> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
> determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
> or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of
Edwina, Jon S, List,
Edwina wrote:
Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very beginning
of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore, as primordial,
because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior to the
existential emergence of the Universe. That
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And here we still have a sticking point. Jon wrote:
"So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall,
but I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three
Categories were present from
Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has
its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of
Thanks for the references.
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 07 April 2017 6:30 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re:
Jon S, List,
What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the original
continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as "a generalizing
tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") reminded me that
Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like Peirce's idea of
Gary R., List:
I have been tied up all day, and may have more to say later. For now, I
just want to point out what Peirce wrote about continuity, potentiality,
and habit in the last RLT lecture.
CSP: This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization,
and as such a general,
Edwina, Clark, John S, List,
Clark wrote:
I think Peirce has [two] categories of chance. One is discontinuous whereas
the other is continuous. This ends up being important in various ways.
I see a change, shall we say an evolution, in Peirce's thinking towards a
much greater emphasis on
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> 1) You write that 'chance isn't separate from Thirdness'. I think it is.
> Chance/Firstness is a basic modal category; it's not part of Thirdness.
>
> 2) I don't read Peirce's view as Neoplatonism ..i.e., that the
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> I don't see that 'repetition depends on chance'. I think that you are
> ignoring that Thirdness [the action of developing and taking habits] is
> primordial and not a result of another modal category, i.e.,
Clark, list -
1) You write that 'chance isn't separate from Thirdness'. I think it
is. Chance/Firstness is a basic modal category; it's not part of
Thirdness.
2) I don't read Peirce's view as Neoplatonism ..i.e., that the
first principle is 'the One'. I see Peirce's first
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> "We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a
> limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure
> spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be
Clark, list - but the breaking up of old habits and the development
of new habits are two separate actions. It could conceivably happen
that the old habits might dissipate - and no 'chance' occurrences
took place to enable new habits [that would be entropic ...and I
posit doesn't happen that
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Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I
don't see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of
different habits.
But habit-taking is primordial. My only difference is that I
Dear all,
“Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation.”
So what is chance doing, breaking up habits or creating new ones?
Is the habit stable or unstable?
Which habit, the broken up one or the newly created one?
What is the start; a condition of disorder or a condition of
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up old
> habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur
Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation. The key point
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:50 PM, John Collier wrote:
>
> SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though
> it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex
> planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that adaptation and evolution are
> due to randomness and Natural Selection. I think that adaptation and
> evolution are actions of Mind; that is, the biological systems
Clark:
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 3:02 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying universally
> because they only applied to determinate systems. He also saw entropy as a
> statistical measure. The question is whether his semiotics
Edwina, list:
“We didn't sit down and forge a synthesis. We all knew each other's
writings; all spoke with each other. We all had the same goal, which was
simply to understand fully the evolutionary process...By combining our
knowledge, we managed to straighten out all the conflicts and
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Jerry - is there much difference between standard Darwinism and
Neo-Darwinism with regard to how adaptation and evolution emerges and
develops?
Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus -
Edwina,
I put myself forth *as* a biologist before anything else and I object to
your classification of mutation/natural selection (rather, descent with
modification) as a *neoDarwinian hypothesis*. That’s just terrible.
There is a lot that has been contemplated about chance/spontaneity in
SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though
it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex
planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many French theorists
rejected it because atoms and molecules were not observables.
I
Clark, list:
1) First - I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that
adaptation and evolution are due to randomness and Natural Selection.
I think that adaptation and evolution are actions of Mind; that is,
the biological systems adapt to environmental realities - not
randomly - but
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:03 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the
> fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say
> that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them - and since
> chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so to speak,
> necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are
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Jon, list - actually, I agree with everything you have said below
EXCEPT for the notion of 'God'.
That is - I certainly agree that:
- chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them -
A few points. Thermodynamics is a specialty of mine since I was an
undergraduate, especially the statistical version. I don’t think I agree with
Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some cases it can be. In other
cases it is just something like form considered in isolation. I take it
Clark, List:
CG: For Peirce chance both forms habits but also allows breaks from habit.
As I understand him, especially in his late writings, for Peirce chance *does
not* form habits, it *only* facilitates breaking them; e.g., small
deviations from the laws of nature. The habit-taking
Clark, Edwina, list:
If you know that “Local entropy can (and often does) decrease whereas the
universal entropy increases”
then perhaps you thought to place this law in context of entities with
permeable membranes. It seems to me an important matter to consider if one
is going to talk
Clark-list; I'm not saying that biology is reducible to physics
Physics doesn't have that self-organization or 'negentropy that
biology has.
I don't see how or where I am rejecting Peirce's views. I don't see
that chance 'enables habit'; it breaks up some habits and allows for
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:16 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
> “So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe is
> growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics. Clearly
> it is.
>
>
> Hmmm… then what’s the semiotic answer to why
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Clark, list: Hmm - it's always interesting to read how others view oneself.
>
> I hadn't thought that I was saying that " that thinking of all this in the
> idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should
Clark, list: Hmm - it's always interesting to read how others view
oneself.
I hadn't thought that I was saying that " that thinking of all this
in the idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should
appropriate Peirce more in a materialistic way"
I don't know what the
Clark- but isn't the reality of the biological realm, which
introduces the non-isolation of a system and self-organization and
thus, works against entropy - a natural action? After all, the basic
mode of action of semiosis is its non-isolation - and the
transformation of energy from one to
Edwina, Clark, list:
Clark, you said:
“So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe
is growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics.
Clearly it is.
Hmmm… then what’s the semiotic answer to why spirals in BZ reaction?
What did people say of
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except
> that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint,
> uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> So- I don't see how Peirce's view is incompatible with the current view - but
> I might be missing what you are trying to explain.
>
Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying universally
Yes - I saw your second post after I had replied...
You wrote, with regard to habits:
"However as they become more and more habitual they come more and
more to take the character of substance. That is substance/matter is
simply a reflection of a lack of variation from
Clark, List:
CG: I suppose this is a very long way of saying that I think signs are
only the same sign when both the immediate interpretant and immediate
object are the same.
I think that Edwina and I came to the same conclusion over the course of
our discussion in this thread. We agreed that
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the
> ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward
> more differentiation but towards more generality.
>
>
> On Mar 31, 2017, at 3:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> It turns out that Short "counts" different Signs based on different Immediate
> Interpretants, but not based on different Dynamic Interpretants. This makes
> sense, given that the Immediate Interpretant
Edwina, List:
At the risk of pressing our luck, since we have already unexpectedly
identified at least two points of agreement today, I would like to revisit
(selectively) some comments that I posted yesterday.
CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second
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