On 24 Sep, 16:01, "david.nyman" <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> >> priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> >> consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is
> >> false on the posit of PM.
> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
> intelligibility of CTM,
I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer. Which neither
pshycialism nor CTM currently do.
>and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
> reject CTM.
...in favour of physicalism?
>But I'm prepared to grant Bruno's reversal of matter and
> mathematics as a working hypothesis to retain the possibility of a
> computational mind-body theory, to be justified abductively.
> >>.If it
> >> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
> >> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
> >> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
> >> add to this?
> > Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> > ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> > truth.
> Well then we're in agreement. AR as we have defined it is
> unambiguously a posit of comp.
You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?
> Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.
I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.
> >> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
> >> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
> >> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
> >> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
> >> don't).
> > You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> > therefore
> > and immaterial UD are RITSIAR.
> Ah, if you are proposing that, beyond theoretical and methodological
> constraints, any metaphysical posit per se could disambiguate what is
> RITSIAR, I must disagree.
Uhhhh...no. I already know I am RITSIAR....
>In developing third-person accounts of
> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities. But
> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
has to be postied as real itself. Deciding between rival
posits is another matter. I think you are much being much
to "quick" to decide it is a hopeless mystery.
What is "it"????
>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
> Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
> theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
> is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
> insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
> other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed. IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
> Hard Question: how can that be me?
I think you have got the question of positing somehting
AS real in a theory confused with the question of
confirming a theory. A theory according to which
the real can spring from the unreal (as in
Woody Allens Purple Rose of Cairo) is a non-starter.
Bruno needs Platonism for his theory to be
coherent, let alone true.
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