RE: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[gnox]

Gary R and Martin, i'm just now reading your posts in reply to the one i put up 
last week.

 

Gary, you focus on Merleau-Ponty's reference to the “mystery” inherent in 
“ipseity.” What this brings to my mind is not Heidegger, but rather Peirce's 
own reference to Secondness as “the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being” (CP 6.342 
 , 1907; that link leads to the 
context as quoted in Turning Signs). 

 

The rationality of science is in its Thirdness, of course, but the truth of a 
theory in positive science depends on the genuine Secondness, the inexplicably 
real existence, of the objects of its attention. That's why Secondness is 
predominant in Peirce's usage of the term “experience.” Some phenomenologists 
think that scientific explanation of phenomena reduces their “mystery,” but for 
Peirce, their genuine “anti-rational” Secondness is involved in the truth of a 
sound theory, not eliminated by it. Rationalization, on the other hand, would 
“destroy its being,” leaving the predicate of a proposition bereft of an ens 
reale to which it could really apply.

 

Scientific reasoning is much more than rationalization because, as Martin says, 
it is inherently public. No valid proposition in science is merely “true for 
me”: if it is true, it is true for any suitably equipped observer of the 
phenomenon which is subject of its predicate. This is what enables a science to 
generalize without losing touch with experiential reality. That's why only a 
refutation of a theory can be logically conclusive, as both Popper and Peirce 
recognized. 

 

Confirmations can turn out to be rationalizations, even by people who are 
honestly trying to make their perceptual judgments “objectively.” But when some 
of the most powerful vested interests on the planet are determined to 
rationalize destructive public policies and corporate behavior based on denial 
of ecological reality, and have ways of using “social media” to do it, the 
practical result is the continuing degradation of the planetary life support 
system. The rise of the tech giants and surveillance capitalism 
  in the 21st century is 
a major factor in humanity's failure to address, at scale, the present reality 
of ecological overshoot  . 
They tend to reinforce the “domineering” attitude of the dominant culture 
toward nature, as your source mentioned, Gary.

 

GR: Have we already passed the tipping point where our attempt to master nature 
is leading to imminent ecological disaster?

 

GF: The science shows that we are already breaking several of the “planetary 
boundaries” marking the limits of the “safe zone” for human activity. Even 
Netflix has shown this in several recent documentaries. Whether we have passed 
the tipping points where the damage becomes irreversible is hard to say, as the 
evidence of the future isn't in yet. But the trend is unmistakable. William 
Catton's Overshoot could have made this clear as far back as 1980, if anyone 
had been paying attention. But collectively on the global scale, we still 
appear to be ecologically blind. A new book on the subject by economist Peter 
A. Victor is entitled Escape from Overshoot, which seems optimistic, although 
it gives a factually realistic assessment of the present situation. It may 
still be possible to manage a gradual decline of human consumption and 
pollution patterns instead of a catastrophic collapse.

 

I think Peircean semiotic is highly valuable for analyzing and understanding 
the role of communication media in this situation. They all deploy symbols, of 
course, and it's crucial to recognize that “Symbols are particularly remote 
from the Truth itself” (EP2:307  
). But Peirceans also have to use symbols in order to communicate that insight, 
and the message is submerged in the flood of mis- and disinformation. It seems 
that no matter what people believe these days, however implausible to 
scientific (or even common) sense, they can find sources online that will 
reinforce their beliefs. Personally i'm not optimistic that semiotics can do 
much to reverse the trend of the Anthropocene. Maybe we can hope that human or 
posthuman survivors of the ongoing degradation of the planet will learn 
something from whatever is left of semiotic science.

 

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. Bateson] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2024 6:10 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: 

[PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[gnox]

List,

After so much striving for precision, perhaps a shift to the subject of 
indeterminacy would be in order. The following is excerpted from Content and 
Context (TS ·15) (gnusystems.ca)  , where 
it includes a dozen or so links to its larger context (omitted below). I don’t 
think it says anything controversial among Peircean specialists, but it does 
make a salient point about ordinary everyday communication.  — gary f.

_

According to Peirce, ‘No concept, not even those of mathematics, is absolutely 
precise; and some of the most important for everyday use are extremely vague’ 
(CP 6.496, c. 1906). Genuinely informative communication depends on taking this 
necessary vagueness into account. Properly understanding any utterance requires 
us to interpret it with the degree of vagueness appropriate to the situational 
context. To meet this requirement, every language user has to develop a 
sensitivity to context at an early age, though few are conscious of it.

[[ The perspectival nature of linguistic systems means that as children learn 
to use words and linguistic constructions in the manner of adults, they come to 
see that the exact same phenomenon may be construed in many different ways for 
different communicative purposes depending on many factors in the communicative 
context. ]]  (Tomasello 1999, 213)

To construe is to simplify, and to simplify is to generalize: a symbol, by 
referring to a type of experience, can thus refer to many tokens of it on 
various occasions, including future occasions. Even proper nouns (names of 
specific things, places, people etc.) are general signs insofar as each implies 
the continuity of its object through time: each momentary manifestation of the 
object is a token of that type, and some features of it may vary from one 
occurrence to another – especially if the object is a complex adaptive system.

Things we talk about, whether we perceive them to be in the external or the 
internal world, are already construed, categorized and “framed” by the time we 
mention them. But each actual reference to them can affect our framing habits; 
and these in turn affect our way of talking about them, or hearing others talk 
about them. Since everyone has a history of cycling through such loops 
countless times, and this history determines for each a “natural” idiom, 
synchronizing reference between speakers is not always easy.

The upshot of this in communication is that in trying to connect words with 
referents or experiences, ‘all sorts of risks are taken, assumptions and 
guesses made’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 19). This is the only practical way to 
reduce the many possible ‘construals’ of phenomena – or meanings of words – to 
the simplicity required for the maintenance of a conversation.

Sperber and Wilson take this as an argument against what they call ‘the 
mutual-knowledge hypothesis,’ but they are using the word knowledge here in an 
absolute sense, as equivalent to objective certainty (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
19-20). In reality, the common ground that people must have in order to carry 
on a conversation is a network of rather vague default assumptions. Actual 
conversation often consists of attempts to render some of the ‘mutual 
knowledge’ more precise, but in the actual context, there are pragmatic limits 
to this precision.

William James, in typically elegant fashion, gives a more psychologically 
realistic account of cognition as ‘virtual knowing’:

[[ Now the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond this 
virtual stage. It never is completed or nailed down. … To continue thinking 
unchallenged is, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, our practical substitute 
for knowing in the completed sense. As each experience runs by cognitive 
transition into the next one, and we nowhere feel a collision with what we 
elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit ourselves to the current as if the 
port were sure. We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing 
wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all 
we cover of the future of our path. ]] (James, ‘A World of Pure Experience’)

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception takes a slightly different 
perspective:

[[ My set of experiences is presented as a concordant whole, and the synthesis 
takes place not in so far as they all express a certain invariant, and in the 
identity of the object, but in that they are all collected together, by the 
last of their number, in the ipseity of the thing. The ipseity is, of course, 
never reached: each aspect of the thing which falls to our perception is still 
only an invitation to perceive beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the 
perceptual process. If the thing itself were reached, it would be from that 
moment arrayed before us and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to exist 
as a thing at the very moment when we thought 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

[gnox]

“From manuscripts R 703–4 it is clear that Peirce worked extensively on the 
third Illustrations article, “The Doctrine of Chances,” that same month.” That 
month was August 1910, according to Cornelis de Waal’s edition of Illustrations 
of the Logic of Science, from which the above quote is taken. (Open Court. 
Kindle Edition).

 

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of James Rizzo
Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2024 6:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

 

Dear All,

 

Would anyone know how to find out when specifically in 1910 (i.e., month) 
Peirce wrote his additional notes on "The Doctrine of Chances"? The editorial 
note at CP 2.661, where these additional notes appear, just gives the year 
1910, as does Justus Buchler.  

 

Thanks in advance for your help,

 

James Rizzo

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[PEIRCE-L] phaneroscopic observation

[gnox]

List,

I recently updated a section of one chapter of my online book 
  Turning Signs, a section that 
introduces Peirce’s phaneroscopy in such a way that those interested in the 
subject might want to have a look at it. It is only one small part of a much 
larger work, but there are links to that larger context embedded in it, which 
may be helpful to some readers. I decided to simply furnish the link above 
rather than copy the whole section to the list. Questions and comments are 
welcome here, of course.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Every man is fully satisfied that there is such a thing as truth, or he would 
not ask any question. [Peirce] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs  

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics

[gnox]

Thanks for your comments, Dan. What I was trying to show, in a nutshell, is 
that Peirce anticipated what is now called an “enactive” approach to cognition, 
as defined by Varela here in   Turning 
Signs. I think it is obvious that this approach is closely related to 
pragmatism and pragmaticism as a theory of meaning. And I would guess that your 
forthcoming book will bring out the linguistic aspects of this.

I should mention, however, that the “enactive” approach emerged from 
developments in neuroscience and cognitive psychology since Peirce’s time 
(developments which were themselves anticipated by John Dewey). This might seem 
to compromise Peirce’s insistence on keeping the sciences of logic and 
psychology (and linguistics too) well separated. Yet he does devote some parts 
of “Kaina Stoicheia” (which purports to be about “new elements” of logic 
itself) to both psychology and linguistics. Maybe Peirce’s own “unscientific” 
use of the term “logic”   accounts for 
the discrepancy.

Love, gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Dan Everett
Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2023 10:44 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics

 

Really excellent stuff, Gary.

 

In training perception in the context of semiotics, in my forthcoming (2024) 
Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Linguistics, I discuss how culture plays a 
role in learning new perceptual categories, looking at how Amazonian 
hunter-gatherers learn to perceive 2-D images (photographs), going from being 
unable to perceive much at all about them to seeing them clearly based on 
evolving experience and discrimination. 

 

I like the interpretations you provide.

 

Dan





On May 13, 2023, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:



List,

I’m attaching a PDF of the slideshow used in my “10-minute thesis” presentation 
last month to a Zoom session hosted by the Charles S. Peirce Society, in case 
there is further interest in it. My thesis was that “Peircean semiosis is a 
continuous nonlinear process involving recursive functions and (sometimes 
nested) feedback loops.” I illustrated this by mapping several Peirce texts 
onto diagrams representing the flow of “logical energy” (Peirce’s term in 
EP2:241, CP5.212).

I should mention that my “thesis” was abstracted, as it were, from a close 
study of Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia  ” 
(c. 1901, despite the c.1904 date given in EP2:300). In this curious paper 
Peirce sets out to explain “the logic of mathematics,” but instead of doing 
that in the “mathematical style” exemplified by Euclid’s Elements, works it out 
in terms of logic as semiotic. (He does not use the term “semiotic”, however, 
nor does he refer to “triadic relations” in this paper.) He concludes by 
working out the metaphysical and cosmological implications of a logic based on 
this semiotic foundation. I think “Kaina Stoicheia” is worth a close look in 
its own right, beyond my “10-minute thesis,” if other list members are 
interested. 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction. 

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it  ? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the 
greater community closer to the whole truth is a psychological characteristic 
that can’t be reasonably extrapolated to the ultimate purpose of the universe — 
or even to the esthetic ideal of pragmatism, in my opinion. It’s a concession 
by Peirce to linear thinking. And I think his reduction to three of the 
possible sentiments toward the whole of the universe one instance where he 
“forces divisions to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy” (CP1.568).

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description whatever. 
[Peirce, CP 7.119] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2023 9:05 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

Gary F., List:

 

I doubt that Peirce's use of "sentiments" in R 953 in exactly the same as when 
he says elsewhere that reasoning is subordinate to sentiment in matters of 
vital importance. On my reading, he is simply anticipating his later 
recognition of esthetics as the normative science that "considers those things 
whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200, 1903), 
aligning meliorism with the identification of concrete reasonableness as the 
summum bonum and its constant growth as the ongoing process of creation. The 
beginning and the end are ideal limits, not actual events, and the latter state 
is "better than" the former in the specific sense that it is utterly 
determinate instead of utterly indeterminate, corresponding to perfect 
knowledge instead of blank ignorance.

 

CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real 
facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man 
many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions 
with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, 
observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that 
truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error 
always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually 
dispelled. (R 953:7-8[6-7], c. 1899)

 

By contrast, pessimism identifies "eternal nothingness" as the summum bonum, 
and epicureanism effectively denies that there is any summum bonum at all. My 
James/Rorty interlocuters seem to fall into the latter camp, embracing "tragic 
pluralism" as inevitable because they believe that some value conflicts are 
genuinely unresolvable in principle.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon

 

On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 6:50 PM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Jon and other folks in this thread,

[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some 
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon and other folks in this thread,

[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some 
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that landed us in the 
Anthropocene!

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [Daodejing 52 
(Feng/English)] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

List:

 

For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I am now 
suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished Principles 
of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised subscriptions (1894) 
and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a forward, and saying that 
the first volume "is devoted to the consideration of the question of where we 
are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." Moreover, the text references 
Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 (c. 1893), and begins to discuss 
the three grades of clearness that he introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear" (1878)--which he updated to serve as chapter 16 of How to Reason: A 
Critick of Arguments (1894)--and presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" 
(1897). Presumably, he would have been keen to revisit them once more after 
William James started popularizing pragmatism (1898).

 

Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with pessimism 
and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he summarizes all three 
with respect to cosmology and knowledge.

 

CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then

1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to that 
same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past;

2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or 
tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole;

3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future different 
from that in the infinitely distant past.

These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various special 
applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human knowledge. ...

Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much to 
support it.

The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development toward a 
destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt from which it 
first set out.

The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about, 
appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into disputes.

The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate settlement, 
which must be called the truth.

Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding view of 
the constitution of the universe.

 

In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy that 
Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, including 
materialism/physicalism and necessitarianism/determinism--additional 
characteristics of our intellectual climate that are contrary to 
synechism/pragmaticism.

 

CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact adherence 
to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to designate a general 
type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has discovered that the 
universe consists of molecules moving about under the governance of inflexible 
law, the law of energy; that that is all there is to it; and that consequently 
the ideas of God, Freedom of the Soul, and Immortality are silly superstitions. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon and other folks in this thread,

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that landed us in the 
Anthropocene!

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [Daodejing 52 
(Feng/English)] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

List:

 

For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I am now 
suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished Principles 
of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised subscriptions (1894) 
and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a forward, and saying that 
the first volume "is devoted to the consideration of the question of where we 
are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." Moreover, the text references 
Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 (c. 1893), and begins to discuss 
the three grades of clearness that he introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear" (1878)--which he updated to serve as chapter 16 of How to Reason: A 
Critick of Arguments (1894)--and presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" 
(1897). Presumably, he would have been keen to revisit them once more after 
William James started popularizing pragmatism (1898).

 

Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with pessimism 
and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he summarizes all three 
with respect to cosmology and knowledge.

 

CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then

1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to that 
same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past;

2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or 
tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole;

3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future different 
from that in the infinitely distant past.

These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various special 
applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human knowledge. ...

Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much to 
support it.

The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development toward a 
destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt from which it 
first set out.

The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about, 
appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into disputes.

The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate settlement, 
which must be called the truth.

Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding view of 
the constitution of the universe.

 

In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy that 
Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, including 
materialism/physicalism and necessitarianism/determinism--additional 
characteristics of our intellectual climate that are contrary to 
synechism/pragmaticism.

 

CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact adherence 
to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to designate a general 
type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has discovered that the 
universe consists of molecules moving about under the governance of inflexible 
law, the law of energy; that that is all there is to it; and that consequently 
the ideas of God, Freedom of the Soul, and Immortality are silly superstitions. 
That whole type of opinion I think superficial. ...

If the Büchnerite cared to pause to listen to my answer to his question of 
whether I am not in favor of Büchner and a philosophy based on facts instead of 
a philosophy based on tradition, he might be 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[gnox]

Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for 
Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and public venues 
that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those are aimed at 
venues and audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a 
special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. 
If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary 
issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues. When I 
have something Peircean to say on those issues, I say it in my online book or 
my blog or one of the other spaces of discourse I participate in.

Among the other books I know of which have applied Peircean analyses to 
contemporary issues, these come immediately to mind:

Deely, John (2001), Four Ages of Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press).

Kohn, Eduardo (2013), How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the 
Human (Berkeley: University of California Press)

Ivakhiv, Adrian (2018), Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-realism for turbulent 
times (punctum books, Earth, Milky Way; Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 
International license).

My book Turning Signs has the same CC license as Adrian Ivakhiv's, by the way, 
so both are accessible for free.

I think the issues that receive Peircean analyses in those books are at least 
as “empirical” as the ones you mention.

Love, gary f

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Dan Everett
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 11:37 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

 

I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe 
this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely 
concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But 
there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. 
For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the 
superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a 
multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other 
gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an 
Existential Graph analysis) and so on. 

 

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably 
being demanded these days.

 

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room 
Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being 
interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not 
all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns). 

 

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

 

Dan Everett





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon et al.,

It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a contradiction) 
between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, and his account of 
the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also explain why I see KS 
(written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the phenomenology of 1902-3 and the 
semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is explicitly based on that 
phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it phaneroscopy until 1904.) 
I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my website 
  as a way of providing Peirce’s 
context for the quotations I’ll include. 

First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality of 
multiple  possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the general 
account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS 
 , “must begin with the formal 
assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” 
which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness 
and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial 
“indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been general. 
How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the universe”) 
could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it could have 
been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are both 
exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes continuity 
to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)

Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account of 
the   practice of the logician 
clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot be 
supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning 
 ” of the kind which is “dissected” in 
existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact 
 .” This phenomenological component is 
also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS 
 , which leads into a subtle 
account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This 
requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it 
all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments in 
logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. All 
I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out the 
recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and later 
works by Peirce.

Third, I think this “nonlinear” quality is not at all evident in a “universe 
constantly becoming more determinate”. In our universe, for instance, the state 
of things on planet Earth is no more determinate now than it was 4 billion 
years ago when the first life forms appeared. Since then, life forms have 
become more differentiated, and thus more complex, but not more determinate. 

Symbols have been determining their interpretants endlessly ever since the 
beginning, and some of those interpretants have become habits which determined 
the behaviors of innumerable beings. It’s true that determination, like time, 
proceeds in one direction only; but determination, unlike time, is strictly a 
logical process. As Peirce says in KS 
 , “the first of all logical 
principles is that the indeterminate should determine itself as best it may.” A 
synechist must acknowledge the continuity between the physical and the 
psychical, but that doesn’t mean we can ignore the difference between them, or 
between logic and physics. A one-way process of determination would be linear 
in a way that reasoning is not, and evolution too involves nonlinear dynamics. 
My hypothesis is that Peirce had greater insight into this nonlinearity in KS 
(1901) than he showd in the Cambridge lectures of 1898. 

I’m going to end this with a juxtaposition of several Peirce texts, and leave 
it to readers to think through the implications. First, this one copied from 
Jon’s post:

CSP: We look back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was 
no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to a point in the infinitely 
distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but a complete 
reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, however early, there was 
already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any assignable date in the 
future there will be some slight aberrancy from law. (CP 1.409, 1887-8)

Second, this one which I quoted previously (EP2:323, 1901):

CSP: a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of 
the absolute beginning, is a symbol.

Third, another one from KS (EP2:307):

CSP: 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[gnox]

Jon, i have a question about your slides 20 and 23.

On #20, under the heading of Objective Idealism, your proposal is that 

“Continuous/triadic semiosis is real and primordial (3ns).”

On #23, under “Defining Continuity,” you cite the “Categorial Vector: 
3ns→1ns→2ns,” (the vector of representation in Gary R's terminology), and i 
think it was at this point that you mentioned the idea of an “ur-continuity” 
which was there at the beginning in Peirce's cosmology (referring, i think, to 
his 1898 Cambridge Lectures).

I wonder whether (or how) all this can be reconciled with the cosmology Peirce 
develops in “Kaina Stoicheia”, which i barely mentioned in my CSPS presentation 
on Saturday, but which seems to me highly relevant to Objective Idealism. KS 
was written a few years after the Cambridge lectures, and Peirce does not 
explicitly mention either continuity or 3ns anywhere in KS; instead, his 
cosmology begins with indeterminacy. On EP2:322 he says:

[[CSP:] If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the 
beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction and no 
quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time, but just nothing at 
all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is determinately not A supposes 
the being of A in some mode. Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is 
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, 
is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be 
understood. What logically follows?]

The whole paragraph starting   
here in the edition of Kaina Stoicheia on my website gives Peirce's account of 
what logically follows. What he arrives at is this: “That is logical which it 
is necessary to admit in order to render the universe intelligible. And the 
first of all logical principles is that the indeterminate should determine 
itself as best it may” (EP2:324).

It is not obvious how this can be reconciled with a cosmology arising from an 
ur-continuity or a primal Thirdness. We could dismiss Kaina Stoicheia as 
anomalous among Peirce's works, or as something he changed his mind about 
later, but my preference (and i think yours, Jon) is to look for some 
continuity between KS and Peirce's other works that offer a semiotically 
realistic cosmology. I have a few ideas about this but would like to hear what 
others think before i post mine.

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Everything is actually everything else, recycled. [anon] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

[gnox]

Jon, thanks for the correction. So it’s three volumes in 5 books. I didn’t see 
any mention of the forthcoming third volume on the DeGruyter site.

 

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2023 9:12 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

 

Gary F., List:

 

Unless you are finding something that I cannot, only the first two volumes are 
currently available, although the second is in two parts (1903 Lowell Lectures 
and Logical Tracts). The third will also be in two parts (Pragmaticism and 
Correspondence), and is apparently not coming out until October 2024. In other 
words, the three volumes are actually being published as five books, three of 
which can now be purchased.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
/ twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 6:11 PM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

For those who may not know, The Logic of the Future is a 3-volume set published 
by DeGruyter, in which Ahti Pietarinen set himself the task of publishing 
everything Peirce wrote related to Existential Graphs and their applications. 

I may be attacked (as Jon was) for “advertising” Logic of the Future, but 
according to the publisher’s website all three volumes are now available, and 
there’s even a paperback version which is much cheaper than the hardcover, PDF 
or Kindle versions. These paperbacks are print-on-demand, according to 
DeGruyter, and I was surprised to discover that Amazon.ca even has some copies 
in stock! Whether that’s true in the U.S. or other countries, I don’t know. 

One thing though: entering “Logic of the Future” into the search field did not 
find the listings for the books, but I had better luck with “peirce pietarinen”.

 

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

[gnox]

For those who may not know, The Logic of the Future is a 3-volume set published 
by DeGruyter, in which Ahti Pietarinen set himself the task of publishing 
everything Peirce wrote related to Existential Graphs and their applications. 

I may be attacked (as Jon was) for “advertising” Logic of the Future, but 
according to the publisher’s website all three volumes are now available, and 
there’s even a paperback version which is much cheaper than the hardcover, PDF 
or Kindle versions. These paperbacks are print-on-demand, according to 
DeGruyter, and I was surprised to discover that Amazon.ca even has some copies 
in stock! Whether that’s true in the U.S. or other countries, I don’t know. 

One thing though: entering “Logic of the Future” into the search field did not 
find the listings for the books, but I had better luck with “peirce pietarinen”.

 

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2023 1:46 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L 

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Double Cut Rule as Iteration/Deiteration

 

Jon,

 

We have discussed this issue many times before.  R669 was the end of the line 
for Peirce's old specification of EGs.  In the next MS, R670, he deleted the 
complex encrustations that made it impossible to generalize EGs beyond two 
dimensions, and he began to replace them with a more precise and general 
foundation -- the polished and perfected specification in L231 a few weeks 
later.

 

In my article for the Semiotica issue on EGs (2011), I made the mistake of 
calling the version in R514 a tutorial, because it had been mistakenly dated 
1909 -- prior to the version  of R669 dated May 1911.   Peirce's undated draft 
in R514 and the final version in L231 (dated June 1911) is his best 
specification of EGs,Please read or reread that article:   
 https://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf 

 

And please read the section on advanced topics, which show innovations that are 
superior to later developments by other logicians, including Gerhard Gentzen 
(1935).  In that section, I showed how Peirce's version in R514 can prove an 
unsolved research problem from 1988 that was still unsolved in 1910.  Since I 
made a mistake of calling it a tutorial, that article didn't get the attention 
it deserved.  But I presented a more complete version in   
 Reasoning 
with diagrams and images, Journal of Applied Logics 5:5, 2018, pp. 987-1059.   
That article got a huge amount of attention and citations.

 

In the letter L231, which Peirce sent to Lady Welby's group, he presented a 
clean, general foundation that incorporates the innovations of R670.  In that 
same letter, he summarized issues related to his proof of pragmaticism, which 
he had been working on since 1904.  In it, he also wrote that he was trying to 
develop a method for reasoning about "stereoscopic moving images".In 
today's terminology, he was anticipating virtual reality (VR).

 

The old method with cuts cannot be generalized beyond two dimensions.  But the 
new method of shading can be extended to any number of dimensions -- including 
everything being done today with virtual reality.

 

Please stop advertising an obsolete system that Peirce had abandoned.  It's 
important to give him credit for anticipating some of the latest and greatest 
innovations of the 21st century.

 

John

 

 

  _  

From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >

 

List:

 

When explaining his system of Existential Graphs (EG), Peirce typically 
identifies five standard transformation rules--erasure, insertion, iteration, 
deiteration, and double cut. Sometimes he groups the first four into two pairs, 
erasure/insertion and iteration/deiteration. At the end of R 669 (1911), he 
calls these "illative permissions" and claims that they "will suffice to enable 
any valid deduction to be performed," while the double cut rule "ought to be 
reckoned as a permission, but it is not an illative permission, i.e. a 
permission authorizing a species of inference." Instead, he suggests that 
"since a scroll [double cut] both of whose closes are empty asserts nothing, it 
is to be imagined that there is an abundant store of empty scrolls on a part of 
the sheet that is out of sight, whence one of them can be brought into view 
whenever desired." Any graph already scribed on the sheet may then be iterated 
into the inner close of that empty double cut, followed by erasure of the 
original instance.

 

What about the reverse operation of removing a double cut with an empty outer 
close? Peirce offers a clever theoretical justification for this about five 
years earlier, in a manuscript that will be published in its entirety for the 
first time in volume 3 of Logic of the Future (R S-30[Copy T], 1906). Whereas 
"a Scroll is not a Graph and its 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

In Peirce's terms, existence is one of three modes of being. Many philosophers, 
he says, “recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or 
fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place for itself 
in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all 
other things. I call that existence. … My view is that there are three modes of 
being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at 
any time before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative 
possibility, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern 
facts in the future.” (CP 1.21,23, 1903)

 

Gary f.

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

-Original Message-
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 10-Sep-22 07:35
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

 

Jon, List,

 

Altough I see your explanation, I am not completely happy with two different 
definitions of "existence", or two different universes of experience. …

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, a feeling, in the Peircean sense we’re using here, can’t be sent or 
received, or even perceived in the way that an external object can be 
perceived. As Jon explained, it can only be prescinded from an actual 
experience, which means dropping out of consideration the usual distinctions 
between subject and object, external and internal. Firstness is called that 
because it is monadic, not dyadic or triadic. It is a quality minus the thing 
that “has” that quality, a possibility minus its instantiation. It does not 
exist. Existence is metaphysical secondness. 

Systems exist because they are “cut off” from other systems (as the etymology 
of the word suggests); they have an inside and an outside, although some of 
them are more open than others to exchanges of energy or information. 
Psychological “feelings” are actual, embodied feelings; phaneroscopic 
“feelings” are prior to actuality or embodiment. This is crucial to 
understanding the metaphysical basis of Peircean semiotic.

 

gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 30-Jun-22 18:20
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

 

 

Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling 
as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means 
something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, 
my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But 
for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate 
quality.

 

Best, Helmut

  

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >
An: "Peirce-L" mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Jack, List: 

 

When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is 
felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring 
to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It 
is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, 
which is always involved in 3ns.

 

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until 
it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in 
itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the 
contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series 
of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

 

Regards,

  

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
/ twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

  

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol. 

 

gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

  

  

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca  
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense   works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.

  

Best Regards

 

Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense   works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.

  

Best Regards

 

Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other 
species of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we 
think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the 
thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing 
regarded from different points of view. …

We must conclude, then, that the reason why different things have to be 
differently thought of is that their modes of metaphysical being are different.

Aristotle, however, failed to strike the nail squarely on the head when he said 
that generals are known by reason and singulars by sense. Generals are 
predicates. Now while the structure, not only of predicates, but of all kinds 
of thought, is known by reason, that is, by symbols, like words, the matter of 
predicates, simple predicates, is not known by reason, but by the senses and by 
other feelings. A subject of every judgment — and it is the subject par 
excellence — is a singular; and every singular, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

I see it was a mistake for me to suggest searching Turning Signs for the word 
“meaning,” since it gives well over 700 hits and most of them are distractions 
(from the project of constructing a theory of meaning) when taken out of 
context. I should have paid more attention to the Herbert Simon quote at the 
end of my post!) I was hoping that the 1909 quote from Peirce would stimulate 
some reflection on the categorial (and metaphysical) basis of how semiosis 
happens, i.e. how meaning works. But maybe Peirce’s explanation here doesn’t 
seem as clear or convincing to others as it does to me. 

Anyway I’d rather not comment on your pejorative reference to “myth,” and I’ll 
refrain from saying anything further in this thread until you or others have 
time to redirect attention to the Peirce quote and perhaps respond to it more 
directly. (It’s still included below.)

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 28-Jun-22 12:51
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] corrected post on meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

About the three modes of being in Peirces below Text: What about myths? They 
are neither products of the universal intelligible force, nor of brute action, 
nor of a feeling. In your text("by entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” 
into your search engine"), you speak of confabulation, and also of entelechy 
(the seed metaphor). Myths are confabulations, as you said due to a person´s 
lack of memory, but also due to incomplete information along with the need for 
explanation-as-justification for actions of dominance. I guess that myths 
usually are produced by the prophetical branch of a religion, and entelechies 
(true turning signs?) discovered by the spiritual branch of a religion. The 
spiritual parts of religions are much more similar with each other than the 
prophetic ones.

 

Is the sad situation of our planet, you describe at the beginning of your 
chapter, also the result of myths (like humans have to conquer the world, the 
economy must always grow)?

 

In my post I said, that for a subject, the meaning of an object is given to the 
past. A system is also a subject. Now the question above is, is the history of 
an object constructed (myth), or reconstructed (entelechy, spirituality)? And 
why does a system, that produces myths, not fail? System theories say, that a 
system has intentions, like growth, complexity, viability, 
integration...(Luhmann, Maturana, and others). But a system does not care for 
truth, only for viability. If this can be achieved with myths, the system does 
so.

With the universal system (Tapped with spirituality) it is different of course. 
So I think it is good to analyze cultural concepts´ meanings and ask, whether 
their generalities are structural parts of the benevolent universal system (the 
living intelligence), or a careless other system.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

  

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other 
species of signs. The key to 

[PEIRCE-L] corrected post on meaning

[gnox]

(My previous attempt to post this was hit by the dreaded whiteout syndrome, so 
here’s a corrected version.)

 

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other 
species of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we 
think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the 
thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing 
regarded from different points of view. …

We must conclude, then, that the reason why different things have to be 
differently thought of is that their modes of metaphysical being are different.

Aristotle, however, failed to strike the nail squarely on the head when he said 
that generals are known by reason and singulars by sense. Generals are 
predicates. Now while the structure, not only of predicates, but of all kinds 
of thought, is known by reason, that is, by symbols, like words, the matter of 
predicates, simple predicates, is not known by reason, but by the senses and by 
other feelings. A subject of every judgment — and it is the subject par 
excellence — is a singular; and every singular, as Aristotle himself says, is a 
subject. But to say that a singular is known by sense is a confusion of 
thought. It is not known by the feeling-element of sense, but by the 
compulsion, the insistency, that characterizes experience. For the singular 
subject is real; and reality is insistency. That is what we mean by “reality.” 
It is the brute irrational insistency that forces us to acknowledge the reality 
of what we experience, that gives us our conviction of any singular.

The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature 
of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence 
which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge 
of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being.

So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, 
in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric 
possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of 
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living 
intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is 
rational necessity and necessitation.

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, 
consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its 
being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is 
to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

[gnox]

Helmut and John,

It may take me awhile to respond to either or both of your posts in this 
thread, because I have less time for reading and writing than I used to, and 
I’m deliberately slowing down at both. For instance, when I first noticed an 
affinity between the Merleau-Ponty quote near the end of my mini-essay 
  and the Peircean concept of the 
phaneron, it took me almost three weeks to decide that the affinity was genuine 
enough to warrant some explication, and then to transform a previously-written 
TS point into that explication. So I expect it will be a similarly slow process 
for me to make a post-worthy response to your responses (especially since I 
haven’t read your Chapter 7 before, John). So right now I’ll just thank you 
both for your responses and leave it at that.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} The Path is fundamentally without words. We use words to reveal the Path. 
[Blue Cliff Record 25] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: 15-Jun-22 23:17
To: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

 

Gary F,

 

I enjoy browsing through your Turning Signs from time to time -- mainly because 
you put more emphasis on the questions than the answers.  Any particular 
answers can become obsolete, but questions always remain fresh.  One set of 
answers always leads to more questions.  For any truly interesting question, 
there is no such thing as  a final answer.

 

In my book, Conceptual Structures (1984), the first six chapters had a lot of 
answers.  Many of them are still quite good, but updating them would be a huge 
amount of work.  But Chapter 7 raises the questions and loose ends that were 
not answered. 

 

One reviewer said that Ch 7 seems to refute everything in the previous six 
chapters.  But it doesn't refute them.  It just points out the many loose ends 
for which the answers are incomplete.  After 38 years, much more has been 
written about those questions, but the answers are just as incomplete as they 
ever were..  The main thing that has changed is that there are now many more 
questions.

 

See below for the opening paragraph of Chapter 7 and the URL to the rest.

 

John

 

--

 

7. Limits of Conceptualization


No theory is fully understood until its limitations are recognized. To avoid 
the presumption that
conceptual mechanisms completely define the human mind, this chapter surveys 
aspects of the mind
that lie beyond (or perhaps beneath) conceptual graphs. These are the 
continuous aspects of the
world that cannot be adequately expressed in discrete concepts and conceptual 
relations.

 

http://jfsowa.com/pubs/cs7.pdf

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[PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

[gnox]

List,

The ongoing updating of points in my online book Turning Signs 
  has generated another mini-essay, this time 
connecting texts from Buddhist philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
biology and even physics with Peircean semiotic/logic and phaneroscopy. It may 
be difficult to follow for those unfamiliar with some of the above, but I’ve 
included some hyperlinks to contexts that may help to elucidate the terms and 
concepts involved. I hope it’s not too eclectic to be useful. Anyway it’s at 
Closure and Disclosure (TS ·10)   .

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve. 
[Wheeler] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

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[PEIRCE-L] diagrams and mental images in reasoning

[gnox]

According to C.S. Peirce, deductive reasoning is of a diagrammatic nature. But 
it’s not always perfectly clear what the nature of a diagram is in this context 
(which is both semiotic and psychological). I’ve just put together a mini-essay 
that aims to clarify this. Due to all the links and quotes within it, 
reformatting it as an email would be time-consuming, so I’ll just give this 
link to it:

Meaning and Modeling (TS ·9) (gnusystems.ca) 
 . This takes you to a section of 
the ‘reverse’ side of my online book Turning Signs.

Gary f.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] thoughts, signs and things

[gnox]

Hello Sally, good to hear from you!

Thich Nhat Hanh has performed great service in making Buddhist ideas and 
practices accessible to the “Western” world. Peirce’s writings refer vaguely to 
Buddhism here and there, but he didn’t have access to the translations and 
studies of Zen texts that we have now, so it’s hard to say what he would have 
thought of them. I can’t help thinking, though, that Hanh’s idea of 
“interbeing” is closely related to Peirce’s synechism, especially to the 
continuity of time. 

I also see great affinities between Peirce’s phenomenology and Dogen’s, as 
readers of Turning Signs   must have noticed. This 
comes out especially with the interplay between mediation and immediacy 
(Thirdness and Firstness, Time and Presence) in the chapter on Creation 
Evolving  . I only wish I could express it as 
clearly as Thich Nhat Hanh does.

Gary f.

} And one day you get that letter you've been waiting for forever. And 
everything it says is true. And then in the last line it says: Burn this. 
[Laurie Anderson, “Same Time Tomorrow”] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: 17-Dec-21 17:19
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] thoughts, signs and things

 

Thank you for initiating this thread, Gary.  

 

I have often thought that Thich Nhat Hanh's teachings in particular were 
closely aligned with Peirce's semiotic.  They kind of slow semiosis down to 
near stillness, but it is a Peircean semiosis that they are slowing down. 

 

When Hanh reflects on a tree, for example, and says it is more beautiful than a 
cathedral and proceeds to explain why, his understanding of the tree comes 
across as a fact of Thirdness.  He says it is beautiful because he can see 
"everything is there in the tree." He can see a cloud in the tree (why? you 
cannot have a tree without water), or  he can see the Earth in the tree (why? a 
tree could not have grown without the earth feeding it). When he finds that 
everything is there in the tree, he is recognizing the tree as a presence that 
connects him to all of these, a presence that co-presences.  The tree seems 
very much like a Peircean sign in these teachings. Perhaps it is more of a 
later Peircean sign--mediating and extending rather than "standing for."  
Perhaps it illustrates why Peirce later rejected the concept of representation 
as an apt characterization of everything he wanted to include in his notion of 
a triadic relation and turned instead to mediation.  In any case, clearly Hahn 
appreciates the indexicality inherent in the tree's being in these teachings.

 

I also find Hanh aligned with Peirce when Hahn teaches that "the present is 
made of the past" and that the future must grow from the "seeds" of the 
present.  When he says that we can "touch the past" only when we are living 
fully in the present moment--it is hard to imagine how this kind of experience 
could be anything other than irreducibly triadic.

 

With gratitude,

Sally

 

On Fri, Dec 17, 2021 at 8:56 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Since the list has been fairly quiet lately, some Peirceans might be interested 
in a newly revised part of Turning Signs which explores some of the connections 
(and apparent contradictions) among Peircean semiotics, phaneroscopy, Buddhist 
sutras and meditation practices. This part/point is here 
  — it includes so many internal links 
that I thought it better to just post the one link to the whole thing. It also 
includes an explanation of Peirce’s statement (c. 1901 
 ) that “a sign is not a real thing,” 
which has evoked some discussion on the list before, but is recontextualized 
here.

Gary f.

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[PEIRCE-L] thoughts, signs and things

[gnox]

Since the list has been fairly quiet lately, some Peirceans might be
interested in a newly revised part of Turning Signs which explores some of
the connections (and apparent contradictions) among Peircean semiotics,
phaneroscopy, Buddhist sutras and meditation practices. This part/point is
here   - it includes so many internal
links that I thought it better to just post the one link to the whole thing.
It also includes an explanation of Peirce's statement (c. 1901
 ) that "a sign is not a real
thing," which has evoked some discussion on the list before, but is
recontextualized here.

Gary f.

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[gnox]

Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final 
paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.

 

JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are 
degenerate triadic relations, reducible to their constituent dyadic relations … 
Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a 
dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 

GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball B, 
efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently causing it 
to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is dynamical, all right, 
but it is not really an interpretant simply because some intelligent being 
chooses to call it so. There are dyadic relations between A and B, and between 
B and C, but there is no triadic relation between the three of them, not even a 
degenerate one; there is only a chain of efficiently caused events. There is no 
object-interpretant relation between A and C that is in any way different from 
the relation between B and C or the relation between A and B. A sequence of 
events has a temporal order, but that’s not sufficient to create a triadic sign 
relation, in my view.

 

I think you’ve also glossed over a crucial difference between biotic and 
abiotic entities. For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will be 
passively moved, but it will not respond actively to a kick as a dog, being 
biotic, probably would. Living embodied beings, even the simplest, are complex 
adaptive systems which respond to contacts with their environments, and 
semiosically respond to signs in such a way that their interpretant responses 
are triadically related to the signs and their objects. The cells of our immune 
systems respond to other microscopic entities by distinguishing between those 
that belong to the body-system and those that don’t, and attacking the latter 
kind. The attack is certainly an interpretant, in my view. I don’t see that 
you’ve given any examples of abiotic entities doing anything comparable to that.

 

Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of 
“life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an “interpretant” to one end 
of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the chain of efficient causations 
that precede it in time. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 21-Nov-21 21:09
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

 

Gary R., List:

 

GR: But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the 
near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning than 
its modern biological one?

 

I agree that Peirce often advocates a much broader and deeper conception of 
"life" and "living," such that he might plausibly be understood as viewing 
"biotic" vs. "abiotic" semiosis to be a false dichotomy. I was simply 
highlighting the narrower conception that Champagne evidently adopts in the 
article, presumably because his purpose is to propose a rigorous criterion for 
a phenomenon to qualify as physicosemiosis, which he defines as "sign-action 
purportedly occurring at the level of purely material interactions." Consider 
how he restates his thesis near the end.

 

MC: [F]or a sign to be truly abiotic, confirmation that a sign-vehicle and 
object are abiotic does not suffice, as the interpretant which such a pair 
produces must likewise not depend on a living entity.

 

Aside from the inclusion of the problematic term "sign-vehicle," this seems 
like a reasonable limitation as far as it goes, but its validity ultimately 
hinges on what is allowed to count as an interpretant. Champagne references an 
earlier paper of his 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275293999_A_Note_on_M_Barbieri's_Scientific_Biosemiotics)
 "for more on the often misunderstood term-of-art 'interpretant.'"

 

MC: Peirce insisted that a representamen must be capable of determining an 
interpretant which will "assume the same triadic relation to its Object" ... 
such that the interpretant in question is henceforth "capable of determining a 
Third of its own" and lead interpretation to the same object. (quotations are 
from EP 2:272-273, 1903; emphasis added by Champagne)

 

In that particular text, Peirce indeed plainly maintains that the interpretant 
of every sign is another sign of the same object, which is consistent with his 
contemporaneous taxonomy for classifying signs. However, he abandons that 
position within a couple of years, after coming to recognize that a sign has 
three interpretants--immediate, dynamical, and final--and that the actual 
(dynamical) interpretant of a sign-token is not necessarily another sign but 
might instead be an exertion or a feeling (CP 4.536, 1906). In fact, he no 
longer requires a sign to have an actual (dynamical) interpretant at all-- 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[gnox]

GF: I would say that the [John Cage] score, the set of instructions for the 
performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or 
sequence of sounds) was a sign.

JAS: Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking?

GF: It’s lacking an object. It doesn’t represent anything. The performance 
interprets the score but doesn’t represent it; it simply presents itself. When 
we drop the distinction between sound and music, each sound is a percept 
without a perceptual judgment. Refraining from perceptual judgments is a 
phenomenological practice, I suppose, a way of prescinding the Secondness from 
the Thirdness of a phenomenon. Percepts are signs for psychology, but not for 
phenomenology. I see it as a meditative practice as well. John Cage’s intention 
was to make unintended music, to make available an experience uncorrupted by 
interpretation. It’s an affirmation that nature is not an artifice — which is 
what it must be if it has a narrator who deliberately selects which events to 
actualize within it in accordance with a purpose.

I wouldn’t feel at home in an artificial universe. I gather that you (and 
Peirce?) do, and maybe this gets close to the core of the differences between 
us in how we experience the world. I appreciate the signs of signlessness 
 , as some Buddhists call it. (Maybe my 
unintentional white-on-white text betrays that!)

Gary f. 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 7-Nov-21 16:48
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or 
argument?

 

Gary F., List:

 

FYI, your post once again had some white-on-white text, which I have fixed 
below.

 

GF: A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is 
not necessarily meaningful in any way.

JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" ...

GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a representation, and a 
representation is a sign. Its dynamic object is a sequence of events, and that 
object (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any way.

 

Here we have a clear example of a misinterpretation on my part--specifically, I 
misidentified the dynamical object of a sign because I misunderstood its 
immediate object. I incorrectly took the referent of the pronoun "which" to be 
"representation," so I misread your statement as, "A narrative is basically a 
representation which is not necessarily meaningful in any way." That is why I 
replied by insisting that every sign is meaningful. It turns out that you 
intended the referent of the pronoun "which" to be "sequence of events," so I 
should have read your statement as, "A narrative is basically a representation 
whose object is a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any 
way." On this, we are in agreement, since a sequence of events is not 
necessarily meaningful in itself--only by virtue of a sign about it that 
determines an interpretant, which is the meaning of that sign.

 

GF: Point a camera out a window, set it to record for an hour, go off and do 
something else, and when you return you’ll have an hour-long visual narrative 
in which no events are selected or treated as significant. Only the point of 
view and the time frame was deliberately selected.

 

Except that by deliberately selecting "the point of view and the time frame," 
one is deliberately selecting only those events that occur within the camera's 
field of view during that time frame for inclusion in the resulting visual 
narrative, thus ignoring any and all events that occur elsewhere and/or outside 
that time frame--i.e., treating the latter as insignificant relative to one's 
purpose in making the recording. In other words, I am having a hard time 
imagining anything qualifying as a narrative that is not "deliberately 
constructed" to at least this minimal extent.

 

GF: The same would apply to a recording of a concert of aleatory music: it 
represents a sequence of sonic events which can be meaningless in themselves.

 

It seems to me that this defines "meaning" too narrowly. For Peirce, any effect 
of any sign is its "meaning," namely, its interpretant. The compression and 
decompression of air molecules that constitute those "sonic events" are an 
"existential meaning"--a dynamical interpretant--of the sign token that is the 
musicians' actual performance, which is itself a dynamical interpretant of the 
score as another sign token, even if it consists only of verbal instructions 
rather than the conventional marks on a staff that convey specific notes to be 
played.

 

GF: I would say that the score, the set of instructions for the performers, was 
a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or sequence of sounds) was 
a sign.

 

Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking?

 

GF: Some of my favorite music is, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[gnox]

Jon, list,

GF: A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is 
not necessarily meaningful in any way.

JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign …

GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a representation, and a 
representation is a sign. Its dynamic object is a sequence of events, and that 
object (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any way. The mere 
fact of being represented does not make anything meaningful. This is how I 
distinguish sequences from consequences. I do not believe that everything that 
happens is a sign with its own object(s) and interpretant(s). Perhaps we 
disagree on that point.

JAS: … so constructing a narrative involves deliberately selecting and 
demarcating which events in the sequence to include rather than ignore--i.e., 
which events to treat as significant.

GF: Yes, that’s true, to the extent that the narrative is deliberately 
constructed, as of course a fictional narrative or documentary film usually is. 
A narrative constructed for some purpose can also be an argument, or perhaps a 
quasi-argument if it doesn’t “separately show what interpretant it is intended 
to determine” (EP2:204). But narratives in the basic sense I’m using are not 
necessarily deliberately constructed. Point a camera out a window, set it to 
record for an hour, go off and do something else, and when you return you’ll 
have an hour-long visual narrative in which no events are selected or treated 
as significant. Only the point of view and the time frame was deliberately 
selected. 

The same would apply to a recording of a concert of aleatory music: it 
represents a sequence of sonic events which can be meaningless in themselves. I 
attended a John Cage concert at the University of Rochester in 1965. 
Afterwards, one of my professors asked to see the score. Cage replied “It’s 
verbal.” I would say that the score, the set of instructions for the 
performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or 
sequence of sounds) was a sign. Since then I’ve never felt that a musical 
composition was necessarily a sign with an “emotional interpretant.” Some of my 
favorite music is, to me at least, quite meaningless, because what I’m hearing 
in it is pure Secondness, quite innocent of Thirdness (unless you count the 
time it takes as Thirdness). Likewise I think a narrative doesn’t have to be an 
argument. A friend of mine is a fan of plotless novels; and it seems to me that 
the universe as sign can be a narrative without being an argument. 

JAS: For better or for worse, a good story can often be more persuasive than a 
sound argument.

GF: Yes indeed. Especially if the person hearing the story is not conscious of 
being persuaded.

Gary f.

} O Loud, hear the wee beseech of thees of each of these thy unlitten ones! 
[Finnegans Wake 259] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 6-Nov-21 17:22
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or 
argument?

 

Gary F., Gary R., List:

 

GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an argument?

 

An argument is a specific kind of sign as distinguished from a proposition or a 
name in that it distinctly represents its interpretant, namely, its conclusion 
(CP 2.95, 1902). Accordingly, I suggest that the question is really whether a 
narrative qualifies as an argument, or is merely a copulative proposition. If 
"every true poem is a sound argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:194, 1903), then it is at 
least plausible that a narrative could also be an argument. But what exactly is 
a true poem as opposed to a false poem? Is the latter still an argument, though 
presumably an unsound one? Is a true narrative likewise a sound argument, while 
a false narrative is an unsound argument? What about a fictional narrative?

 

GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.)

 

Peirce maintains that "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work 
of art, a great poem--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony" (ibid). 
My proposed argumentation for the reality of God relies on the semeiotic 
principle that every sign must be determined by an object that is external to, 
independent of, and unaffected by that sign itself--namely, its dynamical 
object. Of course, a case for the same conclusion could also be made on the 
basis that every work of art requires an artist, every poem requires a poet, 
and every symphony requires a composer. Likewise, if the entire universe is 
conceived as "a single grand narrative," then it seems to me that it requires a 
narrator.

 

GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html): A 
narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way.

 

On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,

Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example. 

My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.

Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a   meaning space. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.

Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument ( 
 Peirce).

A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.

However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have  
 conscious purposes, they have 
motivations or intentions which can be read as natural signs or tokens of some 
type of “purpose”, or as intimations of Thirdness in the universe.

Consequently I think that in calling the universe a narrative, Raposa is not 
denying that the universe is an argument or has a purpose, he is merely leaving 
that question open. A kind of agnosticism, perhaps.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 5-Nov-21 20:53
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary R., Phyllis, List:

 

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway 
token is ...

 

I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the 
semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English 
term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when 
"subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token 
of that type.

 

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

 

The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed 
thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The 
object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it 
is about.

 

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the 
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the 
dream, I would expect).

 

Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream 
itself is still an actual thought-token. After all, the events that take place 
in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written story is still 
an actual text-token.

 

GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out 
of the blue" as the expression has it.

 

It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a definitely 
significant form; and it would still be about something other than itself, 
namely, its object. It would also be a 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, Gary R, List,

Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my 
internal editor.

JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken word that is a token. It 
would follow that the three words in the different languages are subtypes, not 
tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” 
This implies a hierarchy of types but not of tokens.

I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to external signs. In 
his October 1995 Monist article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under which 
designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external signs)” (CP 
5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied 
here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just 
as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on 
a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to 
others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call 
it a type.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary F., List:

 

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

 

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

 

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, list,

JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …

GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!). 

Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which 
Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type 
(Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? 
I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather 
not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once.

By the way, some years ago I did   a slideshow 
dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a 
Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” 
of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs  
 here, in a passage leading up to a 
discussion of the “categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 3-Nov-21 13:18
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative 
semeiotic for interpreting texts)

 

Gary F., List:

 

I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens as 
two different signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term here) of the 
same sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with 
Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is 
either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea 
that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens, which can (and 
often do) have different tones. In other words, a sign involves types, which 
involve tokens, which involve tones.

 

After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of 
such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states that every 
individual utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same representamen" 
even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in different languages; 
and that the same is true of every individual instance of a certain diagram, 
picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as every individual weathercock (CP 
5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says that its individual 
embodiments are existents governed by the general type, such that each of them 
conforms to that type (CP 8.313, 1905).

 

One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant? I am 
inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" when it 
is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is a sign 
token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be capable of 
determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of conforming to a 
type that has an immediate (internal) interpretant.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon,

GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere 
replica or copy of the sign.

JAS: That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems 
inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text 
is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered text is 
translated every single time it is read or heard, thus producing another 
dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously translatable as well as 
replicable. What am I missing?

GF: My previous statement assumes that the type is one sign and its embodiment 
(the token, the existing “text”) is another. Your perception of inconsistency 
is based on the assumption that type and token are not two “signs” but one. 
Both assumptions are arbitrary  . That’s 
all.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 31-Oct-21 21:05
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: So when you refer to the three interpretants of the one sign, you are 
thinking of “type” and “token” as aspects of the one sign, not as different 
signs ...

 

Although I would not call them "aspects," this is basically where I landed 
after wrestling for a while with the ambiguity of "sign" throughout Peirce's 
writings on semeiotic. However, I would not be surprised to discover that there 
are problematic elements of my resulting speculative grammar that I have not 
yet fully recognized.

 

In summary, every sign has one final interpretant that is common to all its 
types and all their tokens, every type has one immediate interpretant that is 
common to all its tokens, and every token has one dynamical interpretant for 
each distinct effect of it. The underlying diagrammatic conception is that the 
sign itself is a continuum of three dimensions for an argument, two dimensions 
for a proposition, or one dimension for a name. Its types are portions of the 
same dimensionality, and its tokens are discrete points within those portions 
where different spaces, surfaces, and lines intersect.

 

GF: ... so the proposition and its embodiment (sinsign) are one sign, not two.

 

Each actual expression of the proposition is one token of one sign in 
accordance with one type. Another expression of the proposition in the same 
language is a different token of the same sign in accordance with the same 
type. An expression of the proposition in a different language is a different 
token of the same sign in accordance with a different type.

 

GF: Does the presumable tone aspect of a sign not get interpreted at all?

 

I understand a tone to be a quality of a token that affects its dynamical 
interpretants. Two tokens of the same type, but with different tones, can thus 
have different dynamical interpretants. Examples of tones in this sense include 
voice inflections, punctuation marks, and font changes for emphasis such as 
bold, italics, or underline.

 

As you probably know, Marc Champagne takes a very different approach in his 
2018 book, Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs. He employs "tone" for the 
qualitative presentation of a sign and "type" for each different meaning that 
it can have. In his example, "Because of his long fast, he was too weak to 
stand fast or hold fast or even to run fast," he thus counts one tone, four 
tokens, and three types. While this seems like a potentially useful 
distinction, I do not see how it is at all compatible with Peirce's explicit 
definitions of a type as "a definitely significant Form" and a tone as "[a]n 
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice" (CP 4.537, 1906; 
emphasis mine).

 

GF: Do all signs have both type and token aspects, or only legisigns?

 

My understanding of Peirce's different sign taxonomies is that 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign in 1903 is virtually synonymous with tone/token/type 
in 1906, such that the latter terminology effectively replaces the former. That 
is why, as you might have noticed, I generally avoid the earlier terms and 
stick with the later ones. In any case, I do lean toward all signs having both 
types and tokens, including natural signs as well as uttered signs. For 
example, ripples on the surface of a lake are a type of a natural sign that 
indicates the direction of the wind, which is embodied in a token wherever 
there are actual ripples on the surface of an actual lake.

 

GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere 
replica or copy of the sign.

 

That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems inconsistent 
with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text is only 
replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered text is 
translated every single time it is read or heard, thus producing another 
dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously translatable 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon AS,

JAS: Again, I tend to think of an immediate interpretant as an interpretant of 
a type, each dynamical interpretant as an interpretant of a token, and the 
final interpretant as the interpretant of the sign. Any given proposition 
(sign) has a certain final interpretant, formulations of it in different 
languages and other systems of signs such as EGs (types) have somewhat 
different immediate interpretants, and each utterance of it (token) can have 
very different dynamical interpretants in the minds of different interpreters.

GF: OK, I missed that somehow. So when you refer to the three interpretants of 
the one sign, you are thinking of “type” and “token” as aspects of the one 
sign, not as different signs; so the proposition and its embodiment (sinsign) 
are one sign, not two. I’ve never thought of it that way, and I’m not sure I 
want to … but it raises some questions: Does the presumable tone aspect of a 
sign not get interpreted at all? Do all signs have both type and token aspects, 
or only legisigns?

GF: A proposition as defined by Peirce is translatable as well as replicable. A 
printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable, and an 
interpretant is a kind of translation, in my view.

JAS: How are you (and Peirce) defining "translatable" and "replicable" here? 
When someone reads or hears a printed, written, or uttered text, is the 
resulting dynamical interpretant in that person's mind a translation or a 
replication?

GF: As for Peirce, I’m relying on the definition of proposition that I quoted 
earlier in this thread from CP 8.313. By a replica I mean simply a copy, in the 
sense that all printed copies of a published book are copies of the one book, 
all essentially identical except in numerical identity. (Peirce of course used 
“replica” as a technical term in his 1903 lectures and writings about both 
signs and graphs.) A translation of a text is embodied differently from the 
text, e.g. it’s in a different language, but is more or less recognizable to 
anyone who knows both languages as a translation, i.e. as a rendering of the 
same symbol that determined the embodiment of the original text. (And the more 

recognizable it is, the more we judge it to be a good translation.) So in that 
sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of 
the sign. I don’t consider a copy of a written, printed or vocally uttered text 
to be an interpretant of it. 

This thread is reminding me of the parenthetical remark Peirce made in R 1476:

CSP: It is by a patient examination of the various modes (some of them quite 
disparate) of interpretations of signs and of the connections between these (an 
exploration in which one ought, if possible, to provide himself with a guide, 
or, if that cannot be, to prepare his courage to see one conception that will 
have to be mastered peering over the head of another, and soon another peering 
over that, and so on, until he shall begin to think there is to be no end of 
it, or that life will not be long enough to complete the study) that …

GF: That’s a replica, not an interpretant.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 30-Oct-21 12:28
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: I was referring not to the metaphysical priorities but to the methodical 
focus on “individual signs” as opposed to the sign-systems made of “connected 
signs.”

 

As I see it, any sign-system comprised of connected signs must be treated as 
one sign in order to talk meaningfully about its two objects and three 
interpretants. That is all I mean by an "individual sign" from a methodological 
standpoint.

 

GF: In your final paragraph here, I notice a terminological change from 
“individual” to “particular” and “quasi-individual,” and I don’t think you’ve 
confirmed my assumption that an “individual sign” must be a sinsign (e.g. the 
“embodiment” or “replica” of a proposition, as opposed to the proposition 
itself).

 

Yes, I am still trying to figure out the best terminology here because you are 
correct that a truly individual sign technically must be a token, "A Single 
event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or 
a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of 
time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and 
where it does" (CP 4.537, 1906).

 

GF: Anyway I’m still inclined to think that the interpretant of a proposition 
is really of the proposition itself rather than being an interpretant of the 
existent sinsign which embodies it.

 

Again, I tend to think of an immediate interpretant as an interpretant of a 
type, each dynamical interpretant as an interpretant of a token, and the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon,

JAS: In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be 
"bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any 
individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, 
since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is 
always continuous.

I was referring not to the metaphysical priorities but to the methodical focus 
on “individual signs” as opposed to the sign-systems made of “connected signs.” 

In your final paragraph here, I notice a terminological change from 
“individual” to “particular” and “quasi-individual,” and I don’t think you’ve 
confirmed my assumption that an “individual sign” must be a sinsign (e.g. the 
“embodiment” or “replica” of a proposition, as opposed to the proposition 
itself). That doesn’t change my description of your method as “bottom-up.” 

Anyway I’m still inclined to think that the interpretant of a proposition is 
really of the proposition itself rather than being an interpretant of the 
existent sinsign which embodies it. A proposition as defined by Peirce is 
translatable as well as replicable. A printed, written or uttered text is only 
replicable, not translatable, and an interpretant is a kind of translation, in 
my view. But maybe this is nothing but a terminological quibble.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 29-Oct-21 13:59
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: I was thinking that my top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on 
the “connected signs theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn 
out to be complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to 
the complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that 
doesn’t work.

 

In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" 
rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign 
that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we 
arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is always 
continuous.

 

GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a 
discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants?

 

Which three interpretants do you have in mind? Again, I see the communicational 
and effectual interpretants respectively as the immediate and dynamical 
interpretants of the uttered sign, determinations of the commind and the 
interpreter's mind; and I see the intentional interpretant as a dynamical 
interpretant of previous signs, determinations of the utterer's mind that are 
connected such that they can have that one actual interpretant (CP 4.550). More 
generally, I have suggested in the past that the immediate interpretant 
pertains to each type of a sign, the dynamical interpretant to each token of a 
type, and the final interpretant to the sign itself--the idea being that one 
sign can have different types within different sign systems, such as "man" in 
English vs. "homme" in French--but I might need to rethink that theoretical 
scheme in light of recent discussions.

 

GF: That would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one 
interpretant of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no 
matter how.” Is this another consequence of the connected signs theorem? If so, 
could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects (immediate and 
dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect continuum" has only 
one?

 

No, I believe that every sign--including the entire universe, conceived as "a 
vast representamen" that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs"--has two objects and three interpretants, but I did not 
attempt to sort them out in that post 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). The 
immediate object is internal to the sign, the object as represented in that 
sign, while the dynamical object is external to the sign, the object as it is 
in itself. The immediate interpretant is internal to the sign, the interpretant 
as represented in that sign, while the dynamical interpretant is any actual 
effect of that sign and the final interpretant is the ideal effect of that 
sign. I have my own opinions about the external correlates in the case of the 
entire universe, but they tend to be controversial and are not essential to the 
topic of this thread.

 

GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other 
general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication.

 

At the risk of belaboring the point, the most salient general principle here is 
that we can only discuss objects and interpretants in relation to a particular 
sign. In other words, the first step of semeiotic analysis is always 
demarcating the sign of 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon AS,

Evidently the two 1906 texts we’ve been discussing got fused or “welded” in my 
quasi-mind. And meanwhile the sign you had uttered failed to fulfill its 
function because the minds of utterer and interpreter were not fused into a 
commens “at the outset” (EP2:478). I was thinking that my top-down approach to 
these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on 
“Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up 
approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves 
and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work.

Let me try to extract a principle or two from this failure so that I can learn 
something from it.

JAS: … the uttered sign … is clearly a token in this context, not a type. As 
such, it is an individual sign that determines an individual dynamical 
interpretant in the individual quasi-mind that is the quasi-interpreter, which 
is what I sometimes call an individual event of semiosis.

GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a 
discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants? That 
would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant 
of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is 
this another consequence of the connected signs theorem?

If so, could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects 
(immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect 
continuum" has only one? I’m referring here to this (from your Semiosic 
Synechism post):

JAS: Therefore, the entire universe as a vast argument is not a static sign 
that is built up of discrete propositions that are built up of discrete names, 
it is an ongoing inferential process--a semiosic "perfect continuum" (CP 4.642, 
1908), whose "material parts" are its connected constituent signs including all 
"external representations" (CP 6.174, 1908). In other words, it is "top-down" 
such that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis, rather than 
"bottom-up" such that the parts are real and the whole is an ens rationis.

GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other 
general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication. 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 28-Oct-21 15:54
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the 
uttered sign itself.

JAS: To what other sign could he be referring in that passage?

GF: I’ll quote the entire passage below, but first we have to resolve the 
ambiguity introduced with  the term "uttered sign."

 

You did not quote CP 4.551, you quoted EP 2:478. Here is the actual referenced 
passage.

 

CSP: We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a 
sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a 
Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. 
Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a 
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in 
the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so 
to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a 
necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. 
(CP 4.551, 1906)

 

As I said yesterday, paraphrasing the third and fourth quoted sentences, every 
sign has a quasi-utterer and a quasi-interpreter, and those two quasi-minds are 
at one in the sign itself--namely, the specific sign that is uttered by the 
quasi-utterer and interpreted by the quasi-interpreter. This is what I mean by 
the uttered sign, and there really is no ambiguity--it is clearly a token in 
this context, not a type. As such, it is an individual sign that determines an 
individual dynamical interpretant in the individual quasi-mind that is the 
quasi-interpreter, which is what I sometimes call an individual event of 
semiosis. Here is Peirce's description earlier in the same article 
("Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism").

 

CSP: A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that 
one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any 
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring 
just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a 
single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (CP 
4.537)

 

Nevertheless, exactly how we mark off each of these individual constituents of 
semiosis is a somewhat arbitrary artifact of the analysis because the real 
process is continuous. For example, what we are currently discussing is a 
single reading of a single text, which obviously 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jack, I'm not sure what you mean by "consubstantiality" - maybe the language
and the language-using bodymind being of the same substance, or the same
kind of agency? Peirce does seem to assert that, and I've applied the idea
in my book, but I don't know that it's scientifically testable.

When I said that the object was the "key constituent of the commens", I
meant that it's the one on which attention is focussed consciously. The
shared language has to be functioning implicitly. We don't think about the
the grammatical principles which govern what we say while we are saying it.
But I guess that was an infelicitous way of expressing the idea. 

Gary f.

 

From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY  
Sent: 28-Oct-21 13:42
To: 'Peirce-L' ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative
semeiotic for interpreting texts

 

Gary F, List,

 

Hi Gary, I'm not sure what prompted the current topic, but I think that when
discussing dialogism and Peirce we come closest to the most pragmatic frame
of reference which it is possible to establish within a Peircean framework. 

 

GF: It is therefore the object, and not the shared language, that is the key
constituent of the commens, "that mind into which the minds of utterer and
interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take
place."

 

Whilst I agree with this quite broadly, I would just like to prod you a
little. My own reading suggests that it is a mixture of the two (a basically
dialectical relationship between shared language and Object) which is the
"key constituent of the commens". That is, imagine the Saussurean langue for
a moment and take it as unideal - as asymmetrical. If our means of decoding
a "shared" language vary according to unique, though overlapping, contextual
conditions (collateral experience) which surround the acquisition of
language, then there is scope within Saussure's framework for the role of a
Peircean object. 

 

I wonder, also, what your thoughts are regarding consubstantiality -- of
language as volitional movement which seeks to index objective relations
which are never, or quite rarely, contained within language itself? 

 

Interesting topic which dovetails nicely with some of my own research right
now. 

 

Best

 

Jack

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon AS, List,

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the 
uttered sign itself.

JAS: To what other sign could he be referring in that passage?

GF: I’ll quote the entire passage below, but first we have to resolve the 
ambiguity introduced with  the term “uttered sign.” In my view, Peirce is 
referring in that passage to the symbol, the legisign, which is embodied in the 
“individual sign,” the fully determinate text or “utterance,” which is a 
sinsign. Here I am applying to the text a distinction which Peirce applies to a 
proposition in this excerpt from a 1905 letter to James:

CSP: … according to me, reality is a conception that every man has because it 
is involved in every proposition; and since every man makes assertions he deals 
with propositions. (Of course, I have not fully defined a proposition, because 
I have not discriminated the proposition from the individual sign which is the 
embodiment of the proposition. By a proposition, as something which can be 
repeated over and over again, translated into another language, embodied in a 
logical graph or algebraical formula, and still be one and the same 
proposition, we do not mean any existing individual object but a type, a 
general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals 
conform.) (CP 8.313)

GF: If we need a name for the legisign or type which is embodied in a text, 
let’s call it the Thought. Since the Thought is dialogic, it is continuous with 
the rest of the dialogue, the one sign in which all the connected signs 
(Thoughts) of the dialogue are embedded. I consider the text to be of a lower 
dimensionality than the dialogue because the text, having been uttered, is 
static, while the dialogue is not — and neither is the Thought (a portion of 
the dialogue), because its embodiment is not yet fully determined. It is on the 
way to its final interpretant, which (as we have agreed) is an ideal and not an 
individual sign that will exist. This Thought is what is “conveyed” in a moment 
of communication.

Now if we re-read that paragraph from the 1906 letter to Welby with the 
understanding that the Thought (and not the utterance or text which embodies 
it) is the sign in question, we can more easily see how its three interpretants 
are related:

CSP: There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the 
mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of 
the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, 
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in 
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. This I proceed to 
explain.

GF: For now I will just make two more comments on this. First, the commens 
consists of all that is well understood between the two communicants at the 
outset of the moment of communication. In the top-down view of communication 
which I am proposing, the Cominterpretant (and the fusing of minds) does not 
follow after the other two interpretants; nor does the Effectual Interpretant 
follow the Intentional, because these “determinations” are not individual 
interpretants any more than the Thought is an individual sign. That’s why 
Peirce says that “There is” the Intentional, the Effectual and the 
Cominterpretant, without assigning any temporal or logical order to them.  

Second, Peirce proceeds to explain the commens with this sentence: “No object 
can be denoted unless it be put into relation to the object of the commens.” As 
I’ve said earlier in this thread, the object of the text or individual sign has 
to be also the object of the Thought, and of the whole dialogue, if the 
dialogue is genuine. This is the object that the partners in a dialogue have to 
direct their joint attention to if they are really communicating. It is 
therefore the object, and not the shared language, that is the key constituent 
of the commens, “that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have 
to be fused in order that any communication should take place.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Oct-21 15:39



Gary F., List:

 

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the 
uttered sign itself.

 

To what other sign could he be referring in that passage? Every sign has a 
quasi-utterer and a quasi-interpreter, and those two quasi-minds are at one in 
the sign itself--namely, the specific sign that is uttered by the quasi-utterer 
and interpreted by the quasi-interpreter.

 

GF: Indeed, by your own reasoning, I don’t see how a determination of the mind 
of the interpreter can be included in a discrete sign whose utterance precedes 
the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Gary R, thanks for introducing this quote into the thread:

CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic 
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the 
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we 
think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be 
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? CP 
2.107 

Indeed, I think the pragmatic result of this conversation should be to bring 
greater self-control to our interpretive habits, and that requires 
psychological realism as well as logical rigor.

JAS: According to Peirce, the intentional, effectual, and communicational (or 
com-) interpretants are determinations of the mind of the utterer, the mind of 
the interpreter, and the commens (or commind), respectively (EP 2:478). He does 
not say that the first two interpretants/determinations are "welded" into the 
third interpretant/determination, he says that the first two (quasi-)minds are 
"welded" into the third (quasi-)mind in the uttered sign itself (CP 4.551).

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the 
uttered sign itself. Indeed, by your own reasoning, I don’t see how a 
determination of the mind of the interpreter can be included in a discrete sign 
whose utterance precedes the effectual interpretant. In the language of 
“Peirce’s Topical Continuum”, the uttered sign is of a lower dimensionality 
than the continuous dialogue of which it is a part, which is itself an 
argument. An uttered sign can be regarded (in binocular vision) either as a 
topical singularity in the continuum (a break in it) or as a “limit” which 
joins two portions of the continuum. 

The way I see it, a communicative dialogue, if genuine, must be the sign of 
higher dimensionality which includes all three (intentional, effectual, and 
communicational) interpretants. I guess that would make them all immediate 
interpretants, since they are all in the sign? But I’m finding it hard to 
breathe in this rarified atmosphere of abstractions, so I’d better stop now 
before I expire.

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 26-Oct-21 17:50
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman ; Jon Alan Schmidt 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F, Jon A.S., List,

 

The introduction of psychological considerations into this discussion is, I 
think, important, posing perhaps some interesting challenges for Peirce's 
logic. 

 

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously distinct and welded into one mind in the 
sign, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one 
sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and 
interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? There is no relation of 
antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and 
interpretant.

GF: This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted 
above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a 
binocular vision   (both logical and 
psychological) of semiosis. . . Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own 
explanation.

That "loose talk" includes, however, this rather telling 'binocular' comment:  

"Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of 
Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. ( 
 CP 4.551, 1906)

 

Yet even here the psychology/logic distinction is adumbrated, for dialogic, 
Peirce writes, is a mere fact for psychology, but a necessity for logic. 

That passage in turn reminded me of this remark by Peirce to the effect that 
approaching research into Speculative Rhetoric his rule of excluding 
psychological content could be relaxed in the interest of making the last 
branch of logic as semeiotic "practically useful."  

 

CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic 
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the 
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we 
think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be 
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? CP 
2.107 


A few years ago Ben Udell and I contributed a short chapter, "Logic is rooted 
in the social principle, and vice versa" in a volume, Charles Sanders Peirce in 
His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, edited by 
Torkild Thellefsen and Ben Sorensen. I had long been intrigued by the 
juxtaposition of these two snippets of Peirce. . .


1. Logic is rooted in the social principle. CP 2.653 

2. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.CP 5.354

 

. . . and the invitation to contribute a chapter to that volume offered the 
opportunity to think more deeply on 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon AS, List,

JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including both 
motivation and intention, cannot be any interpretant of the sign that is 
currently being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that such determinations 
must pertain somehow to the object of that sign, since they are antecedent to 
it.

GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an 
interpretant of the dialogue in which he was currently engaged, which continues 
both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is not an 
isolated sign.

CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be 
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least 
two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these 
two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless 
be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not 
merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical 
evolution of thought should be dialogic. (CP 4.551 
 , 1906)

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously distinct and welded into one mind in the 
sign, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one 
sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and 
interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? There is no relation of 
antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and 
interpretant.

This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted above 
may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a binocular 
vision   (both logical and psychological) 
of semiosis. (Follow that link for an explanation relevant to 21st-Century 
concerns.) Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own explanation:

JAS: I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as 
well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that ... 
[the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). This 
"co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each interpreter 
because connecting the same uttered sign with a different interpreter's mind 
results in a system that constitutes a different new sign.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 25-Oct-21 19:04
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., Helmut, List:

 

Your longer Peirce quotation below brings to mind his famous opening remarks in 
"The Fixation of Belief"--"Few persons care to study logic, because everybody 
conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But 
I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and 
does not extend to that of other men" (CP 5.358, EP 1:109, 1877). It is also 
consistent with his observation that we reconstruct argumentations consisting 
of discrete premisses and conclusions only in retrospect, since the real 
inferential process is continuous (CP 2.27, 1902).

 

GF: With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” 
with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes.

 

That might be appropriate for psychology, but as applied to the object and 
interpretant in speculative grammar, Peirce states repeatedly that "immediate" 
simply means "as the sign represents it." This explains why his late taxonomies 
for sign classification include trichotomies according to the mode of 
presentation of the immediate object and interpretant vs. the mode of being of 
the dynamical object and interpretant (and the purpose of the final/normal 
interpretant), as well as additional divisions according to the sign's dyadic 
relations with the dynamical object and interpretant (and final/normal 
interpretant) but not with the immediate object and interpretant.

 

GF: But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a text 
also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine what gets 
selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is generated.

 

As I said before, I have had trouble accounting for this undeniable aspect of 
real semiosis. Where do the interpreter's established habits of interpretation 
come into play, such that the uttered sign determines his/her mind to this 
particular dynamical interpretant rather than another one? How does Peirce's 
theory of signs explain the fact that there can be (and often are) different 
dynamical interpretants--some of which are clearly misinterpretations--that are 
determined by the same uttered sign, which has the same immediate and final 
interpretants?

 

I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as well. 
The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that ... [the] 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[gnox]

We should mention that John Sowa quoted part of R 602 back on August 16 (Re: 
[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25 (mail-archive.com) 
 ), 
claiming that it contradicted “ADT’s slide 25”. There was some follow-up 
discussion (which I think did not bear out that claim). But it’s good to have a 
more complete transcription, which shows that the whole manuscript is an 
explanation of why phaneroscopy has to precede the normative sciences in the 
classification. By the way there is a PDF of the manuscript at 
https://www.unav.es/gep/MS602.pdf. 

 

Gary F.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 25-Oct-21 13:51
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of 
normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

 

Robert, List:

 

Indeed, Peirce likely wrote R 602 no earlier than 1904 since it uses his new 
name "phaneroscopy" for the distinct science in question, mainly to distinguish 
it from Hegel's "phenomenology." Its contents appear to be fully consistent 
with his mature classification, including the dependence of phaneroscopy on 
mathematics for principles.

 

Moreover, just as "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of 
mathematics," likewise "in order successfully to prosecute the study of logic, 
we ought to prepare the ground by a preliminary study of ethics in general" (R 
602:8-9). Again, this is a major revision of the early classifications in R 
1345, which situate ethics as the first branch of pragmatics--below not only 
logic, but also metaphysics and all the special sciences as the branches of 
empirics.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 10:15 AM robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Jon Alan, List

 

Jon Alan, perhaps this classification - which I extract from MS 602 - will 
leave you less perplexed. First, because of its date (1902-1908 according to 
Robin, 16 p.), and second, because of the extreme accuracy and clarity of its 
exposition. I have not finished examining all of them, but for the moment, this 
one is the best I have come across. But I have no doubt that your extreme rigor 
of thought will find at least one asperity to catch some powerful criticism, 
because that is how science works  I add as an attachment my transcription 
of the whole MS.

 


  ...beginning of the quote 
.

MS0602_012

[M 12] [ ...] But preliminary to normative sciences, which is essentially 
classificatory, -stop to take that well in, I beg you, gentle reader, there 
should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the different 
indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is conceivably 
possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be varied and 
combined. This science I hesitate to call phenomenology  after Hegel, for fear 
of marring his peculiar conception of it; and therefore , though  I think it is 
essentially the same thing under a somewhat different aspect, I will name 
Phaneroscopy. It is the science of the different elementary constituents of all 
ideas. Its material

MS0602_013

[M 13] is, of course, universal experience, -experience I mean of the fanciful 
and the abstract, as well as of the concrete and real. Yet to suppose that in 
such experience the elements were to be found already separate would be to 
suppose unimaginable and selfcontradictory. They must be separated by a process 
of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand. They must be picked 
out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter; and therefore it is 
that phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of mathematics. 
[emphasize mine]

With this remark our ladder of the sciences is completed and may be exhibited 
in tabula form as follows:

MS0602_014

[M 14]   HEURETIC SCIENCE

MATHEMATICS

  CENOSCOPY

   Phaneroscopy

   Normative Science 

Esthetics

Ethics 

Logic

  Metaphysics

   IDIOSCOPY

  PhysiognosyPsychognosy

  Nomology   Nomology

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jerry R, Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which will 
surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, though, that 
my own internal context for thinking about these matters is weighted toward the 
psychological perspective on them. Peirce was always careful not to base his 
logic, or his semeiotic, on psychological theories — but his work “betrays” 
plenty of psychological insight. Jerry’s response to my earlier post gave added 
emphasis to this one: “In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, 
yourself, and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, 
you would believe” (EP2:2). Another one appears here:

CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that 
this is largely illusory: they are much less guided by reason, much more guided 
by instinct, than they seem to themselves to be; because their reasonings are 
prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts 
they are hardly aware of, except later when they come to review their conduct. 
Even then, they are so immersed in instinct that they are hardly able to 
perceive it. (R 410:1–2, c. 1894)

In our time, cognitive science and social psychology have taken this a step 
further with the study of “motivated cognition” and “motivated reasoning 
 ”, which shows that our 
conscious reasoning itself is driven by subconscious motivations and 
intentions, or “instincts” as Peirce called them. Jonathan Haidt encapsulates 
this in the metaphor of the elephant (instinctive motivation or intuitive 
judgment) and the rider (reason): the rider may think he controls the elephant, 
but much of our reasoning is a more or less desperate attempt to rationalize 
our actions or our intuitive beliefs. And many of our intuitive beliefs are 
determined by conformity to the beliefs of some group that we belong to, or 
wish to belong to. This is one reason why your neighbors are yourself, as 
Peirce put it. 

“Motivated reasoning” often leads to the “hypocrisy” that Jerry mentioned, 
among other effects on communication between humans. For an obvious example, 
just consider a typical campaign speech by any politician. But we all act this 
way in matters that we care about, and getting to the Truth (or Final 
Interpretant) is not always our prime motivation, even in a process of inquiry. 
Often it takes some effort to make it prevail over other motivations.

With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” with 
spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. When it comes to 
Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants, this bias of mine may be hard to 
reconcile with Jon’s more purely semiotic definitions.

JAS: As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the sign. As 
I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of possible 
understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise 
it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules 
of grammar for the language in which it is written.

GF: OK, that fits with the Firstness and indeterminacy of the first in a triad 
of interpretants. But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter 
reading a text also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine 
what gets selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is 
generated. And that selection itself tends to be pre-conscious or “immediate” 
in my psychological sense of the word. The reader may even be subconsciously 
motivated to overlook “the syntax and other rules of grammar” and the external 
context of the text when constructing a dynamic interpretant.

Peirce's theories and applications of those theories, whether directly quoted, 
paraphrased or summarized, come out of a context which (for us) is the whole 
body of Peirce's extant work. That work came out of an even larger context, 
which is the whole body of scientific discourse extending at least from the 
time of Aristotle up to Peirce's lifetime. In order to situate his work in that 
larger context, Peirce had to internalize it, to develop an implicit 
understanding of it which served as the internal context of his explicit 
thoughts. Likewise, students of Peirce internalize an understanding of Peirce 
which is vastly simplified in comparison with the totality of Peirce's work. It 
may include a few familiar quotations which are represented in memory more or 
less accurately, but onboard memory is limited. Attentively reading or 
re-reading the texts themselves in their original context will normally modify, 
in some measure, the reader's internalized understanding of the author – unless 
the reader is more motivated to find confirmations 
  of his or her prior 
understanding.

As for the Intentional Interpretant of a Peirce 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted Peirce’s 
Logic Notebook:

CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, explicitly or 
implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the intended interpretant. 
So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate 
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of 
another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign. (R 
339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2)

I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term “Intentional 
Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce introduced three or 
four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them for different analytical 
purposes, so that they might well overlap in their reference to a given 
situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on the communicative function 
of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he seems to be more focused on, well, 
logic (as semeiotic). The Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be 
the basic one for logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless.

Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own internal 
contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the case in 
verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant as Peirce 
defines it can be internal both to the sign itself and to the utterer, so that 
it is an Immediate Interpretant as well as an Intentional Interpretant. The 
same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign can also be part of the 
interpreter's internal context, as his more or less intuitive sense of what the 
utterer's intention was in uttering the sign.

If a semiosic process is continuous, as you have argued in another thread, then 
the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of analysis: they 
are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On the psychological 
side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between people are likewise 
indeterminate and arbitrary:

 

CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all you.’ 
If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. In 
the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater 
measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. Really, 
the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the 
vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men who resemble you and 
are in analogous circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in 
the same way in which your neighbors are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)

 

Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a continuous 
semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would communication 
between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism also has a 
phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early work (long before 
he started using the term “phenomenology”):

 

CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, 
image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it 
follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance 
and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation 
of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without 
us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the 
rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a 
sign. (EP1:38)

 

The rainbow is at once a sign of realities “without us” and a “phenomenal 
manifestation of ourselves.” Our perception of it is both objective and 
subjective. For a synechist semiotician, then, there should be no problem 
seeing an Intentional Interpretant as also an Immediate Interpretant internal 
to the sign. The “boundaries” between signs, like those between organisms and 
their environments, are permeable by nature.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 23-Oct-21 19:10
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary R., List:

 

I fully agree.

 

GR: If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can never be 
perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that serves as a 
standard for assessing actual interpretations.

 

Again, the ultimate standard for different dynamical interpretants of a 
particular sign, including a text, is its final or normal interpretant, which 
is final in the sense of a final cause and normal in the sense of normative. 
Peirce defines it as the "effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign 
after sufficient development of thought" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908); "that 
which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration 
of the matter were carried so 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jack, the pragmatic use of the final interpretant is that it serves as an
ideal for each author and each reader to aim at: the Truth of the matter. It
is not merely the last dynamic interpretant in the series; it is more like a
mathematical limit, or like the final cause of a process, to use the
Aristotelian term.

Think of the dialogue between writers and readers as a single continuous
semiosic process. It differs from a real-time, in-person dialogue because
there are long time gaps (and cultural gaps) between author and reader. The
semiosic process has to bridge these gaps somehow; otherwise its continuity
is lost. Even an in-person dialogue will break down if one of the partners
does not trust the other to be aiming at the truth of the matter, and thinks
that his utterances are otherwise motivated.

If we start with a text uttered by Peirce in, say, 1903, we trust that what
he "had in mind" (i.e. the content of the text) was a sign purporting to
think something true about some subject matter, which is the object of that
sign. And we must presume that the text is another sign of the same object.
The explicit text was presumably co-determined by (1) the dynamic object
which was part of a context external to Peirce and (2) the context into
which his perception of the object came, the context constituted by his
habits of thought at the time, coupled with his intention to speak the truth
about the object. 

In order to approach a final interpretant of it - the truth which is
independent of any individual interpreter - each dynamic interpretant of
that text-sign in the chain (or rather network) following it (both
temporally and logically) must be another sign of the same dynamic object.
"Objectivity" is simply the interpreter's habit of keeping his attention on
that object, even though the text gives him only a "hint" (the immediate
object) of what it is. Of course the dynamic interpretant is co-determined
by the internal context of the interpreter, just as the original text was
co-determined by the author's habits and intentions. All interpretations are
fallible. But if the reader does not share the author's attention to the
dynamic object, so that it is a focal point in the commens which author and
reader share, then that object is remote from the determination of the
dynamic interpretant, and the interpreter is left with nothing to go on
except the reaction to the text determined by his own habits and intuitions.
This is what we call a "subjective" reading. 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 23-Oct-21 19:36
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic
for interpreting texts

 

Or, to put it another way if there were such an "objectivity" possible,
students would not read Plato and Aristotle, they would read the logically
"objective" meaning which we should, by now, have come to possess (which
brings me back to final interpretant - two and half millennia is not enough
to produce "objective" scholarly consensus, then what pragmatic use does the
"final interpretant" actually have?

 

 

Jack 

  _  

From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> >
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2021 12:22 AM
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >;
Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic
for interpreting texts 

 





This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing as
an objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In
terms Gary Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the internal
context of the interpreter govern over the external context that is shared
with the utterer.

 

Gary, list,

 

What is an objectively correct reading of a text? Wouldn't it merely be one
which reproduced the text entirely without adding or removing anything
to/from it? 

 

We can have objectively correct renderings of mathematical principles, but
when we move to normative language, we would be lying to ourselves if we
assumed we could always retrieve the author's intent within objectively
scientific degrees of accuracy. Such is rarely (if ever) possible. 

 

The object is experienced subjectively, and the subject (re)produces the
object from these conditions. There cannot be an absolutely "objective"
reading of a text (especially regarding intent). If there is, I have yet to
encounter it (and suspect only people who agree with each other in every
respect have encountered such a thing). There are of course interpretations
of texts which we think of as being better than others - but I'm not "sold"
on the "final interpretant" of Peirce in a semeiotic system wherein all
evolves continuously (what is final?). 

 

Best

 

Jack

 

  _  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
  mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > on behalf of 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

[gnox]

Margaretha, Jon AS, List,

I don’t see as much similarity between Popper’s “Three Worlds” and Peirce’s 
three “categories” as Jon does. The main difference is that there’s no 
Firstness in Popper’s schema. The list of “logical distinctions” Margaretha 
gives in explanation of it is a list of dyadic relations. But Firstness, in its 
simplest (relational) definition, is “that which is such as it is positively 
and regardless of anything else.” In other words, a First (in Peirce’s 
phenomenology) is a Quality (or quale) independent of any relation, dyadic, 
triadic or n-adic. But every experience involves relations; so the only way to 
get a strict conception of monadic Firstness is to prescind 
  it from experiential 
relationships, such as the subject-object relationship in perception or the 
subject-predicate relationship in propositions. 

Some of the posts about phaneroscopy on this list seem to show an inability to 
perform such prescission, or perhaps the posters just don’t see the point of 
it. This is quite natural, as we are all aware that perception of any existing 
thing is essentially an interaction (based on a dyadic relation) between a 
perceiver and a perceived object. So we can’t easily conceive of a thing 
existing “regardless of anything else”; and indeed a First does not exist as 
the things in Popper’s First World do. That’s why existence, in Peirce’s 
terminology, always involves Secondness. But qualia, unlike our conceptions of 
them and words for them, are innocent of both Secondness and Thirdness.

Like Jon, I’m wondering what you mean by “in-depth discussion of the role of 
metaphors.” I’ll just mention that I’m especially interested in the metaphors 
that we are not aware of as such. For instance, the container metaphor that 
lurks in the background whenever we talk about the “content” if a text or other 
sign. My chapter on Context and Content   
uses a semiotic analysis to uncover some of the misleading ideas arising from 
that metaphor.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Oct-21 18:06
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

 

Margaretha, List:

 

MH: Popper introduced what is now called the Three-Worlds Hypothesis.  It is a 
heuristic advising people to carefully reflect on the initial logical 
distinctions with which they work as containers.

 

This sounds conceptually similar to Peirce's "three Universes of Experience," 
respectively comprising "Ideas," "Brute Actuality," and "Signs" (CP 6:455, EP 
2:435, 1908). Popper's three worlds are "first, the world of physical objects 
or of physical states; secondly the world of states of consciousness, or of 
mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly, the 
world of objective contents of thought" (Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Approach, p. 106). Hence, it seems to me that Popper's world 1 directly 
corresponds to Peirce's second universe, while Popper's worlds 2 and 3 only 
loosely correspond to Peirce's first and third universes.

 

MH: Below is a blog of someone who is seeing all these connection as well (with 
pictures of Peirce and Rosenberg!)

 

While the linked blog entry correctly identifies James and Peirce as the 
founders of pragmatism, it unfortunately proceeds to make an all-too-common 
mistake in summarizing that philosophy.

 

One of the core tenets of Pragmatism is that theories should be considered as 
instruments, not solutions or truths. In their view, a theory, like any other 
tool, should be judged primarily by its ability to get a desired result, rather 
than validity in any absolute sense.

 

This is consistent with James's nominalist version of pragmatism, which is a 
theory of truth, but definitely not with Peirce's extreme scholastic realist 
version of pragmatism--i.e., pragmaticism--which is a theory of meaning.

 

MH: The one thing that is missing on this blog is an in-depth discussion of the 
role of metaphors in it all.

 

Please elaborate, including any relevant insights that Peirce might have 
offered.

 

Thanks,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 11:37 AM Margaretha Hendrickx mailto:mahe3...@gmail.com> > wrote:

I second Gary's and Jon's comment and would like to use it as an opportunity to 
further scholarship on the connections between the work of Karl Popper and CSP. 
 

 

Popper introduced what is now called the Three-Worlds Hypothesis.  It is a 
heuristic advising people to carefully reflect on the initial logical 
distinctions with which they work as containers.  Popper advised us to remain 
diligent about maintaining the following logical 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

[gnox]

List, this time my post does address the matter of the subject line. I hope no 
one will object to using the Peircean (and post-Peircean) semiotic framework to 
explain how attention to context, or lack of it, can affect communication among 
people like ourselves: Turning Signs 15: Context and Content 
 . The post copied below is a good 
example of what happens when internal or “intuitive” context distracts 
attention from external (public) context. The TS text at the link above also 
has links within it which may be helpful.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 18-Oct-21 09:18
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce

 

Gary F, list

The reason people take it as an insult is because, on this list, it is used as 
an insult. It is used - and you use it - to define a post and poster as 
deviating from The Words and Meaning of Peirce and putting in their own meaning 
- which is understood as almost irrelevant, deviating from and not worthy of 
attention.

Reaction to this description [post Peircean] is not due to someone's personal 
psychology [their own animosity] but to acknowledge that the term is used 
pejoratively.  After all, does someone who is writing about Darwin's theory as 
actualized within a rain forest - expect to be critiqued, not for the analysis 
- but with the term of 'post-Darwin'...suggesting they are misusing or 
misinterpreting Darwin?

And note how you have dismissed and described  Robert Marty's comment about the 
FACT that there has been a strong alienation from and sidelining of mathematics 
..as a conspiracy theory, and further smeared his simple fact with other 
attributions that people 'bought into it' [suggesting irrationality] and 
further labelled Robert's rejection of De Tienne as 'uncritical animosity' - 
totally, wholly, throwing out his long detailed criticisms of the De Tienne 
outline. And followed up your claim of conspiracy with an ambiguous and 'hidden 
agenda' statement that Robert-and-his-followers [suggesting an emotional rather 
than rational bond]...'have the advantage'. 

That's quite the outline. And that helps explain why some of us have problems 
with the Peirce-List.

Edwina

 



 

On Mon 18/10/21 8:19 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Jon, List,

I am post-Peircean myself, and so is my book. I find it hard to understand why 
anyone takes that adjective as an insult, whether to themselves or to their 
theories, unless they are looking for something to take as an insult and an 
excuse to vent their animosity. My original point was that if we are trying to 
explain how Peirce came up with his categories, it is simply anachronistic to 
claim that he derived them from a mathematical model which was invented after 
his death. Peirce gives several accounts of how he actually arrived at the 
categories — I included them in my Transactions paper that was published in the 
issue honoring Joe Ransdell — and I think the simplest option is to take his 
word for it. As for “ante-Peircean”, that would have to refer to the theories 
of Kant, Aristotle, …

I must admit that I triggered Robert Marty’s animosity by pooh-pooing his 
conspiracy theory “that there has been a strong movement in the Peircean 
community for quite a long time in favor of an extreme minimization of 
mathematics or even its exclusion” (as he stated it in a Sept. 20 post). I 
should have simply ignored it from the start, as I did afterwards, even after 
some of the loudest voices on peirce-l bought into it, or at least adopted 
Robert’s uncritical animosity to De Tienne. As it turned out, it was Robert who 
had the “advantage,” and apparently still does with his followers. But I must 
take  some of the blame for the derailing of the slow read, and I apologize to 
the list for that. Also for not saying anything substantive about the subject 
line in this post. 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 17-Oct-21 19:48
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

 

Edwina, List:

  

ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not describe 
the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was referring to Marty's 
thoughts and analysis.

 

Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive and try to 
avoid them since they tend to distract participants from the substance of the 
discussion.

 

ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of the 
thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce as somehow 
'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't use those words' etc. 

 

It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow 'impure' 
or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[gnox]

Jon, List,

I am post-Peircean myself, and so is my book. I find it hard to understand why 
anyone takes that adjective as an insult, whether to themselves or to their 
theories, unless they are looking for something to take as an insult and an 
excuse to vent their animosity. My original point was that if we are trying to 
explain how Peirce came up with his categories, it is simply anachronistic to 
claim that he derived them from a mathematical model which was invented after 
his death. Peirce gives several accounts of how he actually arrived at the 
categories — I included them in my Transactions paper that was published in the 
issue honoring Joe Ransdell — and I think the simplest option is to take his 
word for it. As for “ante-Peircean”, that would have to refer to the theories 
of Kant, Aristotle, …

I must admit that I triggered Robert Marty’s animosity by pooh-pooing his 
conspiracy theory “that there has been a strong movement in the Peircean 
community for quite a long time in favor of an extreme minimization of 
mathematics or even its exclusion” (as he stated it in a Sept. 20 post). I 
should have simply ignored it from the start, as I did afterwards, even after 
some of the loudest voices on peirce-l bought into it, or at least adopted 
Robert’s uncritical animosity to De Tienne. As it turned out, it was Robert who 
had the “advantage,” and apparently still does with his followers. But I must 
take  some of the blame for the derailing of the slow read, and I apologize to 
the list for that. Also for not saying anything substantive about the subject 
line in this post.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 17-Oct-21 19:48
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

 

Edwina, List:

 

ET: I think it's a sidestep red herring to claim that Gary F did not describe 
the person of Robert Marty as 'post-Peircean' but was referring to Marty's 
thoughts and analysis.

 

Like I already said, I personally find such labels counterproductive and try to 
avoid them since they tend to distract participants from the substance of the 
discussion.

 

ET: And that's one of the problems of this list - this definition of the 
thoughts of someone who is using the analytic framework of Peirce as somehow 
'impure' or 'degenerate' with claims that Peirce 'didn't use those words' etc.

 

It is not a matter of whether a given analytic framework is "somehow 'impure' 
or 'degenerate,'" but whether it is truly Peirce's analytic framework. 
Terminology is important, but the issue is really whether concepts are being 
deployed in way that is congruent with how Peirce himself defines and uses 
them. If not, it might very well be a Peircean analytic framework, or at least 
a Peirce-inspired analytic framework, but it is not the Peircean analytic 
framework.

 

ET: I'm claiming such a final step is impossible because semiosis has no final 
point.

 

Yes and no. According to Peirce, every text is a sign. Consequently, every text 
has a final interpretant--how it necessarily would be understood under ideal 
circumstances. Every text also has an immediate interpretant--how it possibly 
could be understood in accordance with the definitions of the words that 
comprise it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and 
other rules of grammar for the system of signs in which it is expressed. The 
result of any individual reading of a text is a dynamical interpretant--how it 
actually is understood on that particular occasion, which for any sincere 
inquirer is an abductive/retroductive hypothesis about the final interpretant 
as the proper aim of interpretation.

 

In order to be a valid understanding of the text, this dynamical interpretant 
must be consistent with the immediate interpretant; and in order to be an 
accurate understanding of the text, it must conform to the final interpretant. 
Of course, all dynamical interpretants are fallible, so we can never be 
absolutely certain that our understanding matches the final interpretant. 
Nevertheless, we can ascertain when a particular understanding is inconsistent 
with the immediate interpretant, and is thus objectively invalid; and in such 
cases, we can also say with confidence that such an understanding does not 
conform to the final interpretant, and is thus objectively inaccurate--it is a 
misunderstanding, a misinterpretation.

 

Surely we agree that such misunderstanding and misinterpretation are 
possible--in fact, all too common in human discourse. Peirce's semeiotic 
provides this plausible explanation for those phenomena. While it is true that 
"semiosis has no final point" in the sense of a last actual sign, it does have 
a "final point" in the sense of a telos or ideal aim as I have described here. 
Otherwise, why bother trying to communicate at all?

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 

[PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[gnox]

Jack, I appreciate your point that “we cannot have an epistemology without some 
form of "anthropology".” If I may extend the idea a little, we cannot hope to 
understand human nature, or why humans think and act the way we do, unless we 
can draw on insights emerging from biology, anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, phenomenology, semiotics, and the whole range of empirical sciences 
(“Idioscopy” was Peirce’s term). But the fact that all these disciplines have 
been hived off into academic special interests makes it difficult to integrate 
them all into a coherent system.

I happen to think that Peirce’s philosophy, especially his phenomenology and 
the semiotics which is quite explicitly based on it, is highly relevant to the 
challenges of living in our time — relevant just as it is, in the writings that 
Peirce left us. That’s why I included so much of it in my online book Turning 
Signs  . My purpose there was to integrate it with 
more recent insights from the disciplines mentioned above, along with 
selections from ancient scriptures and Indigenous traditions. Jeremy Lent’s new 
book The Web of Meaning does much the same thing, and very well (I think), but 
leaves out the semiotics. So I think my book may have some added value, 
although Lent’s may be more accessible.

I do not believe that studies of Peirce are relevant only when we can link them 
up somehow with current developments in our own specialized field (such as 
“Cognitive Science,” using John Sowa’s example). I think Peirce’s ideas, just 
as he expressed them, can and should be integrated with matters of living 
concern. I think they are “directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full 
of nutrition for man's highest growth,” as Peirce said of his “neglected 
argument” (EP2:435). The center of my own concern these days (as readers of my 
blog   know) is the current global situation in 
which human activity is rapidly undermining our life support system. Since 
there is wide consensus on what needs to be done in this decade to have a 
chance of stabilizing our life support system, I am especially interested in 
what it is about human nature that has brought us to this pass and seems to be 
preventing us from doing what needs to be done. But I do not consider this to 
be a ‘special interest’; I think it is of general concern for all life forms on 
this planet.

I have several reasons for thinking that Peirce’s work is highly relevant to 
this general concern. One is his emphasis on the continuity of semiosis; and 
closely connected with this is his psychological insight that human conscious 
reasoning is only the tip of the vast iceberg of semiosis (sorry about the 
hackneyed metaphor). I think recent developments in social psychology have 
borne out this insight — for instance, those summarized at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_intuitionism. I’d be happy to explore this 
further on peirce-l if there is interest (and not too many objections). 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 17-Oct-21 07:30
To: robert marty 
Cc: Margaretha Hendrickx ; tabor...@primus.ca; Peirce-L 
; Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Should we start a new email list (was 
Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

 

Dear Robert, 

 

My point is definitely anthropological, but we cannot have an epistemology 
without some form of "anthropology" (Comte was a sociological philosopher after 
all). I don't know how to answer your questions, though you do raise some 
interesting points. If mathematics is defined as "the development of 
hypotheses", it would seem all other branches logically depend upon 
mathematics. On the other hand, how do we develop hypotheses if not via 
experience of and in the world of actuality and being? The relationship between 
empirics and mathematics seems more dialectical rather than strictly 
hierarchical to me, though from a purely (natural) "scientific" point of view, 
I can understand why such a hierarchy is both accepted and important. It 
becomes less easy to accept and defend when we move into the world of human 
action and interaction and so your comment re the sociological axis is indeed 
apt. 

 

Best

 

Jack

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list?

[gnox]

John, I was puzzled by Edwina's response to my note in support of your (and
her) proposal of starting a new list. The context of your proposal was a
series of complaints about the subject matter of postings on the list; the
gist of it seems to be that there's too much posting about Peirce's actual
texts and not enough about the topics of current interest to you. So I
assumed (naturally enough, I think) that your idea was to start a new list
where you could post about anything you like, applying your established
expertise in Peirce's thought, without having to show any connections
between what Peirce wrote and what you're posting. And as I said, I think
that could be helpful, especially for you.

So I am doubly surprised to read that "Most of the complaints seem to be
generated by three people (GF, GR, and JAS) who object to people who
introduce topics for which they have no canned answer." People who introduce
new topics on the list are usually people who are still learning from or
about Peirce and are interested in exploring some of his more original ideas
- people like Margaretha and Jack Kelly. Or they have unearthed Peirce texts
which throw some new light on those ideas. I have yet to see any complaints
from GR or JAS or me which object to the introduction of such new topics. I
would be grateful if you could point to one or two in the archives.

The complaints I was referring to in my note of support have mostly come
from you, ET and a few others, the common thread being that there's too much
close attention to what Peirce actually wrote, especially to Peirce texts
that the complainers are not familiar with. I understand that such subject
matter is of little use to experts like yourselves, but those of us who are
still discovering the depth and relevance of Peirce's ideas really need to
read (and re-read!) what Peirce wrote, without thinking that we have it down
pat already. So I for one don't find those complaints helpful, and would be
genuinely pleased if you, ET and the others had a better place to air your
expert thoughts about Cognitive Science or whatever. And I certainly
wouldn't miss your frequent attacks (in recent years) on peirce-l members
who would rather learn from Peirce than defer to your authority.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 16-Oct-21 17:59
To: tabor...@primus.ca; Margaretha Hendrickx 
Cc: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list?

 

Margartha, Gary F, Ediwna, Jerry R, List,

 

Before saying anything else, I'll repeat my previous remark:  "both and",
not "either or".  I would not drop my subscription to Peirce-L, but I hope
to discuss topics about Cognitive Science, which do not seem to be welcome
on this list.  For an example of those topics, please see
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf

 

MH:  What I am trying to say is that it does not make sense to slice and
dice Peirce.  A lot can be learned from engaging in non-judgmental
listening; that is, thinking without a judgmental sucking-up/talking-down
attitude (spatial metaphor).  Face-to-face interaction makes it easier to
switch into a horizontal attitude (spatial metaphor). 

 

I strongly agree.  The Peirce Centennial Congress was an excellent place,
but it was so huge that it was hard to have more than a few offline
sessions.   In any case, I like the term "nonjudgmental listening".

 

Since it would be difficult for all of us to meet face-to-face, I suggest
that we should practice "non-judgmental reading" of any note about which we
may disagree:  Stop.  Count to 10.  Reread the note.  And state any
objection as a question.. There is only one kind of disagreement that can be
stated as matter of fact:  a correction of an error in mathematics or formal
logic.  No mathematician would ever object to a correction of an error in a
mathematical statement.

  

ET:  That [following note] shows, clearly, how different subject matters are
treated on this list:

 

GF:  I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining
about the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one that
would be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to peirce-l)
wouldn't have to read all those complaints any more. 

I agree with ET.  Most of the complaints seem to be generated by three
people (GF, GR, and JAS) who object to people who introduce topics for which
they have no canned answer.  An example is my note about phaneroscopy as a
science egg.  ADT had no explanation for Peirce's remark.  Somebody
mentioned the attempt by Atkins to broaden phaneroscopy..  But that attempt
blurred the line between phaneroscopy and normative science.  When I
observed that the combination of phaneroscopy and normative science would be
equivalent to semeiotic, they refused to answer.  These are very important
questions that need to be asked.  I am not complaining.  I am asking a
question that gets to the heart of Peirce's 1903 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[gnox]

I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining about the 
subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one that would be more 
to their liking. At least we (subscribers to peirce-l) wouldn’t have to read 
all those complaints any more.

 

Gary f.

 

} Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it 
or not. [Peirce, CP 8.143, EP2:61] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 16-Oct-21 11:22
To: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's 
contributions to the 21st c

 

List,

 

I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list. 

 

Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a mirror to see 
what is going on in society today.  

 

If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails distributed by 
this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about the possibility that this 
has to do more with what is going on in society today and that one's feelings 
about society are being projected on the emails distributed by this list?

 

My very best, Margaretha H.

 

PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list emails 
within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am juggling many other 
balls.  There are many interesting emails on this list, but I am simply not in 
the right place to reply to them immediately. I hope to reply to them in the 
future once my schedule is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this email 
immediately before other ones, well, it caught my attention and it kept on 
bothering me.  Its divisive rhetoric mirrors the divisive rhetoric in society 
at large.  

 

Let me end with a question.  Popper is known for warning against the 
manipulative use of language and logic. Did Peirce do something similar?  If my 
question shows a lack of understanding of Peirce's work, I apologize.  I am 
still in the learning stages.  

 

 

On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 6:02 PM sowa @bestweb.net   
mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

List,

 

On Thursday, I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received some strong 
positive comments and suggestions offline, but complete silence from the people 
who send most of the notes to Peirce-L.For example:  "As for the natural 
extensions of Peirce's thought, even when they agree closely with his 
principles, they are rejected [on Peirce-L] as post-Peircean"

 

I interpret those responses as evidence that we need n email list that is 
dedicated to the kinds of topics that dominated the Peirce Centennial Congress 
in 2014.  That was a very exciting conference on  research that builds on 
Peirce's work and relates it to developments in the century after Peirce.   As 
Peirce frequently emphasized, the meaning of any  sign is its implications for 
action in the future.  We live in Peirce's future, and our actions today depend 
critically on the developments in the century after Peirce.

 

I don't believe that we should reject Peirce-l, but we should have another 
email list that relates Peirce's ideas to the issues of today.  I would 
encourage subscribers to Peirce-L to participate in both lists.  I'll send 
another note tomorrow..

 

John 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

[gnox]

Margaretha, when you speak of “argumentative dynamics,” are you referring to an 
“argument” as a verbal conflict between people, or as an attempt to persuade 
someone of the truth of some assertion, or as the type of sign that represents 
a process of reasoning from premisses to conclusion?

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 7-Oct-21 16:09
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca; mkettel...@msn.com; Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

 

Helmut, list.

 

I would love to hear how other people see/experience the various argument-as 
metaphors and how these metaphors might explain argumentative dynamics.  

 

My best, Margaretha H.

 

I myself wrote some comments below.

 

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 2:14 PM Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote:

Edwina, Margaretha, List,

 

HR: I want to get back to Margaretha´s argument-metaphors, a bit late, now the 
topic is Popper, but anyway, Popper wrote about the open society and its 
enemies, and I think that Margaretha´s metaphors can help us to be an open 
society, and not become its enemies:

-

- argument as war:

 

HR: Who arguments with the intention of leading a war, is an enemy, makes 
someone other an enemy, then the society is not open, even split, so he:she is 
an enemy of its too. 

 

Margaret: only two outcomes winning or losing; very existential; argument as a 
zero sum game.  truth is subordinate to winning the argument. 

 

- argument as a tennis tournament:

 

HR: A tennis tournament is not lethal like a war, but people are meant to be 
excluded too, though merely from the discussion, not from their own lives.

 

Margaret: also about winning and losing, but now according to some prespecified 
rules and in front of an audience whom one would like to impress by scoring 
points.  Truth is subordinate to winning the argument.

 

- argument as constructing a cathedral:

 

HR: It depends, whether the common goal is a cathedral, or only the utterer 
wants to build one, and the others rather want to build other premises. If the 
cathedral is gaining insight in general, it is good,

 

Margaret: as masons your reputation is at stake; also whether you will get 
future work.  Furthermore, you could be inside the cathedral/apartment complex 
when it falls down.  Truth is important insofar that you are directly linked to 
that cathedral.

 

- argument as dance:

 

HR: This is art-pour -l´-art. It merely has esthetical value, but doesn´t cause 
much harm, except occupation of time.

 

Margaret: yes, all about the sport itself; with limited attention to the larger 
implications.  truth is a secondary issue

 

- argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea:

 

HR: Do all agree, that the ship should be repaired? That it can be repaired? 
That it can be repaired in the middle of the sea, or better should be hauled to 
a dock?

 

Margaret:  Let us assume that the ship is falling apart in the middle of the 
ocean, with no other ships in sight.  Truth matters

 

- argument as computer programming:

 

HR: Finding algorithms that abbreviate or laminate turbulent streams of 
thoughts seems not bad to me.

 

Margaret: is it sensible to think of argumentation as the art of programming 
someone else according to whatever the algorithm du jour is?  What is the 
net-benefit value of arguing?  Is it to find the absolute indubitable truth and 
then share it with others the path to truth?  Or is its purpose to find the 
cognitive blind spot in one another's worldview so that less time and energy 
will be wasted on fixing/repairing errors and mistakes ?

 

 

--

 

HR: All in all, I think it is good, before uttering an argument, to always 
think: "Why do I want to utter this argument?". And: "Is my intention the same 
the others have?", e.g. the gain of insight. And not to fight against, or 
compete with, the others, but to think: "We are all on the same side, we want 
to gain insight, and reflect, keep our society open, be solidaric with others, 
and even if we assume, that one or the other is falling into a war- or 
competition- mode, not regard him:her as enemy, but try to nudge her:him back 
into a cooperative mode, because the cathedral still is not finished, and the 
ship is still badly damaged". In between dance a bit.

Margaret:   

 

 

Best, Helmut

  

  

07. Oktober 2021 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
wrote:

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.  I've 
always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, 
the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato . 
But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - an 
evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as a 
metaphysical 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[gnox]

Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, but 
one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, science as 
a “conversation with nature”:

Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca) 
 .

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 7-Oct-21 09:49
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

List,

 

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

 

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, the 
French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

 

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not in 
philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his work on 
semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key answers to 
epistemological problems in management research.  

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[gnox]

“Perfect readiness to assimilate new associations implies perfect readiness to 
drop old ones.… To be a philosopher, or a scientific man, you must be as a 
little child, with all the sincerity and simple-mindedness of the child's 
vision, with all the plasticity of the child's mental habits.” — C.S. Peirce, 
RLT 192 (1898)

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 7-Oct-21 05:18
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case 
ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))

 

John, List,

 

"Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that this 
is largely illusory . . . because their reasonings are prominent in their 
consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts [and emotions] they 
are hardly aware of. . . .   — Charles S. Peirce

 

"To think is easy. To act is difficult. To act as one thinks is the most 
difficult.” — Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

 

“Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first principle is that 
you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.” — Richard 
Feynman

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York







 

 

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:50 AM sowa @bestweb.net   
mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

Gary R,

 

I agree that those suggestions are helpful:

 

GR:  [Margaretha's] ideas and suggestive metaphors about how List discussion 
might be improved -- along with the suggestions by John Sowa and Gary Furhman 
which Jon Alan Schmidt just quoted -- if taken up in the spirit of 
collegiality, could help improve communication here considerably.

 

I would like to add a few more suggestions.

 

The first one is that the method of asking questions, as in Plato's dialogues 
with Socrates as the discussion leader, is one of the best ways to promote 
fruitful discussions.  People may be offended by a direct contradiction of what 
they just said, but nobody is offended by an honest question.  (A loaded 
question can be offensive. e.g. "Have you stopped beating your wife?") 

 

The so-called "Socratic method" can also be annoying when pushed to an extreme. 
 But  an honest question is more likely to generate a fruitful discussion.

 

For Peirce, it's especially important to recognize that he had a very fertile 
imagination, and his ideas were constantly growing .and developing over the 
years.  His comment "symbols grow"  indicates that the same words on different 
occasions may have very different meanings and implications:

 

1903:  For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that
is no mere figure of speech.  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but
the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off
old ones.  (CP 2.222).

 

The only statements by Peirce that remain constant are the ones in mathematics 
and formal logic  A statement in math or logic has a fixed meaning forever.  
But Peirce's comments about then may change, as we have noted in various 
discussions.

 

The following point is significant:

 

CSP:  The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the
fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than
the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
(CP 5.469, R318, 1907)

 

The categories of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness are based on logic, and they have 
been central to his thought throughout.  But his applications of those ideas 
continued to grow.  Even in his late writings of 1913, his ideas continued to 
grow, and he had hopes of writing more.  Nobody on planet earth can be certain 
that any ideas outside of mathematics and logic would remain unchanged.

 

The recent discussions of comments by De Tienne and Atkins about phaneroscopy 
were interesting, but nobody can be certain that their opinions about the 
"science egg" are what Peirce intended.  On these issues, good questions are 
more valuable than definitive answers.

 

In summary, a good way to improve the level of discourse on Peirce-L is to ask 
more questions and to avoid making definitive pronouncements about what Peirce 
meant.  De Tienne read as much or more than anybody else, and even he doesn't 
know.  We can state our own opinions, but we can't claim that our opinions are 
what Peirce intended.

 

John

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Broadening Phaneroscopy (was Critical analysis ofBelluci's paper)

[gnox]

John, your post advocating a narrow view of phaneroscopy is based on the
claim that identification = assessment = evaluation. That strikes me as an
extraordinary claim. Can you offer any basis for it in formal logic?

 

Gary f.

 

} Love truth, but pardon error. [Voltaire] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 2-Oct-21 20:53
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] Broadening Phaneroscopy (was Critical analysis
ofBelluci's paper)

 

Jon AS, List,

 

That kind of broadening is essential to go beyond a science egg to a science
that can develop useful results.  But as soon as it includes methods of
evaluation, it begins to include normative science.  In that case,it goes
beyond what Peirce called phaneroscopy.  In fact, it becomes the science of
semeiotic.

 

JAS:  Atkins likely includes the "broadening" of phaneroscopy as discussed
in these two papers in his subsequent book. I read it a couple of years ago
and may need to revisit it now. I already mentioned his comments about the
method of phaneroscopy going beyond just inspection and description to
include analysis and assessment. He also notes, as you [GF] do, that the aim
of phaneroscopy is to identify not only the universal/formal categories, but
also the particular/material categories.

 

Any kind of assessment implies criteria for doing the assessment
(evaluation).  All values depend on normative principles.

 

JAS: Atkins ultimately proposes that phaneroscopy should likewise have three
branches, calling them "General Categorics," "Internal Phaneroscopy," and
"External Phaneroscopy" (p. 110). Overall, his hope in writing all this and
more about phaneroscopy is "to develop it from the condition of a
science-egg to an embrio-science" (p. 112).

 

I agree with Atkins that assessment or evaluation is necessary for any
useful science.  But evaluation or assessment requires values.  That
immediately crosses the boundary between phaneroscopy and the normative
sciences.  The science that Atkins is talking about is more properly called
semeiotic.

 

In fact, Peirce failed to mention one very important science in his 1903
classification:  semeiotic.  To complete his classification, define two main
branches of philosophy:  Semeiotic and Mtetaphysics.  Then specify two
branches of Semeiotc:  Phaneroscopy and Normative Science.

 

With this classification, semeiotic is a full-fledged science, but the
branches under it, by themselves, are eggs or embryos.  I suspect that
Atkins was taking steps in that direction, but his names do not recognize
the need for normative science in any attempt to broaden phaneroscopy.

 

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[gnox]

Jon AS, list,

Your final paragraph (referring to the particular/material categories) 
reinforces a remark I made Wednesday concerning ADT’s slide 48: “Peirce 
indicates in a couple of texts that the “material categories” could be picked 
out phaneroscopically as well as the “universal categories,” but that he didn’t 
have much success at making a list of them, so he chose to focus on the formal 
elements of the phaneron instead (CP 1.284).” Here are the texts I had in mind, 
both from around 1905:

CSP: [[My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking. I 
know very well that there are other categories, those which Hegel calls by that 
name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with any list of them. We may 
classify objects according to their matter; as wooden things, iron things, 
silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification according to structure is 
generally more important. And it is the same with ideas. Much as I would like 
to see Hegel's list of categories reformed, I hold that a classification of the 
elements of thought and consciousness according to their formal structure is 
more important. ] —CP 8.213 ]

CSP: [[I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its 
indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or 
indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or 
division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into 
their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some 
acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and 
there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the 
form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter. The two 
most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying 
to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the 
attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not 
neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that 
they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of 
every department have found classifications according to structure to be the 
most important. ] CP 1.288, R 295 ]

A similar text appears in Lowell Lecture 3 
 . The two papers from R.K. Atkins, by 
the way, are dated 2012 and 2013, so presumably the “broadening” he proposes 
there (which would include the material categories) is incorporated into his 
2018 book Charles S. Peirce’s Phenomenology. I’m just getting started on the 
two papers though.

Gary f.

 

} I do not think much of a man who is no wiser today than he was yesterday. 
[Lincoln] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 1-Oct-21 21:25



 

Robert, List:

 

I have refrained from commenting on this up until now because it is indeed 
mostly unobjectionable, and my remarks on it would largely repeat what I have 
already said on-List. Unfortunately, it reflects a characteristic adversarial 
stance that is unwarranted since no one here (including Bellucci) is "in favor 
of an extreme minimization of mathematics or even its exclusion," nor are we 
seeking to "maintain a mistrust towards mathematics and mathematicians."

 

Instead, like Peirce, we are simply distinguishing phaneroscopy from 
mathematics, which does not entail disconnecting or separating phaneroscopy 
from mathematics. Phaneroscopy depends on mathematics for principles, but it is 
not controlled by nor reducible to mathematics. In particular, an absolutely 
essential difference between them is that phaneroscopy is a positive science, 
while mathematics is a strictly hypothetical science. This is perfectly 
consistent with Nathan Houser's conclusion that is favorably quoted (twice) and 
which no one is disputing.

 

NH: These categories, though abstractable (prescindable) from experience, are 
mathematical conceptions. Thus, firstness, secondness, and thirdness constitute 
an important link between the a priori world of mathematics and the contingent 
world of experience, at which juncture we find the ground of phenomenology. 
(https://www.academia.edu/4253972/The_Form_of_Experience, p. 21)

 

On a more agreeable note, I appreciate the suggestion that phaneroscopy should 
draw from not only formal logic as the first branch of mathematics, but also 
its other two branches that have to do with discrete series and continua. This 
is consistent with something that Richard Kenneth Atkins highlights in his two 
papers on "Broadening Peirce's Phaneroscopy" 
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/pluralist.7.2.0001, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/pluralist.8.1.0097 
 ), namely, that 
the universal/formal categories are 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

[gnox]

Gary R, I see what you mean, but as far as I know Peirce’s “phaneroscopy” (just 
like his “phenomenology”) included analysis and generalization as well as 
observation. In R 318 (1907) he wrote, “Everybody recognizes that it is no 
inconsiderable art, this business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one 
frames a scientific definition” (EP2:403) — which seems to make phaneroscopy 
both an art and a science! Anyway, given my own emphasis on practice-perception 
cycles  , I prefer to think of 
observation and generalization as parts of a continuous process rather than 
dividing them into separate activities, so I don’t see a need to differentiate 
the science into branches.

 

Re slide 48: In my mild disapproval of wine-tasting as André’s example, I was 
forgetting that a practice (art? science?) such as that would indeed be good 
training for focussing on the material elements of the phaneron. Peirce 
indicates in a couple of texts that the “material categories” could be picked 
out phaneroscopically as well as the “universal categories,” but that he didn’t 
have much success at making a list of them, so he chose to focus on the formal 
elements of the phaneron instead (CP 1.284). 

 

Gary f.

 

} Drawing nearer to take our slant at it (since after all it has met with 
misfortune while all underground), let us see all there may remain to be seen. 
[Finnegans Wake 113] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 29-Sep-21 01:06
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

 

Gary F, List,

 

GF: "I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific." 

 

Yet Peirce positions it as First cenoscopic science. I have long held the view 
that since the observational practice of phaneroscopy is indeed 
"pre-scientific," yet it is necessary as the first stage/branch in the 
development of a phenomenological science, one which will require at least one, 
and perhaps two, additional branches in order to become a fully developed 
science. 

 

So, despite Peirce's late terminology valorizing "Phaneroscopy" as the name of 
the science, I tend to think that it is better to think of the First cenoscopic 
science taken as a whole -- which is to say, were it to be fully developed --  
as Phenomenology, and its pre-scientific, first observational branch as 
Phaneroscopy. 

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity

[gnox]

Edwina, in your haste to respond, you forgot to mention that your 
interpretation of my post is your opinion, as all interpretations are. But we 
will assume that you meant that, and evaluate your reply accordingly.

 

} Act in such a way that your heart may be free from hatred. Let not your heart 
be offended with anyone. [Abdu'l-Baha] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 27-Sep-21 09:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity

 

Gary F, list

You are ignoring the FACTS of linguistic interpretation and the FACTS of the 
semiosic triadic process. 

The facts are, that language is not a mechanical communication system where 
Item X is simply moved from Site A to Site B,  but necessarily rests on a 
dialogic interaction of interpretation. This is hardly a novel analysis; 
linguistic research has shown this to be a fact for many, many years.

 And since this dialogic interaction is triadic, it inserts a mediating action, 
the Representamen/Sign..which transforms that raw data into a meaning. AND - 
this resultant Interpretant meaning is different according to the actions of 
the Representamen/Sign. AND - the Representamen/Sign can be and is necessarily 
different for different Agents. An expert physicist understands the atom in a 
very different way than the individual without such knowledge. 

Therefore - your claim that I declare that Peirce meant the opposite of what he 
wrote - rejects the semiosic triadic process and instead, proclaims the 
validity of the mechanical process. It actually removes the 
Representamen/Sign!!! Rejects semiosis!!

Edwina



 

On Mon 27/09/21 8:54 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

John, you’ve said repeatedly that only a direct quotation from Peirce can 
represent what he thought or meant. Now you tell us that not even a direct 
quotation can do that: “Nobody on planet earth is qualified to say that he or 
she knows exactly what Peirce meant.” For all we know, Peirce could have meant 
exactly the opposite of what he wrote in some direct quotation, as Edwina has 
been arguing. So we are all free to attribute any thought to Peirce, as long as 
we say that the attribution is an opinion; for all opinions are equally 
baseless.

 

I think this logic, or hermeneutic, has the potential to revolutionize Peircean 
studies. But of course that’s only my opinion, as all interpretations are. 
Still, I can’t help wondering: why would anyone bother to read Peirce at all?

 

Gary f.

} By their fruits ye shall know them. [Matthew 7:20] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
On Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 27-Sep-21 00:33
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com  ; 
tabor...@primus.ca  
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity (was Argumentation for the Reality 
of God

 

Edwina, Gary R, List,

 

I've spent many years working with linguists, lexicographers, and computer 
scientists in developing tools for analyzing languages.and relating them to and 
from logic and computer notations.  Following are the slides for a talk about 
the problems:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/natlog.pdf 

 

The first 20 slides present examples from a variety of sources.  You can skip 
the rest.  But I want to emphasize slide 17 on microsenses.  That's a term 
coined by the linguist Allen Cruse, who observed that  there is an open-ended, 
potentially infinite, range of variations for nearly every word in  every 
language.


  _  


ET: Thank you for the link to the last chapter of your book, where you outline 
the basic ambiguity of language.This is a well-known fact and simply supports 
my view that, for example, a reading of Peirce can only be an interpretation 
and is not a direct mechanical transfer of meaning from Site A to Site B. It's 
an interpretation and subject to further discussion.

 

Yes.  Please read the examples in those slides.   It's never safe to assume 
that the same word in two different contexts has the same meaning.  The 
technical terms of science are more likely to have fairly fixed meanings, but 
note the examples for the word number. 

ET: This means that I reject JAS's statement that my interpretation of Peirce's 
Mind/Body relationship is merely an 'assertion' whereas his interpretation is 
an accurate demonstration because he provides 'exact quotations'

Yes.  Peirce's thought was dynamically developing over the years.  It's never 
safe to assume that words in two different MSS have exactly the same 
miicrosense.  Nobody on planet earth is qualified to say that he or she knows 
exactly what Peirce meant.  His statements about mathematics and logic are 
fairly reliable.  But 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity

[gnox]

John, you've said repeatedly that only a direct quotation from Peirce can
represent what he thought or meant. Now you tell us that not even a direct
quotation can do that: "Nobody on planet earth is qualified to say that he
or she knows exactly what Peirce meant." For all we know, Peirce could have
meant exactly the opposite of what he wrote in some direct quotation, as
Edwina has been arguing. So we are all free to attribute any thought to
Peirce, as long as we say that the attribution is an opinion; for all
opinions are equally baseless.

 

I think this logic, or hermeneutic, has the potential to revolutionize
Peircean studies. But of course that's only my opinion, as all
interpretations are. Still, I can't help wondering: why would anyone bother
to read Peirce at all?

 

Gary f.

} By their fruits ye shall know them. [Matthew 7:20] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 27-Sep-21 00:33
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com; tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Vagueness and ambiguity (was Argumentation for the
Reality of God

 

Edwina, Gary R, List,

 

I've spent many years working with linguists, lexicographers, and computer
scientists in developing tools for analyzing languages.and relating them to
and from logic and computer notations.  Following are the slides for a talk
about the problems:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/natlog.pdf 

 

The first 20 slides present examples from a variety of sources.  You can
skip the rest.  But I want to emphasize slide 17 on microsenses.  That's a
term coined by the linguist Allen Cruse, who observed that  there is an
open-ended, potentially infinite, range of variations for nearly every word
in  every language.

  _  

ET: Thank you for the link to the last chapter of your book, where you
outline the basic ambiguity of language.This is a well-known fact and simply
supports my view that, for example, a reading of Peirce can only be an
interpretation and is not a direct mechanical transfer of meaning from Site
A to Site B. It's an interpretation and subject to further discussion.

 

Yes.  Please read the examples in those slides.   It's never safe to assume
that the same word in two different contexts has the same meaning.  The
technical terms of science are more likely to have fairly fixed meanings,
but note the examples for the word number.

ET: This means that I reject JAS's statement that my interpretation of
Peirce's Mind/Body relationship is merely an 'assertion' whereas his
interpretation is an accurate demonstration because he provides 'exact
quotations'

Yes.  Peirce's thought was dynamically developing over the years.  It's
never safe to assume that words in two different MSS have exactly the same
miicrosense.  Nobody on planet earth is qualified to say that he or she
knows exactly what Peirce meant.  His statements about mathematics and logic
are fairly reliable.  But it's not possible to assume that any two people
have the same interpretation of the following words:  mind, thought,
feeling, God, imagination and many others ,...

John

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

[gnox]

John, thanks for your continued interest in ADT’s talk! It was originally
given as a Zoom webinar, and the recording of it can be played from the
University of Milan website: André De Tienne: The Role and Relevance of
Phaneroscopy for inquiry | Dipartimento di Filosofia - DIPAFILO (unimi.it)
 . I must say it is not easy listening, given
André’s vocal style and accent, and I think it assumes a graduate-level
acquaintance with Peirce’s writings. But it does explain the content of the
slides more fully.

 

I’m attaching a text file (UTF encoding, so it includes some non-ASCII
characters, but no italic or bold formatting) of all the transcriptions I
did from the slides; at the top of it is the link to the IUPUI page where
the slides can be viewed in order (forward or reverse). I guess a single
HTML file putting it together with the slide images would be possible, but
not sure whether it would be worth the time it would take, and I would want
to ask André’s permission first.

 

About the questions that you say are important issues to discuss, I don’t
have anything much to say at the moment, but I’m open to hearing what you or
other list members might say about them. 

 

Gary f.

 

} For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.
[Wittgenstein] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: sowa @bestweb.net  
Sent: 19-Sep-21 21:02
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 50

 

Gary F,

 

Thank you for doing the work of extracting all the slides and transcribing
them to text that can be copied and discussed.

 

Now that each slide has been discussed separately, it would be useful to
scroll forward and backward through them and discuss their relationships to
one another, to Peirce's writings, and to writings by other  authors during
the century after Peirce.  It would be useful to have an HTML file with each
slide followed by the transcription.

 

But it would also be useful to have a pointer following each slide to a
recording of  De Tienne's presentation.  After reading a slide, it would be
good to jump to the recording to hear what he said to the audience at the
presentation.

 

Do you have any thoughts or plans about that?

 

I admit that I have criticized some of his comments.  I certainly admit that
he has a very strong background in his long-term study of Peirce's writings
and the years of publications during the past century.  But his final
comments about the science egg raise serious questions:

 

1. Does Peirce mean that phaneroscopy is only nascent as a science,
and not yet a full-blown one?  But clearly phaneroscopy is no ordinary
science.  And yet he is sure that it is at once necessary and
fundamental ...

 

2. Is it a call for a community of phaneroscopists to gather and start
institutionalizing the theory and practice of phaneroscopy?

 

3. Is it because phaneroscopy is the first positive science that it is

a science-egg and will always be a science-egg?

 

4. Is it because the ever-streaming Phaneron encloses EVERY
possibility, every actuality, every generality as firsts?

 

5. Is it because it originates any inquiry in any domain?  Is it the

egg from which all sciences get hatched?  Does it need to be
fertilized?  By what?

 

6. Can we break that egg?  Is it good?  Does it have a sunny side or
is it hopelessly scrambled?

 

These are important issues to discuss.

 

John

https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations

Title slide [1]:  The Role and Relevance of Phaneroscopy for Inquiry
André De Tienne, IUPUI
Seminar presentation (University of Milan, Italy)
Philosophy as a Method of Thinking Practices: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and 
Post-Structuralism in the Light of Pragmatism
8 April 2021


[2] Plan of talk
• 1. Phaneroscopy may be mystifying but is no mystery
• 2. Reminders about Peirce's theory of three categories
• 3. The place of phaneroscopy in Peirce's mature classification of sciences
• 4. From mathematics to phaneroscopy
• 5. Phaneroscopy as Inquiry into the positiveness of experience
• 6. The Phaneron and its ingredients
• 7. How to scope the phaneron and why
• 8. Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry
• Conclusion: Phaneroscopy as a science-egg


[3] Phaneroscopy is a sort of white elephant in Peirce studies. 

Most scholars are familiar with Peirce's seminal theory of categories and its 
association with multiple research areas in his philosophy, logic, semiotics, 
and evolutionary metaphysics. 

They are also familiar with that theory's association with what Peirce ended up 
calling “phaneroscopy.” But as to what phaneroscopy is, the kind of 
activity it consists in, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

[gnox]

ET: … and frankly, from these slides, he [ADT] doesn't seem to have any 
understanding of the categories.

 

Those Who Know All about the categories have thereby spoken!

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 16-Sep-21 17:16
To: jawb...@att.net; jerryr...@gmail.com
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

 

List

My own view is that phaneroscopy is not a science.

 I see it as the phase of the Dynamic Object and Immediate Object interacting 
with the agent; that is, it is the reception of data. [And I think that Peirce 
used the term 'data' to refer to 'prebit'.

It is unprocessed data but can be experienced within the three modes: 
quality/reaction/continuity. 

And that's about all it does. This data, as classified within its categorical 
modes,  then awaits the analytic mediation of the Representamen node...which 
must add some scientific analytic method, ie, mathematics, in order to 
interpret this data.

But I consider De Tienne's outline ambiguous and unclear. He sets up this phase 
of semiosis - and it IS a phase of semiosis - as some kind of New Age campfire 
experience...and doesn't show us how it fits into a scientific analysis.

and frankly, from these slides, he doesn't seem to have any understanding of 
the categories.

Edwina




 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

[gnox]

Jerry R,

The slow read is not quite concluded: there are still two more slides to go. 
Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you ask here; the 
last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical portrait of a 
science-egg (with its various parts labelled). 

As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with their 
own answers (or else leave the questions open). I’ve given some hints of my own 
answers along the way, and back in June I submitted a paper on the subject 
which is due to be published later this year as part of a collection edited by 
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Mohammad Shafiei. Nothing has been said during the 
slow read that would persuade me to make substantial changes to that paper, so 
I’m content to let it speak for me.

I wouldn’t have written such a paper if I hadn’t paid very close attention to 
Peirce’s writings that explicitly deal with phenomenology and phaneroscopy. 
Some of the most vociferous opinions expressed during the slow read came from 
people who consider themselves experts but obviously have not paid close 
attention to what Peirce said on the subject, and have even objected to 
Peirce’s writings on the subject being posted to the list (instead of his 
writings on mathematics, for instance). Some of these opinions were clearly 
motivated by a hostile reading   of 
ADT’s slides. I think any readers who still have open minds regarding 
phaneroscopy owe it to themselves to at least read everything in EP2 on the 
subject, if not some of the harder-to-find texts like R 645 
  (which is now on my website). 

If someone has paid close attention to the practice of phaneroscopy as 
described in concrete detail by Peirce, and has tried it out for himself (as 
Peirce insisted one must in order to draw any conclusions from it), then he can 
form and express a valid opinion about its scientific value (or lack thereof), 
as R.K. Atkins did in his book about it. I don’t believe that any opinions 
about it which aren’t based on such a study are worth arguing about. I also 
believe that opinions about Peirce’s philosophy which ignore his 
phenomenology/phaneroscopy are just as liable to distortion as opinions which 
ignore his mathematics or his semeiotics.

I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific. I don’t have a 
more direct answer to your question, so this will have to do.

Gary f.

} Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already enough 
names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32  (Feng/English)] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jerry Rhee
Sent: 16-Sep-21 13:56
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

 

Dear Gary, list:

 

Since the slow read has concluded, 

I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial announcement 

(on June 11).

 

“My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that 

Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.  

That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy 

merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily) 

and not systematically- as a true science.”

 

So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?

 

Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?

 

___

 

If, as Peirce says

  Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, 

  hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, 

  though enough to assure the student of it that … 

  it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficent science. (R 
645:2, 1909)

 

And if, as Gary says

  In these letters (between Peirce and William James, 1898) 

  Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls 

  “conservative sentimentalism” or “sentimental conservatism.” 

  The basic idea is that in the conduct of everyday social life, 

  when it comes to making crucial decisions, 

  we ought to trust our instinctive or “gut feelings” 

  rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical theories..

 

I hardly see any reason why we ought to take him seriously.

That is, it is impossible for me to believe a man, 

who puts himself forth genuinely as logician, 

that he would prescribe such an immature belief.

 

That he has the belief is not surprising, but there is something obvious that 
is missing here.  

For have you forgotten the old decree?

 

  Believest thou that he there spake the truth? 

  Why dost thou believe it?"

 

  The disciple answered: "I believe in Zarathustra." 

 

  But Zarathustra shook his head and smiled.

  -- Belief doth not sanctify me, said he, 

  least of all the belief in myself. 

 

  But granting that some one did say in all seriousness 

  that the poets lie too much: he was right

 —WE do lie too much.

 

Moreover, when 

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Conclusion: 
Phaneroscopy as a “science-egg”

Gary f.

 



 

Text: 

Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of 
it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that 
... it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficent science. (R 
645:2, 1909) 

We need to remember that, for Peirce, sciences are living activities conducted 
by living communities of inquirers. Sciences get born and die. Their 
classification is actually akin to a natural classification. In many ways 
Peirces classification is phylogenetic in character.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theism (was Inquiry Into Inquiry)

[gnox]

John, I have to agree with you on this:

JFS: There are many other religions around the world that don't seem to
attribute a personality to their creator.  So Peirce's claim that the NA
proves that human nature requires a personal God does not seem to be
convincing.

GF: It is certainly not convincing as the conclusion of an inductive
argumentation. But the NA itself is not an argumentation, let alone an
inductive one. Peirce simply asks the reader to practice Musement himself
and see whether it leads him to belief in a personal God. Well, having done
my best to practice Musement, I do not find that it leads me in that
direction. I have no problem coming up with the idea of a Creator, but I
can't conceive of that Creator as a person in any sense that I recognize as
valid.

On the other hand, when Peirce asks me to practice phaneroscopy and see
whether it leads me to the conceptions of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness as the formal elements of the phaneron, I seem to end up with the
same "categories" that he does. This is not an argumentation either,
certainly not an inductive one - rather a hypothetical one, like Peirce's
"strictly hypothetical God" - yet this categorial analysis does prove highly
useful in more inductive investigations.

Likewise, I think Peirce's assumption in the NA is that belief in a personal
and benevolent God is a worthy guide to conduct for everyone who holds that
belief instinctively rather being convinced of it by logical argumentation.

CSP: If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally
conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good
outweighing all others, we should naturally expect that there would be some
Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low
alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter; and
further, that this Argument should present its conclusion, not as a
proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to
the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth.
(EP2:435)

GF: The recent book by Richard Kenneth Atkins on Peirce and the Conduct of
Life includes quotes from the exchange of letters between Peirce and William
James as Peirce was preparing his Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In these
letters Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls "conservative
sentimentalism" or "sentimental conservatism." The basic idea is that in the
conduct of everyday social life, when it comes to making crucial decisions,
we ought to trust our instinctive or "gut feelings" (as we would say today)
rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical theories. This
does not, of course, apply to the conduct of scientific or philosophical
inquiry. But both Musement and Phaneroscopy are essentially pre-scientific,
and I think the 1908 NA is quite compatible with what Peirce called
"sentimental conservatism" in 1898. In R 645
<https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm>  (1909) he was still
self-identifying as a "conservative" and "an old-fashioned Christian." It
all goes back to his gut feelings.

My own gut feelings are different. For one thing, I don't really feel that
the Creator is benign. But I recognize that Peirce's statement about
religious belief and the conduct of life in the NA is expressed as a
conditional: "If God Really be, and be benign, then ." - the value of this
belief for the conduct of life is conditional on its being a gut feeling of
the believer. And in that sense I agree with it.

Gary f.

 

} There's nothing more ruthless than life itself, and there's no other
source of compassion. [gnox] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 16-Sep-21 00:31
To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theism (was Inquiry Into Inquiry)

 

Jon AS,List,

 

JAS:  Why would anyone not take [Peirce's] own word for it?

 

I admit that Peirce's NA writings are consistent with a
traditional Christian interpretation.  His family was Unitarian, but
his triadic philosophy led him to prefer a trinitarian God.  And that
led him to join the Episcopal Church.

 

Although he took Communion in the Episcopal Church, he also wrote that
his beliefs were "unconventional".  But he didn't elaborate, perhaps
because he didn't want to scandalize other parishioners.

 

I also admit that Peirce's NA makes a good case for a belief that is

consistent with many religions  and with the beliefs of many scientists

who claim that they are atheists or agnostics.  But the claims for a proof

of the existence of a personal God are less convincing.

  

>From the gospel of John, which he preferred, the first few verses from

"In the beginning was the Logos"  to "And the Logos was made flesh and

dwelt among us."  are consistent with e

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Slide 46 is a 
continuation of 45.

Gary f.

 



 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[gnox]

Jon AS, I forgot to thank you for providing the quote from Baldwin’s Dictionary:

CSP: Formal logic classifies arguments by producing forms in which, the letters 
of the alphabet being replaced by any terms whatever, the result will be a 
valid, probable, or sophistic argument, as the case may be;

This confirms that, as I said in my post this morning, formal logic produces 
explicit formulations (which may include “letters of the alphabet” as symbols 
of the variables). But the phaneroscopist’s attention would be distracted from 
the basic task of phaneroscopic analysis if he had to pay conscious attention 
to such formulations. If he has developed sufficient skill by practicing the 
use of such theoretical formulations, the logic they represent may function 
implicitly to guide his present generalizations. But it is also possible for 
phaneroscopic analysis to draw on an implicit logic which has never been made 
explicit, just as it is possible (and usual, in fact) for children to learn the 
use of their language without receiving any explicit instruction in its 
grammar. I wouldn’t refer to an implicitly functioning logic as “formal logic” 
because I consider it misleading to do so. But of course I can’t dictate the 
terms of your usage.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 11-Sep-21 17:48
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

 

Gary F., Gary R., List:

 

GF: ... what I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to something 
“Done or made with the forms recognized as ensuring validity; explicit and 
definite, as opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding” (OED) — “formal” 
as opposed to “informal.” This is quite different from “formal” as opposed to 
“material,” which is the usage that applies to “formal elements of the 
phaneron.”

 

You went on to quote Peirce's entry for "formal" in the Century Dictionary, but 
he also wrote this entry for "material logic" in Baldwin's Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology.

 

CSP: Formal logic classifies arguments by producing forms in which, the letters 
of the alphabet being replaced by any terms whatever, the result will be a 
valid, probable, or sophistic argument, as the case may be; material logic is a 
logic which does not produce such perfectly general forms, but considers a 
logical universe having peculiar properties.

Such, for example, would be a logic in which every class was assumed to consist 
of a finite number of individuals; so that the syllogism of transposed quantity 
would hold good. In most cases material logic is practically a synonym of 
applied logic. But a system like Hegel's may also properly be termed material 
logic. The term originated among the English Occamists of the 14th century, who 
declared Aristotle's logic to be material, in that it did not hold good of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. (CP 2.549, 1902)

 

As John Sowa rightly noted, formal logic is simply mathematical logic, which is 
diagrammatic and strictly deductive. Hence, it corresponds to the logica utens 
that is employed in mathematics, phaneroscopy, esthetics, and ethics, rather 
than the logica docens that is developed by the normative science of logic as 
semeiotic. That being the case, I am inclined to agree with Gary R. that the 
formal elements of the phaneron are formal in the same sense that mathematical 
logic is formal.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 6:45 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Gary R, list,

GR: However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly 
unlikely that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a 
logica docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in 
consideration of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that I follow here. 
What supports your contention, hardly Peirce's, that a logica docens is a 
requirement of formal logic, mathematical logic?

GF: I wouldn’t call it a “contention,” more like a suggestion, but anyway, what 
I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to something “Done or made 
with the forms recognized as ensuring validity; explicit and definite, as 
opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding” (OED) — “formal” as opposed 
to “informal.” This is quite different from “formal” as opposed to “material,” 
which is the usage that applies to “formal elements of the phaneron.” 

Peirce’s entry on the word in the Century Dictionary includes these two 
applications to logic: 1) “— Formal law, in logic, an explicit law; also, one 
which has no exceptions.” 2) “— Formal logic, the theory of the relations of 
different forms of propositions and syllogisms; also (by loose 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logica utens vs docens (was Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

John, Jon A.S., Phyllis et al.,

JFS: Nobody today makes a distinction between a logica utens (using) vs a
logica docens (teaching).

GF: It may well be that nobody outside of Peircean studies uses those terms,
which Peirce took from the Scholastic philosophers. And it may be that the
distinction itself is not commonly made in your particular field, John. But
the distinction is a crucial one in cognitive science and related
disciplines. It is essentially the distinction between a "logic" that
operates implicitly and an explicitly formulated "logic" (often one which
aims to explicate the "logic" which functions implicitly). It is precisely
analogous to the difference between semiosis and semiotics. In cognitive
science it is sometimes referred to as the "use/mention" distinction. See
Comminding (TS   .14)
(gnusystems.ca) for more on this; also https://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x14
for a Peirce quote which makes the distinction without using the Scholastic
terms.

For more evidence that this is the distinction Peirce denotes by using those
terms, see Logica Utens | Dictionary | Commens
 . For example, he says
that "In everyday business, reasoning is tolerably successful; but I am
inclined to think that it is done as well without the aid of theory as with
it. A Logica Utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the billiard
player's nerves, best fulfills familiar uses" (CP 1.623, EP2:30). 

Since Peirce's phaneroscopy eschews prior theorizing while it generalizes
from observation of familiar experience, it seems clear to me that any logic
it uses must be a logica utens. Formulating that logic is the task of
logical theory, i.e. logica docens. The reason that phaneroscopy can draw on
mathematical logic is that the logic of mathematics is a logica utens, as
Peirce said c. 1896. It operates prior to formulation. Hence the ambiguity
of "formal logic," which, if it can denote an implicitly functioning logic,
can also denote a range of explicit theories of logic formulated
mathematically. That's why I think it confusing to refer to the "logic"
which is "resident in the phaneroscopist's nerves" as "formal logic." 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 11-Sep-21 20:53



 

Nobody today makes a distinction between a logica utens (using) vs a
logica docens (teaching).  And nobody today claims that a formal logic
(either Peirce's algebraic notation or his existential graphs) is
inappropriate for calculation.

 

In fact, Frege made exactly the same mistake.  Neither Peirce nor
Frege had any experience with the long and complicated proofs that
became common in the century that followed their discoveries.  Even
Whitehead and Russell, who adopted Frege's rules of inference, did not
consider their proof methods to be efficient for computation.

 

But much better proof procedures were discovered in the century after
Peirce, and the search for better algorithms accelerated when digital
computers became available.  Gerhard Gentzen (1936) invented several
important methods that were adapted to computer processing.

 

But the simplicity of Peirce's EG rules are a major improvement over
Gentzen's methods.  In fact, they are so simple and elegant that they
enabled an unsolved research problem from 1988 to be solved as a
simple corollary in terms of Peirce's rules.

 

For an overview of these issues, see the slides I presented at an APA

conference, session on Peirce in April 2015:
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

 

Slide two of ppe.pdf has a link to a 76-page article in the Journal of
Applied Logic, in which I spell out all the details.

 

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

John, Phyllis,

I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic is
a logica utens or a logica docens. Since you teach the subject yourself,
John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires explicit
instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s “Logic of
Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its reasonings by a
logica utens which it develops for itself, and has no need of any appeal to
a logica docens.” Unless he changed his mind about this after c. 1896 (which
I doubt), the implication is that the logic of mathematics is a logica utens
while mathematical logic is a logica docens.

If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
upon for principles is the logic of mathematics or mathematical logic. Since
phaneroscopy is cenoscopic, according to Peirce, that would seem to rule out
any special logica docens being an essential part of it.

Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
mathematics involved is really the logic of relatives, which (being
mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical logic.)
Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a logica utens?
What do you think?

By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 11-Sep-21 15:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

 

Gary F,

 

That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There
are many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out
the vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy
is more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing
the experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping
them to a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and
interrelationships. 

 

In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience
to words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to
Peirce's methodeutic.

 

John

 

 

 

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

GR: However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly 
unlikely that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a 
logica docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in 
consideration of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that I follow here. 
What supports your contention, hardly Peirce's, that a logica docens is a 
requirement of formal logic, mathematical logic?

GF: I wouldn’t call it a “contention,” more like a suggestion, but anyway, what 
I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to something “Done or made 
with the forms recognized as ensuring validity; explicit and definite, as 
opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding” (OED) — “formal” as opposed 
to “informal.” This is quite different from “formal” as opposed to “material,” 
which is the usage that applies to “formal elements of the phaneron.” 

Peirce’s entry on the word in the Century Dictionary includes these two 
applications to logic: 1) “— Formal law, in logic, an explicit law; also, one 
which has no exceptions.” 2) “— Formal logic, the theory of the relations of 
different forms of propositions and syllogisms; also (by loose writers) applied 
to the opinion of those who hold that such logic is adequate to representing 
human thought.” But you may be right that what Peirce had in mind when he wrote 
of “formal logic” was the formal/material distinction (i.e. the logic of 
external relations rather than internal composition), and not the 
formal/informal or explicit/implicit distinction, which certainly informs the 
difference between logica docens and logica utens. I think this is 
questionable, but I’m not prepared to argue the question one way or the other. 
We would have to look at each case in context.

I certainly don’t deny the generative potency of the number three, just 
wondering about the generative potency of “formal logic.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 10-Sep-21 23:09



 

Gary F, List

GF: Gary, thank you for reminding us of “The Simplest Mathematics”, i.e. “of 
these very simple branches of mathematics which lie at the root of formal 
logic.” When we juxtapose ["The Simplest Mathematics"] with some of Peirce’s 
other writings on mathematics, logic and phaneroscopy. . .  it raises some 
questions which are not simple at all. 

GR: I agree, and I believe you pointed to one of the most important of the 
"other writings" in this context, viz., “The Logic of Mathematics: An Attempt 
to Develop My Categories From Within.”

GF: I admire Bellucci’s attempt to untangle some of the paradoxes involved in 
phaneroscopic analysis, but I don’t regard it as definitive.  I think some of 
these questions simply have to remain open, as long as we are determined to 
find answers fully consistent with Peirce’s writings and diagrams.

GR: I agree that not only Bellucci's but virtually every "attempt to untangle 
some of the paradoxes involved in phaneroscopic analysis," at least, those I 
know of, cannot be seen as definitive, that many questions remain open, and 
that in a strong sense that the work of explicating and developing 
"phaneroscopic analysis" is still in its infancy, the the science-egg has a 
long way to go before it's hatched and the (potentially) beautiful bird emerges.

GF: To give just one example: is “formal logic” formal in the same sense that 
the “formal elements of the phaneron” are formal?

GR: I have tended to think of it rather in the reverse order that you frame the 
question; so that the question as I see it is: are the formal elements of the 
phaneron formal in the same sense as “formal logic”is formal? That is, since 
phaneroscopy derives at least some of its principles from formal logic, it 
seems sensible to me to answer your question (albeit reversed), yes! The formal 
elements are deeply related in so far as valency theory and the reduction 
thesis in mathematics leads to the Three Universal Categories of phaneroscopy.

As you wrote, Peire, in “The Logic of Mathematics” holds that “mathematics 
performs its reasonings by a logica utens which it develops for itself, and has 
no need of any appeal to a logica docens; for no disputes about reasoning arise 
in mathematics which need to be submitted to the principles of the philosophy 
of thought for decision” (CP 1.417). 

And as you added: "This explains the priority of mathematics over [normative] 
logic as “the philosophy of thought” — and over phenomenology, which comes 
between mathematics and (normative) logic in Peirce’s later classification of 
sciences. . ."

GR: So far we are, I think, in agreement.

However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly unlikely 
that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a logica 
docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in consideration 
of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that I follow here. What supports 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[gnox]

Gary, thank you for reminding us of “The Simplest Mathematics”, i.e. of “of 
these very simple branches of mathematics which lie at the root of formal 
logic.” When we juxtapose it with some of Peirce’s other writings on 
mathematics, logic and phaneroscopy, and the relations of “dependence” between 
them, it raises some questions which are not simple at all. I admire Bellucci’s 
attempt to untangle some of the paradoxes involved in phaneroscopic analysis, 
but I don’t regard it as definitive.  I think some of these questions simply 
have to remain open, as long as we are determined to find answers fully 
consistent with Peirce’s writings and diagrams.

To give just one example: is “formal logic” formal in the same sense that the 
“formal elements of the phaneron” are formal?

Among the many Peirce texts that should be considered in trying to answer such 
a question would be Peirce’s c. 1896 essay on “The Logic of Mathematics” 
(subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within”) where he says 
that “mathematics performs its reasonings by a logica utens which it develops 
for itself, and has no need of any appeal to a logica docens; for no disputes 
about reasoning arise in mathematics which need to be submitted to the 
principles of the philosophy of thought for decision” (CP 1.417). This explains 
the priority of mathematics over logic as “the philosophy of thought” — and 
over phenomenology, which comes between mathematics and (normative) logic in 
Peirce’s later classification of sciences — but it seems highly unlikely that 
“formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a logica docens. 
And if the mathematics that phaneroscopy depends on is based on a logica utens, 
then it would seem that the phaneroscopist does not need any specialist or 
formal training in mathematics. What she would need instead, as De Tienne 
suggests in his slides, is “training” and practice in sensory (and imaginative) 
observation of the constituents of the phaneron. The mathematics involved, on 
the other hand, is as simple as one, two, three. The closest Peirce comes to 
formulating it is his diagram showing the “valency” of a rhema or a “spot” in 
EGs.

But what I’ve just written is no more definitive than Bellucci’s 2015 paper on 
the question of what constitutes phaneroscopic analysis. On the contrary, I’m 
just giving an example intended to keep such questions open. As for the 
practice of phaneroscopy, solvitur ambulando, as they say in Latin.

 

Gary f.

 

} Her untitled mamafesta memorialising the Mosthighest has gone by many names 
at disjointed times. [Finnegans Wake 104] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 9-Sep-21 16:15

 

List, Gary F,

 

A while back I took another look at "The Simplest Mathematics" and began a 
draft intended as a response to something you'd written, Gary, but which I 
wasn't able to complete at the time. I decided to post the draft today as the 
quotations are of considerable interest. [All the quotations below are from 
"The Simplest Mathematics" (1902)]

 

Peirce begins his discussion "with a little a prior chemistry."

 

The most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency. 
This is a great philosophical truth having its origin and rationale in 
mathematics. It will be convenient to begin with a little a priori chemistry. 
An atom of helion, neon, argon, xenon, crypton, appears to be a medad (if I may 
be allowed to form a patronymic from méden). Argon gives us, with its zero 
valency, the one single type A (CP 4.309, emphasis added).

 

He continues in this vein taking up other valencies which eventually leads to a 
discussion of triads. 

 

Triads, on the other hand, will give every possible variety of type. Thus, we 
may imagine the atom of argon to be really formed of four triads, thus [. . .] 
We may imagine the monadic atom to be composed of seven triads;  [. . . ] A 
dyad will be obtained by breaking any bond of A; while higher valencies may be 
produced, either simply [. . . ] or in an intricate manner (emphasis added, CP 
4.309 [note: each bracket above is a diagram in the text])

 

He arrives at what might be seen as the crux of the matter:

. . . .

It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the whole of mathematics is 
enwrapped in these trichotomic graphs; and they will be found extremely 
pertinent to logic. So prolific is the triad in forms that one may easily 
conceive that all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it 
[. . . ] All that springs from -[this symbol] [in the text, a diagram of the 
valental triad] -- an emblem of fertility in comparison with which the holy 
phallus of religion's youth is a poor stick indeed (CP 4.310, emphasis added).

 

Finally, and somewhat abruptly, he arrives at the conclusion of this section of 
the paper.

 


Other points concerning trichotomic mathematics are more of 

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 43

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: 

How does one become a phaneroscopist? 

How to train oneself?

There are a myriad ways of learning the trade.

•  Study how oenologists train themselves to taste and describe wines. 
Study how perfume makers describe scents.

•  Observe abstract paintings and create for each of them a list of 
titles plausible to you.

•  Bring yourself to perceive new qualia and to isolate (prescind) them.

•  Draw, paint, write poetry: don't pretend to be an artist, just a 
mere phaneroscopist - though an extraordinarily assiduous one.

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 42

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 8. 
Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry

Gary f.

 



 

Text: 

•  As Vincent Colapietro repeats tirelessly, the categories “guide and 
goad inquiry.” They guide and goad every philosophical science, but especially 
phaneroscopy because phaneroscopy actually initiates, knowingly or unknowingly, 
the very process of inquiry itself.

•  All it takes to engage in phaneroscopy is for us to start looking 
anew or afresh at anything, puzzling or not, as though one had never seen it 
before, as though one had never adopted any habit of looking at it, as though 
we were a naïve but enormously inquisitive and curious child.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another perspective

[gnox]

For another perspective on the roles of mathematics and logic in
phaneroscopic analysis, see Francesco Bellucci's 2015 paper at
https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis .

(It's a .doc file instead of the usual .pdf.)

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 6-Sep-21 17:37
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond

Cc: Phyllis Chiasson 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another perspective

 

Gary R,

 

Do you know the story about the man who spoke prose all his life and didn't
realize what he was doing?

 

Well, you have been doing mathematics and teaching mathematics, and your
comment confirms Peirce's point:  Phaneroscopy depends on pure mathematics,
especially formal logic.   Anybody who uses the following six words is
speaking logic:  some, every, and, or, not, if.

 

Every time you use any of those six words, you're speaking a subset of
first-order logic.  If you use all six of them correctly, you have a basuc
understanding of first-order logic.  You don't need to study logic for
simple common sense.  .But that's the equivalent of saying tht you don't
need more than an eighth-grade education to do research,:

 

GR: I found that it doesn't take formal logic -- although a bit of
commonsensism seems requisite -- and soon the simple, ordinary, naive
observation of the phaneron (or whatever one cares to call it) reveals that
qualities, interactions, and thought-signs are all that there is. One
doesn't require the reduction thesis, or valency theory, or mathematical
logic, or graph theory to see the trichotomic structure of the world. 

 

Have you ever seen a diagram and understood its implications?   Have you
ever drawn a diagram to illustrate some point in your lectures?  If you did
either of these two activities, you were using and understanding a subset of
graph theory.  But  if you want to get beyond an eighth-grade education,
doing a bit of studying helps a lot.

 

Fundamental principle:  The reason why we are studying Peirce's writings
instead of Hegel's is that Peirce knew a lot more math and ogic than Hegel
did.  For the simple issues, Hegel's common sense was adequate -- and Peirce
gives him credit for those insights.  But when you get to the more complex
issues, Hegel's insights were insufficient.  Peirce and Husserl were the
first two philosophers who pushed phenomenology beyond Hegel.  Husserl had a
PhD in math.  Peirce didn't get a PhD, but he learned math at an advanced
level from his father.

 

John

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

[gnox]

I wonder whether Peirce was being ironic when he wrote in R 645 of Phaneroscopy 
being “still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being 
as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under 
the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues 
long, it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science.”

In the light of what’s been said about it by its vociferous opponents on 
peirce-l, the part about “fostering care” sounds ironic to the point of 
sarcasm. But then again, the long continuation of “human culture” is, in our 
time, a bigger IF than ever. When we see the overwhelming ecological facts 
being ignored by the Powers that Be, it seems extremely unlikely that the 
“beneficient” potential of any science like Phaneroscopy will ever be developed.

Well, if you want to make an Anthropocene, you gotta break some science-eggs.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 3-Sep-21 13:27
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 39

 

JA: "not everything under construction is a science."

 

True. But I'd suggest that there is no good reason to block the way of inquiry 
of those who think that phaneroscopy, for example, may prove to be a science 
even if, at present, it remains in my view but a science egg. That it is not 
yet clear whether it can be fully developed as a science (I believe that there 
is good to think that it can) is, for me at least, one of the reasons why we're 
having this slow read.

 

So, those who think phaneroscopy (involving the doctrine of categories) is 
worth looking further into include not only Andre De Tienne, but to cite again 
a recent book on the topic, Richard Kenneth Atkins', 2018 monograph, Charles S. 
Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness 

https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.001.0001/oso-9780190887179

 

 GR

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[gnox]

Thanks for your comments, Jon!

What I posted yesterday was only the first few pages of R 645. Reading the rest 
of it yesterday, I realized that it reveals quite a lot about the theory and 
practice of Peirce’s phaneroscopy, that it has not been published in the 
standard primary sources, and that I couldn’t find a complete transcription of 
it on the web. So I made one and put it on my website: How to Define 
(gnusystems.ca)  . (“How to Define” is 
Peirce’s title for it, which is interesting in itself.) I highly recommend it 
to those who wish to clarify the concept of phaneroscopy by reading Peirce 
himself rather than peirce-l posts and other secondary sources. It also 
includes some autobiographical asides— perhaps the reason why Ketner included 
most of it in his “Autobiography of Charles Sanders Peirce,” His Glassy 
Essence— which are relevant to his own practice, both of phaneroscopy and 
writing.

Gary f.

 

} Now listed to one aneither and liss them down and smoothen out your leaves of 
rose. [Finnegans Wake 101] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 2-Sep-21 18:27
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

 

Gary F., List:

 

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three studies 
is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.

 

As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire 
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different 
purposes. It is not a matter of how people identify themselves, professionally 
or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to learn by embarking upon a 
particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and then drawing necessary 
conclusions from them, is acting as a mathematician. Someone observing whatever 
is or could be present to the mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its 
irreducible elements, is acting as a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the 
distinction between truth and falsity, along with the theory of how to attain 
the former and avoid the latter, is acting as a logician. Someone investigating 
the actual workings of embodied minds is acting as a psychologist.

 

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of 
consciousness.

 

This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing the 
phaneron as whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way. Moreover, 
as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not just concerned with our 
individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's much more general sense. In R 
645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he equates "consciousness" with this 
broader notion of unmediated presence to the mind--immediate consciousness 
rather than self-consciousness or cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense 
rather than altersense or medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 
2ns or 3ns. From this standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even 
individual atoms are "conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree 
(CP 6.201, 1898).

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[gnox]

List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make an 
amendment to Ketner’s transcription. 

One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions of 
what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning.” 
But it seems to me that this description fits phaneroscopy and not psychology. 
In the source manuscript (page 4 as numbered by Peirce), the entire sentence 
after the word “Psychology” is crossed out, and the following words, which are 
not crossed out, continue the sentence: “endeavours to make known the positive 
facts of the workings of the mind.” (This obviously does refer to Psychology, 
but is omitted from Ketner’s transcription.) The last sentence on the page 
which is not crossed out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must 
follow in hypothetical cases.” 

So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text below, in a way 
better reflects the manuscript (and makes more sense):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[gnox]

Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences 
between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic, some readers may be interested in 
the context of the quotation from R 645 (1909) which occupies most of slide 38. 
Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book His Glassy 
Essence (1998):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the diversity of their general aims. Phaneroscopy asks what are the 
possibilities of consciousness. Psychology deals with questions of what we are 
directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning. Logic involves 
no more observation than Pure Mathematics itself, and is entirely occupied with 
necessary reasoning. Logic inquires into the theory of what must follow or is 
likely, or a warrantable assumption in hypothetical cases. Psychology reunites 
in itself all the methods and all the difficulties of the other Empirical 
Sciences; it endeavors to make known the positive facts of the workings of the 
mind. 

In the Second place, the methods of the three 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 36

[gnox]

Jack, what you are asking for here is what I call (in my book
 ) “premature precision.”
Nevertheless I can offer a few pointers. The Commens Dictionary (Commens |
Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce  ) is the best
resource for his terminology, but all of the many quotations in it are taken
out of context (of course), so it’s no substitute for reading the two
volumes of The Essential Peirce, which are by far the best way to begin
learning what he thought. (Except that the very first article in EP1 is
among his most difficult.) A shorter online alternative is Peirce:
selections, summaries and secondary sources (gnusystems.ca)
 . 

Referring to the specific terms you mention: there is no “dynamic/degenerate
distinction” that I know of. There is a very important dynamic/immediate
distinction which applies to both objects and interepretants (not to signs
themselves). There is also a genuine/degenerate distinction which he only
rarely applies to signs, but does apply to Secondness and Thirdness (it does
not apply to Firstness) in his phenomenology/phaneroscopy. You can find
examples of these applications in the Commens Dictionary.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 31-Aug-21 10:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 36

 

Gary F, List,

 

I wonder, in the context of the below slide, what are the precise
relations/roles of dynamic/degenerate signs with respect to distinctions of
internal/external (or fiction/fact, though this might be far too sharp a
boundary to draw)? 

 

Or, is there any work people would suggest for those of us still coming to
terms with Peirce's terms? (but especially the dynamic/degenerate
distinction). 

 

Best

 

Jack

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 36

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: General definition 

I use the word phaneron to mean or denote an ens or object of no matter what 
kind, a thing in the widest sense of that word, in short, whatever is present 
to or can come before the mind directly, at any time and in any sense or in any 
way whatsoever, without caring whether it be regarded as real or not, as fact 
or fiction, whether it be a tinge of feeling, or be imagined, or thought or 
desired, and whether it be objectified or not. [Blend of multiple sources]

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[gnox]

Jeff, List,

I did notice, Jeff, that your usage of "phenomenology" is very close to
John's - that is, it agrees with the "general" definition of the word that I
quoted from the OED, as opposed to the "Philosophy" definition given there,
which is much more detailed - but i won't try to persuade you, any more than
i did John, that Peirce's definitions are more philosophical than general. I
also noticed your reference to the "distinction between the phenomenological
and nomological phases of inquiry," but i don't see the relevance of that
distinction to phenomenological practice as Peirce defined it, so i don't
intend to argue that point either.

JD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does
what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of
how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable
scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational
errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses,
develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for
given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing
hypotheses.

GF: I don't think Peirce's phenomenology does that, so i certainly can't
provide "an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of
experience" does that kind of thing. Some phenomenologists in the Husserlian
tradition do try to give an account of how phenomenology can inform
psychology in those ways; one example is Gallagher and Zahavi, The
Phenomenological Mind (3rd edition, 2021). But i don't see Peirce giving any
such account for his phenomenology. If his phenomenology were more concerned
with the material elements (or material categories) of phenomena, it might
be possible to talk about "phenomenological phases of inquiry" within the
special sciences, but Peirce says quite explicitly and consistently that his
phenomenology/ phaneroscopy is concerned only with the formal elements and
not the material elements of the phaneron. I have seen no text by Peirce
suggesting that his phenomenological method can be of any direct assistance
to special sciences such as astronomy, biology or psychology in the ways you
list above.

Some of these distinctions verge on hairsplitting, so i can easily see how
Jon A.S. could be in general agreement with both posts (yours and mine).
That's why i would rather not spend more time arguing over these
distinctions, which may turn out to be more verbal than pragmatic. The
outcome would make no difference to my practice of phaneroscopy, or anyone
else's, as far as I can see.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 30-Aug-21 14:20
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,

 

Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
Jeff."

 

Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and
I may have some disagreements. 

 

At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on
the apparent disagreement?

 

Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to
aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:

 

1.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
explanations of consciousness.
2.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice of
analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses
of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will be important
for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to observational error
in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to how to make measurements of
these phenomena and how to formulate plausible explanations. Most
importantly, an account of the elemental forms of experience will put us in
a better position to frame scientific questions and more clearly comprehend
the space of possible hypothetical explanations. As such, a Peircean
phenomenology will be similarly helpful in the special sciences, especially
where there are disputes about (1) the proper forms of measurement of the
phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various hypotheses. 

 

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 35

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Since the 
word “manifest” is a key word in Peirce’s “etymological definition” (slide 34), 
De Tienne poses here a number of questions dealing with the ambiguities of that 
word, in order to help readers disambiguate the word “phaneron,” i.e. direct 
attention to the object of that sign. He does not give explicit answers to 
these questions, as each user of the word has to work out his own answers based 
on his reading of Peirce (especially the other definitions of “phaneron” which 
will follow shortly). 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: This is a good place to discuss how manifest the phaneron is ...

Seeming vs. appearance: are they the same?

Manifestation: manifesting or manifested?

Is the manifest obscure?

Is the manifest an indeterminate manifold?

What about the continuous stream of manifestation (or presencing)?

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[gnox]

John, I am aware that some scientists use the word "phenomenology" in
reference to "The division of any science which is concerned with the
description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or
theoretical explanation." The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell
and Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it
would not surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878,
especially in a non-philosophical context.

I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce's use of the word from 1902
on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a
close reading of Peirce's work that uses the word specifically in reference
to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but
provides a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the "formal
elements" of the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name
of this science to "phaneroscopy" in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling
evidence of that he was referring not to "a division of any science" but to
"the most primal of all the positive sciences" (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won't
try to change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will
simply have to accept that what you call "phenomenology" or "phaneroscopy"
is not what I refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce's
usage of them, or when I am using them in any philosophical context. 

I'll just go back to the discussion of ADT's slides now, with that in mind.
We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some
issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification.  I recall that Gary F said that the
dependencies in the development seemed to be circular.  And I
agree.  In their daily work, everybody, including professional
mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
way from any source.  Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when
he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath.

But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original
discovery, is independent of any features from its origin.  Its
principles then become available for any science of any kind.

JAS:  I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the
phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis
agrees with the actual facts or not.

But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
phenomenology from the people who develop and use them.  All people
have all their knowledge available at all times.  Peirce was a
polymath.  At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
analyzing experience.  But in the next moment, he could use normative
principles to evaluate the results.  Then he could apply those results to
a problem in physics.  For a case study, see his Photometric
Researches, or the excerpts I posted at
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf

JAS:  I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience
in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of mathematics.

Yes.  Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as
anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination.  A chess expert can
play a good game blindfold.  And mathematicians can do the algebra or
the geometry in their heads.

GF:  John says, "The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the
raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses." But we have
previously agreed that in Peirce's hierarchy of sciences, each science
depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can
and often do get their raw data from those below.

Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf.  Peirce published that book
in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences.
On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be
called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction
between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
(as it really is).  On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
and Maxwell.

In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in
evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

[gnox]

List,

Rather than take a side in this recurring “debate”, I’d like to take a long 
view of how the list has changed over the two decades that I’ve been subscribed 
to it. I will try to keep it relevant, but those who are inclined to dismiss it 
as the mere reminiscences of an old man, or as a statement representing some 
“tribe” or other, are welcome to do so.

My first impression of the list, all those years ago, was that its contributors 
were a group of people from diverse backgrounds, most of whom were there for 
the purpose of learning from Peirce, or learning about Peirce, or in many cases 
both. These people evidently had what Peirce called “the Will to Learn. The 
first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's 
present state of opinion” (CP 5.583, EP2:47, 1898). I certainly had good reason 
to be dissatisfied with my opinions of what Peirce was saying, as I was still 
working my way through the two volumes of The Essential Peirce, and finding 
that every Peirce text I read was forcing me to modify my rather crude 
understanding of those I had read previously. I was gradually building up a 
mental context which guided my interpretation of whatever Peirce text I read 
next. At the same time I was incorporating this developing understanding, along 
with many texts from Peirce, into the philosophical book I was working on, 
which eventually became Turning Signs  . 
So I was simultaneously learning from and learning about Peirce.

I got a lot of help in those days from other learners on the list, especially 
those who took the trouble to post entire long excerpts from Peirce’s work. 
It’s probably hard for more recent subscribers to realize how limited online 
access to Peirce’s work was back then, even on the Arisbe website; the 
situation has changed radically since then. Very early on, I started making my 
own collection (in an HTML file) of many of the Peirce texts I had read, 
arranged in chronological order, so that I could easily revisit them in search 
of statements by Peirce that I recalled, and recover the immediate context. By 
now, this searchable collection of mine amounts to over 5MB and includes, 
besides the entire contents of EP1 and EP2, many texts gleaned from CP, W, many 
anthologies, secondary sources, and manuscript images I found online. (For help 
with finding those manuscripts I must thank especially Jeff Downard and Jon 
Alan Schmidt.) 

I included every one of these texts in my collection because they were parts of 
my learning process, and in most cases it was peirce-l posts by other learners 
that directed my attention to Peirce texts I had been unaware of or unable to 
find. So I am eternally grateful to those other learners; and soon I was able 
to “give back” to the list by posting relevant quotations myself (always citing 
the source so that others could find the original context if they took the 
trouble to do so). I’m still doing that; so I plead guilty to the crime 
(according to a recent Bernard Morand post) of posting Peirce quotations to the 
list.

Over the early years of my participation in peirce-l, however, I began to 
notice that not all the participants were demonstrating “the first thing that 
the Will to Learn supposes.” Some were so satisfied with their own opinions of 
what Peirce meant that they adamantly refused to modify them when they were 
questioned or criticized by others. Some of them, who had evidently based their 
notions of Peirce’s work on a relatively limited stock of familiar quotations, 
began to complain when others posted quotations from Peirce that were 
incompatible with their opinions about Peirce’s system of philosophy or 
semiotics. 

In the past few years these complaints have grown louder, accompanied by 
accusations of “cherry-picking” (as if the complainer’s own favorite quotes 
were not cherry-picked out of context), and accusations of claiming some sort 
of authority (as if the complainers were not asserting their own expertise and 
authority as interpreters of Peirce). The complainers also accuse the quoters 
of Peirce of misunderstanding Peirce’s work — not seeing the beam in their own 
eye, the limitations of their own opinions about Peirce. Hence the “debate” 
which has degenerated into an series of personal attacks, with the attackers 
claiming to defend their right to an opinion, or even claiming to defend 
Peirce, against the learners who insist on posting what Peirce wrote. A genuine 
learner would not behave this way, but would welcome opportunities to 
reconsider and perhaps modify their entrenched opinions, especially when they 
are manifestly at odds with what Peirce wrote (not with anyone’s interpretation 
of what Peirce wrote).

These complaints and accusations directed against those who post Peirce 
quotations to the list —especially those who point out their incompatibility 
with interpretations expressed by the complainers — is in my opinion 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[gnox]

John, Jeff, List,

We seem to have consensus that Peirce's phenomenology makes observations
based on direct experience and draws upon mathematical principles to analyze
whatever appears into its elements, to arrive at a very general theory which
he calls the "Doctrine of Categories." Without mathematics, it could
accomplish nothing; without experience, it would have nothing to apply
mathematical principles to, and again would accomplish nothing. 

Logic as semiotics inherits this characteristic form from phenomenology in
the form of the Dicisign, as Frederik Stjernfelt has shown in Natural
Propositions: iconic signs, often diagrammatic, must be combined with
indexical signs in order to convey information - the icons signify the form,
and the indices the subject matter of the informational sign, i.e. the
identity of its object.

I think John's account below is one expression of this consensus. But there
is one point in it that I must take issue with. John says, "The special
sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for
forming hypotheses." But we have previously agreed that in Peirce's
hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for
principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from
those below. Since phenomenology is above the special sciences in the
hierarchy, they should be drawing theoretical principles from it, not "raw
data." I believe that this is indeed the case, and gave an example above of
how semiotics "inherits" categorial principles from phenomenology.

On the other hand, since phenomenology/phaneroscopy observes anything that
can appear "to the mind," it can draw some "raw data" from special sciences.
But what makes phaneroscopy distinctive, and places it before everything in
the hierarchy of sciences except mathematics, is the kind of attention it
deploys in its observations. "Its task requires and exercises a singular
sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost
service throughout the study of logic" (CP2.197). As Peirce says to James in
the 1904 letter previously quoted, "Psychology, you may say, observes the
same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It
looks upon the same world; - the same world that the astronomer looks at.
But what it observes in that world is different."

Phenomenological observation is, we might say, looking for the mathematical
essence of experiencing itself. It can do this because it does not draw upon
any theoretical framework developed by the later sciences such as semiotic
or astronomy. D.S. Kothari says "The simple fact is that no measurement, no
experiment or observation is possible without a relevant theoretical
framework." What sets phenomenology apart from (and above) all other
positive sciences is that the only theoretical framework it employs is from
mathematics, and a very pure kind of mathematics which is free of any prior
application to normative or special sciences. For instance, it employs
"dichotomic mathematics," (which Peirce referred to as "the simplest
mathematics") to arrive at the concept of Secondness, which is the basis of
the subject/object distinction in philosophy of mind; and Peirce was clear
that phenomenology does not assume this distinction but reveals its
experiential basis by applying that mathematical framework.

If any scientific observation could be called "phenomenology" - which seems
to be John's idea in what he has said up to now about
phenomenology/phaneroscopy - there would be no need to practice it as the
"primal positive science", as Peirce called it. This is the one point where
I think John's description below needs to be modified.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 28-Aug-21 20:28
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List

I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.

ET:  the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very
fuzzy.  I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology.  But I do support
and agree with [Jeff's] agenda of using both mathematics and
phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the
world.

For both subjects, the distinction is precise.   JAS highlighted
Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and
phenomenology:

JAS:  It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559
(and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.

Yes, of course.  That distinction is the greatest power of
mathematics:  it is independent of whatever may exist in our universe
or any other.  It gives us the freedom to create new things that never
existed before.  The only constraints are physical, not mental.

That point is also true of phenomenology.  For both fields, there is
no limitation on what anyone may 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jeff, Helmut, John, List,

Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically 
about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of 
phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason 
for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I 
learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different 
writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or 
different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their 
particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving 
that word.

Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 
7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness 
is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious 
experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is 
life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that 
myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all 
that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it 
with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity 
between the various grades of biological consciousness.

We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo 
sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when 
or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce 
comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality 
is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious 
control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no 
basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus serves as 
a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and reasoning, or between 
perception and conception. But if we take this as a boundary between 
unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary in the sense that (according to 
synechism) there is no real discontinuity between the two.

I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining why I don’t see 
a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say in response to it.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,

 

Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and 
account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on 
consciousness. 

 

The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and 
techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. 
Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to 
develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.

 

Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising 
observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the 
logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.

 

Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms 
of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does 
phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias 
and prejudice?

 

If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, 
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry. 

 

Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious 
experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias 
and prejudice that might shape our experience?

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or 
“seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The 
phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why 
percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for 
phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In 
phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some 
monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the 
three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Gary F., List

 

You wrote:

"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt 
whatever that what appears, appears.".

 

I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different 
points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible 
to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal 
reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the 
system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to 
serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this 
intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and 
can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares 
relations, is structurally coupled).

 

Best,

Helmut

  

 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
  g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:

Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of 
jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else 
external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured 
observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The 
question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this 
appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. 
Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of 
phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the 
foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite 
indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the 
study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be 
understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might 
rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what 
appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present 
themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of 
thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service 
throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for 
reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may 
seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are 
certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they 
cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look 
and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason 
will receive special attention. [end CSP]

 

Gary f.

 

 

From:   peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
<  peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L <  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Jon A., List:

 

I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in 
the referenced slide.

 

CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to 
denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No 
external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)

 

I can see how this 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jon A, allow me to point out that slide 34 (except for its title) consists 
*entirely* of a quotation from Peirce. There are two more slides coming which 
give definitions of the phaneron, and all three present some challenges to 
interpretation, but to begin by assigning them (or ADT's interpretation) to 
some academic "-ism" or other does not strike me as a good strategy. So yes, 
give it a while.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: 27-Aug-21 11:16
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Dear Gary,

I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on ADT's 
interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up, but every now and then 
the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip, as the selection and stress just seem 
too twisted and warped.
It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some new-fangled 
never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy.
I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's not looking so 
good ...

Regards,

Jon


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of 
jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else 
external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured 
observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The 
question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this 
appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. 
Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of 
phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the 
foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite 
indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the 
study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be 
understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might 
rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what 
appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present 
themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of 
thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service 
throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for 
reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may 
seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are 
certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they 
cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look 
and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason 
will receive special attention. [end CSP]

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Jon A., List:

 

I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in 
the referenced slide.

 

CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to 
denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No 
external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)

 

I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for 
someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me 
that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ...

 

CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive 
steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his 
heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be 
conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he 
will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 
2:353-354, 1905)

 

Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. 
His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that 
phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and 
thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about 
external objects is the result of inference rather than direct observation, 
beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of 
all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903).

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
 

 

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess 
we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of 
course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey  
Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess 
we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 34

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Here we reach 
the point where Peirce invents a new English word to replace “phenomenon” 
(which, he said, had too many other uses) as the key term in defining what he 
would now call “phaneroscopy.”

Gary f.

 



 

Text: Etymological definition 

The word φανερόν is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifest. ... 
There can be no question that φανερός means primarily brought to light, open to 
public inspection throughout ... 

I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote 
whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external 
object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:4-5 & 7, 1904)

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[gnox]

John, I am puzzled as to why you bother to repeat all this, since it's all
been said before and nobody has questioned any of it. The only question I
have is why you insert "phaneroscopy" in your new subject line, as there is
nothing in the entire post about "phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular,"
because there is nothing in it that differentiates phaneroscopy from
"Peirce's
thought in general." It's a good summary of the role of diagrams in Peirce's
thought, but it does nothing to explain the unique role of phaneroscopy in
his classification of sciences or in his philosophy. Phaneroscopy is
certainly not unique in requiring a previous study of mathematics. What does
make it unique is precisely the subject of the current "slow read" of ADT's
slides, especially the recently posted ones which you have chosen to ignore
- which is your privilege, of course, but why do you claim to be saying
something about "phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular" when you are not?

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 26-Aug-21 22:42
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was
Modeling

 

Robert M, Gary F, Gary R, Jon AS, List,

I changed the subject line to emphasize the role of diagrams in Peirce's
thought in general and in phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular.  I
cited some of these quotations in previous notes, and I copied others
from a note by Robert.  All of them are relevant to recent discussions
with Gary, Gary, and Jon.

At the end of this note, I include seven quotations by Peirce, and two
by Cornelis de Waal.  The following nine points summarize the issues
that Peirce or de Waal make in those quotations.

1. In the first quotation, Peirce explains why "phaneroscopic research
requires a previous study of mathematics."

2. "The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
mathematical use."

3. A diagram is an "icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the
subject of discourse."

4. "we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed
to observe it...  We not only have to select the features of the diagram
which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but it is also of great
importance to return again and again to certain features."

5. A diagram may be "a concrete, but possibly changing, mental image of
such a thing as it represents."

6. "We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible."

7. "Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."

8. According to de Waal, Peirce argues that it is the mathematician who
is best equipped to translate the more loosely constructed theories
about groups of positive facts generated by empirical research into
tight mathematical models.

9. Finally, "The three mental qualities that in Peirce's view, come into
play are imagination, concentration, and generalization."

I agree with these nine points.  And I emphasize that they are not
just my opinions.  The first eight are by Peirce himself.  The ninth is
de Waal's summary of quotations by Peirce.

And by the way, I mentioned language as the third item in the subject
line above.  I plan to send another note to P-list to show the role of
diagrams in representing the semantics of language.  The roots of
language are found in phaneroscopy, but they develop into diagrams that
can represent the semantics of everything that people think or say.

John

--

1. "Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
constituents of all ideas.  Its material is, of course, universal
experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as
well as of the concrete and real.  Yet to suppose that in such
experience the elements were to be found already separate would be to
suppose the unimaginable and self-contradictory.  They must be separated
by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand.
They must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
scatter, and therefore it is that phaneroscopic research requires a
previous study of mathematics.  (R602, after 1903 but before 1908")

2. The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
mathematical use.  They have, in short, to be adapted to the powers of
mathematics and of the mathematician.  It is only the mathematician who
knows what these powers are; and consequently the framing of the
mathematical hypotheses must be performed by the mathematician.'
(R 17:06)

3. there are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all
reasoning; the first is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a
similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse.  [second is index;
third is symbol] (CP 1.369)

4. All necessary 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

ET: I think that this is becoming absurd –

 

GF: On that point we agree!

I will henceforth cease to comment on your interpretations of Peirce, no matter 
how far they may wander from what Peirce actually wrote. You have your own 
style of interpretation and you are welcome to it. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 09:17
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

 

Gary F, list

I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular meaning. 

When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign - I 
understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean what Peirce means 
when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what I think you mean [and I may 
be wrong] as any kind of direct or even indirect contact.

And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis which is 
an action of mediated interpretation. 

Edwina

 

On Wed 25/08/21 9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910) 

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50

Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca 
  sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as 
fundamental. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context. 

Edwina

 

 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910)

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky  
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50



Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as fundamental.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context.

Edwina

 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

[gnox]

Jon A.S., John S., list,

Perhaps we are making some progress in this reading of ADT’s talk, if John is 
ready to admit that Peirce’s phenomenology is a separate science from 
mathematics, that it occupies a place in the hierarchy below mathematics but 
above all other sciences, and that its focus on experience makes it different 
from any other science. (I think you must be ready to admit this, John, since 
you took it as an insult when I said that you haven’t admitted it before!) 

GF (previously): Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear 
that the key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he 
renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is experience.

JAS: Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of 
experience is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, 
experience is strictly cognitive (i.e., semiosic) and involuntary, constraints 
that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole.

GF: Yes, the time has come for examining the relation between experience and 
the phaneron. André mentions in slide 32 (already posted) that “the term 
phaneron was coined in late October 1904 after an exchange with William James.” 
To provide more context for this discussion, I’ll post here some excerpts from 
that “exchange,” quoting those parts of the letter to James (CP 8.286-301) 
where Peirce writes explicitly about phenomenology. 

 

CSP: … As I understand you, then, the proposition which you are arguing is a 
proposition in what I have called phenomenology, that is, just the analysis of 
what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives, (whether these 
be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of 
philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked upon almost 
as much as I have upon logic. It has nothing to do with psychology. …

Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one you 
send me is the first, will prove to be that it shows so clearly that 
phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. I know that 
you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing between one science 
and another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to any progress. 
The standards of certainty must be different in different sciences, the 
principles to which one science appeals altogether different from those of the 
other. From the point of view of logic and methodical development the 
distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has no right to appeal 
to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on 
phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as 
phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the 
same world; — the same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes 
in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of 
the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the 
phenomenologist.

I am not sure that it will do to call this science phenomenology owing to 
Hegel's Phänomenologie being somewhat different. But I am not sure that Hegel 
ought not to have it named after his attempt. …

My “phenomenon” for which I must invent a new word is very near your “pure 
experience” but not quite since I do not exclude time and also speak of only 
one “phenomenon.”

 

GF: The “new word” he invented was, of course, “phaneron.” To contrast it with 
Peirce’s usage of “experience,” the first thing I’d say is that “phaneron” 
refers to the collective total of whatever is or (can be) experienced, rather 
than the experience itself (considered as something that happens or occurs to a 
“subject of experience”). But Peirce also says that the practice of 
phenomenology/ phaneroscopy itself does not assume a distinction between 
experience and what is experienced, or between “subjective” and “objective” 
experience — or, as he put it elsewhere, between consciousness and the 
“contents of consciousness.” 

Anyway, we’ll have to sort this out in more detail later, with direct 
quotations if necessary. We will no doubt continue to get alternative 
interpretations posted by others, who are welcome to post them, but unless they 
are based directly on something Peirce actually wrote about the subject, I 
don’t see much point in arguing for or against them.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 24-Aug-21 13:00
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

 

Gary F., List:

GF: Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the key 
word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he renamed it 
“phaneroscopy”) is experience.

Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of experience 
is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, experience is 
strictly cognitive (i.e., semiosic) and 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, Helmut,

"Qualitative possibility" is the term Peirce used in the Lowell Lectures of
1903  :

CSP: My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind
in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the
being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the
future. (CP 1.23)

In CP 1.25 he calls it "positive qualitative possibility." I also quoted it
from CP 1.533 in an earlier post. Since "Quality" is Peirce's first choice
for a word representing Firstness, it's a natural choice in a context where
he needs to distinguish it from other kinds of "possibility."

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 22-Aug-21 22:30
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: h.raul...@gmx.de; g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Helmut, 

Technical terms are important when a completely new concept has been
invented for which there is no convenient term in the common vocabulary.
If a new term is necessary, it's important to choose some combination of
common words that is not likely to create ambiguities or confusions.

There was some discussion about confusing implications of the word
'possibility'.  That is why somebody suggested the adjective 'qualitative'
in front of 'possibility'.

I was not involved in the original discussion, but I agree that the term
'qualitative possibility' is a bad choice, for several reasons:  (1) It's an
unusual combination, whose intended meaning cannot be derived from the
dictionary definitions of the two words, considered separately.  (2) It was
suggested as a term for an issue about Peirce's philosophy, but Peirce
himself never used that combination. (3) Even for somebody who has studied
Peirce's writings, the intended meaning of the combination is not clear. 

Finally, I suggested the word 'diagram', one of Peirce's favorite terms,
which could be used in discussions of the issues that were raised.  The word
diagram does *not* mean 'qualitative possibility' (whatever that may mean).
But that is a huge advantage.  The word 'diagram' steers the discussion into
clear, precise issues instead of some vague talk about qualitative
possibilities.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

[gnox]

Edwina, I think we should note that De Tienne follows chronological order in 
his presentation of Peirce quotes in this part of his talk, but the chapter of 
CP 7 that you are quoting from strings together a number of texts from widely 
separated periods in Peirce’s life, and in complete disregard of chronology. CP 
7.581 (near the end of your post) is from Lecture XI of Peirce’s Lowell 
Lectures (W1:493) dated November 1866, so it is even earlier than his “New List 
of Categories” (1867). Peirce’s ideas (and of course his terminology) changed 
considerably over the following 30-odd years, and we can’t ignore this if we 
want to properly interpret what he wrote about phenomenology and phaneroscopy 
from 1902 onward. As always, context matters.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 22-Aug-21 10:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

 

List

To my understanding, what De Tienne seems to be  talking about in this and 
subsequent slides [and I don't think one can separate them],  with his 
reference to Experience is what Peirce refers to as Consciousness. He also 
writes that 'consciousness is also used to denote what I call feeling" 7.586 
and 'man's feelings are perceptions, he is affected by objects' 7.587, and 
"Perception is the possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more". That 
is, of learning. 

What is learning?

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only to reflect 
that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not learning. That is only 
something from which something can be learned, by interpreting it. The 
interpretation is the learning" 7.536

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but these are not acts of 
learning. Consciousness can classify, by grouping perceptions within the 
element of  Medisense, but can it Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must discriminate 
"between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of the facts of human life. 
We have seen that every fact requires two kinds of explanation; the one 
proceeds by induction to replace its subject by a wider one, the other proceeds 
by hypothesis to replace its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these 
two explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the action 
within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as outlined in 
7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the 'percepts', and 
associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics provides the hypothetical 
explanations, which makes them 'teleological or purposive.7.570.

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am 
'misinterpreting' him. 

Edwina



 

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 29

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. This slide
continues his narrative of the gradual development of Peirce’s thinking
toward the concept which eventually became “Phaneroscopy.” The next slide
will follow shortly.

Gary f.

 



 

Text: 

In CP 7.526, he has High Philosophy precede the two main branches of
Philosophy (Logic and Metaphysics): 

Still more general than these [two] is High Philosophy which brings to light
certain truths applicable alike to logic and to metaphysics. It is with this
high philosophy that we have at first to deal. 

So Peirce feels “prescissively” that one cannot transition directly from
mathematics to logic or metaphysics. Some fundamental step is missing,
something that must ground both logic and metaphysics.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, in the clear light of morning, it appears to me that your revision of
ADT's slide 25 is all about theoretical models. (I prefer "model" over
"diagram", generally speaking, because we tend to think of a "diagram" as
two-dimensional, while the dimensionality of a "model" is not thus limited.)
Instead of elucidating the practice of phaneroscopy, you have virtually
eliminated it from the scope of science. I say "virtually" because it's not
clear whether, by not mentioning it, you are denying it or simply taking it
for granted. Peirce refused to do either, and that is why he had to include
it in his classification as "the primal positive science."

The first step in your account is a "mathematical interpretation." You don't
say what it is an interpretation of. But every interpretant, mathematical or
otherwise, must be triadically related to a sign and its object. If we
regard cognition as semiosis, we are already making a theoretical model.
Peirce on the other hand says that cognition must begin with direct
experience  . Sometimes he says it
begins with the percept, which is another way of saying the same thing. The
first step is attention to what appears, to the phenomenon, to what is
"before the mind in any way." Only after attending to it do we begin to sort
out the different "ways" of being "before the mind" (as an object, as a
sign, as an interpretant, as a specific kind of object or sign or
interpretant, etc. etc. ad infinitum.)

There are philosophers who deny that "direct experience of things in
themselves" is possible, but most take it for granted. Peirce, instead of
taking either of those options, made it into a science by analyzing it (i.e.
analyzing the phaneron) into its "indecomposable elements." As ADT explains
in the slides I'm about to post, he called this science "high philosophy,"
and then "phenomenology," and then "phaneroscopy," coining a term whose
reference couldn't be confused with anything else because nobody else was
using the term. But in order to define it, he had to use terms that
everybody uses, such as "mind" and "experience." It took me an entire
chapter of my book   to explain what
people mean by "experience", so I won't try to do that here; but it is a key
word in the current part of ADT's talk, so we can discuss it later if need
be.

Gary f.

 

From: John F. Sowa  
Sent: 22-Aug-21 00:26
To: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Helmut Raulien ;
g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

My only excuse is that it's after midnight.

Helmut, List,

JFS:  I agree with Gary that "there are no perfect choices when it
comes to naming such things" and we should "weed out the choices most
likely to cause confusion."

HR:  But if we weed out too many terms, we may not be able to talk
anymore!  Can we not instead "count on mathematicians" to tell us, how
we should define and use "possibility" and "relation"?

The objection to the word 'possibility' was that it suggests a kind of
Secondnesss, since it would involve a dyadic relation to something
else.

My proposed revision to ADT's slide is to bring back Peirce's word
'diagram', which is one of his favorite terms.  Since every diagram is
an icon, it belongs to the first member of (icon, index, symbol).

It's true that a diagram may also be considered as a possibility, but
by itself, it's a first.  The aspect of Secondness only occurs after
somebody deliberately chooses it as a description of something else.

Instead of the new terms that ADT proposed, I said that his slide 25
could be stated more clearly and simply by bringing back the word
'diagram'.  See below for ADT's original slide 25.  After that is my
revised version of slide 25.  And just now, I thought of an even
simpler version of ADT's last sentence.  See my new version at the
bottom.

John



The original slide 25 by ADT:

. Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, we
cannot count on mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
experience.

. Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to
figure out the all-too-real world that holds us under its bondage.  We
want to sort out its laws, its structures, its composition, its guises
and disguises.

. As a point of method, however, given that mathematics is the "first"
stage of research in the heuristic schema, how do we transition out of
it into a concern no longer detached from but attached to the
conditions sustaining the cosmos, the world, nature,



A revised version of slide 25 suggested by JFS in the previous note:

. Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, the
phenomenologist must map any mathematical interpretation to a diagram
that can help us figure out what goes on in experience.

. Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to
figure out the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, we agree that De Tienne’s reference to a “transition out of mathematics” 
in slide 25 can be confusing, and you say that we can avoid the confusion “by 
adopting the word 'diagram' for ADT's slide 25.” It’s not clear to me how this 
“adopting” would work. Do you mean substituting the word “diagram” for some 
part of slide 25? Here’s the original text of it:

 

ADT: • Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, we cannot 
count on mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in experience.

• Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to figure 
out the all-too-real world that holds us under its bondage. We want to sort out 
its laws, its structures, its composition, its guises and disguises.

• As a point of method, however, given that mathematics is the “first” stage of 
research in the heuristic schema, how do we transition out of it into a concern 
no longer detached from but attached to the conditions sustaining the cosmos, 
the world, nature, life in general, our life?

 

Can you demonstrate how you would “adopt the word 'diagram'” for that slide?

 

JFS: The word 'diagram' is an English word whose common meaning includes 
Peirce's mathematical sense.  Since Peirce defined a diagram as a kind of icon, 
it is the first in the trichotomy of icon, index, symbol.

 

GF: I see much potential for confusion here. In the first place, “diagram” is 
clearly not a synonym for “icon.” An existential graph, for instance, is more 
iconic than its equivalent in algebraic notation or in a verbal sentence, but 
it certainly isn’t a “pure” icon, as its symbolic aspects have to be taken into 
account in the interpretation of it. Nobody can read an existential graph 
without first learning the conventions of the system. Besides, these graphs 
usually include words as names of the “spots,” and visual “icons” used as 
substitutes for those names are no less symbolic. The “icons” we use in 
everyday life, such as those on men’s and women’s washrooms, are also 
conventional despite their independence of any particular verbal language. The 
fact that a diagram is a kind of icon does not imply that the words “icon” and 
“diagram” are interchangeable.

 

In short, I don’t see how your use of the term “diagram” clarifies the practice 
of phaneroscopy. Maybe you can explain by drawing me a diagram.  (insert smile 
icon here.)

 

Gary f.

 

 

}  {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 20-Aug-21 23:30
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F, Helmut, List,

I agree with Gary that "there are no perfect choices when it comes to
naming such things" and we should "weed out the choices most likely to
cause confusion."

HR:  In mathematical language, the sentence "possibility implies a
relation to what exists" is false.  Maybe in ordinary English usage it
is true, I dont know

That uncertainty is a good reason for not adopting it as a technical
term, except in the context of modal logic.

GF:  In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English
usage, “possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since
existence involves Secondness, that renders tthe word “possibility”
unfit for rendering the concept named “Firstness.” In order to
consistently use “qualitative possibility” in reference to Firstness,
it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary implication which
connects the word to Secondness.  This is what Peirce does in the
bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

More reason for avoiding it, except in the context of modal logic.

This discussion started with slide 25, in which ADT wanted a
"transition" out of mathematics to something that "the rest of us" can
understand.  The word 'diagram' is an English word whose common
meaning includes Peirce's mathematical sense.  Since Peirce defined a
diagram as a kind of icon, it is the first in the trichotomy of icon,
index, symbol.

By adopting the word 'diagram' for ADT's slide 25, we resolve the
issues without introducing new jargon.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Thanks Jon, this does clarify the matter, especially the definitions of 
Firstness where Peirce uses phrases such as “positive suchness” and “positive 
possibility.” It’s yet another reminder of the importance of context in 
determining the meaning of a word. I think it was Comte who first used the term 
“positive science,” and I think Peirce was just following his lead in opposing 
it to hypothetical science; but his other uses of “positive” do not refer to 
actuality as opposed to possibility, or to Secondness as opposed to Firstness. 
Anyway there’s no perfect choices when it comes to naming such things. As long 
as a word is used to denote anything real, its inherent vagueness is 
incorrigible; only a nonverbal index can make a real connection to the dynamic 
object. Nevertheless we try (Peirce certainly tried) to weed out the choices 
most likely to cause confusion, and trust the interpreter to pay close 
attention to the context.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Aug-21 14:21
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.”

 

I previously highlighted another usage by Peirce in which "possibility implies 
a relation to what exists," namely, in accordance with his pragmaticism 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00228.html). I went on to 
suggest in that post that only possibilities that can become actual are 
relevant to practitioners of the positive sciences, a limitation that does not 
apply to the hypothetical science of pure mathematics. This seems to be 
consistent with how Peirce spells out what he means by "positive" vs. 
"hypothetical" in his classification of the sciences, where he affirms again 
the dependence of phaneroscopy on pure mathematics for principles.

 

CSP: This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the 
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any 
other positive science. By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for 
positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may conveniently be 
expressed in a categorical proposition. Logic and the other normative sciences, 
although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, nevertheless are positive 
sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are 
able to show that what they call good really is so; and the right reason, right 
effort, and right being, of which they treat, derive that character from 
positive categorical fact.

Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science which 
should not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I 
reply that it is not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such 
science exists and flourishes, and Phenomenology, which does not depend upon 
any other positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly 
grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of 
Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things actually are, 
but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some 
other. A Phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science 
hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful 
club-footed affair that Hegel produced. (CP 5.39-40, EP 2:144, 1903)

 

The knowledge discovered in the positive sciences is properly expressed in 
categorical propositions, while the knowledge discovered in pure mathematics as 
a hypothetical science are properly expressed in conditional propositions. Note 
also that since Peirce considers the normative sciences to be positive 
sciences, he explicitly rejects the modern "is-ought" problem.

 

GF: Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization.

 

Indeed, Peirce's first universe encompasses whatever is "capable of being so 
present [to one consciousness] in its entire Being" (EP 2:479, 1908); or as he 
puts it elsewhere, "anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for 
getting fully represented," i.e., "their Being consists in mere capability of 
getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them" (CP 6.452&455, EP 
2:434&435, 1908).

 

GF: I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though.

 

I agree, since phaneroscopy is a positive science and yet is not confined to 
the study of actuality and 2ns. In fact, it is not concerned at all with 
distinguishing actuality from possibility and necessity, and it is where 2ns is 
discovered by prescission from 3ns.

 

GF: ... Firstness has its own kind 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …

 

In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness 
can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he 
says this:

 

CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very 
being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility 
implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of 
being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, 
“possibility” would have answered the purpose.

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since existence involves 
Secondness, that renders the word “possibility” unfit for rendering the concept 
named “Firstness.” In order to consistently use “qualitative possibility” in 
reference to Firstness, it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary 
implication which connects the word to Secondness. This is what Peirce does in 
the bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

 

CSP: One of these [three] Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe 
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability 
of actualization. 

 

GF: The quote is continued below by Robert (who omitted the first two sentences 
given above).

Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization. This 
effectively cancels, in the logical context, the objection which prevented him 
(in the Lowell Lecture) from using “possibility” as another name for 
“Firstness,” justifies Peirce’s use of “qualitative possibility” in reference 
to Firstness, and gives us De Tienne (and the rest of us) license to use 
“possibility” in that way. 

 

I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though. Peirce’s statement in a 1904 letter to 
Welby that “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328) suggests that 
Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own kind of 
reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s text, so I 
don’t intend to argue the point.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 19-Aug-21 09:51
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation), what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness — that is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of 
Thirdness. …

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of 
King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new 
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the 
purpose. …

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of 
mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, 
poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, 
qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from applying 
Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: primity, 
secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03



 

List,

No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT supporters.

 

 ADT >

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the actualization 
of a special form, which can be rendered into the term positiveness, an 
abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the 
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will explore that 
resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 CSP >

 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles,although the 
latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary 
as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect 
actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For 
that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially 
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now since 
every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to exist as 
boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the place common to three 
bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or liquid is merely the place at 
which its forces of cohesion are neither very great nor very small, which is 
essentially vague, it is plain that the idea is essentially vague or 
indefinite. Moreover, suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are