2009/9/23 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
>> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
>> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
>> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> self-evidence.

AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
false on the posit of PM.  Neither alternative forces anyone to adopt
either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of
the consistency of two simultaneous posits.  And of course we are
agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its
explanatory power.

> He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> is positing Platonism at all.
> And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> an abductive argument.

But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have?  If it
were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
add to this?  Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
don't).

>> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
>> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
>> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
>> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
>> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
> Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption.

Surely that's not so.  He argues that the reversal of material and
mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
justification is to be sought abductively.

 >Other
> peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.

Do they in fact?

> You are putting forward
> a better argument on his behalf than he is.

TVM (ta very much)

David

>
>
>
> On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>> >> one case.
>>
>> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
>> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
>> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.
>
> Isn't that what I have been saying.
>
>>The entities so
>> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
>> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
>> "unmathematical".
>
> It does, so why not?
>
>> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
>> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
>> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
>> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> self-evidence.
>
>> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> >> >> explanatory scheme.
>>
>> >> > Who's been doing that?
>>
>> >> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>> >> Platonism to justify the UDA
>>
>> > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
>> > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>>
>> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
>> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
>> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.
>
>
>
>>On the evidence
>> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
>>  He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
>> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
>> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.
>
> He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> is positing Platonism at all.
> And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> an abductive argument.
>
>
>> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
>> abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
>> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
>> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
>> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
>> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
>> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
>> said as much).
>
> I think Bruno has zero interest in AI,
> he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic
> mysticism.
>
> CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
> bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
> Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
> realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
> since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.
>
>
>> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
>> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
>
>>The
>> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
>> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
>> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
>
> Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Other
> peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. You are putting forward
> a better argument on his behalf than he is.
>
>
> >
>

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