.)
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 1:04 PM
To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Is UCLA violating the Establishment Clause?
I'm unaware of any official UCLA chaplaincies (except
Another example is Beauharnais v. Illinois, the 1952 group libel
case. When discussing how the law has changed since then, and how the case
would come out today, students have to discuss how the court should
interpret the assertions (there are multiple possible interpretations),
whether
Title: Message
Seems to me like a pretty
clear constitutional violation. The only things that the ministers did
here was (1) say some words, which have no force of law, and (2) perform a
religious ceremony, which may be seen as religiously binding by the parties but
again has no legal
Title: Message
What exactly does it mean to "purport to
exercise the authority vested in [one] by the State of New York"? If the
claim is that the clergyman is trying to defraud someone by claiming authority
he doesn't have, that just seems incorrect on the facts. If the claim is
that the
I appreciate, as always, Tom's thoughtful arguments; but let me explain why I at least
tentatively disagree.
(1) MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT. I think that indeed if the clergy are saying This is a
valid civil marriage, they are not expressing a fact; they're expressing an opinion.
An analogy:
I think that if someone falsely claims to be exercising legal authority *and people
are likely to be deceived into believing that he is*, then indeed the state could
impose sanctions for misspeaking for the government.
But here everyone knows that the minister doesn't have legal authority. In
I took a closer look at the New York statutes, and heres what I found:
Domestic Relations Law sec. 12 provides that No particular form or ceremony is
required when a marriage is solemnized as herein provided by a clergyman or
magistrate, but the parties must solemnly declare in the
Folks: I don't think I need to go further into the need to keep posts on the list as
polite and substantive as possible -- and to think twice before hitting enter, both
to look again over the substance of the message, and to make sure it's being sent to
the right place.
Let me remind people
Folks: Let me again mention the need to keep things as calm as
possible, and not claim, for instance, that other list members are doing
things incompatible with common decency.
Any discussion of the law related to homosexuality, for
instance, will naturally involve analogies that
I realize that this might be entirely idiosyncratic, but might I
suggest that people refer to each other by first name (if you know the
person well), or by honorific and last name (such as Ms. X or Prof. Y),
rather than simply by last name?
I have the tentative sense that such
Title: Message
Let me also say that
there's no reason why common decency would bar people from describing
sadomasochistic conduct, or for that matter more common homosexual conduct, when
that is relevant to the discussion. It might be better to do it using
clinical terms, but I'm sure that
I think that the free speech claim, standing alone, would have
to be a loser. I take it that a public university should be free to
discriminate based on viewpoint in setting up panels -- we do that all
the time, even when we're trying to set up balanced panels, and I think
there's no
An emergency medical technician fired by an ambulance company
for refusing to help drive a woman to an abortion clinic sued the
company Friday . . . .
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-amb08.html
___
To post, send message to [EMAIL
Here's a question that just came up, and that seems thornier than I at first thought.
Many states have laws that give medical workers who don't want to participate in
abortions a categorical right to refuse to participate, and bar employers (public or
private) from disciplining employers based
I like Tom's argument, but I don't think it's quite as open and shut as the post below
suggests. The property tax exemptions for nonprofits really did end up flowing to a
large number of nonreligious groups. The right not to be dismissed or disciplined
for not participating in abortions will
Folks: The RELIGIONLAW list software is configured by default
to block all posts that are more than 40 kilobytes. This generally
means that (1) you can't post large attachments, and that (2) if you're
quoting others' posts that quote others' posts that quote others' posts,
you'll at some
3120 East 4th Place
Tulsa, OK 74104-3189
918-631-3706 (office)
918-631-2194 (fax)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Volokh,
Eugene wrote:
Interestingly, the court also dismissed a false light invasion
of privacy cause of action, which would normally not require proof of
injury to reputation.
---
State v. Pedersen, 2004 WL 1093320 (Minn. App. Aug. 18), rejects
Pedersen's claims of a state constitutional exemption from a marijuana
ban, because the panel concludes that appellant's beliefs about
marijuana use are personal beliefs rather than communal religious
practices or tenets.
See
http://www.fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2004/052004/05242004/1374047,
discussing a public baptism. Here's the explanation for why the people
involved thought the public nature of the baptism was important:
[begin quote]
For Kris Jones, who describes herself as a quiet person, it was a bold
to facilities. Isn't it
still good law that singling out of a religious viewpoint for exclusion
from non-financial access is unconstitutional, or at least triggers
strict scrutiny, even in a nonpublic forum?
Tom Berg
University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)
From: Volokh, Eugene
It looks like there is a policy of prohibiting most public
religious activities in the park. Wouldn't that be unconstitutional in
a traditional public forum (which the park, though not the river, likely
is), even if there is no discrimination? But it would also be some
evidence that
not interfere with
other park patrons, do you agree that religious activities
should not -- must not? -- be treated more favorably than
political activities?
- Original Message -
From: Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:24 PM
argument as well, of a sort
that affects public forum doctrine generally, because,
whatever might be
said about, e.g., celebrations of the Mass, which might be performed
(let me assume) in a shelter, baptisms of the sort at issue can't be.]
Volokh, Eugene wrote:
It looks like
Any thoughts on this? The First Amendment argument is obviously a
loser, given Smith -- but say that the issue came up in one of the many
states that have state RFRAs and concealed carry licensing programs. My
sense is that the requirement would pass strict scrutiny, as would a
similar driver's
Now this I don't understand: It seems to me that slavery is by definition
*involuntary* servitude. One might debate about what the proper scope of consent
should be (e.g., should someone be able to consentually surrender at one time the
right to withdraw his consent in the future). But to be
http://www.augustafreepress.com/stories/storyReader$22599
___
To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
I continue to be somewhat skeptical of the defamation claim, for reasons I mentioned
before. But I don't think the examples below are quite analogous: Both of them
involve statements of opinion about (1) how to characterize a person's beliefs, and
(2) the spiritual consequences of those
I've always been puzzled about this quid pro quo theory of the Religion Clauses.
There is no religion as a source of values and beliefs; there are *religions* (or
denominations) as a source of values and beliefs. Many of them may share many values,
but they will also differ on many values and
A question: Say that in the 1960s, the President told a group of white Protestant
leaders that they needed to tell their congregations to take seriously Christ's
teachings of human dignity, and to renounce racism and support civil rights. Or say
that in 2004 in an alternate universe,
Title: Message
It's always hard to argue with people's
imaginations, but I would assume that at least many of Bush's supporters would
simply say that the Catholic bishops have it wrong on the merits -- they're
entitled to express their religious views, but voters should disagree with those
Title: Message
I wouldn't say hypocrisy -- I'd just say that
it's easy even for well-meaning people to (1) see the conduct of those they
oppose as wrong and even unconstitutional, and think that this is so for some
objective, nonpolitical reason, but (2) then to think better of the matter
Title: Message
Sorry to sound like a broken record, but I
wonder how this would have played out in other contexts. For instance, the
abolitionist movement, the civil rights movement, and various anti-war and other
movements have involved political-religious alliances on controversial public
and the
PopeNot to ride a hobby-horse too hard, but does Eugene
think that there's a relevant difference between public statements (which, if
I interpret his examples correctly, is what he's citing) and a private
conversation with a religious leader (again, in a world of
leaks)?Volokh
the second position, not
the first.
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, June 14, 2004 11:32 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: The President and the Pope
A question: Say that in the 1960s, the President told
It seems to me that Justice Thomas's position -- or for that
matter, the Chief's similar position in Wallace v. Jaffree in the
mid-1980s -- is eminently credible.
The case for the Establishment Clause not being incorporated is
at least as strong, it seems to me, as the case for
Well, if Alan is right, then the program is unconstitutional
even as to secular messages. Perhaps he's correct; I've always a hard
time grasping when a Court considers something to be compelled speech
(I think Wooley v. Maynard is probably mistaken, for instance), but
given the Court's
An acquaintance of mine writes:
-Original Message-
Ok, here is an interesting one for all of you:
-- Under Employment Division v. Smith applies, does the Archdiocese have
a free exercise defense to, for the example, the appointment of a
trustee or an examiner?
-- Might
I much appreciate the response, but I thought I might ask a
couple of follow-up questions.
First, how would Chapter 11 law handle debtors who routinely
give away goods and services, for the sake of giving them away?
Businesses generally try to make money with nearly all their
I'm a little puzzled as to how the alleged homosexuality of the
priests (or, if you prefer, the homosexual nature of their pedophilia)
makes a difference to the legal issues here. As I understand it from
press accounts, actually, some of the plaintiffs who allege they were
molested in
See http://www.dioceseofeaston.org/licensetags.html:
MARYLAND DRIVERS:
Order your Episcopal Church license tags here!
The Diocese of Easton has made arrangements with the Maryland Motor
Vehicle Administration for the production and distribution of Episcopal
Church license tags.
They
Let me correct myself: The Ali Ghan Temple, despite its name,
is a Shriner organization, not a religious group as such. But
non-Episcopalian religious groups have certainly gotten them. And given
the First Amendment, Satanists and Wiccans would naturally have to be
given them as well --
Title: Message
Does anyone know of any good articles on
religious profiling -- i.e., deciding whom to target in an investigation based
partly on their religion? If you do, please e-mail me, off-list if you
prefer ([EMAIL PROTECTED]).
Many thanks,
Eugene
Let me try to take another shot at this. It seems to me that a
wedding ceremony consists of three things:
1) A mutual promise to love and cherish. While some promises
are punishable -- consider conspiracies to commit crimes, or agreements
to fix prices -- this promise is not.
Title: Message
This is of course a
judgment call, but my sense is that many public condemnations of racism are
indeed attempts to establish racial tolerance as "canonical belief that is not
subject to challenge" (at least by reasonable, decent people who are good
Americans). The same is
What if a black student group distributed flyers to other black students, inviting
them to join the group, inviting them to join some off-campus group, inviting them to
some rally or discussion of issues related to blacks, and so on? Or what if a Jewish
student group distributed leaflets to
It's interesting how the rhetoric of harassment works its way into the analysis. Here
we have what sounds like a simple attempt to convert people, with no threats, insults,
or even repetition; yet it ends up being labeled as imping[ing] on the rights of
other students, as harassment, and
Whoops -- accidentally sent this to CONLAWPROF instead of RELIGIONLAW; retransmitting
it here.
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Fri 11/5/2004 1:05 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc:
Subject: Re: Pamphlets at School
Title: Message
It seems to me that Marty's proposal is indeed
for content-based restrictions, not justcontent-neutral antidiscrimination
rules. He suggests that the rule is facially content-neutral -- presumably
"no singling people out based on religion for speech or conduct that they're
Marty Lederman writes: 1. Could a state prohibit private
discrimination on a public sidewalk generally? Well, no legislature
would ever do so, because we are nowhere near any sort of social
consensus that legislatures should start regulating the choices we make
in our everyday interactions, on
Title: Message
Oddly enough, I agree with one point that Marty
suggested: If someone is giving material or saying things to a particular
person, and that person says "please stop giving me this stuff," then the
government may generally give the recipient that sort of veto power (though
I'm puzzled. Is Mark genuinely saying that it should be
considered harassment -- and thus presumably punishable under hostile
environment harassment law (unless Mark agrees with me that hostile
environment harassment law is unconstitutional to this extent) -- for
people to express the
I'm glad that we agree such speech shouldn't be called
harassment. But I'm puzzled by Mark's second paragraph. Why does the
fact that *schools* may not teach religion or atheism mean that schools
may or even must restrict *students* who want to advocate religion or
atheism?
Mark
Hmm; I had thought Mark's original point was both the second and
potentially the first -- It does seem fairly clear to me that under the
Establishment Clause a state can say (perhaps must say, given mandatory
attendence) that no pro[se]lytization shall go on in the schools, as he
put it in
I don't quite understand how Mark's textual argument works.
The Establishment Clause does distinguish *government* actions
vis-a-vis religion from government actions vis-a-vis politics. But that
doesn't justify restricting speech by citizens, such as students.
The Free
Well, Alan is asserting that Most Jewish parents experience
attempts to convert their children as assaults on their families that
are completely beyond the pale of acceptable conduct -- which is to say
that expression of certain viewpoints, aimed at getting certain entirely
lawful results,
Title: Message
Seems to me hard to see how a university can
give "community service" credit for student speech advocating controversial
political viewpoints (presumably viewpoints of the student's own choice), but
deny credit for student speech advocating controversial religious
irement
Comes back to the disagreement mentioned by someone else earlier --
religion is a special case in all respects. Non-discrimination is not
sufficient.
On Wednesday, November 10, 2004, at 04:06 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
Hmm; can a
university really say that converting people t
-- religion is a special case in all respects.
Non-discrimination is not sufficient.
On Wednesday, November 10, 2004, at 04:06 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
Hmm; can a university really say that converting people
to a belief about gun control, or animal rights, or
environmentalism
Marc makes a good point, but say that there is a dispute about whether the
particular strain of, say, Islam -- or for that matter, Christianity -- to
which the defendant has converted is a religion of peace or a religion that
allows or even suggests violence that U.S. law would condemn. What
Let me suggest an analogy, one that is hardly on all fours but that I thought
might be relevant: As I understand it, rules of evidence generally bar the
factfinder from considering a person's religiosity as evidence of honesty
(setting aside the question whether membership in a particular
Steve Jamar writes:
It is lawful to discriminate for and against religions. Indeed the
Constitution mandates EXACTLY that.
People keep saying things like this (cf., e.g., some recent posts by Mark
Graber), but it strikes me as a vast overreading of the Constitutional
Any thoughts on this issue? The Indiana Free Exercise Clause
has been interpreted to require strict scrutiny, City Chapel Evangelical
Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001), though I
know of no cases that have dealt with the government's role as K-12
educator.
seem to require excusal absent
compelling interest. Marc Stern
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh,
Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2004 12:20 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: FW: Student reprimanded for religious
Title: Message
I'm puzzled by how this argument would be
reconciled with traditional strict scrutiny analysis, which is what the Indiana
Constitution seems to call for. Is it really the case that expelling
students for missing 8 days of school is *necessary* to accomplish the
compelling
alternative to requiring attendance? They aren't home
schooling-- they are asking to be exempted from truly generally applicable
neutral rules.
Steve
On Tuesday, November 23, 2004, at 06:57 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I'm puzzled by
how this argument would be reconciled
Quizzes are definitely a problem -- but they're also a problem
for students who take their one religious holiday that the school does
provide, as well as for students who are sick. Presumably the school
has some means of dealing with that, and the burden on the school seems
likely to be
I've been trying to think a bit more about the Establishment Clause no-coercion
doctrine. It seems to me that if coercion is defined as government-caused
pressure to engage in religious doctrine or profess a religious belief --
including a belief that one doesn't possess -- then the
and religious exemptions
Is there really a coercion test, especially in light of
Scalia's dissent in Santa Fe?
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2004 4:11 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Coercion and religious exemptions
Title: Message
I agree that "this will
swamp the judicial system" arguments deserve some empirical inquiry; and since
it's impossible to tell up front what exactly will happen, perhaps sometimes one
ought to start granting exemption and then see what follows. (This is my
view as to how
It's off-topic.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Paul
Finkelman
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2004 1:53 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: John Lofton/Role Of Judges?
is this a final exam
I'm not sure this is quite right. Surely principles such as no
killing, no stealing, no beating people up, no defaming people, no
destroying their property, and so on -- both those mentioned in the Ten
Commandments and those not so mentioned -- are a far more important part
of the moral
Sandy's hypothetical is an excellent one, but let me add a refinement: I'm not
sure that this assignment would violate the Establishment Clause, or even that
Williams' assignment did so. Yet would anyone on the list think that it's
unconstitutional for the school to conclude that this
I actually agree with Bobby on this point; I've written in the past (on my
blog, not in any scholarly work) that the Ten Commandments don't form much of a
basis for modern American law, and that it's not clear to what extent they even
formed a but-for cause of American law historically, partly
ignored by our law. Some of our law -- or at least our economy --
cuts against the 10 C-- Our economy is based on the concept of coveting your
neighbors things goods, house (maybe not wife). That is what makes capitallism
run.
Paul Finkelman
Quoting Volokh
I'm not positive, but it sounds to me like Paul is saying that the vision of
God expressed in the Declaration is generally Deistic. Deism, as I understand
it, is defined as The belief, based solely on reason, in a God who created the
universe and then abandoned it, assuming no control over
Surely one can be an atheist and accept the core moral
principles of the Declaration. But I think that atheists generally
wouldn't accept some of the rhetoric, especially the confidence in
divine Providence or God as Judge. That doesn't sound to me as the
'unknowable' or the 'unprovable'
Please note that Mr. Heckmann's post is a response to Paul
Finkelman's argument, not to mine.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ross
S. Heckmann
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:54 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law
Title: Message
It seems to
me that this brings up the old question of the extent to which tax exemptions
are effectively subsidies. The Court has generally held that they are,
see, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock (religion-preferential tax exemption
violates the Establishment Clause); Bob
Alan Brownstein writes:
First, would economists distinguish between the government giving a
religious institution cash subsidies (enough to hire a person for a
particular job with appropriate benefits) to hire someone to
provide some secular assistance to a religious school or charity and
Please make sure that you have bookmarked the page
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw . When you
need to change your address (by unsubscribing and resubscribing), change
your list options, access the archives, or do other things related to
the list, that's the page
In a forthcoming article, I make the following argument: In
principle, the correlation between theological belief and behavior may
sound plausible: One could argue, for instance, that people who believe
that they'll be punished in Hell for evil behavior and rewarded in
Heaven for good
As we discussed not long ago, the references also included an
appeal[] to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions, and a firm reliance on the protection of divine
Providence. Some suggested that in the 1770s this would have been seen
as Deism, and I can't speak
The Third Circuit just denied an atheist's challenge to a
religion-only exemption to a school uniform policy, relying on
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos. Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys
Point Regional School Dist., 2005 WL 348363 (3rd Cir. Feb. 14). The
court notes the ongoing
Folks: The list software is configured to block all posts with
a length of more than 40 Kbytes. I think this is a good system; most
posts that are longer either (1) have attachments, which sometimes screw
up the software, and which many people find clutter their mailboxes, or
(2) have a
Paul Diamond posted a week ago about this decision, and I found
what seems like a longer copy at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2510.ht
ml?query=%22religious+vilification%22. It seems to basically hold that
a Christian pastor's mocking and harshly
Title: Message
I much appreciated Mr. Heckmann's helpful
response to the offending post --which I
would have offered myself, had I read my e-mail earlier. But for now let's
assume that the poster has been properly enlightened about the list rules, and
that no more needs to be added.
The
Title: Message
I don't find it
offensive because of its content -- but it's not allowed in this venue.
Imagine that this were a mathematicians' convention, and people were talking
about math, and someone got up and started to evangelize. That would be
inappropriate, because off-topic. So
Title: Message
Folks: Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I think
this discussion is getting to be as off-topic as the post that prompted
it.
Eugene
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get
Here's what I had as of 1999, that people can start with:
S.B. 604, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (state constitutional amendment approved
by the voters in the Nov. 1998 election); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ยง 52-571b (West
1998); 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 98-412 (West); 775 Ill. Comp.
I should also add to the list Missouri and Pennsylvania. I
think a WESTLAW search through STAT-ALL for some key words (e.g.,
(compelling w/3 interest) and religio!) should find most of these.
Eugene
___
To post, send message to
Apropos Andy's question, I thought I'd ask: What states have
read their state Free Exercise Clauses as providing strict scrutiny, or
something like it, *after* Smith? My list is Alaska, Washington,
Minnesota, Wisconin, Indiana, Ohio, Vermont, and Massachussetts. I'll
take state court of
Folks: (1) Even if you think a fellow list member's position is nonsense,
don't say it. Say it's mistaken, or unsound, or turns out not to be the case.
It's more persuasive, more conducive to sound discussions, and more likely to
shed heat than light.
(2) This is especially so if your
Folks: The question whether the phrase the Biil of Rights should be
understood as referring to the first ten amendments, or the first twelve
proposed amendments, is fascinating. It is not terribly relevant to the law of
government and religion. One could have a great discussion about it,
Title: Message
Folks: Really,
please, this is not on-topic for the list. I think Jim has acknowledged
that the meaning of the words has changed. I take it that he has not only
taken back the harshness of the language, but has implicitly agreed that it's
not currently a linguistic error to
Well, Allegheny involved a creche donated by a Catholic group,
and a menorah. There was also a Ninth Circuit involving a meonrah
display in a public park; I believe the Chabad people (quite Orthodox
Jews) put it up. I'm not sure what using religious arguments as
superior to positive law
nd
not loaded abstractions. Making bad or false analogies or comparisons
does little to advance a serious discussion of a matter. (I dont know
how else to read you final paragraph in particular. Sorry!)
-Original
Message-From:
Volokh, Eugene
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Se
Michael Newsom writes: The text of the Religion Clauses has to mean
something: there is something distinctive about religion, enough to
warrant the inclusion of 16 words in the text of the First Amendment.
Certainly the text of the Religion Clauses must mean something.
But why couldn't
Any thoughts on how this analysis applies to Bob Jones
University, which was in fact required to change its religiosity -- or
at least to violate its felt religious obligations -- to fit the
government regulation? Or to the various landlords to whom marital
status housing discrimination
Brad's and Marc's posts raise an excellent question: If free
speech means that people have the constitutional right to impose burdens
on others, why shouldn't free exercise operate the same way? The same
can be said of other rights, incidentally: For instance, the Compulsory
Process
Religious speech, it seems to me, should be no more and no less
protected by the Free Speech Clause than other speech. Thus, the
interesting questions (including the ones we've been discussing on
related threads) arise when there's a claim of religious accommodation
for conduct, or for
1 - 100 of 1198 matches
Mail list logo
