subject:"\[peirce\-l\] Re\: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign"


At 9:19 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:

In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love 
for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent 
and true are related.


That's the big one Jim!

I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as "that 
object for which truth stands"


Regarding what is real, I think Peirce would say that we all have our 
opinions, more or well founded about what is real, or what the real 
is, and there is always a cheerful hope that we shall develop some 
further opinions on the matter that are even more well developed in 
this some respect or other.


But of course, we are fallible, and thus no none, however well read, 
can claim any kind of absolute monopoly on the truth, so it's better 
to always keep an open mind (bearing in mind too, that some matters 
have been reasonably well settled for the time being) and keep on 
asking questions and making (courageous) speculations about how 
matters that cause us puzzlement may best be answered on the basis of 
what we already know, or at least think we know.


Regarding existent, I think that Peirce always keeps fairly close to 
the whiteheadian notion of "actual occasions" in his conceptions of 
this, and again on this matter I think it is most profitable to make 
reference to his notion of matter as "effete mind", and Objects as 
Things or Existents that are characteristic for our experience of 
Secondness as a "Modality of Being".


In a letter to Lady Welby (See EPII: 479), and talking of Secondness 
(which he actually refers to in this particular connection as 
"Another Universe", distinguished by a particular "Modality of 
Being"), Peirce writes:


"Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in 
their Brute reactions, and of second, the facts (reactions, events, 
qualities etc.) concerning these Objects, all of which facts, in the 
last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, 
Things, or more unambigously, Existents, and the facts about them I 
call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object 
subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of 
Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a 
singular subject."


Best regards

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Hi Jim, and thanks for your comments.

You wrote:
At 8:47 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:

Dear Patrick, Folks--

Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family 
resemblance.  Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and 
resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasting mere 
intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the 
highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make 
neither by the inward attractions of the feeling or representations 
themselves, nor by a transcendental force of haecceity, but in the 
interest of intelligibility, that is, in the interests of the the 
synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does by introducing an 
idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which they 
would not otherwise have had".


Connections, yes, in the habit-forming, relational aspect of 
Thirdness, but retaining always the possibility of chance being 
operative in the universe as an active element that can introduce 
novelty into the world and into the reality of our experience of the 
world, as an integral part of it.


In a sense, we are the world and the world is us, but we also have 
the possibility of thinking about it, and about ourselves, and 
exchanging thoughts with one another so they can grow and develop, 
and that's a great ol' thing!


Later in that same paragraph (from A Guess at the Riddle) Peirce 
continues with a further good word for those who attempt to sort and 
categories experience saying "Intuition is regarding of the abstract 
in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation of relations; 
that is the one sole method of valuable thought.  Very shallow is 
the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided.  You might 
as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has 
led to so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought 
would that e and so well in accord with the spriit of nominalism 
that I wonder some one does not put it forward.  The true precept is 
not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently".


Yes, exactly, but then when I see presumably intelligent people 
getting so worked up about defending their own particular point of 
view on reality (or let's say on Peirce's view of reality) that they 
start insulting others in the process, then I often start to wonder 
if they haven't become momentarily "blinded" to the possibility of 
realty having many many "facets", as Joe often likes to put it, and 
that in order to get a firmer grip on as many as possible of these 
facets, then we all have to do a bit of grass-like "bending in the 
wind", just moving with the flow, so to speak, from time to time...


Cheers

Patrick


Cheers,
Jim Piat
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Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jim Piat


Patrick wrote:
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic 
process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.



Jean-Marc responded:

Not at all.
Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. 
Peirce was not a nominalist.



Dear Patrick, Jean-Marc,  Folks--

I have a bit of trouble keeping track of the similarities and differences 
among the notions of  true, real and existent as Peirce uses them.


I am especially unclear about the the application of the term real to his 
category of Firstness.Are firsts real but non existent?   Seems to me 
the notion of real qualities (as opposed to illusory ones) only has meaning 
in the context of qualities coupled with secondness as they are embodied in 
objects.


In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for 
someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are 
related.


Best wishes
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jim Piat




Dear Patrick, Folks--
 
Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's 
notion of family resemblance.  Signs, like thought are more or less 
continuous and resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasting 
mere intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the 
highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the 
inward attractions of the feeling or representations themselves, nor by a 
transcendental force of haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that 
is, in the interests of the the synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does 
by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which 
they would not otherwise have had".   Later in that same paragraph 
(from A Guess at the Riddle) Peirce continues with a further good word for 
those who attempt to sort and categories experience saying "Intuition is 
regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation 
of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought.  Very 
shallow is the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided.  You 
might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to 
so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought would that e and so 
well in accord with the spriit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put 
it forward.  The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but 
to do it intelligently".
 
 
Cheers,
Jim Piat
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

Thanks for your comments Arnold, and yes indeed, what Peirce and 
Whitehead probably have most in common is their respective 
competencies in mathematics, and the way in which they use these 
competncies to consolidate and explicate their respective 
philosophical projects.


It's their maths that lets them try building a bridge between 
physics, phenomenology and metaphysics, if you will.


One of my great frustrations is that I am no theoretical 
mathematician myself, and cannot read or make sense of anything 
rather than really quite simple mathematical proofs, so I basically 
have to take on trust anything that Peirce or Whitehead might have 
used mathematical forms of argumentation in order to "demonstrate" in 
detail.


If you read around the lives and works of both these talented 
authors, you can see from many qualified commentators that both were 
fairly well respected in the international mathematical communities 
of their times for their mathematical musings.


In any case, it seems quite clear to me that any philosophical or 
other project that is trying to really get a handle onto what they 
were talking about in all the various corners of their work, and to 
put it all into perspective needs must be a fairly inter- or 
transdisciplinary one...


Peirce-l always seemed to me right from the beginning to be that kind 
of community...


Best regards

Patrick


Jean-Marc, Patrick

Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in 
representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the 
way to use `presuppose, by the way?).  Jean-Marc equally has a point 
in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later 
thinking.  Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in 
Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for 
understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I 
would guess.  Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent 
material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well 
enough known.


Cheers

Arnold Shepperson
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--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Thanks JM for your brief comments,

I still think we need some way of distinguishing between that which 
is for us phenomenologically or experientally real and that which is 
(enduringly) existent in the world.


Peirce and Whitehead both operate with notions that postulate some 
kind of relational continuity between what we call "mind" and 
"matter". In this connection Whitehead introduces into the cartesian 
(epistemological) chasm between mental and material substance his 
notions of "actual occasion" or "organism", while Peirce handles the 
same problem with his conception of matter as "effete mind".


For both, "being" is in some sense always "becoming" -- the 
actualisation of a potential for what Peirce often referred to as 
"the growth of concrete reasonableness", and what Whitehead refered 
to as "satisfaction", or in one of his definitions of that notion: 
"the culmination of concrescence into a completely determinate matter 
of fact" both of which I think, can be tied to the notion of 
"entelecheia", which was discussed at some length here on the list 
previously.


I may well be wrong here, of course -- indeed, I haven't been working 
with Whitehead's ideas so long myself, and trying to see these in 
relation to those of Peirce is actually quite a daunting task -- so 
it would be interesting to hear some opinions from other Peirce 
listers too...


Best regards

Patrick


Patrick Coppock wrote:

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I 
do not anticipate much time for replies.

...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
"Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.


Not at all.
Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in 
that context. Peirce was not a nominalist.


Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 
1890). Look for "outward clash", or  "Scotus" in the CPs and his 
criticism of Hegel's idealism.


He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), 
and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or 
signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too 
difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for 
"nominalism", "realism", "idealism" ...


However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, 
meaning that they have no real existence.


Regards
/JM


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--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Arnold Shepperson wrote:

Jean-Marc, Patrick
 
Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in 
representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way 
to use `presuppose, by the way?).  Jean-Marc equally has a point in 
noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later 
thinking.  Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in 
Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding 
this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess.  Also, 
the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, 
the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known.
 
Cheers
 
Arnold Shepperson
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Hi, I don't think there's any contradiction. semiosis being an 
inferential process that "reconstructs" the forms of reality, a third 
can be created by a combination of a dyad with a monad. A second will 
evolve into a Third.  This will be an "internal" third or degenerate 
third, a third by construction --call it what you like. but a third anyway.


the only forms that are directly experienced from reality are the 
Seconds -- with which we experience the "clash" to use a Peirce 
expression.  Thirds are constructed by inference. Firsts are embedded in 
Seconds.


the phenomenological approach which consists in studying how forms can 
be combined together have the advantage that there is no need to resort 
to teleology to explain how these forms (First, Second, Thirds) "can be 
seen to emerge" from semiosis.


PS: this is an interesting discussion but I'm off the list for a while...

Regards
/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Arnold Shepperson

Jean-Marc, Patrick
 
Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way to use `presuppose, by the way?).  Jean-Marc equally has a point in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later thinking.  Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess.  Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known.

 
Cheers
 
Arnold Shepperson


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Patrick Coppock wrote:

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do 
not anticipate much time for replies.

...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
"Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.


Not at all.
Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context. 
Peirce was not a nominalist.


Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 
1890). Look for "outward clash", or  "Scotus" in the CPs and his 
criticism of Hegel's idealism.


He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), and 
of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs) I 
don't have the exact references, but that's not too difficult to find if 
you go through the Collected Papers, look for "nominalism", "realism", 
"idealism" ...


However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning 
that they have no real existence.


Regards
/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do 
not anticipate much time for replies.


Talking of Whitehead, whose process philosophy, or "philosophy of 
organism" is surely an interesting and challenging read for any 
Peirce student or scholar, it strikes me that in all the talk on the 
list of late of lattices and diagrams, firsts, seconds and thirds, 
ordered or non ordered systems of relations, we seem along the way to 
have lost something of the essentially processual character of the 
peircean notion of semiosis.


Perhaps it's the seemingly "concrete" nature of the diagrams/lattices 
themselves that has been leading us a bit astray?


Let me try speculating a bit by merging a few notions from a 
Whitehead'ian process perspective with a Peircean one. This is all 
very sketchy and speculative, so I'm naturally open for all forms of 
positive or negative criticism.


In the interests of saving time and energy for one and all, however, 
it would probably be a good idea if respondents could keep their 
comments fairly brief and to the point...


OK, as pointed out by Joe and others here a number of times (also 
recently), the (phenomenological) category of Thirdness will always 
presuppose Secondness, which in turn presupposes Firstness, but none 
of these three more "basic" categories (or any of their ten or more 
"fine-tuned" variants as these can be seen to emerge in any form of 
narrative traversing of the various triadic configurational "rooms" 
represented in the tables of sign classes) can actually be said to 
"exist" as pure, or static forms or entities.


They always emerge as part of a process, which could be described 
roughly in terms of an ongoing narrative (or argumentation, if you 
like)


According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three "aspects" 
of the sign (function), by way of which we are able to "experience" 
or "recognise" the "presence" of any given (manifest for someone or 
something) sign, are destined to keep on "morphing" into one another 
continuously, emerging, submerging and and re-emerging again as the 
meanings we singly or collectively attribute to the signs we 
encounter from day to day continue to grow in complexity -- at 
different rates of development, of course, depending on the relative 
"strength" of the habits (mental or otherwise) that "constrain" 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and allow them to "oscillate"/ 
"morph" in relation to one another at different "rates" in different 
situations and contexts, and allow them to be conceived of by us as 
"conventionally" (or otherwise) representing "signifying" (or 
culturally meaningful, if you like) units/ configurations/ events/ 
states of affairs.


Every culturally significant "event" that we are able to conceive of 
as a sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to 
"embody" or "posess", to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less 
saliently, all three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness)  at any given time in the ongoing flow of 
semiosis.


However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
"Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.


The categories/ classes are essentially functional event-states that 
must be seen as potentially transitory and recursive all along the 
line in any given semiosic process. They can pass from one to another 
"at will", or better "as needs be", only to "reappear" again, perhaps 
in a different giuse or configuration (class) on some later occasion. 
The specific "charactistics" that "make" Firsts appear to us as 
Firsts, Seconds as Seconds and Thirds as Thirds, i.e. Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness, are able to emerge transitorily and make 
themselves "subjectively known" to us at any given moment in any 
given "event" (the two latter ""'ed notions I've taken from 
Whitehead, rather than from Peirce) that forms part of any given 
semiosic process, which by default must be seen as open-ended and as 
possessing only a potential for limits.


It strikes me that might be more profitable if we were to try 
thinking dynamically of the ten "classes" of signs as possible 
emergent events that may arise as a result of any given ongoing 
semiosic process, and that they are all inter-related with one 
another, and that each "class" must possess a "subjective" organic 
potential for having more or less "stable" periods of duration, 
according to the relative strength of the specific habits or laws 
that (have) become culturally/ contextually associated with any given 
configuration/ class at any given time...


It also occurred to me that someone well versed in Category Theory 
(cf some earlier discussions here on the list) might well be able to 
realise some kind of visual, dynamic model in t

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Benjamin Udell

Jerry, Gary, list,

> A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of:

>>On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:
>> Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

> I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to 
> individual scholars.
> The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me.
> At issue is the question of why are these terms important to understanding 
> human communication.

To Peirce, logical process = representational process, and is not a 
specifically human or intelligent-life phenomenon, a chapter in the books of 
psychology, sociology, history, even if these books covered reasoning creatures 
other than homo sapiens which is the only clear example of which we know (SETI 
hasn't found ET, at least not yet).  

Instead, to Peirce, humans are a special logical phenomenon -- he might assent 
to a current phrase like "logic processors" though not in the computer sense 
(deductive, with strict algorithms, etc.). For my part, I would say that 
"logicality" is general like statisticality or (in the information-theoretic 
sense) information.

So these terms (signsign, legisign, qualisign) are important in understanding 
the logical possibilities which human communication tends to actualize. IMHO 
the importance is not so very different from the importance of aerodynamics to 
the evolution and anatomy of winged insects, pterosaurs, birds, bats, flying 
organisms generally. But I think that a more exact analogy would be the 
relationship of probability, statistics, and, as a general mathematical & 
statistical subject, stochastic processes, to matter. 

In the Peircean system, terms like qualisign/sinsign/legisign are also 
important, or regarded as destined to be important, in understanding the 
possibilities realized in metaphysics -- questions of ontology, questions of 
God, freedom, immortality, and (philosophical) questions of space, time, 
matter, etc. This is implicit in Peirce's classification of logic as a field 
which does not presuppose metaphysics but which is presupposed by metaphyiscs.

> The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a "sign" is clearly 
> a creative use of language.
> The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories as 
> derivatives of the parent word, sign.
> Could one imagine other prefixes  to the word sign?

Peirce imagined quite a few other prefixes to the word sign. But presumably you 
mean such as to make a semantic distinction, not merely a morphological 
improvement.

> Could one imagine more than three other prefixes?

Your question would be helpfully clarified if you stated it directly instead of 
morphologically. Obviously one can imagine, so to speak, many more classes of 
signs, and Peirce certainly did. Can one imagine a classification into a 
4-chotomy of signs? Of course one can, but, for better or worse, it would be 
unPeircean. Triadism is built deeply into Peirce's semiotic.

> How is this context important in distinguishing among paths of usages?

It's a way of distinguishing between specific occurrences of signs, the 
appearances of signs, and the general "meaning" or habitual 'conventional' 
interpretation of a sign. (The symbol's interpretant, in being an inferential 
outcome, usually goes beyond such conventional significations.) For many 
practical and theoretical purposes, English "horse" and Spanish _caballo_ are 
the same legisign.  "Horse" and _caballo_ won't be regarded as the same 
qualisign (except by those for whom all human words are indistinguishably the 
same qualisign). "Horse" and _caballo_ won't be regarded as ever being the same 
sinsign (except by those for whom pretty much all human occurrences are one 
single undecomposable occurrence).

> What other terms might be substituted for these terms?

Peirce himself offered, at various times, at least three sets of words for the 
same trichotomy of logical terms:

Tone, token, type.
Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
Potisign, actisign, famisign.

One might call them:
a quality-as-a-sign, a singular-as-a-sign, and a general-as-a-sign.

He at least mentioned other words as candidates as well.

> Do these terms impact the concept of a grammar?

It depends on the grammar. If this were some other forum, your conception of 
"grammar" might be implicitly understood and accepted. Here, in a philosophical 
forum which happens to be a crossroads of many specialties and traditions, you 
need to define it and state the context and tradition from which you are 
drawing your sense of the word, in order to make yourself widely understood.

> Is this ad hoc extension of the concept of sign desirable for mathematics?
> How does it contribute to the mathematical usages of signs?

You specified neither the "hoc" nor the basal concept of which you characterize 
Peirce's terms as an extension. I guess everybody likes to think of his or her 
concept as the genus and of the other forms of the concept as the 
specializations.  But y

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Gary Richmond wrote:

Jerry,

Here's the 'classic' presentation of qualisign, sinsign, legisign (why 
they are given in the order of the subject of the thread I don't know, 
but the categorial order I just gave them in is as to their firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness). In any event, this is the order in which 
Peirce first presents them.


In earlier texts, the icon / index / symbol was considered the most 
important one and the one from which the other classes were derived.


CP 2.275 ...  The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, 
Indices, and Symbols.


then Peirce continues by dividing icons into images (qualisign), 
diagrams (iconic sinsigns), metaphors (iconic legisigns). These are the 
same classes that you would have found had you started with the 
qualisign / sinsigns / legisign division.


see CP 2.283 for the division of indices

to be honest I think that Peirce gives the divisions in that order 
because when you have several things to talk about ... you have to start 
with the first one before you can start with the second :-) The results 
of the divisions eventually are the same, thank God..


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Gary Richmond







Jerry, 

Here's the 'classic' presentation of qualisign, sinsign, legisign (why
they are given in the order of the subject of the thread I don't know,
but the categorial order I just gave them in is as to their firstness,
secondness, and thirdness). In any event, this is the order in which
Peirce first presents them.
CP 2.243 
§4. ONE TRICHOTOMY OF SIGNS
  
    243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies;†1 first, according
as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
general law;†2 secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its
object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in
some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an
interpretant;†3 thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as
a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.†4
Peirce: CP 2.244 Cr
    244. According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a
Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign.
Peirce: CP 2.244 
    A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as
a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with
its character as a sign.
Peirce: CP 2.245 
    245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning "being
only once," as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual
existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its
qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a
sign through being actually embodied.
Peirce: CP 2.246 
    246. A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually
established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not
conversely]. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it
has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through
an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it.
Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five
times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word,
the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica
is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not
ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded
as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if it were not for
the law which renders it so
Peirce employs this same order in a letter to Lady Welby:
CP 8.334
    334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an
appearance, when I call it a qualisign; or secondly, it is an
individual object or event, when I call it a sinsign (the syllable sin
being the first syllable of semel, simul, singular, etc.); or thirdly,
it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a legisign. As we
use the term 'word' in most cases, saying that 'the' is one 'word' and
'an' is a second 'word,' a 'word' is a legisign. But when we say of a
page in a book, that it has 250 'words' upon it, of which twenty are
'the's, the 'word' is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying a legisign, I
term a 'replica' of the legisign. The difference between a legisign and
a qualisign, neither of which is an individual thing, is that a
legisign has a definite identity, though usually admitting a great
variety of appearances. Thus, &, and, and the sound are all one
word. The qualisign, on the other hand, has no identity. It is the mere
quality of an appearance and is not exactly the same throughout a
second. Instead of identity, it has great similarity, and cannot differ
much without being called quite another qualisign.
These two passages are, it seems to me, equivalent. I guess all of this
is clear enough as you wrote:

Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me. 

Then you continued:
At issue is the question of why are these terms important
to  understanding human communication. 
  
The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a "sign" is 
clearly a creative use of language. 
  
The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories  as
derivatives of the parent word, sign. 
  
Could one imagine other prefixes  to the word sign? 
  
Could one imagine more than three other prefixes? 

Again, the three are associated with Peirce's category theory (not to
be confused with modern mathematical category theory, but concern what
Marty refers to as "simple category theory" first appearing in Peirce's
decidedly trichotomic phenomenology), so that
what a sign in itself is is its 'firstness' but as a firstness it is
itself either
a firstness, secondness or thirdness in so far as when it is
embodied it expresses some character or quality as a sign, or is a
single existent thing or event--again when it is embodied (and will
then also
employ a qualisign), or as a sign it is 'merely' a convention and then
must appear as a replica of this law that is a sign, so that the
written
word two, the numeral 2 (or II, etc.) and the vocable "two" are all the
same con

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-18 Thread Auke van Breemen


Ben,


-Original Message-
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: vrijdag 16 juni 2006 16:25
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


MessageAuke, list,

>[Auke] Ben I have the feeling that much of your uneasyness is a
>consequence of the way in which you use the terms. It seems as if you 
>promote the semiotic aspects that can be discerned (are involved) in 
>signs to full fledged signs. I try to make this clear between the 
>lines.

>[Auke] BU:
>>There is a qualisign which is the English word "red," and which
>>consists in the appearance and/or sound of the word as 
>>written/printed/uttered.  The qualisign "red"'s semiotic object is the
sinsign "red" which is the single actual appearance of the word "red" on
the page or its single utterance. The sinsign "red" is a replica of the
symbol "red" (and is an index).  This bothers me because the semiotic
object of both the legisign and sinsign "red"s is the red thing or
redness (dependently on context), but the semiotic object of the
qualisign "red" is the sinsign "red," because a qualisign is always an
icon and can have for its object only that which it resembles.
---

>[Auke] I would state things differently like: the English word "red"
>involves the qualisign aspect. With "qualisign aspect" we draw 
>attention to the qualities of a sign, its appearance or sound when 
>written, printed, uttered, part of thought or perceived, to the 
>exclusion of all other aspects.

BU
It seems six of one or half a dozen of the other. 
---

? The question mark expresses that I have to gamble a little. I quess
that it is an expression with a fixed meaning like "It is synonymous in
its consequences."  
I don't see such a sameness in meaning in our wordings. But won't argue
this further. My initial response was written because you wrote about
something bothering you, that did bother me some time in the past, but
not anymore. 

For the remainder just one remark. I only keep the relevant context of
the previous mail.

1
>[Auke] One of the objects in the range of possibilities is the sinsign
>that arouse the feeling. We must be aware however that the sign in this

>case is not "red", but the "feeling of red" and the object is not "the 
>object of the sinsign red", but the "sinsign red" itself. Here we have 
>one of the possible sources of error in the process by which signs 
>generate their meaning effects.

BU:
The sign in this case is not "feeling of red" but "feeling of 'red' "
i.e. the appearance of the _word_ "red." 

Ben, you are right, this is better. Maybe it is even better to write
"The feeling of '...'." This in order to express that in terms of
articulation it is below the iconic replica sinsign rheme level.



Best,
Auke



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Benjamin Udell




Wilfred wrote, 
"List, 
"I did not know the Digital Peirce online site before. "
 
I should just send this to every new peirce-lister. Additions & 
corrections welcome. I've checked these links, they're all live, though some of 
the URLs seem to be the result of recent changes. - Ben Udell
 
- Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway: http://members.door.net/arisbe/ 
(Joseph Ransdell)
- Peirce-Related Papers On-Line  http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm
- Papers by C.S. Peirce [Online] http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/aboutcsp.htm
- Special Resources http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/rsources.htm
- Syllabus - Classification of Sciences 1.180-202 G-1903-2b (1903) http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm
- Classification of the Sciences http://www.textlog.de/4257.html
- Digital Encyclopedia of C. S. Peirce http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/ 

- Dictionary of Peirce's Terminology http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html 
(Mats Bergman & Sami Paavola)
- The Peirce Helsinki Commens http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/index.html
- Peirce Edition Project http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce (Nathan 
Houser, Andre DeTienne, Indiana University  Purdue University at 
Indianapolis, USA)
- UQAM satellite of the Peirce edition Project  http://www.pep.uqam.ca/index_en.pep 
(François Latraverse & David Lachance, working on the preparation of the 
Century Dictionary material for W7)
- The Century Dictionary online http://www.global-language.com/century/
- The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlpeir.htm
- Charles Sanders Peirce: Published Works I http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlppw1.htm
- The Writings of Charles S. Peirce -- A Chronological Edition 
(Forthcoming) http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlcspc.htm
- [in FAQ] What is the relation between the various Peirce titles? http://www.nlx.com/pstm/pstmfaq.htm#peirce
- Conceptual Graphs http://conceptualgraphs.org/ (John Sowa, 
IBM, Fritz Lehmann, USA, et al.) 
- CeneP (Centro de Estudos Peirceanos) http://www.pucsp.br/pos/cos/cepe/ 
(M. Lúcia Santaella-Braga, Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Paulo 
(PUC-SP), Brasil)
- John Josephson, Ohio State, USA (LAIR: Logic of Abduction) http://www.cse.ohio-state.edu/~jj/
- Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos http://www.unav.es/gep/ (Jaime Nubiola, 
University of Navarra, Spain)
- The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html
- Institute for the Study of Pragmaticism http://www.pragmaticism.net/
- Wyttynys.net (_His Glassy Essence_) http://www.wyttynys.net/ (Kenneth Lane 
Ketner)
- Computer Semiotics: Peircean Semiotics and Digital Representation http://www.ckk.chalmers.se/people/jmo/semiotics/
- Institut de Recherche en Sémiotique, Communication, et Éducation 
(L'I.R.S.C.E)  http://www.univ-perp.fr/lsh/rch/semiotics/irsce/irsce.html 
(Gérard Deledalle, Joëlle Réthoré, Université de Perpignan, France)
- International Research Group on Abductive Inference at the Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth 
(Uwe Wirth, Alexander Roesler; Frankfurt, Germany)
- Research Group on Semiotic Epistemology and Mathematics Education, 
Institut für Didaktik der Mathematik http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/idm/semiotik/semiotik-e.html 
Michael Hoffman, Michael Otte, Universität Bielefeld, Germany)
- Nijmegen C.S.Peirce Study Center http://www.kun.nl/fil-beta/peirce-en.html 
(Guy DeBrock, Director; Menno Hulswit, Coordinator: University of Nijmegen, 
Netherlands) This Webpage seems to have disappeared, and the Wayback Machine (http://www.archive.org) says that access to 
archived versions has been blocked.
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen

Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign








List,

 

I did not know the Digital
Peirce online site before. But am now reading some article there which I regard
very good. And it is just the first article I am reading. Would advice people
here who did not see the site before to certainly take a look at the link below
(the modelling applets), but also to the site in general (removing the last
part of the mentioned http). So just http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/

 

Kind regards,

 

Wilfred

 









Van: Patrick Coppock
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: vrijdag 16 juni 2006
12:38
Aan: Peirce
 Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign,
Legisign, Qualisign



 



Ben, I wonder, have you, Gary or any of the others looked at and evaluated
any of the potential of the modelling applets mentioned below (this comes from
the Digital Peirce online site)?





 





http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-intfar.htm





 





Interactive diagrams for
Charles Peirce's classifications of signs





 Priscila Farias





This article presents some results of an
ongoing program of research on new strategies for the visualization of sign
processes and structures --something I am proposing to call 'sign design'. The
current focus of this research are the various (3-, 10-, 28- and 66-fold)
classifications of signs described by Peirce. The main issue addressed here is
how computer graphics and design methodology may help us to build dynamic and
interactive models that serve as tools for the investigation of sign theory.
Two models are presented. One of them concerns specifically the 10-fold
classification, while the other deals with the deep structure of Peirce's
various trichotomic classifications. The first is '10cubes', an interactive 3-D
model of Peirce's 10-fold classification. The second is '3N3,' a computer
program that builds equivalent diagrams for any n-trichotomic classification of
signs, allowing us to analyze and compare different hypothesis regarding those
classifications.





Keywords: Peircean semiotics, graphic design, sign
design, dynamic diagrams, interface design, HCI





 





It would be interesting to hear your opinions.





 





Best





 





Patrick



-- 




Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:  http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:  http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread merkle

List, Bernard, Robert, Joe, Ben, Gary, Claudio, Arnaud,

For a long time I do not post on this list. I wish I had more time, so
interesting and dear to me is this topic. It's nice to see how this topic
is a recurrent theme in the important discussions that take place here,
and how new visualizations of Peirces classes appeared.

Well, some time ago I attempted to visualise Peirce's Classes and their
relations through a formalism known as a Hasse Diagram, which I extended
to three dimensions. It was a final chapter of a Computer Science Ph.D.
Thesis.

My aim was to show that some formalisms used in mathematics could
contribute to mediate some discussions I've found in the literature about
classes of signs.

Indeed, my objective was not to discuss the meaning of the classes, or the
corresponding order (or partial order) of the sign relation (triadic,
hexadic, decadic), but to show that different partial orders correspond to
different class sets. If a specific order (or partial order) was
correct according to Peirce was way beyond the scope of that work,
although I had my views of it.

The reader will find appendend a diagram of a  3D hasse
diagram of the ten classes. I've tried to include a second diagram of a 6D
Hasse Diagram of two sets of 28 classes (page 299 at
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf), derived from two
distinct hexadic sign relations. The 729 possibilities appear on the
background.

Unfortunately it was too large to send to the list. There are some classes
in common in sets associated with distinct sign relations. Although I have
problems with the hexadic notion of sign, because I think that they lack
the relations between SOI, I never did a 10D Hasse diagram of the 66
classes, showing at least all 59059 possibilities.

A word of caution. At the time when I wrote it I used the term
"categories" instead of "classes", which may cause confusion for those
acquainted with Peirce's work. My apologies. However, I always used
"Cenopythagorean Categories" to stand for Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness. Once I have time to review that text, replacing single
occurrences of "categories" to "classes", I will post again the link to it
at Arisbe. For the moment, I post it on this list, which may contribute to
the currend discussion.

The whole chapter, which include several other visualizations of the
classes, and some footnotes indicating my favorite interpretations, is
available at:
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf

[]s,
Luiz Merkle






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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Benjamin Udell

Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign



Patrick,
 
I did look at them right away, and they seem cool. But, though I'm good 
with PowerPoint and gifs & jpgs, I'm not really the kind of person to offer 
evaluations of modelling applets for use by Peirce-interesses. So I held off 
replying, thinking that some idea might come into my mind. I'd like to toss the 
ball into Gary's court and say, well, Gary is just the man for the job, and if I 
had created those applets I'd eagerly anticipate his opinioen. But I can't be 
100% sure that his response wouldn't resemble mine, a hearty "they're cool" but 
a diffidence about predicting their utility to others, so I won't promise a 
response from him. For my part, I like knowing that they're there and I think 
that they may come in handy at some point. 
 
Best, Ben- Original Message - From: Patrick Coppock 
To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 6:37 
AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, QualisignBen, I wonder, 
have you, Gary or any of the others looked at and evaluated any of the potential 
of the modelling applets mentioned below (this comes from the Digital Peirce 
online site)?
 
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-intfar.htm 
Interactive diagrams for Charles Peirce's classifications of signs
 Priscila Farias
This article presents some results of an ongoing program of research on new 
strategies for the visualization of sign processes and structures --something I 
am proposing to call 'sign design'. The current focus of this research are the 
various (3-, 10-, 28- and 66-fold) classifications of signs described by Peirce. 
The main issue addressed here is how computer graphics and design methodology 
may help us to build dynamic and interactive models that serve as tools for the 
investigation of sign theory. Two models are presented. One of them concerns 
specifically the 10-fold classification, while the other deals with the deep 
structure of Peirce's various trichotomic classifications. The first is 
'10cubes', an interactive 3-D model of Peirce's 10-fold classification. The 
second is '3N3,' a computer program that builds equivalent diagrams for any 
n-trichotomic classification of signs, allowing us to analyze and compare 
different hypothesis regarding those classifications.
 
Keywords: Peircean semiotics, graphic design, sign design, dynamic 
diagrams, interface design, HCI
 
It would be interesting to hear your opinions.
 
Best
 
Patrick-- Patrick J. CoppockResearcher: Philosophy and 
Theory of LanguageDepartment of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative 
SciencesUniversity of Modena and Reggio EmiliaReggio 
EmiliaItalyphone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 
0522.522512email:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]www:  
http://coppock-violi.com/work/faculty:  
http://www.cei.unimore.itthe voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com 

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Benjamin Udell

MessageAuke, list,

>[Auke] Ben I have the feeling that much of your uneasyness is a consequence of 
>the way in which you use the terms. It seems as if you promote the semiotic 
>aspects that can be discerned (are involved) in signs to full fledged signs. I 
>try to make this clear between the lines.

>[Auke] BU:
>>There is a qualisign which is the English word "red," and which consists in 
>>the appearance and/or sound of the word as written/printed/uttered.  The 
>>qualisign "red"'s semiotic object is the sinsign "red" which is the single 
>>actual appearance of the word "red" on the page or its single utterance. The 
>>sinsign "red" is a replica of the symbol "red" (and is an index).  This 
>>bothers me because the semiotic object of both the legisign and sinsign 
>>"red"s is the red thing or redness (dependently on context), but the semiotic 
>>object of the qualisign "red" is the sinsign "red," because a qualisign is 
>>always an icon and can have for its object only that which it resembles.
---

>[Auke] I would state things differently like: the English word "red" involves 
>the qualisign aspect. With "qualisign aspect" we draw attention to the 
>qualities of a sign, its appearance or sound when written, printed, uttered, 
>part of thought or perceived, to the exclusion of all other aspects.

It seems six of one or half a dozen of the other. 

>[Auke] Since 'qualisign' is a possible and not an existent it needs the 
>sinsign aspect for its embodiment. Without embodiment it will never be able to 
> function as a sign and will have object nor interpretant.
>[Auke] Only when we engage in a study of the process by which mind processes 
>signs it makes some sense to ask for the object of a qualisign (aka emotional 
>interpretant). 

"Only?" I'm not sure what makes you think that I don't have such a process in 
mind, and what you say sounds arbitrary and limiting. Any time when it is 
claimed that something is a sign, can be a good time to ask what is its 
semiotic object. You can make explicit the theme of involved mental process in 
order to enrich the context, not to replace the context.

I think that it is wrong to say that the qualisign is equated with the 
emotional interpretant. 

>[Auke] One of the objects in the range of possibilities is the sinsign that 
>arouse the feeling. We must be aware however that the sign in this case is not 
>"red", but the "feeling of red" and the object is not "the object of the 
>sinsign red", but the "sinsign red" itself. Here we have one of the possible 
>sources of error in the process by which signs generate their meaning effects. 

The sign in this case is not "feeling of red" but "feeling of 'red' " i.e. the 
appearance of the _word_ "red." I think I've already made clear that I'm 
talking about the appearance of the word "red" such that the sinsign "red" is 
its semiotic object and that I haven't erroneously held that its semiotic 
object is something else. I've been arguing, moreover, that that is a problem.

>[Auke] The sinsign 'red' is not a replica of the symbol red, it is a replica 
>of the legisign "red". 

The symbol "red" is by its very symbolicity a legisign; it's not an accidental 
relationship. It's not that the symbol "red" is in some composite sense also a 
legisign, like an added sidecar. Qua symbol it _is_ a legisign, and the replica 
of such legisign is replica of such symbol.

>[Auke] The symbol "red" is as you state indexically connected with the replica 
>sinsign. But since it is a habit, it must be a symbolical idexical aka replica 
>indexical relation.
>[Auke] The relation material word - word form differs from the relation word - 
>meaning. 
>[Auke] BU: 
>> And actually, I don't understand how it is that the sinsign "red," -- when 
>> used mainly as a replica of the symbol (and not used indexically with an 
>> implicit "over there!") -- can be regarded as having redness or something 
>> red as its semiotic object. If its semiotic object is redness or something 
>> red, because it is a replica, then I don't see why a qualisign "red" should 
>> not have redness or something red as its semiotic object by virtue of being 
>> a kind of qualisignal version of a replica of the symbol. I'd rather say 
>> that the single utterance/appearance of "red" is simply a symbolic sinsign 
>> (or "sinsignal symbol") and that the qualisign "red" is simply a symbolic 
>> qualisign.  

>[Auke] The sinsign can only have something as its object if it is not only 
>recognized as a sinsign but also as a replica sinsign (legisign) with a symbol 
>attached. If we prescind from that for the sake of analysis, we  attribute 
>other objects. It is akin to what happens if we shift from a syllogism and its 
>object to one of the propositions and its object. 

This is the first time that I've heard that every sinsign is a replica with a 
symbol attached.  Does Peirce say that somewhere? What you say in the 
paragraph's remainder is vague. 

>[Auke] The, in a sinsign embodi

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Patrick Coppock

Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign,
Qualisign


Ben, I wonder, have you, Gary or any of the others looked at and
evaluated any of the potential of the modelling applets mentioned
below (this comes from the Digital Peirce online site)?

http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-intfar.htm

Interactive
diagrams for Charles Peirce's classifications of
signs
 Priscila Farias
This article
presents some results of an ongoing program of research on new
strategies for the visualization of sign processes and structures
--something I am proposing to call 'sign design'. The current focus of
this research are the various (3-, 10-, 28- and 66-fold)
classifications of signs described by Peirce. The main issue addressed
here is how computer graphics and design methodology may help us to
build dynamic and interactive models that serve as tools for the
investigation of sign theory. Two models are presented. One of them
concerns specifically the 10-fold classification, while the other
deals with the deep structure of Peirce's various trichotomic
classifications. The first is '10cubes', an interactive 3-D model of
Peirce's 10-fold classification. The second is '3N3,' a computer
program that builds equivalent diagrams for any n-trichotomic
classification of signs, allowing us to analyze and compare different
hypothesis regarding those classifications.
Keywords:
Peircean semiotics, graphic design, sign design, dynamic diagrams,
interface design, HCI

It would be interesting to hear your opinions.

Best

Patrick
-- 


Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:  http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:  http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Auke van Breemen

Title: Message



Ben, 
List,
 
Ben I 
have the feeling that much of your uneasyness is a consequence of the way in 
which you use the terms. It seems as if you promote the semiotic aspects that 
can be discerned (are involved) in signs to full fledged signs. I try to make 
this clear between the lines.
 
BU:
There is a qualisign which is the English 
word "red," and which consists in the appearance and/or sound of the word as 
written/printed/uttered.  The qualisign "red"'s semiotic object is the 
sinsign "red" which is the single actual appearance of the word "red" on the 
page or its single utterance. The sinsign "red" is a replica of the symbol "red" 
(and is an index).  This bothers me because the semiotic object of both the 
legisign and sinsign "red"s is the red thing or redness (dependently on 
context), but the semiotic object of the qualisign "red" is the sinsign "red," 
because a qualisign is always an icon and can have for its object only that 
which it resembles.
---
 
I 
would state things differently like: the English word "red" involves the 
qualisign aspect. With "qualisign aspect" we draw attention to the 
qualities of a sign, its appearance or sound when written, printed, 
uttered, part of thought or perceived, to the exclusion of all other 
aspects. 
 
Since 'qualisign' is a possible and not an existent it 
needs the sinsign aspect for its embodiment. Without embodiment it 
will never be able to  function as a sign and will have object nor 
interpretant.
Only 
when we engage in a study of the process by which mind processes signs it makes 
some sense to ask for the object of a qualisign (aka emotional interpretant). 
One of the objects in the range of possibilities is the sinsign that arouse 
the feeling. We must be aware however that the sign in this case is 
not "red", but the "feeling of red" and the object is not "the object of the 
sinsign red", but the "sinsign red" itself. Here we have one of the possible 
sources of error in the process by which signs generate their meaning effects. 

 
The 
sinsign 'red' is not a replica of the symbol red, it is a replica of the 
legisign "red". The symbol "red" is as you state indexically connected with the 
replica sinsign. But since it is a habit, it must be a symbolical idexical aka 
replica indexical relation.
 
The 
relation material word - word form differs from the relation word - meaning. 

 
 
BU: 
 And actually, I don't 
understand how it is that the sinsign "red," -- when used mainly as a replica of 
the symbol (and not used indexically with an implicit "over there!") -- can be 
regarded as having redness or something red as its semiotic object. If its 
semiotic object is redness or something red, because it is a replica, then I 
don't see why a qualisign "red" should not have redness or something red as its 
semiotic object by virtue of being a kind of qualisignal version of a replica of 
the symbol. I'd rather say that the single utterance/appearance of "red" is 
simply a symbolic sinsign (or "sinsignal symbol") and that the 
qualisign "red" is simply a symbolic qualisign.  
 
The 
sinsign can only have something as its object if it is not only recognized as a 
sinsign but also as a replica sinsign (legisign) with a symbol attached. If we 
prescind from that for the sake of analysis, we  attribute other 
objects. It is akin to what happens if we shift from a syllogism and its object 
to one of the propositions and its object.  
 

The, 
in a sinsign embodied, qualisign can only involve the legisign and symbol if 
there is an established habit that determines such involvement. It is more safe 
to assume the lower sign types (the 10 types resulting from the three triads of 
aspects) involved in the higher, than to assume the higher to be present in the 
lower. A symbolic sign involves qualisigns, but a qualisign is not on its own 
account a symbolic sign.
 
BU:
 The only purpose that I 
can see in the constraints which eliminate these options is to maintain a rule 
which restrains the multiplication of signs but does little else except to 
multiply problems, having us adding little detours and curlicues like the 
conception of the "replica" and like the qualisign's being an icon of an 
indexical sinsign which is a replica of a symbol.  
 
I see 
an other purpose. Every distinction is justified by its ability to discern 
sources of error. The idea of a detour arises if we assume meaning aspects to be 
present when they are in fact not present. 
 
 
Best,
 
Auke
 
 In everyday language and 
thought we think of such qualities as colors as quite capable of being symbolic 
in certain typical contexts, and certain appearances such as that of the English 
word "horse" are so tied habitually with specific symbolic significations that I 
think it's just strange to say that it's false that the qualisign "horse" has 
for its semiotic object not a horse but an individual utterance, writing, or 
printing of the word "horse." 
 
 Now, suppose I d

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-15 Thread Benjamin Udell




Wilfred, list,
 
Wilfred wrote,
>So why would the word “red” be a symbol??? To me it is also not. I 
would regard the word “red” more as being a qualisign, which then would also fit 
the last sentence below. To me the word “red” can not be a sinsign since it is 
not an actual existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also 
not be a legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course.
 
Well, perhaps I should have said the _term_ (rather than the 
_word_) red is a symbol (and a legisign). It seems hard to argue 
against the idea that words do occur singularly, in single utterances, writings, 
printings. The classic example is the difference between the word "the" in 
general and the number of its occurrences on a given page.
 
There 
is a qualisign which is the English word "red," and which consists in the 
appearance and/or sound of the word as written/printed/uttered.  The 
qualisign "red"'s semiotic object is the sinsign "red" which is the single 
actual appearance of the word "red" on the page or its single utterance. The 
sinsign "red" is a replica of the symbol "red" (and is an index).  This 
bothers me because the semiotic object of both the legisign and sinsign "red"s 
is the red thing or redness (dependently on context), but the semiotic object of 
the qualisign "red" is the sinsign "red," because a qualisign is always an icon 
and can have for its object only that which it resembles.  In the Peircean 
system, a qualisign cannot be a symbol because this would violate the 
involutionary rule which involves that 3rds presuppose 2nds & 
1sts, but not vice versa, and 2nds presuppose 1sts but not vice versa. 
 
And actually, I don't understand how it is that the sinsign "red," -- when 
used mainly as a replica of the symbol (and not used indexically with an 
implicit "over there!") -- can be regarded as having redness or something red as 
its semiotic object. If its semiotic object is redness or something red, because 
it is a replica, then I don't see why a qualisign "red" should not have redness 
or something red as its semiotic object by virtue of being a kind of qualisignal 
version of a replica of the symbol. I'd rather say that the single 
utterance/appearance of "red" is simply a symbolic sinsign (or "sinsignal 
symbol") and that the qualisign "red" is simply a symbolic qualisign. 
The only purpose that I can see in the constraints which eliminate these 
options is to maintain a rule which restrains the multiplication of signs but 
does little else except to multiply problems, having us adding little detours 
and curlicues like the conception of the "replica" and like the qualisign's 
being an icon of an indexical sinsign which is a replica of a symbol. In 
everyday language and thought we think of such qualities as colors as quite 
capable of being symbolic in certain typical contexts, and certain appearances 
such as that of the English word "horse" are so tied habitually with specific 
symbolic significations that I think it's just strange to say that it's false 
that the qualisign "horse" has for its semiotic object not a horse but an 
individual utterance, writing, or printing of the word "horse."
 
Now, suppose I define a kind of sign which I call an "evocant," and define 
it as any sign which is either a symbol or a replica of a symbol. The 
distinction between sinsign & legisign is not abolished by this. Instead, 
the replica becomes simply the sinsignal evocant and the symbol is the legisinal 
evocant. Well, it wouldn't be enough. If I define the evocant simply as either 
symbol or replica, then I've defined it as either symbol or a kind of index 
whose significative power I've already found problematic. Instead I have to 
argue that a singular thing is capable of "evoking" and I have to define this as 
a power much like symbolizing. I'd have to argue that the habits which 
constitute symbols can be tied to qualisigns in such a way as to embody 
themselves in sinsigns such that the qualisign "horse"'s object, the sinsign 
"horse"'s object, and the legisign "horse"'s object, are all the horse, insofar 
as all three evoke the horse in the interpretant mind. Now is it really false 
that the qualisign, the appearance, "horse" evokes a horse in its interpretant's 
mind? I think that the appearance of the word does evoke a horse in my mind at 
least, because of the habitual connection of that appearance with an idea of a 
horse. Furthermore the interplay of singular utterances, qualitative 
appearances, and habits, do affect the symbol in its habitual 
character.
 
Best, Ben Udell
 
- Original Message - From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen To:

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen









So why would the word “red” be a
symbol??? To me it is also not. I would regard the word “red” more
as being a qualisign, which then would also fit the last sentence below. To me
the word “red” can not be a sinsign since it is not an actual
existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also not be a
legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course.

 

Wilfred 

 









Van:
Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: dinsdag 13 juni 2006
9:51
Aan: Peirce
 Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l]
Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign



 



. If the same rules hold for these 10 trichotomies as for
the three, then it would appear, for instance, that all symbols are copulants.
Copulants "neither
describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express… logical
relations"; for example "If--then--"; "--causes--."
That seems like it just must be wrong. Then a symbol like the word
"red" couldn't be a symbol, instead, since it's descriptive, it can
be a legisign, a sinsign, or a qualisign, but in any case it has to be a descriptive abstractive iconic
hypothetical sympathetic suggestive gratific rhematic assurance of instinct.
That just can't be right.





 

 






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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Bernard, Ben and others":

I think the quote from Peirce I gave earlier today justifies my reservations 
about the acceptance of  the ten trichotomy scheme that Ben was working 
with, and my claim that there is no version of it which can simply be put 
forth as Peirce's considered and self-accepted view,  I have no disagreement 
with your view of the importance of figuring out what the best or proper 
version of that should be, though.  I am just warning people away from 
taking that version which occurs in the CP as the "definitive" one or as 
having some special status among the several versions he came up with, none 
of which can, in my opinion, be so regarded.  So I don't see any real 
disagreement here unless you want to insist on the special value of that 
particular version.

As regards your earlier post, though, which pertained rather to the question 
of why I did a diagram for that particular way of ordering the three 
trichotomies -- as distinct from the ten trichotomies -- when there were 
other options available, I am glad that you raised a question about that 
because I am not at all sure that I chose the best way of representing that, 
as regards the particular ordering relation (1,2,3), nor can I say 
immediately why I did so.  It will take me at least another day, though, to 
think this through again by rereading my article closely again and also by 
going back to that material from  the Syllabus on Logic which it was based 
upon and rethinking that.  The more I look over the various ordering 
possibilities the more sense I get that there is something wrong but without 
being able yet to see precisely what.  So let me simply stall you on that 
until I can answer intelligently and, if necessary, make a revision in my 
account.  Tomorrow then, hopefully.

Joe

- Original Message - 
From: "Bernard Morand" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" 
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 5:39 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view. I would tend
to comprehend such statements within a pessimistic view aiming at
undervaluate what was at stake for an understanding of Peirce's
semiotic. In fact your diagnosis could remain correct while what Peirce
tried to clarify at the beginning of the century and during quite a
decade could be of the utmost interest for semiotics. This is more or
less my own view. In particular I think that if we manage to produce
someday a sufficient account of signs theory in order that it be of
practical usage in special sciences, such a sign theory will be informed
by the 10 trichotomies system. I know that this statement will have to
be justified but just an example: the study of concrete signs needs some
concepts as the distinctions between immediate and dynamic objects, and
betweeen the three interpretants too. From the theoretical point of view
I am also convinced that the transition from the 3 trichotomies to 10
and the relation between the two kinds of systems deserves to be studied
on the methodological level (pragmatism).

Bernard

Joseph Ransdell wrote:
> Ben asks:
>
> "My basic question here is whether these structural relations are
> correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I, II, III, IV,
> V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X" is correct."
>
> REPLY:
> The MS material in the logic notebook (MS 339) shows quite clearly
> that Peirce did not regard himself as having arrived at anything he
> could regard as satisfactory, as regards the ten trichotomies, as late
> as Nov. 1 of 1909, and the two versions which he thought were -- at
> best -- the least objectionable were ones he formulated on Oct 13th of
> 1905 and March 31st of 1906.  The version you are working with is from
> an unsent draft of a letter to Welby of 1908, a year earlier than the
> assessment just mentioned, and it differs in significant ways from the
> versions he thought best though still unsatisfactory.  The fact that
> it appears in the Collected Papers gives it no special status since it
> is really just discarded draft material.   Take all talk about the ten
> trichotomies with a VERY LARGE grain of salt, Ben, until we get
> some effective and shared access to the relevant MS material.  Of
> course it is perfectly okay for people to do their own constructions
> of the expanded set of trichotomies as th

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Bernard Morand

Thanks very much for the quote Joe. The last sentence puzzles me. Will 
have to think about it: seems like Peirce considered lately that he had 
earlier put erroneously some considerations related to the (dynamic) 
interpretant  into his characterizations of the relation of the object 
to the sign. This is a common mistake that we all do everyday.


Bernard


Joseph Ransdell a ¨crit :


Bernard says::,

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view.

REPLY:
I'll reply more extensively later in the day, Bernard, but the basis for
my saying this is as follows, from MS 339D.662 (1909 Nov 1)

=quote Peirce
During the past 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Division of 
Signs and have only lately -- in the last week or two -- been turning back 
to it; and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though 
the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without 
consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red "The Prescott Book," and also this one 
[the "Logic Notebook", MS 339], I find the entries in this book of 
"Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31st" and of 1905 Oct 13 
particularly in imporant from my present (accidentally limited, no doubt) 
point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book, 1909 Oct 21, and what immediately precedes that in that book but is 
not dated.


Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define this difference besween 
Icon, Index, & Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction 
as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.


end quote==

Joe Ransdell




 




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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Bernard says::,

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view.

REPLY:
I'll reply more extensively later in the day, Bernard, but the basis for
my saying this is as follows, from MS 339D.662 (1909 Nov 1)

=quote Peirce
During the past 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Division of 
Signs and have only lately -- in the last week or two -- been turning back 
to it; and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though 
the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without 
consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red "The Prescott Book," and also this one 
[the "Logic Notebook", MS 339], I find the entries in this book of 
"Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31st" and of 1905 Oct 13 
particularly in imporant from my present (accidentally limited, no doubt) 
point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book, 1909 Oct 21, and what immediately precedes that in that book but is 
not dated.

Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define this difference besween 
Icon, Index, & Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction 
as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.

end quote==

Joe Ransdell




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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Bernard Morand


Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies 
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in 
progress for Peirce.


I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering 
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.


However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow 
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2) 
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view. I would tend 
to comprehend such statements within a pessimistic view aiming at 
undervaluate what was at stake for an understanding of Peirce's 
semiotic. In fact your diagnosis could remain correct while what Peirce 
tried to clarify at the beginning of the century and during quite a 
decade could be of the utmost interest for semiotics. This is more or 
less my own view. In particular I think that if we manage to produce 
someday a sufficient account of signs theory in order that it be of 
practical usage in special sciences, such a sign theory will be informed 
by the 10 trichotomies system. I know that this statement will have to 
be justified but just an example: the study of concrete signs needs some 
concepts as the distinctions between immediate and dynamic objects, and 
betweeen the three interpretants too. From the theoretical point of view 
I am also convinced that the transition from the 3 trichotomies to 10 
and the relation between the two kinds of systems deserves to be studied 
on the methodological level (pragmatism).


Bernard




Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Ben asks:
 
"My basic question here is whether these structural relations are 
correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I, II, III, IV, 
V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X" is correct."
 
REPLY:
The MS material in the logic notebook (MS 339) shows quite clearly 
that Peirce did not regard himself as having arrived at anything he 
could regard as satisfactory, as regards the ten trichotomies, as late 
as Nov. 1 of 1909, and the two versions which he thought were -- at 
best -- the least objectionable were ones he formulated on Oct 13th of 
1905 and March 31st of 1906.  The version you are working with is from 
an unsent draft of a letter to Welby of 1908, a year earlier than the 
assessment just mentioned, and it differs in significant ways from the 
versions he thought best though still unsatisfactory.  The fact that 
it appears in the Collected Papers gives it no special status since it 
is really just discarded draft material.   Take all talk about the ten 
trichotomies with a VERY LARGE grain of salt, Ben, until we get 
some effective and shared access to the relevant MS material.  Of 
course it is perfectly okay for people to do their own constructions 
of the expanded set of trichotomies as they should have been 
formulated, provided they are clear on the fact that this is their own 
theory; but if the question is as to what Peirce's theory was it can 
only be said that it was work in progress which never arrived at a 
reasonably stable developed state and which cannot reasonably be 
represented as being his view.   
 
Joe Ransdell
 
 



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Benjamin Udell

Joe, Bernard, Wilfred, list,

_Magno cum grano salis_ it is, then. The content of the 10-chotomy on which I 
got my paws is very suggestive, beginning with the sign's own phenomenological 
category and ending with a trichotomy of _assurances_ of instinct, experience, 
and form, i.e., as at an inquiry's end. I look forward to comparing the 
10-chotomies of -- (clears throat) -- semio-parametric trichotomies.

Wilfred, for my part I don't happen to know why Peirce put some relationships 
and not others into that 10-chotomy. With Peirce, sometimes things not 
immediately explained do have explanations. For all I know, Peirce himself was 
dissatisfied with that 10-chotomy for the pattern of inclusions & exclusions 
which you mention. As Joe said, Peirce didn't bring this aspect of his work 
into a satisfactory form.

The reason that Peirce wanted to put his definitions into structural, 
"diagrammatic" relations is the same reason that scientists like to do that 
with physical quantities. It unifies understanding, turns it into a sensitive 
web, and makes far-separated things into both supports and checks/balances to 
each other. The unification of conceptions of mathematical & empirical 
understanding in his accounts of the observations and manipulation of diagrams 
has not yet been plumbed, so far as I can tell. The structuring-together of 
definitions strengthens the constraints for consistency, pattern, and logical 
dependence, and provides constraints for making clarity out of things which 
seemed hopelessly confused. However, it's a rare thing to combine a talent for 
that with a talent for giving structural "names and habitations" to the deep 
elements & patterns of human life & experience. Peirce comes before some sort 
of weird great divide in philosophy, when those who aspired to logical 
structure tended to try to "reduce" and explain away the deeper things, while 
those whose inclination was opposite thereto seemed to become strangely 
estranged from the scientific worldview.  Anyway, whatever "ultimate" entelechy 
might be reached would be something beyond our imagining -- if a diagram, then 
a diagram beyond our imagining, and I much doubt that Peirce thought that he 
could imagine in any detail what it would be like. It's an ideal-limit idea, 
something that might be infinitely far off. C.S. Peirce often said that 
adequate research will discover anything, but he never said that ultiimate 
truth was within his grasp (i.e., that adequate earthly funding of C.S. Peirce 
would lead to ultimate truth :-). Now Peirce did think that _some_ of his 
structures of ideas had reached their final form -- he wasn't 
infallibilistically sure of it, but he felt reasonably sure -- but as to the 
10-chotomies of semio-parametric trichotomies, he'd certainly agree that 
they're not at endstate and he'd like very much for discussion and research to 
go on and on. Peirce was not the kind to think that the patent office would 
need to be closed in the foreseeable future.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen 
To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 5:55 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Dear list,

I would like to state First of all that I regard the ongoing discussion about 
sinsign, legisign and qualisign here on the list as being very interesting. 
But, I also have my remarks. Some of them might be worthwhile to reconsider. Or 
not. It might also just be I am just not wise enough to respond the way I do.

First remark is just some remark about the first diagram here below. With the I 
to X at the left. There is stated at IV The relation to the sign to the dynamic 
object. What I do not understand is why there is stated nowhere "the relation 
of the sign to the immediate object? Then there is VII the relation of the sign 
to the dynamic interpretant. Again, why nowhere the relation of the sign to the 
immediate interpretant? Then X..why not more triadic relations

Another remark I have, is that somehow Charles Sander Peirce disappoints me if 
he really aimed at putting his definitions in a diagram and if he thought that 
would ever lead to some all-inclusive and complete diagram with perfect 
entelechy. Or, connected with that, that he would think that all thoughts 
SHOULD be diagrammatic. This has to do with the Dutch saying "de weg is het 
doel". Maybe. Or maybe not. My dissappointment is still not much if i am 
correct on this one since his definitions are great and also this diagrammatic 
reflections are. But still, I am wondering.

Last remark I have is that Charles Sander Peirce still was a human being like 
all of us. Not some god that never made any mistakes. So whether some diagram 
being his endstate or not is not so important. More important is that the 
discussions will be going on and on and on. B

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign





Ben, list,

You wrote:
Actually, the way I in which I checked was by
literally flipping Robert Marty's diagram around in PowerPoint
That is to say, by diagram manipulation and observation leading to
fresh insight, an abduction regarding relations--exactly what Peirce
sees as the value of diagram observation. And while he often discusses
this in connection with existential graphs, there are many examples of
geometrical (all varieties including topical) and other forms of
diagram manipulation. Thought itself was for Peirce a kind of diagram.
An experiment is a diagram. I recently quoted him to the effect that a
simple noun  "with the ideas of its
application and signification" is a kind of diagram.
"[S]omething of the nature of a diagram, be it
only an imaginary
skeleton proposition, or even a mere noun with the ideas of its
application and signification is needed in all necessary reasoning.
Indeed one may say that something of this kind is needed in all
reasoning whatsoever, although in induction it is the real experiences
that serves as diagram." (from MS 459, The Lowell Lectures, in Stuhr,
ed., Classical American Philosophy, p 50)
As for trikonic diagrams, I try to employ them as often as possible in
workshops, seminars and classes to get fresh insight into relations.
The ICCS community is not yet completely comfortable with them, but
several people are. I certainly hope to have many more doing trikonic
diagram observation and manipulation at the ICCS interoperability
workshop this summer in Denmark. Diagram observation by an individual
can be quite productive (witness your recent lovely one), but a diagram
observed by several prepared folk (for example, an inductive
experiment) can be of the greatest value towards consensus formation
and what Aldo de Moor calls "goal alignment" in consideration of
communities of shared interest.

You continued:
That made it so easy that I was disinclined to
take credit for my having understood it. I mean, the insight can be
non-trivial without my deserving much credit for running into it. 
But that's the way I think it is with diagram manipulation: the
prepared mind will simply see--sometimes for the first
time--the 'obvious' (once its seen) but hitherto not noticed
relationship. But the mind must be prepared. . .
On the other hand, why should I let my
reputation be only for computer skills? Very well, you've convinced me!
:-)
Hey, don't get carried away, yet--it's only an abduction after all :-)
And while I think it may prove to be a very good and useful one indeed,
R. Marty may not (the "French school" has not been very fond of
semeiotic triangles you may recall), and it will undoubtedly require
some testing. But, again, I think it's a most promising abduction.

Best,

Gary


Benjamin Udell wrote:

  
  
  
  
  Gary, list,
   
  Well, come to think of it, I guess the leading edge of my
understanding was abductive. There were some moments when I thought the
equivalence possible, without seeing it clearly. Actually, the way I in
which I checked was by literally flipping Robert Marty's diagram around
in PowerPoint. That made it so easy that I was disinclined to take
credit for my having understood it. I mean, the insight can be
non-trivial without my deserving much credit for running into it. On
the other hand, why should I let my reputation be only for computer
skills? Very well, you've convinced me! :-)
   
  Best, Ben
   
  


---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Frances Kelly

Frances to listers...

As posited by Peirce under speculative grammatics, it is clear enough
to me that the classes of immediate object signs are qualisigns and
sinsigns and legisigns, and that the classes of dynamic object signs
are icons and indexes and symbols, and that the various interpretant
signs of these signs are classed as immediate and dynamic and final.
What is not clear to me however is what classes of signs Peirce may
have posited to account for immediate representamen signs. These would
presumably be determined by the immediate and dynamic objects they
refer to, and would in turn presumably determine the various terns of
interpretants they generate as an effect. Such representamens
therefore would presumably constitute the sign vehicles or carriers
that moderate between their objects and their interpretants.

The only tern of signs Peirce mentions that might be posited to fit
this class called immediate representamen signs are potisigns and
actisigns and famsigns. There is however some seeming resistance among
semioticians and pragmatists to allocate this fundamental tern in such
a way, but the reasons usually turn either on substitutions, whereby
they are claimed to be mere synonyms stated earlier by Peirce for what
is now correctly deemed to be immediate object signs, or on the fact
that they are not mentioned in the familiar ten classes of signs. If
these reasons justly warrant dismissing them from serious semiotic
concern, then the problem persists for me as to just what exactly are
immediate representamen signs within semiosis.



---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign





Ben, list,

By now you've received my completed and corrected message which omits
the request for the not-simplified lattice version of my trikonic
diagram of the 10 classes (since I very much like your simplified form
which I included in the revised message) and adds analytical content.
For right now, and also since I've posted too much today, I'd like to
address for now just your question of why I called your diagram adding
the lattice structure to my trikonic diagram an "abduction."  Well,
really, you point to it yourself. 
What I'm getting at, is that it really is fair
to say that the 10-adic triangular arrangement turns out to be quite
suitable to depict the lattice for. . . the structure of ordering and
non-ordering.
Combining the two may also allow for a kind of possible diagram
observation and manipulation which either one apart from the other
wouldn't. Also, what you are "getting at" in the comment above is
clear  once one sees it diagrammed! But I do not think that
your bringing together the lattice structure and the trichotomic one is
trivial, and it is that combination which I think may constitute a kind
of abduction (or maybe it's really a form of diagram
manipulation--although perhaps I really do think that to say that the
10-adic triangular structure is suitable for depicting the lattice
structure is a kind of abduction).

Best, 

Gary

Benjamin Udell wrote:

  
  
  
  Gary R., list,
   
  (Note: anybody responding, please remember to delete all
unneeded graphics & text.)
   
  Gary Richmond wrote,
  > (one I believe he hasn't posted yet, but which I hope he
will, shows a possible correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure...
   
  The graphic which I already posted (and which is the first one
shown here) pretty much shows it. It's just simplified, and is at a
different angle as a whole than Robert's, and is with Robert's vertical
arrows slanted in order to be like others. Gary's calling this an
"abduction" but, unless he means that I've kidnapped Robert's lattice
diagram (I certainly have done _something_ with it! :-) ), the only
element of abduction or surmise is that I don't know whether the
verticality of some of Robert's arrows in fact is somehow determinate
in terms of the lattice representation. I can see how one could argue
that it makes "the most sense" but my surmise is that the distinctive
slope of those arrows with respect to the others is indeed optional.
Aside from that, and aside from the overall orientation and handedness
(left/right) of the visual representation, there's little if any
surmise in it, instead it's an equivalence (at least up to a point,
which I'll get to in a moment). The lattice structure is pretty much
"deterministic" -- I mean, that aside from our flipping it horizontally
or vertically or whatever, and aside from our turning the
"loose-end"-looking vertices to one angle or another, etc., etc., .its
vertices are in a definite arrangement. What I'm getting at, is that it
really is fair to say that the 10-adic triangular arrangement turns out
to be quite suitable to depict the lattice for -- I don't know what
it's called -- the structure of ordering and non-ordering. The second
graphic is a re-created version of Robert Marty's. The third is a cross
between Robert Marty's style and Gary's trikonic style. The fourth shows
  


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign





Joe, list,

I want to correct something in my last post which could cause
confusion. I wrote:
That Peirce apparently included this triangular
on the back of a letter
which included a very tentative presentation of his very different 10
trichotomies of signs has I think resulted in confusing that discussion
(EP 483-490) with the diagram in the Essential Peirce which is not
as I see it of the 10 trichotomies discussed in the letter, but rather
of the famous and completed 10 classes (the diagram is labeled "Signs
Divided into Ten Classes" not into 10 categories). 

This should have read--and especially note the change of the very last
word:
That Peirce apparently included this triangle
of triangles on the back of a letter
which included a very tentative presentation of his very different 10
trichotomies of signs has I think resulted in confusing that discussion
(EP 483-490) with the diagram in the Essential Peirce which is not
as I see it of the 10 trichotomies discussed in the letter, but rather
of the famous and completed 10 classes (the diagram is labeled "Signs
Divided into Ten Classes" not into 10 richotomies). 

Note that while the diagram is labeled "Signs Divided into Ten Classes"
the discussion in the text has the heading "The Ten Main Trichotomies
of Signs" (cf. EP2:481 and EP2: 491. This has been I think the biggest
bone of contention between Bernard Morand and me in this matter. But
since I have my own reservations about the EP diagram I based my 10
classes on  CP 2.264 as this seems quite "definitive."

Best,

Gary



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign




Gary:
 
Sorry for the confusion of the ten classes with 
the ten trichotomies.  I didn't read your message carefully enough.  I 
have no problem with that and there is no need to respond further to 
it.
 
Joe

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Gary 
  Richmond 
  To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
  Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 11:51 
  AM
  Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, 
  Legisign, Qualisign
  Joe,By now you've read my corrected and completed post 
  so that I hope some of what you asked is addressed in that corrected post. 
  Just a point or so more for now. You wrote:
  Would you mind reposting the diagram you refer to below?  It 
  is my trikonic diagram of the 10 classes of signs which you find as an 
  attached gif and, hopefully, at the bottom of the message. Ben has produced 
  various versions of this, the last one includes his abduction that relates 
  Robert's lattice structure to my trikonic one.
  I don't recall 
what was said about that at that time but I think it important to get clear 
on what can and cannot legitimately be imputed to Peirce, and the absence of 
availability of the relevant MS material is important to bear in mind and I 
don't recall if that was sufficiently stressed at that time.I 
  agree. My suggestion has been that the diagram  at CP 2.264 and  the 
  one at EP2:491 are equivalent diagrams (there's much more to be said here 
  regarding some of my reservations, but suffice it to say for now that they are 
  related precisely to the ones you just expressed).That Peirce 
  apparently included this triangular on the back of a letter which included a 
  very tentative presentation of his very different 10 trichotomies of signs has 
  I think resulted in confusing that discussion (EP 483-490) with the 
  diagram in the Essential Peirce which is not as I see it of the 10 
  trichotomies discussed in the letter, but rather of the famous and completed 
  10 classes (the diagram is labeled "Signs Divided into Ten Classes" not 
  into 10 categories). I do not see how the diagram in EP2 would 
  have the variety of numberings which they have since they are all "static" 
  parameters (in Ben's & my sense). Three of them are used to generate the 
  completed diagram of the 10 classes, the 9 parameters recently discussed, and 
  the placement of these in the EP2 diagram strongly suggests that the diagram 
  does not concern these plus 7 additional ones (relating to the two forms of 
  the object and the three of the interpretant). The nonadic group does not 
  requite categorial numbering because those parameters are not embodied. Again, 
  I would hope that diagram observation would make this clear enough.On 
  the other hand, and for the reasons you've recently given, except for my own 
  "guess" at the structure of the later 10 trichotomies (which Ben has put into 
  an attractive form), I have not spent much time on the unfinished, problematic 
  10 trichotomies, while I have found the finished classification  most 
  helpful in semeiotic analyses, and not just at the level of semeiotic grammar, 
  but in critic and methodeutic as 
  well.Best,Gary---Message from peirce-l forum to 
  subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  
  

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign





Joe,

By now you've read my corrected and completed post so that I hope some
of what you asked is addressed in that corrected post. Just a point or
so more for now. You wrote:

  Would you mind reposting the diagram you refer to below?  

It is my trikonic diagram of the 10 classes of signs which you
find as an attached gif and, hopefully, at the bottom of the message.
Ben has produced various versions of this, the last one includes his
abduction that relates Robert's lattice structure to my trikonic one.

  I don't recall 
what was said about that at that time but I think it important to get clear 
on what can and cannot legitimately be imputed to Peirce, and the absence of 
availability of the relevant MS material is important to bear in mind and I 
don't recall if that was sufficiently stressed at that time.

I agree. My suggestion has been that the diagram  at CP 2.264 and  the
one at EP2:491 are equivalent diagrams (there's much more to be said
here regarding some of my reservations, but suffice it to say for now
that they are related precisely to the ones you just expressed).

That Peirce apparently included this triangular on the back of a letter
which included a very tentative presentation of his very different 10
trichotomies of signs has I think resulted in confusing that discussion
(EP 483-490) with the diagram in the Essential Peirce which is not
as I see it of the 10 trichotomies discussed in the letter, but rather
of the famous and completed 10 classes (the diagram is labeled "Signs
Divided into Ten Classes" not into 10 categories). 

I do not see how the diagram in EP2 would have the variety of
numberings which they have since they are all "static" parameters (in
Ben's & my sense). Three of them are used to generate the completed
diagram of the 10 classes, the 9 parameters recently discussed, and the
placement of these in the EP2 diagram strongly suggests that the
diagram does not concern these plus 7 additional ones (relating to the
two forms of the object and the three of the interpretant). The nonadic
group does not requite categorial numbering because those parameters
are not embodied. Again, I would hope that diagram observation would
make this clear enough.

On the other hand, and for the reasons you've recently given, except
for my own "guess" at the structure of the later 10 trichotomies (which
Ben has put into an attractive form), I have not spent much time on the
unfinished, problematic 10 trichotomies, while I have found the
finished classification  most helpful in semeiotic analyses, and not
just at the level of semeiotic grammar, but in critic and methodeutic
as well.

Best,

Gary

---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Frances:

In view of what I was just now relating to Ben, I would have to regard the 
sort of enterprise you speculate about below as a timewaster of monumental 
proportions, promising to generate word salad that startle even the inmates 
at Bedlam, given that it would be based on an unreliable understanding of 
Peirce's view to begin with (as I explained to Ben), taken together with 
what is surely a misguided attempt to conflate Peircean semiotic with the 
radically different conception of Charles Morris (as Gene Halton reminds us 
now and again).

In short: fuhgeddaboutit! (as T. Soprano might state the point).

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" 
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 10:59 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


Frances to listers...

The broad theme of this topic and its leading threads is a subject
that remains intriguingly foggy for me. At the core of my haze perhaps
is the forced application of categorics upon semiotics, yet with
synechastics lurking in the wings. In my attempt to wrestle with the
many classes of signs in acts of semiosis as listed by Peirce, it is
tempting to take various kinds of signs he mentioned and organize them
within a sort of tridential diagram of soles and pairs and terns.

Some of those signs would require a tentative assumption that they are
not mere synonyms of each other. These signs might include potisigns
and actisigns and famsigns as immediate representamen signs or
moderating vehicles, and then qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns as
immediate object signs of fundamental reference, and then icons and
indexes and symbols as dynamic object signs of advanced reference.
These might also include semes or rhemes and sumisigns and terms as
immediate interpretant signs of initial effect, and then phemes and
dicisigns or dicents and propositions as dynamic interpretant signs of
obstinate or remediate effect, and last delomes or dolemes and
suadisigns and arguments as final interpretant signs of destinate and
culminate and ultimate effect. Another thorn here for me is that those
classes of dynamic object signs and dynamic interpretant signs are of
secondness, but are not listed or structured in a trichotomically
consistent manner. In other words and for example, icons would be a
sole first, with indexes and symbols as a subsequent dual pair under
some categorical umbrella, which is seemingly missing here.

All these signs furthermore might rest only within the first semiosic
division of grammatics, often called the inscriptive information of
signs by Morrisean semioticians. Many of the signs mentioned correctly
as other interpretant signs might very well be kinds of "super" signs
that rest further within the other semiosic divisions of critics and
rhetorics, where critics is often called the descriptive evaluation of
signs, and rhetorics is often called the prescriptive evocation of
signs, again by Morrisean semioticians. Those other interpretant
"super" signs that could be deemed post grammatic might include
normative assurances to the signer or semiotician of the sign.

Another thorn for me is whether Peirce intended that these further
divisions of critics and rhetorics, and seemingly infused with
advanced interpretant signs, would be categorically structured as
phenomenal trichotomies. In this regard, it remains tempting for me to
structure the Peircean divisions of grammatics and critics and
rhetorics each with the Morrisean dimensions of syntactics and
semantics and pragmatics. This might then allow for advanced
interpretants to take on the critical characteristics of appraised
syntactic values and defined semantic meanings and inferred pragmatic
judgements or worths, and for further advanced interpretants under
rhetorics to deal with the syntactic means of communication and the
semantic signification of modes and the pragmatic methods of
responsive actions. All signs would of course be speculative.

The further assumption by me is that while these signs in acts of
semiosis are all objective logical constructs, semiotics or logics in
the broadest sense actually embraces both nonlingual and lingual
signs, and lingual signs would presumably embrace both nonverbal and
verbal signs, but linguistics and its languages is held to a practical
science by Peirce, and thus excluded from semiotic concern as having
no logical import. Of course, all logical signs used by humans are
seemingly proposed by Peirce as degenerate forms of pure logic, so
that there should be little problem in permitting lingual signs into
semiotics and thus into logic. This may imply however that semiotics
with linguistics is degenerate logics, while the normative sciences
aligned as aesthetics and ethics and logics is less so. Nonetheless,
interpretants like terms and propositions are both held by Peirce to
be either nonlingual or lingual, ther

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign





Claudio, Ben, Robert, Bernard, Joe, list,

First, sorry for sending out that last incomplete message by mistake.

Claudio, so good to see you on the list again. I too am pleased to see
all the
diagrammatic discussion and especially some of Ben's abductions
relating diagrams (for example the one which shows a possible
correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure--which possible correspondence I want to discuss this summer
at ICCS in Aalborg, Denmark with Rudolf Wille, whom I believe in part
inspired Robert to his lattice structure of the 10 classes). 

I want now to respond
to just one of your questions, Claudio, as it concerns the diagram of
the 10 classes of signs which I devised and which Ben produced in power
point and now in these new gifs. You asked:
 I am sure that also Ben/Gary's diagram has a
criteria for that rotation...? Which is the purpose of that change?
The diagram of the 10 classes is itself meant to be observed as a
categorial trikon with firstness at the top, secondness at the bottom,
and thirdness to the right (as in all trikonic structures):

firstness
|> thirdness
secondness

for semeiotics this involves the structure of semiosis itself:

sign
|> interpretant
object

and for each of these in the 9-adic diagram, which are the parameters
of the signs to be embodied at the level of the 10-adic
classification--using Ben Udell's very useful parametric notion &
language which came about as he was editing my ICCS paper on trikonic
of last year, available at Arisbe-- (these three themselves arranged as
the trikon of 3 trikons) upon which Peirce builds his 10-adic
classification. So we have:

9 sign parameters

sign (in itself) parameters: 

qualisign
|> legisign
sinsign


|>  interpretant parameters:

. . .rheme
. . .|> argument
. . .proposition
 

 object parameters:

icon
|> symbol
index


Finally, as noted at the top, my diagram of the  10 classes of
signs is itself arranged  trikonically, three trikons of trikons
(each associated with one of the three categories for reasons which I
hope are obvious enough involving the notion that firstness, secondness
or thirdness dominate their respective structures) around a central
single lone trikon  (which is NOT dominated by firstness,
secondness, or thirdness at this level of structure), namely the
rhematic indexical legisign. One is supposed to see all these
levels of tricategorial structure observing the diagram, so of course,
as the _expression_ goes, trying to explain it is like trying to explain
a joke. :-)  Maybe Ben can do a better job?

Best,

Gary





---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Frances Kelly

Frances to listers...

The broad theme of this topic and its leading threads is a subject
that remains intriguingly foggy for me. At the core of my haze perhaps
is the forced application of categorics upon semiotics, yet with
synechastics lurking in the wings. In my attempt to wrestle with the
many classes of signs in acts of semiosis as listed by Peirce, it is
tempting to take various kinds of signs he mentioned and organize them
within a sort of tridential diagram of soles and pairs and terns.

Some of those signs would require a tentative assumption that they are
not mere synonyms of each other. These signs might include potisigns
and actisigns and famsigns as immediate representamen signs or
moderating vehicles, and then qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns as
immediate object signs of fundamental reference, and then icons and
indexes and symbols as dynamic object signs of advanced reference.
These might also include semes or rhemes and sumisigns and terms as
immediate interpretant signs of initial effect, and then phemes and
dicisigns or dicents and propositions as dynamic interpretant signs of
obstinate or remediate effect, and last delomes or dolemes and
suadisigns and arguments as final interpretant signs of destinate and
culminate and ultimate effect. Another thorn here for me is that those
classes of dynamic object signs and dynamic interpretant signs are of
secondness, but are not listed or structured in a trichotomically
consistent manner. In other words and for example, icons would be a
sole first, with indexes and symbols as a subsequent dual pair under
some categorical umbrella, which is seemingly missing here.

All these signs furthermore might rest only within the first semiosic
division of grammatics, often called the inscriptive information of
signs by Morrisean semioticians. Many of the signs mentioned correctly
as other interpretant signs might very well be kinds of "super" signs
that rest further within the other semiosic divisions of critics and
rhetorics, where critics is often called the descriptive evaluation of
signs, and rhetorics is often called the prescriptive evocation of
signs, again by Morrisean semioticians. Those other interpretant
"super" signs that could be deemed post grammatic might include
normative assurances to the signer or semiotician of the sign.

Another thorn for me is whether Peirce intended that these further
divisions of critics and rhetorics, and seemingly infused with
advanced interpretant signs, would be categorically structured as
phenomenal trichotomies. In this regard, it remains tempting for me to
structure the Peircean divisions of grammatics and critics and
rhetorics each with the Morrisean dimensions of syntactics and
semantics and pragmatics. This might then allow for advanced
interpretants to take on the critical characteristics of appraised
syntactic values and defined semantic meanings and inferred pragmatic
judgements or worths, and for further advanced interpretants under
rhetorics to deal with the syntactic means of communication and the
semantic signification of modes and the pragmatic methods of
responsive actions. All signs would of course be speculative.

The further assumption by me is that while these signs in acts of
semiosis are all objective logical constructs, semiotics or logics in
the broadest sense actually embraces both nonlingual and lingual
signs, and lingual signs would presumably embrace both nonverbal and
verbal signs, but linguistics and its languages is held to a practical
science by Peirce, and thus excluded from semiotic concern as having
no logical import. Of course, all logical signs used by humans are
seemingly proposed by Peirce as degenerate forms of pure logic, so
that there should be little problem in permitting lingual signs into
semiotics and thus into logic. This may imply however that semiotics
with linguistics is degenerate logics, while the normative sciences
aligned as aesthetics and ethics and logics is less so. Nonetheless,
interpretants like terms and propositions are both held by Peirce to
be either nonlingual or lingual, thereby probably yielding arguments
where some of their premises are nonlingual or nonverbal yet allowing
the competent performance of illocutionary acts in any event. This
would certainly correct the psychologistic subjectivism of notions and
the nominalism of mentions and notations that Peirce wanted to avoid,
at least as global approaches to the generality and universality of
logical signs.



---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Gary:

Would you mind reposting the diagram you refer to below?  I don't recall 
what was said about that at that time but I think it important to get clear 
on what can and cannot legitimately be imputed to Peirce, and the absence of 
availability of the relevant MS material is important to bear in mind and I 
don't recall if that was sufficiently stressed at that time.

Joe


.
- Original Message - 
From: "Gary Richmond" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" 
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 10:35 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


Claudio, Ben, Robert, Bernard, Joe, list,

Claudio, so goo to see you on list. I too am pleased to see all the
diagrammatic discussion and especially some of Ben's abductions relating
diagrams (one I believe he hasn't posted yet, but which I hope he will,
shows a possible correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure--which I want to discuss this summer with I want to respond to
just one of your questions, Claudio, as it concerns the diagram of the
10 classes of signs which I devised and which Ben produced in power
point. You asked:
I am sure that also Ben/Gary's diagram has a criteria for that
rotation...? Which is the purpose of that change?








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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Ben asks:
"My basic question here is whether these
structural relations are correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I,
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X" is correct."
REPLY:
The MS material in the logic notebook (MS 339)
shows quite clearly that Peirce did not regard himself as having arrived at
anything he could regard as satisfactory, as regards the ten trichotomies, as
late as Nov. 1 of 1909, and the two versions which he thought were -- at best --
the least objectionable were ones he formulated on Oct 13th of 1905 and March
31st of 1906. The version you are working with is from an unsent draft of
a letter to Welby of 1908, a year earlier than the assessment just mentioned,
and it differs in significant ways from the versions he thought best
though still unsatisfactory. The fact that it appears in the Collected
Papers gives it no special status since it is really just discarded draft
material. Take all talk about the ten trichotomies with a VERY LARGE
grain of salt, Ben, until we get some effective and shared access
to the relevant MS material. Of course it is perfectly okay for
people to do their own constructions of the expanded set of trichotomies as
they should have been formulated, provided they are clear on the fact
that this is their own theory; but if the question is as to what Peirce's theory
was it can only be said that it was work in progress which never arrived
at a reasonably stable developed state and which cannot reasonably be
represented as being his view.
Joe Ransdell

- Original Message -
From:
Benjamin Udell

To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 2:50
AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign,
Legisign, Qualisign

Various corrections. Sorry about that.
Also, anybody replying, please remember to delete all unneeded graphics
and text. - Ben
---
Gary R., Robert, Bernard, Wilfred, Claudio, List,
I thought I'd try to the branching style chart of Peirce's
ten-adic division of sign parameters. (These parameters are not mutually
independent). I supposed that the same formal relations applied as with the
main three trichotomies of parameters (qualisign/sinsign/legisign,
icon/index/symbol, and rheme/dicisign/argument).

As you can see, it gets complicated and long, and I ended up omitting
divisions V through IX.

Then I did a complete table of the "branching" variety but I did it
without repeating such terms as "assurance of instinct" 55 times.
My basic question here is whether these structural relations are correct
or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII,
IX, X" is correct. If the same rules hold for these 10 trichotomies as for the
three, then it would appear, for instance, that all symbols are copulants.
Copulants "neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express
logical relations"; for example "If--then--"; "--causes--." That
seems like it just must be wrong. Then a symbol like the word "red" couldn't
be a symbol, instead, since it's descriptive, it can be a legisign, a sinsign,
or a qualisign, but in any case it has to be a descriptive abstractive
iconic hypothetical sympathetic suggestive gratific rhematic assurance of
instinct. That just can't be right.
After this big table, I append (for those who wish to review these 10
trichotomies) a table of the 10 trichotomical divisions of sign parameters,
pretty much using a table which I found in "Problems With Peirce" http://jameselkins.com/Texts/Peirce.pdf ,
which is an excerpt from _Visual Culture: A Skeptical Reader_ (work
in progress) by James Elkins. (The nice thing about his table is (a) it
includes quotes from Peirce & (b) it's on the Internet.)
The funny thing is, I once produced a 10-ad of the sign parameter
trichotomies for Gary Richmond, and he had most of that info included in it,
but I forgot about it because, at the time, I simply thought of it vaguely as
"advanced" classifications and I hadn't mentally connected the "parameters"
with it.
Best, Ben Udell.

I. The sign in itself
II. The nature of the immediate object
III. The nature of the dynamic object
IV. The relation of the sign to the dynamic
object
V. The nature of the immediate interpretant
VI. The nature of the dynamic interpretant
VII. The relation of the sign to the dynamic
interpretant
VIII. The nature of the normal interpretantthe Purpose
of the Eventual Interpretant
IX. The relation of the sign to the normal
interpretant
X. The triadic relation of the sign to its dynamic object and

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign