Jerry, List,
About consciousness: I guess that ethics requires self-consciousness, which only humans have, and animals that would pass the mirror-test, like some apes, some birds, and so on. Logic seems quite ubiquituous to me, and feeling too, but only if you identify it with sensation. In this
Helmut, list,
There’s a clear response to your explicit assertion for your consideration
of what effects you conceive the object of your conception to have. For
whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists.
But perhaps given past experience, it’s better to leave the trut
Dear Jerry, List,
From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s
Dear Helmut, list,
I’m glad you think so. Please consult the list of criteria to ensure that
your conception passes the test of universality. If not, please modify
accordingly.
Best,
Jerry R
As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently
pursued is a bad aim. It c
Dear Jerry, List,
I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is
on such an
assumption.
Hope that helps.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, March 10, 2018 8:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L]
Dear list,
This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.
The books do seem so feeble…
Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes.
It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is
illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the h
Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. I can see tru
Jon, List,
I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or i
Helmut, List:
Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or
regulative hopes. A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
are such truthful Signs. A lying Sign takes advantage of our
Jon, List,
I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point a
Edwina, list,
Edwina wrote:
ET: I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means
that no final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the
perfect' or even 'truth'.
I would tend to strongly agree "that no final state can be reached.",
Neither JAS nor I have sugge
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}Gary R, list:
Peirce doesn't employ the notion of perfection in any concrete
sense. I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean
semiosis means that no final state can be reached - whether that
final sta
Edwina, list,
Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion
of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."
Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
does P
Helmut, Edwina, List:
HR: I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.
And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of
Jon, list,
You concluded: "Any comments? I am guessing that these topics must simply
not be of much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I
find it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been
posting. :-)"
I would imagine that there are several on this lis
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}List -
I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the
perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
The fact
Disregarding the pejorative tone of your note the creators of CP certainly
did not see their work as exhaustive though they hoped for a complete
display of Peirce online. Blocking the road of inquiry is to Peirce one of
the major evils and if I have committed it I apologize. The substance of
your n
Stephen, Jon S, list,
Stephen wrote:
SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important.
I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important.
List,
I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection, nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition, depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether it/she/he/they is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept of transcendental ph
The main problem with this is that one can be a realist without assuming we
have reached a point at which reality as a state of actual existence is
realized. It is a paradox admittedly, but I believe fundamental to Peirce
to assume things as real that are not fully realized and to see continuity
as
Dear list,
‘man is a sign.’
*The purpose of every sign is* to express "fact," and by being joined with
other signs, *to approach as nearly as possible* to determining an
interpretant which would be *the perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as
such (at least, we may use this language) would
I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
preceded by t
List:
Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
EP 2:545n25. Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
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