Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laboratory for phenomenological research

[robert marty]

A scientific man is likely in the course of a long life to pick up a pretty
extensive acquaintance with the results of science; but in many branches,
this is so little necessary that one will meet with men of the most
deserved renown in science who will tell you that, beyond their own little
nooks, they hardly know anything of what others have done. (EP 2: 130)

That's how science works ...

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 19 avr. 2024 à 23:47, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> I just came across an announcement of this laboratory at the University of
> Illinois. https://institutephenom.web.illinois.edu/people/
>
> Note that they mention Heidegger and Husserl, but not Peirce.
>
> These are the kind of people we need to educate.  Fine points about
> Peirce's MSS are important for Peirce scholars.  But people like these are
> addressing important issues for today.  And they never heard of Peirce.
>
> Following is the web page of their leader, Thomas Byrne:
> https://thomasbyrnephenomenology.com
>
> John
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[robert marty]

John, List,
In the same vein, I also published another article in Academia.edu, which
consists of a commented reading of CP 265, the item that follows his
diagram of affinities between classes of signs of 2.264 (a sort of
intuition that Peirce had of the structure of order that is a lattice,
which I have shown many times). Probably I wasn't convincing enough.
Perhaps this comment will be more convincing. There is no mention of
Tone/Mark, Token, or Type, but of course, they are present in other names.

 https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs
<https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs>

As for hypoicons, which I, too, have noted appear only once in MS 478, I am
in the process of finalizing a solid argument, at my peril, of course, to
the effect that this notion should be abandoned because it is invalidated
by the contents of MS 540.  My conclusion is that these hypoicons, wrongly
considered as a sort of subdivisions of icons (which I myself erroneously
theorized) are a kind of shadow image of the trichotomy of the object of
the sign, forgotten by Peirce in MS 478. But that's another story.
Regards,
Robert

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 21:19, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert, Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for the note.  There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree
> with Jon's comments.
>
> But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes
> enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others.  For
> example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that
> Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he
> introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes.
>
> This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the
> decade of 1903 to 1913.  To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I
> won't say anything more.
>
> John
>
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *Sent*: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
> *To*: Peirce-L 
> *Cc*: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, Anthony Jappy ,
> "Houser, Nathan R." 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
>
> Robert, List:
>
> Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
> List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
> 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
> 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only
> quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is
> why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly
> replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537,
> 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three
> additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost
> oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
> sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.
>
> RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should
> make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a
> tone/mark of a particular kind.
>
>
> Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.
>
> CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act
> as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with
> its character as a sign.
> A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It
> can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or
> rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and
> only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291,
> 1903)
>
> CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as
> some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon,
> and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only
> be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign.
> (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)
>
>
> Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be
> carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant
> Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied
> in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every
> sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every
> iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign.
>
> Regards,
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[robert marty]

List,
I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> John, List:
>
> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>
>
> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
> Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>
> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be
> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>
>
> Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so
> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion,
> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and
> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting
> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>
> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often,
> mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>
>
> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is
> the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times
> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
> necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during
> his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries
> and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign"
> found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone."
> As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining
> principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and
> difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more
> convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>
> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody
> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or
> the other, please let us know.
>
>
> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his
> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately
> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's
> *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Gary, Jon, List,
>>
>> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous
>> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>>
>> My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the
>> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word
>> pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But
>> some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered
>> ugly.   They are certainly not memorable.
>>
>> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
>> mark'.  That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word
>> for the future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more
>> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>
>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
>> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
>> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
>> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
>> street).
>>
>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
>> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/

Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination

[robert marty]

Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it
will be"

*"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379
M-20b *(1908))*

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of
determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *




Sans
virus.www.avast.com

<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Dear list members,
>
> some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds
> of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also
> determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and
> classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it
> more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the
> second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that
> determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or
> "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or,
> if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.
>
> Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society
> determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there
> is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined
> by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the
> government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines
> the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself
> as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion
> (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and
> classification form a complexity.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[robert marty]

 as generalizations of appropriate transformations for these
objects. As for natural transformations, they have no equivalent in these
analogies. They do not generalize anything; they are simply a "*new product*"
of category theory. Saunders Mac Lane, one of the founders of this field,
is said to have once confided that he didn't "*invent categories to study
functors [but] to study natural transformations*."  So, a simple mental
move to look at the ten functors we've just obtained as objects of a new
category whose morphisms (the relations between these functors that have
become objects) are the natural transformations of functors causes the
lattice structure of the ten classes to fall like ripe fruit. The same
applies to the 28 classes and to the 66 classes (when they are
well-defined, which is not yet the case). Moreover, if we situate these
lattice structures in the Classification of Sciences, we see that they are
at the level of Logic, "*the science of the general laws of signs,*" and
more precisely, after trichotomy of Logic, they each constitute the
Grammatica Speculativa of the corresponding sets of signs. This is, in a
way, confirmed by Peirce when he explicitly refers to the "*syntax*" of
certain classes of signs (Dicent Sinsign, CP 2. 257; Dicent Symbol, CP
2.262).

But I posited these results at least 40 years ago, and they haven't
percolated down, apart from a few researchers in France, who have used them
in fields such as Phenomenology and pragmatics in the medical field,
multimedia, epistemological questions linked to the subjectivity of
researchers, or the methodology of criminal investigation.  However, by
confining myself to order structures and relational algebra, I was able to
artificially arrive at lattices without evoking these abstract natural
transformations, which are undoubtedly major obstacles. In vain ...


I'm going to give myself one last chance to convince the only community
that can validate my work, whose scientific integrity I do not doubt, by
trying to find a third way to lattices that uses the only conceptions set
out by Peirce, just clarified and specified unquestionably. I'll soon be
publishing the results of my "disabstraction" efforts.



Regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 10 févr. 2024 à 22:45, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Gary R, Robert M, Jon AS, Edwina, List,
>
> Thanks, Gary, for explaining our points of agreement.  As you emphasize in
> bold face, we all agree with Nathan Houser and with Short that* Peirce’s
> later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make out,
> incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly went on to
> point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own findings but
> “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that is important.*
>
>
> I also emphasize our agreement with Max Fisch, who* pointed out, during
> the final six years of Peirce’s life he was engaged on a system of logic
> considered as semiotic which he hoped would “stand for realism in the
> twentieth century*.  I also agree with the other sentences you emphasized
> in bold.
>
> Since I have finished the article on phaneroscopy, I am now writing the
> article on Delta Graphs.  That is an example where Peirce was on solid
> ground with his deep understanding of logic and mathematics.   Next week,
> I'll send the abstract and preview of the new article, which shows how
> Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was developed in the 21st
> century (2006 to be exact).
>
> Since I also agree with Robert Marty's emphasis on Peirce's mathematical
> background, I include his note below.  The emphasis on mathematics is
> essential.  It explains Peirce's successes and the areas where he was less
> successful, such as  the points that Short said were sketchy, tentative,
> and even incoherent.
>
> I agree that the questions about interpretants are important, but the
> answers depend on issues of cognitive science that are so complex that our
> best known mathematical methods are inadequate.  This is still an open
> research area, and the most we can say is that the problems Peirce
> attempted to solve are still unsolved.
>
> John
> 
>
> *From*: "robert marty" 
>
> List,
>
> I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of
> the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more
> precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable
> to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce borrows
> from Auguste Comte, revisiting it as JAS mentioned) leads to placing the
> Spec

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[robert marty]

is question in terms of particular
competencies unequally distributed among the members of a scientific
community, perhaps we should first ask ourselves the question of the
exactitude of the thinking of the question and give ourselves the means to
do so:

*Every science has its mathematical part, in which certain results of the
special science are assumed as mathematical hypotheses. But it is not
merely in this way that logic is mathematical**. It is mathematical in that
way, and to a far greater extent than any other science; but besides that
it takes the proceedings of mathematics in all their generality and founds
upon them logical principles. All necessary reasoning is strictly speaking
mathematical reasoning, that is to say, it is performed by observing
something equivalent to a mathematical diagram; but mathematical reasoning
par excellence consists in those peculiarly intricate kinds of reasoning
which belong to the logic of relatives. The most peculiarly mathematical of
these are reasonings about continuity of which geometrical topics, or
topology, and the theory of functions offer examples. In my eighth lecture
I shall hope to make clear my reasons for thinking that metaphysics will
never make any real advance until it avails itself of mathematics of this
kind. *(EP 2: 36)



And for that, you need to have the "mathematician's sword" in our hands:

*I have gained an unfortunate reputation as a writer upon the algebra of
logic. It is generally understood that I hold logical algebra to be the
main part of logic. But that is quite a mistake. I am in the world but not
of the world of formal logic. A calculus, even in mathematics proper, is
like the sword that our warriors by sea and land carry at their sides.
Having it there at hand marks the mathematician as the sword marks his
officer.* (MS 1334, 1905)

And what could be more penetrating than a sword?

Regards,

Robert Marty




Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 10 févr. 2024 à 04:06, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Jon,
>
> I would tend to strongly agree with what you've written. However, this
> passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be entirely clear.
>
> JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be
> understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
> recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
> denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that
> iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
> relations
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary, List:
>>
>> Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder;
>> and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of
>> useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of
>> scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular
>> field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful
>> for his/her peculiar purposes.
>>
>> Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is
>> based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental
>> principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180,
>> EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including
>> cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence,
>> neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as
>> semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to
>> semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature,
>> not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with
>> observations such as come within the range of every man's normal
>> experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP
>> 1.241, 1902).
>>
>> Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a
>> backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call
>> *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and
>> fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast,
>> the labor too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree
>> with Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to
>> anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to
>> be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of
>> forging ahead from t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[robert marty]

Jon, List,

One more effort ... if you take the definition of a mathematical category,
you'll see that you only need to "flatten" your diagram a little to get the
category O → S → I. To do this, we'll consider the abstract category X → Y
→ Z with three abstract objects X, Y and Z and not two but three morphisms
in addition to the three identities. Indeed, the compound morphism X → Z
exists by definition . There's no need to mention it.  It doesn't need to
be, since an axiom assures us of its existence. By implementing this
abstract form on the definition of the sign, we obtain the diagram O → S →
I, and its validation as a diagram of the triadic sign depends only on the
nature of the arrows which, in the triadic sign, are determinations. Now,
Peirce defines a determination as follows:

*renders definitely to be such as it will be* (CP 8.361, 1908)



and if O *renders definitely  S to be such as it will be**  and S renders
definitely I to be such as it will be, *then* O renders definitely I  to be
such as it will be . *This results from the semantics of determination
according to Peirce (and according to common sense).

Peirce himself notes:

*I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an
Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that
this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is
thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. *(n° 47 bis – 1908
- Letter to Lady Welby in  CP 8.343 ).

This is how the Peircian sign can be apprehended by this mathematical
object; and of course, there's more to come...


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le lun. 8 janv. 2024 à 16:01, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> List:
>
> Here is a modified version of my EG with the two dyadic relations of
> determining now included. Erasing them in accordance with the usual
> transformation rules gives the other version of my original EG as posted on
> Friday, its only difference from the one below being the convention for
> where to locate the three correlate lines of identity around the relation
> name. Erasing "mediating" instead gives my EG for "the object determines
> the sign, which determines the interpretant," which again is not false but
> could be misleading--although the genuine triadic relation of mediating (or
> representing) *involves *those two dyadic relations, it is not *composed *of
> them in the sense that it is not built up from them nor reducible to them.
>
> [image: image.png]
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 1:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Ben, List:
>>
>> I share your concern about describing the *genuine *triadic relation of
>> mediating (or representing) with its three correlates (sign, object,
>> interpretant) as if it were reducible to dyadic relations of determining,
>> which could only be true if it were a *degenerate *triadic relation. It
>> is not *false *to say, "the object determines the sign, which determines
>> the interpretant," but it could be misleading because it omits the *mediation
>> *of the sign by which the object *also *determines the interpretant.
>> Indeed, it is more accurate to say, "the object determines the sign to
>> determine the interpretant." Peirce expresses this even more precisely as
>> follows, in what I consider to be one of his very best definitions of a
>> sign.
>>
>> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being,
>> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both
>> determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and
>> determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise
>> as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the
>> mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907)
>>
>>
>> That is why I call the relation "mediating" in my Existential Graph (EG)
>> that I posted on Friday, rather than "representing," although the latter
>> could be substituted with some loss of generality. Here is that EG again.
>>
>> [image: image.png]
>>
>> Peirce himself apparently never scribed this EG, but he did scribe the
>> one for the genuine triadic relation of *giving *with its three
>> correlates (giver, gift, recipient). As one would expect for *any *genuine
>> triadic relation, it is isomorphic with the EG above, except that instead
>> of three heavy lines of identity with the correlate names attached, the
>> relation name has three dots (also called "hooks" or "pegs" in other
>> writings) to which Peirce assigned those names in the subsequent text. Here
>> is an image of that handwritten sentence in R 670 (1911).
>>
>> [image: image.png]
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[robert marty]

That's okay Jerry ... I'm just trying to stay within the framework of exact
philosophy as Peirce sees it :

*The doctrine of exact philosophy, as I understand that phrase, is, that
all danger of error in philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating
the problems as mathematically as possible,** that is, by construction some
sort of a diagram representing that which is supposed to be open to the
observation of every scientific intelligence, and thereupon
mathematically,--that is, intuitionally,--deducing the consequences of that
hypothesis. *(NEM IV:12, unidentified fragment)


Regards,
Robert

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 8 janv. 2024 à 17:11, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>
> Jerry, List
>
> You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in
> mathematics.
>
>
> Sorry, Robert.
> Interesting but hardly compelling response.
>
> Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open to
> misunderstandings.  To “invoke” such a phrase is meaningless to your
> readers.
>
> In applied mathematics, the calculations are contained to the
> interpretations of the symbols asserted in the formula.
>
> In philosophy, each individual philosopher assigns symbols and asserts
> premises ad hoc with an intended “unit of meaning.”  Isn’t that what
> philosophical discourse is all about?
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[robert marty]

Jerry, List

You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in
mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he
doesn't note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the
three iconic signs are rhematic. Since my diagram represents a category, an
axiom assures us that identity morphism exists for every object. They are
rarely mentioned. That's why I didn't worry about it when I realized they'd
disappeared. I thought it would lighten the load without doing any damage.

For the same reasons, the diagram shows that there are not two but three
arrows in O  * →*  S  * →*   I, simply because we know or affirm that it
represents a category. The third morphism is the compound of the two. It is
also, by definition, for those who know what the word "category" means
(i.e., for those who know the category axioms). There's no metaphor here;
it's a formalization of the triadic sign, implicitly validated by Peirce:

*I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an
Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that
this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is
thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. *(n° 47 bis – 1908
- Letter to Lady Welby in  CP 8.343 ).

All because for Peirce "determination" means:

*renders definitely to be such as it will be* (CP 8.361, 1908)


 Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 8 janv. 2024 à 06:07, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On Jan 7, 2024, at 9:10 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>
> It's clear, then, that the composition of the two determinations gives
> rise to the triadic relation for Peirce. That's why I've underlined
> "therefore." Consequently, the formalization is simplified considerably,
> without any loss of information, by :
>
> O  à S à I
>
> The arrows represent determinations, and this diagram reads:
>
> O determines S, which determines I
>
> Referring to the Peircean conception of a determination:
> *We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
> such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. *(CP 8.361, 1908)
>
> We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS
> 611 (Nov. 1908).
>
> This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the
> mathematical object below:
>
> Schematic representation of a category with objects *X*, *Y*, *Z* and
> morphisms *f*, *g*, *g* ∘ *f*.
> <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg/200px-Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg.png>
> (click)
>
> It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one
> is the archetypal example of a category on the
>
>
> Robert:
>
> You may want to check your mathematical conclusions.
>
> While I understand that the following details are highly technical in
> nature, it is important that mathematics NOT be treated as merely a
> symbolic metaphor when an inquiry into the meaning of symbols is under the
> microscope.
>
> The sequence O—> S —> I. as three alphabets symbols and two arrows.
>
> The schematic diagram referenced by the “click," (which is, by the way,
> only a partial representation of a mathematical category,) has three arrows
> and repeats the function labels and even composes the two functions.
>
> In addition, the identity arrows necessary to define a mathematical
> category are missing. These notational constraints are essential for the
> additional property of closure, which is far beyond the simple property of
> transitivity illustrated by the simple sequence of three alphabetic symbols
> and two arrows.
>
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[robert marty]

determines an idea in a person's mind, that
this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is
thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. *(n° 47 bis – 1908
- Letter to Lady Welby in  CP 8.343 ).

*Every object of experience excites an idea of some sort; but if that idea
is not associated sufficiently and in the right way so with some previous
experience so as to narrow the attention, it will not be a sign.* (from n°56
- 1911 - MS 849)

This is the latest stage in his reflection on the triadic sign. He extended
it to the hexadic sign, defined using a sequence of five determinations
between 6 elements everyone knows. The question of the determinations of
the decadic sign is still open. I challenge anyone to master the
combinatorial explosion of the number of classes of signs without these
determinations.

 Regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 7 janv. 2024 à 18:54, Ben Udell  a écrit :

> Hi, Robert, all,
>
> I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that
> you quote in your message,
>
> *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a
> Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or
> Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and
> Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some
> substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be
> directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second
> is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness.
> An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271)
>
> We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce
> meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to
> the categories.  Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others,
> argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories.
>
> I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing
> the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined
> by the object.  At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could
> find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a
> quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could
> remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about
> it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase.
>
> Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN
> BY C.S. PEIRCE"
> http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm
>
> It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version.
>
> Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads:
>
> "*O determines S, which determines I*."
>
> I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by
> its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra.
>
> Generally I recall people saying that —
>
> an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant
>
> — rather than that —
>
> an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant
>
> — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem
> possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like
> dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not
> finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal
> dominoes that some person set up to fall that way).  I remember (though not
> in detail) a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l.  Does the
> category-theoretical understanding of "O determines S, which determines I"
> avoid that seeming problem?  To put it another way, how does "*O → S → I*"
> keep from breaking down into dyads "*O → S*" and "*S → I*"?  I'm not
> trying to be argumentative, I'm actually wondering.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 1/7/2024 10:10 AM, robert marty wrote:
>
> Cécile, List
>
> I present here, in the most condensed form possible, the merits of a
> purely algebraic formalization of Peirce's semiotics, entirely indexed to
> the history of its development.
>
>
> *How do we distinguish the correlates of a triadic sign? How do we
> formalize the triadic sign?*
>
> This question arises because the definition of a triad, strictly speaking,
> implies no a priori distinction between the elements it links together. If
> you represent them by letters, you're surreptitiously introducing
> lexicographical order and by numbers,

[PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[robert marty]

 a determination:

*We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. *(CP 8.361, 1908)


We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS
611 (Nov. 1908).

This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the
mathematical object below:

Schematic representation of a category with objects *X*, *Y*, *Z* and
morphisms *f*, *g*, *g* ∘ *f*.
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg/200px-Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg.png>
(click)

It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one
is the archetypal example of a category on the Wikipedia site devoted to
this part of mathematics, which emerged in the second half of the 20th
century (Category theory - Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_theory>). In 1977 (in French) and
1982 (in English), I was able to use it to generate, in just a few pages,
not only classes of triadic signs but also, above all, to show that these
classes are naturally organized in a lattice structure (which Peirce had
intuited in the form of affinities). I've verified that Peirce knew about
this type of structure, but limited by set theory, he couldn't obtain it
formally. In his classification of the Sciences, this lattice occupies the
place of the *Grammatica Speculativa*. It's his ultimate form.

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness

[Robert Marty]

The problem with using the triangle to represent a sign is not its
vertices, but its sides. The triangle above, which illustrates a very
simple (algebraic) category in Wikipedia, represents the triadic sign as
Peirce defined it after 1905, in which the arrows represent determinations,
A the object, B the sign S and C the interpretant I. gof is the compound of
f and g.

Le lun. 18 déc. 2023 à 20:54, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Mary, List,
>
> I agree that the triangle by Ogden & Richards is horribly misleading.  But
> a triangle by itself can be used for many useful purposes of various kinds.
>
> What is misleading is that O & R drew their triangle in a book that also
> contained an appendix with MSS by Peirce.  That combination may have misled
> people to think that their triangle had some connection to Peirce's
> writings.
>
> And by the way, Arthur Burks cites the O & R book in CP8.  He was editing
> that volume at Harvard while I. A. Richards happened to be a professor in
> the philosophy dept.  Since both of them were at Harvard at the same time,
> it's very likely that they met on various occasions.
>
> Does anyone know of any interactions they may have had?
>
> John
>
> PS:  I have been very busy trying to finish this article I'm writing.  I
> have wanted to repond to various notes on these threads but when I start
> writing, it's hard to stop.
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Mary Libertin" 
>
> I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean
> infrastructure.”  Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective
> that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a
> triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden
> in *The Meaning of Meaning,* in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That
> triangle has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.]
>
> Mary
>
>
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Clear Ideas,

[robert marty]

List,

In the end, Peirce left us a research journal of over 100,000 pages. The
current debate shows that any assertion or term can give rise to sourced
contestation. However, the choice of sources and the meanings attributed to
them can create a fog, mainly through biased responses, which can
discourage even the best-disposed people.

Proof: The message I reply to begins with “*For the record (again),
although the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign
classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense
defined by Peirce as follows*.”

I’ll spend little time on “*again,”* which shows a certain self-importance
on the part of the person who, *once again*, has to defend himself against
a false accusation. Then comes the rhetorical process of admitting what
you’re about to contest (*the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for
sign classification*), only to deny it by invoking another meaning of the
terms, a “specific” meaning attributed to Peirce and pointed out by the
author for the sake of his argument. This is pure fantasy, as there is
nothing new or specific in 5.72 that follows. Indeed, all you have to do is
look it up and read just the two sentences that precede the quotation and
which have not been reproduced by the author:

*5.72. The relatively degenerate forms of the Third category do not fall
into a catena, like those of the Second. What we find is this.*

So, there’s nothing “specific” about what follows. It’s about genuine
Thirdness and its two degenerate forms. It’s easy to see that this is a
trichotomy in Peirce’s sense since authentic Thirdness is the Category of
the law independently of any application; it degenerates in the first
degree in its role of governing facts (relatively reactional) and in the
second degree in its role of governing qualities of feeling embodied in
these same facts (relatively qualitative). Peirce’s use of this supposedly
“specific” trichotomy is usual; it is found a little further on in 5.73 :

*5.73. The representamen, for example, divides by trichotomy into the
general sign or symbol, the index, and the icon*.

 And he confirms this without possible dispute:

*5.73 Of these three genera of representamens the Icon is the Qualitatively
Degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the
relatively genuine genus.*

Therefore, I stand by my statement in its entirety, particularly by the
fact that the three interpretants, however Peirce calls them, cannot be the
result of a trichotomy. Moreover, we get no results if we research the
terms “trichotomy” or “trichotomies” in my thesaurus of definitions, which
contains 76 definitions of signs including those with two objects and three
interpretants.

What can we learn from this dissension? Peirce again provides it:

*Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really
different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to
beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular
deception of this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation
produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we
are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely
subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is
essentially mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us
in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of
the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it
obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so
that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate
it, and its adherents to guard against it*.(CP 5.398, from How To Make Our
Ideas Clear).

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

 List,

In the end, Peirce left us a research journal of over 100,000 pages. The
current debate shows that any assertion or term can give rise to sourced
contestation. However, the choice of sources and the meanings attributed to
them can create a fog, mainly through biased responses, which can
discourage even the best-disposed people.

*Proof*: The message I reply to begins with “*For the record (again),
although the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign
classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense
defined by Peirce as follows*.”

I’ll spend little time on “*again,”* which shows a certain self-importance
on the part of the person who, *once again*, has to defend himself against
a false accusation. Then comes the rhetorical process of admitting what
you’re about to contest (*the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for
sign classification*), only to deny it by invoking another meaning of the
terms, a “specific” meaning attributed to Peirce and pointed out by the
author for the sake of his argument. This is pure fantasy, as there is
nothing new or specific in 5.72 that follows. Indeed, all you have to do is
look it up and read just the two sentences that precede the quotation and
which have not been reproduced by the author:

*5.72. The relatively degenerate forms of the Third category do not fall
into a catena, like those of the Second. What we find is this.*

So, there’s nothing “specific” about what follows. It’s about genuine
Thirdness and its two degenerate forms. It’s easy to see that this is a
trichotomy in Peirce’s sense since authentic Thirdness is the Category of
the law independently of any application; it degenerates in the first
degree in its role of governing facts (relatively reactional) and in the
second degree in its role of governing qualities of feeling embodied in
these same facts (relatively qualitative). Peirce’s use of this supposedly
“specific” trichotomy is usual; it is found a little further on in 5.73 :

*5.73. The representamen, for example, divides by trichotomy into the
general sign or symbol, the index, and the icon*.

 And he confirms this without possible dispute:

*5.73 Of these three genera of representamens the Icon is the Qualitatively
Degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the
relatively genuine genus.*

Therefore, I stand by my statement in its entirety, particularly by the
fact that the three interpretants, however Peirce calls them, cannot be the
result of a trichotomy. Moreover, we get no results if we research the
terms “trichotomy” or “trichotomies” in my thesaurus of definitions, which
contains 76 definitions of signs including those with two objects and three
interpretants.

What can we learn from this dissension? Peirce again provides it:

*Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really
different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to
beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular
deception of this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation
produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we
are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely
subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is
essentially mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us
in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of
the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it
obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so
that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate
it, and its adherents to guard against it*.(CP 5.398, from How To Make Our
Ideas Clear).

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 15 déc. 2023 à 14:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> List:
>
> For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
> trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
> specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.
>
> CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
> Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
> ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera,
> involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
> reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
> relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)
>
>
> Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
> relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
> do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
> interpretants 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

he two classes is one of general to
particular (and not just of complementarity, which is a somewhat
"ensembleist" view of the question). The latter is the particularity of the
former. I fully subscribe to this vision as soon as it is formulated in
this way. All the more so as it allows me to situate my work well (thank
you for that), because with mathematics, I invest (formalize) the general
with the universal, and that's all there is to it! And when that's done, I
have a royal road to show, thanks to category theory (which enables me to
do what set theory doesn't), that I can achieve a structuring of classes of
signs (with lattices) ) that Peirce intuited (the "affinities"). These
lattices correspond perfectly to Peirce's Gramatica Speculativa (this
becomes clear in the rigorously organized Classification of the Sciences in
Peirce's "Well of truth". That's why I've made it my Chapter 1, the entry
point into "the peircean exact thinking."
But that's another story...
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 12 déc. 2023 à 14:56, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> List:
>
> JFS: Another term that raises confusion is "final interpretant".  I
> believe that Peirce used that term for discussing important issues.  But
> the details of multiple levels of interpretants are unclear.   I noticed
> that in the last decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary
> correspondent, he avoided that issue.  That does not imply that Peirce
> thought that the word was irrelevant.  But it suggests that he did not
> require that word for the most important issues he discussed with her,
> William James, and other late correspondents.
>
>
> For the record, Peirce did not at all avoid the issue of multiple
> interpretants, including the final interpretant, in his late correspondence
> with Lady Welby and William James. On the contrary, he introduces the whole
> notion of three interpretants in one such letter
> (immediate/dynamic/signified; CP 8.333-339, SS 32-35, 1904 Oct 12), briefly
> mentions it again in another (explicit/effective/destinate; EP 2:481, SS
> 84, 1908 Dec 14), and elaborates on it extensively in several others
> (immediate/dynamical/final; CP 8.184-185, EP 2:496, 1909 Feb 26; SS
> 109-111, 1909 Mar 14; CP 8.315, EP 2:499-500, 1909 Apr 1). For more on this
> subject, please see my recent *Semiotica *paper, "Peirce's Evolving
> Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPEI-12.pdf).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Dear John, List

On your proposal to change the terminology for Categories :

 First, I agree with you about the drawbacks of the terminology currently
in use. However, it is so old and the alternative proposals so numerous
that it would be opening a Pandora's box. For example, I note the following
names, only in 1905, in the Logic Notebook
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$1i :

seq 454: Primity, Primality; Secundity, Secundality; (see also CP 1.533:
primity, secundity, tertianity)

seq 457: Tertiality, Primany Secundany Tertiany ;

seq 461: Monadont, Monadousy

seq 463: Dyadont, Dyadousy, Secundality (dated 1905, June 2)

seq 465: Triadont, Triadousy, Tertiality (dated 1905, July 52)

seq 511: Primanity, Secundanity, Tertianity (dated 1905, December 20)

seq 513: Dyadont, Secundanity (dated 1905, december 21)

In this LNB, Peirce anticipates a practice common today among researchers,
that of the "personal research journal," a record of everything they are
thinking about their research or what they think at the time of their
research.

Don't forget: Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion (CP 2.89)

Personally, in answer to your question, I think it would be very
interesting to retain Primanity, Secundanity, and Tertianity as category
names ("comprehensions" or "denotations"), because they would be perfectly
consistent with Priman, Secundan, and Tertian as the names of the elements
belonging respectively to each of these categories ("extensions"). This
would avoid Firsnesses, Secondnesses, and Thirdnesses, not to mention the
confusion caused by using ordinals First, Second, and Third, as pointed out
by Edwina and myself.

 This would lead to "Primanité , Secondité et Tertianité" in French and
"Primanidad, Secundidad et Tertianidad" in Spanish, with the advantage of
having in each of the three languages "Priman, Secundan, et Tertian" to
designate the elements.

I don't see how such a change could happen. For a long time, Firstness and
Primarity (or Primanity), Secondness and Secondarity (or Secundanity),
Thirdness and Tertiarity (or Tertianity) would have to be allowed to
coexist in the hope that the new terms would take hold. I can't imagine
that any authority would be set up today to standardize vocabulary.

 Robert
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le dim. 10 déc. 2023 à 00:47, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List,
>
> I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers
> who rarely comment on this list.  We have discussed these and related
> issues before.  In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of
> discussion by some of the best and most respected Peirce scholars.  But
> most of them have dropped out.  Some still subscribe, but they don't join
> the discussions because they find their ideas rejected or distorted by
> people who "shoot first" and ask questions later.
>
> There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it
> with people who would consider it seriously.   In the Logic Notebook (LNB
> 268r, 1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended
> to develop in detail:
>
>1. The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general.
>Here take up Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs.
>
>2. The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof
>that are *a priori *possible.
>
>3. The forms we actually find.
>
>4. The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity.
>
> Point 4 is significant.  It seems that Peirce was considering three new
> terms that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  Was that
> what he intended?  Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or
> trichotomy?  I have been searching for some discussion of these questions,
> but I can't find anything anywhere.
>
> I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for
> 1-ness, 2-ness,  and 3-ness.  Most people who never read much or any of
> Peirce's writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing.  I was
> recently reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his
> initial response to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that
> the concepts were absolutely fundamental.  I strongly agree.
>
> Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I
> don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the
> three "Nesses".  I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity,
> and Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.
>
> Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary
> correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect
> that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most
> respected colleagues and other 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Dear John,
I appreciate the interest of all these questions, even if sometimes the
answer cannot be largely speculative, especially as regards Peirce's
intentions.
Now, as for your observation about Peirce's marginal status within the APA,
this may be somewhat related to Peirce's anti-psychologism, but in my
opinion, the main responsibility for this lies with the Peircean community
as a whole. Indeed, although the latter always brandishes a banner that
reads "d*o not block the way of inquiry*", it is not uncommon for this path
to be objectively blocked due to the extreme heterogeneity of this
community, which can reach the point of a kind of sectarianism. From the
outside, you get the feeling that you have to be a long-time initiate to be
able to benefit from the 100,000 pages of the MS. What's more, the places
where interested researchers can observe the - indispensable -
confrontations between initiates are not models of empathy that would
encourage them to run the risk of naively exposing their initial questions.
I won't say any more on the subject, as I'm sure those of you reading this
know where you stand.

Moreover, as far as I'm concerned, I have some personal complaints, mainly
about the evaluation mechanisms available to the Peircian community, which
are particularly lacking. Indeed, this community, it should be noted, has
set up an international organization with different names depending on the
language used, English or French (IASS-AIS <https://iass-ais.org/)>). The
former covers vague semiotic studies, where any informal discourse evoking
concerns about meaning is a priori accepted. The second seems to refer to a
well-constituted science, i.e. one that at least agrees on a well-defined
object of knowledge: "*semiotics*", which is obviously not the case. Go and
talk about Relational Algebra and Category Theory, as I did, or Catastrophe
Theory, as René Thom (Medall Fied) and Jean Petitot did, in such a fog! And
yet, as is often the case in the Humanities, there is an avowed desire to
move towards a scientific status comparable to that of the Exact Sciences,
which inevitably poses the problem of formalization and therefore of the
place of mathematics in any approach that would like to move in this
direction. I feel that this is also the case for Existential Graphs, the
reception of which you know better than anyone. In short, it's time for an
institutional body to take charge of these fundamental problems.

I have no doubt that researchers in the cognitive sciences - and not only
in this field - would benefit from Peirce's writings. Last summer, in June,
I was asked to present five videos at the "PRAGMA" Thematic School:
PRAGMATISM, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES: TRADITIONS, USES, NEW CHALLENGES,
hosted by Porquerolles from June 26 to July 1, 2023. The audience was made
up of young researchers from leading French schools and universities. The
school's scientific objectives were: "to train teachers-researchers and
professionals in a variety of fields in pragmatist approaches, by bringing
together and bringing into dialogue researchers from different disciplines,
theoretical sensibilities and political perspectives, who consequently have
different readings of the contributions of pragmatism to the renewal of
forms of philosophical and sociological inquiry into social reality."
Earlier, an Ecole Polytechnique journal had published a long interview on
my involvement with Peirce's phenomenology and semiotics.

Finally, I was present at Peirce's Sesquicentennial (1989).  I'd love to
see (on screen) the bicentenary, as I'll be 103 by then... Who knows?
 I don't think I can do any more than I'm doing now, working on a treatise
provisionally entitled: "*TREATISE OF SEMIOTICS, The Charles S. Peirce's
exact thinking, from mathematics to pragmatism via semiotics*". And as an
opening line, I'd like to add this quote, which will carry all my hopes:
*"Now this book sets forth the theory of finding out the truth; but I shall
call it a practical treatise because I aim, not only at giving the theory
in the briefest adequate form, but also at explaining how the theory can be
conveniently applied in practice.*" (Peirce C.S, NEM IV, REASON'S
CONSCIENCE, MS 693, p.187).
It's a very exciting task ...

Best regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 8 déc. 2023 à 23:48, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert,
>
> These discussions raise several important issues:  What did Peirce intend
> in any particular MS at the time he wrote it?  How did his thinking on the
> same and related issues develop over time?  How are they related to the
> authors he studied, and to his colleagues he worked with, taught, learned
> from, and corresponded with?  And what are their implications for ongoing
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

hree elements, but what characterizes it as an
Icon is that the First place, the place on which attention must be focused,
the place of the sign S, is occupied by a Priman, an element of the
category of Firstnessy".
*end of quote *
Voilà ... I'd be happy if this post contributed a little to unlocking your
brain ... It's a painful condition we all are familiar with ... 
Robert Marty.
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 7 déc. 2023 à 20:12, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Robert, List,
>
> I was thinking, that the first correlate is one due to its firstness
> (character, capability, essence...), the second and the third analogously.
> So I thought, that mixing the terms up, saying "a secondness" instead of "a
> second (correlate)" would be perhaps a slight linguistic unprecisity, but
> not a mistake potentially causing damage or ravage. I mean, for example, if
> all three correlates are possibilities, they are all firstnesses, if you
> look at each of them alone. But if the second correlate, the object, (being
> a possibility too though), restricts the range of the first´s possibility,
> determines it, and the first correlate, the sign, mediates between the
> object and the interpretant in the way, that the interpretant, although
> still being a possibility, is an explicit range of possibilities, the range
> being the result of this mediation, then why not say, that restriction is a
> brute action, and the result is one due to some quasi-mind or mind? Ok, it
> might be seen as a contradiction, that if you look at the correlates each
> alone, they all are of firstness character (possibilities), but if you look
> at the triadic relation between the three, they are of firstness,
> secondness, and thirdness characters, in this triadic relation, in this
> context. Ooookeeey, i am beginning to see: The damage may be done, if you
> look at a possibility, and claim, that it cannot be a secondness. Hmmm. May
> it be, that the term "possibility" is unprecise? I mean, if I say: "This,
> this, and that is possible", somebody else understands, that i said,
> everything else would be impossible? But I didn´t say so! So, in this
> moment, I have the opinion, that a possibility is merely a positive
> attribute, and an incomplete induction. So it does not have a range in
> reality, only in my knowledge. So one possibility cannot really restrict
> another, or cannot be a resriction result in reality, it cannot be a second
> or a third in reality. But it can, if the topic is not reality, but my
> knowledge.
> Sorry that i was writing while thinking, but I guess I have it clear now:
> "Firstness, secondness, thirdness" apply to reality, while "a first, a
> second, a third" may as well merely apply to my knowledge, for example. But
> on the other hand: My knowledge is real, isn´t it? Now I am not clear
> again, completely confused and brainblocked.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 07. Dezember 2023 um 11:40 Uhr
> *Von:* "robert marty" 
> *An:* "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" <
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
> Helmut, List,
>
> I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that
> can sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms
> "a First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a
> Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a
> Third" and  " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron):
>
> "*Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
> indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
> predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
> the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one
> subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject;
> thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one
> subject on another relatively to a third"* (CP 5.469)
>
> Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted)
> that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second
> and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not
> the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at
> his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before
> 1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic
> sign (

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Helmut, List,

I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that can
sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms  "a
First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a
Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a
Third" and  " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron):

"*Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one
subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject;
thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one
subject on another relatively to a third"* (CP 5.469)

Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted)
that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second
and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not
the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at
his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before
1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic
sign (see 76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce, Collected by Robert
Marty | Commens
<http://www.commens.org/links/link/76-definitions-sign-c-s-peirce-collected-robert-marty>
,
clicking the link on webarchive, because the link on Arisbe
http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.htm  is recently in error
404.)

Peirce makes this very clear around 1903, when it becomes clear that
trichotomies operate on the three correlates of a triadic relation once
they have been defined:

*We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any
triadic relation. (CP 2.235)*

*The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. (CP
2.235)*

* The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the
most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not
being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.236)*
*The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being
either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second
Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different
natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. (CP 2.237)*

*Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as
the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere
possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken
together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes [see footnote to
235]. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as the
existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and
according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general
modes of fact, or general modes of law. (CP 2.238)*

*There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into
ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute
between either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or
the Second and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws;
and these ten classes will be subdivided in different ways.( CP 2.239)*

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 6 déc. 2023 à 19:46, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Helmut, List,
> The question is easily answered by looking at the triadic or hexadic
> classes of signs.
> In the first case, only the Argument is a sign whose interpreter is a
> Thirdness.
> In the second case, in the absence of denominations, it suffices to list
> the classes of signs that incorporate interpretants with Thirdness; these
> are the six classes :
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan --> Secundan
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->  Secundan --> Priman
> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman -->  Priman
> Notations are obvious; arrows are determinations. Valid combinations

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[robert marty]

Helmut, List,
The question is easily answered by looking at the triadic or hexadic
classes of signs.
In the first case, only the Argument is a sign whose interpreter is a
Thirdness.
In the second case, in the absence of denominations, it suffices to list
the classes of signs that incorporate interpretants with Thirdness; these
are the six classes :
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Secundan --> Secundan
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian -->  Secundan --> Priman
Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Tertian --> Priman -->  Priman
Notations are obvious; arrows are determinations. Valid combinations result
from the application of the principle according to which :
« It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is
equally so that a Necessitant; can be determined by nothing but a Necessi-
tant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, Which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant which determines the
Effective Interpretant which determines the Explicit Interpretant the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes » (Letter to Lady Welby, 1908
Dec 23)
Decadic signs are not yet defined.
Best regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 2 déc. 2023 à 23:05, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Dear All,
>
> The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new
> sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of
> explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant)
> just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would
> be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to
> interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A
> system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean
> semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics
> just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim,
> that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be
> everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other,
> superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like
> that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled
> anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.
>
> Best Regards
>
> Helmut
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the
> links!
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is anyone familiar with this book by Tursman?

[robert marty]

Dear colleagues interested in this issue,
A dozen used copies of this book are available for about $10 on AbeBooks.com

Best,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 21 avr. 2023 à 06:43, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Hi Harris,
>
> I don't know the book, but you might find this review of interest.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery: A System of Logic Conceived as
> Semiotic (review)
>
>-
>- Patrick Sullivan
>
> <https://muse.jhu.edu/search?action=search=author:Patrick%20Sullivan:and=1=10=query_term>
>- Journal of the History of Philosophy
><https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/76>
>- Johns Hopkins University Press
><https://muse.jhu.edu/search?action=browse=publisher_id:1>
>- Volume 28, Number 2, April 1990 <https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/12335>
>- pp. 307-308
>- 10.1353/hph.1990.0035 <https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1990.0035>
>- https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/226423/pdf
>-
>
> Richard Tursman. Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery: A System of
> Logic Conceived as Semiotic. Peirce Studies, No. 3. Bloomington: Indiana
> University Press, 1987. Pp. xi + 16o. $25.00.
>
>
> Tursman has provided a work that is a significant guide to understanding a
> difficult and complex area of Peirce's philosophical thought, and a guide
> both to locating the position of Peirce's thought with respect to the
> intellectual currents of his own time, and to marking out for us today a
> distinctively pragmatistic philosophy of science.
>
>
> Tursman's general project can be seen as attempting to address several of
> the eight "unfinished tasks of Peircean semeiotic scholarship" indicated by
> Max Fisch? Among those tasks important for understanding Tursman's
> direction are that of showing how, for Peirce, the analysis of the logic of
> science was to be situated in a semiotic framework , and revealing what we
> might have seen if Peirce had finished his own *A System of Logic,
> Considered as Semiotic*. Tursman's subtitle should suggest that the last
> of these suggested tasks is a central concern, and he employs the very
> organizing principle suggested by Fisch for Peirce's own work.
>
>
> This principle is the division of Peirce's theory of signs into
> Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Speculative Rhetoric. What Tursman's
> analysis shows is how Peirce constructed a system of logic within semiotic,
> and how the semiotic was constructed within a larger framework of the
> analysis of the most general features of experience. This, as Fisch
> suggests, is what would have been the outcome of Peirce's own unfinished
> System of Logic.~ The explication of Peirce's method of inquiry (the
> interrelated functions of abductive , deductive, and inductive inference,
> governed by the Pragmatic Maxim) is one of the most thorough available.
>
>
> One of the most important contributions Tursman's examination makes is the
> treatment of the illative relation (transitivity) and its function in
> Peirce's system. Within the Peircean account of the method of science and
> its shift in focus from existentially particular cognitive antecedents for
> knowledge toward a focus on the results of inquiry, the importance of the
> illafive relation emerges. The illative relation is, for Peirce, the
> primary semiotic relation because it is the law of inference that grounds
> the leading principles which inform abduction, deduction, and induction,
> and thereby governs the relations of signs with other signs. ' Max H.
> Fisch, "Peirce's General Theory of Signs,". . .
>
>
> Tursman thus shows us how intricately involved the interrelations among
> Peirce's categories, his theory of signs, and his account of the method of
> science really are. Understanding precisely what these interrelations are
> and how they function is, however , crucial to understanding Peirce's
> philosophical thought, and specifically, his account of the method of
> science. We should be able to see, for example, the differences between
> Peirce's account of inquiry and both positivistic and the various
> "postpositivistic " approaches to the method of science.
>
>
> Tursman's book makes one other important contribution that should be
> noticed. It is commonly thought that Peirce said very little in a
> systematic fashion about the third branch of his semiotic, Speculative
> Rhetoric. The amount of secondary literature on Speculative Rhetoric,
> moreover, is quite small. Tursman's treatment of Speculative Rhetoric in
> the last three chapters of h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Interprets Peirce

[robert marty]

This is a wonderful project that will be of great benefit to all members of
the Peircian community. However, the question may arise of a possible
technological black box between the manuscripts and the final product. I
have no doubt that the community to be vigilant in this regard! Thank you
and good luck to all !
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 24 nov. 2022 à 05:15, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Peirce Interprets Peirce The project aims to study, disseminate, and
> valorize Charles S. Peirce’s work by transcribing, analyzing, and
> visualizing the Peirce archives, held at Harvard’s Houghton Library.
>
> https://mlml.io/p/peirce-interprets-peirce/
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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>
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[PEIRCE-L] The trichotomic machine on line.

[robert marty]

Dear colleagues,
My publication below is now available online.

Marty, Robert. "The trichotomic machine" *Semiotica*, vol. 2019, no. 228,
2019, pp. 173-192. https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0084
Abstract

The formal analysis of the principles leading the classification of the
hexadic, decadic, and triadic signs from C. S. Peirce especially, gives
rise to a general methodology allowing to systematically classify any *n*-adic
combinatory named “protosign.” Basic concepts of the algebraic theory
regarding the categories and functors will be used. That formalization
provides an additional benefit by highlighting and systematizing formal
immanent relationships between the classes of protosigns (or signs). Well
known hierarchical structures (lattices) are then obtained. Thanks to the
contribution of specific concepts in the Homological Algebra, new
methodologies of analysis and creation of significations can be introduced.
Best-regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Guidelines for improving discussions

[Robert Marty]

 I fully associate myself with this initiative which has the remarkable
characteristic of adding an opening to Peirce-L without subtracting
anything from it... it is perfectly justified, and it puts an end to a
malaise which has lasted for too long...

Le jeu. 11 nov. 2021 à 23:46, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> I think it's an excellent idea.
>
> My own view is that another List would be beneficial, with a focus on the
> use of the Peircean framework in the modern world.
>
> As you say, it is not instead of the current Peirce-L list but an
> additional site for a more expansive type of discussion.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 11/11/21 4:22 PM , "John F Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> In the good old days of Peirce-L, there were friendly, collegial
> discussions with no winners or losers.  All participants contributed
> something and learned something.  More recently, a group of three
> individuals, whom some have called the Triumvirate or the Mutual
> Admiration Society (MAS), have dominated the list.  Their stated goal
> is to produce a standard summary or synthesis of Peirce's writings as
> a "foundation" for further research and teaching.  Peirce himself could
> not produce such a summary, but they claim the authority to declare
> that their personal opinions are "consistent with Peirce", and they
> squelch other views with the label "inconsistent with Peirce".
>
> Mathematics, which includes formal logic, is the only subject in which
> anyone may correct an expert and the expert would reply "Thank you".
> In the empirical sciences, which include philosophy, no one can claim
> absolute certainty about anything.  That is the point of Peirce's First
> Rule of Reason:  "Do not block the way of inquiry."  He applied that
> rule to his own writings:
>
> CSP:  in philosophy what a man does not think out for himself he never
> understands at all.  Nothing can be learned out of books or lectures,
> they have to be treated not as oracles but simply as facts to be studied
> like any other facts.  That, at any rate is the way in which I would
> have you treat my lectures.  Call no man master, or at any rate not me.
> Only bear in mind that I have been a good many years trying in
> singleness of heart to find out how these things really are, and always
> disposed to doubt and criticize my own results.  (R304, 1903, Lecture 2;
> for the context of this quotation, see the attached Turrisi139.png.)
>
> Two months ago, the Triumvirate was silent for about two weeks.  That
> was wonderful.  Peirce-L blossomed with free and open discussions.
> People who had not sent a note for years contributed fresh ideas.  And
> nobody silenced them with the hammer INCONSISTENT WITH PEIRCE.
> But the Triumvirate came back "To block the way of inquiry."
>
> That's when some subscribers decided to start a new list -- not as a
> replacement for Peirce-L, but as an option for more open discussion.
> Anyone would be welcome to subscribe to both lists.
>
> Following are slightly edited excerpts from notes by four Peirce
> scholars, all of whom have PhDs and years of publications and teaching.
> The first person abandoned Peirce-L some years ago.  The others are still
> subscribers:
>
> 1. Most of the Peirceans I admire have long since left that list,
> including XXX, who says we need a new one on an entirely new platform
> (there are now several options).  Surely we can do better for Peirce.
>
> 2. I consider Peirce-L irredeemable at the moment.  It’s dealing with
> personal hot buttons of MAS or getting lost in endless irrelevant
> terminology.  There’s no understanding of semiosis, and no possibility
> of discussing it.
>
> 3. The pretentious behavior, the gratuitous aggression, and the silence
> of others is the reason way I stopped writing to the List some years ago.
>
> 4. We are backwoodsmen in the traces left by Peirce, faithful to his
> spirit.  There are several of us on this list who follow and develop
> some of these traces.  We find them particularly valuable because we
> have new tools and theories to develop them further.  Some literalists
> think we should leave the forest as it is.  Every time they get in the
> way, they create more heat than light.
>
> Peirce's ideas were constantly growing and changing, and the available
> MSS are incomplete evidence.  See the attached CSPmss.png.  Note that
> many MSS at Harvard are not on microfilm, and they have not yet been
> digitized.  There are many other MSS that are not at Harvard, and others
> were lost or even burned.  Nobody can say for certain what is or is not
> consistent with Peirce's final remarks on any subject.
>
> This discussion suggests the followings guidelines for Peirce-L and/or
> any new list.  The most important is Peirce's First Rule of Reason:
>
> 1. Do not block the way of inquiry.
>
> Since the available MSS are just a fraction of what Peirce wrote and
> a much smaller fraction of what he thought, there is no evidence to
> determine his final opinions about 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Signs, Types, and Tokens

[robert marty]

Jack, List
For me it is my "Trichotomic machine".(included in   
https://www.academia.edu/40493861/The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants
)
that provides the answer, as it builds on the foundations visualized in the
podium to go to the formal  foundations of semiotics ... but maybe not
everyone agrees? 樂
I hope you'll give me yours!

Cordially,
Robert

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mar. 9 nov. 2021 à 10:49, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> a écrit :

> Jon, Vincinius, List
>
> Thank you each (Jon and Vincinius) for your replies - both were helpful in
> trying to actualize theory-heavy terminology.
>
> Also wanted to say that Robert Marty's Podium diagram is maybe the most
> helpful of all resources I've yet looked through. It's this variety of
> "concreteness" which could be helpful in conceptualizing relations between
> the one sign, its two objects, and its three interpretants. Maybe such
> already exists?
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
>
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 9, 2021 1:14 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
>
> *Warning*
>
> This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System.
> Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the
> sender and know the content is safe.
> Vinicius, List:
>
> Thanks for the additional explanations. I see now that holisigns and
> altersigns fit into a phaneroscopic analysis in accordance with Robert
> Marty's podium diagram (
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338449971_The_podium_of_the_categories-final
> ).
>
> [image: image.png]
>
>
> There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
> degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
> holisigns (1/2/3).
>
> VR: If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
> categorial destiny is sealed.
>
>
> Again, what exactly does it mean to say that "a representamen has 1ns [or
> 2ns or 3ns] for its final interpretant"? Perhaps an example of each would
> be helpful.
>
> VR: They have different classification principles, though.
>
>
> I agree, but would appreciate some further elaboration. As I have already
> discussed in this thread, while qualisign/sinsign/legisign are three
> classes such that each sign is assigned to exactly one of them, I see
> tone/token/type as three "dimensions" of the same sign. The sign itself is
> a continuum, its types are its continuous portions of the same
> dimensionality as definitely significant forms, its tokens are its discrete
> embodiments of lower dimensionality that conform to those types, and its
> tones are indefinitely significant characters possessed by those tokens.
>
> VR: The first uses degenerations, the second does not and by choosing so
> Peirce had to deal with a much longer array of aspects.
>
>
> Where I see degeneracy in the later taxonomies is in the initial
> identification of two objects and three interpretants for each sign.
> Referencing Robert's podium diagram again, we have the genuine sign (1),
> dynamical object (2), and final interpretant (3); the degenerate immediate
> object (1/2) and dynamical interpretant (2/3); and the doubly degenerate
> immediate interpretant (1/2/3). Notice that the three genuine correlates
> are the ones in the genuine *triadic *relation of representing or
> mediating.
>
> Here the podium diagram reflects other important aspects, as well. The
> immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant (1/2/3) are *internal *to
> the sign (1), while the dynamical object (2), dynamical interpretant (2/3),
> and final interpretant (3) are *external *to the sign (1). That is why
> each of the latter three correlates has a *dyadic *relation with the
> sign, unlike the first two. The dynamical object (2) determines the
> immediate object (1/2), and the final interpretant (3) determines the
> dynamical interpretant (2/3), which determines the immediate interpretant
> (1/2/3)--not as efficient causes, just in terms of the logical order of
> trichotomies where "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a
> Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481,
> 1908). This is another reason why I maintain that "the Destinate
> Interpretant" is the final interpretant, not the immediate interpretant.
>
> VR: Speculative Grammar is not easy.
>
>
> I strongly agree. :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 3:12 PM Vinicius Romanini 
> wrote:
>
> Jon, list
>
> Joh, I agree with (almost) everything you say about 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[robert marty]

Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
 or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens

Abstract

In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the terminological
level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the formal equivalences
of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add, instance, graph,
graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still others... These
confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary distinctions
which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of
expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*" (CP 5.398)
and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of
thought for a character of the object we are thinking"* (CP 5.398). This
short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of Peirce's work
around his ten classes of signs and the relations of embodiment they
maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of tokens and only
six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his definitions of
the classes of signs.

Best regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 8 nov. 2021 à 00:50, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Vinicius, Jack, List:
>
> VR: My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
>
>
> I appreciate this acknowledgment, and I would say the same about my own
> approach to speculative grammar.
>
> VR: I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which is
> the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>
>
> I agree that we must take the final interpretant into account, but I
> understand it to be how the sign *would be* interpreted under *ideal 
> *circumstances,
> in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.
> Any *actual* interpretation of the sign is a *dynamical *interpretant,
> and the final interpretant might never *actually *come about. It is
> "final" in the sense of a *final cause* (and "normal" in the sense of
> *normative*), not the *last *interpretant in a logical or temporal
> sequence. That said, your use of "destined" here is consistent with my
> understanding that "the Destinate Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908) is the *final
> *interpretant, not the *immediate *interpretant as some scholars claim,
> including Tony Jappy. Just curious, what is your view on this?
>
> VR: A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant.
>
>
> When you say that a replica has "secondness for the final interpretant,"
> are you referring to the trichotomy "According to the Purpose of the
> Eventual Interpretant" such that for a replica (instance) it is "To produce
> action," while for a genuine legisign (type) it is "To produce
> self-control" (EP 2:490, 1908)? If so, then it seems to me that a
> "holisign" is a gratific type and an "altersign" is a gratific token. Is
> that right? If so, then why introduce the new terminology? If not, then
> what *does *it mean for a sign to "have" 1ns/2ns/3ns "for the final
> interpretant"?
>
> JRKC: I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little.
> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to
> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament"
> and "firstness for the final interpretant"?
>
>
> As Vinicius already explained, "degenerate" is adapted from the concept in
> geometry of projecting a figure of a certain dimensionality to produce a
> figure of lower dimensionality, like a solid object's shadow on a surface
> when a light is shining on it. In this context, what I take him to be
> saying is that since a legisign (type) is a necessitant (3rd universe)
> according to the mode of apprehension of the sign itself, a *genuine *legisign
> (type) is also a necessitant according to the purpose of its final
> interpretant (to produce self-control), while a *degenerate *legisign
> (type) is instead an existent (2nd universe) or a possible (1st universe)
> in that respect (to produce action or gratific). I invite his correction if
> I am misunderstanding him.
>
> JRKC: I often read the discourse on this list and wonder if contributors
> shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in order to clarify their use
> of terms, because trying to ground some of these concepts 

[PEIRCE-L] To the benefit of those who have an answer for everything ...

[robert marty]

List,

>From MS 498, undated  (transcription Ahti-Veiko Pietarinen, DOI
10.1007/s11229-014-0498-y) :

"















*I may remark that in no science, not even in comparative anatomy, are
questions ofclassification so vital as they are in phaneroscopy and
semeiotics. My classificationof signs is not yet fully matured. I have been
at work upon it, or at least have kept it inmind since 1863, but still
confidently expect important improvements in it. If I live tocomplete it,
it will be the contribution to exact logic that has cost me the most labor,
andit will be recognized by exact logicians as a very positive and
indisputable contributionto exact logic even if I should leave it in its
present imperfect state. There remain manyhundreds of difficult questions
yet to be considered, though the majority of them havereceived an
examination which cannot justly be called careless or summary. Lest
itshould be suspected that I exaggerate in saying that there are many
hundred questionsI will say that the exact number, so far, is 205 billion
891132 million 94619. Butthese are not all independent. From the answers to
some the answers to others canbe deduced. The total number of really
independent and really difficult questions,requiring each some days of
laborious consideration is only 1073 million 741794. Sothat if I should
have the good fortune to live 82 or 83 million years longer I mighthope to
exhaust the subject. It is not to be expected that I should live long
enough toanswer them all with positive assurance"*

This gives rise to a little humility ...

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[robert marty]

ems to me that those "*on and off this List"* who think
that the goal "*in the case of a written text is always to correctly
discern the author's (intentional interpreter's) intended meaning as
expressed in the tex*t" (Gary R), are in fact proposing to us that we play
a Chinese fantasmatic game, the rules of which they have long been trying
to establish.

Regards,
Robert Marty

--

[1] <#_ftnref1> Word cut (probably the word Representation). The previous
page is not included in MS 1345.

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 24 oct. 2021 à 00:20, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> List,
>
> To incorrectly, in my opinion, define 'representamen' as 'the mediative
> node' -- for example, as the 'function' that transforms 'input' into
> 'output' -- effectively assigns the role of mediating between the object
> and interpretant to the* interpreter* rather than to the *sign*.
>
> This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing
> as an objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In
> terms Gary Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the *internal
> context **of *the interpreter *govern over* the *external context* that
> is *shared* with the utterer.
>
> If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can never be
> perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that serves as a
>  *standard* for assessing actual interpretations.
>
> In the view of some on this List and off, this goal in the case of a
> written text is always properly discerning *the* *author's intended
> meaning* (intentional interpretant) as expressed in the text (immediate
> interpretant). For anyone who makes the interpreter the mediator, rather
> than the sign being that, there are only various individual readings, none
> of which is more or less valid than any other.
>
> Such a version of semiotics is not a *normative *science at all as It
> provides no basis for evaluating any particular reading as a *better* 
> interpretation
> of a text, or even a *mis*interpretation of the text. And who would
> honestly deny that misinterpretations of texts do indeed occur? And who
> would seriously argue that any and every interpretation is as good as any
> other?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[robert marty]

Gary R.

Thank you for your encouraging words, but I do not imagine for a moment
that your intervention aims at underlining that to be interested in the
principles of the classification of sciences according to Comte and Peirce
is an outdated literalism. In my article "Podium", I quoted Nathan Houser
who in his well-known article *"The Forms of experience"* quotes Beverley
Kent in this way:

*"*Over the course of his more than fifty productive years, Peirce worked
out a number of different classifications, but his efforts had led by 1903
to what Beverley Kent calls his 'perennial classification'.

*' In this mature classification, we find that mathematics is the most
fundamental science, the only science independent of all others, and that
following mathematics comes philosophy which is divided into three
branches: (in order of dependency) phenomenology, normative science, and
metaphysics. After philosophy come the special sciences, physics and
psychics, and these are followed by the sciences of review and the
practical sciences. Logic, we find, is the third of the three normative
sciences (in order of dependency), preceded by aesthetics and ethic*s.'( N.
Houser, “The Form of Experience,” p. 4)

Helmut Pape, for his part, points out in his review of Beverley Kent
that "* she
has strong tendency to regard other versions simply as inconsistent within
the one she prefers*" (p.142). I agree with this criticism, especially when
one knows the mass of undated MS. Consequently, a study without a priori
must take into account the principles of this classification, the first of
which is intangible: among the Sciences of Discovery, Mathematics does not
depend on any other science; and all other sciences will depend on it. This
is what Pape welcomes in the work of Beverley Kent :

"*A remarkable feature of her exposition is the inclusion of several
perspectival diagrams showing that the Hausdorff dimensions of Peirce's
classification, i.e., the property of parts having the same structure as
the whole of which they are parts"* (p.140). He also quotes Beverley Kent:"*
What the meant by logic or normative semiotic must be seen within the
context of a complex diagram that having the three-dimensionality of a
lattice, a diagram that represents his classification*."

This is not true, because the classification of sciences is not a lattice.
Indeed, there is no need to verify the axioms of a lattice; it is enough to
see that if it has an upper bound (the Mathematics) it does not have,
obviously, a lower bound. On the other hand, the Poset 3 --> 2 -->1 that I
propose is a lattice and, secondarily, a diagram, a structure that does not
only belong to the Mathematical Logic but is a simple algebraic structure
belonging to Discrete Mathematics (a Poset) which obviously is obtained by
respecting the laws of this Mathematical Logic.  This Poset gives real
content to the descending structural dependence in the ladder of the "Well
of truth" of Peirce.

Pietarinen makes the observation that these principles are still valid,
which is quite right since all the creations to which they refer are as
many fields of empirical sciences anticipated by Peirce which are situated
in the Idioscopy, that is to say in "(AIII) Idioscopy - Special sciences-
positive sciences (based on special experiences, discover new phenomena)"
of the compiled classification of Tommi Vekhavaara.

Regards,
Robert Marty


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 20 oct. 2021 à 05:54, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Jon, Robert, John, List,
> As I have in the past, I encourage anyone who wants to explore in detail
> and in depth all of Peirce's versions of a classification of the sciences
> to study the sole monograph on these various versions, Charles S. Peirce:
> Logic and the Classification of the Sciences by Beverley Kent.
> https://www.amazon.com/Charles-S-Peirce-Classification-Sciences/dp/0773505628
> Helmut Pape, in his review of the book [untitled, in *The Journal of
> Speculative Philosophy* New Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1988)
> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i25668231>, pp. 140-145] highlights the 40
> pages in which Kent explores these several versions from 1866 to the
> "perennial" classification of 1903.
> More recently, Akti-Veikko Pietarinen in "Interdisciplinarity and Peirce's
> classification of the sciences: A centennial reassessment" (*Perspectives
> on Science*, 14, 2006) comments on the "perennial" classification.
>
> The overall structure of Peirce's [1903] classification, were it to be
> applied in today's situation, would not, in any major respect, be radically
> different from what it was designed to reflect a hundred years ago, in
> spite

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Shouldwe start a new email list)

[robert marty]

John, Bernard, List,

There is Another Classification of the Sciences from MS 1345  with an
explanation by Peirce on his agreement with Auguste Comte:

=

MS1345_037

 *Art*.2 In the development science, a point is soon reached at which
men have to receive special training and be armed with special instruction
in order to collect their facts. Thus, arise special classes of minds
fitted for different kinds of inquiries. It now becomes necessary to
distribute sciences in general into departments. It thus becomes necessary
to classify the sciences according to the different sorts of observations
which they make. Modifications in the details of such classification arise
in course of time. Spectroscopy and photography become applied to
astronomy; and pretty because an observatory is more costly than a
spectroscopic and photographic outfit, it is the astronomer who takes up
these arts, not the physicist who takes up astronomy. Philogists [Philologists]
will soon be availing themselves of acoustical apparatus; and though books
are cheap and easy to use compared with such instruments, we may be sure
that the study of language by that means will remain in the hands of the
philogists  [Philologists] and not be turned out to the physicists.

 The reason is, that the segregation of different knots of students
according as they are interested in more specialized or more generalized
observations, turns out to the more decisive and deeper than that between
men who use different kinds of instruments. Accordingly, the most permanent
division of the sciences is based upon the  [MS1345_038] greater or less
specialization of their objects of interest and observation.

Another reason, already pointed out by Auguste Comte, one of the first
to employ this type of classification further recommends it. It is, that
the less general sciences have to employ the results of the more general,
which because of their being less embarrassed by minutiae, are earlier
developed.

Art.3. From this point of view, the great divisions of science are as
follows:

   *First*, *Mathematics*, which does not inquire into facts, but only
develop hypotheses;

   *Second*, *Philosophy*, which makes no business of observation,
using merely the facts familiar to all opus;

   *Third*, *Positive Science*, which makes researches to ascertain
facts.

Philosophy, again, is divided into,

A. *Logic*, the Philosophy of thought, which attends to facts
closets to us; and

B. *Metaphysics*, The Philosophy of Being, which attends to the
facts of the whole universe.

Positive science, in its turn, is derived into,

   A. *Nomology*, The Science of Laws, general physics and general
psychology;

MS1345_039

B. Systematic Science, which studies classifications and systems of
things; and

 C. Descriptive Science, which studies individual objects, as
Astronomy, Geography, History, etc.

===

*Following with the MS ...*
Best,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 18 oct. 2021 à 23:35, sowa @bestweb.net  a écrit :

> Dear Robert, Bernard, List,
>
> Peirce's classifications in R 1345 is complementary to his more widely
> accepted classification in 1903.  Many Peirce scholars have considered the
> 1903 version as a better developed version that replaces 1345.  i admit
> that I had  also accepted that conclusion.  But after the "slow read" of
> ADT's slides and the subsequent discussion, I now agree with you that 1345i
> incorporates insights by Peirce that clarify Peirce's conception of
> phenomenology.  A phenomenology based on 1345 could be a fully developed
> science, not a science egg.
>
> RM:  Dividing all science into
> 1. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.
> *2. ** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify
> their forms with those that mathematics has studied.
> *3. Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
> experience.
>
> I believe that is an excellent top level, which is more consistent with
> Peirce's triadic philosophy than his 1903 classification.
>
> Comte's idea of dependencies had considerable merit.  But  I now believe
> that it is responsible for limiting phaneroscopy to a science egg.  Atkins'
> attempt to broaden the scope of phaneroscopy to include some normative
> principles  violates Comte's principle.  But I believe that it's better to
> go back to an updated version of 1345.
>
> There is, of course,  much more to say about all these issues.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[robert marty]

Jon, Bernard, List,

Two other Classification of Sciences from the MS 1345;

*FIRST :*

MS1345_004

Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*

The first year I would propose to point my masterly Syllabus of Science of
which I have given a table of contents.

*Contents of Syllabus of Science.*

Dividing all science into

I. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.

*II.** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify their
forms with those that mathematics has studied.

*III. **Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
experience.

I consider Mathematics

1. *Geometry* and the mathematics of continua, giving only a few
generalities§1

2. *Arithmetic*, or the mathematics of discrete infinite collections. The
special merle of reasoning explained

 §2

3. *The theory of finite groups*. The peculiarity of the reasoning
explained.   §3

II. Phenomenology being divided into

1. *Philosophy*, or the universal characters of Phenomena

2. *Nomology*, or the discovery of the characters of classes of phenomena,
and the accounting for them by the general principles of philosophy,

3. *Descriptive and Explanation* Science, or the description of individual
things, and explanation of their characters by the laws discovered by
Nomology.



MS1345_005

*Part 3* continued

I divide *Pragmatics* into

1*. Ethics*, or the universal principles of conduct

2. *Arts*, the study of general problems not going back to first principles.

3. *Policy,* or the study of special problems.

_

  Mathematics requires no subdivision for our proposal.

  I divide *Philosophy *into

A  Logic

 B  Metaphysics

I divide *Nomology *into

A  Psychics

B. Physics

I divide *descriptive Science*, or Episcopy, into

A.  Ergography, the account of the works of intelligent beings

B.  Empsychography, the account of those beings themselves

C. Cosmography, the account of inanimate nature.



MS1345_006

I divide *Ethics* into

A. Private Ethics

B. Public Ethics

I divide *Arts* into

A. Arts practiced by individuals

B. Sociology or public arts.

I divide *Policy* into

A. Policy toward men

B. Religion, or policy toward superior beings

C. Policy toward lower animals

__

No further subdivision of Philosophy is requisite.

I divide Psychics into

a. Psychology groper, or mind viewed partly at least from an internal
standpoint

b. Anthropology etc (say Empsychonomy) or mind viewed wholly from an
external Standpoint

  α in individuals, men; spiritual intelligences,
animals

  β in families

  γ in communities of races
___ THE END OF THE FIRST 

*SECOND *:


MS1345_007

Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*

 Here we must adopt a classification of the sciences, not necessarily
inflict upon the user of the encyclopaedia, but *to guide the compiler.*

  I divide all science into *three* parts, the first much the smallest,
the last much the largest. They are

I. *Mathematics,* the study of *ideal constructions* independently of the
question of their real existence.

II*. Empirics*, or *Phenomenolog*y, the study of *phenomena* with the
purpose of identifying their forms with those which mathematics as studied.

III. Pragmatics, the study of *how we ought to act* in the light of
experience.

I divide *mathematics* into 1 Geometry, 2 Arithmetic, and 3 The
theory of finite groups.

I divide Empirics into

1.*Philosophy*, or the study of the universal characters of phenomena.

2.* Nomology*, or the study of those characters of phenomena which though
not universal, belong  to whole classes of phenomena, and the attempt to
account for them by connecting them with the universal laws which
philosophy discovers.

3.*Episcopy*, or the description of individual things, with a view to
explaining them by the laws nomology makes out.


Regards,

Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 23:08, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, Bernard, List:
>
> RM: this classification of sciences is the simplest he [Peirce] provided
> ... but the most detailed ones are consistent with this matrix.
>
>
> It is indeed his simplest, but there is a *very* *fundamental *difference
> from his more detailed ones. This early (mid-1890s) classification situates 
> *nothing
> *between mathematics and logic, the first branch of empirics, and places
> pragmatics as "the study of how we ought to behave" *after *all the
> special sciences, the later branches of empirics. By contrast, Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[robert marty]

List,
Finally everything becomes clearer and I understand better why Gary F sees
me as a Post-Peircean ... it is because he is basically himself an
Ante-Peircean who reduces Peirce to an Idioscopy as it could exist before
him, without Cenoscopy and of course without Mathematics . ... as I simply
claim to be Peircean, without any truncation, he sees me as Post ... and I
see him as Ante ... however, he is in a position of advantage over
Peirce-L; consequently, if a justification of a parallel list was needed,
here it is ...
RM
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 16:24,  a écrit :

> Jack, I appreciate your point that “we cannot have an epistemology without
> some form of "anthropology".” If I may extend the idea a little, we cannot
> hope to understand human nature, or why humans think and act the way we do,
> unless we can draw on insights emerging from biology, anthropology,
> sociology, psychology, phenomenology, semiotics, and the whole range of
> empirical sciences (“Idioscopy” was Peirce’s term). But the fact that all
> these disciplines have been hived off into academic special interests makes
> it difficult to integrate them all into a coherent system.
>
> I happen to think that Peirce’s philosophy, especially his phenomenology
> and the semiotics which is quite explicitly based on it, is highly relevant
> to the challenges of living in our time — relevant *just as it is,* in
> the writings that Peirce left us. That’s why I included so much of it in my
> online book *Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>. *My purpose there
> was to *integrate *it with more recent insights from the disciplines
> mentioned above, along with selections from ancient scriptures and
> Indigenous traditions. Jeremy Lent’s new book *The Web of Meaning* does
> much the same thing, and very well (I think), but leaves out the semiotics.
> So I think my book may have some added value, although Lent’s may be more
> accessible.
>
> I do *not* believe that studies of Peirce are relevant *only* when we can
> link them up somehow with current developments in our own specialized field
> (such as “Cognitive Science,” using John Sowa’s example). I think Peirce’s
> ideas, just as he expressed them, can and should be integrated with matters
> of living concern. I think they are “directly applicable to the conduct of
> life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth,” as Peirce said of
> his “neglected argument” (EP2:435). The center of my own concern these days
> (as readers of my blog <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> know) is the current
> global situation in which human activity is rapidly undermining our life
> support system. Since there is wide consensus on what needs to be done *in
> this decade* to have a chance of stabilizing our life support system, I
> am especially interested in what it is about human nature that has brought
> us to this pass and seems to be preventing us from doing what needs to be
> done. But I do *not* consider this to be a ‘special interest’; I think it
> is of *general* concern for all life forms on this planet.
>
> I have several reasons for thinking that Peirce’s work is highly relevant
> to this *general* concern. One is his emphasis on the *continuity* of
> semiosis; and closely connected with this is his *psychological* insight
> that human conscious reasoning is only the tip of the vast iceberg of
> semiosis (sorry about the hackneyed metaphor). I think recent developments
> in social psychology have borne out this insight — for instance, those
> summarized at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_intuitionism. I’d be
> happy to explore this further on peirce-l if there is interest (and not too
> many objections).
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
> *Sent:* 17-Oct-21 07:30
> *To:* robert marty 
> *Cc:* Margaretha Hendrickx ; tabor...@primus.ca;
> Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Should we start a new email list
> (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
>
>
>
> Dear Robert,
>
>
>
> My point is definitely anthropological, but we cannot have an epistemology
> without some form of "anthropology" (Comte was a sociological philosopher
> after all). I don't know how to answer your questions, though you do raise
> some interesting points. If mathematics is defined as "the development of
> hypotheses", it would seem all other branches logically depend upon
> mathematics. On the other hand, how do we develop hypotheses if not via
> experience of and in the world of actuality and being? The 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list?

[Robert Marty]

Cher Bernard, vous écrivez :
"I think that the content and purpose of Phaneroscopy needs to be cleared
up independently of the question of classification of sciences.
On the contrary what has been suggested is to find a place for an unknown
thing into a pretty trichotomy a priori derived from the logic of the
categories."
then my question is: does this "a priori trichotomy derived from the logic
of the categories" fall from the sky or rather from the mathematical
repository with 1- the triadic reduction theorem of the relational
structures; 2- a Poset 3-->2-->1 which is the form of the phaneroscopic
categories incorporating their interdependence relationship; all in the
well of the truth?
Bien cordialement,
RM
Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 12:03, Bernard Morand  a
écrit :

> John, List,
> Le 16/10/2021 à 23:58, sowa @bestweb.net a écrit :
>
> I agree with ET.  Most of the complaints seem to be generated by three
> people (GF, GR, and JAS) who object to people who introduce topics for
> which they have no canned answer.  An example is my note about phaneroscopy
> as a science egg.  ADT had no explanation for Peirce's remark.  Somebody
> mentioned the attempt by Atkins to broaden phaneroscopy..  But that attempt
> blurred the line between phaneroscopy and normative science.  When I
> observed that the combination of phaneroscopy and normative science would
> be equivalent to semeiotic, they refused to answer.  *These are very
> important questions that need to be asked.*  I am not complaining.  I am
> asking a question that gets to the heart of Peirce's 1903 classification.
> (my emphasis)
>
> I strongly agree with this statement from John.
>
> I was surprised at first reading by the mixing of two topics in the
> discussion about the ADT slides, a mix which he himself posited in his
> presentation and which seemed to me as being unnecessary.
>
> I think that the content and purpose of Phaneroscopy needs to be cleared
> up independently of the question of classification of sciences.
>
> On the contrary what has been suggested is to find a place for an unknown
> thing into a pretty trichotomy a priori derived from the logic of the
> categories.
>
> This is too much putting the cart before the horse.
>
> Furthermore I wonder whether the Peirce's aim after 1903 was not to
> compare the logical reality of the categories with the observable facts of
> living signs, hence his strong interest for his correspondence with Lady
> Welby.
>
> If this was the case, something we would call today experimental method,
> then the observation of living signs (phanerons) needs to be conducted out
> of the categories schema and not vice versa.
>
> So the matter of classification of phaneroscopy would have to come after.
>
> Coming back to the reading of ADT slides, what have we learned from it on
> the List ? None of the initiators of the topic has offered any insight into
> concluding remarks (at least as it appears to me).
>
> Regards
>
> Bernard
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Robert Marty]

Dear Jack,
The hierarchy is in your mind, not in mine because the identification of
forms does not imply a hierarchy of forms... consider mathematics as a
repository of forms some of which can be embodied in empirics... for
example a Poset (partially ordered set) can be embodied in a phaneron
becoming a trichotomy tertian -->secundan-->priman i.e. a set or three
categorized elements WITH their interdependence relationship ... And we can
continue with other forms ... do you know the collaboration of Claude
Lévi-Strauss with the mathematician André Weil about the kinship system of
the Murngins ?
Best regards ...
Robert Marty

Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 13:29, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> a écrit :

> Dear Robert,
>
> My point is definitely anthropological, but we cannot have an epistemology
> without some form of "anthropology" (Comte was a sociological philosopher
> after all). I don't know how to answer your questions, though you do raise
> some interesting points. If mathematics is defined as "the development of
> hypotheses", it would seem all other branches logically depend upon
> mathematics. On the other hand, how do we develop hypotheses if not via
> experience of and in the world of actuality and being? The relationship
> between empirics and mathematics seems more dialectical rather than
> strictly hierarchical to me, though from a purely (natural) "scientific"
> point of view, I can understand why such a hierarchy is both accepted and
> important. It becomes less easy to accept and defend when we move into the
> world of human action and interaction and so your comment re the
> sociological axis is indeed apt.
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
> --
> *From:* robert marty 
> *Sent:* Sunday, October 17, 2021 11:27 AM
> *To:* JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
> *Cc:* Margaretha Hendrickx ; tabor...@primus.ca <
> tabor...@primus.ca>; Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman <
> g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Subject:* Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list
> (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
>
> Dear Jack,
> Your point is now anthropological and I do not reject it ... my
> preoccupation is strictly epistemological (remember that we are here in the
> Sciences of Discovery): what are the practical consequences of this
> identification of forms for knowledge? Here is another version of the
> classification of sciences in the same MS 1345 :
>
> "Synopsis of Logic
>
> *Chapter I . The Place of Philosophy among The Sciences.*
>
> Art. 1. Division 1. The *Sciences *are divided *according to the distance
> at which they paint nature into**: *
>
> 1.Mathematics.
> 2. Philosophy.
> 3. Nomology: general physics and general physics;
> 4. Natural History, the descriptions of classes;
> 5. Sciences descriptive of individual objects, geography, astronomy,
> ordinary history, etc.
> *Definition 1. Mathematics is the development of hypotheses.*
> *Definition* 2. *Philosophy* is the science which deals with the general
> phenomena of life.
>
> Art 2.* Division* 2. *Philosophy* is divided into
>
> 1. The philosophy of thought: The *Philosophical* *Trivium*
> 2. The philosophy of action: *Ethics*, etc.
> 1. The philosophy of being: *Metaphysics.  "*  [emphasize mine]
>
> What do we do with this? Do we have the right to develop new hypotheses
> and to study them in open and respectful dialogue? Knowing that a bricoleur
> will be able to repair his electrical network but that for a nuclear power
> plant, one will rather call upon a specialist of Dynamics of Fluids ...
> When Newton saw an apple fall and encapsulated this apple in a binary
> relation of attraction with the earth, he opened the possibility for
> humanity to take a big step on the Moon...
>
> Here are the questions ...
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
>
>
> Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 11:16, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> a écrit :
>
> Robert, List,
>
> I think that Peirce's classification, quoted in your post below, is
> absolutely accurate (and I'm firmly within the sociological axis). I would
> say, though, that just as Peirce considered people to be practicing
> phaneroscopy (artists and so on) even when they were unaware of it, it is
> also highly possible (or in fact, probable) that people practice
> mathematics in all walks life without ever referring to it (to themselves)
> as mathematics. The vast majority of theory which deals with abstract forms
> (without reference to "real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[robert marty]

Dear Jack,
Your point is now anthropological and I do not reject it ... my
preoccupation is strictly epistemological (remember that we are here in the
Sciences of Discovery): what are the practical consequences of this
identification of forms for knowledge? Here is another version of the
classification of sciences in the same MS 1345 :

"Synopsis of Logic

*Chapter I . The Place of Philosophy among The Sciences.*

Art. 1. Division 1. The *Sciences *are divided *according to the distance
at which they paint nature into**: *

1.Mathematics.
2. Philosophy.
3. Nomology: general physics and general physics;
4. Natural History, the descriptions of classes;
5. Sciences descriptive of individual objects, geography, astronomy,
ordinary history, etc.
*Definition 1. Mathematics is the development of hypotheses.*
*Definition* 2. *Philosophy* is the science which deals with the general
phenomena of life.

Art 2.* Division* 2. *Philosophy* is divided into

1. The philosophy of thought: The *Philosophical* *Trivium*
2. The philosophy of action: *Ethics*, etc.
1. The philosophy of being: *Metaphysics.  "*  [emphasize mine]

What do we do with this? Do we have the right to develop new hypotheses and
to study them in open and respectful dialogue? Knowing that a bricoleur
will be able to repair his electrical network but that for a nuclear power
plant, one will rather call upon a specialist of Dynamics of Fluids ...
When Newton saw an apple fall and encapsulated this apple in a binary
relation of attraction with the earth, he opened the possibility for
humanity to take a big step on the Moon...

Here are the questions ...

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 11:16, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> a écrit :

> Robert, List,
>
> I think that Peirce's classification, quoted in your post below, is
> absolutely accurate (and I'm firmly within the sociological axis). I would
> say, though, that just as Peirce considered people to be practicing
> phaneroscopy (artists and so on) even when they were unaware of it, it is
> also highly possible (or in fact, probable) that people practice
> mathematics in all walks life without ever referring to it (to themselves)
> as mathematics. The vast majority of theory which deals with abstract forms
> (without reference to "real" conditions of existence) is mathematical (in
> the sense Peirce ascribes to it). And so, I think the problem is one of
> personal positioning and self-understanding rather than practice itself -
> which, in agreement with Peirce, I think we all do more or less in common
> form.
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
> ------
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of robert marty 
> *Sent:* Sunday, October 17, 2021 8:59 AM
> *To:* Margaretha Hendrickx 
> *Cc:* tabor...@primus.ca ; Peirce-L <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Gary Fuhrman 
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list
> (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c
>
> *Warning*
>
> This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System.
> Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the
> sender and know the content is safe.
> Dear Margaretha,
>
> Your conception of attitude is in interpersonal relations, very
> psychological. But it is not about that... it is about epistemology ...
> Here is for example a very vertical "*epistemological attitude*" of
> Peirce :
>
> *""Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of
> the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of
> steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may
> adapt our phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of
> stairs leading down into it:*
>
> *We divide the whole into three great parts:*
>
>
>
> * - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to
> their real existence,- empirics, the study of phenomena with the
> purpose of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied,*
>
> * - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the
> truths of empirics."*
>
> (C.S. Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, vol III.2 1122)"
>
> And now try to get a horizontal comment on Peirce-L (*on the sociological
> axis*) that takes into account this question of identification of forms
> ... and if you are answered "OK" then ask where and when your interlocutors
> tried to give content to their agreement "in the flights of stairs within
> of well of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[robert marty]

Dear Margaretha,

Your conception of attitude is in interpersonal relations, very
psychological. But it is not about that... it is about epistemology ...
Here is for example a very vertical "*epistemological attitude*" of Peirce :

*""Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of
the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of
steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may
adapt our phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of
stairs leading down into it:*

*We divide the whole into three great parts:*



* - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to
their real existence,- empirics, the study of phenomena with the
purpose of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied,*

* - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the
truths of empirics."*

(C.S. Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, vol III.2 1122)"

And now try to get a horizontal comment on Peirce-L (*on the sociological
axis*) that takes into account this question of identification of forms ...
and if you are answered "OK" then ask where and when your interlocutors
tried to give content to their agreement "in the flights of stairs within
of well of truth"

NB: this classification of sciences is the simplest he provided ... but the
most detailed ones are consistent with this matrix.

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 16 oct. 2021 à 18:51, Margaretha Hendrickx  a
écrit :

> What about taking this conversation off list, as in literally off list?
> For example, to a Skype or ZOOM session that we treat as a
> drink/juice-in-a-bar happening where no one is allowed to talk about
> serious stuff for the first half hour?  Something like an international
> Peirce Meet 'n Greet?
>
> Or who knows?  Some list members may be living in driving distance from
> one another.  I live in Ithaca, NY, USA.
>
> What I am trying to say is that it does not make sense to slice and dice
> Peirce.  A lot can be learned from engaging in non-judgmental listening;
> that is, thinking without a judgmental sucking-up/talking-down attitude
> (spatial metaphor).  Face-to-face interaction makes it easier to switch
> into a horizontal attitude (spatial metaphor).
>
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 12:33 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Exactly!! That's the spirit!
>>
>> And it shows, clearly, how different subject matters are treated on this
>> list.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat 16/10/21 12:23 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining about
>> the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one that would
>> be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to peirce-l) wouldn’t
>> have to read all those complaints any more.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to
>> admit it or not. [Peirce, CP 8.143, EP2:61] {
>>
>> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>>
>>
>>
>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
>> Sent: 16-Oct-21 11:22
>> To: s...@bestweb.net
>> Cc: Peirce-L
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's
>> contributions to the 21st c
>>
>>
>>
>> List,
>>
>>
>>
>> I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list.
>>
>>
>>
>> Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a mirror to
>> see what is going on in society today.
>>
>>
>>
>> If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails
>> distributed by this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about the
>> possibility that this has to do more with what is going on in society today
>> and that one's feelings about society are being projected on the emails
>> distributed by this list?
>>
>>
>>
>> My very best, Margaretha H.
>>
>>
>>
>> PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list emails
>> within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am juggling many other
>> balls.  There are many interesting emails on this list, but I am simply not
>> in the right place to reply to them immediately. I hope to reply to them in
>> the future once my schedule is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this
>> email imm

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century (was Dimensionality

[robert marty]

le if they had good eyesight because
they do not reason wrongly on the principles they know. And subtle minds
would be geometricians if they could bend **their sight toward the
unaccustomed principles of geometry*." (Pascal: 1669)



This difference has become increasingly institutionalized. It is
particularly evident in the academic organization's disciplinary sectors
and their assignment to dedicated, separate, specifically managed research
teaching locations. Pluridisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, and a
fortiori transdisciplinarity have almost no material inscription. Their
practice is often associated with institutional deviance or even desertion
from the original academic community, often accompanied by dissuasive
judgments on values. On both sides, tenacious prejudices have been
established that must be confronted as calmly as possible."(From  "Iconographic
and Mathematical Models in Semiotics; *From the 'unformed' to Peirce's
'skeletons sets'")*

I come back to the beginning of my argument: we must make, collectively and
in the long run, a rational representative construction of Peirce's work
that is communicable with a minimum of effort. To reach this goal, we must
not fall into a dialogue of the deaf. We are also backwoodsmen in the
traces left by Peirce; faithful to his spirit there are several of us on
this list who follow and develop some of these traces. We find them
particularly relevant because we have new tools. Some literalists think we
should leave the forest as it is. Every time they get in the way, which
keeps happening, there's a big problem.

Regards,

Robert Marty

--

[1] <#_ftnref1> (11) (PDF) La découverte du continent peircien | Jean-Marie
C Chevalier - Academia.edu
<https://www.academia.edu/3383353/La_d%C3%A9couverte_du_continent_peircien>

[2] <#_ftnref2> Sokal affair - Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokal_affair>

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 10 oct. 2021 à 23:48, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> John, List,
>
> John, do you really believe that most everyone -- or even many a one --
> now working in linguistics, cognitive science, and AI sufficiently, let
> alone, thoroughly understands Peirce's contributions to philosophy,
> semeiotic and a number of relevant sciences and so they are now fully ready
> to employ it to springboard into a new "foundation for science"?  Would
> that were the case.
>
> Your paper, "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century" (which I read
> during that decade when I was attending your *International Conference on
> Conceptual Structure* and was reading all your papers then available as
> well as the 1st edition of your book on KR), your "Peirce's contributions"
> paper,  even in its abstract, suggests that you are, of course, well aware
> that Peirce has been severely neglected;  and, I would add, not only
> neglected but misused by certain thinkers, and not only those whom you
> mentioned in the analytic tradition.
>
> Abstract. Peirce was [. . .] a largely neglected philosopher in the 20th
> century. Peirce's research in logic, physics, mathematics, and lexicography
> made him uniquely qualified to appreciate the rigors of science, the
> nuances of language, and the semiotic processes that support both. Instead
> of using logic to understand language, the philosophers who began the
> analytic tradition — Frege, Russell, and Carnap — tried to replace language
> with a purified version of logic. As a result, they created an unbridgeable
> gap between themselves and the so-called Continental philosophers, they
> exacerbated the behaviorist tendency to reject any study of meaning, and
> they left semantics as an unexplored wilderness with only a few elegantly
> drawn, but incomplete maps. . . This article reviews the ongoing efforts to
> construct a new foundation for 21st-century philosophy on the basis of
> Peirce's research and its potential for revolutionizing the study of
> meaning in cognitive science, especially in the fields of linguistics and
> artificial intelligence.
>
>
> It seems to me that the continuing, and in many cases, excellent work of
> those who want Peirce to be understood on his own terms, that *that* work
> ought to be respected as a kind of propaedeutic to the 'revolutionary' "new
> foundation" for science which you propose. By this I mean that in my view
> one needs a clear, contextualized and, optimally, both broad understanding
> as well as a specific (to the disciplines one is working in) understanding
> of what Peirce thought, as difficult as it may be to attain those
> understandings.
>
> Peirce was not only thoroughly neglected, b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Peirce & Popper

[robert marty]

Jack, List,

> JACK : "Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have
to do with the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which
resembles an index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of
the intersection (which I know would logically be contained within each
line, but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts which
corresponds to icon?"

> RM First, two remarks:
1- first it is not a preference, since there is no choice!
2- I answer yes to your question but on the condition that this resemblance
that you perceive is explained. For that, rather than speaking of an index,
we must speak of an indexical sign and for an icon, we must speak of an
iconic sign. This implies referring to the ten classes of signs (see CP
2.254 to 2.263 ) and what you have perceived is that in every indexical
sign (there are 4) the object is in a real (dyadic) relation with the sign
it determines, whereas in every iconic sign (there are 3), the relation of
the sign with the object that determines it is a mere possibility (monadic:
at least one quality in common).  Finally, you had the intuition that index
and icon correspond to distinctions in the classes according to the
relations (seen as "tails") that the object and the sign have.
Best regards,
Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 19:56, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Jack, list
>
>
> Good heavens - A cutting board example!
>
>
> 1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's hard
> to, on a computer, show this.
>
>
> 2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the three
> lines of the Y.
>
>
> Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site, for
> THREE Relations.
>
>
> 3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data. Think of a
> Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and another node.
>
>
> 4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three
> spokes/Relationsthat's the GROUND, that big Dot. [even though I can't
> show it on this computer].
>
>
> Notice - there are THREE lines/Relations coming out of that Centre 'dot'.
> You cannot reduce these three; otherwise, it's not a semiosic sign.
>
>
> 5] The first Relation we'll consider is the vertical one. That's the
> Representamen in itself. That's a mediating relation; it only functions
> within the triad. It will be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. Its function is to
> receive the input data, 'mediate it' according to its stored laws,
> transform it'...and pass it on to the Interpretant Relation.
>
>
> 6] The next Relation is that between the Representamen and the Dynamic
> Object.  That brings in the input data to that Representamen. Also could be
> in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.  [icon, index, symbol]
>
>
> 7] the next Relation is that between the Representamen and the
> Interpretant node. That relation is the result of the Representamen's
> mediative actions on the input data. Also could be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns,
> 3ns.
>
>
> Hope this helps a bit.
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 1:05 PM , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie
> sent:
>
> Marty, Edwina, List,
>
> Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have to do with
> the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which resembles an
> index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of the
> intersection (which I know would logically be contained within each line,
> but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts which corresponds to
> icon?
>
> I have never really been able to make much headway with the graphs... Also
> really good to see some discussions in past couple of days.
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
> --
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of robert marty
> Sent: Thursday, October 7, 2021 4:00 PM
> To: tabor...@primus.ca
> Cc: Peirce-L ; mahe3...@gmail.com
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
>
> *Warning*
>
> This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System.
> Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the
> sender and know the content is safe.
> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[robert marty]

It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"!
Excuse me ...
RM
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic
> idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On
> Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on
> Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced
> the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I
> saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
> recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
> conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see
> two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of
> them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man.
> But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, [emphasize mine]
>
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
> while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
> or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
> build graphs with every higher number of tails.
> [image: image.png]
>
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
> or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
> be found in the phenomenon "
>
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
>
>
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a
> écrit :
>
>> Margaretha
>>
>> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
>> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
>> but in a Y shape.
>>
>> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
>> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is
>> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and
>> enable networking with other triads.
>>
>> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
>> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>>
>> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
>> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
>> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
>> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
>> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>>
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
>> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
>> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
>> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
>> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
>> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
>> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
>> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> List,
>>
>> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
>> co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[robert marty]

Margaretha, Edwina, List

Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...

  "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
-- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may think
that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But
analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see
a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may
say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday,
and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of
triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two
premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I
cannot by any such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw
before. I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same,
but as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of
manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which
denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize
mine]

 C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
build graphs with every higher number of tails.
[image: image.png]

  And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
be found in the phenomenon "

Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Margaretha
>
> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
> but in a Y shape.
>
> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant
> do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but
> within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable
> networking with other triads.
>
> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>
> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must
> be others.
>
> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
> in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
> answers to epistemological problems in management research.
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List
This response is another example of what I mean by "characteristic"
inability to produce a contrary argument. The corollary is a flight into
childish denials: no, no, no ... with always Nathan Houser used as an
authority figure of rescue, although I have shown that there is :
- misappropriation by the omission of the spirit of the whole text, The
forms of experience,
- misappropriation of the meaning of the word "juncture."
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 5 oct. 2021 à 22:42, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> This response is another example of what I mean by a characteristic
> adversarial stance that is unwarranted. No one is advocating
> "discriminatory attitudes ... towards mathematics." No one considers
> mathematics to be "evil" within the context of phaneroscopy. There is no
> "movement that opposes this essential collaboration between mathematics and
> positive sciences." No one is undertaking an "offensive against
> mathematics." No one is disputing Houser's quoted conclusion. No one is
> claiming that there is a "rupture" or "separation" between mathematics and
> experience. No one is engaged in a "rearguard battle." Please stop erecting
> these strawmen.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 2:53 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>> JAS's usual and unsurprising response is an authoritative judgment not
>> supported by any argument, illustrated by selected quotes interpreted in
>> specific ways. Once again, he has not read the text he is supposed to
>> criticize (this will appear later). One can add to that impute motives
>> without any justification. For my part, I will again carefully argue for
>> the benefit of those readers who will have the patience to follow my
>> detailed answer.
>>
>> 1- the first paragraph, whose first words reflect certain self-importance
>> ("I have refrained"), is of no interest since it contains only denials
>> without any argument refuting my allegations concerning the discriminatory
>> attitudes, underlined and sourced, towards mathematics in Belluci's text.
>>
>> 2 – the following paragraph, which begins with "*Instead, like Peirce*,"
>> is an outright annexation of Peirce in what  JAS  wants to make appear
>> "simply" as the camp of Orthodoxy. In this camp are those who know how to
>> distinguish, like Peirce, "phaneroscopy from mathematics "without 
>> "*disconnecting
>> or separating*" them.   It is a rhetorical figure of insinuation
>> introduced by "*Instead*" by which I am sent back to a camp of the "bad
>> guys," thus created in a performative way. This is the camp of those who
>> would voluntarily confuse these two levels. We guess that the whole sequel
>> will exploit this phantasmatic dichotomy of the Peircean community. But I
>> do not feel concerned because I place myself, *with Peirce, *in the camp
>> of those *"who* *distinguish*," except that I certainly have another
>> idea, always "*with Peirce*," of the connections between mathematics and
>> phaneroscopy.
>>
>> The following sentence goes even further with rhetoric (of the kind that
>> the semiologist Roland Barthes had detected [1]
>> <#m_-1940227308786793678_m_8517954477817507515_m_3816163190580610126__ftn1>)
>>   which consists in first admitting a little evil in its camp (*Phaneroscopy
>> depends on mathematics for principles*) to justify saying a lot of evil
>> about the other camp which would like *to control and even reduce*
>> phaneroscopy to mathematics. This is a way to impute these bad intentions
>> to me without providing any proof. If he had read me, JAS would have known
>> that I have always proposed a collaboration in a mathematical framework
>> consubstantial with the three Categories and their necessary relations of
>> interdependence. No more, no less. This proves once again that JAS did not
>> read my critique since I conclude at the end of 2.1:
>>
>> "Moreover, Houser's last note 44, devoted to a comparison with Husserl's
>> phenomenology, with which I am in total agreement, leads to a scientific
>> practice that is the exact opposite of that advocat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[robert marty]

gy". *(p.21) [emphasize mine]



It is exciting because we can now clarify the postures thanks to the
meaning of the word "juncture." For JAS, this "juncture" obviously marks a
border, the line of separation. For him, one would only deduce on the side
of mathematics; on his side, one only retains principles. Except that we
place them in a decorative showcase since we do nothing with them in
practice. This is a skillful way for someone who has collected 61 versions
of the maxims of pragmatism[2] <#_ftn2>. He knows perfectly well that he
thus deprives these "principles" of any meaning.



And yet Nathan Houser, whom I quote again (p.9), writes a little above:



*"In mathematics, the categories are found to be universal categories of
relational structures. In phenomenology, the categories are found to be
universal categories of experience. The conclusion we can draw is that
experience instantiates a mathematical structure and is, therefore, subject
to mathematical analysis." *(p.21) [emphasize mine]



And if I am to believe the Merriam-Webster, that is how Nathan Houser
conceives this juncture:

*Definition of **juncture*

*1**: *a point of time
at this
*juncture **especially**: *one made critical by a concurrence of
circumstances

*2a**: *JOINT <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/joint>, CONNECTION
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/connection>

*b**: *the manner of transition or mode of relationship between two
consecutive sounds in speech

*3**: *an instance of joining: JUNCTION
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/junction>

*Definition of **junction*

*1**: **an act of joining**: **the state of being joined *[emphasize mine]

No idea of rupture nor separation in these lines... But perhaps I will be
reproached for not being a "native"? Will JAS be reproached for his
omissions when he quotes Nathan Houser?



From now on, for me, all has been said, and I trust the sagacity of the
readers to draw conclusions about the rearguard battle that JAS and his
supporters are engaged in; in my opinion, it does the most significant
damage to the Peircian cause. On this point, I have also quoted the firm
position of *Cornelis de Waal*.



But, finally, I must quote the admirable Carolyn Eisele, who succeeded with
the edition of the New Elements of Mathematics, to give Peirce a much more
accurate image than the one conveyed by JAS and his supporters; this is
what is at stake in this debate:



*"Peirce hoped to create an exact philosophy by applying the ideas of
modern mathematical exactitude. He developed a semiotic pattern of
mathematical procedure with which to test validity in all areas of
investigation[3] <#_ftn3>." *




[1] <#_ftnref1> Roland Barthes
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Barthes>,   Mythologies
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mythologies_(book)>, 1957, Seuil : Paris.



[2] <#_ftnref2> (1) Peirce's Maxim of Pragmatism: 61 Formulations
(researchgate.net)
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351211192_Peirce%27s_Maxim_of_Pragmatism_61_Formulations>

[3] <#_ftnref3> Carolyn Eisele, Mathematical Methodology in the thought of
Charles S. Peirce, Historia Mathematica 9 (1982), 333-341, summary*.*


Regards,


Robert Marty


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 2 oct. 2021 à 03:26, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> I have refrained from commenting on this up until now because it is indeed
> mostly unobjectionable, and my remarks on it would largely repeat what I
> have already said on-List. Unfortunately, it reflects a characteristic
> adversarial stance that is unwarranted since no one here (including
> Bellucci) is "in favor of an extreme minimization of mathematics or even
> its exclusion," nor are we seeking to "maintain a mistrust towards
> mathematics and mathematicians."
>
> Instead, like Peirce, we are simply *distinguishing *phaneroscopy from
> mathematics, which does not entail *disconnecting *or *separating 
> *phaneroscopy
> from mathematics. Phaneroscopy *depends on* mathematics for principles,
> but it is not *controlled by* nor *reducible to* mathematics. In
> particular, an absolutely essential difference between them is that
> phaneroscopy is a *positive *science, while mathematics is a strictly 
> *hypothetical
> *science. This is perfectly consistent with Nathan Houser's conclusion
> that is favorably quoted (twice) and which no one is disputing.
>
> NH: These categories, though abstractable (prescindable) from experience,
> are mathematical conceptions. Thus, firstness, secondness, and thirdness
> constitute an important link between the a priori world of mathematics and
> t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[robert marty]

List,

Here is the public version on Academia.edu with some modifications.
(DOC) Critical analysis of a Francesco Belluci's paper. | robert marty -
Academia.edu
<https://www.academia.edu/54543542/Critical_analysis_of_a_Francesco_Bellucis_paper>

 also available on ResearchGate :
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354987042_Critical_analysis_of_a_Francesco_Belluci's_paper


*Abstract :*

The circumstances of the production of this critique show how important it
is for a community to have venues for debate that bring together
participants who play the game openly and fairly. That this is not
sometimes the case should not be an obstacle. After specifying the precise
circumstances that motivated my criticism, I developed it as objectively as
possible, arguing as clearly as I could, scrupulously citing all my
sources. I then drew some conclusions from it, thanks to which it finds, it
seems to me, its whole meaning.

__

Regards,

Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 28 sept. 2021 à 10:44, robert marty  a
écrit :

> List,
>
> I posted this review of Francesco Belluci's article that was opposed to me
> eight days ago. The same day, I informed the author. He confirmed receipt.
> However, I did not get any answer on a list characterized by particularly
> vigilant participants quick to react to the slightest deviation. I reject
> the idea that they have concerted to ignore my remarks because this would
> be an unworthy attitude on the part of researchers, peirceans moreover.  It
> would therefore be a rare case on this list of *approval by default*.
> Besides, I remembered a French saying: "Qui ne dit mot consent" (Who
> doesn't say a word, consents). I am therefore entitled to consider today
> that my criticism is fully recognized as fair and well-founded. This
> encourages me to publish it more widely and extend this kind of analysis of
> the relationship to mathematics to other eminent researchers in the
> Peircean community.
>
> Many thanks and best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
>
>
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
>
>
> Le lun. 20 sept. 2021 à 12:36, robert marty  a
> écrit :
>
>> List, I remind the thread opened by  Phillys Chiasson, entitled "Another
>> perspective."
>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00036.html> In
>> this thread, Gary Richmond wrote
>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00038.htm> :
>>
>> *"I had a similar experience teaching undergraduate students in critical
>> thinking courses. I found that it doesn't take formal logic -- although a
>> bit of commonsensism seems requisite -- and soon the simple, ordinary,
>> naive observation of the phaneron (or whatever one cares to call it)
>> reveals that qualities, interactions, and thought-signs are all that there
>> is. One doesn't require the reduction thesis, or valency theory, or
>> mathematical logic, or graph theory to see the trichotomic structure of the
>> world." [emphasize mine]*
>>
>> John Sowa  answers him
>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00042.html>:
>>
>> Have you ever seen a diagram and understood its implications?   Have you
>> ever drawn a diagram to illustrate some point in your lectures?  If you did
>> either of these two activities, you were using and understanding a subset
>> of graph theory.  *But* *if you want to get beyond an eighth-grade
>> education, doing a bit of studying helps a lot. *[emphasize mine]
>>
>>
>>
>> *I fully agree with this opinion. (RM) *
>>
>> Following  Gary f  intervene signaling  another perspective
>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00043.html> :
>>
>>
>>
>> *"For another perspective on the roles of mathematics and logic in
>> phaneroscopic analysis, see Francesco Bellucci's 2015 paper at*:
>> https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis
>> <https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis>"
>>
>> Gary Richmond immediately declared his enthusiasm for this text and quoted
>> several extracts
>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00046.html>.
>>
>> *"Thank you for posting this excellent short paper by Bellucci, without
>> doubt the best compact analysis I've read o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[robert marty]

List,

I posted this review of Francesco Belluci's article that was opposed to me
eight days ago. The same day, I informed the author. He confirmed receipt.
However, I did not get any answer on a list characterized by particularly
vigilant participants quick to react to the slightest deviation. I reject
the idea that they have concerted to ignore my remarks because this would
be an unworthy attitude on the part of researchers, peirceans moreover.  It
would therefore be a rare case on this list of *approval by default*.
Besides, I remembered a French saying: "Qui ne dit mot consent" (Who
doesn't say a word, consents). I am therefore entitled to consider today
that my criticism is fully recognized as fair and well-founded. This
encourages me to publish it more widely and extend this kind of analysis of
the relationship to mathematics to other eminent researchers in the
Peircean community.

Many thanks and best regards,

Robert Marty


Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 20 sept. 2021 à 12:36, robert marty  a
écrit :

> List, I remind the thread opened by  Phillys Chiasson, entitled "Another
> perspective."
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00036.html> In this
> thread, Gary Richmond wrote
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00038.htm> :
>
> *"I had a similar experience teaching undergraduate students in critical
> thinking courses. I found that it doesn't take formal logic -- although a
> bit of commonsensism seems requisite -- and soon the simple, ordinary,
> naive observation of the phaneron (or whatever one cares to call it)
> reveals that qualities, interactions, and thought-signs are all that there
> is. One doesn't require the reduction thesis, or valency theory, or
> mathematical logic, or graph theory to see the trichotomic structure of the
> world." [emphasize mine]*
>
> John Sowa  answers him
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00042.html>:
>
> Have you ever seen a diagram and understood its implications?   Have you
> ever drawn a diagram to illustrate some point in your lectures?  If you did
> either of these two activities, you were using and understanding a subset
> of graph theory.  *But* *if you want to get beyond an eighth-grade
> education, doing a bit of studying helps a lot. *[emphasize mine]
>
>
>
> *I fully agree with this opinion. (RM) *
>
> Following  Gary f  intervene signaling  another perspective
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00043.html> :
>
>
>
> *"For another perspective on the roles of mathematics and logic in
> phaneroscopic analysis, see Francesco Bellucci's 2015 paper at*:
> https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis
> <https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis>"
>
> Gary Richmond immediately declared his enthusiasm for this text and quoted
> several extracts
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00046.html>.
>
> *"Thank you for posting this excellent short paper by Bellucci, without
> doubt the best compact analysis I've read of "the roles of mathematics and
> logic in phaneroscopic analysis."*
>
> I replied to GR that I did not share his enthusiasm for this text. But it
> was an opinion. A real debate requires argumentation. So I took the time to
> make a critical analysis of Belluci's paper (attached file). It is part of
> a set of studies that I am making of the main texts available in the
> literature about the bases of phaneroscopy and the practices associated
> with them in the framework of the Sciences of Discovery.
>
> Although the text is short, I had to spend a lot of time on it. But it
> also allowed me to show that there has been a strong movement in the
> Peircean community for quite a long time in favor of an extreme
> minimization of mathematics or even its exclusion. It is explicitly
> admitted above by Gary Richmond.
>
> In addition, I could situate my mathematical modeling of Phaneroscopy and
> semiotics. Finally, two camps are emerging, as defined by the ethnologist
> Claude Lévy-Strauss, after his successful collaboration with the great
> mathematician André Weil: the "bricoleurs" and the "engineers." This
> collaboration is refused for reasons that belong to the sociology of
> research. They deserve a separate study.
>
> Best  regards,
>
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
>

[PEIRCE-L] Critical analysis of Belluci's paper

[robert marty]

List, I remind the thread opened by  Phillys Chiasson, entitled "Another
perspective."
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00036.html> In this
thread, Gary Richmond wrote
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00038.htm> :

*"I had a similar experience teaching undergraduate students in critical
thinking courses. I found that it doesn't take formal logic -- although a
bit of commonsensism seems requisite -- and soon the simple, ordinary,
naive observation of the phaneron (or whatever one cares to call it)
reveals that qualities, interactions, and thought-signs are all that there
is. One doesn't require the reduction thesis, or valency theory, or
mathematical logic, or graph theory to see the trichotomic structure of the
world." [emphasize mine]*

John Sowa  answers him
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00042.html>:

Have you ever seen a diagram and understood its implications?   Have you
ever drawn a diagram to illustrate some point in your lectures?  If you did
either of these two activities, you were using and understanding a subset
of graph theory.  *But* *if you want to get beyond an eighth-grade
education, doing a bit of studying helps a lot. *[emphasize mine]



*I fully agree with this opinion. (RM) *

Following  Gary f  intervene signaling  another perspective
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00043.html> :



*"For another perspective on the roles of mathematics and logic in
phaneroscopic analysis, see Francesco Bellucci's 2015 paper at*:
https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis
<https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis>"

Gary Richmond immediately declared his enthusiasm for this text and quoted
several extracts
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00046.html>.

*"Thank you for posting this excellent short paper by Bellucci, without
doubt the best compact analysis I've read of "the roles of mathematics and
logic in phaneroscopic analysis."*

I replied to GR that I did not share his enthusiasm for this text. But it
was an opinion. A real debate requires argumentation. So I took the time to
make a critical analysis of Belluci's paper (attached file). It is part of
a set of studies that I am making of the main texts available in the
literature about the bases of phaneroscopy and the practices associated
with them in the framework of the Sciences of Discovery.

Although the text is short, I had to spend a lot of time on it. But it also
allowed me to show that there has been a strong movement in the Peircean
community for quite a long time in favor of an extreme minimization of
mathematics or even its exclusion. It is explicitly admitted above by Gary
Richmond.

In addition, I could situate my mathematical modeling of Phaneroscopy and
semiotics. Finally, two camps are emerging, as defined by the ethnologist
Claude Lévy-Strauss, after his successful collaboration with the great
mathematician André Weil: the "bricoleurs" and the "engineers." This
collaboration is refused for reasons that belong to the sociology of
research. They deserve a separate study.

Best  regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*


Critical analysis of Belluci's paper.docx
Description: MS-Word 2007 document
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Classification of Sciences and Scientific Research, was Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

"No one" ... I don't know since it was not Gary R. who spoke; but anyway,
from now on, there will be at least one, because I am ready to adopt it ...
and maybe we should ask ADT what he thinks ...

 Regards,
Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 31 août 2021 à 15:01, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> No one is suggesting that *phaneroscopy *falls within the sciences of
> review, Gary R. is simply noting that *Peirce's classification of the
> sciences* is a work of the sciences of review. Within that classification
> in its mature form, phaneroscopy is the first positive science, situated
> between mathematics and the normative sciences.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 4:06 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List
>>
>>
>>
>> Your opinion that De Tienne :
>>
>>
>>
>> *"**emphasizes in that aspect of his presentation having the purpose of
>> positioning phaneroscopy within Peirce's Classification of Sciences, a
>> work, btw, of Science of Review, concerned with
>> sciences qua scientific disciplines as distinct from how the knowledge of
>> each of these will be employed in the actual work of any given scientist or
>> group of sciences*.*"*
>>
>>
>>
>> seems to me very appropriate; indeed, it completely changes the nature of
>> the debate by discarding the conflict because:
>>
>>
>>
>> *"By "science of review" is meant the business of those who occupy
>> themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests,
>> and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science*."(CP 1.182, AN
>> OUTLINE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES)
>>
>>
>> By placing the activity of the phaneroscopists in this branch of the
>> Classification of Sciences, it not depends directly on the Sciences of
>> Discovery and one understands better than the insistence of De Tiennne to
>> distance himself from Mathematics. For the "phaneroscopists" would draw
>> "the results of discovery,"* without having the responsibility of their
>> elaboration* and would import them among the Sciences of Review, in
>> which they would assume a necessary work "beginning with digests, and going
>> on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science". A critical work quite
>> indispensable.
>>
>> For Peirce, classifications are general, that nobody is enclosed in a
>> branch and that each can deploy his activity by passing from one to another
>> if he has the desire and the competence.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
>> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Classification of Sciences and Scientific Research

[robert marty]

Without forgetting that they classify their observations "with the purpose
of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied, " ( [C.S.
Peirce, 1976: NEM, vol III.2 1122], MS 1345) otherwise there would be only
empirical sciences, and we would still be at the physics of Aristotle and
the chemistry of phlogiston.
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mar. 31 août 2021 à 17:47, Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> Thank you for this. Peirce said that the task of the phenomenologist is to
> observe and to classify observations. This is a good example of that.
>
> On Tue, Aug 31, 2021, 8:30 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> Continuing with our Phenomenological∫Phaneroscopic survey of
>> colleges and their course catalogues, let's take up the sample
>> Gary R. supplied and see how Phenomenology is manifested there.
>>
>> Searching the Azusa Pacific University site on “Phenomenology” I get
>> exactly one hit:
>>
>> • https://www.apu.edu/articles/search/?q=Phenomenology=#results
>>
>> Result 1
>>
>> On Living and Aging: The Voices of the Oldest Old
>>
>> Over the course of their very long lives, these oldest-old people
>> developed vibrant habits of the heart and mind that inspired them
>> to focus on the good and live with gratitude.
>>
>> •
>> https://www.apu.edu/articles/on-living-and-aging-the-voices-of-the-oldest-old/
>>
>> The haul this time is one superb article.  It exemplifies one of the
>> most important and interesting styles of phenomenology as I knew it
>> in the real world of qualitative observational research studies.
>> It would do a few of the members of this List a world of good
>> to come down from their Phaneroscopic Towers and study what
>> real researchers in real sciences do on their day jobs.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> 
>> >
>> > On Living and Aging: The Voices of the Oldest Old by Julie Pusztai
>> >
>> > Hardly a day passed when I did not talk to someone growing old or
>> someone with an aging parent, spouse, family
>> > member, or friend. This includes my own father, a member of that
>> growing population age 85 and older—the oldest old.
>> > I wondered how they lived with all the changes and was eager to
>> understand. Phenomenology, my doctoral research
>> > approach, provided a way to listen to them—to examine this most
>> ordinary, yet extraordinary, experience of growing
>> > very, very old with its losses and gains, sadness and happiness,
>> satisfaction and disappointment, and sense of
>> > meaning and purpose.
>> >
>> > Phenomenology investigates the actual lived experience of a phenomenon
>> by describing and interpreting narrative data.
>> > Thirteen people from 87 to 100 years old who represented diverse
>> backgrounds, ethnicities, and genders participated
>> > in my study. They shared their stories with me during three separate
>> interviews that focused on their life history,
>> > typical day, and experiences of aging. Each approached these late years
>> influenced by the unique context of their
>> > past, present, and envisioned future. All had their own tale to tell,
>> and all shared with honesty.
>> >
>> > Most people recognize the physical changes that occur as a result of
>> living a very long life. When the body reaches
>> > oldest-old age, it speaks loudly. Caregivers must listen attentively to
>> gauge the impact this has on the individual’s
>> > life and the person’s resulting daily challenges. Practical matters
>> need attention and falls must be prevented.
>> > Slowness and fatigue persist, and living with pain may become the new
>> normal. Losses of vision, hearing, and memory,
>> > even the ability to walk without assistance, usually lead to
>> surrendering drivers’ licenses and the dreaded decrease
>> > of independence and increase of dependence. While all of these
>> limitations produced significant, personal meaning, it
>> > was through listening and relistening to the narratives of these 13
>> people that I began discerning the hard work and
>> > intentionality used to prevent these challenges and changes from
>> determining their attitudes. They walk on a
>> > tightrope, gripping their balance pole to remain hopeful and positive.
>> >
>> > One factor that helps them maintain that balance is staying connected,
>> largely through family. The narrators
>> > explained that they gained great satisfaction from strengthening family
>> ties, discovering the trustworthiness of
>> > children, and feeling celebrated and important to others. And while
>> most identified aspects of a satisfying life,
>> > some could not. A few respondents stated: “I can’t think of anything
>> positive.” Such bleakness and discouragement
>> > signal a red flag to caregivers and loved ones to respond with support
>> and encouragement.
>> >
>> > Those who exhibited prevailing positivity, however, revealed a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Classification of Sciences and Scientific Research, was Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[robert marty]

Gary R., List



Your opinion that De Tienne :



*"**emphasizes in that aspect of his presentation having the purpose of
positioning phaneroscopy within Peirce's Classification of Sciences, a
work, btw, of Science of Review, concerned with
sciences qua scientific disciplines as distinct from how the knowledge of
each of these will be employed in the actual work of any given scientist or
group of sciences*.*"*



seems to me very appropriate; indeed, it completely changes the nature of
the debate by discarding the conflict because:



*"By "science of review" is meant the business of those who occupy
themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests,
and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science*."(CP 1.182, AN
OUTLINE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES)


By placing the activity of the phaneroscopists in this branch of the
Classification of Sciences, it not depends directly on the Sciences of
Discovery and one understands better than the insistence of De Tiennne to
distance himself from Mathematics. For the "phaneroscopists" would draw
"the results of discovery,"* without having the responsibility of their
elaboration* and would import them among the Sciences of Review, in which
they would assume a necessary work "beginning with digests, and going on to
endeavor to form a philosophy of science". A critical work quite
indispensable.

For Peirce, classifications are general, that nobody is enclosed in a
branch and that each can deploy his activity by passing from one to another
if he has the desire and the competence.



Sincerely,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 31 août 2021 à 04:49, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> John, Jon, Gary F, Edwina, List,
>
> I don't believe that it is in any way controversial that not only Peirce,
> but virtually every serious scholar makes a distinction between theory and
> practice and, likewise, between pure and applied mathematics.
>
> Here I'd like to comment on the later distinction (i.e., between pure and
> applied mathematics); but rather than offering abstract definitions of
> these, to emphasize the legitimate interest of many folk on this list in
> the importance of real world applications of mathematics and science,
> I'll instead quote from a college website commenting on how pure and
> applied mathematics are distinguished in their undergraduate degree
> programs. These simple summaries are meant to help students decide which
> major (pure or applied mathematics) to enroll in.
>
> Edwin Ding, PhD, an associate professor in the Department of Mathematics,
> Physics, and Statistics at APU, noted that the mathematics major focuses on
> pure mathematics. He explained that pure mathematics deals with the
> theoretical side of math and has a greater concentration on proofs,
> theorems, and abstract concepts.
>
> “The applied math major, on the other hand, focuses more on applying
> analytical/computational math techniques to solve real-world problems in
> different fields,” said Ding. These fields can include actuarial science,
> biology, physics, computer science, and statistics. According to Ding,
> “Both majors start with the foundational courses, such as calculus sequence
> and ordinary differential equations, and go into different specializations
> later on.”
> https://www.apu.edu/articles/the-difference-between-mathematics-degrees-applied-math-vs-pure-math/
>
>
> What it seems to me that De Tienne emphasizes in that aspect of his
> presentation having the purpose of positioning pharneroscopy within
> Peirce's *Classification of Sciences*, a work, btw, of *Science of Review*,
> concerned with sciences *qua* scientific *disciplines *as distinct from
> how the knowledge of each of these will be employed in the actual work of
> any given scientist or group of sciences.
>
> So, if one wants to prepare for work in, for example, biology, a student
> would most likely want to have and, indeed, need to have some training in
> several sciences in addition to biology, for example, in mathematics,
> logic, chemistry, etc. But her more advanced training would *emphasize* the
> distinctive research characters (methodology) of the science of biology, a
> science which she may have a burning interest in which may eventually lead
> to her making important discoveries in it.
>
> As I see it, Peirce's *Classification of Sciences* is principally
> devised  to point to the specific *subject matter* of individual sciences
> as they have already been developed, but equally importantly, may be
> developed, and will be researched by generations of future scientists with
> special interests i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[robert marty]

John, List

Thank you for these enriching additions, which show the crucial importance
of diagrams in the discovery sciences. In this respect, I wonder about the
status of diagrams as practiced in Category Theory, well known for its
practice of "diagram chasing," which also diagrammatizes the mental
activity itself.

For example, when we prove a "small lemma of the four," we establish that
when certain hypotheses are gathered in commutative diagrams, a morphism is
a monomorphism.

Let the diagram :


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cc/4_lemma_left.svg/300px-4_lemma_left.svg.png




Hypotheses: it is assumed that
1) that the above diagram is commutative
2) that both lines of the diagram are exact (the image of each morphism is
equal to the kernel of the following morphism)
3) that *m* and *p* are monomorphisms, and that *l* is an epimorphism.

Proof (this is like a game):

Let *c **∈**C* such that *n(c)* = *0; t(n(c)) = 0.*

the square *(C,D,C',D')* is commutative so *t(n(c)) =p(h(c))= 0*

 *p* is a monomorphism so *h(c) = 0* (because the kernel of *p *is {0})

The above suite is exact, so there exists an element *b **∈**B* such that *g(b)
= c*.

 The square (*B,C,B',C')* is commutative so *s(m(b)) = n(g(b)) = n(c) = 0*.
(because the image of B by *g* is equal to the kernel of *h*)

The lower suite is exact, so there exists an element *a' **∈** A'* such
that *r(a') = m(b*) (because the image of *A'* by r is equal to the kernel
of *s*).

Since *l *is an epimorphism, there exists *a* such that *l(a) = a'.*

The square *(A,B,A',B'*) is commutative so *m(f(a)) = r(l(a) = m(b).*

Since *m* is a monomorphism, *f(a) = b,* then *g(f(a) = g(b) = c.*

but trivially *g(f(a))= 0* so *c = 0*.

It follows that n is an epimorphism (since the kernel of* n* is {0}) *QED*


The semiotic interest of this "*diagram chasing*" is that we can follow it
step by step in the animated gif below in which *b1* and *b2 *distinguish
two instances of *b* :

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Four_lemma_monic_case.gif/500px-Four_lemma_monic_case.gif

We can see that we start with any element *c *and that at the end of the
sequence of successive movements permitted, it becomes "0".  It is thus an
iconic diagram in which the movement of thought is expressed, using the
hypotheses. These diagrams of the homological algebra made up only of
points and arrows indexicalized by letters are of a particular kind. What
semiotic status can we give them?

The use of diagrams do not stop here, and their semiotic interest does not
cease. For more information, see Diagram (category theory) - Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diagram_(category_theory)>.

Best regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 04:42, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert M, Gary F, Gary R, Jon AS, List,
>
> I changed the subject line to emphasize the role of diagrams in Peirce's
> thought in general and in phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular.  I
> cited some of these quotations in previous notes, and I copied others
> from a note by Robert.  All of them are relevant to recent discussions
> with Gary, Gary, and Jon.
>
> At the end of this note, I include seven quotations by Peirce, and two
> by Cornelis de Waal.  The following nine points summarize the issues
> that Peirce or de Waal make in those quotations.
>
> 1. In the first quotation, Peirce explains why "phaneroscopic research
> requires a previous study of mathematics."
>
> 2. "The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
> severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
> mathematical use."
>
> 3. A diagram is an "icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the
> subject of discourse."
>
> 4. "we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed
> to observe it...  We not only have to select the features of the diagram
> which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but it is also of great
> importance to return again and again to certain features."
>
> 5. A diagram may be "a concrete, but possibly changing, mental image of
> such a thing as it represents."
>
> 6. "We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
> iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible."
>
> 7. "Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."
>
> 8. According to de Waal, Peirce argues that it is the mathematician who
> is best equipped to translate the more loosely constructed theories
> about groups of positive facts generated by empirical research into
> tight mathematical models.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

List,


 JAS > . "As for CP 3.559, there is no"magic trick" involved in simply
recognizing that its last sentence is a *summary *of the entire paragraph."



Here is that last sentence. This is indeed a summary of CP 3.559. But you,
JAS, *summarize this summary* to the only part I underlined in bold:



*"**Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does* *without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not **(1**);*
 *and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that
hypothesis."*


This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
scientific ethics.

After the hodgepodge of quotes created in a few minutes that would require
a whole book to answer,

After the "improved" quote from EDT kindly qualified as a humoristic touch
by Gary Richmond,

After this "reconstructed" quote to cover up an operation to revise the
foundations of Peirce's thought,

All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
denounced after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,

I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S. Peirce
to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
intervening.

However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste another
minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...

Following serenely ...


Regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 19:52, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> I am glad that we agree on the interpretation of CP 5.589. As for CP
> 3.559, there is no "magic trick" involved in simply recognizing that its
> last sentence is a *summary *of the entire paragraph. That is why it
> begins with "Thus, ..." Moreover, I was not laying out the *chronological
> *sequence of events, which is actually (2) (3) (1) (4). This is evident
> if we replace (1) with the following sentences, which say basically the
> same thing and come between (3) and (4) in the original text.
>
> CSP: Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty
> to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He
> does not in the least care whether they are correct or not.
>
>
> Instead, I first quoted the summary (1) since it succinctly makes the
> point that I was primarily emphasizing, and then the other relevant phrases
> in order (2) (3) (4).
>
> I also did not claim or imply that the phaneroscopist is "now an
> engineer." Peirce *begins *the paragraph by stating, "A simple way of
> arriving at a true conception of the mathematician's business is to
> consider what service it is which he is called in to render in the course
> of *any scientific or other inquiry*" (emphasis added). He gives as
> examples not only an engineer, but also "a business company (say, an
> insurance company), or a buyer (say, of land), or a physicist." I see no
> reason why it would somehow be illegitimate to add a phaneroscopist to this
> list.
>
> For the record, I have no issue with the actual quote from de Waal, just
> how it was misrepresented as applied to the current List discussion. In
> fact, I have previously cited Daniel Campos likewise discussing Peirce's
> identification of imagination, concentration, and generalization as the
> intellectual abilities required for mathematical reasoning, and thus for
> the proper practice of phaneroscopy as well as pure mathematics (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-07/msg00052.html). Please
> stop repeatedly alleging hostility to mathematics and mathematicians where
> it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 11:50 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>> *A MAGIC TRICK*
>>
>>
>>
>> *How to make a pseudo-quote from a quote to create a desired meaning*
>>
>>
>>
>> It is straightforward: you choose in the last sentence a piece that suits
>> you (1), then you go back to the beginning of the text by selecting another
>> piece (2), which you link with two others (3) and (4) in the logic of the
>> text. You obtain the following demonstration (which you attribute to
>> Peirc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

gt; This is a straw man, since no one is advocating what is described here as
> an "impossibility." I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged the role
> of mathematicians in *formulating *the pure hypotheses ("skeleton-sets")
> from which they subsequently draw necessary conclusions in accordance with
> the concluding sentence of CP 3.559 (1898). Nevertheless, as Peirce himself
> goes on to observe, they do this "without inquiring or caring whether it
> [the pure hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not." It is the
> phaneroscopist who "finds it suits his purpose to ascertain what the
> necessary consequences of possible facts would be," and thus "calls upon a
> mathematician and states the question"; and it is the phaneroscopist who
> inductively evaluates whether the mathematician's deductive conclusions
> from the resulting "simpler but quite fictitious problem" are consistent
> with observed facts.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 3:24 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>  List,
>>
>> Following ...
>>
>> *B1 *– To state the *logical order* (of the discovery), we must follow
>> Peirce "*I am partially inverting the historical order, in order to
>> state the process in its logical order*"(CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898), as
>> quoted by Jon Alan Schmidt.
>>
>>
>>
>> I recall the *chronological order* observed in part A (
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00177.html) :
>>
>>
>>
>> 1- observation of phanerons by "phaneroscopists" who identify "candidate"
>> forms. Peirce himself has found forms that come from his knowledge of
>> theoretical chemistry: the "valences" of the elements.
>>
>> 2- for each "candidate" form found, search in the mathematical repository
>> or creation of isomorphic mathematical forms.
>>
>> 3-choosing, by the scientific community involved in the discovery, of the
>> "best form."
>>
>> 4-generate, by pure mathematical activity, new mathematical forms to be
>> submitted to a new validation process.
>>
>> What is then the order advocated by Peirce? It is the dependencies stated
>> in his classifications of sciences with respect to mathematics, which
>> generates the process of the Sciences of Discovery described below:
>>
>>  1- Mathematics (the "good" forms found in 3 above)
>>
>>  2- Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima- positive science (which rests upon
>> familiar, general experience): continuation of the "phaneroscopic"
>> activity which may give rise to the emergence of new competing candidates.
>>
>> 3- Phenomenology - Phaneroscopy (1904-) - study of Universal Categories
>> (all present in any phenomenon): Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Work of
>> the phaneroscopists driven by the mathematics of the 1.
>>
>>  *"**Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
>> constituents of all ideas.  Its material is, of course, universal
>> experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as well
>> as of the concrete and real.  Yet to suppose that in such experience the
>> elements were to be found already separate would be to suppose the
>> unimaginable and self-contradictory.  They must be separated by a process
>> of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand.  They must be
>> picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter*, and* 
>> therefore
>> it is that phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of mathematics.*
>> (R602, after 1903 but before 1908")
>>
>> 4 - unchanged
>>
>>
>>
>> *The chronological order 1,2,3,4 is changed to logical order: 3, 2, 1, 4.*
>>
>>
>>
>> *"Phaneroscopists" cannot constitute a category in themselves and that,
>> since they do not study mathematics, they would be better advised to
>> collaborate with mathematicians who have "forms in mind".*
>>
>>
>>
>> In his writings, Peirce presents his research relative to the categories
>> either in chronological order by reporting his observations (CP 1.284,
>> 1.286), or in a logical order by reporting the result of his observations
>> in formal terms, in particular by reasoning by analogy with the notion of
>> valence in chemistry (CP 1.292 ) and more formally with the monad, dyad,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

Dear Jon Alan, List



Until the assertion that I discuss below, your answer is a simple
paraphrase of my text. The discrepancy occurs here:



JAS > *"On the contrary, phaneroscopy is a distinct science in Peirce's
mature classification, so in his view there are phaneroscopists, distinct
from mathematicians and other kinds of inquirers; and as quoted below, he
states explicitly that "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of
mathematics" (R 602; emphasis added). This is not to say that they cannot
or should not "collaborate with mathematicians," just that their purpose is
different--they are studying whatever is or could be present to the mind in
any way, rather than strictly hypothetical states of things".*

*"*

In fact, you recognize the indispensable role of mathematics in the
process, but you try to empower phase 3 artificially below to oppose it to
the whole process in which it is embedded:



RM > "3. Phenomenology - Phaneroscopy (1904-) - study of Universal
Categories (all present in any phenomenon): Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness. *Phaneroscopic work driven by the mathematics of 1*. " [
emphasize mine]"



For that you forget that mathematicians can be, like everyone,
"phaneroscopists." Yet ADT explicitly recognizes this:



EDT > slide 22:


" Shocking news!

*Mathematicians are phaneroscopists, too!*

They must be, somehow.

After all, before they come up with fundamental theorems of all sorts, they
have to conduct a ton of observations based on diagrams and imaginative
constructions. They contemplate ideal forms. They are looking for patterns
and patterns of patterns, which they need to *manifest* one way or another
– but artificially (though not arbitrarily).

Yet, phaneroscopy as such does not and cannot provide mathematics with any
fundamental principle."


RM-Comment > The rhetoric of irony employed by EDT ("Shocking news!") makes
mathematicians into a kind of sect devoted to the contemplation of ideal
forms cut off from a world where they would take pleasure in manipulating
"patterns and patterns of patterns." His obsession is such that in the
following slide (23), he modifies a quotation from Peirce to hammer home
the point that mathematicians are only good for that! Dubbed "sense of
humor" by its supporters, it is the cover for pure and simple
discrimination which tends to make mathematicians the "useful idiots" of a
self-proclaimed science which would be phaneroscopy (for this purpose, the
term "phaneroscopist" is a recent ad hoc creation of its promoters). They
are so stupid that "The world might cease to exist, but for pure
mathematicians, this would be at most an inconvenience." (slide 23). This
is paradoxical revisionism since both you and EDT acknowledge the existence
of a cyclic self-increasing process in which the purely "phaneroscopic
phase is considered necessary. It is practiced by ALL actors in the
production of scientific knowledge, mathematicians included.  Of course,
some of them, Peirce being the first, have this capacity to identify
"skeleton-sets," which turn out to be universal forms "free from any
disguise." Wherever they come from, all researchers are "phaneroscopists";
some of them are also mathematicians. This is an asymmetrical situation
that I will study in part C, "sociological analysis," because you end up
saying that mathematicians would be deprived of the inductive capacity
reserved only for "phaneroscopists":

JAS* > *"*and it is the phaneroscopist who inductively evaluates whether
the mathematician's deductive conclusions from the resulting "simpler but
quite fictitious problem" are consistent with observed facts."*

 RM > This is still humorous anthropology: how will "phaneroscopists" do if
they don't have the means to apprehend these "fictitious problems," these
mathematical objects that will be proposed to them? That is the question!

But you have found a magic trick to answer it, as explained in the
following post

Following ...

Robert Marty...
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 03:28, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> RM: To state the logical order (of the discovery), we must follow Peirce "*I
> am partially inverting the historical order, in order to state the process
> in its logical order*"(CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898), as quoted by Jon Alan
> Schmidt.
>
>
> I agree, but in that passage he is not *specifically *addressing
> phaneroscopy, since at the time (1898) he had not yet even recognized it as
> a distinct science that needed to come between mathematics and logic in his
&

[PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

rticle (
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40321072, 2005) widely *by Cornelis de Wall*,
who says much better than I do the impossibility of relegating mathematics
and mathematicians to a corner where they would devote day and night in
endless deductions, while self-proclaimed "phaneroscopists" would propose
specific informal bricolage without "skeleton-sets" to support them:



"By defining science in terms of the activities of its promoters, Peirce's
division of the sciences largely comes down to a division of labor. This
attitude toward science enables Peirce to argue that it is the
mathematician who is best equipped to translate the more loosely
constructed theories about groups of positive facts generated by empirical
research into tight mathematical models:


*'The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and severed
from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they arc suited to mathematical
use. They have, in short, to be adapted to the powers of mathematics and of
the mathematician. It is only the mathematician who knows what these powers
are; and consequently the framing of the mathematical hypotheses must be
performed by the mathematician*.' (R 17:06!)



Now what constitutes a well-equipped mathematician? The three mental
qualities that in Peirce's view, come into play are imagination,
concentration, and generalization. The first is, as Peirce put it, *"the
power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate configurations*"; the
second is *"**the ability to cake up a problem, bring it to a convenient
shape for study, make out the gist of it, and ascertain without mistake
just what it does and does not involve*"; the third is what allows us "*to
see that what seems at first a snarl of intricate circumstances is but a
fragment of a harmonious and comprehensible whole*" (R 252:20).6 In
particular the power of generalization, which Peirce believes "*chiefly
constitutes a mathematician*" (R 278a:9 l ), is a difficult skill to
attain. Peirce's emphasis on imagination, concentration, and generalization
draws the attention away from the notion that it is the premier business of
mathematics to provide proofs."



In section B2, I will study how some of the most prominent Peircean have
confronted this dependence of phaneroscopy on mathematics and the responses
they have provided.


Best regards,

Robert Marty


Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[robert marty]

Edwina, List
It is very clear ... for Gary F., tribalism is the others!
R M
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 19 août 2021 à 16:06, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Gary F, list
>
> 1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
> as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
> by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is that this
> perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all, we, for the most
> part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are caused by germs. Does
> this mean that the scientists who hold this view do so because the
> Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are members of a tribe'?
>
> 2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
> idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
>  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean quote on the other
> hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being' and points out
> that 'life' includes all three - and they are not operationally separate.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 19/08/21 9:50 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of
> what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe
> opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and
> duelistic) practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s
> capitalization) something about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to
> define “tribalism” differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about
> terminology.) By the way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of
> the root problem with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for
> insisting on what is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading
> of what ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear,
> so I won’t comment on it here.
>
> The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your
> highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other
> tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in
> Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look
> if we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d
> like to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is
> from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the
> third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here:
> https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The question about “possibility”
> arises in the second paragraph of this selection:
>
>
>
> CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which
> affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it
> does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where
> you have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you
> have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not
> of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
> Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and
> such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as
> the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness
> and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get
> the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
> (thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving to
> apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that is what
> Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness. …
>
> A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is
> perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus
> the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That
> wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of
> Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies
> a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being
> of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise,
> “possibility” would have answered the purpose. …
>
> To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of
> mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as
> any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of
> Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from
> applying Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for
> them: primity, secundity, te

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Tribalism (was André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25)

[robert marty]

Gary F.,

I didn't write "a blood sport" but "Semiotics is a fighting sport" (another
quote with a sense of humor ..) and what followed showed that my metaphor
was fully justified. In rugby, when an opponent wants to push you out of
the game by claiming that you are playing badly, and moreover, is approved
by the referee, you rebel and push harder in the opposite direction.

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:39,  a écrit :

> Jon, yes, that’s pretty much the sociological phenomenon I refer to as
> “tribalism.” I might add that in the present case, those who indulge in it
> typically interpret criticism of their expressed *opinions* as criticism
> of *themselves*, and often claim they are defending themselves, their
> personal reputations or their specialties against the kind of attacks that
> they are themselves perpetrating.
>
>
>
> I’m sure you know what I mean because you’ve been the target of many such
> attacks in recent years on the list, while your appeals to reason and
> evidence have been pointedly ignored. If others want to see examples of the
> tribalist “debating” technique, they can look into the archives and read
> almost any recent post by Robert Marty. I mention him specifically because
> he has openly declared his favored style of ‘scholarly’ discourse to be a
> “blood sport” and has acted accordingly, making no attempt to conceal the
> personal basis of his animosities (unlike those who spread their slanders
> offlist). At least he’s honest enough about it that the evidence is there
> on the list for anyone who cares to look.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 17-Aug-21 10:23
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Tribalism (was André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25)
>
>
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>
>
> I cannot speak for Gary F., but my understanding of tribalism as a
> sociological phenomenon is that Person X affirms what Person Y says, not so
> much because X agrees with the content of what Y says, but simply because X
> considers Y to be a member of the same tribe. Likewise, Person X denies
> what Person Z says, not so much because X disagrees with the content of
> what Z says, but simply because X considers Z to be a member of a different
> tribe. In other words, responses are not based primarily on the substance
> of a given post, but on the identity of the person who wrote it.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 8:24 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Gary F, list
>
> It is commendable that you have removed Bernard Morand as a tribal member
> - and are willing to engage with him as an individual  - but this still
> leaves the problem of the existence, as you outline, of others " who have
> demonstrated the tribalistic tendencies ".
>
> That is, your post still asserts the existence of tribes on the list.
>
>  I'd like to know: what are the attributes, according to you, of
> 'tribalistic tendencies'?
>
> Surely you can't be saying that IF X person agrees with Y person, then,
> the two are members of the same tribe.
>
> Or is it, IF X person disagrees with Z person - then, the two are members
> of different tribes?
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[robert marty]

Dear Jon Alan,

When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look away?

"… *Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and,
secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis"* (CP
3.559)

Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous
mathematics of which you say that ADT "*explicitly affirms the dependence
of phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for
certain principles, including formal deductive logic"* [emphasize mine ],
are for him pure artifacts. Indeed, he does not exhibit any of them, and
neither do you. They are empty argumentation factors, "elements of language
without denotation," like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I
have to repeat myself). Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of
ghosts without risking being contradicted to better exclude realities, like
every mathematical object.

Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to recognize
"mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex phanerons if one
does not have them, either in one's mind or if one does not have the
capacity to construct them?
"A*t the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are
insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first
business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame
another simpler but quite fictitious problem (supplemented, perhaps, by
some supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same time
it is sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill,
as a substitute for it*." (CP 3.559, again)

But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?

Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> John, List:
>
> JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics in
> Peirce's philosophy.
>
>
> On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone accusing André of
> hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has completely
> misunderstood his point. He *explicitly affirms* the dependence of
> phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for certain
> principles, including formal deductive logic. Nevertheless, he rightly
> distinguishes *pure *mathematics as the science which draws necessary
> conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of things from *applied 
> *mathematics
> as an integral part of every other science, including phaneroscopy. We
> cannot count on *pure *mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
> experience, because they only formulate and explicate a *pure *hypothesis
> "without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or
> not" (CP 3.559, 1898).
>
> JFS: In the second sentence, the phrase "rest of us", which is intended to
> exclude mathematicians, is extremely insulting to Peirce and the many
> mathematicians quoted in ppe.pdf.
>
>
> There is no reason to take this remark by André so personally. As with his
> hyperbolic statement on slide 23--"The world could stop existing, but to
> pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience"--he is clearly
> referring here only to the idealization of someone who *never *inquires
> or cares about actual facts. Peirce was indeed a mathematician, but he was
> not *only *a mathematician, and he was certainly not a *pure *mathematician
> in this extreme sense.
>
> JFS: Diagrams are the form of mathematics where the mathematicians and the
> people who claim they know nothing about mathematics share common ground.
>
>
> I agree--for Peirce, all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning,
> and all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning, so all necessary
> reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning.
>
> CSP: For mathematical reasoning consists in constructing a diagram
> according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between
> parts of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that
> these relations will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this
> conclusion in general terms. All valid necessary reasoning is in fact thus
> diagrammatic. (CP 1.54, c. 1896)
>
> CSP: All necessary reasoning is strictly speaking mathematical reasoning,
> that is to say, it is performed by observing something equivalent to a
> mathematical d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Robert Marty]

In English :
Where do you get this position of power on this list that allows you to
choose very biased ADT slides, to supposedly put them up for debate, to set
yourself up as a vigilante when participants argue disagreements and to
pass judgement on them? Edwina has long experienced this and I myself have
been called a post-Peircian! Mind you, maybe I should take it as a
compliment! 

Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:54, Robert Marty  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :
>
>> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about
>> the “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong.
>> Indeed you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in
>> your philosophy of language.
>>
>> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
>> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
>> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
>> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
>> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
>> references to their authors.
>>
>> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
>> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
>> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
>> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>>
>> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
>> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
>> less.’
>>
>> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so
>> many different things.’
>>
>> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
>> all.’
>>
>> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
>> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
>> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
>> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
>> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
>> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
>> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>>
>> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
>> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
>> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
>> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
>> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
>> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
>> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
>> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7:
>> Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca)
>> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>). And as you say, any attempt
>> to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant in his reference to a
>> “process of thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked
>> out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to
>> failure.
>>
>> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
>> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
>> than to anyone else’s?
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F. ,
>>
> d'où tenez vous sur cette liste cette position de pouvoir sur qui vous
> permet de choisir des slides de ADT très tendancieux , de les mettre
> soi-disant en débat, de vous ériger en justicier lorsque des participants
> argumentent des désaccords et de porter des jugements sur eux ? Edwina en a
> fait depuis longtemps l'expérience et moi-même je me suis vu traité de post
> peircien ! Remarquez que je dois peut-être le prendre comme un comp
>
>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> *On Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
>> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F., list
>>
>> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>>
>> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
>> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>>
>> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
>> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father.
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Robert Marty]

Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :

> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the
> “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed
> you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your
> philosophy of language.
>
> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
> references to their authors.
>
> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>
> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
> less.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so many
> different things.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
> all.’
>
> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>
> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience
> and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>).
> And as you say, any attempt to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant
> in his reference to a “process of thought” by which the elements of
> experience “must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
> scatter” is doomed to failure.
>
> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
> than to anyone else’s?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> Gary F. ,
>
d'où tenez vous sur cette liste cette position de pouvoir sur qui vous
permet de choisir des slides de ADT très tendancieux , de les mettre
soi-disant en débat, de vous ériger en justicier lorsque des participants
argumentent des désaccords et de porter des jugements sur eux ? Edwina en a
fait depuis longtemps l'expérience et moi-même je me suis vu traité de post
peircien ! Remarquez que je dois peut-être le prendre comme un comp

> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>
>
>
> Gary F., list
>
> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>
> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>
> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father.
> Surely we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas
> on what he called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.
>
> GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the *dynamic
> object* of that sign — *is what it is* independently of anything Peirce
> said about it. Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or
> “synechism”? I find this a very odd way of using technical terms,
> especially those invented by an expert lexicographer like Peirce.
>
> After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,”
> and finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter
> name change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that *type*
> of investigation, an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Robert Marty]

Gary F,
Soyez persuadé que je ne cesserai pas de lut

Le lun. 16 août 2021 à 17:10,  a écrit :

> Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the
> “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed
> you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your
> philosophy of language.
>
> BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any
> language except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in
> formal languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in
> scientific exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the
> usual necessary reference to its inventor as well as definitions and
> references to their authors.
>
> GF: What’s missing from this account is the *denotation* of the word, as
> opposed (by Peirce) to its *signification*. I think this approach to
> language use is very concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of
> dialogue from Lewis Carroll:
>
> ‘When *I* use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
> scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor
> less.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you *can* make words mean so many
> different things.’
>
> ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's
> all.’
>
> GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters
> on this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an
> “arena” (his word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are
> typecast as either allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends
> not on what has been said but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have
> been assigned to. Indeed this pattern seems to be taking over most public
> discourse these days, so the Peirce list is not unusual in this respect.
>
> The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol
> which is *all signification* and *no denotation* is a symbol devoid of
> *information*, as the “logical product” defined by the formula Breadth ×
> Depth = Information (Peirce, W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth)
> of a term is zero, the product (information) is also zero. In other words,
> you can’t get information from a symbol that lacks *indexicality*. Of
> course, as Peirce pointed out, words in themselves (other than proper names
> and pronouns) are quite poor in indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience
> and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob>).
> And as you say, any attempt to convey *experientially* what Peirce meant
> in his reference to a “process of thought” by which the elements of
> experience “must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
> scatter” is doomed to failure.
>
> But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay
> any more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy)
> than to anyone else’s?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
> *Sent:* 16-Aug-21 05:53
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25
>
>
>
> Gary F., list
>
> Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :
>
> Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French,
> but unfortunately I don’t have that ability.
>
> BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching
> to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father.
> Surely we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas
> on what he called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.
>
> GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the *dynamic
> object* of that sign — *is what it is* independently of anything Peirce
> said about it. Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or
> “synechism”? I find this a very odd way of using technical terms,
> especially those invented by an expert lexicographer like Peirce.
>
> After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,”
> and finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter
> name change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that *type*
> of investigation, and it didn’t seem right to call it “phaneroscopy”
> because that would claim its exact *identity* with what Peirce called by
> that name. So I chose a different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the *Century
> Dictionary* definition of it (Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca)
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm>). There is in fact no definition of
> “phaneroscopy” in either

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[robert marty]

Jon, excuse me for "John" ...
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 15 août 2021 à 12:18, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Dear John,
>
> I think that the text "*Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's
> Semiotics (Part A*)" that I just published answers your question. I
> maintain that retaining a definition of the sign that does not incorporate
> the internal determinations of the sign by the object and the interpreter
> by the sign does not allow us to classify signs. But you can still try to
> find a meaning to each of the 6 combinations of S, O, I by not using the
> interdependence of the categories, which translates into the
> phenomenological constraint according to which::* "It is evident that a
> Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a
> Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant.*" (EP2: 481).
> This constraint is the only one that allows us to control the combinatory
> explosion.
> ...
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
>
>
> Le sam. 14 août 2021 à 18:45, Jon Awbrey  a écrit :
>
>> Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 10
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/14/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-10/
>>
>> Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 8
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/13/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-8/
>>
>> Re: Category Theory
>>
>> https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations
>> ::: Morgan Rogers
>>
>> https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations/near/249456735
>>
>>  Please clearly state at least one “distinctive quality of
>> sign relations”. 
>>
>> Dear Morgan,
>>
>> Sign relations are triadic relations.
>>
>> Can any triadic relation be a sign relation?
>>
>> I don’t know.  I have pursued the question myself whether any
>> triadic relation could be used somehow or other in a context
>> of communication, information, inquiry, learning, reasoning,
>> and so on where concepts of signs and their meanings are
>> commonly invoked — there’s the rub — it’s not about what
>> a relation is “intrinsically” or “ontologically” at all
>> but a question of “suitability for a particular purpose”
>> as they say in all the standard disclaimers.
>>
>> What Peirce has done is to propose a definition intended to capture an
>> intuitive, pre-theoretical, traditional concept of signs and their uses.
>> To put it on familiar ground, it’s like Turing’s proposal of his namesake
>> machine to capture the intuitive concept of computation.  That is not a
>> matter to be resolved by à priori dictates but by trying out candidate
>> models in the intended applications.
>>
>> I gave you what I consider Peirce’s best definition of a “sign”
>> in relational terms and I pointed out where it needs filling out
>> to qualify as a proper mathematical definition, most pointedly in
>> the further definitions of “correspondence” and “determination”.
>>
>> That is the current state of the inquiry as it stands at this site …
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
>> message and nothing in the body.  More at
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>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;
>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[robert marty]

Dear John,

I think that the text "*Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's
Semiotics (Part A*)" that I just published answers your question. I
maintain that retaining a definition of the sign that does not incorporate
the internal determinations of the sign by the object and the interpreter
by the sign does not allow us to classify signs. But you can still try to
find a meaning to each of the 6 combinations of S, O, I by not using the
interdependence of the categories, which translates into the
phenomenological constraint according to which::* "It is evident that a
Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a
Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant.*" (EP2: 481).
This constraint is the only one that allows us to control the combinatory
explosion.
...
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le sam. 14 août 2021 à 18:45, Jon Awbrey  a écrit :

> Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 10
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/14/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-10/
>
> Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 8
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/13/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-8/
>
> Re: Category Theory
>
> https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations
> ::: Morgan Rogers
>
> https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations/near/249456735
>
>  Please clearly state at least one “distinctive quality of sign
> relations”. 
>
> Dear Morgan,
>
> Sign relations are triadic relations.
>
> Can any triadic relation be a sign relation?
>
> I don’t know.  I have pursued the question myself whether any
> triadic relation could be used somehow or other in a context
> of communication, information, inquiry, learning, reasoning,
> and so on where concepts of signs and their meanings are
> commonly invoked — there’s the rub — it’s not about what
> a relation is “intrinsically” or “ontologically” at all
> but a question of “suitability for a particular purpose”
> as they say in all the standard disclaimers.
>
> What Peirce has done is to propose a definition intended to capture an
> intuitive, pre-theoretical, traditional concept of signs and their uses.
> To put it on familiar ground, it’s like Turing’s proposal of his namesake
> machine to capture the intuitive concept of computation.  That is not a
> matter to be resolved by à priori dictates but by trying out candidate
> models in the intended applications.
>
> I gave you what I consider Peirce’s best definition of a “sign”
> in relational terms and I pointed out where it needs filling out
> to qualify as a proper mathematical definition, most pointedly in
> the further definitions of “correspondence” and “determination”.
>
> That is the current state of the inquiry as it stands at this site …
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
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> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[robert marty]

List,

My initial comment was to salute Jon Alan's message (Peirce-l - Re:
[PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23 - arc (iupui.edu)
, with a
single quote from Peirce that I thought particularly adapted to introduce
the objectivity necessary to understand the current debate started with
André de Tienne's slow read bellicose towards mathematics and
mathematicians... I wanted to exploit the general scope, but this finally
led me to a too-long text, the basis of a future article and/or book
chapter. So I propose it to the debate in several parts ... a quick read,
so to speak ... Here is the quote from JAS and then the part (A):



*"The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the
universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the
force of facts. But it finds, at once--I am partially inverting the
historical order, in order to state the process in its logical order--it
finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call
upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find
Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume
naturale. But in so far as it does this, the solid ground of fact fails it.
It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must
then find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find
confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon the
bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground
seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.*
(CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898)[emphasize mine]



Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's Semiotics.

Chronological, logical and sociological aspects.


A- the *chronological order* of discovery is:



1- the abstract observation of phenomena; it suggests that three categories
in relation of "involvement" are candidates for a complete description of
phenomena (this is the work of the "phaneroscopists" with Peirce at the
forefront, of course)



2- the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). We find a very simple object
which fulfils these conditions. It is a candidate to be the "skeleton-set"
of phenomenology. It is a very simple structure of order called (Poset).



3 - the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with this
abstract form, one verifies in each particular field [such as Experience
(see Houser), relative predicates, psychology, etc], the relevance and the
correctness of the abstract observation made in point 1. It is an
implementation phase which verifies that the formal structure is well
inscribed in each field of knowledge. This verification is possible thanks
to the mathematical language provided in point 2, which is stripped of
substance from the specificities of each of the fields in which the
abstractions have been made. It is a common language that allows us to
verify the universality of the first extraction (realized more than a
century ago by Peirce).



4 - In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms with
all guarantees of universality since they are independent of any real
existence. As we have a Poset, we can in this (algebraic) category of
Posets, not only generate new Posets, but also benefit from all the
possibilities of linking them to other mathematical structures (graphs for
example). One can then proceed to"natural" (formal) extensions and then
return to the abstract observations of the "phaneroscopists", starting with
those of Peirce, in order to "see" (sometimes literally by observing
various mathematical diagrams: Veen or representations with points and
arrows) if there is the possibility of finding other skeleton-sets which
would be endowed with the same utility and the same universality. This is
notably the case for the 10 classes of signs, which are not only generated
but are also naturally classified in a particular structure of Poset called
Lattice. Peirce did not have this structure at his disposal, since it only
really became established in the mathematical field in 1940 (Birkhoff).
However, he had the intuition of it by identifying "affinities" (CP 2.264)
between classes, thanks to which he traced diagrams which it is easy to
show that they are inscriptions of the mathematical lattice in Peirce's
semiotic theory.One can easily spend time on the hexadic signs and discover
that this is not possible for the decadic sign as long as new observations
have not shown how to classify the four new trichotomies with relations of
determination.





Everyone will realize that this chronological order is the one I have
personally followed. But I used the "on" and not the "I", because I claim
without fear of being contradicted, that any other mathematician,
connoisseur of Peirce's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[robert marty]

Jon, List

  Thank you for reminding me of the definition of a group that I have
taught for 45 years ... I think you work with the permutations of
symmetrical groups that do not fit well with the interdependence of
categories and which make us go out of the Peircian theory, which is not
forbidden as long as we point it out. I'll look at the use you make of them
when you've answered my previous questions with something other than a
stream of links and the definition of a group! (my Ph.D. Math is on Abelian
Groups)... formulating my questions correctly takes me time, especially to
grasp your thought... I would like a reciprocal... I always thought that
you had the capacity to do it without giving up your certainties, but I
must say that today I am disappointed...
Regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; Ph.D. Mathematics ; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 13 août 2021 à 00:20, Jon Awbrey  a écrit :

> Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Comment 3
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/12/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-comment-3/
>
> All,
>
> It helps me to compare sign relations with my other favorite class
> of triadic relations, namely, groups.  Applications of mathematical
> groups came up just recently in the Laws of Form discussion group,
> so it will save a little formatting time to adapt the definition
> used there.
>
> Cf: Animated Logical Graphs • 60
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/02/21/animated-logical-graphs-60/
>
> Definition 1.  A group (G, ∗) is a set G together with
> a binary operation ∗ : G × G → G satisfying the following
> three conditions.
>
> 1.  Associativity.
>  For any x, y, z in G, we have (x ∗ y) ∗ z  =  x ∗ (y ∗ z).
>
> 2.  Identity.
>
>  There is an identity element 1 in G such that for all g in G,
>  we have 1 ∗ g  =  g ∗ 1  =  g.
>
> 3.  Inverses.
>  Each element has an inverse, that is, for each g in G,
>  there is some h in G such that g ∗ h  =  h ∗ g  =  1.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[robert marty]

Gary R., List


The mathematical modeling in the case of the Peircian theory of
phenomenology and semiotics, it is necessary to repeat, reveals the general
structure of the Universal Categories and their interdependence by
extracting it from the observations of the phaneroscopists, mainly from the
first of them Charles S.  Peirce. It provides the form stripped of
substance from the observation of their complexity by extracting the
skeleton-set (a mathematical object called Poset formed precisely from the
definitions of their universal categories that he provided.  No more, no
less. It is not my opinion; any other mathematicians who would have been
interested in this question could have done the same.  Besides, it happens
that some authors rediscover rather clumsily (and more than thirty years
after me), the usefulness of the Mathematical Theory of Categories (for
example, Gianluca Caterina and Rocco Gangle, in their book: Iconicity and
Abduction, Series Title Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and
Rational Ethics, Vol. 29, 2016, Springer International Publishing).
Moreover, they did not get much out of it from the semiotic point of view;
they were more concerned with Existential Graphs.   ... and did not make a
serious bibliography of the question ...



Modeling is therefore not a threat but a help ... This is clearly shown,
with some examples, in Models in Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/#UndeMode>:


*"Many authors have pointed out that understanding is one of the central
goals of science. In some cases, we want to understand a certain phenomenon
(e.g., why the sky is blue); in other cases, we want to understand a
specific scientific theory (e.g., quantum mechanics) that accounts for a
phenomenon in question. Sometimes we gain understanding of a phenomenon by
understanding the corresponding theory or model. For instance, Maxwell’s
theory of electromagnetism helps us understand why the sky is blue. It is,
however, controversial whether understanding a phenomenon **always**
presupposes
an understanding of the corresponding theory (de Regt 2009: 26)."*



Modeling clarifies Peirce's intuition on the structuration of the classes
of signs, thanks to relations that he named "affinities"(2.264). They are
organized in a lattice structure, a powerful tool to set up methodologies
to analyze bundles of signs. All are drawn as necessary conditions which,
since they are necessary, must find their implementation in phaneroscopy,
and it is in that they are useful.

Best regards,


Robert Marty

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 13 août 2021 à 02:09, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Jon, Edwina, Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: . . . Gary F. already noted [that] it is questionable whether *all 
> *hypotheses
> are mathematically generated, although Peirce's broad definition of
> mathematics as the science which draws necessary conclusions about
> hypothetical states of things could arguably be construed that way.
>
> In these ongoing reflections concerning the role that mathematics plays in
> phaneroscopy it is, I think, important to consider several points, all of
> which may be so obvious as to be easily forgotten or ignored:
>
> (1) while mathematics undoubtedly offers principles to phaneroscopy, it
> doesn't offer it *all* its principles (or phaneroscopy would constitute
> something like a branch of mathematics);
>
> (2) phaneroscopy also generates *its own principles, *as every discovery
> science does;
>
> (3) for phaneroscopy these include categoriality itself (which is *not*
> equivalent to valency); that is, the three Universal Categories are
> discerned in phaneroscopy; phaneroscopy can and does offer its principles
> to sciences further down in the classification, for example, to semeiotic
> grammar in its various trichotomic divisions in the classification of
> signs: such as qualisign; sinsign, legisign; icon, index, symbol; rheme,
> dicisign, argument;
>
> (4) forms and examples of the three Universal Categories always appear in
> the phaneron *together* so that while 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns (that is,
> examples of these) may be prescinded from it, that prescision is an act of
> abstraction and not the phaneronic appearance itself (which, again,
> necessarily involves all three categories);
>
> (5) while constituents of the phaneron may be assigned adicity (valency),
> that too is an abstraction from, for example, the qualities (1ns),
> interactions (2ns), and mediations (3ns) observed by the phaneroscopist.
> For example, the color 'red' is not a mathematical entity.
>
> Consequently, I obviously strongly agree with Gary F questioning whether "
> *all

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[robert marty]

Jon, List

  I am familiar with this type of confusion, and it is not because it has
been in Wikipedia for 15 years that it is validated. It existed in my
immediate environment that I finally break.  I will first make some remarks
and then ask you a question.

The remark: you spend without justification six different grammatical forms
allowing six different predicates to describe the same phaneron by linking
the letters A, B, C, in six ways to the six purely formal combinations of
the three letters S, O, and I. For each of the six combinations, which
predicate? A Y diagram with three free ends where the letters S, O, I
circulate might be the answer? (I can't think of any other, but you tell
me...) But then you spend from the six different ways given by Pierce to
express a single phaneron grammatically = the fact that an object in the
world has changed ownership (in all six grammatical cases, it is the same
fact that has happened in the real world) to the semiotic with six
combinations of three letters O, S, I which one wonders about the relation
with what precedes. Indeed, if O is the object of a sign, S the sign itself
(= the concrete thing that represents) and I the interpreter, that makes
three distinct elements possibly present to the mind according to the
focus, so three distinct phanerons, two out of mind and the third is a
determination of this mind. In passing, I note that you illustrate by
quotations from Peirce only three combinations (what about the other
three?) whose coherence is open to discussion.  Finally, you quote
2.228-229 (1902) and 2.230 (1910) from which it seems that Liszka would
have drawn (by observation?) four normative conditions that a sign should
fulfill, in which, if he retains that the sign determines the interpretant,
and represents the object thanks to ground, he still ignores that the
object determines the sign, although almost all the definitions after
1904-1905 expressly stipulate it.  Now, because we have a sign with three
elements, each of which can also be present in mind, Peirce can classify
the signs according to the categorial belonging of each of them (I have
modeled it).
So my question is: How will you get the 10 classes of signs, let alone the
28 (and I'm not talking about the 66 that are still not defined)? With OSI,
I presume? What will be the use of the 5 others?
  Best regards,
Robert Marty
NB: just now, I see that you had posted before I finished reacting. At
first glance, I see that the Cartesian product O x Sx I partially answers
my question above but does not inform me about the rest.
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 11 août 2021 à 01:15, Jon Awbrey  a écrit :

> Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Comment 2
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/10/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-comment-2/
>
> Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Comment 1
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/09/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-comment-1/
>
> All,
>
> Definitions tend to call on other terms in need of their own definitions,
> and so on till the process terminates at the level of primitive terms.
> The main two concepts requiring supplementation in Peirce's definition
> of a sign relation are the ideas of “correspondence” and “determination”.
> We can figure out fairly well what Peirce had in mind from things he wrote
> elsewhere, as I explained in the Sign Relation article I added to Wikipedia
> 15 years ago.
>
> Sign Relation
> https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sign_relation=68541642
>
> Not daring to look at what's left of that, here's the relevant section
> from the OEIS Wiki fork.
>
> Sign Relation ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )
> • Definition ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation#Definition )
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

Helmut, List
In general algebra, we define particular types of structure formed by a set
with one or more "internal" laws of composition possessing certain
properties. I voluntarily leave aside the external laws with operator
domains on the set. The laws themselves are ways of associating any two
elements noted with conventional signs to obtain a third. Thus the sign "+"
has absolutely nothing to do with addition as you practice it in the real
world. The simplest structure consisting of a set of elements (without real
existence) and an internal law of composition that we can write as we want
(with "+" if we want) is called a magma... this abstract structure can be
implemented in a multitude of concrete sets in which we have observed that
the elements associate themselves two by two to form a third belonging to
the same set. For example, the set of natural integers (with or without the
zero) is a "magma." But it is more than that. It is also a semigroup as
soon as we establish that its law is associative, semigroup being a name
conventionally chosen to designate this more complex advanced type of
abstract structure. We can also say "associative magma." The natural
integers are still part of it. Now the set {1,2,3} consisting of the
numbers 1,2 and 3 alone is not a magma for the usual addition. On the other
hand, it has a structure of another kind, listed in the mathematical
repository, under the name of "total order structure" (so a fortiori it is
also a Poset = Partially Ordered Set) when we provide it with the natural
order relation. But if we call the three elements X, Y, and Z and if we
provide their set with an order relation defined in such a way as to "copy"
the previous relations by substituting X to 3, Y to 2, and Z to,1 we will
obtain an abstract structure which can be implemented in many other 3
elements sets, like for example (taken at random ;-) ) Peirce's categories
considered with their interdependence relations (involvement). This is why
your example of Aliens has no sense in algebra because the abstract
elements that we compose according to your addition is an "algebraic
unicorn." Indeed, the starting elements are fixed, unalterable, and all the
more unalterable because they have no real existence, even if the letters
that designate them are on Earth. If the Aliens want to call this way of
altering objects on their planet "+," they can, but they will not practice
the algebra that is practiced on Earth.
Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 12 août 2021 à 16:45, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Robert, Edwina, List
>
> The skeleton metaphor for a poset makes sense to me. Is it also a good
> metaphor for mathematics being the skeleton of all other sciences?
> I earlier wrote, that mathematics is based on axioms, and axioms are not
> hypothetical, but inducted. Edwina asked what I mean by axioms. I admit,
> that I donot understand the axiom- (inducted relation to the real world-)
> character of these things. For example, "a + b = b + a" is said to be an
> axiom. But to me it only seems to be a tautology of the definition of the
> plus-operator (summation). Summation is defined as a not temporal, and not
> sequential, only spatial connection. So where is the axiom? If axioms
> really exist, these are connections to the real world, which are not
> hypoteses (abductions), but experiences (inductions). This is how "axiom"
> is defined, I think. But I until now dont see the so-called axioms as
> axioms.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
> 12. August 2021 um 10:39 Uhr
>  "robert marty" 
> wrote:
>
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
> The case of Peirce's semiotics is different from that of the empirical
> sciences...it does not require induction to be verified and in this sense
> it can be said to be "robust" a priori. Indeed, the mathematical modeling
> by an abstract structure of Poset isomorphic to the organization of
> universal categories by involvements is purely qualitative and does not
> require any experimental verification. CP 3.559 has been quoted a lot but
> each one has drawn partial arguments from it. The part that I have
> personally underlined ( see Podium, p.4) does not suffer any dispute and
> leads us on the way to understanding this false debate between "formalists"
> and "empiricists" reformulated in a kind of will of power of mathematics on
> phaneroscopy. Here is this part: "*The skeletonization or
> diagrammatization of the problem serves more purposes than one; but its
> principal purpose is to strip the significant relations of all disguise*". The

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Relations & Their Relatives

[robert marty]

 is three loose ends. I base my challenge
on the fact that you have not retained in the notion you have chosen the
term "determined" (i.e., an internal determination of the sign) but " (n°
14 of 1902 in the list of 76 definitions) does not contain the two internal
determinations (of the sign by the object and of the interpretant by the
sign and thus by transitivity of the interpretant by the object) but the
terms: "same sort of correspondence." You explain well the terms
"Correspondence" and "determination." For this last term, Peirce was
clear: *"We
thus learn that the Object determines **(**i.e.*,* renders definitely to be
such as it will be**) the Sign in a particular manner. *(CP 8.361) 342-379
M-20b (1908)). The problem is that if the composition of determinations is
transitive, the composition of correspondences is not, and this is why I
think Peirce uses the terms " sort of correspondence. " This is why from
1904-1905, he has, in my opinion (see my analysis of the 76 definitions),
included the two determinations in his definitions of the sign. On the
other hand, he himself made sure that their definition of "determination"
that I have recalled above is transitive ( see 67 (C. S. Peirce
Manuscripts, MS 611-15) | FromThePage
<https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15/display/7732>
and 68 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 611-15) | FromThePage
<https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15/display/7734>
 ).

  The consequence is that the chosen definition forces you to stay in a
"logicist" framework at the AIIbiii level in the "well of truth" (see the
Classification of sciences compiled by Tomi Vahkavaara) and forbids you to
access the founding mathematical principles that are at the entrance of the
well, with all the advantages that are associated with it in an openly
Categorical-mathematical structuralism framework (see Structuralism in the
Philosophy of Mathematics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structuralism-mathematics/#StruBeyoMath>
.
Also, I didn't find "triple correspondence" in any pdf, but maybe you have
a reference? I only know about "tricoexistence" (CP 2.318: "*It predicates
the genuinely Triadic relation of tricoexistence 'P and Q and R coexist'.).*"In
this "global" form, there is no internal determination for the sign; it
seems to me hardly usable.
I am at your disposal to discuss it, of course ...
Best regards, Robert Marty






Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 12 août 2021 à 00:00, Jon Awbrey  a écrit :

> Cf: Relations & Their Relatives • 3
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/18/relations-their-relatives-3/
>
> All,
>
> Here are two ways of looking at the divisibility relation,
> a dyadic relation of fundamental importance in number theory.
>
> Table 1 shows the first few ordered pairs of the relation on
> positive integers corresponding to the relative term, “divisor of”.
> Thus, the ordered pair i:j appears in the relation if and only if
> i divides j, for which the usual notation is i|j.
>
> Table 1.  Elementary Relatives for the “Divisor Of” Relation
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/elementary-relatives-for-the-e2809cdivisor-ofe2809d-relation.png
>
> Table 2 shows the same information in the form of a logical matrix.
> This has a coefficient of 1 in row i and column j when i|j, otherwise
> it has a coefficient of 0.  (The zero entries have been omitted here
> for ease of reading.)
>
> Table 2.  Logical Matrix for the “Divisor Of” Relation
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/logical-matrix-for-the-e2809cdivisor-ofe2809d-relation.png
>
> Just as matrices in linear algebra represent linear transformations,
> these logical arrays and matrices represent logical transformations.
>
> Resources
> =
>
> • Relation Theory ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory )
>
> • Triadic Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )
>
> • Sign Relations ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )
>
> • Peirce’s 1870 Logic Of Relatives
> (
> https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Overview
> )
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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> message and nothing in the b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

Helmut, List

The case of Peirce's semiotics is different from that of the empirical
sciences...it does not require induction to be verified and in this sense
it can be said to be "robust" a priori. Indeed, the mathematical modeling
by an abstract structure of Poset isomorphic to the organization of
universal categories by involvements is purely qualitative and does not
require any experimental verification. CP 3.559 has been quoted a lot but
each one has drawn partial arguments from it. The part that I have
personally underlined ( see Podium, p.4) does not suffer any dispute and
leads us on the way to understanding this false debate between "formalists"
and "empiricists" reformulated in a kind of will of power of mathematics on
phaneroscopy. Here is this part: "*The skeletonization or diagrammatization
of the problem serves more purposes than one; but its principal purpose is
to strip the significant relations of all disguise*". The Poset is nothing
else than "*the skeleton-set*" of all phanerons, a tri-relation of elements
a priori in all that is present to any mind.  But there are many other
things in the phaneron! The metaphors of the X-ray of the skeleton of a
vertebrate allow us to illustrate this point (phaneroscopy vs. radioscopy):
radioscopy reveals the skeleton by making it appear within an image.  The
scanner, by taking over with the help of computers (tomodensidometry) can
show it in three dimensions and from all angles. All the rest is
obliterated and is part of the "disguise", i.e. all the rest in which it is
immersed; the technique of X-rays allows the extraction of the skeleton
(Wilhelm Röntgen, the first Nobel Prize of physics gave them the usual name
of the unknown in mathematics, X! ). Continuing the metaphor, my
"trichotomic machine" is a kind of scanner perfected to radiograph the
signs based on the preliminary phaneroscopy of each of the elements of the
sign but respecting the determinations of their tri-relation.

Regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le jeu. 12 août 2021 à 00:08, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Edwina, List
>
> I dont think that De Tienne "tells us that it is essentially detached and
> isolate from the Real World to be almost irrelevant". After all,
> mathematics is based on axioms, which come from the real world. These are
> premisses. What I donot understand is, why these are called "purely
> hypothetical" (in this thread). A hypothesis is a result of an abduction,
> but axioms are results of induction.
>
> Now, how mathematics further deals with these premisses, is said to be
> deductively. I think so too. But you, with Peirce, call it "reasoning with
> specially constructed schemata". This to me seems completely different from
> pure deduction. I donot undertand what is meant by it. Can you give an
> example for such a constructed schema?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
> 11. August 2021 um 19:54 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" 
> wrote:
>
>
> Bernard, JAS, Gary F, Robert, list:
>
> The problem I have with De Tienne's outline of mathematics is the intense
> focus he gives to its essential irrelevance to we who live in the real
> world. I don't think it can be ascribed to his sense of humour. He repeats
> it often enough that we must consider that he takes this view very
> seriously.
>
> And - I don't agree with JAS's view that this focus is merely to
> differentiate 'pure' from 'applied' mathematics. We have to instead, ask
> WHY Peirce emphasized the role of pure mathematics in his SCIENCES. Surely
> it has a role in our scientific exploration and analysis of our Real World?
> Otherwise - why do it?
>
> Yes, mathematics "deals exclusively with hypothetical states of things and
> asserts no matter of fact whatever, and further, that it is thus alone that
> the necessity of its conclusions explained" 4.232. And Peirce warns against
> what we can consider as the'induction' process as the sole sense of
> information, with his comment "to assert that any source of information
> that is restricted to actual facts could afford us a necessary knowledge,
> that is, knowledge relating to a whole general range of possibility, would
> be a flat contradiction in terms" 4.232.
>
> And he moves, not into applied mathematics but into phenomenology, for
> 'Thinking in general terms is not enough. It is necessary that something
> should be DONE. In geometry, subsidiary lines are drawn. In algebra
> permissible transformations are made. Thereupon the faculty of observation
> is called into play...Theorematic reasoning invariably depends upon
> experimen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

List,

Well, this discussion has taught me at least two lessons about how debates
work on peirce-L:

1- you can create cookies-quotes

2- when one is in trouble, one can cancel one's comments by invoking one's
sense of humor...

and so I can add :

 3 - "of course, 1 and 2 are manifestations of my unique sense of humor"
...

Regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 11 août 2021 à 18:31, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Gary F, Jon S, Bernard, List,
>
> I must admit that I've been finding the discussion of 'pure' vs 'applied'
> mathematics a bit frustrating since the distinction which Peirce makes
> between the two is quite clear (whether one agrees with it or not) and has
> been explicated here with textual support quite adequately and, in my
> opinion, more than adequately for a discussion centered on
> phaneroscopy/phenomenology.
>
> However, for now I'd like to comment rather much more generally on our
> decision to do a slow read of  Andre's PowerPoint presentation. Bernard
> wrote:
>
> BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>
>
> And Jon commented:
>
> JAS: I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that
> for Peirce, *pure *mathematics does not concern itself with whether or
> not its hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.
>
>
> Gary F hads earlier responded to Bernard's comment:
>
> GF: Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
> his peculiar sense of humor.
>
>
> Combining those two responses, I would say that De Tienne's statement is
> an example of his use of hyperbole as a manifestation of his unique sense
> of humor. Anyone who knows Andre personally or perhaps has been at an event
> where he was speaking  knows that he enjoys playing pranks, making jokes,
> and the like. This is characteristically so even in his more formal
> presentations at conferences and seminars, etc. For example, forum members
> may recall Sally Ness's account of the 'seance' that he conducted at the
> mini-conference in conjunction with the dedication of the Peirce monument
> in Milford a few years ago as an exaggerated expression of his distinctive
> (some might say 'peculiar') sense of humor.
>
> However, the specific point I want to make is that we are *not* doing a
> slow read of an academic paper or a scholarly book as we have in the past,
> but of a slide show presentation accompanying remarks by De Tienne which
> most likely not only explicated or, perhaps,  expanded on the brief
> comments appearing on each slide, but which, through verbal and non-verbal
> means, helped clarify the meanings attached to each slide, revealing which
> were meant humorously, etc.
>
> Taking such a comment as the one being discussed here *literally* could
> most naturally lead someone, in this case the very learned Bernard Morand
> (whom I'm delighted to see participating in this slow read), to see it as a
> blunder. I suppose that's something of a hazard for this experiment in
> doing a slow read of slides accompanying a talk, especially one given by
> such a clever fellow as Andre De Tienne. On the other hand, the format of
> this slow read has certain obvious advantages as well, or at least that
> seems to me to be the case.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 10:45 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Bernard, List:
>>
>> I agree with Gary F.'s reply just now, but already drafted this one so I
>> am going ahead and posting it.
>>
>> BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
>> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>>
>>
>> I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 24

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List,

JAS > " ... what is allegedly still not being recognized?"

But I will tell you! What now stands in the way of your recognizing the
value of the mathematical object (Poset) "3→2→1" (C) (the arrow
representing abstracts morphisms)? Because I have shown very simply ( see
Podium, section 6, p.18) that this object is isomorphic to the
phaneroscopic object "Thirdness →Secondness →Firstness" (D) ( with the
arrow representing involvements).  I have been proposing it for a very long
time as a provider of the mathematical principles of phaneroscopy. If you
can present me a better one I am ready to redirect my research ...

Regards,

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 11 août 2021 à 16:56, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> Where has anyone disputed anything stated in the quotation below from
> Peirce or implied by the subsequent question? Having acknowledged
> repeatedly that formulating ideal hypotheses from which necessary
> conclusions are subsequently drawn indeed falls within the scope of pure
> mathematics, what is allegedly still not being recognized?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 8:01 AM Robert Marty 
> wrote:
>
>> CS Peirce : 1897 [c.] | On Multitude | MS [R] 26:1
>>
>> Mathematics is a study of exact hypotheses, in so far as consequences can
>> be deduced from them. *To limit mathematics to the deduction* of those
>> consequences would be to separate from it some of the greatest of the
>> achievements of modern mathematicians – achievements which nobody but
>> mathematicians could have performed – such as the formation of the idea of
>> the system of imaginaries, and of the idea of Riemann surfaces*. It must
>> be allowed, therefore, that the formation of the hypotheses is a part of
>> the business of mathematics*." [emphasize mine]
>>
>>
>> Of course, since recognizing mathematical forms in experiments (his own
>> or those submitted to him by phaneroscopists) requires having the right
>> forms in his mind... why not recognize it?
>>
>>
>> 路
>>
>> Le mer. 11 août 2021 à 13:18,  a écrit :
>>
>>> Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
>>> André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
>>> (iupui.edu) <https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site.
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Text:
>>>
>>>- What mathematicians observe (and construct and manipulate) are *pure
>>>hypotheses, possibilia* that get represented in diagrams.
>>>- The significance and truth-value of such constructs depends only
>>>on their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of
>>>experience*.
>>>- Mathematics seeks to *derive consequences* that are true in *every
>>>possible configuration*, and not merely what is true of the actual
>>>world.
>>>- In that regard, *pure mathematics plays freely with forms*,
>>>unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience.
>>>
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 24

[Robert Marty]

CS Peirce : 1897 [c.] | On Multitude | MS [R] 26:1

Mathematics is a study of exact hypotheses, in so far as consequences can
be deduced from them. *To limit mathematics to the deduction* of those
consequences would be to separate from it some of the greatest of the
achievements of modern mathematicians – achievements which nobody but
mathematicians could have performed – such as the formation of the idea of
the system of imaginaries, and of the idea of Riemann surfaces*. It must be
allowed, therefore, that the formation of the hypotheses is a part of the
business of mathematics*." [emphasize mine]


Of course, since recognizing mathematical forms in experiments (his own or
those submitted to him by phaneroscopists) requires having the right forms
in his mind... why not recognize it?


路

Le mer. 11 août 2021 à 13:18,  a écrit :

> Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André
> De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
>  site.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> Text:
>
>- What mathematicians observe (and construct and manipulate) are *pure
>hypotheses, possibilia* that get represented in diagrams.
>- The significance and truth-value of such constructs depends only on
>their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of
>experience*.
>- Mathematics seeks to *derive consequences* that are true in *every
>possible configuration*, and not merely what is true of the actual
>world.
>- In that regard, *pure mathematics plays freely with forms*,
>unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience.
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

John Alan , List
Jon Alan, not being a crusader against ADT, I am much less interested in
ADT's confusion than if he could explain (i.e. state more clearly, make
more intelligible) "these essential principles of mathematics" in such a
way that one can distinguish clearly what kind of mathematics is at their
foundation... Perhaps you can present them to me yourself because you must
know them?
Regards,
Robert
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mar. 10 août 2021 à 20:25, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Gary F., List:
>
> I likewise remain puzzled by the persistent claims that André (or anyone
> else) is somehow "arguing against mathematics," especially with
> over-the-top language about an alleged "phaneroscopy vaccine against the
> mathematics virus." After all, he states plainly in slide 21 that 
> "*mathematics
> *comes up with fundamental principles essential to phaneroscopy." As for
> the acknowledged misquotation in slide 23, I brought it to André's
> attention yesterday and he replied as follows.
>
> ADT: Thanks, Jon, for alerting me to this conflation. How that could have
> happened is beyond my memory: I compiled a list of quotations many years
> ago, and put it to different uses over time. I’ll make the correction once
> I return next week from all an all-too-brief and rare vacation week.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 9:09 AM  wrote:
>
>> Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an
>> equally thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit
>> acknowledgement of the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s
>> choice of language at “the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response
>> will be limited to this part of your post:
>>
>> BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De
>> Tienne is repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete,
>> imaginary and existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding
>> mathematics out of a scientific realm that will end confined into the
>> experimental sciences.  I don't think that such a project can be qualified
>> as peircian.
>>
>> GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a
>> putative attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics”
>> from science and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled”
>> to attribute malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his
>> crusade, even to those who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of
>> us are no less entitled to ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne
>> is saying about phaneroscopy, and to maintain a focus on the actual content
>> of his slides.
>>
>> After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis,
>> which I soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited
>> attention elsewhere. Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty
>> or reading Peirce, I will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to
>> carry on his crusade as long as he likes, and others are entitled to give
>> it the attention they think it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say
>> about it that hasn’t been said already.
>>
>> Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about
>> *phaneroscopy*, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics
>> for abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon
>> mathematics for principles under which to organize their observations is 
>> *taken
>> for granted* in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be made a
>> focal point in a discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his fellow
>> crusaders naturally interpret this taking-for-granted as a *denial* of
>> the importance of mathematics, and insist on reading this denial into De
>> Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of what it actually says in its context.
>> As we have seen, questioning this style of interpretation only leads to
>> more unfounded accusations of malicious intent and various intellectual
>> sins. Consequently I feel entitled to say nothing further about the whole
>> crusade, which I consider a distraction from more relevant issues. In fact
>> I’m already regretting giving so much time and thought to it in this post.
>> Enough already.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

List,

1- Gary F. has just validated the quote-cookie principle! You take a quote,
you choose in another context a compatible piece of another quote, and you
get a new quote that will produce the new meaning you want. It's a metaphor
of how messenger RNA works, which modifying the Spike protein (a quote)
leads the cell to produce antibodies... Against which virus? The "
*mathematics-virus*," of course...  Let's greet the inventors of the
phaneroscopy vaccine against the mathematics virus!

2- I do not polemicize AGAINST André De Tienne (who was never personally
present) but FOR Peirce.

3- GF > "*which is that phaneroscopy does not and cannot provide
mathematics with any fundamental principle*."I totally agree, but I claim
(with Peirce) that it is rigorously the opposite that happens ...and
therein lies the question: will mathematics presented (metaphorically) as a
dangerous virus penetrate the minds despite the antibodies?

4- I underlined (still in the Podium) that eminent Peircians are aware of
the problem and gave an answer to this question by conferring to the
classes of signs the quality of "mathematical" or logical" objects.
This is the case of:
- Nathan Houser: who confers on a simple list of three concepts the status
of "*formal mathematical conceptions"* ;
- Ahti-Vekkho Pietarinen: "*There are cross-divisions of these three
trichotomies across speculative grammar*."

Frederik Stjernfelt, for his part, does not hesitate to take and assume an
explicitly revisionist position funded on his personal opinion: *"But
Phenomenology seems to have received even its core principles the three
categories from a lower discipline, namely Metaphysics, and ultimately
Logic. An immediate conclusion from this may seem to be that the
ontological dependence hierarchy of sciences does not imply any privileged
trajectory of discovery.*"

5- Confronted with Peirce's constant assertions, the camp of the "
*opponents*" (a term I use for want of a better one) has chosen to evoke
mathematics and not more so that it becomes the "*unseen character*" that
we always talk about and never see.  But when they are presented with a "
*mathematical"* object that embodies Peirce's formal definitions, they
launch into a dubious battle of the kind of antivirus production for some,
and/or arguments of authority relying on a stream of quotations from
Brandolini's law for others.
Regards ...
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*

-

Le lun. 9 août 2021 à 14:34,  a écrit :

> Jon S, list,
>
> Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words
> “inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part
> of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the
> consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or
> not anything be existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility
> between CP 1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is
> concerned. Anyway, Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need
> not distract us from the point of slides 22-3, which is that phaneroscopy
> does not and cannot provide mathematics with any fundamental principle.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 8-Aug-21 20:54
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
>
>
>
> Robert, List:
>
>
>
> I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53 (c.
> 1896). It is surprising and indeed troubling that André would insert his
> own words where he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first thought was that
> perhaps the additional phrase was in the original manuscript and omitted
> (inadvertently or otherwise) by the CP editors, which has happened in some
> other places, but inspection of R 1288:7 confirms that it is not the case
> here. As any examination of the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am
> always eager to understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by
> carefully citing and reproducing his actual texts.
>
>
>
> For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest that
> when I provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for "mathematics," I
> somehow "didn't read it well" and thus would find it problematic that
> Peirce included the formulation of mathematical hypotheses within the scope
> of a mathematician's practice. On the contrary, I have never disputed this,
> I have merely insisted with Peirce that mathematics is the science which
> draws necessary conclusions about those hypothetical states of t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in Diagrams vs Thinking in Words

[robert marty]

Dear Jon, List,

> I know what book you are talking about; today it can be downloaded for
> free...
> I looked at your diagram... it rejuvenated me... indeed, I was always the
> terror of my students because, whenever they presented me with a diagram I
> demanded that every single point, every single line be documented... so I
> look at your diagram and I see first of all ovals,5 , with words inside...
> I wonder if they delimit sets of points of the plane which would represent
> each one an object of the extension of each of the labels inscribed in the
> oval... the answer is obvious, it's not. So the ovals are just decorative
> elements that direct attention to the 5 terms of the language they surround.
> I come to the lines ... the graphic conventions in use (signs of law)
> strongly suggest to me that they are relationships between concepts ...
> perhaps of dependence given the context of communication ... the same
> conventions and context suggest that they should be considered top-down
> relationships ... I can't go beyond that as I have no information about
> these lines and the modes of correspondence they cover ... in advance of
> the upcoming debate, I say that if all the lines represent top-down
> dependency relationships then this diagram comes into open conflict with
> Peirce's classification ... conflict involving debate in the Sciences of
> Discovery ...I am ready...
>
> On Thu. Jul 29, 2021 at 2:30 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> Dear Robert, John, Edwina, ...
> This discussion reminds me a lot of the time I spent the big bucks
> buying a book on "Diagrammatology" which ran to over 500 pages with
> many sections in very small print and had just over 50 diagrams in
> the whole thing.
>
> So I think the real "versus" here is more like the difference
> between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams"
> and people who "think in words about thinking in words".
>
> Those of us, the very few, who have actually been
> working on "moving pictures" from the very get-go,
> have learned to see things somewhat differently.
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
>
> Regardez,
>
> Jon
>
> On 7/29/2021 5:27 AM, robert marty wrote:
> > Dear John, Edwina, List
> >
> > Let me clarify my question:
> >
> > The references in parentheses refer to the classification
> > <
> https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_
> >
> > compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.
> >
> > The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
> > ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
> > independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since
> it
> > incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part
> of
> > itself.
> >
> > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then
> the
> > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.
> >
> > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then
> the
> > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.
> >
> > In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
> > (Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste
> Comte)
> > comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
> > label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
> > general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
> > the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
> > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of
> nature
> > is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
> > Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.
> >
> > I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
> > Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
> > Discourse.
> >
> > JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
> > actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
> > every possible pattern of any kind.*"
> >
> > In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
> > <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/universe-of-discourse> there is
> a
> > set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
> > Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
> > representative (if this were not the case, you cou

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Dear John, Edwina, List



Let me clarify my question:



The references in parentheses refer to the classification

compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.



The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since it
incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part of
itself.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.



The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.



In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
(Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste Comte)
comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of nature
is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.

I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
Discourse.



JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
every possible pattern of any kind.*"



In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
 there is a
set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me whether
I am introducing any bias by this choice:



 *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10*

*…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must be upon
the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this common
experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only that but each
must know the other knows that he knows the other has it; so that when one
says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he does not mean that it is cold
in Iceland or in Laputa, but right here. In short it must be thoroughly
understood between them that they are talking about objects of a collection
with which both have some familiarity. **The collection of objects to which
it is mutually understood that the propositions refer is called by exact
logicians the universe of discourse." *[emphasize mine]

Then you consider the three universes of discourse which are possibilities,
actualities, and necessities. In other words, the universe of discourse
discussed above is now divided into 3 collections of objects. It remains to
know how this division occurs.



Peirce gives us a well-known (but not exclusive) answer, as one could do in
any observational science:



* "** Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron
I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense
present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real
thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I
leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that
those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at
all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron*"(CP
1.284) [emphasize mine]



It is well specified further on:



*" What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct
observation of **phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes
several very broad classes of **phanerons; describes the features of each**;
shows that although they are so **inextricably mixed together that no one
can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their **characters are quite
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short **list
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and
finally **proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
principal subdivisions **of those categories. *(CP 1.286, 1902) [emphasize
mine]



That this answer is not exclusive, he showed it himself by having recourse
to justify it, on many occasions, to the triadic reduction of polyadic
relations that he did not really establish himself. It was established
later, notably by Herzberger, Burch and more recently by Dau F., Correia
J.H. (2006 )



*" A 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Barthes was exaggerating ... he went back on his declarations later ... but
symbolic violence (which is exerted in particular on cultural minorities)
is a useful concept adopted by sociologists (Pierre Bourdieu and his school
in particular) ... and let's not forget Aesop: "language is the best and
the worst of things"!
RM

Le dim. 25 juil. 2021 à 18:36, Edwina Taborsky  a
écrit :

> Robert, List
>
> 1] What?! Language is fascist?! Does he even know what the term means?
> Most people who fling out this term have no understanding of its meaning.
> No, he's ignoring the work of, if I recall, someone like Michel Breal, who
> focused on language or speech as a living, almost biological reality that
> changed as its users changed. And Bakhtin's dialogic emphasis - as well as
> Peirce's dialogue and triad.
>
> You wrote:" language is a powerful filter in the expression of thought,
> while diagrams, which depend only on universal (or almost universal) graphic
> conventions, are virtually free of any influence."  Yes - language/speech
> ties meaning to its immediate users.
>
> 2] I agree with your pointing out this obligation to find a 'formal
> mathematized model and look for it in the "mathematical repository."
> Without such grounds - as you point out, we become sophists or 'bricoleurs'.
>
> 4] The answer is obvious.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun 25/07/21 11:21 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear John, List
>
> Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion, raise
> fundamental problems.
>
>
>
> 1. JS > "Different people have different ways of thinking and talking."
>
>
> Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak independently
> of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect them learned,
> inculcated like languages and signs organized in systems; for a significant
> part of them, they are imposed (symbolic violence). The semiologist Roland
> Barthes in his speech of reception, remained famous to the College of
> France (1977), denounced the languages as follows: "Language, as the
> performance of all language, is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is
> quite simply fascist; for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige
> to say." This is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects
> that languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
> natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote from
> Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): "All speech is but such an
> algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have relations by virtue
> of the meanings associated with them."(CP 3.418). The fundamental
> distinction I share with you between thinking in words and thinking in
> diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a powerful filter in
> the expression of thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal
> (or almost universal) graphic conventions, are virtually free of any
> influence.
>
> 2. JS > "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first stage of 
> analyzing
> and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams.  It depends on the three
> branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete math, and continuous math)
> to derive and classify the elements and patterns of elements."
>
> I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these observations:
>
>
>
> · either in the "Practical Sciences"( i.e.: "scientific inquiry
> with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g. science of
> morality (ethics in common sense) "(see The outline of Peirce's
> classification of sciences
> <https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_>
> (1902-1911) compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara)
>
>
>
> · either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they depend on
> mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized model and look
> for it in the "mathematical repository."
>
>
>
> Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering only
> Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence between the
> universal categories by involvement), don't we have an obligation to take
> it into account all along its deployment with Phenomenology in the first
> line, because the dependence of Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite
> explicit? Otherwise, won't we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in
> the company of the eternal conservative-bricoleurs?
>
> 3. JS  > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses) whose 
> probability
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Dear John, List

Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion, raise
fundamental problems.



1. JS > "*Different people have different ways of thinking and talking."*


Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak independently
of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect them learned,
inculcated like languages and signs organized in systems; for a significant
part of them, they are imposed (symbolic violence). The semiologist Roland
Barthes in his speech of reception, remained famous to the College of
France (1977), denounced the languages as follows: "*Language, as the
performance of all language, is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is
quite simply fascist; for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige
to say*." This is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects
that languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote from
Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): *"All speech is but such an
algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have relations by virtue
of the meanings associated with them*."(CP 3.418). The fundamental
distinction I share with you between thinking in words and thinking in
diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a powerful filter in
the expression of thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal
(or almost *universal) *graphic conventions, are virtually free of any
influence.

2. JS >* "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first stage of**
analyzing and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams.  It depends on the
three branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete math, and continuous
math) to derive and classify the elements and patterns of elements." *

I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these observations:



· either in the "*Practical Sciences*"( *i.e.: "scientific inquiry
with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g. science of
morality (ethics in common sense)* "(see The outline of Peirce's
classification of sciences

(1902-1911) compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara)



· either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they depend on
mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized model and look
for it in the "mathematical repository."



Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering only
Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence between the
universal categories by involvement), don't we have an obligation to take
it into account all along its deployment with Phenomenology in the first
line, because the dependence of Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite
explicit? Otherwise, won't we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in
the company of the eternal conservative-bricoleurs?

3. JS*  > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses) whose**
probability is evaluated by the normative sciences." *The syntactic
mathematical model having been implemented in the universal categories
become a semantic model. It appears then constitutive of phaneroscopy as a
universal science of discovery; it is neither hypothesis nor enigma,
because it does not have to be submitted to an evaluation, being exact by
nature in all locations and at all times, unlike the experimental models
whose universality must be verified.

The above argumentation is clearly in line with the framework below
extracted from The Structure of Scientific Theories (Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
 :

"A table helps summarize general aspects of the three views’ analyses of
the structure of scientific theories:

*Syntactic View*

*Semantic View*

*Pragmatic View*

Theory Structure

Uninterpreted axiomatic system

(i) State-space,
(ii) Model-/set-theoretic

Internal and external pluralism

Theory Interpretation

Correspondence rules

(i) Hierarchy of models,
(ii) Similarity,
(iii) Isomorphism

(i) Structure already inflected by practice, function, and application
(ii) Pragmatic virtues

Is theory interpretation an aspect of theory structure?

Yes

No

Yes, although the distinction is hard to make.

Table 2. General aspects of each view’s analysis of the structure of
scientific theories."

4. RM > his leads me finally to a final question to be discussed: should
the classification of sciences according to Peirce be considered as a kind
of imperative to be respected or can phenomenology be approached from the
logic that depends on it according to this classification?
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le sam. 24 juil. 2021 à 04:28, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Different people have different ways of thinking and talking.  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[robert marty]

Helmuth, List,
In algebra, the invention of complex numbers
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_number> by Gerolamo Cardano is a
wonderful example that is not new! (1545 !) And so many others ...For
example, Peirce was interested in quaternions  CP 4.138  §10. THE ALGEBRA
OF REAL QUATERNIONS; CP 4.307
§4. TRICHOTOMIC MATHEMATICS) which are extensions of complex numbers ...
and even to onions ( CP 4.321) ...
Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 14 juil. 2021 à 18:29, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Jon, List
>
> I disagree with this "strictly hypothetical". In mathemathics,* mostly *there
> are hypotheses at the beginning, presumtions, which then are deductively
> proven or refuted by disproof or failed to prove. But, as I said, in
> mathematics also are surprising phenomena for subject matters (e.g.
> attractors in chaos theory), and in statistics the subject matter is
> induction. But the rules of investigation are always (strictly) deductive,
> I think, so to "its method is strictly deductive" I don´t have a
> counterexample. But to "its suubject matter is strictly hypothetical" I
> disagree.
>
> Best
> Helmut
>
>
>  14. Juli 2021 um 17:28 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> wrote:
>
> Robert, List:
>
>
> RM: What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature,
> i.e. the knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of
> Phaneroscopy are in the inner world.
>
>
> On the contrary, as Gary F. already pointed out, phaneroscopy does not
> concern itself with the distinction between the outer world and the inner
> world. It studies whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way.
>
>
> RM:  I understand that it [the Triadic Reduction Theorem] embarrasses you
> because it ruins all your arguments, as well as those of Gary F. and Gary
> R. who follows you.
>
>
> Nonsense, which arguments of mine does it supposedly "ruin"? In this
> particular thread, I provided nine quotations yesterday demonstrating that
> Peirce consistently defines mathematics as the science which draws
> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things, i.e., its method
> is strictly deductive and its subject matter is strictly hypothetical.
> Anyone is free to disagree with him about this, but no one can legitimately
> attribute a different view to him without providing a direct quotation
> where he explicitly repudiates it later.
>
>
> RM: But to make sure you read Peirce's thinking on it, I extract the
> following blunt quote because it is the core of my entire approach since
> 1977.
>
>
> CSP: And analysis will show that every relation which is *tetradic*,
> *pentadic*, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
> compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that
> beyond the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is
> nothing else to be found in the phenomenon. (CP 1.347, 1903)
>
>
> No one is disputing what Peirce states here. In fact, it is a good example
> of the two major principles underlying his *mature *classification of the
> sciences as summarized by André in the three slides that Gary F. posted
> this morning. Phaneroscopy depends on mathematics in the sense that it
> makes use of its general principles, both by manifesting instantiations of
> them and by providing critical and validating feedback. This reflects a
> considerably more developed understanding of the relationships among
> different sciences than his earlier description of "empirics" as "the study
> of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those
> mathematics has studied," especially since the latter encompasses not only
> phaneroscopy but also logic, metaphysics, and all the special sciences.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 4:46 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., John Alan, Gary R., List,
>>
>>
>>
>> What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature, i.e.
>> the knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of Phaneroscopy
>> are in the inner world. It so happens that in this world, the relations
>> between A preliminary mathematical result govern mathematics and
>> Phaneroscopy that you never mention -and for a good reason- which is the
>> Triadic Reduction Theorem.  I understand that it embarrasses y

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List,
I have just answered Gary F ... if you take up his criticism without making
sure of its validity, you are objectively in the same case as him ...

For the second part, it seems to me that you are stating something very
close to what I am proposing when you write "both by manifesting
instantiations of them ..." This is what I am saying but in an unclear way.
Indeed, if you have read me, you have seen that I define an isomorphism
between forms found in the "mathematical repository" (a Poset) and forms
that emerge from the observation of phanerons: another Poset. Simple but
with important consequences. This is what supports the movement of Peirce's
thought: "It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
be found in the phenomenon". The three categories are already in his mind
and he is not surprised to observe them in the phanerons. Perhaps you will
admit that in your way of saying, the two isomorphic fields are mixed up.
I don't ask for more. Besides, there is a concept that allows
apprehending this mixture; I will use it soon: a cryptomorphism
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptomorphism>.

Regards,
RM


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy


fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 14 juil. 2021 à 17:28, Jon Alan Schmidt 
a écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> RM: What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature,
> i.e. the knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of
> Phaneroscopy are in the inner world.
>
>
> On the contrary, as Gary F. already pointed out, phaneroscopy does not
> concern itself with the distinction between the outer world and the inner
> world. It studies whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way.
>
> RM:  I understand that it [the Triadic Reduction Theorem] embarrasses you
> because it ruins all your arguments, as well as those of Gary F. and Gary
> R. who follows you.
>
>
> Nonsense, which arguments of mine does it supposedly "ruin"? In this
> particular thread, I provided nine quotations yesterday demonstrating that
> Peirce consistently defines mathematics as the science which draws
> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things, i.e., its method
> is strictly deductive and its subject matter is strictly hypothetical.
> Anyone is free to disagree with him about this, but no one can legitimately
> attribute a different view to him without providing a direct quotation
> where he explicitly repudiates it later.
>
> RM: But to make sure you read Peirce's thinking on it, I extract the
> following blunt quote because it is the core of my entire approach since
> 1977.
>
>
> CSP: And analysis will show that every relation which is *tetradic*,
> *pentadic*, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
> compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that
> beyond the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is
> nothing else to be found in the phenomenon. (CP 1.347, 1903)
>
>
> No one is disputing what Peirce states here. In fact, it is a good example
> of the two major principles underlying his *mature *classification of the
> sciences as summarized by André in the three slides that Gary F. posted
> this morning. Phaneroscopy depends on mathematics in the sense that it
> makes use of its general principles, both by manifesting instantiations of
> them and by providing critical and validating feedback. This reflects a
> considerably more developed understanding of the relationships among
> different sciences than his earlier description of "empirics" as "the study
> of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those
> mathematics has studied," especially since the latter encompasses not only
> phaneroscopy but also logic, metaphysics, and all the special sciences.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 4:46 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., John Alan, Gary R., List,
>>
>>
>> What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature, i.e.
>> the knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of Phaneroscopy
>> are in the inner world. It so happens that in this world, the relations
>> between A preliminary mathematical result govern mathematics and
>> Phaneroscopy that you never mention -and for a good reason- which is the
>> Triadic Reduction Theorem.  I understand that it embarrasse

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[robert marty]

List,

Here is a malicious criticism from someone who obviously hasn't read what
he is criticizing ... I won't say more ... except to tell those who read
this thread to avoid reading the opinions of someone who makes you say the
opposite of what you said without checking anything ...
But let's stay positive by quoting what I wrote on page 26 of the Podium
section 9.1:

 "The experience is thus fed by binary relations between the external world
and the internal world (without forgetting that the second is imbricated in
the first). The internal world captures the external world under the binary
form of Secundans; they enter the mind by the door of Secondness. But
Secondness involves Firstness, which at the same time brings in the Priman
elements constituting each Secundan; moreover, we have seen that Secondness
is eventually involved in Thirdness, which also captures the cases in which
Secundans are involved in Tertians.  It  is the reason why Peirce can write:*
"**The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason**.*" (CP 5.212).



As such, experience is thus a cumulative process in which every new
experience concerns "facts accomplished" in the external world concerning
the objects of knowledge added to previous experiences of these same
objects whose aggregate is already structured. This addition may require
changes in their general structure if the particular structures of the new
entrants do not conform to the general form in use. The brute force that is
exerted forces minds to make structural changes. Nevertheless, they force
to proceed to modifications, even to radical changes of structure to
preserve the structural unity of the aggregate, and so on,  because the
process is iterative. It describes how knowledge invests external objects
by continuously modifying the structures attributed to them and sometimes
by reconsidering in a disruptive way these structural assets by
substituting them with new adequate structures. We then speak of a change
of paradigm."


All this - and much more - is visualized in the Podium: Figure 2, 3 and 4.


Robert Marty


Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 14 juil. 2021 à 17:05,  a écrit :

> List,
>
>
>
> CSP: ... every man inhabits two worlds. These are directly distinguishable
> by their different appearances. But the greatest difference between them,
> by far, is that one of these two worlds, the Inner World, exerts a
> comparatively slight compulsion upon us, though we can by direct efforts so
> slight as to be hardly noticeable, change it greatly, creating and
> destroying existent objects in it; while the other world, the Outer World,
> is full of irresistible compulsions for us, and we cannot modify it in the
> least, except by one peculiar kind of effort, muscular effort, and but very
> slightly even in that way. (CP 5.474)
>
>
>
> RM: The objects of Phaneroscopy are in the inner world.
>
>
>
> GF: We have already seen several of Peirce's definitions of phaneroscopy
> and of the phaneron. None of them say that phaneroscopy ignores objects in
> the outer world; on the contrary, the phaneron includes anything that
> appears or can appear in any way. Robert's statement above would be true
> enough if we changed the word “Phaneroscopy” to “Mathematics”; but as it
> stands, it is nonsense. (Just pointing this out to those who are trying to
> follow the thread, because it may not be obvious to everyone.)
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 14-Jul-21 05:46
>
>
>
> Gary F., John Alan, Gary R., List,
>
>
>
> What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature, i.e.
> the knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of Phaneroscopy
> are in the inner world. It so happens that in this world, the relations
> between A preliminary mathematical result govern mathematics and
> Phaneroscopy …
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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_ _ _ _ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[robert marty]

s according to
form, and not according to the qualities of matter, in case division
according to form is possible at all. "*

*3-  **"They are further considerations, however, which warrant our
expecting more confidently to finds in elements of the Phaneron certain
forms than to find in elements of the Phaneron certains forms than to find
certain others."*

*4-  **"Therefore, if there is a phaneron, the idea of combination is
an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad; for il involves the
ideas of a whole and of two parts (a point to be further considered below).
Accordingly, there will necessarily be a triad in the Phaneron".*

*5-  **"But out of triads exclusively it is possible to build all
external forms, Medads, monads, dyads, triads, tetrads, pentads, hexads,
and the rest".*

*6-  **"I **mean the principle that whatever is logically involved in
an ingredient of the Phaneron is itself an ingredient of the Phaneron; for
it is in the mind even though it be only implicitly so." *

*7-  **Thus, the entire function of the tetrad is performed by a series
of Triads; and consequently, there can be no unanalyzable tetrad, nothing
to be called an quartan element of the Phaneron. Plainly, the same process
will exclude quintanity, sextanity, septanity and all higher forms of
indecomposable elements from the Phaneron.*



*8-  **To many a reader this reasoning will appear obscure and
inconclusive.*



*9-  **This is by no means the only difficulty of mathematics, which
incessantly employs them, but it is perhaps the chief reason why we find
among particularly able professional men, and even among thinkers, so many
who are completely shut off from mathematics. But those whom this
demonstration fails to reach may find themselves convinced by the facts of
observation when we come to consider them.*



*10-   **Much might be profitably added to this preliminary a priori study;
but even with the greatest compression I shall cover too many of the
valuable pages of the Monist. We must hasten, then, to try how well or ill
our a priori conclusions are supported by the actual examination of the
contents of the Phaneron. Let us begin at once.*



*11-   **Can we find a Phaneron any element logically indecomposable, which
is such as it is, altogether otherwise than relatively, but positively, and
regardless of aught else?*

*  I answer, there are many such elements.*



*12 -What room, then, is there for Secundans and Tertians? Was there some
mistakes in our demonstration that they must also have their places in the
Phaneron? No, there was no mistake*



*13 - But the phaneron does contain genuine Secundans.*

Regards

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 13 juil. 2021 à 19:59,  a écrit :

> Well, I guess I underestimated how eager we are to focus on the
> classification of sciences! A couple of brief questions before I post the
> slides on that:
>
> Robert, thanks for attaching the Tommi Vehkavaara diagram. In it
> mathematics is labelled “negative science.” This is a new term for me, and
> I haven’t found it in any of Peirce’s texts, so it would be helpful if you
> explain what it means, or else point us to the paper where Tommi does so.
> (Maybe he just invented it to distinguish it from “positive science.”)
>
> Jon, you wrote that “what mainly distinguishes it [phaneroscopy] from
> mathematics is observation vs. imagination; or rather, observation as 
> *including
> but not limited to* products of the imagination” — but for the very
> reason you give after the semicolon, I wouldn’t want to frame the
> distinction as “observation vs. imagination.” Peirce says that even
> mathematics is observational, in a quote that Robert posted earlier:
>
> CSP: The first [ science ] is mathematics, which does not undertake to
> ascertain any matter of fact whatever, but merely posits hypotheses and
> traces out their consequences. It is observational, in so far as it makes
> constructions in the imagination according to abstract precepts, and then
> observes these imaginary objects, finding in them relations of parts not
> specified in the precept of construction. This is truly observation, yet
> certainly in a very peculiar sense; and no other kind of observation would
> at all answer the purpose of mathematics. (CP 1.239)
>
> GF: So the “very peculiar” kind of observation in mathematics is
> observation *of imaginary objects*, while phaneroscopic observation is of
> *any* objects that can be “before the mind” regardless of whether they
> are imaginary or not. (What we usually call the “empirical” sciences
> generally observe objects that are *not* imaginary in the sense that
> mathematical constructi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[robert marty]

List,

   - Minimal classification, but strong :
   *"Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of
   the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of
   steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may
   adapt our phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of
   stairs leading down into it:*

*We divide the whole into three great parts:*


* - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to
their real existence,   - empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose
of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied,*

* - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the
truths of empirics."*

(Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, III.2, 1122) [emphasize
mine]


   - Maximally extended classification according to  Tommi Vehkavaara,
   attached ...

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 13 juil. 2021 à 17:20,  a écrit :

> List,
>
> Slide 14 is the last in Part 2 of the slideshow, and I’m sure many of us
> are eager to start on Part 3, which is about “the place of phaneroscopy in
> Peirce’s mature classification of the sciences.” So unless questions arise
> today about the specific content of this slide, I’d like to post the next
> slide tomorrow, along with slides 16 and 17 (as a sort of triptych). They
> outline the two principles which guide Peirce’s classification of sciences,
> which I think need to be considered together. Here’s why:
>
> Peirce’s classification is mostly inherited from Auguste Comte, including
> the hierarchical order which places the most abstract sciences at the top,
> with the idea that they supply *principles* to the lower sciences. Comte
> also introduced the concept of *positive science*, which (for Peirce at
> least) means *experiential* science. (This usage of “positive” has
> nothing to do with “positive logic” (as opposed to “negative logic.”) Where
> Peirce differs from today’s common usage is that he considered the
> *normative* sciences (esthetics, ethics and critical logic) to be
> positive sciences. He also argued, from 1902 on, that the normative
> sciences — and especially logic — depend for their principles on
> mathematics *and* phenomenology/phaneroscopy. We can’t hope to understand
> the relationship *in practice* between mathematics and phaneroscopy by
> reducing either one to the other. That is Peirce’s point in asserting that
> phaneroscopy is a positive science while mathematics is not.
>
> The classification hierarchy in which order is determined by dependence *for
> principles* of the lower upon the higher *does not reflect the procedural
> order in the practice of heuristic sciences*. For example, Peirce says
> that the practice of phanerocopy consists of “observation and
> generalization.” Naturally we tend to assume that observation comes first
> and generalization later. But if we are practicing this science *for the
> purpose of discovering the categories* as elements of a phaneron which
> includes possibilities *and* actualities, we are quite likely to start
> with possibilities and *then* do a ‘reality check’ to see whether our
> hypothetical schema applies as well to actualities; and the reality check
> must be a kind of observation, experiential like the surprising events that
> prompt us to come up with a hypothesis in the first place. Indeed all
> theoretical sciences, to the extent that their theories are testable, go
> through *cycles* of observation and generalization *and testing and
> modification, *or conjecture and refutation (Popper). In practice, then,
> sciences can *precede each other* so that there is no pragmatic
> significance in debates over which comes first.
>
> This is all a sort of prolegomena to André’s outline of the *two*
> principles which, he says, guide the classification of sciences. I suppose
> those who consider themselves experts in that department (which I don’t!)
> might want to skip Part 3 of the slideshow and jump ahead to Part 4, which
> is entitled “From mathematics to phaneroscopy”; but I think that would
> violate a cardinal principle which I just invented: *Thou shalt not rush
> a slow read*.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Sent:* 13-Jul-21 08:55
>
>
>
> Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
> slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
> <https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site. Now that
> we have definitions of the three universal categories, the next step in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Lasting Flash from the Past

[robert marty]

Mike, List

I share this opinion as much as possible because it is what I felt when
life hazards allowed me to meet Peirce. Shortly afterward, I abandoned the
theory of the Abelian Groups to devote myself to a long immersion in the
heart of this continent that I had just discovered. I understood at once
that I could do it without leaving my original mathematical culture
(Homological Algebra, mainly), and it was for me an exciting intellectual
adventure... but quickly appeared the difficulties that everyone can
imagine and even observe on this list. One can see daily that Paul Weiss's
enthusiasm for the maximum openness coextensive to Peirce's thought is not
the most shared attitude ...  May this reminder inspire the spirit of our
debates!

Then we would find "The Best" ...

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 12 juil. 2021 à 07:13, Mike Bergman  a écrit :

> Hi All,
>
> "Though Peirce had a preference for the element of Thirdness, I think we
> must look at him as essentially a First. He is, in fact, one of the
> clearest cases of sheer Firstness in the history of thought.
> Unpredictable, fresh, alive, spontaneous, his primary function has been,
> and undoubtedly will continue indefinitely to be, that of a source of
> ideas powerful enough to withstand the brutalities of existence and
> valid enough to make possible a somewhat closer approach to a universal
> and lasting truth.” [1, p 192]
>
> Thanks, Mike
>
> [1] Weiss, Paul. 1942. “Charles Sanders Peirce.” The Sewanee Review
> 50(2): 184–92.
>
> --
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation
> 319.621.5225
> skype:michaelkbergman
> http://cognonto.com
> http://mkbergman.com
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[Robert Marty]

Here is the entire beginning of my section 5 to which Gary F. refers:

*"5. Some preliminary and necessary clarifications about terminology.*

*Universal Categories are "categories of elements of phenomena.*"
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish clearly, in any statement,
whether one is referring to a particular category or an element (phaneron)
belonging to this category"."

In addition, there is no problem because :

| ... ] an obvious principle which is as purely a priori as a principle
well can be, since it is involved in the very idea of the Phaneron as
containing constituents of which some are logically unanalyzable and others
analyzable, promptly reduces that subjective possibility to an absurdity. *I
mean the principle that whatever is logically involved in an ingredient of
the Phaneron is itself an ingredient of the Phaneron*; for it is in the
mind even though it be only implicitly so. (EP2: 364)


Le dim. 11 juil. 2021 à 17:18,  a écrit :

> Robert, you wrote yesterday:
>
> RM: here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that Peirce
> proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name to designate
> the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these categories.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 11-Jul-21 09:56
>
> Gary F. ... now it's you who goes faster than the music 
>
> GF : *"Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as
> “phanerons.” *(sic). I have never written such nonsense. For more than 40
> years I have been talking about the elements of phenomena; I have even
> built a "trichotomic machine"
> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336217698_The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants>
> ( Marty,Robert, "The trichotomic machine", Semiotica, vol. 2019, no 228,‎
> mai 2019, p. 173-192)  which breaks down a phaneron into elements like a
> crystal breaks down light and better like X-rays make a skeleton appear on
> a screen (corresponding at the "skeletonisation" of Peirce..
>
> Here is a quote from my preprint "The Podium " :
> "In the main text, "The basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy" (EP2 360),
> Peirce invites his reader to accompany him in his discovery:
> "I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron(which
> will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover
> what different forms of indecomposable elements it contains."  (Marty 6.3
> from EP2 360)
>
> "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
> present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present
> at any time to the mind in any way" (CP 1.186)
>
> GF : *"Peirce’s phaneroscopy is a positive science, not a purely
> hypothetical one like mathematics"*
>
> "Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science
> which should not aim to declare that something is positively or
> categorically true. I reply that it is not only possible to conceive of
> such a science, but that such science exists and flourishes, and
> Phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other positive science,
> nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon
> the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only aim
> is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might be supposed
> to be, if not in our universe, then in some other. A Phenomenology which
> does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science hardly come to years of
> discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful club-footed affair
> that Hegel produced. (CP 5.40)
>
>
>
> *GF : "** Also, we’ve seen in Robert’s previous posts that he regards the
> categories as produced by deduction from mathematical principles ..."*
>
>
>
> This is wrong, completely wrong! The word "deduction" does not even appear
> in my article "Podium"! Gary F. presents me as he would like me to be!
>
>
>
> Here is what I do, it is very simple:
>
> 1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1
> (C) which is a Poset
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partially_ordered_set>  in wich les
> graphismes 3,2,1 sont reliés par des flèches qui représentent des
> homogenous binary relations entre eux qui vérifient les axiomes requis pour
> être un Poset.
>
> 2-On the other hand, I find that Peirce's 3 universal categories
> constitute an object (D) diagrammatized as follows: Thirdness → Secondness
> → Firsness (D) where the arrows represent homogenous binary relations
> between the categorie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[robert marty]

correction concerning item 1:

1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1
(C), which is a Poset in which the graphs-numbers 3,2,1 are connected by
arrows that represent homogenous binary relations between them that verify
the axioms required to be a Poset

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 11 juil. 2021 à 15:56, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Gary F. ... now it's you who goes faster than the music 
>
> GF : *"Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as
> “phanerons.” *(sic). I have never written such nonsense. For more than 40
> years I have been talking about the elements of phenomena; I have even
> built a "trichotomic machine"
> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336217698_The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants>
> ( Marty,Robert, "The trichotomic machine", Semiotica, vol. 2019, no 228,‎
> mai 2019, p. 173-192)  which breaks down a phaneron into elements like a
> crystal breaks down light and better like X-rays make a skeleton appear on
> a screen (corresponding at the "skeletonisation" of Peirce..
>
> Here is a quote from my preprint "The Podium " :
> "In the main text, "The basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy" (EP2 360),
> Peirce invites his reader to accompany him in his discovery:
> "I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron(which
> will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover
> what different forms of indecomposable elements it contains."  (Marty 6.3
> from EP2 360)
>
> "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
> present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present
> at any time to the mind in any way" (CP 1.186)
>
> GF : *"Peirce’s phaneroscopy is a positive science, not a purely
> hypothetical one like mathematics"*
>
> "Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science
> which should not aim to declare that something is positively or
> categorically true. I reply that it is not only possible to conceive of
> such a science, but that such science exists and flourishes, and
> Phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other positive science,
> nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon
> the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only aim
> is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might be supposed
> to be, if not in our universe, then in some other. A Phenomenology which
> does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science hardly come to years of
> discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful club-footed affair
> that Hegel produced. (CP 5.40)
>
> *GF : " Also, we’ve seen in Robert’s previous posts that he regards the
> categories as produced by deduction from mathematical principles ..."*
>
> This is wrong, completely wrong! The word "deduction" does not even appear
> in my article "Podium"! Gary F. presents me as he would like me to be!
>
> Here is what I do, it is very simple:
> 1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1
> (C) which is a Poset
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partially_ordered_set>  in wich les
> graphismes 3,2,1 sont reliés par des flèches qui représentent des  homogenous 
> binary
> relations entre eux qui vérifient les axiomes requis pour être un Poset.
> 2-On the other hand, I find that Peirce's 3 universal categories
> constitute an object (D) diagrammatized as follows: Thirdness → Secondness
> → Firsness (D) where the arrows represent homogenous binary relations
> between the categories; they result from their respective definitions that
> Peirce obtains by abstractive observation. These relations also verify the
> three axioms required by Poset's definition. The three universal categories
> are thus also in a Poset relational structure. De Tienne has almost
> captured this structure as "Quasi-Ordinal" (sic).
> 3- I establish that the two posets (C) and (D) are isomorphic
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomorphism>, which is child's play. As a
> result, "In mathematical jargon, one says that two objects are the same up
> to an isomorphism.There is nothing deductive in this identification of
> structures; however, ignoring it has consequences. I will explain them when
> the time comes.
>
> This isomorphism captures with the greatest accuracy the identification of
> forms explicitly mentioned in MS 1345 in the sentence "-*empirics* , t*he
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[robert marty]

Gary F. ... now it's you who goes faster than the music 

GF : *"Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as
“phanerons.” *(sic). I have never written such nonsense. For more than 40
years I have been talking about the elements of phenomena; I have even
built a "trichotomic machine"
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336217698_The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants>
( Marty,Robert, "The trichotomic machine", Semiotica, vol. 2019, no 228,‎
mai 2019, p. 173-192)  which breaks down a phaneron into elements like a
crystal breaks down light and better like X-rays make a skeleton appear on
a screen (corresponding at the "skeletonisation" of Peirce..

Here is a quote from my preprint "The Podium " :
"In the main text, "The basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy" (EP2 360),
Peirce invites his reader to accompany him in his discovery:
"I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron(which
will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover
what different forms of indecomposable elements it contains."  (Marty 6.3
from EP2 360)

"Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present
at any time to the mind in any way" (CP 1.186)

GF : *"Peirce’s phaneroscopy is a positive science, not a purely
hypothetical one like mathematics"*

"Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science
which should not aim to declare that something is positively or
categorically true. I reply that it is not only possible to conceive of
such a science, but that such science exists and flourishes, and
Phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other positive science,
nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon
the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only aim
is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might be supposed
to be, if not in our universe, then in some other. A Phenomenology which
does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science hardly come to years of
discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful club-footed affair
that Hegel produced. (CP 5.40)

*GF : " Also, we’ve seen in Robert’s previous posts that he regards the
categories as produced by deduction from mathematical principles ..."*

This is wrong, completely wrong! The word "deduction" does not even appear
in my article "Podium"! Gary F. presents me as he would like me to be!

Here is what I do, it is very simple:
1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1
(C) which is a Poset  <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partially_ordered_set>  in
wich les graphismes 3,2,1 sont reliés par des flèches qui représentent
des  homogenous binary
relations entre eux qui vérifient les axiomes requis pour être un Poset.
2-On the other hand, I find that Peirce's 3 universal categories constitute
an object (D) diagrammatized as follows: Thirdness → Secondness → Firsness
(D) where the arrows represent homogenous binary relations between the
categories; they result from their respective definitions that Peirce
obtains by abstractive observation. These relations also verify the three
axioms required by Poset's definition. The three universal categories are
thus also in a Poset relational structure. De Tienne has almost captured
this structure as "Quasi-Ordinal" (sic).
3- I establish that the two posets (C) and (D) are isomorphic
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomorphism>, which is child's play. As a
result, "In mathematical jargon, one says that two objects are the same up
to an isomorphism.There is nothing deductive in this identification of
structures; however, ignoring it has consequences. I will explain them when
the time comes.

This isomorphism captures with the greatest accuracy the identification of
forms explicitly mentioned in MS 1345 in the sentence "-*empirics* , t*he
study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those
mathematics has studied"*; it also covers the relations of dependence
between mathematics and any positive science mentioned in any other
classification of sciences. ( see Tommi Vehkavaara's compilation
<https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_>
 ).

To assert unceasingly that Phaneroscopy is only a positive science by
rejecting mathematics, is to refuse to recognize the role they play in the
Sciences of Discovery; it is to amputate Peirce's work from its
mathematical part ...

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 10 juil. 2021 à 21:56,  a écrit :

> Jack, lis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[Robert Marty]

JACK, List

For clarification, here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out
that Peirce proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name
to designate the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these
categories. By adopting these distinctions one avoids many confusions.

"5. Some preliminary and necessary clarifications about terminology.
Universal Categories are "categories of elements of phenomena." Therefore,
it is necessary to
distinguish clearly, in any statement, whether one is referring to a
particular category or an element
(phaneron) belonging to this category. Very frequently, Peirce, when he
designates elements, calls
"Priman" any element belonging to the Firstness (CP 1.295, 1.320),
"Secundan" any element
belonging to the Secondness (CP 1.296, 1.319, 1.320), "Tertian" any element
belonging to the
Thirdness (1.297, 1.351). In "The basis of the pragmaticism in
phaneroscopy" (EP2 360- 370) of
1903, Peirce makes systematic use of it (EP2: 364). A distinction rarely
found in the literature. Peirce
also uses other equivalent terms, notably "a Firstness" or "a Possible"
instead of "a Priman, "a
Secondness, "an Existent" or "a Fact" instead of "a Secundan" and "a
Thirdness, "a Necessitant"
instead of "a Tertian." (EP2, 479). This is the reason why it must be well
established, from this
moment on, that we will have a name to designate each of the three
categories and a well
differentiated name to designate the corresponding elements that belong to
each category. This is
necessary because Peirce often leaves the distinction to the reader. For
example, he often refers to the
correlates of relations as "First," "Second," "Third" (CP 2.274), and it
frequently happens that these
terms are interpreted as "a Firstness," "a Secondness," or "a Thirdness,"
respectively. Consequently,
we will proceed to systematic rewriting, which will be very useful in the
definitions in particular. "

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352641475_The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases

Best,
Robert Marty

Le sam. 10 juil. 2021 à 15:05,  a écrit :

> Jack, list,
>
> First, I should clarify that it is only the *universal* categories that
> are “ubiquitous,” to use Peirce’s term. He mentions several times that
> there are other sets of categories, or elements, that the practice of
> phenomenology/phaneroscopy could bring to light; but he preferred to focus
> on the *formal* elements of the phaneron (as opposed to the *material*
> elements) precisely because they are universal, and because the set is very
> small.
>
> Second, Peirce does give examples of a phenomenon with only one (of the
> three) elements. His favorite is a disembodied “red patch” — but you have
> to imagine it as eternal, unchanging, and being the *entire content of
> consciousness*, i.e. the whole universe. It does not stand out from a
> background, and it’s not the predicate of a subject, because the
> subject/predicate distinction brings in the element of Secondness, just as
> the subject/object distinction does in commonsense psychology. You can’t
> even experience it as “a phenomenon” because that would assume that
> multiple phenomena are at least possible, and so you have Secondness again,
> plus Thirdness as soon as you *classify* it as a phenomenon. That, I
> think, is why Peirce wrote to James that he spoke of  “only one
> ‘phenomenon’” (CP 8.301) and needed to invent a new word for it, which
> turned out to be “phaneron”.
>
> But once he had defined *phaneroscopy* as a procedure that could be
> practiced by any number of investigators, then he could (and did, although
> rarely) speak of *phanerons* in the plural:
>
> CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons;
> and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the
> like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can
> control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he
> must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I
> shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of
> effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. (CP 1.286)
>
> So yes, if someone wants to define “elements of the phenomenon” in some
> other way than Peirce’s, he’s free to do so, but according to Peirce’s
> ethics of scientific terminology he cannot call what he is doing
> “phaneroscopy,” because he is not following *the procedure defined by
> Peirce* as phaneroscopy, and thus not repeating *Peirce’s* observations
> and experiments.
>
> JC: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[robert marty]

John, List
I totally agree with you. This can be seen very clearly in Tommi
Vehkavaara's compilation of the classifications of sciences from 1902 to
1911. We can see that the Mathematics at level (AI) are divided in:

 (AIa) *Mathematics of Logic (e.g.*,* formal logic
in contemporary sense)*
 (AIb) Mathematics of Discrete Series
 (AIc) Mathematics of Continua and Pseudo-continua

and the level (AII) is divided as follows
 :
 (AII) Cenoscopy -Philosophia prima- positive
science (which rests upon familiar, general experience) Special sciences -
positive sciences (based on special experiences, discover new phenomena)
   (AIIa)
Phenomenology(1902-3,1906,1911) -Phaneroscopy (1904-)
   (AIIb) Normative Sciences the
Normative Sciences are divided in:
  (AIIbi) Esthetics
(Axiagastics, 1905
  (AIIbii) Ethics -
Anthetics/Practics (1906)
  (AIIbiii)*Logic- Science
of general laws of Signs -Formal Semiotic(Semeiotic)- theory of
(self)-controlled thought*

Moreover, in my article on the "Podium" in section 3, I pointed out that
this confusion was at the origin of the elimination of mathematics in the
secondary literature on Peirce, mainly that concerning semiotics (I quote
Houser, Belluci and Pietarinen, and De Tienne). In fact, by using the logic
of the level (AIIbiii) in which Mathematical Logic is implemented from the
level (AIa) on which it depends, one can ignore the level (AIb) of Discrete
Mathematics in which the mathematical structures that operate on
Phenomenology (Phaneroscopy) are located, thus creating an "illusion of
mathematical structures" despite the loss of the constitutive relations. It
is a more or less conscious avoidance strategy, depending on the case.

Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 7 juil. 2021 à 05:35, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert and Gary F,
>
> The issue you're debating is caused by the ambiguity in Peirce's use of
> the word 'logic'.  In his 1903 classification of the sciences, the word
> 'logic' appears in two places:  mathematics of logic is the first of three
> branches of mathematics.  But logic proper is a branch of normative science.
>
> The logic that is used to derive the categories and hypoicons is th logic
> of mathematics, AKA mathematical logic, AKA formal logic.  The logic that
> scientists use to evaluate the truth of their hypotheses is normative
> logic, which is misleadingly called logic proper.
>
> See the comments and quotations below.
>
> John
>
> 
>
> The categories and hypoicons, the foundation for semeiotic, are
> derived from the phaneron by applying the three branches of pure
> mathematics:  formal logic; discrete mathematics (arithmetic, graphs,
> and discrete sets); and continuous mathematics (geometry, topology,
> and uncountable sets).
>
> We must also distinguish the term *formal logic*, which occurs 119 times
> in CP, from* logic proper*, which occurs just 7 times in CP.  DeMorgan
> coined the term formal logic, and Peirce adopted it for every logic
> notation developed by himself or others.  Note its importance:
>
> CSP:  The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
> matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the
> fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than
> the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
> (CP 5.469, R318, 1907)
>
> CSP:  My trichotomy is plainly of the family stock of Hegel’s three
> stages of thought, — an idea that goes back to Kant, and I know not
> how much further.  But the arbitrariness of Hegel’s procedure, utterly
> unavoidable at the time he lived, — and presumably, in less degree,
> unavoidable now, or at any future date, — is in great measure avoided
> by my taking care never to miss the solid support of mathematically
> exact formal logic beneath my feet  (EP 2:428, R318, 1907
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[robert marty]

Gary F, List


My opinion is that Mathematics and Philosophy are best placed where Peirce
himself put them :


Extract from (26) (DOC) The "Podium" of Universal Categories and their
degenerate cases | robert marty - Academia.edu
<https://www.academia.edu/49325877/The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases>


Section  *1 Prolegomena on the role of mathematics in the classifications
of sciences**.*


Carolyn Eisele, the editor of "The New Elements of Mathematics" of Peirce
(1982), quoting Peirce, emphasized the importance of these principles for a
proper understanding of Peirce's philosophy:



*The doctrine of exact philosophy . . . is that all danger of error in
philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating in philosophy will be
reduced to a minimum by treating the problem as mathematically as possible,
that is, by constructing some sort of a diagram representing that which is
supposed to be open to the observation of every scientific intelligence,
and thereupon mathematically . . . deducing the consequences of that
hypothesis. *(Peirce, NEM IV, x).

*It is no wonder that in every classification of the sciences, mathematics
heads every list, while philosophy, to be exact "must rest on mathematical
principles**. *(Peirce, NEM IV, 273) [emphasize mine]


Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mar. 6 juil. 2021 à 15:45,  a écrit :

> Point of clarification:
>
> CSP: Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic,
> however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It
> is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its
> aim; and in doing so is even more dependent upon ethics, or the philosophy
> of aims, by far, than it is, in the methodeutic branch, upon mathematics.
> We shall soon come to understand how a student of ethics might well be
> tempted to make his science a branch of logic; as, indeed, it pretty nearly
> was in the mind of Socrates. But this would be no truer a view than the
> other. Logic depends upon mathematics; still more intimately upon ethics;
> but its proper concern is with truths beyond the purview of either. (CP
> 4.240, 1902)
>
> CSP: 526. Logic is a branch of philosophy. That is to say it is an
> experiential, or positive science, but a science which rests on no special
> observations, made by special observational means, but on phenomena which
> lie open to the observation of every man, every day and hour. There are two
> main branches of philosophy, Logic, or the philosophy of thought, and
> Metaphysics, or the philosophy of being. Still more general than these is
> High Philosophy which brings to light certain truths applicable alike to
> logic and to metaphysics. It is with this high philosophy that we have at
> first to deal. (CP 7.526, undated)
>
> GF: In my opinion this “High Philosophy,” or first of the positive
> sciences, is essentially the same science that Peirce called
> “phenomenology” in 1902, and later “phaneroscopy”. It makes observations by
> direct experience and generalizes from them with the help of some kind of 
> *logica
> utens.* After the categories have been prescinded, named and
> conceptualized as a trichotomy, then we can use formal logic to apply them
> in other branches of philosophy.
>
> CSP: I have followed out this trichotomy into many other ramifications,
> and have uniformly found it to be a most useful polestar in my explorations
> into the different branches of philosophy. There is no fallacy in it; for
> it asserts nothing, but only offers suggestions…. My trichotomy is plainly
> of the family stock of Hegel’s three stages of thought,—an idea that goes
> back to Kant, and I know not how much further. But the arbitrariness of
> Hegel’s procedure, utterly unavoidable at the time he lived,—and
> presumably, in less degree, unavoidable now, or at any future date,—is in
> great measure avoided by my taking care never to miss the solid support of
> mathematically exact formal logic beneath my feet. (EP2:428, 1907)
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *John F. Sowa
> *Sent:* 5-Jul-21 23:22
> Robert, List,
>
> I strongly agree with you:
>
> RM> My criticism is precisely about the fact that De Tienne starts with
> phaneroscopy and forgets that the formal structures he believes in
> discovering are inherited from mathematics on which they depend.
>
> At the end of this note is the opening section of my previous note on the
> elements of phaneroscopy.  These points are the prerequisites for
> understanding what Peirce wrote about phenomeology or phaneroscopy.  It'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Iconicity and abduction

[robert marty]

John, List

I must point out that  I used the Categories Theory to model Peirce's
semiotics as early as 1977 in French, 1982 in English. I have not stopped
publishing on this theoretical basis.  On my Academia.edu website, you will
find my most recent works and notably the last one in which I take a strong
position in favor of a Category-Theoretic Structuralism (see robert marty
(academia.edu) <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/research#drafts>. In
addition, it turns out that the authors evoke "the fascinating typological
puzzle" (2.2, p.33) that I assembled in a lattice a long time ago.

I think that their bibliographical research did not lead you to retain my
work by citing it in your book. However, Robert Burch references it in the
article "Charles Sanders Peirce" of the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, which everyone knows is an authority. This omission, probably
due to a lack of vigilance on their part, obliges me to clarify the
anteriority of my works on Peirce's semiotics.



In a previous contact of February 2021, the authors had kindly sent me
their book. I had gone through it quickly and put it aside because I was
busy with other work. This is to say that nothing is conflicting about my
intervention; it is just necessary information in scientific matters.


Sincerely,

 Robert Marty

 Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 28 juin 2021 à 05:03, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Since Jon Awbrey no longer subscribes to Peirce-L, I'm sending this note
> about another book he cited.  See below for the title, authors, and the
> publisher's summary.
>
> The Springer website for this book also includes two URLs for free copies
> of the table of contents and Chapter 2 Iconicity in Peirce's semiotics:
>
> ToC:
> http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783319442440-t1.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1588439-p180195139
>
> Ch 2:
> http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783319442440-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1588374-p180195139
>
> John
>
> __
>
> *Iconicity and Abductio*n by Gianluca Caterina and Rocco Gangle
>
> This book consolidates and extends the authors’ work on the connection
> between iconicity and abductive inference.  It emphasizes a pragmatic,
> experimental and fallibilist view of knowledge without sacrificing
> formal rigor.  Within this context, the book focuses particularly on
> scientific knowledge and its prevalent use of mathematics.  To find an
> answer to the question “What kind of experimental activity is the
> scientific employment of mathematics?” the book addresses the problems
> involved in formalizing abductive cognition.
>
> For this, it implements
> the concept and method of iconicity, modeling this theoretical
> framework mathematically through category theory and topoi.  Peirce's
> concept of iconic signs is treated in depth, and it is shown how
> Peirce's diagrammatic logical notation of Existential Graphs makes use
> of iconicity and how important features of this iconicity are
> representable within category theory.  Alain Badiou’s set-theoretical
> model of truth procedures and his relational sheaf-based theory of
> phenomenology are then integrated within the Peircean logical context.
> Finally, the book opens the path towards a more naturalist
> interpretation of the abductive models developed in Peirce and Badiou
> through an analysis of several recent attempts to reformulate quantum
> mechanics with categorical methods.  Overall, the book offers a
> comprehensive and rigorous overview of past approaches to iconic
> semiotics and abduction, and it encompasses new extensions of these
> methods towards an innovative naturalist interpretation of abductive
> reasoning.
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 7

[robert marty]

List,

My aim is not to differ from André's approach to discovering categories. I
do not want to engage in an endless philosophical debate about the reality
of mathematical objects and their complex relationship with experience. The
disagreements will come later because I assume a Categorical Theoretic
Structuralism position in mathematics. I extend it to phaneroscopy using an
isomorphism between an abstract mathematical object (Poset or Functor) and
the set of relations between Peirce's universal categories as he defines
them. It seems to me that this consolidates the scientific status of
phaneroscopy. Then - note that this is my conclusion - I point out all the
interest in considering these structures because they agree with Peirce's
objective idealism if we need a philosophical reference.

Your quotation from Peirce introducing the question of truth is
enlightening in this respect: *"And this truth like every truth must come
to us by the way of experience. No apriorist ever denied that*.". Indeed,
whether you consider me as an apriorist or not, it will not destroy this
isomorphism. All means are good to reach the truth; let us not waste time
in vain quarrels.

Sincerely,

Robert Marty


Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le sam. 26 juin 2021 à 15:07,  a écrit :

> List,
>
> Robert, except for a few inaccuracies (like the misspelling of
> *prescission*), your account of the discovery of the categories is very
> much in line with André’s, although the terminology is different. If I may
> focus on one sentence of your summary, I have a question about your usage
> of the term *a priori* here: “the act of precession is a simple
> observation that we can discover an organization a priori in the phaneron.”
> In most philosophical discourse (since Kant anyway), *a priori* means
> “prior to experience” (usually meaning *sense* experience). If you mean
> that we can discover this “organization” without relying on any
> *particular* sense experience, this is certainly true of phaneroscopic
> observation, because the phaneron includes that “organization” *as well
> as* sense experience. But obviously the discovery cannot be prior to
> observation of the phaneron. Once it has been formulated, mathematically or
> otherwise, the organization has been generalized *from the observation*,
> not the other way round. If you agree with that, your account is in
> agreement with André’s, as far as I can see.
>
> As for Peirce, one relevant comment on the issue is this one:
>
> CSP (CP 1.417,): [[ The questions which are here to be examined are, what
> are the different systems of hypotheses from which mathematical deduction
> can set out, what are their general characters, why are not other
> hypotheses possible, and the like. These are not problems which, like those
> of mathematics, repose upon clear and definite assumptions recognized at
> the outset; and yet, like mathematical problems, they are questions of
> possibility and necessity. What the nature of this necessity can be is one
> of the very matters to be discovered. This much, however, is indisputable:
> if there are really any such necessary characteristics of mathematical
> hypotheses as I have just declared in advance that we shall find that there
> [are], this necessity must spring from some truth so broad as to hold not
> only for the universe we know but for every world that poet could create.
> And this truth like every truth must come to us by the way of experience.
> No apriorist ever denied that. The first matters which it is pertinent to
> examine are the most universal categories of elements of all experience,
> natural or poetical. ]]
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 26-Jun-21 04:08
>
> List,
>
> Since it is a slow read, we have the convenience of dealing with the
> questions one after the other.
>
> I observe that it is admitted in the previous slide that the reader is
> familiar with the categories.  They have a logical role, form a small set
> gradually ordered, participate in a step-by-step process that incorporates
> them. Each category is found inductively (in the phaneron, I suppose);
> finally, they are tested by precession.
>
>  I notice that no formal definition of the categories have been presented
> (like CP 8.328), nor any justification of their reduction to three
> (Reduction Thesis), and that the terms "mode of being" have not been
> mentioned so far.
>
>
>
> Slide 7 provides more details on testing.
>
> - it is an act of abstractive analysis (it is thus an operation of the
> mind on what is in front of it, i.e., a phanero

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[robert marty]

Gary F, It will be possible to debate these questions from the following
slide in which André De Tienne writes about "a non-reciprocal logical order
of dependence". ... I am ready ...

 Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 23 juin 2021 à 18:16,  a écrit :

> Robert, your criticism is duly noted and has been forwarded to André De
> Tienne. Whether he responds to you or to the list is of course up to him.
>
> Since no one (including you) has expressed an interest in having Peirce’s
> texts on the issue (other than the one you quoted) posted to the list, I’ll
> wait until we reach the stage of the slow read that deals with it before
> posting them.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 23-Jun-21 10:47
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L  >
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6
>
>
>
> I will not follow you on this polemical tone because to criticize, in
> scientific matters, is precise to respect, since one makes the first effort
> to consider the thought of the other and then a second effort by building
> arguments to contest it if need be. My criticism is precisely about the
> fact that De Tienne starts with phaneroscopy and forgets that the formal
> structures he believes in discovering are inherited from mathematics on
> which they depend.  You have done very well to warn him, and I hope that he
> will have the opportunity to put forward his own justifications.
>
> I do not doubt that you can bring forward a large number of quotations
> from Peirce, but it will be difficult for you to escape the sense of
> dependence without finding yourself in contradiction with Peirce himself:
>
>
>
> "*It is, however, not a heresy but a doctrine very widely entertained,
> since Auguste Comte wrote, that the sciences form a sort of ladder
> descending into the well of truth, each one leading on to another, those
> which are more concrete and special drawing their principles from those
> which are more abstract and general". *(CP 2.119) [emphasize mine]
>
>
>
> RM
>
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
>
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
>
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Le mer. 23 juin 2021 à 15:08,  a écrit :
>
> Robert, your prescription of “mutual respect” apparently doesn’t oblige
> you to extend respect to André De Tienne. The subject of mathematics and
> its relation to phaneroscopy has not come up yet in the slow read; it
> doesn’t come up until slide 18, with Peirce’s classification of the
> sciences. But you have apparently jumped to the conclusion that De Tienne
> ignores mathematics entirely because he does not *start* with it. I’ll
> copy this to him in case he wants to respond.
>
> I’ll be happy to post here what Peirce said about the reliance of
> phaneroscopy on mathematics, it you really want to discuss it in a mutually
> respectful manner, rather than turning it into a combative “debate.”
>
> Gary f.
>
> }  {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 23-Jun-21 08:16
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L  >
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I followed without intervening in the debates on André de Tienne's slides.
> The initiative is interesting because one spends a long time in a frame,
> breaking with the only particular reactions of the present. Taking the time
> to discuss step by step on a constructed presentation can be eminently
> profitable to the collective progress. Each one can bring his stone or his
> nuance in a climate of mutual respect. Observation shows that this is not
> the case.
>
>
>
> The cause of this is, in my opinion, that from the beginning, the first
> slide introduces a characterized bias. Indeed, the discussion is biased by
> the proposal to choose André de Tienne's idiosyncratic approach as a
> framework. It has not really been discussed. It imposes the entry into the
> Peircean system of thought through phaneroscopy presented as a science of
> observation without any prior foundation. It would be made possible by the
> capacity granted to any mind to prescind universal categories in any
> phaneron, i.e., in everything that is in front of the mind. We can
> immediately observe that if the mind can prescind universal categories in
> any phaneron, they are already there (CP 1.353). Indeed, "The categ

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and category theory

[robert marty]

John, Jon, List

I think I have shown that one can already avoid, at first, the most
repulsive and abstract aspect of the exposition of the axioms of
CategoryTheory . Because it is the natural transformations of functors that
are the essential obstacle opening towards categories of categories. These
"relations of relations" which disturb no longer appear if we place
ourselves in the field of Posets (Partially Ordered Set) which is easy to
apprehend especially since the Poset that we use to begin with is just the
order on the three numbers 1,2,3 that children count on their fingers! Then
it's just a matter of understanding the notion of "structure-preserving
application" which is easy to illustrate with diagrams. I must say that the
mental operations of most philosophers who manipulate sequences of
reasoning in the field of classical logic mobilize capacities far beyond
those required to work with such a simple Poset. The resulting lattice
structure is immediately put into a diagram and there is no need to know
its exact definition.Moreover, to convince oneself of its natural relevance
to semiotics, one need only read Peirce: CP 2.254 to 2.264.
Best regards
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 25 juin 2021 à 06:08, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> The attached file, diag.txt, contains a review of the book *Diagrammatic
> Immanence: Category Theory and Philosophy*, which contains a chapter
> about Peirce.  Since the book is written for non-mathematicians, it uses
> diagrams to explain the ideas, rather than the more complex terminology of
> category theory.
>
> Jon Awbrey sent information about the book to another email list, but not
> to Peirce-L.  But I decided to send this note to Peirce-L, since several
> subscribers have discussed issues about category theory and Peirce.
>
> John
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[robert marty]

I will not follow you on this polemical tone because to criticize, in
scientific matters, is precise to respect, since one makes the first effort
to consider the thought of the other and then a second effort by building
arguments to contest it if need be. My criticism is precisely about the
fact that De Tienne starts with phaneroscopy and forgets that the formal
structures he believes in discovering are inherited from mathematics on
which they depend.  You have done very well to warn him, and I hope that he
will have the opportunity to put forward his own justifications.

I do not doubt that you can bring forward a large number of quotations from
Peirce, but it will be difficult for you to escape the sense of dependence
without finding yourself in contradiction with Peirce himself:


"*It is, however, not a heresy but a doctrine very widely entertained,
since Auguste Comte wrote, that the sciences form a sort of ladder
descending into the well of truth, each one leading on to another, those
which are more concrete and special drawing their principles from those
which are more abstract and general". *(CP 2.119) [emphasize mine]


RM
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le mer. 23 juin 2021 à 15:08,  a écrit :

> Robert, your prescription of “mutual respect” apparently doesn’t oblige
> you to extend respect to André De Tienne. The subject of mathematics and
> its relation to phaneroscopy has not come up yet in the slow read; it
> doesn’t come up until slide 18, with Peirce’s classification of the
> sciences. But you have apparently jumped to the conclusion that De Tienne
> ignores mathematics entirely because he does not *start* with it. I’ll
> copy this to him in case he wants to respond.
>
> I’ll be happy to post here what Peirce said about the reliance of
> phaneroscopy on mathematics, it you really want to discuss it in a mutually
> respectful manner, rather than turning it into a combative “debate.”
>
> Gary f.
>
> }  {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *robert marty
> *Sent:* 23-Jun-21 08:16
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L  >
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I followed without intervening in the debates on André de Tienne's slides.
> The initiative is interesting because one spends a long time in a frame,
> breaking with the only particular reactions of the present. Taking the time
> to discuss step by step on a constructed presentation can be eminently
> profitable to the collective progress. Each one can bring his stone or his
> nuance in a climate of mutual respect. Observation shows that this is not
> the case.
>
>
>
> The cause of this is, in my opinion, that from the beginning, the first
> slide introduces a characterized bias. Indeed, the discussion is biased by
> the proposal to choose André de Tienne's idiosyncratic approach as a
> framework. It has not really been discussed. It imposes the entry into the
> Peircean system of thought through phaneroscopy presented as a science of
> observation without any prior foundation. It would be made possible by the
> capacity granted to any mind to prescind universal categories in any
> phaneron, i.e., in everything that is in front of the mind. We can
> immediately observe that if the mind can prescind universal categories in
> any phaneron, they are already there (CP 1.353). Indeed, "The categories
> are mostly combined in the observables; to separate them, the human mind
> operates by "dissociation," "prescission," and "distinction." It is a
> process that works like chemical analysis, a kind of "cracking" that
> dissociates the molecules to highlight the atoms that constitute it and
> then distinguish the constituents" (auto citation, see the links below). If
> there is a mystification to be mentioned, it may be here!
>
>
>
> De Tienne's idiosyncrasy consists of recognizing the pre-eminent place of
> mathematics in Peirce's thought to better exclude it by confining it, along
> with mathematicians, to their field.  I  support this judgment in the
> preprint that I have just put online. I extract just this quote (among
> others):
>
>
>
> *Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the
> sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of
> steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may
> adapt our phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of
> stairs leading down into it:*
>
> *We divide the whole into t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[robert marty]

List,



I followed without intervening in the debates on André de Tienne's slides.
The initiative is interesting because one spends a long time in a frame,
breaking with the only particular reactions of the present. Taking the time
to discuss step by step on a constructed presentation can be eminently
profitable to the collective progress. Each one can bring his stone or his
nuance in a climate of mutual respect. Observation shows that this is not
the case.



The cause of this is, in my opinion, that from the beginning, the first
slide introduces a characterized bias. Indeed, the discussion is biased by
the proposal to choose André de Tienne's idiosyncratic approach as a
framework. It has not really been discussed. It imposes the entry into the
Peircean system of thought through phaneroscopy presented as a science of
observation without any prior foundation. It would be made possible by the
capacity granted to any mind to prescind universal categories in any
phaneron, i.e., in everything that is in front of the mind. We can
immediately observe that if the mind can prescind universal categories in
any phaneron, they are already there (CP 1.353). Indeed, "The categories
are mostly combined in the observables; to separate them, the human mind
operates by "dissociation," "prescission," and "distinction." It is a
process that works like chemical analysis, a kind of "cracking" that
dissociates the molecules to highlight the atoms that constitute it and
then distinguish the constituents" (auto citation, see the links below). If
there is a mystification to be mentioned, it may be here!



De Tienne's idiosyncrasy consists of recognizing the pre-eminent place of
mathematics in Peirce's thought to better exclude it by confining it, along
with mathematicians, to their field.  I  support this judgment in the
preprint that I have just put online. I extract just this quote (among
others):



*Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the
sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of
steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may
adapt our phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of
stairs leading down into it:*

*We divide the whole into three great parts:*



* - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to
their real existence,- empirics, the study of phenomena with the
purpose of identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied,*

* - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the
truths of empirics.*

(Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, III.2, 1122) [emphasize
mine]



In short, to confer on phaneroscopy, without mystification, the status of
science, we must be collectively capable of identifying mathematical forms
with forms resulting from the abstractive observation of phanerons and, for
that, it is necessary of course that these forms are already there in the
mind of the observers. Not to make mathematics "the unseen character"(in
french "L'arlésienne") is a prerequisite for any healthy discussion.
Otherwise, one will open the way to a war of extermination between clans in
the depths of the "well of truth." In such battles, "the reason of the
stronger is always the best."



(PDF) The "Podium" of Universal Categories and their degenerate cases
(researchgate.net)
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352641475_The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases>

*https://www.academia.edu/49325877/The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases
<https://www.academia.edu/49325877/The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases>*


Sincerely,


Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le lun. 21 juin 2021 à 23:34,  a écrit :

> Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
> slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
> <https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> Text:
>
> Necessary assumption for the purposes of this talk:
>
> You are already minimally familiar with Peirce's three categories of
> firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
>
> • 1864-1867: Initial search for a new conception of the logical role a set
> of genuinely universal categories should fulfill
>
> - Discovery that this set is small and *gradually ordered*.
>
> - Each category is a distinct and indispensable *stage* in the process of
> turning a cloudy *manifold* into a clarified unifying intellection.
>
> - Each category is found *inductively* and confirmed through the test of
> *PRESCISSION*, a powerfu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[robert marty]

For the words I have this quotation that I had placed on the front page of
my book (L'algèbre des signes, 1990) and which says almost the same thing
but in the field of language using the "quasi-morphism":
 notes --> words ;  melody --> speech, music score --->algebra
"All speech is but such an algebra, the repeated signs being the words,
which have relations by virtue of the meanings associated with the them "
(CP 3.418)
The best,
Robert
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le dim. 31 janv. 2021 à 11:58, Frederik Stjernfelt  a
écrit :

> It is interesting Peirce is using the example of melody for his third,
> synthetic kind of consciousness – and also as a metaphor for other
> syntheses like thought, in Robert’s quote.
>
>
>
> Here, there is an interesting parallel to the earliest gestalt theorists
> in Europe around the same time – Stumpf, Ehrenfels – also taking the melody
> as the prime example of gestalts. Only later, gestaltists turned to visual
> examples.
>
>
>
> Best
>
> Frederik
>
>
>
> PS Dear John – I tried to email you at s...@bestweb.net, but it bounces
> back – is there another address where I can reach you?
>
>
>
> *Fra: *John Sowa 
> *Svar til: *John Sowa 
> *Dato: *søndag den 31. januar 2021 kl. 04.46
> *Til: *Robert Marty 
> *Cc: *Auke van Breemen , Cornelis de Waal <
> cdw...@iupui.edu>, Gary Richmond , Jon Alan
> Schmidt , Peirce List ,
> "ahti-veikko.pietari...@taltech.ee" , "
> francesco.belluc...@unibo.it" , "
> martin.irv...@georgetown.edu" 
> *Emne: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911
>
>
>
> Robert,
>
> Thanks for finding that quotation:
>
> > Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our
> sensations” (CP 5.395)
>
> Now that you mention it, I recall reading that some time ago.  It must
> have been lurking somewhere in my mind, but well beneath the conscious
> level.
>
> In any case, it's very appropriate.  The connection to sensations
> emphasizes the relation to Bill's term "embodied experience".
>
> It is also related to my point that the total context is more important
> than particular words. That doesn't mean that words are irrelevant, but
> they can be highly misleading when taken out of context.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs in 1911

[Robert Marty]

Peirce often uses the musical metaphor ...


Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our
sensations” (CP 5.395)



Le sam. 30 janv. 2021 à 04:39, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Gary R,
>
> My remarks were ad rem, not ad hominem.  Mathematics is like music.  A
> mathematician or a musician thinks only in terms of the patterns, the
> operations on those patterns, and their relationship to whatever notation
> is used to represent them.
>
> The words used to describe those patterns are useful for communication
> among teachers, students, and critics.  But those words are absent from the
> minds of the artists (musical or mathematical) who are imagining and
> creating novel patterns.
>
> Peirce was a great mathematical/logical artist.  In June 1911, he had a
> new insight into the melodies of logic.  Any logician can "hear" an
> exciting new melody in R670 and L231 that was not present in R669 or the
> Monist article of 1906.  Peirce didn't have to write a "note to self" about
> the change.  He just did it.  And any logician can "hear" it.
>
> But I realize that many people can't feel or hear the difference.  I plan
> to post the 1906 version and the 1911 version on my web site, and I'll
> point out exactly where the differences occur and their implications.
>
> I'll post that in the next two days.  And I won't refer to any other
> person's comments or opinions on the subject.
>
> Meanwhile, I recommend the following slides and their quotations of
> mathematicians, logicians, and linguists about their subject:
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .  The application of Peirce's EGs to
> Euclidean diagrams is easy with the 1911 EGs, but not with the earlier
> versions.  That application is one of the strongest arguments in support of
> Peirce's claim that EGs represent "the action of the mind in thought."
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

[Robert Marty]

they are also available on Amazon.fr, € 6.57 .


Le sam. 28 nov. 2020 à 20:59,  a écrit :

> Aloha Peirceans,
>
>
>
> I just noticed that Kindle editions of all 7 volumes of the Writings
> Chronological Edition are selling for $9.99 each. (At least they are on
> Amazon.ca, I haven’t checked Amazon.com.) I bought and downloaded one of
> them at it appears to be all there (compared to the hardcover edition) …
> quite a bargain if you don’t already have them. Essential Peirce Vol. 1 is
> also $9.99 on Kindle.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } All messages are coded. [G. Bateson] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
> [image: Image removed by sender.]
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Other subdivisions of signs

[robert marty]

List,

https://www.academia.edu/s/a91a59f285

*"It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs"*

CS Peirce 2.265, EP2 : 297

 Abstract



This article is exclusively devoted to the subdivisions mentioned by Peirce
in CP 2.265. It shows that the lattice of the 10 classes of signs is a
development that perfectly prolongs Peirce's conception of these classes of
signs and also and especially of their affinities. He could not express it
in formal terms because he did not have at his disposal mathematical tools
that will only be available after his death. In short, we show that it is
as if Peirce *"had the lattice in mind*". It seems to us that this work,
perhaps a little tedious, should definitively install the lattice as an
additional tool for apprehending meanings and evacuating critics who
unfairly consider Peirce's theory of signs as a sterile taxonomy.


 Thank you for your remarks and criticisms.


Best regards,
Robert.Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

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[PEIRCE-L] Classes of signs: the iconographic models

[robert marty]

Abstract

Peirce's classes of signs have given rise to a large number of approaches
aimed at exposing them, illustrating them, modeling them, formalizing them
in different terms, and in some cases testing their operationality. Among
these approaches one can distinguish and characterize "iconographic
models". Four of them are studied. They are certainly known to most
peirceans: the "tripods" of Floy Merrell, the "trikonics" of Gary Richmond,
the "cornered signs" of Priscila Farias and Joao Queiroz which are derived
from drawings  of Peirce's hand himself (named so for convenience), the
"signtrees" of Priscila Borges. We demonstrate that they are all isomorphic
to the classes of signs obtained by algebraical method, and therefore
isomorphic each other. But this algebraic model also shows that the set of
10 classes of signs is organized in a lattice structure, which is a natural
extension of the Peircean theory of signs. Peirce, by defining "affinities"
between sign classes, had intuited the existence of this algebraic
structure but it was not yet available as such at his time. Relative to the
state in which Peirce left us his semiotics, this model is, so to speak,
"epistemologically pure".

https://www.academia.edu/s/e2ce02d520
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

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