On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> >> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> > I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> > you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> > argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> > X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> > as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> > of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> > self-evidence.
>
> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
> false on the posit of PM.  

You seem to be assuming a workign MGA

> either alternative forces anyone to adopt
> either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of
> the consistency of two simultaneous posits.  And of course we are
> agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its
> explanatory power.
>
> > He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> > as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> > is positing Platonism at all.
> > And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> > to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> > an abductive argument.
>
> But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have?  


>.If it
> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
> add to this?

Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
truth.

> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
> don't).

You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
therefore
and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
about
what a UD would do if one existed.

> >> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> >> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
> >> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> >> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> >> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
> > Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> > insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption.
>
> Surely that's not so.

I have ssenmay statements from him where he says comp
is his only assumption.

> He argues that the reversal of material and
> mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
> supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
> theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
> justification is to be sought abductively.
>
>  >Other
>
> > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
>
> Do they in fact?

eg Tegmark

> > You are putting forward
> > a better argument on his behalf than he is.
>
> TVM (ta very much)
>
> David
>
>
>
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