On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> >> deployed in a particular research programme.
> > I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> > you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> > argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> > X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> > as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> > of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> > self-evidence.
> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is
> false on the posit of PM.
You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
> either alternative forces anyone to adopt
> either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of
> the consistency of two simultaneous posits. And of course we are
> agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its
> explanatory power.
> > He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> > as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> > is positing Platonism at all.
> > And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> > to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> > an abductive argument.
> But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have?
> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
> add to this?
Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
what a UD would do if one existed.
> >> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> >> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
> >> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> >> mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> >> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
> > Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> > insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption.
> Surely that's not so.
I have ssenmay statements from him where he says comp
is his only assumption.
> He argues that the reversal of material and
> mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
> supervenience - i.e. AR. And he claims that the predictions of the
> theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
> justification is to be sought abductively.
> > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
> Do they in fact?
> > You are putting forward
> > a better argument on his behalf than he is.
> TVM (ta very much)
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at