cryptography  

Messages by Thread

• • Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jim Popovitch
  • Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Jeffrey I. Schiller
  • Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?) Jon Callas
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? zooko
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Jaap-Henk Hoepman
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Andrea Shepard
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Ray Dillinger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto? Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] 1024 bit DH still common in Tor network Perry E. Metzger
• Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Raphaël Jacquot
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Daniel Veditz
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ralph Holz
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS James Cloos
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Marcus D. Leech
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Marcus D. Leech
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Peter Saint-Andre
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Walter van Holst
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) Max Kington
  • Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help) James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Max Kington
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help james hughes
  • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] ADMIN: Ending thread "The One True Cipher Suite" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS zooko
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 Adam Langley
  • Re: [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 William Allen Simpson
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS Chris Palmer
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS The Doctor
• [Cryptography] Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption james hughes
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Peter Saint-Andre
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Guido Witmond
  • Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] one time pads John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Dirk-Willem van Gulik
  • Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) Paul Crowley
• Re: [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns Peter Gutmann
• Re: [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks) Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Dan McDonald
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ralph Holz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jack Lloyd
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Jon Callas
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ray Dillinger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news) Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Thor Lancelot Simon
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] auditing a hardware RNG John Denker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Kent Borg
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Jon Callas
  • Re: [Cryptography] IA side subverted by SIGINT side John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious? Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] NY Times: "NSA Foils Much Internet Encryption" Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier in The Guardian on BULLRUN etc. Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] The Guardian: "US and UK spy agencies defeat privacy and security on the internet" Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Bernie Cosell
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) John Denker
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Charles Jackson
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN) Richard Clayton
  • Re: [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? John Denker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Bill Squier
  • Re: [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN") Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] ADMIN: less Snowden, more Crypto Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Tim Dierks
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Kristian Gjøsteen
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Tim Dierks
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Kevin W. Wall
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Derrell Piper
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eugen Leitl
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Derrell Piper
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Jeffrey I. Schiller
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eric Murray
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Eugen Leitl
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" arxlight
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Samuel Weiler
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Gregory Perry
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Salz, Rich
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Joe Abley
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Joe Abley
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Chris Palmer
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" David Mercer
  • Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" Anne & Lynn Wheeler

• Earlier messages
• Later messages