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a 
> quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; 
> in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)
> 
> CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to 
> be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, 
> is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous 
> time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading 
> in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely 
> immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I agree with Mike. Thirdness, in my view, does not imply or require 
intentionality. That, after all, suggests some kind of consciousness - and I 
think we find Thirdness in chemical and physical matter - and these forms of 
matter do not include consciousness.

I have a problem with the quote of “Continuity presents 3ns almost to 
perfection’ 1.337. I think that the rules of Thirdness CAN and must be, for a 
certain period of time, ‘continuous and stable.After all- we cannot live iin a 
world where a cat suddenly transforms into a dog.  BUT, since thirdness also 
includes 2ns and 1ns, then, it contains within itself, the ability to interact 
with other units of matter - as well as chance - and thus, has the capacity to 
accept more data and thus, change these ‘continuous rules’ and so, adapt and 
evolve.

Again - I consider that Peircean ‘continuity’ is not 3ns but is the continuous 
morphological semiosis formation of energy-into-matter - which is ongoing [ or 
else, as has been pointed out, entropy sneaks in]….

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 5:19 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi John,
> 
> I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of Thirdness, but 
> is not definitive of it. JAS just posted "Continuity represents 3ns almost to 
> perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882), which I concur best captures (with Mind) 
> Peirce's prominent view of Thirdness, and contintuity does not require 
> intentionality. You might even diagram it out.
> 
> And don't forget crystals (and atoms).
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/12/2024 3:59 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>> Mike,
>> 
>> In every example and application that Peirce wrote or cited, Thirdness 
>> involves intentionality.  But intentionality is not an anthropomorphic 
>> notion, it is biomorphic in the most fundamental sense.
>> 
>> Lynn Margulis wrote that a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient 
>> is a primitive example of intentionality, and no non-living physical system 
>> shows any kind of intentionality,  I believe that Peirce would agree, since 
>> he cited dogs, parrots, bees, and even plants at various times.
>> 
>> And by the way, viruses don't have intentions, since they're not alive.   
>> They are signs that are interpreted by living things to produce more signs 
>> of the same kind.
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> From: "Mike Bergman"  
>> Hi Edwina, Helmut, List,
>> 
>> I would like to hear you expand, Edwina, on what you mean about the 
>> 'idexicality of locality'. And, speaking of entropy, here is another 
>> possible link to the universal categories.
>> 
>> flash (of light) [1ns] - energy [2ns] - information [3ns]
>> 
>> I've been toying with this thought for quite a few years. Peirce's cosmogony 
>> begins with a flash (significantly a reference to light). I don't know if 
>> 'flash' is the right analog in Firstness, since both quantum mechanics and 
>> the nature of energy can arguably be better traced to the ideas of harmonic 
>> oscillators. Still, there is something pregnant in that nexus . . . .
>> 
>> For decades there has been confusion and controversy about entropy in the 
>> sense of thermodynamics and its relation to Shannon (information) entropy. 
>> It strikes me that recasting these in terms of Peircean Secondness (energy) 
>> and Thirdness (information) brings sense to the conundrum. Both apply; it is 
>> more a matter of contextual interpretation.
>> 
>> What say the list?
>> 
>> Thanks!
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
> -- 
> __
> 
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225
> http://mkbergman.com 
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __ 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mike, list

I’d define energy as 1ns, with matter being 2ns, and information as these units 
of 2ns defined within 3ns.

By ‘indexicality of locality, I mean that matter functions only within 
relations with other matter . That is, there is no such thing as an 
entity/unit//Sign, that is isolate. Everything is networked and in relationship 
with other enities/units//Signs - and thus, is local in real spatial and 
temporal terms. I think that is part of Stjernfelt’s argument on the Dicisign 
which rejects linguistic and psychological factors in the formation of a Sign 
[triad] and focuses on the physical, or indexical connection. 

I don’t reference my papers here, but, I can send you a recent one on ‘Peircean 
 Semiosis as the transformation of Eerngy and Matter’.  [If I can find it - I’m 
very sloppy with storing papers - both hard copies and online]. 

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:53 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Edwina, Helmut, List,
> 
> I would like to hear you expand, Edwina, on what you mean about the 
> 'idexicality of locality'. And, speaking of entropy, here is another possible 
> link to the universal categories.
> 
> flash (of light) [1ns] - energy [2ns] - information [3ns]
> 
> I've been toying with this thought for quite a few years. Peirce's cosmogony 
> begins with a flash (significantly a reference to light). I don't know if 
> 'flash' is the right analog in Firstness, since both quantum mechanics and 
> the nature of energy can arguably be better traced to the ideas of harmonic 
> oscillators. Still, there is something pregnant in that nexus . . . .
> 
> For decades there has been confusion and controversy about entropy in the 
> sense of thermodynamics and its relation to Shannon (information) entropy. It 
> strikes me that recasting these in terms of Peircean Secondness (energy) and 
> Thirdness (information) brings sense to the conundrum. Both apply; it is more 
> a matter of contextual interpretation.
> 
> What say the list?
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> On 2/12/2024 11:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative 
>> within continuity. But what is continuity? 
>> 
>> I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie 
>> discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, 
>> Nature, God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a 
>> ‘rational action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more 
>> complex networked discreteness, operative within evolving 
>> habits-of-formation [and chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of 
>> the realities of both 2ns and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, 
>> importantly, the indexicality of locality. 
>> 
>> If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we 
>> have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming 
>> into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as 
>> Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this 
>> ‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. 
>> After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps 
>> in..and….
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  
>>> <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by 
>>> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical 
>>> or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So 
>>> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it 
>>> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, 
>>> because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be 
>>> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from 
>>> continuity, to logically handle it.
>>>  
>>> Best, Helmut
>>>  
>>> Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
>>> Von: "Edwina Taborsky"  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> An: "Peirce-L"  <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky"  
>>> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
>>> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing 
>>> Semiotic Project)
>>> List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is 
>>> the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits 
>>> are establis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative 
within continuity. But what is continuity? 

I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie 
discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, Nature, 
God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a ‘rational 
action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more complex 
networked discreteness, operative within evolving habits-of-formation [and 
chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of the realities of both 2ns 
and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, importantly, the 
indexicality of locality. 

If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we 
have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming 
into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as 
Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this 
‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. 
After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps in..and….

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by 
> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or 
> actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So 
> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it 
> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because 
> a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be 
> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from 
> continuity, to logically handle it.
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Peirce-L" 
> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing 
> Semiotic Project)
> List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
> establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
> established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
> Firstness and Secondness. . 
>  
> Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
> free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
> basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
> of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
> 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not 
> the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by 
> the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 
>  
> As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
> ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
> potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. 
> ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 
>  
> Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to 
> .
>  
> Edwina
>  
>  
>  
> Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
>  
> Mike:
>  
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon
>  
>  
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  <mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>>  
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical science of mathemat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
Firstness and Secondness. . 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the 
same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the 
universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which 
I see as continuity/synechism. 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

Edwina



Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Mike:
> 
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  > wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>> Mike:
>>> 
>>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>>> 
>>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought 
>>> synechism suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime 
>>> importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he 
>>> also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity 
>>> governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, 
>>> EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already 
>>> outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, 
>>> and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 
>>> 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman >> > wrote:
 Hi Jon,
 
 Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say 
 I suspect Edwina does as well):
 
 
> What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, 
> if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
 Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on 
 evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs 
 the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.
 One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their 
 too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis 
 as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal 
 categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of 
 Nature and its manifestations.
 
 Best, Mike
 
>> -- 
>> __
>> 
>> Michael K. Bergman
>> 319.621.5225
>> http://mkbergman.com 
>> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
>> __ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mike list

I agree with your comments. Synechism is the functionality of Thirdness [the 
becoming governed by laws} 5.4] - and isn’t the penultimate, because, just as 
you say - the world requires the discrete and discontinuousness of ontological 
Secondness [entropy] and also- the chance functions of Firstness. 

Indeed, Peirce in his critique of Hegel, considered that Thirdness “is an 
essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, 
since this category [which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit] 
can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to 
work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of 
feeling on which to act” 5.436….and Peirce continues that he differs from 
Hegel’s  ‘absolute idealism’. By which “it is sundered by its vigorous denial 
that the third category [which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking] 
suffices to make the world “…and Pierce also rejects Hegels’ rejection of ’the 
first two stages [ ie 1ns and 2ns].

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:14 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Jon,
> 
> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>> 
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>> 
>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism 
>> suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in 
>> philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I 
>> carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole 
>> domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This 
>> has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the 
>> categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 
>> 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 
>> 1ns and 2ns.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> 
>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman > > wrote:
>>> Hi Jon,
>>> 
>>> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say I 
>>> suspect Edwina does as well):
>>> 
>>> 
 What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
 semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
 entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if 
 it is not composed exclusively of signs."
>>> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on evolution, 
>>> emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the classical. 
>>> These are a focus of my current studies.
>>> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their too 
>>> literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis as a 
>>> Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal categories 
>>> to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of Nature and 
>>> its manifestations.
>>> 
>>> Best, Mike
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>> https://cspeirce.com   and, just as well, at 
>> https://www.cspeirce.com  .  It'll take a while 
>> to repair / update all the links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu  . 
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
>>  with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE 
>> of the message and nothing in the body.  More at 
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> -- 
> __
> 
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225
> http://mkbergman.com 
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __ 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I am unaware of anyone who "confines semiosis to the biological realm”!! Never 
heard of such a thing!  But, of course, there are many who confine semiosis to 
the human mind realm - and many who reject the operation of semiosis within the 
physicochemical realms.

As I’ve said - my point is that there are many researchers who are actually 
examining the semiotic function within non-human realms - but are not using 
Peircean terms.  The difficulty, as I’ve said, of accessing and deciphering the 
Peircean texts - as well as the isolationism of the Peircean community - has, I 
think, led to this separation. 

I think it would be instructive for Peirceans to actually explore the work 
being done in biological, physico-chemical and AI areas and see how- using 
different terms from Peirce - there are strong correlations to Peirce in their 
arguments. The additional emphasis in their work on material, concrete 
examples, is, I feel, extremely helpful in moving Peircean analysis from the 
purely argumentative and hypothetical into the pragmatic realism that, after 
all, was Peirce’s basic agenda.

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 3:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary, List:
> 
> It has been several years since I read Natural Propositions, so I will not be 
> able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's more recent book 
> includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees dancing. What I can say is 
> that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological 
> realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast 
> representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
> exclusively of signs." I take the additional step, fully consistent with his 
> overarching synechism though never explicitly expressed in his writings, of 
> conceiving it as a semiosic continuum--an ongoing inferential process whose 
> parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless and until they are 
> deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of propositions is one 
> such purpose; after all ...
> 
> CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a 
> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The 
> purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other 
> signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which 
> would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may 
> use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901)
> 
> If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every sign is 
> to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe itself that has the 
> structure of a proposition, then the importance of understanding the 
> structure of a proposition should be obvious. Moreover ...
> 
> CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a 
> nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one 
> individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of 
> reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that 
> it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," 
> here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 
> 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)
> 
> Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded from 
> reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed Existential Graph on 
> the otherwise blank sheet that represents the entire continuum of true 
> propositions within the universe of discourse. In both cases, the whole is 
> ontologically prior to its parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts 
> and the sheet of assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than an 
> argument is built up of discrete propositions.
> 
> CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built 
> up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... 
> Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact 
> Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens 
> rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of 
> small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. 
> fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for 
> the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought 
> (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) 
> cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential 
> process; and propositions are either roughly described states of 
> Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the 
> description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second 
> order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295, 
> 1906)
> 
> The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, list

Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current 
research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’  - which, very often, 
doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic 
framework of morphological formation,  information generation, transmission and 
transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of 
matter and mind] …is extensive.

 I’d say that these are all analyses well within the notion of the dicisign- 
ie, the concept that information generation, processing etc is not dependent on 
language or even consciousness but is a basic process in the biological and 
physico-chemical realms. ..operative within sensate rather than symbolic 
networking. And - I’d say that these fit the definition of a dicisign 
propositional interaction, where meanings [Interpretants]  are in direct or 
factual connection to the object. The problem is - as noted - this research 
doesn’t use Peircean terminology!

Edwina

> On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
> and artificial worlds.
> 
> Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the 
> literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of 
> which I knew.
> 
> My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. 
> I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything 
> possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in 
> consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"  the 
> dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called 
> Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and 
> criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, 
> anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."
> 
> So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields 
> other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular 
> matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond 
> logic as we generally think of it.
> 
> Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's 
> influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.
> 
> Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life 
> Vinicius Romanini (Editor), Eliseo Fernández 
> <https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez=relevancerank=books>
>  (Editor)
> 
> The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by 
> distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.
> 
> Table of Contents
> 
> Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N. 
> Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A. 
> Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics; 
> R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and Biosemiotics; E. 
> Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life; M. Hulswit, V. 
> Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the Intelligible: Peircean 
> Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. 
> Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean Informational Perspective: 
> Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da Silveira, M.E. Quilici 
> Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other Legisigns: More than a mere 
> Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J. Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols 
> and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry; J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a 
> Living Process; V. Romanini.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
>> Gary R,list
>> 
>> I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
>> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
>> and artificial worlds.
>> 
>> A few quick examples: 
>> 
>> Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
>> February
>> 
>> "Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
>> (Igamberdiev, 2023 
>> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303264723002903#bib22>).
>> 
>> "What is the nature of the various types of information that different 
>> living beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform 
>> their regulatory systems? This informa

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R,list

I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the focus 
in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and 
artificial worlds.

A few quick examples: 

Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
February

"Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
(Igamberdiev, 2023 
).

"What is the nature of the various types of information that different living 
beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform their 
regulatory systems? This information is the result of the simultaneous 
existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these patterns. In 
this context, information is an emergent property of the interaction of two 
categories of entities, patterns and receptors.

This duo of conditions, thermodynamic openness and the need for homeostatic 
regulatory systems, are inherent to all forms of life that we know."
———
Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .
Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. 

This article actually references Peirce.
——

The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021 R.Skern 
Mauritzen

-
 The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of informational 
processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is on information 
processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics is all about. [And 
there are other journals tha examine information processing]...

As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the same 
outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many Peircean 
scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like fervour,  on 
the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the fact that the same 
objective processes are being outlined in many papers - but- using different 
terms.

It is no secret that the difficulty of both accessing Peircean texts AND the 
obscure terminology [AND, I’ll add, the isolationism of the Peircean scholarly 
set]  has hindered the widespread use of Peircean theories. But -once past 
these Walls  - it is clear that the Peircean analysis is a fundamental outline 
of both the natural and human worlds of information processing.  

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 12:23 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify 
> Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:
> 
> JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical 
> nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must 
> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and 
> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the 
> proposition.
> 
> Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move of 
> Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural 
> Propositions." In his extraordinary book, Natural Propositions: The Actuality 
> of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at his word, so to 
> speak, and generalizes the meaning of proposition well beyond the 
> logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which biosemioticians 
> naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know what lasting impact 
> -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, as far as I can tell, 
> it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. This antipathy was 
> suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering at Roosevelt 
> University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius Romanini to read a 
> paper he himself could not deliver since officials refused to allow him to 
> board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his Italian, rather than his 
> Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several Peircean-inspired 
> biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at every turn.
> 
> Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in Natural Propositions that Peirce's 
> generalization of the logical concept of proposition to dicisign as to 
> include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of the greatest 
> consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our specie's 
> intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not necessarily 
> require human language, thought, and logic -- not human consciousness -- 
> whatsoever. 
> 
> I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable 
> interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most 
> interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the 
> generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into the 
> natural world. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> 
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

s would be possible? 
> 
> I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done 
> as well or better without a theory of interpretants.  I have written a lot 
> about applications of Peirce's theories in computer science, computational 
> linguistics, and artificial intelligence.  But I have never found a use for 
> interpretants.  Many other authors have found important applications of 
> Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their publications.  But I have 
> never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants.  Can anybody find any 
> published examples?  By anybody for any practical purpose?
> 
> That reminds me of the parody:  "This theory is so perfectly general that no 
> practical application is possible".
> 
> John
>  
> 
> ,From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> John
> 
> I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
> interpretants. 
> 
> The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
> the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if 
> the Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
> interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
> phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
> held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
> what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
> intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual 
> knowledge base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If 
> he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is 
> quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning. 
> 
> We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
> knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
> misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
> the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
> meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
> intonation …
> 
> I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. 
> 
> My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
> moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
> Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
> first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
> sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
> development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop 
> a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
> behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. 
> 
> As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
> refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic 
> changes. 
> 
> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

John

I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
interpretants. 

The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the 
Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge 
base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If he doesn’t 
share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is quite 
different from the utterer’s intended meaning. 

We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
intonation …

I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. 

My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop a 
thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. 

As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes. 

Edwina

> On Feb 8, 2024, at 6:21 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I was just copying what Short said.  If you don't have it, I'll send you the 
> PDF of his entire book.
> 
> All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of 
> interpretants.  I don't deny that.  But there is no information about how 
> anybody can determine how the utterer can express the content of the phaneron 
> as a linguistic sign, and how the listener can interpret the uttered sign.  
> The critical issue for both of them is the context which may be much more 
> difficult to determine than the words in the utterance.
> 
> In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, 
> "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis".   You don't have to 
> read the whole thing because the early examples show why context is so 
> overwhelmingly important in determining the interpretant.  Just look  below 
> for an example from page 9 of 
> <https://duckduckgo.com/?q=%22Confronting+context+effects+in+intelligence+analysis%22+by+Keith+Devlin.=opera=web>
>  
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effects_in_intelligence_analysis_How_can_mathematics_help
> 
> Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about 
> determining the interpretant.  And examples like that can be repeated 
> endlessly.   Devlin's article is one source, but any detailed analysis of 
> language in context will turn up endless numbers of examples.
> 
> John
> __
>  
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" " style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(0, 102, 
> 147); text-decoration: underline; user-select: 
> auto;"> 
> 
> John, list
> 
> I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the 
> interpretants’. I find his outlines clear and coherent  and are all through 
> his writings- in that it is logical and obvious that the triad includes not 
> merely a single interpretant but several - and these several are basic and 
> functional.  That is- the notion of not merely one but three Interpretants 
> is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis
> _
> 
> Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" 
> by Keith Devlin.  The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD.  And the 
> context is in italics.   Without the context, it's impossible to determine 
> the interpretant of the sentence.
> 
> HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
> being picked up.
> 
> This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-ol

[PEIRCE-L] New Semiotic Publication

[Edwina Taborsky]

There’s a new four volume set of papers just published. 141 papers. 
> 
> 
> Editor: Amir Biglari
> Title: OPEN SEMIOTICS
> Publisher: Editions L’Harmattan 2023
> 
> Volume 1: Epistemological and Conceptual Foundations 
> Part I; Semiotics Without Borders
> Part II: Rethinking Sign and Meaning
> Part III: Semiotics and Philosophy
> Part IV: Semiotics and Mathematics
> Part V: Semiotics and Computing
> 
> Volume 2: Culture and Society
> Part I: Semiotics, Culture and History
> Part II: Semiotics and Social Domains
> Part III: Semiotics, Communication, Media
> Part IV: Semiotics, Learning, Education
> Part V: Semiotics, Economy, Business
> 
> Volume 3: Text, Images, Arts
> Part I: Semiotics and Text Studies
> Part II: Semiotics and Image Studies
> Part III: Semiotics and Art Theories
> Part IV: Semiotics andVisual Arts
> Part V: Semiotics and Performing Arts
> Part VI: Semiotics and Film Studies
> Part VII: Semiotics and Music
> 
> Volume 4: Life land Its Extensions
> Part I:Semiotics and Biology
> Part II: Semiotics and Medicine
> Part III: Semiotics and Psychology
> Part IV: Semiotics anthology
> Part V: Semiotics and Ecology
> Part VI: Semiotics and Cognitive Science
> Part VII: Semiotics and Artificial Intelligence
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your discussion?

Edwina

> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
> 
> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to 
> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or more 
> of my books, the latest being The Logic of Lasnguage (New York: Springer, 
> 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship between 
> sign and object.
> -Original Message-
> From: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
> To: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Cc: John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>, Peirce List 
> mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>, CG 
> mailto:c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> 
>  
> Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic 
> process, in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction  
>  
> That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
> acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction 
> will be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. 
> And indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input 
> happening at the same time.
>  
> Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
>  
> The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal 
> experience of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - 
> if we think of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. 
> If we think of another situation - it would confine the sensation of the 
> experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 
>  
> The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
> response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who 
> treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they 
> might react to. .
>  
> The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
>  
> An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. 
> This one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
> Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
> instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would 
> act as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who would recognize it as 
> an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, 
> always, as an Alarm.
>  
> That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they 
> are, is vital.
>  
> Edwina
> 
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
> 
> John, list
>  
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.
>  
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?
> 
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
>  
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
> an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
> sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
> human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
>  
> Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
> same time..
>  
> 3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
> mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
> three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
>  
> 3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
>  
> with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
> action that generates a potentiality for change; 
>  
> and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
> individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
> actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
>  
> ….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
> generality where new laws are developed. 
>  
> That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
> develop. An exam

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic process, 
in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction  

That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction will 
be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. And 
indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input happening 
at the same time.

Then - the three Interpretants are vital.

The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal experience 
of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - if we think 
of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. If we think of 
another situation - it would confine the sensation of the experience to one 
individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 

The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who 
treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they 
might react to. .

The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.

An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. This 
one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would act 
as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who would recognize it as an 
Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, always, 
as an Alarm.

That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they are, 
is vital.

Edwina

> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> John, list
> 
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
>> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show 
>> how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation 
>> of his commentary.
> 
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
>> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
>> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
>> discover that insight?
> 
> 
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
> 
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
> an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
> sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
> human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
> 
> Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
> same time..
> 
> 3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
> mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
> three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
> 
> 3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
> 
> with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
> action that generates a potentiality for change; 
> 
> and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
> individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
> actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
> 
> ….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
> generality where new laws are developed. 
> 
> That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
> develop. An example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a 
> hard shell [DO]; and what little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is 
> processed by its digestive system [Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 
> 1ns] , which, possibly lacking in nutrients from this small amount produces 
> only a small nutrition result, [II] , but this small result forces the  
> bird’s body to develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, 
> these chemicals act to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction  becomes 
> common among the local bird population [FI].
> 
> My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that 
> includes all three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the 
> capacities of the three categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive 
> systems. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa > <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina,
>> 
>> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those sub

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.

2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?


3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 

3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…

Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
same time..

3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]

3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 

with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
action that generates a potentiality for change; 

and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 

….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual generality 
where new laws are developed. 

That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
develop. An example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a hard 
shell [DO]; and what little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is processed 
by its digestive system [Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 1ns] , which, 
possibly lacking in nutrients from this small amount produces only a small 
nutrition result, [II] , but this small result forces the  bird’s body to 
develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, these chemicals act 
to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction  becomes common among the local 
bird population [FI].

My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that 
includes all three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the 
capacities of the three categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive 
systems. 

Edwina






> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are 
> extremely valuable.  I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 
> 21st C cognitive science in those areas.  That is a conclusion of my recent 
> article, of which I recently sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.
> 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.
> 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
> To: John F Sowa 
> Cc: Peirce List , CG 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> 
> John, list
> 
> I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
> play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
> singular meanings of terms is not very functional.
> 
> I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems - 
> 
> I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
> Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find 
> in other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of 
> ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical 
> interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts 
> of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - 
> the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I 
> personally find this very functional in explaining both biological systems 
> and societal systems. . 
> 
> Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process 
> to be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, 
> both physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree 
> with Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and 
> indeed, is a vast semiosic pro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
singular meanings of terms is not very functional.

I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems - 

I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find in 
other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ 
view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical interactions or 
puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and 
even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - the concept of habit 
formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally find this 
very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. . 

Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to 
be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both 
physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with 
Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and 
indeed, is a vast semiosic process. 

So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional 
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle  to its 
environment [ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the 
internal nature of the dats from this DO - which is commonly quite different 
from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie, the Immediate Object. Then, the 
Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and analyzing it. 

And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the 
individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent 
as the Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by 
Peirce that there could be a commonly developed interpretation of these 
stimuli.  That is - the role of the individual within the community. 

And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three 
categories, which increases the complexity of the semiosic function. 

- I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation 
from the data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign 
vehicle and the development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the 
sign-vehicle. ].   That is - the fact that there are three interepetants, 
moving from the immediate local perception of the input data , to an external 
objective result [ does the effect of the input data as expressed...have any 
functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result - does this 
function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?

Edwina

> On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
> 
> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the 
> branches of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or useful 
> applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling with the 
> ideas up to the end.  
> 
> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
> because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
> convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for the 
> citation and quotations from the Stanford article.  Conclusion:  Neither 
> Peirce nor anybody  else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions 
> about anything.
> 
> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- 
> just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or 
> say anything useful.
> 
> Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and 
> focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest 
> developments in cognitive science.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> John, list
> 
> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
> think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
> Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
> and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ 
> can be in any one of the three modal categories.
> 
> That’s how I see it.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>> 
>> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
>> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
>> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what 
>> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are 
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ can 
be in any one of the three modal categories.

That’s how I see it.

Edwina

> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what 
> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are 
> what Peirce himself had intended.
> 
> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
> 
> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this 
> topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show 
> how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
> 
> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But since 
> Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their 
> interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
> 
> John
> ___
> 
> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in 
> terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece 
> of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various 
> points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of 
> interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, 
> energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, 
> effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As 
> Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests 
> that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are 
> archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these 
> categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view.
> 
> In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies 
> above as follows:
> 
> In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, 
> be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than 
> mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something 
> besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term 
> these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the 
> “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
> . . .
> 
> Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from 
> action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical 
> interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See 
> Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). 
> Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view 
> since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include 
> the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, 
> claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions 
> the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate 
> claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and 
> (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be 
> treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).
> 
> How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, 
> especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. 
> However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, 
> Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when 
> trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from 
> different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the 
> intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological 
> experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct 
> division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce’s projected 
> sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional classifications imposed 
> by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more on this discussion 
> see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 
> 2004).
> 
> 
>  
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sorry- I meant Peirce’s rejection of idealism.  Not simply Popper’s!  [ Peirce 
was an Objective Idealist - completely different from the detached-from-reality 
determinism and finality of pure idealism. ] 

Edwina

> On Jan 29, 2024, at 10:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Helmut, list
> 
> Yes, Popper’s rejection of idealism - as in Plato’s ‘ideal primal state of 
> Forms’ and Hegel’s ideal final state is expressed in numerous places - and 
> clearly in that quote from 6.348.  And - his rejection of Marxist determinism 
> and necessity - in favour of the realities of chance [ Firstness] and the 
> creativity of Thirdness, or the self-generation of new habits.
> 
> Yes, Popper was well aware of Peirce. In his book Objective Knowledge,[Oxford 
> UP, 1972]  Popper references Peirce quite frequently, and called him “one of 
> the greatest philosophers of all time] [212]. And says that his own 
> “indeterminist view of the world” [296] .. is similar to that of Charles 
> Sanders Peirce [ ibid]. 
> 
> In fact, Popper’s Three World Theory. [outlined in Objective Knowledge]  has 
> strong relations to Peirces’ Three Modes.  His World 1 is the basic physical 
> world; his World 2 is the world of individual subjective experience; his 
> world 3 is the world of common objective thought.   I consider that Peirce’s 
> modes are superior to this outline - but-…obviously- the similarities are 
> there.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Jan 29, 2024, at 10:03 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>> 
>>  
>> Edwina, John, List,
>>  
>> I have read the two books by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies" 
>> (Thank you for recommending me!), and, as far as I am competent, completely 
>> agree with Popper. He is against "historicism", and both refutes Platon 
>> (ideal primal state), and Hegel (ideal final state). About Marx, he approves 
>> his analysis of the situation at Marx´ time, but refutes his prophecies, and 
>> therefore his claim, that there "scienttific"ly is a necessity in history. 
>> History is just stories. I wonder, whether Popper knew Peirce, because I see 
>> some parallelity.
>>  
>> Best, Helmut
>>  
>> Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Januar 2024 um 21:33 Uhr
>> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>> An: s...@bestweb.net
>> Cc: "Peirce List" , "CG" 
>> 
>> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy
>> John, list
>>  
>> Thanks for the chapter.  I particularly liked your inclusion off the 
>> Peircean quote;
>>  
>> Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Okhamistic prejudice of political 
>> partisanship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is 
>> due to a degeneration from a primal state of perfect definiteness. The truth 
>> is rather on the side of the Scholastic realists that the unsettled is the 
>> primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of 
>> settledness, are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, 
>> epistemologically, and metaphysically. (CP 6.348)
>> 
>> 
>> This clarifies that neither the primal state nor the ‘final state’ [ of 
>> there be such a state] is ‘perfect definiteness’.  Instead, both are 
>> unsettled’. How could it be otherwise? Without such indefiniteness, no 
>> adaptation or evolution could occur, and the laws of physics would lead to 
>> inevitable dissipation of energy/matter. To prevent this- and thus enable 
>> ever more complex forms, ‘indefiniteness’  on both sides, is the answer.
>>  
>> Edwina.
>> 
>>  
>> On Jan 27, 2024, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the 
>> publisher.  The final Section 7 is attached.  It shows that Peirce's 
>> writings in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing 
>> research in the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, 
>> artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).
>>  
>> At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail 
>> about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.
>>  
>> John 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/>  and, just as well, at
>> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> .  It'll take a while 
>> to repair / update all the links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, list

Yes, Popper’s rejection of idealism - as in Plato’s ‘ideal primal state of 
Forms’ and Hegel’s ideal final state is expressed in numerous places - and 
clearly in that quote from 6.348.  And - his rejection of Marxist determinism 
and necessity - in favour of the realities of chance [ Firstness] and the 
creativity of Thirdness, or the self-generation of new habits.

Yes, Popper was well aware of Peirce. In his book Objective Knowledge,[Oxford 
UP, 1972]  Popper references Peirce quite frequently, and called him “one of 
the greatest philosophers of all time] [212]. And says that his own 
“indeterminist view of the world” [296] .. is similar to that of Charles 
Sanders Peirce [ ibid]. 

In fact, Popper’s Three World Theory. [outlined in Objective Knowledge]  has 
strong relations to Peirces’ Three Modes.  His World 1 is the basic physical 
world; his World 2 is the world of individual subjective experience; his world 
3 is the world of common objective thought.   I consider that Peirce’s modes 
are superior to this outline - but-…obviously- the similarities are there.

Edwina

> On Jan 29, 2024, at 10:03 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> Edwina, John, List,
>  
> I have read the two books by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies" 
> (Thank you for recommending me!), and, as far as I am competent, completely 
> agree with Popper. He is against "historicism", and both refutes Platon 
> (ideal primal state), and Hegel (ideal final state). About Marx, he approves 
> his analysis of the situation at Marx´ time, but refutes his prophecies, and 
> therefore his claim, that there "scienttific"ly is a necessity in history. 
> History is just stories. I wonder, whether Popper knew Peirce, because I see 
> some parallelity.
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Januar 2024 um 21:33 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: s...@bestweb.net
> Cc: "Peirce List" , "CG" 
> 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy
> John, list
>  
> Thanks for the chapter.  I particularly liked your inclusion off the Peircean 
> quote;
>  
> Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Okhamistic prejudice of political 
> partisanship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is 
> due to a degeneration from a primal state of perfect definiteness. The truth 
> is rather on the side of the Scholastic realists that the unsettled is the 
> primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of 
> settledness, are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, 
> epistemologically, and metaphysically. (CP 6.348)
> 
> 
> This clarifies that neither the primal state nor the ‘final state’ [ of there 
> be such a state] is ‘perfect definiteness’.  Instead, both are unsettled’. 
> How could it be otherwise? Without such indefiniteness, no adaptation or 
> evolution could occur, and the laws of physics would lead to inevitable 
> dissipation of energy/matter. To prevent this- and thus enable ever more 
> complex forms, ‘indefiniteness’  on both sides, is the answer.
>  
> Edwina.
> 
>  
> On Jan 27, 2024, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>  
>  
>  
> I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the 
> publisher.  The final Section 7 is attached.  It shows that Peirce's writings 
> in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing research in 
> the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial 
> intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).
>  
> At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail 
> about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.
>  
> John 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

Thanks for the chapter.  I particularly liked your inclusion off the Peircean 
quote;

Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Okhamistic prejudice of political 
partisanship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is 
due to a degeneration from a primal state of perfect definiteness. The truth is 
rather on the side of the Scholastic realists that the unsettled is the primal 
state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of settledness, 
are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and 
metaphysically. (CP 6.348)


This clarifies that neither the primal state nor the ‘final state’ [ of there 
be such a state] is ‘perfect definiteness’.  Instead, both are unsettled’. How 
could it be otherwise? Without such indefiniteness, no adaptation or evolution 
could occur, and the laws of physics would lead to inevitable dissipation of 
energy/matter. To prevent this- and thus enable ever more complex forms, 
‘indefiniteness’  on both sides, is the answer.

Edwina.


> On Jan 27, 2024, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:


> 
> I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the 
> publisher.  The final Section 7 is attached.  It shows that Peirce's writings 
> in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing research in 
> the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial 
> intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).
> 
> At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail 
> about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.
> 
> John 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I’d add Peirce’s term of ‘pragmaticism’ - a focus on the practical consequences 
of a semiosic function, ie, a process, rather than a focus on the theory.

I’d also comment that, in my view, Peircean semiosis is a function of a complex 
adaptive world, where, for example, matter becomes self-organizing and where 
semiosis is a process of exploratory openness enabling diversity of form [ and 
habits] and expansion of networking . 

That is, the DI [Dynamic Interpretant] is merely a current and local ’task 
closure’  and is the normal experience of the semiosic process. But the FI [ 
Final Interpretant ] which occurs less often is exploratory within its 
environment [ which is where the notion of community in its definition enters] 
and thus, both evolution and adaptations cannot be prestated or determined, but 
remain open to both Firstness and influences from the habits from other 
existences/Signs. [5.477 where habits change; also 6. 262, and ‘primordial 
habit-taking]. 

Peirce was not an a priori essentialist but an evolutionist [and not a 
Darwinist , ie, he rejected total randomness as the sole means of generating 
adaptation] and thus, his semiosis had to enable interactional openness to the 
information from other current  semiotic forms as well as chance - to enable 
changes in habits and phenomena. 

His outline of protoplasm, evolution etc -  is obviously not a focus on 
abstract theory - but on pragmatic realities.  

Edwina



> On Jan 24, 2024, at 7:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Helmut, List,
> 
> I don't disagree with your analysis.  But what it shows is that abstract 
> analysis provides zero information about any particular case. 
> 
> Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to 
> methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation 
> in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research 
> (methodeutic).   His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he 
> could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that 
> abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application.
> 
> Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce.  She had zero 
> interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late 
> writings, it's essential to read his letters to her.  She kept him focused on 
> reality.
> 
> It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and 
> replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete 
> examples, rather than formal analysis.  In his last decade, his examples and 
> methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject 
> matter.   He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that 
> are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, 
> especially stereoscopic moving images.   
> 
> Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on 
> representing imagery.And I believe that the importance of imagery is the 
> reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent 
> with the more general trichotomy that included imagery:  seme-pheme-delome.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ...  it is the interpreter, 
> who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant
> 
> As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind 
> is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with 
> the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can 
> have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different 
> collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical 
> interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is 
> a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final 
> interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which 
> obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of 
> effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance 
> with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our 
> dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting 
> only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never 
> be confounded by any possible future experience.
> 
> HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign 
> triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error 
> propagation.
> 
> Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three 
> individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. 
> Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state 
> of things in which one element is present without the other, the one 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry list

I'll answer within what I understand as ‘forms of consciousness’. Again - I 
don’t know what YOU mean by the phrase.

But in comparison to your view,  I’d have to include the processes of memory or 
habit - even in primisense, which is a first primal awareness of ‘otherness’.- 
as in a newborn.  But consciosuness, I think, has to gradually include  even 
quasi-mind memory or habits [ ie, the development of habits of association of 
’that’ input sensation’ with ’that experience'. This enables anticipation.

 It need not be symbolic of course, since all matter has this capacity to 
develop habits and thus, anticipate.  A first primal awareness or feeling 
[primisense] would emerge within the experience of an ‘Other’ [ via Altersense].

This experience would have to be semiosic, ie, triadic, or within the operation 
of the sign triad, I can thus understand your reference to ’tones, tokens, 
types’ [ which are comparable to 1ns, 2ns, 3ns] and aren’t confined to words - 
see 1.322, where he discusses a blind person’s experience of ’scarlet colour’. 

Therefore the question simply comes down to - is primisense or pure feeling 
totally alienated from habit? I think that a body’s capacity to even experience 
feeling, requires ‘habit’ - ie - the existence of a stable ground [even if it’s 
purely and only physiological ..ie hearing, or sight or touch or..]…which 
ground sensation within the perimeters of ‘habit’.  The subsequent ‘awareness’ 
of this sensation, develops within multiple experiences [altersense]..

Edwina





> On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> Edwina:
> 
> Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.
> 
> Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life 
> experiences?”
> 
> Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?
> 
> How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
> conjoined to your memories?  
> 
> Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry 
> 
>> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry, list
>> 
>> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
>> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
>> 
>> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> List: 
>>> 
>>>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>>>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>>>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>>>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>>>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>>>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>>> 
>>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>>> 
>>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>>> alphabetic symbols).
>>> 
>>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>>> properly….
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>> 
>>> Jerry  
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry, list

First - being scholar is not akin to a hat that one puts on/takes off.

But the real problem here is that I don’t know what YOU mean by ‘forms of 
consciousness’.

You seem to differentiate them from ‘memories’.  Do yo mean current experiences?

Therefore - I can’t answer your question of ‘Do you experience forms of 
consciosuness’

Because - again I don’t know what the term means to you.

Edwina

> On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> Edwina:
> 
> Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.
> 
> Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life 
> experiences?”
> 
> Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?
> 
> How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
> conjoined to your memories?  
> 
> Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry 
> 
>> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry, list
>> 
>> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
>> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
>> 
>> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> List: 
>>> 
>>>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>>>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>>>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>>>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>>>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>>>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>>> 
>>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>>> 
>>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>>> alphabetic symbols).
>>> 
>>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>>> properly….
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>> 
>>> Jerry  
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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>>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>>> links!
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>> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry, list

I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 

And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.

Edwina



> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> List: 
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>> 
>> 
> I am curious about your reasoning here.
> 
> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of 
> aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
> 
> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
> alphabetic symbols).
> 
> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
> properly….
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry  
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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> links!
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, list

I’m not sure of your point. 

Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, 
a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with 
‘consciousness.  That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the 
semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of 
matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It 
appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551

This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the 
non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; 
Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that 
all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, 
Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without 
consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and 
begins to develop leaves?  But consciousness?

Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his 
outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for 
‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; 
and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.

Again - I’m not sure of your point.

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, list,
>  
> what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. 
> E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee 
> can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one 
> (thinking, medisense).
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> Cc: "Peirce List" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
> Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
> jerry
>  
> Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated 
> analysis that it’s a triadic experience.
>  
> No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being 
> external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! 
> But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a 
> cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be 
> dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that 
> sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.
>  
> And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and 
> biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. 
> But  you already know this 
>  
> Edwina
>  
> Sent from my iPhone
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
>  
> 
> Edwina, List.
>  
> Very interesting response.
>  
> The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.
>  
> In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of 
> triadicity!u
>  
> The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of 
> experiences.
> Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?
>  
> Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that 
> can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?
>  
> Cheers.
> Jerry.
>  
> Sent from my iPad 
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
>  
> Jerry - list
>  
> Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
> or any sound
>  
> 1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
> recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word
>  
> 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
> triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
> sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 
>  
> I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
> to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 
>  
> By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
> Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
> Secondness. 
>  
> So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, 
> that means that there is even no such thing as a singular tria

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - frankly - I’ve never been a fan of Robert Rosen ; my reference to 
entropy was more along the lines of Prigogine.

And yes- I consider that signs can be understood within the outline of the 
Aristotlean syllogism. ..but I don’t see this triad as confined to the symbolic 
realm of language. 

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 1:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> But  you already know this 
> 
> Edwinia:  
> 
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
> time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
> 
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> ordered pairs.  
> 
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.
> 
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
> Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
> discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
> the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.
> 
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation 
> constrained to multi-valued logics?  
> 
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
> classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of 
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert 
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or 
> dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

jerryYes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But  you already know this EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmet- the triadic process - ie the sign meditation is taking place within the persons mind. EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - list

Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
or any sound

1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word

2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
triadic interaction is:

Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 

I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 

By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
Secondness. 

So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that 
means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is 
networking with other triads.

Edwina



> On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> List: 
> 
> Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my 
> feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. 
> Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a 
> critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or 
> controversial (outside the CSP community.)
> The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of 
> mathematics. 
> The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” 
> (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to 
> carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  
> That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that 
> is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the 
> implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set 
> of triadic relations.
> 
> From these perspectives, I now give an examples.
> When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning 
> interpreted as a “triadic relation”.
> 
> “HEADACHE”.
> 
> Or
> 
> “ORANGE”
> 
> How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of 
> interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense 
> or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)
> 
> In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) 
> (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic 
> relations merely adjectives?
> 
> Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s 
> phrases are welcome. 
> 
>  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered 
> pairs” in set theory.)  
> (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is 
> correctly remembered.)
> 
> Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> Participle
> relātus (feminine relāta <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relata#Latin>, 
> neuter relātum <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relatum#Latin>); first 
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_first_declension>/second-declension
>  <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_second_declension> participle
> Perfect passive participle of referō <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/refero>
> (having been) driven <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/driven> or carried 
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/carried> back
> (having been) returned <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/returned>, restored 
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/restored>, repaid 
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/repaid>
> (having been) reported <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reported>
> (having been) reconsidered <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconsidered>
> 
>> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> List
>> 
>> I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
>> quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
>> having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of 
>> Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness 
>> has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third 
>> degree.
>> 
>> These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in 
>> meaning from the quotation provided by JAS 
>> 
>>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
>>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that O

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness 
has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a 
genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.

These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning 
from the quotation provided by JAS 

> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to 
> which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to 
> which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally 
> Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 
> Jul 7)

The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the 
Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational 
content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the 
determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the 
categories.  That is, although JAS declares:

>  In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate 
> (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns)


I continue to disagree, since this is setting up the semiotic triad and hexagon 
as having the Interpretants all in a categorical mode of Thirdness! But we can 
see from even the list of ten classes, that there is only ONE class where the 
Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - the Argument Symbolic Legisign. [See 
2.234-264 and also 8.341]. All the other nine classes have the Interpretant in 
a mode of either Firstness [there are SIX of these] or in a mode of Secondness 
[ there are three of these]. 

With regard to the following quotation


> CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at 
> once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and to 
> another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen 
> determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2)

I consider that the triad is made up of three correlates or relations, and is 
irreducible. My reading of the above is that the mediate Representamen/Sign 
does not stand in - which suggests some kind of passive existence - but 
actually functions, in that it acts; it transforms the information of the 
Object into a meaning, an Interpretant, according to the knowledge base 
/habits, held within the Sign/Representamen in itself. 

I see no evidence in the many quotations provided that "  the 
representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to its object and 
interpretant, it is not that relation itself.”

I consider that the Sign/Representamen is a mediate node in the triadl;  it is 
an active relation and its function is to do just that - mediate between the 
Object and Interpretant. Therefore - I agree that the Sign/Representamen can be 
defined as

> "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and 
> an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907).

And note - that Peirce says ‘of whosoever mode of being’ - which means that 
this Sign/Representamen can function in any of the modal categories - and we 
can see in the ten classes, that it is in the mode of Firstness only once, in 
the mode of Thirdness six times, and in the mode of Secondness, three times.

Edwina



> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of a 
> triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most complex" 
> right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, object, and 
> interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 
> 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three interpretants 
> in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as follows.
> 
> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to 
> which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to 
> which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally 
> Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 
> Jul 7)
> 
> CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine 
> Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object 
> to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, however 
> penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct 
> conclusions that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

With regard to the use of the terms of ‘genuine, degenerate and doubly 
degenerate’ - my understanding of these terms is that they refer only to the 
categories. Not to the ’nodes’ and relations, ie, not to the two Objects or the 
three Interpretants. .

For example, Peirce writes: “The Sign may be said pose as a representative of 
its object, that is, suggests an idea of the Object which is distinguishable 
from the Object in its own Being. The former I term the Dynamoid Object [for I 
want the word “genuine” to express something different]; the latter the 
Immediate Object …Each off these many have either off the three Modalities of 
Being, the former in itself, the latter in representation.  1908 Letters to 
Lady Welby lMS[R] L463.15. 

That is, Peirce specifically rejects in the above quote,  the use of the term 
‘genuine’ to refer to the Dynamoid Object. 

With regard to the terms of ‘genuine’, degenerate and doubly degenerate’, as 
I’ve said - my readings of Peirce are that these terms refer strictly to the 
categories, with there being genuine and degenerate forms of Secondness [ 2-2 
and 2-1]; See 1903 1.535. and three forms of Thirdness, from genuine, to  a 
first degree of degeneracy [3-2] to ’the most degenerate [3-1]. See 5.70-71; 
and 1903; 1.536-37.  and 8.331-32

I don’t consider that the ordinal numbers of First, Second and Third refer to 
the complexity of the Relations and ’nodes’, but to the order of processing [ 
this is not the same as ‘determination’]..

That is - the Representamen, which functions within the sign-vehicle, begins. 
[is First] the semiosic process when it receives input data from the Dynamical 
Object. [Second]…and mediates this input to arrive at, Third, the 
Interpretant[s]. 

The determinative process, as outlined clearly by Robert Marty, moves from 
O-R-I - by which is meant, the nature of and content of the information being 
semiotically processed. The point of ‘determination, as Robert Marty points out 
is that it ‘renders definitely to be such as it will be [8.361 1908[…by which I 
understand that the informational content [as Interpreted]  is determined  by 
the nature of and content of the data input from the Object…as mediated by the 
semiosic nature of the Representamen…
I am presuming that this ‘grounds’ the semeiotic process in an objective rather 
than subjective world.

Edwina

> On Jan 9, 2024, at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here and 
> how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the origins 
> of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to distinguish Peirce's 
> semeiotic? What do you have in mind as semantic aspects of the triadic 
> relations?
> 
> My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant are 
> internal to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical interpretant, and 
> final interpretant are external to the sign. Presumably, that is why Peirce's 
> late taxonomies for sign classification include separate trichotomies for the 
> sign's dyadic relations with the latter three correlates, but not the former 
> two.
> 
> Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant.
> 
> CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest 
> Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It 
> rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I 
> must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly 
> expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the 
> Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as 
> the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is 
> identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the 
> grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will 
> prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because 
> in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the 
> truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not 
> only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the 
> Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain 
> and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for 
> Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed 
> murder upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without 
> extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, 
> then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is 
> true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a 
> babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of 
> exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only 
suggest: Read Peirce.

And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] 
produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness 
[an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information 
-content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a 
feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular 
thing]?  How? Where does it get that increased  information to form something 
that is so much more organized?  How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] 
produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical 
assumptions!

Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a 
First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 
Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. 

….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal 
categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a 
First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully 
distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. 

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words 
First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood 
how they can come to such a conc

Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS 
between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these 
relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the 
categories.

And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in 
a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational 
capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with 
their much more restrictive natures!

Edwina





> On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the 
> representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, 
> and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you 
> try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is 
> the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is 
> semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of 
> "Gestalt" (overall figure)?
>  
> Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that 
> would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody 
> agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would 
> mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being 
> (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think 
> so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to 
> triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, 
> composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward 
> determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the 
> interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. 
> Mind, of course, includes 3ns.
>  
> Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
> Von: "Helmut Raulien" 
> An: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> Edwina, list,
>  
> ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the 
> "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled 
> away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware 
> of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of 
> new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is 
> transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not 
> transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And 
> the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the 
> sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it 
> part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this 
> memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen 
> to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that 
> the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? 
> Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different 
> objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow?
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, list
I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ 
[sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical 
Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own 
outside of the semiosic interaction. 

With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree 
-within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, 

-  a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as 
O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction 
in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic.

- a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live 
[Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in 
the leaves  to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new 
immunities to those chemicals!

- a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time…

The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in 
the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ 
the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness.  And 
Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. 

Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis.

Edwina

> On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that 
> the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow 
> situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it 
> serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the 
> representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow 
> situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of 
> noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. 
> Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for 
> me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to 
> handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is 
> not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is 
> hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An 
> object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, 
> but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know 
> the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows 
> who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can 
> categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the 
> interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of 
> determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new 
> sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the 
> now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the 
> object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the 
> sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part 
> is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the 
> interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see 
> the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we 
> construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is 
> an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The 
> material part of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is 
> spatially defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical 
> object can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the 
> immediate object, i guess.
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Helmut Raulien" 
> Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> Helmut -  I think one has to be clear about terms.  Do you mean that the 
> Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad 
> or only a new Representamen?
>  
> My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, 
> contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when 
> nutrients from the food-as-object,  contribute to the formation of the 
> cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] 
> contributes  to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, 
> remember in the future what to do when snow arrives..
>  
> That is, this interpretant would a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[Edwina Taborsky]

Ben, list

I remember discussions on this list about that paragraph with follows the p. 
271 warning in this text 

“A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same aObject” EP: 272-3

 -  and being chastised and even sneered at, when I suggested that the terms of 
First, Second and Third, referred to ordinal numbers and not to the modal 
categories. The list members, several who still post here, insisted in very 
authoritative terms, that those words referred to the categories!

But a small bit of thought would have shown that it makes no logical sense for 
a Representamen to be in a mode of Firstness - for it would then have been 
unable to interact with an Object or Interpretant unless they also were in a 
mode of Firstness!.   However, the list wasn’t willing to take this ’small bit 
of thought’. 

I think the whole point of the semiosic process is its generative capacity; ie, 
that a semiotic triad is capable of developing and creating new knowledge and 
therefore, new forms. The reason it can do this is because the object and 
interpretant are separated from each other by the mediative function of the 
representamen. So- rather than mitosis, or mimetic clones where x produces 
another x, [ which has its functionality]  you get the more complex meiosis 
where x produces y - ie, a unique cell.

With the triad, its this ‘insertion’ of a mediating force, the representamen, 
that gathers information from other interactions over time, develops habits or 
knowledge of ‘how to deal with the external world’ and thus enables both 
anticipation and yes, adaptation, for Thirdness isn’t only ‘pure’ or genuine, 
but can connect indexically with the outside world [Thirdness-as-Secondness] , 
and thus, inform itself of those external properties and come up with adaptive 
Interpretants. 

Edwina




> On Jan 7, 2024, at 12:53 PM, Ben Udell  wrote:
> 
> Hi, Robert, all,
> 
> I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that you 
> quote in your message,
> 
> The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a Second 
> should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness, both 
> of which are involved in the conceptions of First and Second. A First is 
> something to which (or, more accurately, to some substitute for which, thus 
> introducing Thirdness) attention may be directed. It thus involves Secondness 
> as well as Firstness; while a Second is a First considered as (here comes 
> Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. An object in the proper sense is a 
> Second. (EP 2: 271)
> 
> We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce meant 
> by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to the 
> categories.  Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, argued 
> that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories.
> 
> I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing the 
> sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined by 
> the object.  At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could find (I 
> happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a quote 
> that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could remember 
> (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about it), but I 
> don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase.
> 
> Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN BY 
> C.S. PEIRCE" 
> http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm
> 
> It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version.
> 
> Robert, you wrote below that "O → S → I" reads:
> 
> "O determines S, which determines I."
> 
> I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by its 
> being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra.
> 
> Generally I recall people saying that —
> 
> an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant
> 
> — rather than that —
> 
> an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant
> 
> — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem 
> possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like 
> dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not 
> finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal dominoes 
> that some person set up to fall that way).  I remember (though not in detail) 
> a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l.  Does the category-theoretical 
> understanding of "O determines S, which determines I" avoid that seeming 
> problem?  To put it another way, how does "O → S → I" keep from breaking down 
> into dyads "O → S" and "S → I"?  I'm not trying to be argumentative, I'm 
> actually 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut -  I think one has to be clear about terms.  Do you mean that the 
Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad 
or only a new Representamen?

My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, 
contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when 
nutrients from the food-as-object,  contribute to the formation of the cell-as 
a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes  
to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the 
future what to do when snow arrives..

That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the 
Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, 
Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content. 

And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the 
semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site. 

But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of 
O-R-I…..and even
DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand 
for….

We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, 
It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, 
and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a 
Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 )

Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational 
nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot 
determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode 
of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. 

And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and 
degenerate categorical modes. 

That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the 
Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three 
Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there 
any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness 
degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]? 
BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to 
Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 
3-3 without an external ‘assistance from another sign input]. 

So- the universe is a complex system.

Edwina


> On Jan 7, 2024, at 8:56 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Cecile, List,
>  
> I think, the interconnection towards other signs takes place where the 
> interpretant serves as a new sign. Especially, if the commens (e.g. the 
> conversation) is not a closed one, like between two people, but includes some 
> publishing (like in this conversation), then the conceptual dynamical object 
> (the concept´s intension) is changed. Or with an energetic interpretant, then 
> even the physical properties of a material object can be changed. For any 
> sign in any other commens for which the change of object may play a role, the 
> interpretant can serve as a new sign, which, in relation with the object, 
> causes a new interpretant, which again may serve as a new sign in the 
> original semiosis (the spiral).
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile

I think the spiral is an interesting image of the dynamic nature of the 
semiosic process - The reality of semiosis is as a  transformative process, 
where  energy/matter is constantly being transformed into another form of 
energy/matter, via the mediating Representamen - In other words - it’s not a 
static ‘OK- I’ve got the meaning’ state’; It’s dynamic and transformative. 

I’ve understood this process as a function : f(x)=y. Or…R(O)=I.  The point is, 
to acknowledge the transformative actions of the mediative Representamen within 
the triadic process.

My question to you, however, is how do you introduce, as an image, in this 
spiral, the fact that other triads are affecting each other. That is. If you 
take one triad, with the Y form of 

O  I
   \/
|
 R

Excuse my sloppy image above,  I’m useless at computer drawings...but you get 
the triadic relations…Well, my point is that you can have another triad 
connecting to the O, and another connecting  with the I and the R…..

That is, you can have this Y form….and the Object Relation could be, in another 
triad,  the Interpretant.  The  Interpretant could be moving into becoming 
another R in another triad.

How does one show this complexity?  In my view, it’s the dynamic processing and 
the complexity that is the basis of Peircean semiosis. 

Edwina


> On Jan 5, 2024, at 5:04 PM, Cécile Cosculluela 
>  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I appreciate your clarifying comments and I am thankful also for the 
> enriching references that have been shared. Interesting though it might be to 
> distinguish the sign as a representamen (or first correlate of a triadic 
> relation) from the (quasi-)sign (or Sign) as a triadic relation (that 
> includes a first, a second, and a third correlate without whose triadic 
> relation there is no sign), it is useful to me to be able to draw a graphical 
> representation of the sign, and then of the semiosis, i.e. the continuum of 
> signs. I have been using the Y diagram since my doctoral dissertation 
> (http://tinyurl.com/Semiotraductologie) and little by little over the years 
> the Y turned into a spiral. Here are the five steps that stand out (I'm also 
> sending them in an attached document in case the diagrams don't come across 
> well in the email):
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would love to hear what you think about this graphical representation of 
> the triadic sign as a spiral. Please let me know! 
> 
> Best regards, 
> 
> Cécile
> 
> Cécile Cosculluela
> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
> 
> 
> De: "Edwina Taborsky"  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>>
> À: "Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela"  <mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>>
> Cc: "Peirce-L" mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
> Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 21:24:59
> Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> 
> Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the 
> wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into 
> a dead end.
>  
> The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the 
> triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 
> 8.305] functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the 
> Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t 
> exist except as a triad. 
>  
> Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into 
> Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. 
> And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or 
> sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist 
> as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this 
> representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. 
>  
> Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories.  
> See an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc.
>  
> ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, 
> the Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909].
>  
> But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms.
>  
> Edwina
> 
> On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela 
>  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, John, List,
> 
> Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the 
> term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic 
> sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce 
> mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the 
wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into a 
dead end.

The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the 
triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 8.305] 
functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the 
Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t 
exist except as a triad. 

Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into 
Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. 
And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or 
sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist 
as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this 
representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. 

Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories.  See 
an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc.

ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, the 
Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909].

But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms.

Edwina

> On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela 
>  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, John, List,
> 
> Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the 
> term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic 
> sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce 
> mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 
> 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character 
> of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the 
> interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, 
> of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] 
> convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a 
> "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a 
> "quasi-sign.“ "
> 
> Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the 
> representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the 
> representamen to the object for the interpretant?
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Cécile
> 
> Cécile Cosculluela
> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
> 
> 
> De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> À: "Peirce-L" 
> Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 20:36:50
> Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> 
> Cécile, List:
> 
> CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually 
> have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the 
> triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant?
> 
> Not if we want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign" after 
> a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he never 
> used "sign" for the triadic relation, only for its first correlate. Again, 
> the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) 
> "mediating."
> 
> For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one 
> "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he 
> ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of 
> this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of 
> an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the 
> scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela 
> mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>> 
> wrote:
>> Jon, Edwina, List,
>> 
>> Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to 
>> consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, 
>> referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the 
>> representamen to the object for the interpretant?
>> 
>> Best regards,
>> 
>> Cécile
>> 
>> Cécile Cosculluela
>> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
>> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
>> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
>> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
>> 
>> De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > >
>> À: "Peirce-L" mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
>> Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55
>> Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
>> 
>> Cécile, List:
>> 
>> CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is 
>> a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol  
>> "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced).
>> 
>> No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) 
>> correlate of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile - yes, I think you could come to such a conclusion. That’s why I always 
use ‘representamen’ to refer to the mediative process. And I capitalize the 
term of Sign when I refer to the triad. 

I think it’s important to recognize that the triad is functionally irreducible; 
That is, the Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant isn’t made up of three 
separately existing entities - which is why I don’t think one can come up with 
a graph of ‘an object’ or ‘a sign’ or ‘an interpretant’. >There are no such 
separate entities. 

As Peirce said [8.305] “I shall define a Sign and show its triadic form”. That 
seems to me, fairly straightforward - that the Sign has a triadic form!. So- 
yes, when referring to the triad, you can use the term of Sign! 

Then he breaks down this triadic form into parts, “A sign has two objects, its 
object as it is represented and its object in itself’ 8.333. 
My understanding of this - is that the Triadic Sign - functions within the 
relationships of ’two objects correlated to it.

Then - Peirce continues: “It has also three interpretants” [ibid]..and these 
are also part of that whole functional triad of the Sign. 


And Peirce does refer just to that mediating relation, the representamen/sign 
which he refers to “as it is in itself” [8334. That is - just that single 
relation without the interaction with the object[s] and interpretant[s]. 

“A Sign, or Representmen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, Called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant…” EP 2:272. 

“A respresentamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at once 
in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object, and to 
another correlate, its interpretant” 1901 MS[R]1147”A sign is an object capable 
of determining in a mind a cognition of an object, called the object of the 
sign. A sign is a species under the genus representamen. A representamen is an 
object A, in such a triadic relation to an objet B, for an objet C’…1903 
MS[R]792:2

“Every sign is in a triad relation to an object and to an interpretant” 1904 
MS[R]L107

My point again, is that the mediating relation [called the sign, the 
representamen] doesn’t exist per se on its own but within a triadic function of 
Object-sign/representamen- Interpretant.  We can analytically explore the 
categorical nature of this mediative relation [ as a Qualisign, Sinsign, 
Legisign] but again - it doesn’t exist on its own but only within the full 
triad, which can also be considered as a Sign….because it functions only within 
relationships!

Edwina

> On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:23 PM, Cécile Cosculluela 
>  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, List,
> 
> Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to 
> consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, 
> referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the 
> representamen to the object for the interpretant?
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Cécile
> 
> Cécile Cosculluela
> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
> 
> 
> De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> À: "Peirce-L" 
> Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55
> Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> 
> Cécile, List:
> 
> CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a 
> triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol  "Y" 
> (preferably with three branches equally spaced).
> 
> No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) 
> correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) 
> mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. 
> As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper 
> (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics),
>  "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. 
> However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were 
> synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the 
> triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455).
> 
> This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name 
> "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase 
> letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" 
> at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with 
> the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is 
> not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of 
> the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name 
> of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent.
> 
> 
> 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile - I won’t presume to provide a ‘general consensus’ of how other Peircean 
scholars view the graphical representation of the sign; I’ll speak only for 
myself.

My view - as based within Peirce’s writings - is that there is no such thing as 
a separate ’sign-in-itself’, or a separate object-in-itself- or an 
‘interpretant in itself’. Therefore one cannot even ask for an image of any one 
of these correlates/relations ‘in themselves’….since they don’t exist. That is 
also why I prefer to refer to the mediate sign in the triad 
[Object-Sign-Interpretant] instead as the Representamen [a term also used by 
Peirce for this relation] - to avoid confusion with the term used for the FULL 
TRIAD [Sign].

  The Sign, as used by Peirce, refers to the triadic set of three relations 
which operate as one unit; as a function, so to speak. As he writes, the sign 
is” “anything which determines something else [its interpretant] to refer to an 
object to which itself refers [ its object] in the same way, the interpretant 
becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infnitum’ "2.303.  

Or “As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object 
which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. “ [1906; EP 
2.544 [notes].] 

In the above, we can see that Price’s definition of the Sign is always as an 
active function, a triadic function. None of the three relations exist 'per 
se’, by themselves for that would be to deny the action. 

Peirce himself used the image of a Y to show this triad as a ‘graph with three 
tails’.  [1.346-347]

Edwina



> On Jan 5, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Cécile Cosculluela 
>  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers,
> 
> Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the 
> oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it 
> represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a 
> triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 
> 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to 
> represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the 
> sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or 
> examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a 
> representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually 
> no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, 
> since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign 
> with the symbol  "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would 
> you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on 
> the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce?
> 
> Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ...
> 
> Warm regards,
> 
> Cécile
> 
> Cécile Cosculluela
> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation

> 
> De: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> À: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Cc: "Peirce-L" 
> Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 16:15:34
> Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
> 
> Cecile
> Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image 
> of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, 
> which is always a triad, 
> 
> “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is 
> an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an 
> interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a 
> relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 
> 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three 
> interpretants’. 8.333.
> 
> “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and 
> refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and 
> the mind” 3.359-60
> 
> Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but 
> it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three 
> correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a 
> closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y 
> shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Cecile
> 
> Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three 
> correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a 
> good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347.
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile
Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image of 
the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, which is 
always a triad, 

“I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is an 
object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an 
interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a 
relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 
8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three 
interpretants’. 8.333.

“A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and 
refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and the 
mind” 3.359-60

Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but 
it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three 
correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a 
closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y 
shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. 

Edwina

> On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Cecile
> 
> Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three 
> correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a 
> good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347.
> 
> As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations 
> and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting 
> three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346.
> 
> And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key 
> factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new 
> Signs.
> 
> Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, 
> with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one 
> may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from 
> it” 
> 
> The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of 
> three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction 
> with other triadic Signs.  As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact 
> about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. 
> 
> And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations 
> are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph 
> of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect.
> 
> Edwina
>> 
>>>  Dear Peirce-Listers,
>>> 
>>> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical 
>>> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his 
>>> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. 
>>> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by 
>>> Peirce would be most helpful.
>>> 
>>> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day!
>>> 
>>> Best regards,
>>> 
>>> Cécile
>>> 
>>> Cécile Cosculluela
>>> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
>>> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
>>> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
>>> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
>>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>> links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
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>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Cecile

Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three 
correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good 
outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347.

As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations 
and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting 
three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346.

And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key 
factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new 
Signs.

Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, 
with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one 
may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from 
it” 

The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of 
three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction 
with other triadic Signs.  As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact 
about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. 

And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are 
open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the 
Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect.

Edwina
> 
>>  Dear Peirce-Listers,
>> 
>> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical 
>> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his 
>> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. 
>> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by 
>> Peirce would be most helpful.
>> 
>> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day!
>> 
>> Best regards,
>> 
>> Cécile
>> 
>> Cécile Cosculluela
>> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA
>> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones
>> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language
>> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Apologies - in a hurry but the correct determination letters are:
DO-IO-R/S- II-DI-FI

IO- Immediate Object; 

So, DO and DI are external to the sign vehicle; and IO and II are internal…..

Edwina

> On Dec 19, 2023, at 8:58 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> I have a completely different analysis.  A short outline is  all I have time 
> for...
> 
> My view is that the terms of ‘genuine and degenerate refer only to the 
> categorical modes, with Thirdness as genuine. [3-3], degenerate in the first 
> degree [3-2] and degenerate in the second degree [ 3-1], [ See the many 
> references in CP, eg, 5 66 and on. Same with Secondness; genuine [2-2] and 
> degenerate in the first degree [2-1]. Obviously, Thirdness can have these 
> three modes and Secondness can have these two modes. Nothing to do with the 
> numerical number of these Relations.
> 
> My view of the Semiosic triad/hexagon is that it is made up of correlates or 
> relations, functioning in the deterministic order of DO-DI-R/S-II-DI-FI. I 
> think most on this list would know what these abbreviations stand for.
> And the semiosic format is that the DO and DI are external to the 
> sign-vehicle, while the DI and II are internal. 
> There are many references to this outline - eg 8.333. The Fi, however, is not 
> an individual correlate but hypothetical,  emerging within a commonality of 
> multiple sign-vehicle responses to the DO. 
> These correlates in themselves as relations and determinants  have nothing to 
> do with the genuine/degenerate modes of the categories. The categories are 
> additional aspects of the complex semiosic process and function within each 
> of the correlates. So, a DO can function in a mode of 3ns, 2ns, 1ns. Same 
> with the DI…[See the outline off the ten classes].  And of course, one can 
> add their genuine and degenerate natures into the complex - being careful not 
> to violate the deterministic rule - and come up with not merely 10 classes 
> but 28 and 66. . 
> 
> For example a Decent Indexical Legisign, has its Interpretant in a mode of 
> Secondness. The three Interpretants can all be in a mode of pure 2ns, - ie 
> ALL are genuine modes! Or we could see a gradual entropy where one or more of 
> the Interpretant Relations, still in 2ns,  becomes degenerate.  {See the 
> outline of 28 classes provided by Marty and Benazet]. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Dec 18, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Gary R., List:
>> 
>> To clarify further, no one is suggesting that all three interpretants are in 
>> a "mode" of 3ns, nor that both objects are in a "mode" of 2ns. Using 
>> Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification, that would amount to 
>> claiming that all three interpretants are always necessitants and both 
>> objects are always existents--an impossible combination according to EP 
>> 2:481 (1908), regardless of whether one aligns destinate/explicit with 
>> final/immediate (as I do) or vice-versa.
>> 
>> Instead, the point is simply that phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine 
>> triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant reveals 
>> that for any one sign, there are two objects and three interpretants. The 
>> dynamical object is genuine, while the immediate object is degenerate. The 
>> final interpretant is genuine, while the dynamical interpretant is 
>> degenerate (relatively reactional) and the immediate interpretant is doubly 
>> degenerate (relatively qualitative). It is in this context that the 
>> interpretants themselves are a trichotomy, while in the context of sign 
>> classification, there is a different trichotomy for each of them 
>> individually.
>> 
>> With that in mind, I continue to maintain that each genuine correlate 
>> logically (not causally nor temporally) determines the corresponding 
>> degenerate correlate(s), in the sense that the universe 
>> (possible/existent/necessitant) of the genuine correlate constrains the 
>> potential universes of the degenerate correlate(s). Again, along with the 
>> obvious terminological affinities, this is why I align the destinate 
>> interpretant with the final interpretant and the explicit interpretant with 
>> the immediate interpretant.
>> 
>> However, I am not (so far) convinced that it is accurate to say that the 
>> genuine correlates involve the degenerate correlates in the way that 3ns 
>> involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns involves 1ns. As far as I know, Peirce never 
>> says nor implies that the dynamical object involves the immediate object; 
>> nor that the final interpretant involves the dynamical interpretant, which 
>> involves the immedi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

I have a completely different analysis.  A short outline is  all I have time 
for...

My view is that the terms of ‘genuine and degenerate refer only to the 
categorical modes, with Thirdness as genuine. [3-3], degenerate in the first 
degree [3-2] and degenerate in the second degree [ 3-1], [ See the many 
references in CP, eg, 5 66 and on. Same with Secondness; genuine [2-2] and 
degenerate in the first degree [2-1]. Obviously, Thirdness can have these three 
modes and Secondness can have these two modes. Nothing to do with the numerical 
number of these Relations.

My view of the Semiosic triad/hexagon is that it is made up of correlates or 
relations, functioning in the deterministic order of DO-DI-R/S-II-DI-FI. I 
think most on this list would know what these abbreviations stand for.
And the semiosic format is that the DO and DI are external to the sign-vehicle, 
while the DI and II are internal. 
There are many references to this outline - eg 8.333. The Fi, however, is not 
an individual correlate but hypothetical,  emerging within a commonality of 
multiple sign-vehicle responses to the DO. 
These correlates in themselves as relations and determinants  have nothing to 
do with the genuine/degenerate modes of the categories. The categories are 
additional aspects of the complex semiosic process and function within each of 
the correlates. So, a DO can function in a mode of 3ns, 2ns, 1ns. Same with the 
DI…[See the outline off the ten classes].  And of course, one can add their 
genuine and degenerate natures into the complex - being careful not to violate 
the deterministic rule - and come up with not merely 10 classes but 28 and 66. 
. 

For example a Decent Indexical Legisign, has its Interpretant in a mode of 
Secondness. The three Interpretants can all be in a mode of pure 2ns, - ie ALL 
are genuine modes! Or we could see a gradual entropy where one or more of the 
Interpretant Relations, still in 2ns,  becomes degenerate.  {See the outline of 
28 classes provided by Marty and Benazet]. 

Edwina

> On Dec 18, 2023, at 8:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> To clarify further, no one is suggesting that all three interpretants are in 
> a "mode" of 3ns, nor that both objects are in a "mode" of 2ns. Using Peirce's 
> late taxonomies for sign classification, that would amount to claiming that 
> all three interpretants are always necessitants and both objects are always 
> existents--an impossible combination according to EP 2:481 (1908), regardless 
> of whether one aligns destinate/explicit with final/immediate (as I do) or 
> vice-versa.
> 
> Instead, the point is simply that phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine 
> triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant reveals 
> that for any one sign, there are two objects and three interpretants. The 
> dynamical object is genuine, while the immediate object is degenerate. The 
> final interpretant is genuine, while the dynamical interpretant is degenerate 
> (relatively reactional) and the immediate interpretant is doubly degenerate 
> (relatively qualitative). It is in this context that the interpretants 
> themselves are a trichotomy, while in the context of sign classification, 
> there is a different trichotomy for each of them individually.
> 
> With that in mind, I continue to maintain that each genuine correlate 
> logically (not causally nor temporally) determines the corresponding 
> degenerate correlate(s), in the sense that the universe 
> (possible/existent/necessitant) of the genuine correlate constrains the 
> potential universes of the degenerate correlate(s). Again, along with the 
> obvious terminological affinities, this is why I align the destinate 
> interpretant with the final interpretant and the explicit interpretant with 
> the immediate interpretant.
> 
> However, I am not (so far) convinced that it is accurate to say that the 
> genuine correlates involve the degenerate correlates in the way that 3ns 
> involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns involves 1ns. As far as I know, Peirce never 
> says nor implies that the dynamical object involves the immediate object; nor 
> that the final interpretant involves the dynamical interpretant, which 
> involves the immediate interpretant.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Sat, Dec 16, 2023 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>> Gary R., List:
>> 
>> I did not say anything one way or the other about involution, I just 
>> explained why I used "determines." However, carefully parsing that quote (CP 
>> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903), Peirce does not say that genuine 3ns involves 
>> reactional 3ns, which involves qualitative 3ns. What he says that for any 
>> class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns, there are 
>> three subclasses--one involving a relatively genuine 3ns, one involving a 
>> relatively reactional 3ns, and one involving a relatively qualitative 3ns.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mary- yes, I fully agree with you. Tha semiotic triangle is disastrous to the 
study of genuine semiotics. 
Peirce never used it; his diagram/image was of a three-tailed ‘umbrella’..[for 
want of a better metaphor]. In 1.347, you can see his outline of “a graph with 
three tails”. 

>-  
This can be connected and networked to other triads.  The triad  represents the 
three Relations of Object-Sign/Representamen-Interpretant….and prevents dyadic 
closure. That is a dyadic interaction is closed, but a triadic end blew an 
interaction with other triads.

As for who thought up putting Peirce’s triad into a triangle - I’ve no idea - 
but it is everywhere, in all basic texts of semiotics, aligning Peirce with 
Saussurian dyadic semiology [disgraceful thing to do] .. 
And reducing Peirce to…..

Edwina
 


> On Dec 18, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Mary Libertin  wrote:
> 
> I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean 
> infrastructure.”  Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective 
> that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a 
> triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden in 
> The Meaning of Meaning, in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That triangle 
> has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.]
> 
> Mary
> 
> 
>> On Dec 18, 2023, at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> I particularly like, however, the outline of the trellis of the 28 classes, 
>> [also provided by Robert Marty]. That shows, even more clearly, the 
>> generative capabilities of the Peircean infrastructure. It shows how the 
>> Interpretant can function, for example, in any of the three modes [ 
>> following Peirce’s laws of such]. The Decent Symbol Legisign can have all 
>> three Interpretants in a mode of 2ns. It can still be - less genuine - 
>> moving triad-by-triad-  into a Rhematic Symbol, with those Interpretants in 
>> a mode of 1ns. 
>> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - I wonder if Peirce’s terms on the Interpretants  are just about result 
of his frequently exploring and using different terms, though I acknowledge he 
does this. 

There is an interesting paper by Brendan Lalor, Semiotics 114–1/2, 31-40, 1997 
on The Classification of Peirce’s Interpretants.

Briefly, he considers the two outlines of the tripartite division and their 
trichotomies [ which refer to the categories]. One outline is from 1906 [5.475, 
491]. The other is from 1909 [8.315]

The 1906 outline  provides  the three terms as: emotional, energetic and 
logical. The 1909 as immediate, dynamic and final.

The argument is over whether these two sets are synonymous or separate. One 
view sees that the two sets of terms are uniform and coextensive - even 
complementary. [ J. Liszka]; the other, that they are distinct. [ T. 
Short]…According to Short - the two sets are distinct; ie “he holds that each 
of the immediate, dynamic and final Interpretants may be divided into emotion, 
energetic and logical interpretants" [ which leads to nine possible 
interpretants]. 

That is, Short understands the 1906 as referencing the categories, and the 1909 
as cognitive place holders or nodes in the semiotic process, so to speak. 
[Note- Lalor makes a serious error in a quote where he mixes up the emotional 
with the energetic interpretant in 5.475] . Categorical formation and place 
holders - are two different semiosic processes. 

I tend to support Short’s view, ie, that there is an analytic reason for the 
different terms, and that this reason refers to the use of the categories in 
their functioning. After all - for example, a dynamic interpretant could 
function within any of the categorical modes not just Secondness [ that is, its 
‘place in the tripartite' is not synonymous with its categorical mode].  And a 
final Interpretant could, forever, function within a mode of 2ns - ie, as in a 
Dicent indexical Legisign.  

Whatever one personally concludes - it’s an interesting article to read.

Edwina Taborsky



> On Dec 14, 2023, at 5:00 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> If I may add a realistic note to the discussion on changing terminology. 
> My opinion come from three significant experiences with scientific notations.
> 
> Before I offer my opinions I would note historically that CSP writings are 
> flows of changing terminologies with rare examples of concerns about 
> precedence of prior terminologies.  Indeed, these flows of terminologies are 
> essential to the developments of his views, style, propositions and logics.  
> 
>  
> 
>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jon, list
>> 
>> With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of 
>> a number of issues.
>> 
>> 1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as 
>> you point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much 
>> more advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s 
>> vocabulary and frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling 
>> them to use their vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
>> There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - 
>> within physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with 
>> Peirce’s work on Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- 
>> the concepts are similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this 
>> awareness - and not require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.
>> 
>> 2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
>> areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
>> Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
>> the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s 
>> semiology is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means 
>> -that’ with an external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore 
>> - it is linguistic or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This 
>> framework readily enables an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit 
>> right into the leftist Marxist frames of created  class and 
>> ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And so, we get semiotics viewed as semiology [ which 
>> it is not] and operating as some kind of subjectivist free-interpretation…
>> The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
>> providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
>> ‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
>> And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.
>> 
>> Indeed - I think the categ

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list

With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of a 
number of issues.

1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as you 
point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much more 
advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s vocabulary and 
frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling them to use their 
vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - within 
physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with Peirce’s work on 
Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- the concepts are 
similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this awareness - and not 
require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.

2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s semiology 
is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means -that’ with an 
external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore - it is linguistic 
or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This framework readily enables 
an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit right into the leftist 
Marxist frames of created  class and ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And so, we get 
semiotics viewed as semiology [ which it is not] and operating as some kind of 
subjectivist free-interpretation…
The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.

Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of Peirce’s 
basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that triangle image]…

Edwina

> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List,
> 
> All three of your discussions are well considered.  As I said at the 
> beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences:  Peirce scholars, for whom 
> exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century readers 
> in all branches of cognitive science.  I'll say a bit more, using the 
> attached figs2_3.pdf for examples.
> 
> For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among 
> texts, exact quotations are essential.  But in writing for a 21st century 
> audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and to 
> the expected vocabulary of the readers.   To illustrate the issues, I'm 
> enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- figs2_3.pdf.
> 
> Re Peirce's ethics of terminology:  As Peirce said, he would consider himself 
> bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his terminology.   
> That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish his intentions 
> from a broader usage by others.  I believe that is also why he coined the new 
> term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his correspondence with 
> Lady Welby.
> 
> To Jon:  I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" 
> Peirce's writings about interpretants.  I had read most of the excerpts you 
> cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of 
> the sequence.
> 
> Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years.  He did not consider 
> himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people had 
> adopted them.  That is the major reason why he adopted the term pragmaticism. 
>   But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt no obligation to 
> continue using that term.  
> 
> For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience.  Most of my 
> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of 
> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983.  The 
> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial 
> intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.  Peirce contributed to or 
> studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each of them 
> participated in the Peirce Bicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in 2009.
> 
> There is much more to discuss about these issues and about ways of bringing 
> Peirce's work and its modern implications to the attention of a broader 
> audience.  I would like to hear and discuss various suggestions.
> 
> John
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

John - thanks for your post. 

My concern, however, is that the Peircean community, should in my view, accept 
that research in other disciplines may be examining the same cognitive and 
physical realities but, might be using different terms than Peirce used. That 
is- their terms, as used by research in computer science, AI, biology, 
economics, etc  could readily be understood as synonyms for Peircean terms.

After all - we cannot and should not assume that Peirce’s concepts apply only 
within - Peirce’s writings! 

I think that the hesitation by the Peircean community to accept this 
‘broadening’ of terminology means that Peirce’s work has been marginalized 
within the broader research world.

Edwina

> On Dec 11, 2023, at 5:02 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all,
> 
> As we have been discussing, Peirce's work is at the forefront of ongoing 
> research and publications in the 21st century. But many people complain that 
> his jargon is an obstacle.  Yet those people don't realize that the jargon 
> they're reading and writing today is far worse, less readable, and less 
> precise than Peirce's.
> 
> For examples. I was browsing through writings by more recent, highly regarded 
> authors whose jargon is far worse and less precise than anything Peirce 
> wrote.   See below for excerpts that compare modern jargon to the clearer and 
> more precise prose by Peirce.  Since I did not want to frighten the readers, 
> I avoided some of Peirce's Greek and the three "Nessie" monsters.  Even 
> without them Peirce's words are clearer and more precise than Armstrong's.
> 
> I believe that we can and should show that Peirce's writings with a modest 
> amount of updating of terminology can serve as a solid foundation for 21st C 
> cognitive science.  I don't believe that we need to reject anything that 
> Peirce wrote.  We can just avoid quoting some of the terms that tend to be 
> confusing.
> 
> One of the most confusing examples is the abbreviation of "logic as 
> semeiotic" as just "logic".  That is horribly confusing for a modern 
> audience.  Instead. we can use the pair of terms "formal logic" and  
> "semeiotic".  Exact quotations, of course, must be written verbatim.  But 
> with a judicious selection of quotations, we can be precise about Peirce and 
> readable by a 21st C audience.  That, in fact, was the choice Max Fisch 
> (1981) made.
> 
> Fisch, Max H. (1981) The “proof” of pragmatism, reprinted in Fisch (1986) pp. 
> 362-375.
> 
> Fisch, Max H. (1986) Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. by K. L. Ketner & 
> C. J. W. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
> 
> Another  term that raises confusion is "final interpretant".  I believe that 
> Peirce used that term for discussing important issues.  But the details of 
> multiple levels of interpretants are unclear.   I noticed that in the last 
> decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary correspondent, he avoided 
> that issue.  That does not imply that Peirce thought that the word was 
> irrelevant.  But it suggests that he did not require that word for the most 
> important issues he discussed with her, William James, and other late 
> correspondents.
> 
> I am not saying that Peirce scholars should avoid these words in detailed 
> analyses of Peirce's texts.  But I believe that they should be avoided in 
> discussions with a broader audience.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> An excerpt from the article https://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf  
> 
> After thousands of years of debate, philosophers have inherited a large body 
> of terminology from competing schools of thought with divergent ways of 
> thinking and talking about what exists. They have all those terms at their 
> fingertips when they write about ontology. To explain them, David Armstrong 
> (1989) wrote an “opinionated introduction” that begins with the distinction 
> between universals and particulars. His book is short (148 pages) and highly 
> regarded by professional philosophers and Amazon reviewers, who gave it four 
> or five stars. On page 1, Armstrong began with a cautionary note about the 
> “Problem of Universals”: 
> 
> "So let me begin by saying what the problem is. It may turn out that it is 
> really a pseudoproblem. That was the opinion of Wittgenstein and his 
> followers, for instance. Quine is not far from thinking the same. But whether 
> it is a real problem or not should not be decided in advance." 
> 
> The index of that book is a warning of the terminology to come: 
> 
> "abstract particulars; argument from almost indiscernible cycles; blob 
> theories; bundle theories; identity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of 
> identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, 
> bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, 
> natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, 
> inter res)." 
> 
> Armstrong’s final chapter summarizes 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

John - yes, I agree with your comments.

With regard to your point 4 - that’s an excellent comment. Primarity, 
Secundarity, and Tertiarity

These are much better terms for the categorical modes than Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness.  They are better descriptions of their modal nature - 
a primary sensation; an awareness of Other, and that mediative plural.  I think 
the categories are basic and foundational to Peirce but these terms for them 
make it difficult for many. 

I’ve found that many easily mistake the three modal categories of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness - and confuse them with ordinal linearity: First, Second, 
Third - and inform us that, for example, the Representamen functions as, First, 
within Firstness! Such a mode only functions when the triad has all three 
correlates in the mode of Firstness. [See 2.55 etc]. . Another confuses the 
three categories with the arithmetic numbers, where Secondness somehow refers 
to the nature of TWO objects, and Thirdness to the nature of THREE 
interpretants.  

So, it would certainly be helpful to use these suggested terms. 

Edwina



> On Dec 9, 2023, at 6:47 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List,
> 
> I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers who 
> rarely comment on this list.  We have discussed these and related issues 
> before.  In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of discussion by 
> some of the best and most respected Peirce scholars.  But most of them have 
> dropped out.  Some still subscribe, but they don't join the discussions 
> because they find their ideas rejected or distorted by people who "shoot 
> first" and ask questions later.
> 
> There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it 
> with people who would consider it seriously.   In the Logic Notebook (LNB 
> 268r, 1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended to 
> develop in detail:
> The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general. Here take up 
> Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs.
> 
> The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof that are a 
> priori possible.
> 
> The forms we actually find.
> 
> The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity.
> Point 4 is significant.  It seems that Peirce was considering three new terms 
> that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  Was that what he 
> intended?  Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or trichotomy?  I have 
> been searching for some discussion of these questions, but I can't find 
> anything anywhere.
> 
> I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for 
> 1-ness, 2-ness,  and 3-ness.  Most people who never read much or any of 
> Peirce's writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing.  I was 
> recently reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his 
> initial response to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that 
> the concepts were absolutely fundamental.  I strongly agree.
> 
> Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I 
> don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the three 
> "Nesses".  I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity, and 
> Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  
> 
> Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary 
> correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect 
> that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most 
> respected colleagues and other readers he hoped to reach.
> 
> Question for Peirce scholars who have been using the three ness-words for 
> years:  Please think back to your first readings of Peirce's writings.  Would 
> you find Primarity, Secudarity, and Tertiarity to be more intelligible or 
> acceptable than Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness?   Why or why not?
> 
> And by the way, issues about the ethics of terminology do not apply, because 
> Peirce frequently changed his own terminology when he found that nobody else 
> had ever adopted it.  Even today, nobody ever uses those terms outside of a 
> discussion about Peirce.
> 
> John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Edwina Taborsky]

Robert, John, ..

I fully agree with Robert’s outline of problems about the research of Peirce 
within the ‘Peircean community’. 

On the one hand, there exists within this community an almost self-isolating 
group of self-defined Peircean scholars,  who treat ‘outsiders’ as almost 
’naive and ignorant’ intruders. And - in addition, this set of scholars is not 
immune to their own deep misunderstandings of Peirce [ which they will not 
acknowledge]. 

An almost inevitable result of this elitism and isolation, is that a major 
section of this community, in my view, trivializes Peirce to rhetoric - where, 
as Robert says, “any informal discourse evoking concerns about meaning is a 
priori accepted’ as pertinent to Peirce. When one reads/hears these papers - 
the references to Peirce are superficial, primarily using just his terms, and 
often, a deeply misunderstood use of those terms. 

As a result, many really serious Peircean scholars tend to work outside of the 
‘Peircean community’, and use Peirce within their work - but expressed and 
published only in non-Peircean conferences and publications. The double problem 
of the elitism and isolationism of the Peircean community - and its concomitant 
expulsion of Peircean research to trivialization within the social sciences - 
has led to this result.

What’s to be done? I have no idea -  but this infrastructure - of isolate 
elitism and trivialization - doesn’t work towards the expansion of Peircean 
thought into the cognitive and other sciences. 

Edwina



> On Dec 9, 2023, at 7:13 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Dear John,
> I appreciate the interest of all these questions, even if sometimes the 
> answer cannot be largely speculative, especially as regards Peirce's 
> intentions. 
> Now, as for your observation about Peirce's marginal status within the APA, 
> this may be somewhat related to Peirce's anti-psychologism, but in my 
> opinion, the main responsibility for this lies with the Peircean community as 
> a whole. Indeed, although the latter always brandishes a banner that reads 
> "do not block the way of inquiry", it is not uncommon for this path to be 
> objectively blocked due to the extreme heterogeneity of this community, which 
> can reach the point of a kind of sectarianism. From the outside, you get the 
> feeling that you have to be a long-time initiate to be able to benefit from 
> the 100,000 pages of the MS. What's more, the places where interested 
> researchers can observe the - indispensable - confrontations between 
> initiates are not models of empathy that would encourage them to run the risk 
> of naively exposing their initial questions. I won't say any more on the 
> subject, as I'm sure those of you reading this know where you stand.
> 
> Moreover, as far as I'm concerned, I have some personal complaints, mainly 
> about the evaluation mechanisms available to the Peircian community, which 
> are particularly lacking. Indeed, this community, it should be noted, has set 
> up an international organization with different names depending on the 
> language used, English or French (IASS-AIS ). The 
> former covers vague semiotic studies, where any informal discourse evoking 
> concerns about meaning is a priori accepted. The second seems to refer to a 
> well-constituted science, i.e. one that at least agrees on a well-defined 
> object of knowledge: "semiotics", which is obviously not the case. Go and 
> talk about Relational Algebra and Category Theory, as I did, or Catastrophe 
> Theory, as René Thom (Medall Fied) and Jean Petitot did, in such a fog! And 
> yet, as is often the case in the Humanities, there is an avowed desire to 
> move towards a scientific status comparable to that of the Exact Sciences, 
> which inevitably poses the problem of formalization and therefore of the 
> place of mathematics in any approach that would like to move in this 
> direction. I feel that this is also the case for Existential Graphs, the 
> reception of which you know better than anyone. In short, it's time for an 
> institutional body to take charge of these fundamental problems.
> 
> I have no doubt that researchers in the cognitive sciences - and not only in 
> this field - would benefit from Peirce's writings. Last summer, in June, I 
> was asked to present five videos at the "PRAGMA" Thematic School: PRAGMATISM, 
> CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES: TRADITIONS, USES, NEW CHALLENGES, hosted by 
> Porquerolles from June 26 to July 1, 2023. The audience was made up of young 
> researchers from leading French schools and universities. The school's 
> scientific objectives were: "to train teachers-researchers and professionals 
> in a variety of fields in pragmatist approaches, by bringing together and 
> bringing into dialogue researchers from different disciplines, theoretical 
> sensibilities and political perspectives, who consequently have different 
> readings of the contributions of pragmatism to the renewal of forms of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CG] [ontolog-forum] Diagrammatic Reasoning and AI

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

Thank you for an impressive paper and outline of diagrammatic thinking. 

My question is - in your paper, do you explain how a diagram becomes [ as 
operative in the categorical mode of Thirdness] a  primary mediative force in 
the movement from sensation [of the object] to an Interpretant [of that 
object].  That is, the diagram is not always in a non-interfering  mode of 
Firstness or Secondness but can become, so to speak, agential [ as in ideology, 
as in a defective immune system,,as well, of course, when we identify the bird 
or insect outside the window].

Edwina

> On Aug 27, 2023, at 10:20 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Alex, Doug F, 
> 
> I'm attaching a PDF of the article I sent yesterday.   This version has 
> diagrams that will clarify many of the issues.
> 
> Figure 2 is fundamental, and Figures 3 and 4 clarify some of the details.  
> (To Alex :  every diagram is a structure, and every structure is a diagram.  
> They serve exactly the same purpose.)
> 
> Doug F> Even if most everybody often thinks in diagrams, that doesn't mean it 
> is
> the sole method of thinking.  If i am listening to a bird or insect making
> noises outside my window, my attempt to recognize the type of animal is
> not diagramatic.  If i am smelling a flower blindfolded, my attempt to
> recognize the type of bloom is not diagramatic.  If i am petting my cat
> while reading and detect a bur in her fur, that is not diagramatic.
> 
> [JFS> All those sensations and actions are continuous.  But  if you want to 
> talk about them or relate them to your inner stock of discrete 
> words/concepts, you must simplify them to a structure/diagram that is 
> constructed of discrete parts.]
> 
> DF>  If I taste something i am cooking to determine whether to add more (and 
> which)
> herb or spice, i am not engaged in diagrammatic thinking. 
> 
> [JFS> Now you have converted the continuous perceptions to discrete units 
> (concepts/words).   That can be represented as a structure or diagram.  A 
> sentence made up of words is just a one-dimensional diagram/structure.  A 
> moving multidimensional diagram can be a much closer map to your perceptions, 
> plans, and actions.  That is what Peirce called diagrammatic thinking.]
> 
> In every one of those examples, the percept is a continuous reflection of 
> external imagery.   As Figures 2, 3, and 4show, that continuous information 
> must be mapped to discrete units before they can be mapped to and from any 
> language that has discrete words or concepts.
> 
> Peirce used the word 'diagram', and Alex used the word 'structure', you could 
> also use words like graph, hypergraph, or whatever.   But the critical issue 
> is that some discrete structure of some kind must serve as the intermediate 
> stage between a continuous world and any discrete set of words or concepts 
> used to talk about it.  I also attached a long list of references, which 
> represent a small subset of the things I have consulted while developing the 
> ideas in that article.   I invite you to explore them (and/or any others you 
> may prefer).
> 
> John  
> ___
> CG mailing list -- c...@lists.iccs-conference.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to cg-le...@lists.iccs-conference.org

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, John, List

I don’t know if there is a ‘widely accepted definition of consciousness’. I am 
referring to Peirce’s discussions of the term. I like his differentiation 
between  the immediate and mediate consciousness. Notice that he refers to BOTH 
types as ‘consciousness’. That is, he doesn’t confine consciousness to the use 
of a symbolic modelling process. 

IF one considers that all that is ‘existential’ functions within a triadic 
interaction, ie as a Sign, made up of O-R-I [object relation, representamen 
relation, interpretant relation], then, the immediate consciousness could be 
better classified as awareness - and we can understand this interaction to be 
composed of Relations within the mode of Secondness and/or Firstness. That is - 
I am assuming that consciousness emerges only within the operation of the mode 
of Thirdness.

But certainly, an animal or plant is aware of its surroundings, whether it be 
the scent of a predator, or, an actual insect eating that plant’s leaves. That 
is - I am suggesting that Thirdness, that modelling process, functions in 
plants and animals as well as humans. An animal/plant can analyze or measure 
the incoming stimulus data from the Object against its internalized model - 
whether this knowledge base is genetic or learned] and come to an 
interpretation that ’this is X…and I’d better do Y”.
Therefore - since Thirdness is functioning in this interaction - I’d call it 
consciousness, a mediated consciousness in this example.. So, I don’t think the 
fruit fly’s interaction is mechanical, but is both awareness [in a mode of 1ns 
and 2ns] but also, mediated consciousness, ie, in a mode of 3ns!!!

But, again, to symbolically model these relations - I think this requires - 
symbolic methods, eg, mathematics, and language etc - and so far, only humans 
can do this!!

Can a computer be ‘conscious’? It can certainly operate within the modes of 1ns 
and 2ns - in its most basic mechanical manner. It has a stored knowledge base 
against which it references incoming data, so, presumably, we’d have to say, 
this is operating within a mode of 3ns. According to our basic definition - it 
is ‘conscious’. It can make decisions on ‘what to do’. 

Can it learn? Apparently - yes. Can it translate its models into symbolic 
format? Yes.  So- what we are talking about, with computers, might be, instead, 
not consciousness but instead- does a computer have any capacity for morality 
or ethics? Does it have the capacity to understand the difference between good 
and evil?  I think those are the important questions. 

Edwina

> On Aug 12, 2023, at 5:29 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Dear John, dear Edwina, dear all,
>  
> is there a widely accepted definition of consciousness? If you say like 
> "Alex>  My concept of consciousness would be an awareness of part of one's 
> thoughts and ability to reason about it", I think,  "awareness" is equally 
> difficult to define, if not the same anyway. I don´ think it is the delay, 
> because delay between stimulus and reaction occurs in computers too. Also the 
> gathering of evidence by fruit flies is not awareness or consciousness, but 
> rather a purely mechanistic thing, including if-then-routines, like stimuli 
> rising to a certain level, and in connection with other levels of stimuli, a 
> reaction is set off. Reads like a computer program to me. But in Alex' quote 
> there is a kind of iteration, if you don´t say "awareness", but 
> "representation": The representation is represented. This representation too 
> is represented, this too, ad infinitum. But here a representation is a 
> (neural) depiction of a (representational) process. If there are neurons to 
> depict the infinity of this chain of representation, then the otherwise 
> infinite process is stopped and depicted/ represented too. I guess, this 
> stopping requires vagueness, because you can only overlook an infinity, if 
> you only vaguely represent it. But still I doubt, that this already is 
> consciousness. I think, a computer might be programmed this way, but I don´t 
> think it will be conscious then. In Alex` quote there also is the term 
> "reason". To reason about something, what is that? That is the next problem. 
> You need a reason to reason. The computer must have needs to have this 
> reason, and therefore it must have a body that has to be maintained and 
> sustained. So I think, a computer cannot be conscious, what you need is a 
> living thing, an organism. So I think, only organisms- with a highly 
> developed brain- can be conscious or aware, but computers, even robots, not.
>  
> Best,
> Helmut
>  
>  
> Gesendet: Freitag, 11. August 2023 um 22:18 Uhr
> Von: "John F Sowa" 
> An: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, "Peirce List" 
> Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important
> Dear All,
>  
> This thread has attracted too many responses for me to save all of them.  But 
> Mihai Nadin cited intriguing experimental evidence that fruit flies "think" 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, List

I view the two terms of awareness and consciousness as aspects of Secondness 
and Thirdness, where, as Peirce wrote, “two sets of objects, what we are 
immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of” [5.395]/. 
Awareness would obviously function within a categorical mode of Secondness, 
that brute unmediated immediate interaction of A with B, while consciousness 
requires a mediated analysis, so to speak, against an internal model.

I don’t view this model as requiring a language; indeed, I’d say modelling goes 
on everywhere - in the chemical-physical and biological realms as well as the 
human societal [who do use symbolic/linguistic models].  This definition would 
thus lead one to ask the question: Is this model transformable to one that is 
’separate’ from itself, so to speak, ie is the holder conscious of the model? 
I’d say that so far, only humans have this capacity to symbolically represent a 
model and thus be conscious of its form.

But I consider that all material reality requires models, which enable 
anticipation of interactions - and thus, enable decision-making, even in the 
most elementary bits of matter. Randomness is not the major force in the 
universe.

As for vagueness, I consider this a property of both Firstness [chance] and 
Thirdness [ habit, generality] See Peirce 5.450] - nothing to do with language 
or notation - but, a property of an interaction of A with B. 

I don’t consider vagueness as a synonym for ‘error’ but as the nature of a 
stimulus ‘outside of a determination ’, so to speak. That is, the interacting 
stimulus/data is open to interpretation. Some interactions, for example, in a 
mode of pure or genuine Secondness [2-2], are not open to interpretation,  such 
as a military order, or a Stop sign, or a basic chemical interaction -  but the 
more complex ones are open. 

Edwina Taborsky





> On Aug 11, 2023, at 4:18 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Dear All,
> 
> This thread has attracted too many responses for me to save all of them.  But 
> Mihai Nadin cited intriguing experimental evidence that fruit flies "think" 
> before they act (copy below).   I also found a web site that says more:about 
> the experimental methods:  
> https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2014-05-22-fruit-flies-think-they-act . See 
> excerpts at the end of this note.
> 
> Ricardo Sanz> My initial question about the difference between 
> "consciousness" and "awareness" is still there.
> 
> The distinction between consciousness and awareness is very clear:  Awareness 
> can be detected by experimental methods, as in the experiments with fruit 
> flies.  Thinking (or some kind of mental processing) can be detected by a 
> delay between stimulus and response.  But nobody has found any experimental 
> evidence for consciousness, not even in humans.  
> 
> We assume consciousness in our fellow humans because we all belong to the 
> same species.  But we have no way to detect consciousness in humans who have 
> suffered some kinds of neural impairment.   We suspect that animals that 
> behave like us may be conscious, but we don't know.   And there is zero 
> evidence that computer systems, whose circuitry is radically different from 
> human brains can be conscious.
> 
> Ricardo> I agree that "vagueness" is an essential, necessary aspect to be 
> dealt with. But it is not the central one. The central one is "the agent 
> models its reality". 
> 
> Those are different topics.  A model of some subject (real or imaginary) is  
> a structure of some kind (image, map, diagram, or physical system) that 
> represents important aspects of some subject.  Vagueness is a property of 
> some language or notation  that is derived from the model.   What is central 
> depends on the interests of some agent that is using the model and the 
> language for some purpose.
> 
> Furthermore, vagueness is not a problem "to be dealt with".  It's a valuable 
> property of natural language.  In my previous note, I mentioned three 
> logicians and scientists -- Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein -- who 
> recognized that an absolutely precise mathematical or logical statement is 
> almost certain to be false.  But a statement that allows some degree of error 
> (vagueness) is much more likely to be true and useful for communication and 
> application.
> 
> Mathematical precision increases the probability that errors will be 
> detected.  When the errors are found, they can be corrected/   But if no 
> errors are found, it's quite likely that nobody is using the theory for any 
> practical purpose..  
>  
> Jerry Chandler> You may wish to consider the distinctions between the 
> methodology of the chemical sciences from that of mathematics and whatever 
> the views of various “seman

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Guidelines for improving discussions

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
think it's an excellent idea.

My own view is that another List would be beneficial, with a focus
on the use of the Peircean framework in the modern world.

As you say, it is not instead of the current Peirce-L list but an
additional site for a more expansive type of discussion.

Edwina
 On Thu 11/11/21  4:22 PM , "John F Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
  In the good old days of Peirce-L, there were friendly, collegial
 discussions with no winners or losers.  All participants contributed
 something and learned something.  More recently, a group of three
 individuals, whom some have called the Triumvirate or the Mutual
 Admiration Society (MAS), have dominated the list.  Their stated
goal
 is to produce a standard summary or synthesis of Peirce's writings
as
 a "foundation" for further research and teaching.  Peirce himself
could
 not produce such a summary, but they claim the authority to declare
 that their personal opinions are "consistent with Peirce", and they
 squelch other views with the label "inconsistent with Peirce". 
 Mathematics, which includes formal logic, is the only subject in
which
 anyone may correct an expert and the expert would reply "Thank you".
 In the empirical sciences, which include philosophy, no one can
claim
 absolute certainty about anything.  That is the point of Peirce's
First
 Rule of Reason:  "Do not block the way of inquiry."  He applied that
 rule to his own writings: 
 CSP:  in philosophy what a man does not think out for himself he
never
 understands at all.  Nothing can be learned out of books or
lectures,
 they have to be treated not as oracles but simply as facts to be
studied
 like any other facts.  That, at any rate is the way in which I would
 have you treat my lectures.  Call no man master, or at any rate not
me.
 Only bear in mind that I have been a good many years trying in
 singleness of heart to find out how these things really are, and
always
 disposed to doubt and criticize my own results.  (R304, 1903,
Lecture 2;
 for the context of this quotation, see the attached Turrisi139.png.)

 Two months ago, the Triumvirate was silent for about two weeks. 
That
 was wonderful.  Peirce-L blossomed with free and open discussions.
 People who had not sent a note for years contributed fresh ideas. 
And
 nobody silenced them with the hammer INCONSISTENT WITH PEIRCE.
 But the Triumvirate came back "To block the way of inquiry." 
 That's when some subscribers decided to start a new list -- not as a
 replacement for Peirce-L, but as an option for more open discussion.
 Anyone would be welcome to subscribe to both lists. 
 Following are slightly edited excerpts from notes by four Peirce
 scholars, all of whom have PhDs and years of publications and
teaching.
 The first person abandoned Peirce-L some years ago.  The others are
still
 subscribers: 
 1. Most of the Peirceans I admire have long since left that list,
 including XXX, who says we need a new one on an entirely new
platform
 (there are now several options).  Surely we can do better for
Peirce. 
 2. I consider Peirce-L irredeemable at the moment.  It’s dealing
with
 personal hot buttons of MAS or getting lost in endless irrelevant
 terminology.  There’s no understanding of semiosis, and no
possibility
 of discussing it. 
 3. The pretentious behavior, the gratuitous aggression, and the
silence
 of others is the reason way I stopped writing to the List some years
ago. 
 4. We are backwoodsmen in the traces left by Peirce, faithful to his
 spirit.  There are several of us on this list who follow and develop
 some of these traces.  We find them particularly valuable because we
 have new tools and theories to develop them further.  Some
literalists
 think we should leave the forest as it is.  Every time they get in
the
 way, they create more heat than light. 
 Peirce's ideas were constantly growing and changing, and the
available
 MSS are incomplete evidence.  See the attached CSPmss.png.  Note
that
 many MSS at Harvard are not on microfilm, and they have not yet been
 digitized.  There are many other MSS that are not at Harvard, and
others
 were lost or even burned.  Nobody can say for certain what is or is
not
 consistent with Peirce's final remarks on any subject. 
 This discussion suggests the followings guidelines for Peirce-L
and/or
 any new list.  The most important is Peirce's First Rule of Reason: 
 1. Do not block the way of inquiry. 
 Since the available MSS are just a fraction of what Peirce wrote and
 a much smaller fraction of what he thought, there is no evidence to
 determine his final opinions about anything.  Therefore, 
 2. Nobody can claim that any opinion is or is not consistent with
 Peirce's best and final statement on any subject.  The most anyone
can
 claim is that some opinion is consistent with a particular text,
even
 though it may be inconsistent with other texts, some of which might
be
 

[PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

That's an excellent outline of the triad and the definition of the
Representamen. and of the Intentional Interpretant and the need for
the Commens. And by the way, this section from Peirce includes a
definition of the Dynamic Object, which is, exactly as I've said
before, not an external object on its own, but is "the dynamical
object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something
forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than
perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience' EP2:478 

Exactly as I've previously outlined. I won't comment on the other
issues because I think I've made my views quite clear many times
before - and they are not in line with those of Gary R, JAS or Gary F
- and this thread hasn't been set up as a discussion but as a debate.

Edwina
 On Sun 24/10/21  6:40 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R, List,I refer to the definition of the representamen (the
number 76 of 
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM [1]) 
resituated in its original broader context on page 34 of MS 1345: 
 
   MS1345_034  

",entation [1] ; and an object which forms one of such a triad and
has for his characteristics is called a Representamen. 

Art.8 Division 7. A Quale can, as such, be considered from only one
point of view. 

  A Reagent can be considered from two formal points of
view, namely, as affected by the reaction, and so as Patient, and as
affecting the complementary factor, and so as Agent. 

 'A Representamen can be considered from three formal points
of view, namely, first as the substance of the representation, or the
Vehicle of the Meaning, which is common to the three representamens
of the triad,  second as the quasi agent in the representation,
conformity to which its Truth, that is, as the Natural Object, and
third, as the quasi-patient in the representation, or that whether
modification makes it Intelligence, and this may be called the
Interpretant. Thus, in looking at a map, the map itself is the
Vehicle, the country represented in the Natural Object, and the idea
excited in the mind is the Interpretant.' (partie reproduite en def
76) 

Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its
intellectual characteristic neglected; and both representamen and
reagent may be considered as quales, their relative character being
neglected. This we do, for example, when we say that the word man has
three letters."

From this definition, it follows that the "intentional interpretant"
("here is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of
the mind of the utterer", EP2 478 ) not being observable, cannot be a
Natural Object. It can only give place to endless inquiries, except
perhaps that science evolving, it allows to read in the brain of the
utterer objective characters of the determination of this mind.

   Indeed, 

"The point to remember is, that whatever we say of ideas as they are
in consciousness is said of something unknowable in its immediacy. The
only thought that is really present to us is a thought we can neither
think about nor talk about. "Of thine eye I am eyebeam," says the
Sphinx. We have no reason to deny the dicta of introspection, but we
have to remember that they are all results of association, are all
theoretical, bits of instinctive psychology. We accept them, but not
as literally true; only as expressive of the impression which has
naturally been made upon our understanding. "( CP 7.425)[emphasize
mine}

If this is the case for introspection, it is, a fortiori, the case
for extrospection!  

A famous example is provided by the misadventure of Ferdinand de
Saussure  

"In a letter dated July 14, 1906, Ferdinand de Saussure, after
several months of research devoted to the study of the Saturnian,
this enigmatic verse which does not obey any known scheme of
classical metrics and of which he believes he has finally succeeded
in piercing the mystery, writes in a state of excitement:
 '..I can announce to you that I now hold the victory on all the
line. I have spent two months interrogating the monster, and groping
against it, but for the last three days I have been using only heavy
artillery [...] it is through alliteration that I have managed to
hold the key to the Saturnian, which is more complicated than we
imagined. The whole phenomenon of alliteration [...] that we noticed
in Saturnian, is only an insignificant part of a more general
phenomenon, or rather absolutely total. The totality of the syllables
of each Saturnian verse obeys a law of alliteration, from the first
syllable to the last; and without a single consonant [...] a single
vowel [...] a single quantity of vowel, is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list
I continue to disagree with your interpretations of Peirce- with regard to the 
triadic sign, the hylomorphic monism of matter-mind, and cosmology and the 
emergence of the universe. I’ve provided enough supportive quotations 
previously to support my interpretations and won’t repeat them. All I’ll say is 
that the reality of semiosis means that one does not read a text as a mirror, 
ie a direct dyadic transfer from text to reader, but within a triadic process. 
This triadic process means that, for both of us, our interpretations go through 
a complex mediation and that means that our meditative content influences the 
interpretation. I disagree with your reading of Peirce and I don’t think there 
is much more to be said. You have failed to convince me of the validity of your 
interpretation and vice versa. But one thing I will not do, unlike you, is 
insist that my reading is The True Reading. But- I am convinced of the validity 
of my reading even though I don’t require or expect you to agree.

As for the metaphoric substitution of terms - I stand by and indeed support the 
importance of using terms used in other disciplines to show how the Peircean 
analytic framework is actually functional in other disciplines. You object - 
and that’s your choice. Again, what I will not do, unlike you, is tell you that 
you are wrong to reject such an expansion and exploration. Your wish to focus 
strictly on the text is your choice. I wish to explore how the Peircean 
analytic framework functions in other disciplines. And that’s my choice.

I think there is nothing more to be said. 

Edwina

Sent from my iPad

> On Oct 19, 2021, at 8:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> As I have already explained twice before in this thread, no one can ever be 
> absolutely certain that a particular understanding of Peirce's writings 
> (dynamical interpretant) matches their final interpretant--the correct 
> reading, how the texts necessarily would be understood under ideal 
> circumstances, in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite 
> community. However, we can discern whether a particular understanding of 
> Peirce's writings (dynamical interpretant) is consistent with their immediate 
> interpretant--the range of valid readings, how the texts possibly could be 
> understood in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, 
> along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules of 
> grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed.
> 
> When it comes to some of the most trenchant on-List disagreements, what 
> Peirce wrote is unmistakably clear. A classification of the sciences that 
> omits phaneroscopy altogether, or that subsumes it under either mathematics 
> or semeiotic, is not Peirce's mature classification. A speculative grammar 
> that defines "sign" as the triad, or that models semiosis as 
> input-function-output, is not Peirce's speculative grammar. A cosmology that 
> denies the reality of God as the non-immanent creator of the entire universe, 
> or in which mind and matter somehow co-evolved such that neither is 
> primordial, is not Peirce's cosmology. Each of these is apparently a 
> Peirce-inspired analytic framework, but none can rightly be labeled as THE 
> Peircean analytic framework--i.e., Peirce's analytic framework.
> 
> How can I assert this so confidently? Because I generally agree with the 
> following past remarks by John Sowa.
> 
> JFS (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-08/msg00067.html): The 
> only clear statements of what Peirce meant are exact quotations.
> 
> JFS (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-05/msg00045.html): But 
> nobody can claim that anything other than an exact quotation is what Peirce 
> intended.
> 
> JFS (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00146.html): For 
> any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations.
> 
> In other words, any alleged description and/or application of Peirce's 
> analytic framework must be explicitly supported by exact quotations from his 
> writings. Anyone choosing to employ different terminology must carefully 
> spell out how the new terms map to his terms.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>> On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 10:37 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> JAS
>> 
>> But how can YOU be sure that YOUR reading of Peirce is correct?  Never mind 
>> the Final Interpretant, which isn't the issue here. I'm talking about the 
>> Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants - and how can you be sure that YOUR 
>> interpretations are correct? You and I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

What does 'obvious discrepancies' mean??? The use of different
terms?

If someone is using the triadic sign,  as, eg, Hoffmeyer did, in
analyzing what is going on within the 'habits of formation' of a
species, such that changes in the ecological niche will be mediated
by the lineage habits to result in a change in the DNA..[1996, p22],
this outline seems to me, to be using both the triadic process and
the categories exactly as Peirce outlined. 

Different terms are used. And Peirce didn't provide similar
examples. But - in my reading, it's an accurate use of Peirce.

Edwina
 On Mon 18/10/21 10:35 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 It has nothing to do with whether Peirce ever used his own analytic
framework in a certain way. My basic question is, how do we ascertain
whether a particular analytic framework that someone is using to
examine the actual world is really THE Peircean analytic
framework--i.e., Peirce's analytic framework--if not by comparing how
that person describes it with his texts? And where there are obvious
discrepancies between them, in what sense can that person
legitimately claim to be using  THE Peircean analytic
framework--i.e., Peirce's analytic framework--at all?
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
-  twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 8:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

Your original reply focused, yet again, on The Text, and seemed to
insist on a focus only on text-to-text outlines, ie, where someone
'explains' to us what Peirce 'really meant' in his texts. 

But I'd still appreciate your thoughts on my basic question - which
is - if someone is using the Peircean analytic framework to examine
the actual world - and of course they can't use ALL of Peirce's
analytic framework! - but if they are using it, would you say that
this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-framework'- because Peirce never
used it this way? 

Edwina  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS

But how can YOU be sure that YOUR reading of Peirce is correct? 
Never mind the Final Interpretant, which isn't the issue here. I'm
talking about the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants - and how can
you be sure that YOUR interpretations are correct? You and I still
argue about quite a few terms and outlines within Peirce. You
obviously think you are correct and I think I am correct. So- how can
you say, on your own, unilaterally, that your interpretation 'matches
what he wrote'?

Edwina
 On Mon 18/10/21 10:31 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 As I already explained below, I can never be absolutely certain that
my (or anyone else's) understanding of Peirce's writings matches their
final interpretant, but I can ascertain when someone else's expressed
understanding of them is inconsistent with their immediate
interpretant, and is thus objectively invalid. That person's analytic
framework might very well turn out to be quite fruitful when "used to
explain the actual world," but it is not  Peirce's analytic framework
unless it matches the one that he describes in his texts.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 8:03 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I'd disagree; you do claim to be defining The Peircean analytic
framework. Otherwise, how could you justify your comments criticizing
others? You don't apply it, admittedly, for you have openly said that
you are not interested in application examples.

But, do you really expect someone who is applying aspects of the
Peircean framework - to use ALL of Peirce's work? After all, the
point of the theoretical work of, eg, Aristotle, Plato, Kant..and
Einstein, Bohr, Darwin and etc, is not endless outlines of what their
whole work 'means' ..as outlined in another textual outline but how
their thoughts and analytic framework function in the actual world!! 

And as for 'what exactly are the three categories' - well, the
meaning of them can only emerge in how they are used to explain the
actual world. Same with everything else. the point is - not to write
up another text [Peirce being 'translated' into another text] but in
showing how Peirce's analytic framework moves out of and off the page
and is used to explain actuality. 

Edwina
 On Mon 18/10/21 12:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I am not the one claiming to be defining and applying "THE Peircean
analytic framework." As spelled out in his texts, there is much more
to it than "using the three categories in both their genuine and
degenerate modes" and/or "using the triadic semiosic process to show
both necessary and adaptive interactions." What exactly are "the
three categories"? What exactly are "their genuine and degenerate
modes"? What exactly is "the triadic semiosic process"? How exactly
is it supposedly being manifested in the specific phenomenon that is
under examination? As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 9:00 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

Then the question I ask is - what is the definition of THE Peircean
analytic framework?

That is, what if someone is examining the semiosic processes of a
wetlands or a meadow, and examining the interactions among all the
myriad species in these areas - using the three categories in both
their genuine and degenerate modes, using the triadic semiosic
process to show both necessary and adaptive interactions.would
you say that this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-analytic
framework.because Peirce himself never carried out such a use of
his framework? 

Edwina
 On Sun 17/10/21  7:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis.
 Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive
and try to avoid them since they tend to distract participants from
the  substance of the discussion.
 ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of
the thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce
as somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't
use those words' etc.
 It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow
'impure' or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly  Peirce's analytic
framework. Terminology is important, but the issue is really whether
concepts are being deployed in way that is congruent with how Peirce
himself defines and uses them. If not, it might very well be a
Peircean analytic framework, or at least a Peirce-inspired analytic
framework, but it is not  the Peircean analytic framework.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Claudio - I am equal to anyone else, and therefore, am as 'equipped'
[whatever does that mean?] to handle further exploration of Peirce's
work in the 21st century. What I expect from the List is that when I
post something that does such exploration, I would be met with: 'Yes,
that's an interesting use of the Categories to examine …" or,
'that's an interesting use but I don't think it works and here's why
I think so"...

But instead - I'm met with no comment on the actual attempt of
modern analysis..but such comments as 'Peirce never used those
words'.  Or..'Peirce never compared his X...to Y.  

That's not a constructive use of Peirce.

Edwina
 On Mon 18/10/21  9:52 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com
sent:
List,
 Of course, we are   post-Peirceans! How could we be
pre-Peirceans or even just   Peirceans...!!!
 this pretentious behavior,   the gratuitous aggression and
the silence of others is the reason   way I left writing to the
List some years ago
 "Some 'literalists' think we should leave the forest as
it is.  Every time they get in the way, which keeps
happening, there's a big problem." (RM; emphasis mine)
  And ET insists in this direction by   pretentiously
stating "I'm   beginning to think that   the Peirce-List is
not equipped to handle the exploration of Peirce and his analytic
framework in the   21st century", apparently she is...???
 Peirce himself was aware of the limits of his possibilities,
like quoted by JS with CP 5.488 and CP 2.1.
 But apparently there are still some that want us to stick to
the misconception that "the weather-wain is an index"...
instead of a complex sign.
 Already after more than 150 years of the first writings by  
  Peirce we are not able to move on... like it happens with the   
 Bible... or with The Capital... and here we are!
 Hope that a creation of a new List will overcome this
retrograde positions that don't help anyone... not even the
sacred memory of Peirce himself.
 All the best
 Claudio
 sowa @bestweb.net escribió el 15/10/2021 a las 19:02:
 List,   On Thursday,
I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received some
strong positive comments and suggestions offline, but
complete silence from the people who send most of the
notes to Peirce-L.For example:  "As for the natural
extensions of Peirce's thought, even when they agree
closely with his principles, they are rejected [on
Peirce-L] as post-Peircean"  
I interpret those responses as evidence that
we need n email list that is dedicated to the kinds of
topics that dominated the Peirce Centennial Congress in
2014.  That was a very exciting conference on  research that 
   builds on Peirce's work and relates it to developments in  
  the century after Peirce.   As Peirce frequently emphasized,
the meaning of any  sign is its implications for action in
the future.  We live in Peirce's future, and our actions  
  today depend critically on the developments in the century  
  after Peirce.  
I don't believe that we should reject Peirce-l, but we
should have another email list that relates Peirce's
ideas to the issues of today.  I would encourage
subscribers to Peirce-L to participate in both lists.  I'll  
  send another note tomorrow..   John 

-
 From: "sowa @bestweb.net" 
 Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2021 10:39 PM
 To: "Peirce-L" 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the   
 21st centuryRobert,
Edwina, List,   The passages 
 Robert quoted show that Peirce admitted that his  
system
   was a work in progress.  We could add his remark
that   phaneroscopy was
   still a "science egg".
  CSP:  I am, as  
far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in
   the work of clearing and opening up what I call   
   semiotic, that is, the
   doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental  
varieties of possible
   semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor
too   great, for a
   first-comer.  I am, accordingly, obliged to
confine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

JAS, list

Your original reply focused, yet again, on The Text, and seemed to
insist on a focus only on text-to-text outlines, ie, where someone
'explains' to us what Peirce 'really meant' in his texts. 

But I'd still appreciate your thoughts on my basic question - which
is - if someone is using the Peircean analytic framework to examine
the actual world - and of course they can't use ALL of Peirce's
analytic framework! - but if they are using it, would you say that
this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-framework'- because Peirce never
used it this way?

Edwina
 On Sun 17/10/21 10:00 PM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Then the question I ask is - what is the definition of THE Peircean
analytic framework?

That is, what if someone is examining the semiosic processes of a
wetlands or a meadow, and examining the interactions among all the
myriad species in these areas - using the three categories in both
their genuine and degenerate modes, using the triadic semiosic
process to show both necessary and adaptive interactions.would
you say that this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-analytic
framework.because Peirce himself never carried out such a use of
his framework? 

Edwina
 On Sun 17/10/21  7:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis.
 Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive
and try to avoid them since they tend to distract participants from
the  substance of the discussion.
 ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of
the thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce
as somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't
use those words' etc.
 It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow
'impure' or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly  Peirce's analytic
framework. Terminology is important, but the issue is really whether
concepts are being deployed in way that is congruent with how Peirce
himself defines and uses them. If not, it might very well be a
Peircean analytic framework, or at least a Peirce-inspired analytic
framework, but it is not  the Peircean analytic framework.
 ET: I'm claiming such a final step is impossible because semiosis
has no final point. 
 Yes and no. According to Peirce, every text is a sign. Consequently,
every text has a final interpretant--how it necessarily would be
understood under ideal circumstances. Every text also has an
immediate interpretant--how it possibly could be understood in
accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along
with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules
of grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed. The
result of any individual reading of a text is a dynamical
interpretant--how it  actually is understood on that particular
occasion, which for any sincere inquirer is an abductive/retroductive
hypothesis about the final interpretant as the proper aim of
interpretation.
 In order to be a valid understanding of the text, this dynamical
interpretant must be consistent with the immediate interpretant; and
in order to be an accurate understanding of the text, it must conform
to the final interpretant. Of course, all dynamical interpretants are
fallible, so we can never be  absolutely certain that our
understanding matches the final interpretant. Nevertheless, we can
ascertain when a particular understanding is inconsistent with the
immediate interpretant, and is thus objectively invalid; and in such
cases, we can also say with confidence that such an understanding
does not conform to the final interpretant, and is thus  objectively
inaccurate--it is a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation.
  Surely we agree that such misunderstanding and misinterpretation
are possible--in fact, all too common in human discourse. Peirce's
semeiotic provides this plausible explanation for those phenomena.
While it is true that "semiosis has no final point" in the sense of a
last actual sign, it does have a "final point" in the sense of a telos
or ideal aim as I have described here. Otherwise, why bother trying to
communicate at all?  
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 5:24 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis. After all - if we were to
actually call a person a 'post-Pei

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

rrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules
of grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed. The
result of any individual reading of a text is a dynamical
interpretant--how it  actually is understood on that particular
occasion, which for any sincere inquirer is an abductive/retroductive
hypothesis about the final interpretant as the proper aim of
interpretation.
In order to be a valid understanding of the text, this dynamical
interpretant must be consistent with the immediate interpretant; and
in order to be an  accurate understanding of the text, it must
conform to the final interpretant. Of course, all dynamical
interpretants are fallible, so we can never be absolutely certain
that our understanding matches the final interpretant. Nevertheless,
we can ascertain when a particular understanding is inconsistent with
the immediate interpretant, and is thus objectively invalid; and in
such cases, we can also say with confidence that such an
understanding does not  conform to the final interpretant, and is
thus objectively inaccurate--it is a misunderstanding, a
misinterpretation.
Surely we agree that such misunderstanding and misinterpretation are
possible--in fact, all too common in human discourse. Peirce's
semeiotic provides this plausible explanation for those phenomena.
While it is true that "semiosis has no final point" in the sense of a
last  actual sign, it does have a "final point" in the sense of a
telos or ideal aim as I have described here. Otherwise, why bother
trying to communicate at all?
Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] 
On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 5:24 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

JAS, list

I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the  person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis. After all - if we were to
actually call a person a 'post-Peircean' - what exactly would we be
saying?? That he lives after 1914? The fact is - that the thoughts
and analysis were called 'post-Peircean'.

And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of the
thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce as
somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't use
those words' etc. After all - what does 'post-Peircean' actually
mean? Does it mean an incorrect reading of the text? I've repeatedly
said that we have to be VERY careful of our readings of texts -
because ALL readings are not dyadic mirrors of the text or author's
mind. Instead - they are our own interpretations - and we surely are
aware of how varied such readings of the SAME texts can be. We cannot
yet, if ever declare that one particular interpretation is The Final
and Correct One. 

Therefore - I would also be against your suggestion that we should
not move into applying Peirce's analytic framework to other fields -
before we have declared what his work 'actually is'. I'm claiming
such a final step is impossible because semiosis has no final point.

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I'd disagree; you do claim to be defining The Peircean analytic
framework. Otherwise, how could you justify your comments criticizing
others? You don't apply it, admittedly, for you have openly said that
you are not interested in application examples.

But, do you really expect someone who is applying aspects of the
Peircean framework - to use ALL of Peirce's work? After all, the
point of the theoretical work of, eg, Aristotle, Plato, Kant..and
Einstein, Bohr, Darwin and etc, is not endless outlines of what their
whole work 'means' ..as outlined in another textual outline but how
their thoughts and analytic framework function in the actual world!!

And as for 'what exactly are the three categories' - well, the
meaning of them can only emerge in how they are used to explain the
actual world. Same with everything else. the point is - not to write
up another text [Peirce being 'translated' into another text] but in
showing how Peirce's analytic framework moves out of and off the page
and is used to explain actuality. 

Edwina
 On Mon 18/10/21 12:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I am not the one claiming to be defining and applying "THE Peircean
analytic framework." As spelled out in his texts, there is much more
to it than "using the three categories in both their genuine and
degenerate modes" and/or "using the triadic semiosic process to show
both necessary and adaptive interactions." What exactly are "the
three categories"? What exactly are "their genuine and degenerate
modes"? What exactly is "the triadic semiosic process"? How exactly
is it supposedly being manifested in the specific phenomenon that is
under examination? As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 9:00 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

Then the question I ask is - what is the definition of THE Peircean
analytic framework?

That is, what if someone is examining the semiosic processes of a
wetlands or a meadow, and examining the interactions among all the
myriad species in these areas - using the three categories in both
their genuine and degenerate modes, using the triadic semiosic
process to show both necessary and adaptive interactions.would
you say that this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-analytic
framework.because Peirce himself never carried out such a use of
his framework? 

Edwina
 On Sun 17/10/21  7:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis.
 Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive
and try to avoid them since they tend to distract participants from
the  substance of the discussion.
 ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of
the thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce
as somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't
use those words' etc.
 It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow
'impure' or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly  Peirce's analytic
framework. Terminology is important, but the issue is really whether
concepts are being deployed in way that is congruent with how Peirce
himself defines and uses them. If not, it might very well be a
Peircean analytic framework, or at least a Peirce-inspired analytic
framework, but it is not  the Peircean analytic framework.
 ET: I'm claiming such a final step is impossible because semiosis
has no final point. 
 Yes and no. According to Peirce, every text is a sign. Consequently,
every text has a final interpretant--how it necessarily would be
understood under ideal circumstances. Every text also has an
immediate interpretant--how it possibly could be understood in
accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along
with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules
of grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed. The
result of any individual reading of a text is a dynamical
interpretant--how it  actually is understood on that particular
occasion, which for any sincere inquirer is an abductive/retroductive
hypothesis about the final interpretant as the proper aim of
interpretation.
 In order to be a valid understanding of the text, this dynamical
interpretant must be consistent with the immediate interpretant; and
in order to be an accurate understanding of the text, it must conform
to the final interpretant. Of course, all dynamical interpretants are
fallible, so we can never be  absolutely certain that our
understanding matches the final interpretant. Nevertheless, we can
ascertain when a pa

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Then the question I ask is - what is the definition of THE Peircean
analytic framework?

That is, what if someone is examining the semiosic processes of a
wetlands or a meadow, and examining the interactions among all the
myriad species in these areas - using the three categories in both
their genuine and degenerate modes, using the triadic semiosic
process to show both necessary and adaptive interactions.would
you say that this is only a 'Peircean-inspired-analytic
framework.because Peirce himself never carried out such a use of
his framework?

Edwina
 On Sun 17/10/21  7:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis.
 Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive
and try to avoid them since they tend to distract participants from
the  substance of the discussion.
 ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of
the thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce
as somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't
use those words' etc.
 It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow
'impure' or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly  Peirce's analytic
framework. Terminology is important, but the issue is really whether
concepts are being deployed in way that is congruent with how Peirce
himself defines and uses them. If not, it might very well be a
Peircean analytic framework, or at least a Peirce-inspired analytic
framework, but it is not the Peircean analytic framework.
 ET: I'm claiming such a final step is impossible because semiosis
has no final point. 
 Yes and no. According to Peirce, every text is a sign. Consequently,
every text has a final interpretant--how it necessarily would be
understood under ideal circumstances. Every text also has an
immediate interpretant--how it possibly could be understood in
accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along
with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules
of grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed. The
result of any individual reading of a text is a dynamical
interpretant--how it  actually is understood on that particular
occasion, which for any sincere inquirer is an abductive/retroductive
hypothesis about the final interpretant as the proper aim of
interpretation.
 In order to be a valid understanding of the text, this dynamical
interpretant must be consistent with the immediate interpretant; and
in order to be an accurate understanding of the text, it must conform
to the final interpretant. Of course, all dynamical interpretants are
fallible, so we can never be  absolutely certain that our
understanding matches the final interpretant. Nevertheless, we can
ascertain when a particular understanding is inconsistent with the
immediate interpretant, and is thus objectively invalid; and in such
cases, we can also say with confidence that such an understanding
does not conform to the final interpretant, and is thus objectively
inaccurate--it is a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation.
  Surely we agree that such misunderstanding and misinterpretation
are possible--in fact, all too common in human discourse. Peirce's
semeiotic provides this plausible explanation for those phenomena.
While it is true that "semiosis has no final point" in the sense of a
last actual sign, it does have a "final point" in the sense of a telos
or ideal aim as I have described here. Otherwise, why bother trying to
communicate at all? 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 5:24 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not
describe the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was
referring to Marty's thoughts and analysis. After all - if we were to
actually call a person a 'post-Peircean' - what exactly would we be
saying?? That he lives after 1914? The fact is - that the thoughts
and analysis were called 'post-Peircean'. 

And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of the
thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce as
somehow 'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't use
those words' etc. After all - what does 'post-Peircean' actually
mean? Does it mean an incorrect reading of the text? I've repeatedly
said that we have to be VERY careful of our readings of texts -
because ALL readings are not dyadic mirrors of the text or author's
mind. Instead - they are our own interpretat

[PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Margaretha

I prefer a cappuccino laced meeting!!

I still see Popper's Open Society as - among so many issues - 
focused on the open or ever-adapting population vs the historicist
tribal population. After all, with the tribal view, the 'truth'
already exists; we simply have to follow it. [And of course, that's
the basis not merely of Plato's ideal society but also of fascism and
communism]. 

As for 'intolerant' - I suggest that is what some of, who are
proposing another List [not in lieu of Peirce-L!!!] have felt
whenever we have suggested the exploration of the Peircean framework
in scientific or AI or other areas. Or, heresy-of-all-heresies,
suggested that the terminology used by researchers in these fields is
analogous to those used by Peirce. The swift disparaging reactions,
the sanctimonious comments that 'Peirce never used those terms' or
the dismissive kicks that we are 'post-Peirce' have had an effect. 
We suggest a separate list where we can engage in our heresies
without any fear-of-the-stake.

I'll comment on your sentence: "When we as readers think of a text
as an indubitable picture of the content of the mind of the author."
That's exactly what some of us have been arguing against! When some
one of 'us' comes up with a view of what Peirce has written - and we
are met with a stern rebuttal of 'No, Peirce did not say that'. and
long quotations are flung at usthis rebuttal falls exactly within
that view...of seeing the text as an indubitable picture of the mind
of the author' . And ignoring that each one of us is an Interpreter
of the Text and does not have direct connection with the author's
mind. I see that your comment on the picture theory of language would
be relevant here. 

For you to set up an analogy of the Peirce-L list as comparable to
Nazi Germany is, I think, unfair. That is, to say that a population
or group is 'tribal' does not also mean that it is 'racist and
inhumane'! It simply means that it is a conceptually and
ideologically closed group that has a definition of its 'utopian
self' and cannot handle deviations from this tribally-validated
ideology. Such a definition  could be applied to all closed
ideologies - whether it be the Flat Earth Society or a political
party or a religious group. 

I don't think that the creation of a new List, focused on the
exploration of Peirce in the modern world, will solve the problems on
this list. It will presumably remain closed and tribal. That is their
choice - and they are, in my view, certainly in the right to continue
on this way. The agenda isn't to solve the problems of the Peirce
list, but to examine Peirce in the modern world. Since the Peirce
List has made it clear that this is not their focus, then, it seems
reasonable to accept their decision and move on.

Edwina
 On Sat 16/10/21  2:28 PM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 Hi Edwina,
 I respect your decision to not interact with people with ZOOM or
SKYPE.  But what about the phone then?  Hopefully, you will consider
joining us via the phone if  this ZOOM/SKYPE gathering were ever to
happen.
 Talking about Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies, the real enemy
is inside each one of us when we flip into a subtly intolerant
attitude.  That is, recall Popper's aphorism, "You may be right; I
may be wrong; together we get closer to the truth." I got the most
out of Popper when I used his writings as a mirror to reflect on what
I was doing.   
 The great insight that I got from it was about the dangers of the
picture theory of language.  That theory is among us in the form of
the causal theory of meaning and the various representational
theories of knowledge.  When we as readers think of a text as an
indubitable picture of the content of the mind of the author.  Or,
alternatively, a picture of reality.
 That is, what is that incontrovertible evidence that the Peirce list
is closed as in the Germany of the 1930s?   
 I am not denying the reality of your frustrations.  I am simply
wondering whether the creation of a new list will solve whatever the
problems are on this list.  
 On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 1:15 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
I'm fine with and would love a real coffee house chat - but I'm not
into Skype or Zoom. Won't even do it with my kids.

I think that Robert Marty's post is correct - where he agreed with
Gary F - that a separate list means that the Peirce-L list members
won't be 'bothered' by the 'sacrilege' of reading 'post-Peirce'
analysis or reading our complaints that the Peirce-L response is to
fling dozens of quotations against such a focus..

I don't see that a separate list is 'divisive'. After all - you
mentioned Popper. You must know his 'Open Society and Its Enemies',
where Popper specifically warns against a closed society, ie, a
tribal society, . a closed ideolog

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}I'm fine with and would love a real coffee house chat - but I'm not
into Skype or Zoom. Won't even do it with my kids.

I think that Robert Marty's post is correct - where he agreed with
Gary F - that a separate list means that the Peirce-L list members
won't be 'bothered' by the 'sacrilege' of reading 'post-Peirce'
analysis or reading our complaints that the Peirce-L response is to
fling dozens of quotations against such a focus..

I don't see that a separate list is 'divisive'. After all - you
mentioned Popper. You must know his 'Open Society and Its Enemies',
where Popper specifically warns against a closed society, ie, a
tribal society, . a closed ideology, and the rejection of individual
freedom of thought. Well, the Peirce-L list, in my view, has become
closed. I think a separate list, which ensures the tribal purity of
the Peirce-L list...and yet, enables freedom [aka 1ns] to explore the
Peircean framework as operative in other areas than Peirce used
[though he DID refer to the biological, the societal]….. is a
constructive action.

Edwina
 On Sat 16/10/21 12:50 PM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 What about taking this conversation off list, as in literally off
list?  For example, to a Skype or ZOOM session that we treat as a
drink/juice-in-a-bar happening where no one is allowed to talk about
serious stuff for the first half hour?  Something like an
international Peirce Meet 'n Greet? 
 Or who knows?  Some list members may be living in driving distance
from one another.  I live in Ithaca, NY, USA.
 What I am trying to say is that it does not make sense to slice and
dice Peirce.  A lot can be learned from engaging in non-judgmental
listening; that is, thinking without a judgmental
sucking-up/talking-down attitude (spatial metaphor).  Face-to-face
interaction makes it easier to switch into a horizontal attitude
(spatial metaphor). 
 On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 12:33 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Exactly!! That's the spirit!

And it shows, clearly, how different subject matters are treated on
this list.

Edwina
 On Sat 16/10/21 12:23 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2] sent:
I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining
about the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one
that would be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to
peirce-l) wouldn’t have to read all those complaints any more.  
Gary f.
} Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society
to admit it or not. [Peirce, CP 8.143, EP2:61] {  

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [3] }{ living the time
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [4]   On Behalf Of Margaretha
Hendrickx
 Sent: 16-Oct-21 11:22
 To: s...@bestweb.net [5]
 Cc: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was
Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
List,
 I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list. 
Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a
mirror to see what is going on in society today.  
If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails
distributed by this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about
the possibility that this has to do more with what is going on in
society today and that one's feelings about society are being
projected on the emails distributed by this list?  
My very best, Margaretha H.
PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list
emails within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am
juggling many other balls.  There are many interesting emails on this
list, but I am simply not in the right place to reply to them
immediately. I hope to reply to them in the future once my schedule
is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this email immediately
before other ones, well, it caught my attention and it kept on
bothering me.  Its divisive rhetoric mirrors the divisive rhetoric in
society at large.
Let me end with a question.  Popper is known for warning against the
manipulative use of language and logic. Did Peirce do something
similar?  If my question shows a lack of understanding of Peirce's
work, I apologize.  I am still in the learning stages.  
On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 6:02 PM sowa @bestweb.net [6]  wrote: 

 List,
On Thursday, I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received some
strong positive comments and suggestions offline, but complete
silence from the people who send most of the notes to Peirce-L.   
For example:  "As for the natural extensions of Peirce's thought,
even when they agree closely with his principles, they are rejected
[on Peirce-L] as post-Peircean"  
I interpret those responses as evidence that we need n email list
that is dedicated to the kinds of topics that dominated the Peirce
Centennial Congress in 2014.  That 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Exactly!! That's the spirit!

And it shows, clearly, how different subject matters are treated on
this list.

Edwina
 On Sat 16/10/21 12:23 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining
about the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one
that would be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to
peirce-l) wouldn’t have to read all those complaints any more. 
Gary f.
} Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society
to admit it or not. [Peirce, CP 8.143, EP2:61] { 

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ living the time
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

  On Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
 Sent: 16-Oct-21 11:22
 To: s...@bestweb.net
 Cc: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was
Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
List,
 I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list. 
Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a
mirror to see what is going on in society today.  
If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails
distributed by this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about
the possibility that this has to do more with what is going on in
society today and that one's feelings about society are being
projected on the emails distributed by this list? 
My very best, Margaretha H.
PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list
emails within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am
juggling many other balls.  There are many interesting emails on this
list, but I am simply not in the right place to reply to them
immediately. I hope to reply to them in the future once my schedule
is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this email immediately
before other ones, well, it caught my attention and it kept on
bothering me.  Its divisive rhetoric mirrors the divisive rhetoric in
society at large.   
Let me end with a question.  Popper is known for warning against the
manipulative use of language and logic. Did Peirce do something
similar?  If my question shows a lack of understanding of Peirce's
work, I apologize.  I am still in the learning stages.  
On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 6:02 PM sowa @bestweb.net [2]  wrote:

 List,
On Thursday, I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received some
strong positive comments and suggestions offline, but complete
silence from the people who send most of the notes to Peirce-L.   
For example:  "As for the natural extensions of Peirce's thought,
even when they agree closely with his principles, they are rejected
[on Peirce-L] as post-Peircean" 
I interpret those responses as evidence that we need n email list
that is dedicated to the kinds of topics that dominated the Peirce
Centennial Congress in 2014.  That was a very exciting conference on 
research that builds on Peirce's work and relates it to developments
in the century after Peirce.   As Peirce frequently emphasized, the
meaning of any  sign is its implications for action in the future. 
We live in Peirce's future, and our actions today depend critically
on the developments in the century after Peirce. 
I don't believe that we should reject Peirce-l, but we should have
another email list that relates Peirce's ideas to the issues of
today.  I would encourage subscribers to Peirce-L to participate in
both lists.  I'll send another note tomorrow.. 
John  


Links:
--
[1] https://gnusystems.ca/wp/
[2] http://bestweb.net
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Re: Re: Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
  - Original Message -
  From: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
  To: s...@bestweb.net, mahe3...@gmail.com
  Sent: Sat 16/10/21 11:58 AM
  Subject: Fwd: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new
email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Margaretha, List

I don't see that you have provided a clear explanation of your
opposition to a new list. To suggest a new list is hardly 'divisive'.
Such a perspective, which brings in a moral and emotional taint, 
means that any adaptation, any new path that adds to another path -
is 'divisive'...and the only 'moral action' is homogeneity and
stasis!

You state that the agenda of the new list would be " to use Peirce's
work as a mirror to see what is going on in society today." 

First- what you do mean by 'what is going on in society today'?
There is a lot, as usual, going on in the world - and that's the way
it's been since the planet emerged. So? 

How did you come to that conclusion that the new list would mirror
this 'going on in society today'?? My understanding of the new list
is that its focus would be "the exploration of Peirce and his
analytic framework in the 21st century.current scientific and
other research areas [linguistic, AI, societal, economic}.

This exploration doesn't operate as a mirror. My own interest is in
the biological realm - where I am interested in how organisms
develop, adapt, and interact with their environment. I think that
Peirce's analytic framework can help in this field. I am also
interested in societies or populations as 'organisms' - and feel that
Peirce's analytic framework is important in this area.

I know that others are interested in using Peirce to develop AI.
Others are interested in complex systems. 

It is a fact that the current list is not conducive to such
explorations of Peirce in these areas. It is a fact that when anyone
introduces such a topic, they are met with either silence or
disparagement that their topic is 'post-Peirce' or that Peirce never
used such terms' ….

Such an attitude is not amenable to exploration of how the
conceptual infrastructure of Peirce can be used to analyze and
explain 'what is going on in the world'. And I simply cannot see how
your explanation that the reason for the disparagement  -- A " has to
do more with what is going on in society today and that one's feelings
about society are being projected on the emails distributed by this
list?" I simply don't understand your comment. How does a lack of
interest in using the Peircean infrastructure to examine biological
systems have anything to do with 'one's feelings about what is going
on in society today'?? 

I don't think anyone is suggesting closing the Peirce-L list!! It
can remain, devoted to its ideals...and another List - which Peirce-l
members may join or may not join - can be used to discuss these,
ah...'post-Peirce' topics. 

Edwina
 On Sat 16/10/21 11:22 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 List,
 I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list. 
 Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a
mirror to see what is going on in society today.  
 If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails
distributed by this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about
the possibility that this has to do more with what is going on in
society today and that one's feelings about society are being
projected on the emails distributed by this list? 
 My very best, Margaretha H.
 PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list
emails within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am
juggling many other balls.  There are many interesting emails on this
list, but I am simply not in the right place to reply to them
immediately. I hope to reply to them in the future once my schedule
is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this email immediately
before other ones, well, it caught my attention and it kept on
bothering me.  Its divisive rhetoric mirrors the divisive rhetoric in
society at large.   
 Let me end with a question.  Popper is known for warning against the
manipulative use of language and logic. Did Peirce do something
similar?  If my question shows a lack of understanding of Peirce's
work, I apologize.  I am still in the learning stages.  
 On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 6:02 PM sowa @bestweb.net [1] <
s...@bestweb.net [2]> wrote:
 List,   On Thursday, I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received
some strong positive comments and suggestions offline, but complete
silence from the people who send most of the notes to Peirce-L.   
For example:  "As for the natural extensions of Peirce's thought,
even when they agree closely with his principles, they are rejected
[on Peirce-L] as post-Pei

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuine triad vs Degenerate triad (was Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Thank you so much for this excellent outline of the reason for the Y
graph of the semiosic triad. It's perfect.

AND - I like your statement: "The point in the center is either the
name off a relation or the name of a variable.". And that is why I
refer to the 'sign' term as the name of either that mediating
relation and/or the name of the whole variable.

And also - thanks for using the term 'relations' rather than just
'correlate'. Peirce himself used both. 

Edwina
 On Tue 12/10/21 10:45 PM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net
sent:
 The difference between a trianglular graph and a Y graph can be seen
in the translation to some version of logic, either linear or graphic.
  If we label the three nodes a, b, and c, the triangle can be
represented by three dyadic relations:  R(a,b) & S(b,c)  & T(c,a).  
But the Y requires  an irreducible triadic connection:  R(a,b,c).  
Some people would object that a Y can be replaced by introducing a
new variable x, and using three dyadic relations:  R(x,a) & S(x,b) &
T(x,c).   But note what happened:  the new variable x now has a
triadic connection to the three relations R, S, T.   If you draw
those linear expressions as graphs, you will find that there is a Y
shaped graph with the variable x at the center instead of the
relation R at the center.  No mattter which choice of variables and
relations you choose, there is no way to eliminate a Y-shaped triad. 
The point in the center is either the name off a relation or the name
of a variable.Conclusion:  The triangle is a degenerate triad
because it can be replaced by three dyads.  But the Y is a genuine
triad because no transformation can get rid of a triadic connection
in the graph.   John 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century (was Dimensionality

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

thank you Robert, for this analysis. But I'm beginning to think that
the Peirce-List is not equipped to handle the exploration of Peirce
and his analytic framework in the 21st century. 

After all -  some of us have been trying for years to introduce
current scientific and other research areas [linguistic, AI,
societal, economic] and explore how the Peircean framework, in
different terms, is being used to examine these fields. We've been
met with a refusal to engage in any discussion and/or, an open almost
horror of such an approach. We've been told that 'Peirce never used
such words'; ...and...your focus is 'post-Peirce'.I think that this
phrase of 'post-Peirce' makes it very clear that the Peirce-List
can't handle such a movement.  Or we've been told 'no-where in the
texts did Peirce discuss such an issue'. That is, the feeling seems
to be that to venture into these modern areas is somehow tainting or
harming not merely the value but the legitimacy of Peirce. 

I suggest that what is needed - after all these fruitless years of
trying to introduce the examination of the Peircean framework in the
21st century fields of research of our world..what is needed is a
NEW LIST. It could be affiliated or somehow 'accepted' by the
Peirce-List - but, it would be specifically open to this modern
world. It would not object to non-Peircean terms or research areas -
but would be engaged in showing how these modern areas are actually
using the Peircean framework and how further use can help those
research fields. There would be no need for members on this new List
to be 'cautioned' that they were 'post Peirce' or using 'non-Peirce'
terms. The focus would be on the meaning of these research areas and
their relevance to Peirce.

Edwina
 On Tue 12/10/21  6:59 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., John, List,

It is necessary, in the first place, to consider that the text of
which we speak is, in the field of knowledge, a true "continent," a
metaphor of Jean-Marie Chevallier[1],  a particularly accurate
metaphor that illustrates its extent, its complexity, the variety of
its territories. Inside we find in particular semiotics and logic of
which Peirce said himself: 

I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the
work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the
doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of
possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too
great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to confine
myself to the most important questions. (CP 5.488) [emphasize mine] 

And of the only writings related to logic, he said: 

All that you can find in print of my work on logic are simply
scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which remains
unpublished. Most of it I suppose has been written down; but no human
being could ever put together the fragments. I could not myself do so.
(CP 2.1)[emphasize mine] 
The Peircean text, which contains so much richness, depth, and
freedom of thought, diversity, creative anticipations when delivered
to interpretation, concerns all the fields of knowledge that are
potential places of conflict. Let us be clear: these conflicts should
be organized as competitions giving rise to debates marked by loyalty
and mutual respect. This is what generally happens in the Exact (or
hard) Sciences. Indeed, constitutionally, one can agree, within them,
on objective criteria of truth. This is obvious for mathematics and
the formal models they structure, much less for the observational
sciences, which depend on data processing. On the other hand, for the
Humanities and Social Sciences, pejoratively qualified as "soft," the
oppositions can be lively and appeal to arguments of authority based
on established disciplinary hierarchies or simply on positions of
power occupied in academic or associative organizations. The
"Peircean continent, "which extends over the whole of knowledge,
accumulates not only the occasions of interpersonal, inter-group, and
even inter-organizational oppositions internal to each camp, but also
and above all the more radical oppositions between the camp of the "
hard " and the camp of the " soft "if we follow the metaphor. This
"continent" is crossed by a large gap between the "hard" and the
"soft" terms that finally plunge us into anthropology. I recall in
this respect that, following the anthropologist Claude Lévy-Strauss,
we find on the hard side the "engineers" and on the "soft" side the "
bricoleurs." Lévy-Strauss experienced a happy collaboration between
the two camps by calling upon the mathematician André Weil; this is,
in my opinion, an example to follow. 
This is a question that has not ceased to be asked precisely because
of the undeniable success of the Exact Sciences. This success has led
many 

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, List

I won't speak for John but only myself. I'm a bit confused by your
post. 

First - I don't believe that anyone - whether in the 'pure
philosophy' field or the applied fields can ever say: 'OK, I now
sufficiently and thoroughly understand Peirce's contributions' .
Someone, either oneself or some one else - will have more to say. 

Nor, can one genuinely say that ONLY people engaged in 'pure
philosophy' research are equipped to ever 'sufficiently and
thoroughly understand Peirce'.  I'd say that people engaged in the
'non-philosophical fields' - whether theoretical or applied sciences,
linguistics, AI, biology etc are capable of sufficient understanding
of Peirce to use his theories and infrastructure to more clearly
explain their fields. 

My understanding of what John wrote was that he was saying that some
people interested in Peirce are focused purely on the texts - and not
on applied analysis. And surely one can't have a problem with that!
BUT - are you saying that the world should not engage in the applied
analysis of Peirce unless and until the 'pure textual research' is
done and finished? [if it ever is, which I doubt].

Are you saying that a biologist or linguistic or economics
researcher, who is not focused on textual, philosophical analysis,
cannot understand Peirce enough to use his theories in their field?
And has to wait until the 'theoretical researcher' has done their
work?  I don't see things this way! Indeed - I'd even bet that the
applied researcher might have a clear understanding of Peirce - just
from their own field - because Peirce's work is pragmatic and
operative in the real world.

???

Edwina
 On Sun 10/10/21  5:47 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List,
 John, do you really believe that most everyone -- or even many a one
-- now working in linguistics, cognitive science, and AI sufficiently,
let alone, thoroughly understands Peirce's contributions to
philosophy, semeiotic and a number of relevant sciences and so they
are now fully ready to employ it to springboard into a new
"foundation for science"?  Would that were the case.
 Your paper, "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century" (which I
read during that decade when I was attending your International
Conference on Conceptual Structure and was reading all your papers
then available as well as the 1st edition of your book on KR), your
"Peirce's contributions" paper,  even in its abstract, suggests that
you are, of course, well aware that Peirce has been severely
neglected;  and, I would add, not only neglected but misused by
certain thinkers, and not only those whom you mentioned in the
analytic tradition. 
 Abstract. Peirce was [. . .] a largely neglected philosopher in the
20th century. Peirce's research in logic, physics, mathematics, and
lexicography made him uniquely qualified to appreciate the rigors of
science, the nuances of language, and the semiotic processes that
support both. Instead of using logic to understand language, the
philosophers who began the analytic tradition — Frege, Russell, and
Carnap — tried to replace language with a purified version of logic.
As a result, they created an unbridgeable gap between themselves and
the so-called Continental philosophers, they exacerbated the
behaviorist tendency to reject any study of meaning, and they left
semantics as an unexplored wilderness with only a few elegantly
drawn, but incomplete maps. . . This article reviews the ongoing
efforts to construct a new foundation for 21st-century philosophy on
the basis of Peirce's research and its potential for revolutionizing
the study of meaning in cognitive science, especially in the fields
of linguistics and artificial intelligence.  
 It seems to me that the continuing, and in many cases, excellent
work of those who want Peirce to be understood on his own terms, that
that work ought to be respected as a kind of propaedeutic to the
'revolutionary' "new foundation" for science which you propose. By
this I mean that in my view one needs a clear, contextualized and,
optimally, both broad understanding as well as a specific (to the
disciplines one is working in) understanding of what Peirce thought,
as difficult as it may be to attain those understandings. 
 Peirce was not only thoroughly neglected, but some of those early
20th century scholars knew well enough the potential value of his
work and opted to ignore it for various reasons including out of a
sense of its very power and potential, in many cases far exceeding
their own. Their studies led to a kind of logical dead-end which we
have yet to recover from. In addition, many of these scholars were
clearly much more concerned with creating 'schools' of 20th century
analytic thought and forming the faculties of university departments
and the like than they were with the advance of science. That is, and
in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century (was Dimensionality

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

I obviously completely agree. A vital issue in Peircean studies is-
what do his ideas mean for us today? Quite frankly, to confine
Peircean studies to textual analysis, terms, etc has its uses, but,
it relegates Peirce to the past. And his conceptual infrastructure is
far too important to be so isolated.

I consider that we should - those of us who want to - focus on the
functionality of the Peircean infrastructure in modern research in
fields such as the natural sciences, and societal systems and
economics.

I acknowledge that for some Peircean scholars - this is
unacceptable. I can't tell how many times I've tried to introduce a
research paper from someone in the sciences to this list, a paper
that, to me, clearly shows how Peirce's infrastructure is relevant in
that field...and been met with total silence. Or, informed that
'Peirce never used those words'; Peirce never mentioned such terms as
'input and output'. Or - You are putting in your own theories and they
have nothing to do with Peirce. Or very commonly, I am told they are 
'post Peirce'...whatever that means. But the taint of impurity is
clear. 

This confinement of Peirce to a focus only on his texts and his
specific words [this word means only this...]...locks the Peircean
infrastructure from reality - which is why I have complained so often
about 'seminar room discussions'. 

I think it's vital to show how the Peircean semiosic infrastructure
is operative in the actual world - For example, I am using a paper
from the journal Entropy on 'Crucial Development: Criticality is
important for cell-to-cell communication and information transfer in
living systems I Hunt von Herbing August 2021.  The authors don't use
Peircean terms but in my view, they do use Peircean concepts of
'complexity patterns [Thirdness]; phase transitions [semiosic
networking]; interplay between homeostasis and disorder [3ns and
1ns]….And this fits in well with a paper I've been asked to write
on biological information generation. 

And I've continued to use the notion of the semiosic process as a
function of f(x)=y - [also used by other Peirce scholars] and of
course, see this as the use of Pierce in modern scholarship.

I agree with John Sowa - it's not up to anyone to criticize the
focus of someone else's research about Peirce. I acknowledge that
those with a textual focus are vital to the whole research field. But
so is work expanding the texts of Peirce from the page into modern
research areas. 

Edwina
 On Sun 10/10/21  1:30 PM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net
sent:
 I accidentally hit SEND on my previous reply.I won't criticize
anybody's attempts to determine exactly what Peirce intended a
century ago/  But a far more important issue is what his ideas mean
for us today.  A few years ago, I wrote a widely cited n article with
the title "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century: 
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.  [1] If I were writing that today,
I'd add quite a bit more.   On the topic of continuity and
dimensionality, an enormous amount of new work has been published in
the century after Peirce.  For a survey, see the article on infinite
dimensional category theory in the October 2021 issue of Scientific
American.  This is related to the work that Robert Marty and others
have been discussing.   Different people have different preferences. 
 Textual criticism of what Peirce wrote (as the PEP project was doing)
is important.  Surveys of what Peirce wrote are also important.  But
at APA,conferences that kind of work is buried in sessions that are
only attended by Peirce scholars.  Meanwhile, lectures on other 19th
century philosophers and logicians (Frege, for example) get far more
attention in general sessions.   I have no intention of telling
anyone what they should not do.  But Peirce himself wwas writing for
the future, especially in the last several years of his life.  I
believe that Peirce's legacy depends critically on his relevance for
ongoing research today.  The Peirce Centennial Congress in 2014 was
far more exciting.  It drew international participants from a wide
range of fields who showed how Peirce's ideas had influenced their
research today.   I have no intention of stopping anybody from
talking about the past, but Peirce's emphasis was always on the
future.  I believe that Peirce would strongly encourage us to relate
his ideas to the latest research today.   John


Links:
--
[1] http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.;
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Connected Signs Theorem (was Cognitive Signs)

[Edwina Taborsky]

does not correspond to the first
definition that he provides in his entry for "perfect" in the 
Century Dictionary
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=05=835)--
[1]"Brought to a consummation; fully finished; carried through to
completion in every detail; finished in every part; completed."
Instead, it corresponds to the second definition--"Full; whole;
entire; complete; existing in the widest extent or highest degree." 
 Note also the identification of "Such perfect sign" with "a
quasi-mind" and "the sheet of assertion in Existential Graphs,"
consistent with my previous replies addressed to Jack Cody and John
Sowa. The question then arises, what is the object of this perfect
sign, by which it "is perpetually being acted upon"? If the
spontaneous changes that it "never ceases to undergo" do not happen
"by its will," then by what will  do they happen?
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Fri, Oct 8, 2021 at 8:23 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

1] I think it is important to be extremely careful of reductionism.
And to be careful of terms and their meaning.

First - Is a 'sign' the discrete triad or the mediative node, the
representamen or is it the process of triadic mediation? 

2] As Peirce wrote -"No sign can function as such except so far as
it is interpreted in another sign" 8.225 

I take this to focus on the process and to mean that the universe is
a massive semiosic process, a process of triadic actions forming
matter, interacting with other forms-of-matterand so on. That is,
I take this to mean that the focus is on the semiosic process; not
just the discrete results, ie, the particular triadic form whether it
be a syllogistic conclusion, a word or an insect.

3] But do these process connections mean that the universe is 
reduced to ONE sign? Again, what is meant by 'sign' - the triad, the
mediative node or the process? 

That is, Peirce wrote " It is that if any signs are connected, no
matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" and

"we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign;
and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from
marriages with the thoughts of other persons.  So the thought-life of
a social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected".

And here, I think we have to be careful. I don't think we can
conclude that ALL discrete triadic results are all connected. The
semiosic process  is connected and universal, but are the results
reducible to one triad?

I can readily see that 'the thought-life of an  individual or a
social group can be understood, in itself, as a connected body, in
this case,  we can understand 'thought-life' to mean the knowledge
base, or the habits-of-the-Representamen. In this case, what is being
referred to are the HABITS, i.e the representamen  But are the
thought-lives or habits of ALL social groups connected in the world?
We certainly don't see homogeneity in the world! We see the semiosic
process, the operation of the syllogism, all over the world - but we
don't see similar results of habit-formation!  Are the habits of all
biological species reducible to ONE type? I don't think we can say
this with any validity.  

4] To conclude from these passages of Peirce that the universe is
reducible to one Sign - and do we mean by this the triad, the
Representamen or the process - would be to deny Peirce's insistence
on the diversity and complexity that is specifically enabled by the
triadic process of semiosis!

 Edwina 


Links:
--
[1]
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=05page=835)--
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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[PEIRCE-L] Connected Signs Theorem (was Cognitive Signs)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 List

1] I think it is important to be extremely careful of reductionism.
And to be careful of terms and their meaning.

First - Is a 'sign' the discrete triad or the mediative node, the
representamen or is it the  process of triadic mediation? 

2] As Peirce wrote -"No sign can function as such except so far as
it is interpreted in another sign" 8.225

I take this to focus on the process and to mean that the universe is
a massive semiosic process, a process of triadic actions forming
matter, interacting with other forms-of-matterand so on. That is,
I take this to mean that the focus is on the semiosic process; not
just the discrete results, ie, the particular triadic form whether it
be a syllogistic conclusion, a word or an insect. 

3] But do these process connections mean that the universe is 
reduced to ONE sign? Again, what is meant by 'sign' - the triad, the
mediative node or the process?

That is, Peirce wrote " It is that if any signs are connected, no
matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" and

"we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign;
and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from
marriages with the thoughts of other persons.  So the thought-life of
a social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected".

And here, I think we have to be careful. I don't think we can
conclude that ALL discrete triadic results are all connected. The
semiosic process  is connected and universal, but are the results
reducible to one triad?

I can readily see that 'the thought-life of an  individual or a
social group can be understood, in itself, as a connected body, in
this case,  we can understand 'thought-life' to mean the knowledge
base, or the habits-of-the-Representamen. In this case, what is being
referred to are the HABITS, i.e the representamen  But are the
thought-lives or habits of ALL social groups connected in the world?
We certainly don't see homogeneity in the world! We see the semiosic
process, the operation of the syllogism, all over the world - but we
don't see similar results of habit-formation!  Are the habits of all
biological species reducible to ONE type? I don't think we can say
this with any validity.  

4] To conclude from these passages of Peirce that the universe is
reducible to one Sign - and do we mean by this the triad, the
Representamen or the process - would be to deny Peirce's insistence
on the diversity and complexity that is specifically enabled by the
triadic process of semiosis!

 Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  9:26 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jack, List:
 As it turns out, in the same manuscript where Peirce states that any
system of connected signs "constitutes one sign" and refers to this as
one of the theorems of "the science of semeiotics," he also discusses
how signs are efficient (without using that word) in the sense of
having external effects.
  CSP: Every mental representation, in the strictest sense,
everything of a cognitive character, is of the nature of a sign.
'Representation' and 'sign' are synonyms. Now the purpose of a sign
is that it shall be interpreted. The interpretation of it is again a
sign. So that the whole purpose of a sign, as such, is to determine a
new sign; and the whole purport of a sign lies in the character of its
intended interpretation. But in order that a sign should produce
another sign, it is necessary that it should in some sense (not
necessarily in this or that technical sense, but in some sense,)
influence or act upon something external to itself. It is only in
doing so that it can get itself interpreted. Consequently, the whole
purport of any sign lies in the intended character of its external
action or influence. This external influence is of different kinds in
different cases. Some signs are interpreted or reproduced by a
physical force or something analogous to such a force, simply by
causing an event; as, sounds spoken into a telephone effect
variations of the rate of alternation of an electric current along
the wire, as a first interpretation, and these variations again
produce new sound-vibrations by reinterpretation. Another case is
where a sign excites a certain quality of feeling, simple or complex,
which quality of feeling is a sign of anything that partakes of it, as
the sound of the word 'red' may make us imagine the color red. (R
1476:34-35, c. 1904)
 The external effect of a sign can be "another sign," "a physical
force" or "an event," or "a certain quality of feeling." These seem
to match up respectively with what Peirce would later call the
"logical meaning" or "logical interpretant," the "existential
meaning" or "energetic interpretant," and the "emotional meaning" or
"emotional interpretant" (R 321&318, 1907). 
 CSP: Of course, there is no exhaustion of energy as if work were
done. The 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Martin, List

I think his Objective Knowledge is a good text to see his arguments
against induction [which he also calls the Bucket Theory of the Mind]
as a means of developing scientific knowledge. 

The methodological nominalism, which, as you point out, is an
argument against Plato's essentialism of Pure Forms, is rather
similar, I think, to Peirce's pragmatism. That is, Popper is against
focusing on some kind of a priori Pure Truth...which is also why, I
think, he is against historicism with its determinism and is instead,
supporting the Open Society. 

And Peirce was also against beginning inquiry with 'pure doubt' [an
impossible state] and relying only on inductive data [which is also
why phaneroscopy is not a primary science but rests within the
hypothetical constructs of mathematics]. 

With Peirce - his abduction was the development of hypotheses about
the world - and of course, these had to be accepted as fallible. With
Popper - his 'logic of discovery' [Ch 3 in Objective Knowledge] has
similarities since this Three World theory sets up that Third World
as the site of universal concepts [p 156] and mathematical truths and
other propositions or theories. Rather similar to Peirce's Thirdness.
And he suggests that this third world has its own realitiy/autonomy
and also..'man-made' p 159. This has similarities with Peirce's
abduction - but I think Peirce explains it better. And, as we know,
Peirce's Thirdness was universal and found within the
physico-chemical and biological realms, not simply human.

So, induction, which is merely data-gathering without hypothesis
construction, does not get science anywhere.

As for fallibility, I see it as an acknowledgement of openness to
data, rather than a modus tollens - though I see your point.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  3:38 PM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Thank you, Edwina. 
 I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and
it’s Enemies” there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends
“methodological nominalism,” which (in his words)
  “Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at
defining its true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in
various circumstances, and especially, whether there are any
regularities in its behavior. In other words, methodological
nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of the thing
and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these
events, i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And
it sees in our language, and especially in those of its rules which
distinguish properly constructed sentences and inferences for a mere
heap of words, the great instrument of scientific description; words
it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as
names of essences.” 
 Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders
how universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain
events’ if (as Popper continues)
 “The methodological nominalist will never think that a question
like ‘What is energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is
an atom?’ is an important question for physics; but he will attach
importance to a question like ‘How can the energy of the sun be
made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what
conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers
who tell him that before having answered the ‘what is’ question
he cannot hope to give any exact answers to any of the ‘how’
questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much
prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his
methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by
theirs.” (p 32) 
 The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from
individual observations to laws of science. In "Logik der
Forschung,” (1935) Popper said that the problem of induction is
insurmountable, and that science is not in fact based on inductive
inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by making bold
conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So,
induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is
falsified by modus tollens.  Popper is desperately trying to avoid
Hume’s problem within the same individualist logic; whereas Peirce
accounts for the validity of induction by his “social theory of
logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” and
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com [1]303 747 4449 
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natura

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs for Triadic Relations (was Peirce & Popper)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I wasn't outlining Peirce's EGs [existential graphs] - so there is
no need to rush into their defense and point out what you consider my
errors.  I wasn't dealing with the EGs! I was answering Jack's comment
on the Peirce and Popper thread [not an Existential Graph thread]. 

I was trying to explain to someone who doesn't have an 'image' of
the semiosic triad, how to imagize it  and see it as a dynamic
interactive process - and I consider that  my example, which I've
used for years [but with a blackboard and lots of chalk] - helps
portray what is going on within the semiosic triadic process. 

And there are indeed three relations - see 8.335 and on , where he
indeed talks about 'relations'. Your insistence on the term of
'correlate' doesn't, as I see it,  help explain the very active
process of information development that is going on. And that is what
has to be explained - the active semiosic process that is developing
information that is going on at these three sites.

My opinion is that the term of 'Representamen' is extremely useful,
to separate that mediative process from the WHOLE triad, of O-R-I,
which I [and others have as well] term the Sign. And I think that
these two - the full triad and the mediating node - have to be
clearly differentiated. It's difficult to do that if you use the same
term for them!!

This thread is not about an insistence on 'I am right' but just
'This is my analysis of Peirce'. You may disagree with me - and you
usually do- but, you are, as am I, equal in being 'interpreters' and
not Final Authorities of Peirce. 

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  2:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jack, Edwina, List:
 ET: Put the dot right at the intersection of the three lines of the
Y.
 In Peirce's EGs, there is no "dot" at the intersection, there is the
name of a triadic relation. In his generic examples (CP 1.347, 1903),
this is simply a letter--"a," "b," "c," or "d." In semiosis, it is
"representing" or "mediating." 
 ET: Now - think of this dot, as the ground site, the attractor site,
for THREE Relations.
 In Peirce's EGs, there are not three relations, there is only one
triadic relation that has three correlates. In semiosis, those three
correlates are the sign, its object, and its interpretant.
  ET: Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one
node and another node.
 Again, the only relation in each of Peirce's EGs is the one whose
name is in the middle. The three lines are not relations, they denote
the three correlates of the one triadic relation. A genuine triadic
relation, such as representing or mediating, involves the three
dyadic relations between its correlates but is not  reducible to
them. In fact, Peirce's 1903 taxonomy classifies a sign according to
the nature of its dyadic relations with its object
(icon/index/symbol) and with its interpretant
(rheme/dicisign/argument), although there is no separate division for
the dyadic relation between the interpretant and the object because it
is the same as the dyadic relation between the sign and the object.
  CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant.A Sign is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have
been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290-291, 1903)
 Peirce later abandons the term "representamen," having decided that
"there was no need of this horrid long word" because the term "sign"
is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905).
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:57 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[3]> wrote:
Jack, list

Good heavens - A cutting board example!
1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's
hard to, on a computer, show this.
2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the
three lines of the Y.
Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site,
for THREE Relations.
3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data.
Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and
another node.
4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'.
I understood him to describe himself as a metaphysical realist
[Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose to accept
realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42]. 

One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again,
certainly not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was,
according to Popper, essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say
it's comparable to Peirce's Thirdness, the realm of developed and
developing habits/laws.This is a rational, logical realm, the realm
of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense'. [p 154] 

The first world is the physical world; the second world is the
subjective world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the
third world is the realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.

So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a
nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
 Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must
reckon with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas
Peirce is a thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not
the least of which is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he
says that all we’ve got is truth in a certain context (like a
chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is afraid that a
realist commitment to truth = closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda.
Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or continuity. 
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society. 
 Responding to 
On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
  List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'mahe3...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

y Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
 fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty [5]
  https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ [6]
 Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :
Margaretha

1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to
this list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as
a triangle but in a Y shape.

That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format,
which is closed, but within that Y shape, where the three
interactions are OPEN and enable networking with other triads.

I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of
these Y shapes connecting with each other [1.327].  

The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of
that triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other
'Y's...plus his three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness [chance, immediate physical connection and reason-habits]
together enable a complex adaptive system that has the capacity to
self-organize and evolve. 

2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society. 

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
[8] sent:
 List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
 So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there
must be others.
 As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic
management, not in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean
philosophy, and especially his work on semiotic triangles, given that
I believe it provides some key answers to epistemological problems in
management research.  


Links:
--
[1]
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'robert.mart...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5] https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
[6] https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[8]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'mahe3...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Margaretha

1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to
this list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as
a triangle but in a Y shape.

That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format,
which is closed, but within that Y shape, where the three
interactions are OPEN and enable networking with other triads.

I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of
these Y shapes connecting with each other [1.327]. 

The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of
that triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other
'Y's...plus his three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness [chance, immediate physical connection and reason-habits]
together enable a complex adaptive system that has the capacity to
self-organize and evolve. 

2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
 So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there
must be others.
 As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic
management, not in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean
philosophy, and especially his work on semiotic triangles, given that
I believe it provides some key answers to epistemological problems in
management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List - I don't think that all these quotations can really deal with
problems on the list.

After all - the quotation below could be read as supporting a
perspective of someone who 'blows with the wind', I.e, an a priori
mode of 'Fixation of Belief'just as much as it can show a
situation where a scientist acknowledges that 'the facts aren't
there' and the hypothesis must be dropped.

I still think that many of the problems on this list can be viewed
as based on a sense by some that their reading of Peirce is the
'correct' one - and they belittle other readings, openly defining
them as 'your personal view and not what Peirce meant'. It's this
two-step action that silences discussion. Why bother posting when one
is met with such an arrogant and dismissive attitude?

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  8:26 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
“Perfect readiness to assimilate new associations implies perfect
readiness to drop old ones.… To be a philosopher, or a scientific
man, you must be as a little child, with all the sincerity and
simple-mindedness of the child's vision, with all the plasticity of
the child's mental habits.” — C.S. Peirce, RLT 192 (1898) 
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

  On Behalf Of Gary Richmond
 Sent: 7-Oct-21 05:18
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the
case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))
John, List,
"Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little
doubt that this is largely illusory . . . because their reasonings
are prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while
their instincts [and emotions] they are hardly aware of. . . .   — 
Charles S. Peirce
"To think is easy. To act is difficult. To  act as one thinks is the
most difficult.” — Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
“Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first
principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest
person to fool.” — Richard Feynman 
Best,
Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
  ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking 

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:50 AM sowa @bestweb.net [1]  wrote:

Gary R, 
I agree that those suggestions are helpful:
 GR:  [Margaretha's] ideas and suggestive metaphors about how List
discussion might be improved -- along with the suggestions by John
Sowa and Gary Furhman which Jon Alan Schmidt just quoted -- if taken
up in the spirit of collegiality, could help improve communication
here considerably.
 I would like to add a few more suggestions.
The first one is that the method of asking questions, as in Plato's
dialogues with Socrates as the discussion leader, is one of the best
ways to promote fruitful discussions.  People may be offended by a
direct contradiction of what they just said, but nobody is offended
by an honest question.  (A loaded question can be offensive. e.g.
"Have you stopped beating your wife?")  
The so-called "Socratic method" can also be annoying when pushed to
an extreme.  But  an honest question is more likely to generate a
fruitful discussion.
For Peirce, it's especially important to recognize that he had a
very fertile imagination, and his ideas were constantly growing .and
developing over the years.  His comment "symbols grow"  indicates
that the same words on different occasions may have very different
meanings and implications:
1903:  For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense
that
 is no mere figure of speech.  The body of the symbol changes slowly,
but
 the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws
off
 old ones.  (CP 2.222).
The only statements by Peirce that remain constant are the ones in
mathematics and formal logic  A statement in math or logic has a
fixed meaning forever.  But Peirce's comments about then may change,
as we have noted in various discussions.
The following point is significant:
CSP:  The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
 matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely
the
 fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more
than
 the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
 (CP 5.469, R318, 1907)
The categories of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness are based on logic, and
they have been central to his thought throughout.  But his
applications of those ideas continued to grow.  Even in his late
writings of 1913, his ideas continued to grow, and he had hopes of
writing more.  Nobody on planet earth can be certain that any ideas
outside of mathematics and logic would remain unchanged. 
The recent discussions of comments by De Tienne and Atkins about

[PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
don't think these suggestions - of not using 'you' [or a personal
name or synonym] or 'not taking offense' will deal with the problems
of the List.

I still think that it's a tribal attitude, where some posters assume
that their post 'correctly' presents Peirce while another post is 'not
what Peirce meant'; ..i.e., the attitude is one of self-assumed
authority. Again, this type of post rejects the fact that ALL
readings of Peirce are interpretations - because the nature of
reading is triadic, is semiosic, and there is no direct
text-to-reader transference of knowledge.

Therefore - if only posters would acknowledge this, and rather than
reacting to someone's post with 'NO, that is not what Peirce said'...
Instead 'cool it'...and say something like: 'My interpretation of that
passage is different...I read it as."

That would acknowledge that one doesn't set oneself up as The Tribal
Authority - but- as a co-researcher-of-Peirce who  has a different
interpretation.

But- I doubt if this suggestion will happen! I've made this same
suggestion countless times - with no result. The authoritative
rebuttals continue, the claims that 'your post is an emotional rant';
that your post is your own opinion about the world and does not
represent Peirce'.these all continue.

Edwina
 On Wed 06/10/21  2:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jerry C., List:
 JLRC: What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our community
and our communications?
 John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman each offered advice a few years ago that
I have generally tried to follow in my own List participation,
although I have not always been successful.
  JFS: In another email list some years ago, a wise soul made a
suggestion for reducing heated arguments in a debate: Avoid the word
'you'. Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the focus from the
statement to the person who made the statement. This immediately puts
that person on the defensive--and the result is an escalating round of
ad hominem attacks and defenses. For the list I mentioned, the
practice of avoiding the word 'you' kept the peace, shortened the
debates, and made life more pleasant for everyone. (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00018.html [1])
 GF: As we’ve seen here recently, people who are inclined to be
defensive (and to engage in heated debates) will tend to do so
regardless of the presence or absence of the word “you” (or any
other particular word) in a message. Shifting the focus from the
statement by “taking it personally” and reacting against some
imagined slight in it is a habit that can’t be cured by avoiding
any specific word across the board. The rule I have invoked in my
past experience moderating email groups is simply this:  Do not take
offense. If nobody takes offense, nobody can give offense, even if
they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their own
statements, on the other hand, will often take offense when none is
intended. If we can avoid this, the impulse to give offense is likely
to dry up, because the would-be offender will not succeed in getting
the reaction he seeks.
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00019.html [2]
)
 It seems to me that the quality of our List discussions would likely
improve considerably if everyone would (a) refrain from posting "you"
messages, especially when the subject matter is potentially
contentious, and (b) deliberately choose not to take personal offense
at anything posted by anyone else.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
 On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 11:05 AM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com [5]> wrote:
 Bernard:On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:33 PM, Bernard Morand  wrote:
  It is a good illustration of my feeling about the bad quality level
of the discussions on Peirce-l. My feelings are fully parallel with
yours.
 Your articulative description of the styles of communication denotes
the essential nature of the subjective logical fallacies that
constrain the discussions to the very, very narrow interests of some
scholars.
 Such styles, while offering a sense of historical truth functions,
ignore the historically historic roots of CSP writings in centuries
of earlier scholarship as well as his extreme breath of knowledge and
imagination in mathematics, logic, physics, chemistry and multiple
natural languages, thereby reducing brilliance to dullness.  The
consequence is the turning of lively ideas into deadly boredom.  (If
not even more deadly complete mis-representation.) 
 What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our community and
our communications? 
 Cheers
 Jerry  
 Postscript for Robert Marty:  Do you believe that CSP’s logic is
congruent with Robinson arithmetic?:-)  


Links:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry - yes, we know what the problem is. The question is:

1] How do we fix it? And even..

2] Can it be fixed?

My answer to 2 is: No. Because we can't deal with 1.

Edwina
 On Wed 06/10/21  2:10 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, Jerry, Bernard, list, 
Why so pessimistic? 

I mean, we at least profess a dogmatic view that Peirce was a great
philosopher, 

 and as such, we would at least follow his method of mediation,
amirite?  

.. because ‘spring to action’ and all that.. 
So then, what does one do, as Peirceans, when faced with tribal
behavior in our own midst? 
For the problem can be stated as thus: 
And before a crowd means among the ignorant: 

for surely, among those who know, he will not be more convincing.. 

Therefore when the rhetorician is more convincing than the doctor, 

the ignorant is more convincing among the ignorant than the expert. 
With best wishes,
 Jerry R
 On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 12:58 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
I think it is very difficult to change this list.  It can be
difficult to post, since one is so frequently met with, not a
discussion, but authoritative assertions of 'No, Peirce did not
say/mean...that'... 

One doesn't find words like: "In my understanding' or 'in my view'.
Or 'I think that'.  Instead, it's authoritative verbiage that is
quite relentless in claiming that you are quite wrong, you are not
genuinely following Peirce...and so on. 

It's almost like a tribal syndrome, where a few people consider
themselves 'Genuine Members of the Peirce Tribe'..and others are
viewed as outsiders with little claim or right to discuss the issues
- and certainly cannot claim membership with the select few.

I doubt if this can change.

Edwina
 On Wed 06/10/21  1:30 PM , Bernard Morand morand.bern...@neuf.fr [2]
sent:
Thanks Jerry for this reply and support. 

Unfortunately I have no complete answer to your pertinent  
question: "What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our  
community and our communications? " 

Perhaps some listers actually silent have good ideas about that.
  They ought to be encouraged to manifest themselves in some kind of  
"one hundred flowers" campaign. 

Regards 

Bernard Le 06/10/2021 à 18:03, Jerry LR   Chandler a écrit
:
Bernard: 
On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:33 PM, Bernard Morand  
   wrote:   
   It is a good illustration of my   feeling
about the bad quality level of the discussions on  
Peirce-l.
   My feelings are fully parallel with yours.   
  Your articulative description of the styles of
communication denotes the essential nature of the subjective
logical fallacies that constrain the discussions to the very,
very  narrow interests of some scholars.
  Such styles, while offering a sense of historical  
  truth functions, ignore the historically historic roots of CSP  
  writings in centuries of earlier scholarship as well as his
extreme breath of knowledge and imagination in mathematics,
logic, physics, chemistry and multiple natural languages,
thereby reducing brilliance to dullness.  The consequence is the 
   turning of lively ideas into deadly boredom.  (If not even more
deadly complete mis-representation.)   
  What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our   
 community and our communications?
  Cheers   
  Jerry 
  Postscript for Robert Marty:  Do you believe that  
  CSP’s logic is congruent with Robinson arithmetic?:-). 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[2]
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

I think it is very difficult to change this list.  It can be
difficult to post, since one is so frequently met with, not a
discussion, but authoritative assertions of 'No, Peirce did not
say/mean...that'... 

One doesn't find words like: "In my understanding' or 'in my view'.
Or 'I think that'.  Instead, it's authoritative verbiage that is
quite relentless in claiming that you are quite wrong, you are not
genuinely following Peirce...and so on.

It's almost like a tribal syndrome, where a few people consider
themselves 'Genuine Members of the Peirce Tribe'..and others are
viewed as outsiders with little claim or right to discuss the issues
- and certainly cannot claim membership with the select few.

I doubt if this can change.

Edwina
 On Wed 06/10/21  1:30 PM , Bernard Morand morand.bern...@neuf.fr
sent:
Thanks Jerry for this reply and support. 

Unfortunately I have no complete answer to your pertinent  
question: "What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our  
community and our communications? " 

Perhaps some listers actually silent have good ideas about that.
  They ought to be encouraged to manifest themselves in some kind of  
"one hundred flowers" campaign. 

Regards 

Bernard Le 06/10/2021 à 18:03, Jerry LR   Chandler a écrit
:
Bernard: 
On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:33 PM, Bernard Morand  
   wrote:   
   It is a good illustration of my   feeling
about the bad quality level of the discussions on  
Peirce-l.
   My feelings are fully parallel with yours.   
  Your articulative description of the styles of
communication denotes the essential nature of the subjective
logical fallacies that constrain the discussions to the very,
very  narrow interests of some scholars.
  Such styles, while offering a sense of historical  
  truth functions, ignore the historically historic roots of CSP  
  writings in centuries of earlier scholarship as well as his
extreme breath of knowledge and imagination in mathematics,
logic, physics, chemistry and multiple natural languages,
thereby reducing brilliance to dullness.  The consequence is the 
   turning of lively ideas into deadly boredom.  (If not even more
deadly complete mis-representation.)   
  What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our   
 community and our communications?
  Cheers   
  Jerry 
  Postscript for Robert Marty:  Do you believe that  
  CSP’s logic is congruent with Robinson arithmetic?:-). 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'morand.bern...@neuf.fr\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

Are these strawmen? From my reading of the De Tienne slides, the
function of mathematics within our analysis of the world, an analysis
which includes phaneroscopy, seems to be non-existent.  De Tienne made
it very clear to us that mathematics was something so 'out of touch
with reality' that we, who want to experience the world, can readily
'transition out of it' and move away from it..because this ' phaneron
'experience' is disconnected from previously assimilated knowledge'. 

And yet, De Tienne, on some slides, acknowledges that some
mathematical forms can be encountered in experience. But - at the
same time, he urges us to 'transition out of mathematics'...showing a
clear separation or rupture.

None of this was critiqued...and instead, we were treated to a
bizarre wine-tasting outline of 'the categories'...and no examination
of whether mathematics was involved collaboratively or otherwise, or
how it functioned to be 'transitioned out of'...and so on.

the Belluci outline was filled with similar problems...

Edwina
 On Tue 05/10/21  4:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Robert, List:
 This response is another example of what I mean by a characteristic
adversarial stance that is unwarranted. No one is advocating
"discriminatory attitudes ... towards mathematics." No one considers
mathematics to be "evil" within the context of phaneroscopy. There is
no "movement that opposes this essential collaboration between
mathematics and positive sciences." No one is undertaking an
"offensive against mathematics." No one is disputing Houser's quoted
conclusion. No one is claiming that there is a "rupture" or
"separation" between mathematics and experience. No one is engaged in
a "rearguard battle." Please stop erecting these strawmen. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 2:53 PM robert marty  wrote:
 Jon Alan, List

JAS's usual and unsurprising response is an authoritative judgment
not supported by any argument, illustrated by selected quotes
interpreted in specific ways. Once again, he has not read the text he
is supposed to criticize (this will appear later). One can add to that
impute motives without any justification. For my part, I will again
carefully argue for the benefit of those readers who will have the
patience to follow my detailed answer. 

1- the first paragraph, whose first words reflect certain
self-importance ("I have refrained"), is of no interest since it
contains only denials without any argument refuting my allegations
concerning the discriminatory attitudes, underlined and sourced,
towards mathematics in Belluci's text. 

2 – the following paragraph, which begins with "Instead, like
Peirce," is an outright annexation of Peirce in what  JAS  wants to
make appear "simply" as the camp of Orthodoxy. In this camp are those
who know how to distinguish, like Peirce, "phaneroscopy from
mathematics "without "disconnecting or separating" them.   It is a
rhetorical figure of insinuation introduced by "Instead" by which I
am sent back to a camp of the "bad guys," thus created in a
performative way. This is the camp of those who would voluntarily
confuse these two levels. We guess that the whole sequel will exploit
this phantasmatic dichotomy of the Peircean community. But I do not
feel concerned because I place myself, with Peirce, in the camp of
those "who distinguish," except that I certainly have another idea,
always "with Peirce," of the connections between mathematics and
phaneroscopy. 

The following sentence goes even further with rhetoric (of the kind
that the semiologist Roland Barthes had detected [1])   which
consists in first admitting a little evil in its camp (Phaneroscopy
depends on mathematics for principles) to justify saying a lot of
evil about the other camp which would like to control and even reduce
phaneroscopy to mathematics. This is a way to impute these bad
intentions to me without providing any proof. If he had read me, JAS
would have known that I have always proposed a collaboration in a
mathematical framework consubstantial with the three Categories and
their necessary relations of interdependence. No more, no less. This
proves once again that JAS did not read my critique since I conclude
at the end of 2.1: 

"Moreover, Houser's last note 44, devoted to a comparison with
Husserl's phenomenology, with which I am in total agreement, leads to
a scientific practice that is the exact opposite of that advocated by
Belluci: 

'This is, perhaps, another similarity between Peirce's and Husserl's
phenomenologies. According to Dougherty (1983, p. 167), 'Of the many
claims made on its [Husserlian phenomenology's] behalf