2009/9/23 Flammarion <[email protected]>: >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be >> deployed in a particular research programme. > > I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing > you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive > argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that > X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists" > as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth > of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori > self-evidence.
AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is false on the posit of PM. Neither alternative forces anyone to adopt either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of the consistency of two simultaneous posits. And of course we are agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its explanatory power. > He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism > as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he > is positing Platonism at all. > And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments > to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not > an abductive argument. But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have? If it were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism add to this? Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP, which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who don't). >> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental >> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. >> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for >> mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected >> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. > > Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps > insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Surely that's not so. He argues that the reversal of material and mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational supervenience - i.e. AR. And he claims that the predictions of the theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate justification is to be sought abductively. >Other > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. Do they in fact? > You are putting forward > a better argument on his behalf than he is. TVM (ta very much) David > > > > On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be >> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least >> >> one case. >> >> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial >> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. >> >> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of >> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of >> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. > > Isn't that what I have been saying. > >>The entities so >> posited are of course trivially "immaterial". You might as well say >> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be >> "unmathematical". > > It does, so why not? > >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be >> deployed in a particular research programme. > > I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing > you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive > argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that > X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists" > as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth > of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori > self-evidence. > >> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for >> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that >> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point >> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either >> >> >> explanatory scheme. >> >> >> > Who's been doing that? >> >> >> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were >> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of >> >> Platonism to justify the UDA >> >> > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He >> > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. >> >> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding >> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we >> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. > > > >>On the evidence >> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. >> He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is >> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of >> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. > > He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism > as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he > is positing Platonism at all. > And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments > to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not > an abductive argument. > > >> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to >> abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a >> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the >> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. >> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive >> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without >> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes >> said as much). > > I think Bruno has zero interest in AI, > he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic > mysticism. > > CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole > bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many > Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical > realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point > since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable. > > >> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental >> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. > >>The >> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for >> mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected >> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. > > > Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps > insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Other > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. You are putting forward > a better argument on his behalf than he is. > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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